The Delay in the Fall:  
Upright Posture and the Evolution of Modeling

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A Thesis  
In Partial Fulfillment  
Of the Requirements for  
The IDP PHD Program at  
The University of Manitoba
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THE DELAY IN THE FALL: UPRIGHT POSTURE AND THE EVOLUTION OF MODELING

BY

STEPHEN THOMAS LADD

A Thesis/Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirement of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Dedicated
To the Mother Who
Bore Me

With Special Thanks to My Intrepid Advisor

Dr. Dawne McCance
Professor and Head
Department of Religion

My Reading Committee Members

Dr. David Arnason
Professor and Head
Department of English

Dr. Robert Kroetsch
Distinguished Professor Emeritus
Department of English

All of the University of Manitoba

And My External Reader

Dr. Samuel Weber
Avalon Professor of Humanities
Northwestern University Director
UCLA-Northwestern Paris Program in Critical Theory
Supposing truth is a woman - what then? Are there not grounds for the suspicion that all philosophers, insofar as they were dogmatists, have been very inexpert about woman? That the gruesome seriousness, the clumsy obtrusiveness with which they have usually approached truth so far have been awkward and very improper methods for winning a woman's heart? What is certain is that she has not allowed herself to be won - and today every kind of dogmatism is left standing dispirited and discouraged. If it is left standing at all! For there are scoffers who claim that it has fallen, that all dogmatism lies on the ground - even more, that all dogmatism is dying (Nietzsche 1966 2).

But she does not want truth: what is truth to a woman (ibid. 163)?

Perhaps truth is a woman who has reasons for not letting us see her reasons? Perhaps her name is - to speak Greek - Baubo (Nietzsche 1974 38)?

Frontispiece:
Hans Baldung Grein,
Allegory, 1514-15, in
Lucie-Smith 1991, 56.
Abstract

The thesis shows how the acquisition of upright posture has conditioned the structure and evolution of organizational behavior, or modeling, at the levels of both species and individual development. In the course of this exposition the thesis also shows how the concept of the mental evolved on the format of the empirical/conceptual distinction, in the context of the development of sedentary agriculture and linear alphabetic writing. This has the effect of situating the history of philosophy in our anthropological history and life evolution, by showing how Homo sapiens comes to understand itself as ontologically distinct from all animality. It is this characteristic of the thesis, which necessitated a consistent critical dialogue with psychoanalysis. For it is in psychoanalysis that the concept of the human as animal re-emerges in modernity while still retaining the structure of the mental in the concept of psychic life on the model of the empirical/conceptual distinction. From the performative bodily perspective adopted by this thesis, this persistence constitutes a critical symptomatology, which shows the 'psycho' in analysis - the projection of the 'psyche' - to be indicative of a repressive castration operating systematically within psychoanalysis and the history
of western philosophy. A repressive castration that is immediately linked to the idealization of the father, the structure of reality testing, and the repression of role of the mother in the acquisition of independent locomotion in upright gait as the delay in the fall. This critique of the 'psycho' in analysis does not however constitute a repudiation of analysis, but rather a liberation of the body which opens the door to possibilities for pluri-dimensional cognition and analysis no longer limited by the strict linearity of alphabetic notation which has been contiguous with the projection of the 'psyche' for the last two thousand years of western history. Further, it has the consequence of reducing the metaphysical unity of the anthropose to a contingent, upright, postural one, the functional acquisition of which is shown to have made all other specifically human technical developments possible, while conditioning the structure of their deployment. This reduction is also shown to have an ethical component, for it shows the extent to which 'I' can say 'we', beyond all sexual and cultural difference.
# The Delay in the Fall: Upright Posture and the Evolution of Modeling

## Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Chapter I: The Terrain</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Chapter II: Groundwork</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Chapter III: The Delay in the Fall</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Chapter IV: The Grammar of the Step: Shelter - Terrain - Territory</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Chapter V: What Was Called Thinking: The Freeing of Pluri-dimensional Cognition</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bibliography: 150
The Delay in the Fall:
Upright Posture and the Evolution of Modeling

Chapter I
The Terrain

This thesis will attempt to elucidate how certain broad, indisputable, yet contingent, facts of natural evolution have facilitated and conditioned human conceptual and behavioral organizations. Specifically, it will assert that the metaphysical unity of the anthropose is reducible to a contingent, up-right, postural, one; the functional acquisition of which, will be shown to have made all other specifically human technical developments possible, while conditioning the structure of their deployments.

By locating the technical at the source of the 'human' in this manner we will further be required to re-evaluate language on a more general level as an aspect of the evolution of technics¹. In doing this, the thesis will also show how certain central tendencies which have controlled the historical trajectory of western philosophy emerged, in

¹It must be noted that the use of such words as 'technics' and 'human', and the use of other, related terms, below, such as 'internality' and 'externality', etc., will of necessity be successively re-examined in the course of our exposition. Indeed, to the point where they will no longer retain their original, conventional, meanings. This does not imply that our current usage of these terms in an introductory fashion is misleading. It is rather, that they grant strategic access to the problematic that will concern us here.
relation to this, in the evolution of organizational behavior, or, modeling.

Finally, the thesis will attempt to show how these limitations, set upon the western philosophical tradition's architecture of concepts, can be powerfully re-modeled, from an essentially linear orientation, into a more complex, differential, pluridimensional one, that will benefit all the sciences.

Such an endeavor will have the effect of situating the history of philosophy in our anthropological history and the history of life evolution. In doing this, we shall be acting somewhat after the manner of Ludwig Wittgenstein when he says that:

415. What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; we are not contributing curiosities however, but observations which no one has doubted, but which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes (Wittgenstein 1983 125).

As such, the thesis proposed will also be a kind of continuation of the philosophical project of gaining knowledge of the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. It will not thereby remain, however, simply philosophical.

It may easily be thought that such a general discussion of the 'concept' of philosophy, and of the problem of knowledge, entails that we might engage in some sort of second order philosophical discourse, or in some sort of 'meta-philosophy', this however will not be the case. On
this point the following remark of Wittgenstein's from his
Philosophical Investigations, is apposite:

121. One might think: if philosophy speaks of the
word "philosophy" there must be a second-order
philosophy. But it is not so: it is, rather, like
the case of orthography, which deals with the word
"orthography" among others without then being
second-order (Wittgenstein 1983 49).

The reader is invited to extend this observation into a
critique of the whole concept of the 'second-order', and
therefore to the critique of the concept of philosophy as
such.

Though this thesis derives certain aspects of its
orientation from Wittgensteinian themes, it is by no means
reducible to them. It will perhaps be instructive to
briefly point out, here, how what follows will relate to and
diverge from some of them.

Wittgenstein asserted the autonomy of collective
grammar from any supposed individual subjective state as the
criterion for meaning. Further, he saw these grammatical
regularities as having emerged from elaborations on what he
termed 'the common behavior of mankind'. This 'common
behavior' he understood as being composed of non-cognitive
'primitive responses' common to the vast majority of human
beings, that are elaborated on through training, into more
complex, variegated, and contingent grammatical functions.
"The common behavior of mankind is the system of reference
by means of which we interpret an unknown language
(Wittgensten 1983 82)." For him, there is no further
explanation, substrate, or appeal, beyond the fact of these
tendencies for the theory of meaning. It is in this spirit
that he was known to quote Goethe with approval: "In the
beginning was the deed."

This thesis will not dispute Wittgenstein's conclusions
with respect to the autonomy of grammar from supposed
subjective states, nor will it contest his conclusion that
this relative autonomy of grammar is contingent on the
relative consistency of primitive responses in species
bodies, i.e.; organic regularities. Indeed, much will be
said that will support these assertions. It will, however,
explore the relations between the 'common behavior of
mankind' and the acquisition of meaningful behavior in a far
more systematic fashion than Wittgenstein himself ever
attempted. For, to the best of my knowledge, this was not a
matter which Wittgenstein himself was inclined to pursue, as
his interest was directed more towards the therapeutic
dissolution of the philosophical difficulties which arise
from not paying attention to these facts. The aim of this
thesis is more positive. It aims to elucidate the
relationship between the evolution of the species body and
meaningful behavior, somewhat after the manner of
psychoanalysis; a movement with which Wittgenstein expressed
some sympathy. It will, however, diverge from traditional
psychoanalytic approaches in significant ways, which will be
noted and elaborated on as the thesis progresses.

Lest these remarks become too opaque and misleading in
miniature, before giving a more precise statement of the thesis, we will, by way of introduction, give the reader a brief history of the development of the questions which govern the deployment of its perspective and its problematics. This will lead naturally to discussion of the particulars. In this way it is hoped that the reader will be given a context through which to appreciate the significance of the issues which will be addressed, and the ways in which they are connected to the philosophical tradition and to the development of our concepts of knowledge. With respect to attempts at understanding the conditions for the possibility of knowledge, we will begin, only somewhat arbitrarily, with Kant, and the post-Kantian fate of his critical project.

The Kantian concept of 'critique,' attempted the delineation of the structural, a-priori, conditions of all possible concept formation, and in so doing, also attempted to make of epistemology a kind of unifying super-science capable of prescribing the roles and relations of successful scholarly and scientific endeavor, and thus the structure and telos of the academy. While the work of Hegel in the _Phenomenology of mind_, appeared to historicize and immanatize the Kantian transcendental categories, it still maintained their development within the horizon of an ontological dialectic, and thus, also, of a teleological vision. It only remained for Darwin's work on the origin of species, and the evolution of kinds, to open the door on the
possibility of a complete naturalization of both the conditions for, and the deployment of, concepts. Something which also entailed their general malleability. Hence, by the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Kantian critical project, as well as the Hegalian one, appeared to Nietzsche, and many of his continental philosophical successors, to have foundered on the shoals of natural history. With the emergence of this factor, a-priori conditions, their relations, and the categorical imperatives of practical reason, appeared thrown into contingency, and questions about the relation of the body to concept formation, the organic conditions of concept formation in general, and their relation to the establishment and development of civilization, were inevitably posed.

Though Nietzsche - whose Genealogy of Morals might well be considered one of the pioneering works in this field - and others wrestled with these problems, perhaps no single thinker exemplified the nature of this historical transition with the systematic persistence of Sigmund Freud. For our immediate purposes it is not yet necessary to engage in any extended exposition of the varied complexities of psychoanalytic theory. It is sufficient for us to observe the relations and differences between psychoanalysis and classic philosophical attempts at understanding conditions for the possibility of knowledge, and structures of cognition generally. From there we can turn to relate these to other considerations.
Overtly, in psychoanalysis, the function of the transcendental appears to be situated in phylogeny. This is articulated plainly for us by Freud himself towards the end of his essay From the History of an Infantile Neurosis where he attempts to deal with the problem of the relation between ontogeny and phylogeny. There, he speaks of two problems, here, for now, we are concerned only with the first:

The first relates to the phylogenetically inherited schemata, which, like the categories of philosophy, are concerned with the business of 'placing' the impressions derived from actual experience. I am inclined to take the view that they are precipitates from the history of human civilization. The Oedipus complex, which comprises a child's relations to his parents, is one of them...Where ever experiences fail to fit the hereditary schema they become remodeled in the imagination...We are often able to see the schema triumphing over the experience of the individual...The contradictions between experience and the schema seem to supply the conflicts of childhood with an abundance of material (Freud 1982 vol.9 363 my emphasis).

Whatever one's views about the Oedipus complex - and we will have cause to return to it later - our immediate interest is with the way in which the phylogenetic subsumption of the transcendental orients research into cognitive structures towards an intersection of psychoanalysis, anthropology, archaeology, ethnology and paleontology. Indeed this is what Freud foresaw:

...I am of the opinion that the time will soon be ripe for us to make an extension of a thesis which has long been asserted by psychoanalysts, and to complete what has hitherto had only an individual and ontogenetic application by the addition of its anthropological counterpart, which is to be
conceived phylogenetically. 'In dreams and in neuroses', so our thesis has run, 'we come once more upon the child and the peculiarities which characterize his modes of thought and his emotional life.' 'And we come upon the savage too,' we may now add, 'upon the primitive man, as he stands revealed to us in the light of the researches of archaeology and of ethnology' (Freud 1982 vol. 9 222-23, my emphasis).

Freud made various attempts at developing this 'anthropological' component of psychoanalysis along phyletic lines, and, certain of these we will explore. In doing so, however, we must touch on how the views of Jung relate to those of Freud, for whenever Freud discusses the issue of the relation between ontogony and phylogony, mention of Jung is never far away. It is almost uniformly hostile, especially in later works. This is because Jung postulated the phyletic inheritance of a collective unconscious with unvarying archetypal content, which required transcendental commitments. For Freud this was simply too much like philosophy, or religion, and as such, something, which the staunch naturalism of psychoanalysis could not countenance. Besides, it denied the all-important sexual dogma. If there is such a thing as a phylogenetic heritage its mode of transmission cannot be ideal, but is, rather, understandable on analogy with "the far-reaching instinctive knowledge of animals (Freud 1982 vol.9 364)." Further, in the context of objecting to Jung, Freud insists that it is only through psychoanalytic research exhausting all possible ontogenetic components that it becomes possible to identify a phylogenetic content:
I am aware that expression has been given in many quarters to thoughts like these, which emphasize the hereditary, phylogenetically acquired factor in mental life. In fact, I am of opinion that people have been far too ready to find room for them and ascribe importance to them in psychoanalysis. I consider that they are only admissible when psychoanalysis strictly observes the correct order of precedence, and, after forcing its way through the strata of what has been acquired by the individual, comes at last upon traces of what has been inherited (Freud 1982 vol.9 364-5).

This insistence on exhausting the ontogenetic aspect of psychoanalytic research, nevertheless, consistently led Freud to articulate theories in which regularities of individual experience and behavior were conditioned by, and embedded in, what might be called bio-mechanical, structural, species regularities. An example of which, is, of course, his theory on the impact of the structural exigencies of human child rearing on individual development in the Oedipus complex. One would think, given the above, that such structures would, of necessity, qualify for phylogenetic status, even given Freud's strict conditions. Things, however, are not quite so simple.

As we have seen, Freud, on at least one occasion, and in fact, on many others, is content to ascribe a phylogenetic status to such cognitive-behavioral arrangements as those supposedly exposed in the analysis of the Oedipus complex. However - again in the context of objecting to Jung - Freud notices, as it is important for us to notice, that cognitive and behavioral regularities in
individuals conditioned by a given set of bio-mechanical regularities need not necessarily be classed as phylogenetic. Such regularities might proceed completely from a pre-selected relation between sets of bio-mechanical and environmental factors and have no relation to any phyletic behavioral organization. They may require no prior ideal, or instinctual, organization to explain the regularity of their deployment:

I fully agree with Jung in recognizing the existence of this phylogenetic heritage; but I regard it as a methodological error to seize on a phylogenetic explanation before the ontogenetic possibilities have been exhausted. I cannot see any reason for obstinately disputing the importance of infantile pre-history while at the same time freely acknowledging the importance of ancestral pre-history. Nor can I overlook the fact that phylogenetic motives and productions themselves stand in need of elucidation, and that in quite a number of instances this is afforded by factors in the childhood of the individual. And, finally, I cannot feel surprised that what was originally produced in certain circumstances in pre-historic times and was then transmitted in the shape of a predisposition to its re-acquirement should, since the same circumstances persist, emerge once more as a concrete event in the experience of the individual (Freud 1982 vol.9 337-8, my emphasis).

Now this last objection, which Freud levels at Jung, is powerful enough, for Freud himself has made no arguments to meet it, to bring into question the phylogenetic status of the Oedipus complex as well. And it is possibly only the combination of his desire to refute Jung, with a tacit confidence in the security of his own, ontogenetic, deductions that allows him to articulate it at all. Though
we must note, in fairness, that Freud consistently prioritized observation over a-priori theorizing - and in this sense is totally consistent in his objection to Jung - he does in at least one famous instance involve himself in 'speculation'.
I am, of course, referring to Beyond the Pleasure Principle.

Interestingly, in Beyond, Freud's ambivalence about the status and value of speculation is symmetrical with the ambiguous status of phylogeny observed above, requiring, as it does, a move beyond the strictly 'observational'. It is perhaps no co-incidence that there, the shoe is on the other foot, as it were, as Freud resorts to speculation about the death instinct as an organic compulsion to repeat, partly in order to distance himself from the monism of Jung (Freud 1982 vol. 11 325-329, also, c.f.: Derrida 1987 366-7).

Towards the end of Beyond this situation leads Freud into a discussion of the status of speculation, which supports it to a certain degree, but which, however, implicates all of psychoanalytic practice in its procedure.
There, he tells us, referring to developments in psychoanalytic theory, that:

I do not dispute the fact that the third step in the theory of the instincts, which I have taken here, cannot lay claim to the same degree of certainty as the two earlier ones - the extension of the concept of sexuality and the hypothesis of narcissism. These two innovations were a direct translation of observation into theory and were no more open to sources of error than is inevitable in all such cases. It is true that my assertion of the regressive character of instincts also rests on observed material - namely on the facts of the
compulsion to repeat. It may be, however, that I have overestimated their significance. And in any case it is impossible to pursue an idea of this kind except by repeatedly combining factual material with what is purely speculative and thus diverging widely from empirical observation (Freud 1982 vol. 11 333 my emphasis).

Freud continues on with his qualifications, even going so far as to assert that the interactive dichotomy of observation and speculation is a necessary function of our embeddedness in figurative languages, whose domains extend over the whole of the sciences, including those of physiology and chemistry (Freud 1982 vol.11 334), and is not therefore limited simply to psychoanalysis, but is the general characteristic of experimental awareness. That is, of the reality principle. We will see more clearly why this must be so when we turn to consider the relation between word and thing presentations below.

The brilliant contiguity of the death instinct as organic compulsion to repeat, 'to restore an earlier state of things', with these further speculations on the status of speculation as repetition, is easily overlooked amidst the appearance of qualification. "And in any case it is

---

Here the reader may usefully refer to Why War, where, after summarizing the theory of the death instinct for Einstein, Freud proposes that psychoanalysis is a type of mythology which can be considered on par with the mythology of Einstein's physics:

It may perhaps seem to you as though our theories are a kind of mythology and, in the present case, not even an agreeable one. But does not every science come in the end to a kind of mythology like this. Cannot the same be said to-day of your own physics (Freud 1982 vol.12 358)?
impossible to pursue an idea of this kind except by repeatedly combining factual material with what is purely speculative. The more frequently this is done in the course of constructing a theory, the more untrustworthy, as we know, must be the final result (my emphasis)." But we have also already seen that what counts as 'factual material', or 'observed fact', is only ascertainable as such as the result of a figurative regime. So we can now say, 'that it is impossible to pursue any idea, or any observation, of any kind, without the use of figurative language, and therefore speculation, and repetition'. Speculation is simply the form of 'reality testing'.

Thus it emerges, that it is the process of qualification itself that is essential, and this qualification must be qualifiedly qualified as such; as the repetition of repetition, as the repetition of the death instinct. Speculative repetition as qualified reality-testing works at overcoming its own precondition as figurative language, but without this qualified gap there is only silence. Unqualified silence. Just as the repetition compulsion of the death instinct works to restore an earlier state of things, where there is not yet a distinction to be made between organic and inorganic, the work of the reality principle in psychoanalysis and science seeks to restore an earlier state of things where a division cannot be made between 'observed fact' and 'figurative language'.

Psychoanalytic, or scientific, truth is equivalent to death.
But as these expressions are aspects of figuration, we must say that 'truth' and 'death' are only qualified fictions. Qualification is the death of theory, just as it is its life. Interestingly, the theory of the death instinct as organic compulsion to repeat, which is presented as the weak point of psychoanalysis, becomes not only constitutive of psychoanalysis, but of the experimental capacity itself; and, of any arguments that might be brought against it, or psychoanalysis. Here, one is reminded of that other great bastion of psychoanalytic theory, articulated in the assertion that negation is the token of repression. Casting forth and back, Da und Fort, the speculative feelers of the psychoanalytic organism, master (Freud 1982 vol. 11 299), and bind, the large amounts of stimuli that flood its mental apparatus (ibid. 301), and so delay its fall:

It is as though the life of the organism moved with a vacillating rhythm. One group of instincts rushes forwards so as to reach the final aim of life as swiftly as possible; but when a particular stage in the advance has been reached, the other group jerks back to a certain point to make a fresh start and so prolong the journey (ibid. 313).

Such is the piquant condition of psychoanalytic theory: an endless fort-da of speculative steps, jerked back and forth by the string of an impossible telos. A performance, we may remark, in a somewhat anticipatory fashion, which is structurally isomorphic with the endless displacement of the impossible desires of incestuous libido onto, so called 'secondary objects'. Now this condition should in fact be
seen as a symptomatic one, and not simply as the necessary repetition of the described in the form of the description; where what is described is meant to be the format for object relations in general. In fact, the claim that language underwrites observation undercuts the distinction between the actual and the figurative at its very base; and thus also, we must note the distinction between the reality principle and the pleasure principle. With this, the ontogenetic analysis must also come to be seen as speculatively 'diverging from immediate observation' in the same way that the phylogenetic analysis does, effectively nullifying the distinction.

The problematic of the supposed division and interplay of 'the actual' and 'figurative language' in reality testing, we may also note, corresponds to the distinction Freud makes in his essay The Uncanny, between a symbol and what it symbolizes; the conflation of which gives rise to the sense of the uncanny:

...an uncanny effect is often and easily produced when the distinction between imagination and reality is effaced as when something that we have hitherto regarded as imaginary appears before us in reality, or when a symbol takes over the full functions of the thing it symbolizes, and so on. It is this factor which contributes not a little to the uncanny effect attaching to magical practices. The infantile element in this, which also dominates the minds of neurotics, is the over-accentuation of psychical reality in comparison with material reality—a feature closely allied to the belief in the omnipotence of thoughts (Freud vol. 14 1985 367, my emphasis).
Below we shall see, as you may already guess, that this is exactly what happens to Freud. Just when 'reality testing' applies 'it-self' to 'it-self', allied with a 'belief in the omnipotence of thoughts', in the 'over-accentuation of psychical reality' thus engendered, the asserted distinction between the 'actual' and 'figurative language' collapses, and the 'symbol takes over the full function of what it symbolizes'. All of which is deployed in the sort of systematically incompossible series that Freud would have us take as being indicative of repression.

What is accomplished in this systematic assertion and retraction of the distinction between the 'actual and the 'figurative'? Certainly it is the step of speculation, but curiously, it has become a step without traction and without terrain. Indeed, without a foot! Thus without a step that grants real measure. And what if what was being repressed here, was precisely that: the step and the foot? The delay in the fall from upright posture? We shall see.

In any case, from our above observations we can think of any number of reasons why any threat to this distinction, might be extremely disquieting to Freud (it performs, perhaps, the same role for him, as does the ontico-ontological difference in Heidegger). That putting it forward was both an answer too, and an occasion for, anxiety; seeming, as it does, to be a basis for the possibility of a science whose very deployment undercuts its own possibility. Such is the oscillation at which
psychoanalysis arrives, when it begins, with speculative reality testing, as its principle, its procedure, and its object. The distinction itself is doubled. Then, collapsing in the dividing of its own doubling, it becomes, "uncanny". But this state of affairs is not accidental.

3 The feeling of the uncanny was one to which Freud claimed a particular, and perhaps peculiar, insensitivity. A sensitive insensitivity which, it could easily be demonstrated, performs this same fort-da, around the status of science. One need simply note the following quotations from The Uncanny in this context, though many other examples could be found in other works:

The writer of the present contribution, indeed, must himself plead guilty to a special obtuseness in this matter, where extreme delicacy of perception would be more in place. It is long since he has experienced or heard of anything which has given him an uncanny impression, and he must start by translating himself into that state of feeling, by awakening in himself the possibility of experiencing it (Freud 1985 vol. 14 340, my emphasis).

...anyone who has completely and finally rid himself of animistic beliefs will be insensible to this type of the uncanny. The most remarkable coincidences of wish and fulfillment, the most mysterious repetition of similar experiences in a particular place or on a particular date, the most deceptive sights and suspicious noises - none of these things will disconcert him or raise the kind of fear which can be described as 'a fear of something uncanny'. The whole thing is purely an affair of 'reality testing', a question of the material reality of the phenomena (ibid. 371, my emphasis; c.f.: also the footnote on this page where Freud recounts his uncanny experience with a mirror on a train ride).

As I was walking, one hot summer afternoon, through the deserted streets of a provincial town in Italy which was unknown to me, I found myself in a quarter of whose character I could not long
and it is precisely the emergence of supposed object relations, and the concept of 'object relations', that we seek to understand, with respect to Freud's actual procedure with relation to 'objects'. We shall see that it is in the concepts of 'object language' and of 'object relations', and in the problem of reference entailed by their assumption as purely infrapsychic significations, that the problem lies, indefinitely frustrating Freud's anthropological and epistemic intentions.

To grasp this, we must re-examine how Freud understood

remain in doubt. Nothing but painted women were to be seen in the windows of the small houses, and I hastened to leave the narrow street at the next turning. But after having wandered about for a time without inquiring my way, I suddenly found myself back in the same street, where my presence was now beginning to excite attention. I hurried away once more, only to arrive by another de'tour at the same place yet a third time. Now, however, a feeling overcame me which I can only describe as uncanny, and I was glad enough to find myself back at the piazza I had left a short while before, without any further voyages of discovery (ibid. 359).

...I read a story about a young married couple...It was a naive enough story, but the uncanny feeling it produced was quite remarkable (ibid. 367).

'All this is not unrelated to Jacques Derrida's analysis of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in certain places in The Post Card, where he links the death instinct as the compulsion to repeat with the repetition and qualification of the steps of Beyond. Steps that go nowhere (c.f.: Derrida 1987 esp. 381 - 4). We are not, here, however, specifically concerned with this immediate relation, for the angle of our pursuit is a somewhat different from Derrida's.
the role of language, and how it relates to meta-psychology, individual psychological development, and thus, also how Freud's tacit and explicit understanding of the conditions for the possibility of science, conditioned the possibilities of his science. For this, we turn to his essay *The Unconscious* where he elaborates on the infra-psychic relations between word presentations, thing presentations, and object presentations, their relation to repression, and to primary and secondary processes:

What we have permissibly called the conscious presentation of the object can now be split up into the presentation of the word and the presentation of the thing; the latter consists in the cathexis, if not in the direct memory-images of the thing, at least of remoter memory-traces derived from these...the conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone. The system Ucs. Contains the thing-cathexis of the objects, the first and true object-cathexis; the system Pcs. comes about by this thing presentation being hypercathedected through being linked with the word-presentations corresponding to it. It is these hypercathexis, we may suppose, that bring about a higher psychical organization and make it possible for the primary process to be succeeded by the secondary process which is dominant in the system Pcs. Now, too, we are in a position to state precisely what it is that repression denies to the rejected presentation in the transference neurosis...what it denies to the presentation is translation into words which shall remain attached to the object. A presentation which is not put into words or a psychical act which is not hypercathedected, remains thereafter in the Ucs. in a state of repression (Freud 1982 vol.11 207, my emphasis).

It is important for us to notice, how the infra-psychic
divisions, between 'word-presentations', 'thing-presentations', and their linkage in 'conscious object presentations', with respect to repression, and unconscious primary, and pre-conscious, or conscious, secondary processes, made above, is structurally identical to both the distinction between 'symbols' and what they 'symbolize', with respect to the 'uncanny'; and to the distinction between 'the actual' and 'figurative language', with respect to 'reality testing'. In every case, it is a matter of realizing a proper differentiation and relation of correspondence between words and things. These distinctions, in turn, control and make possible the supposed distinction between ontogony and phylogeny - with all its inherent difficulties. Not to mention the distinction between the analyst and the neurotic, with their common compulsion to interpret, and their common anxiety about 'reality testing'.

'This hypothetetic correspondence between word and thing presentations, resulting in Pcs. and Cs. object presentations, is, in turn, the basis for the possibility of, and the model for, the representation of relations between object presentations, and thus for their construal as a form of object themselves:

Moreover, by being linked with words, cathexis can be provided with quality even when they represent only relations between presentations of objects and are thus unable to derive any quality from perceptions. Such relations which become comprehensible only through words, form a major part of our thought processes (ibid. 208).

The category of what is accidental and requires no motivation, in which the normal person includes a
Now the reciprocal permeability of all these distinctions could easily be demonstrated along the same lines which we observed, above, in the discussion of the relation between the 'actual' and the 'figurative' in reality testing. Indeed they are reducible to each other. For the nonce, however, what I wish to draw attention to, is the fact that Freud's concept of the relation between 'word' and 'thing presentations' in 'conscious object presentation', is essentially referential and representational, and that this is linked to the limits of 'infra-psychic' analysis, as well as to the limits and structure of scientificity, as Freud understood them.

The word presentation names the thing presentation that part of his own psychical performances and parapraxes, is thus rejected by the paranoiac as far as the psychical manifestations of other people are concerned. Everything he observes in other people is full of significance, everything can be interpreted. How does he reach this position? Probably here as in so many similar cases he projects on the mental life of other people what is unconsciously present in his own. In paranoia many sorts of things force their way through to consciousness whose presence in the unconscious of normal and neurotic people we can demonstrate only through psychoanalysis (Freud 1982 vol. 5 317-318, my emphasis).

The differences between myself and the superstitious person are two: first, he projects outwards a motivation which I look for within; secondly, he interprets a chance as due to an event, while I trace it back to a thought. But what is hidden from him corresponds to what is unconscious for me, and the compulsion not to let chance count as chance but to interpret it is common to both of us (Freud 1982 vol. 5 320, my emphasis).
corresponds to it, through a 'hypercathexis', thereby becoming a 'conscious object presentation'; and it is because the unconscious treats words as 'things' that it cannot express a referential-representational relation, and is not, therefore, 'pre-conscious', or 'conscious'. Accordingly the hallmark of Pcs., and the possibility of Cs. within that system, is the establishment of correspondences between word presentations and thing presentations. This is to say, that it is the distinction and relation between word presentations and thing presentations that makes psychic life possible; and to trouble this distinction, therefore, is to trouble the whole topology of the psyche and the concept of its local.7

7Alternately, we might say, that Pcs. treats some things as words. Freud gives the means whereby this comes about some consideration:

But word presentations, for their part too, are derived from sense perceptions, in the same way as thing presentations are; the question might therefore be raised why presentations of objects cannot become conscious through the medium of their own perceptual residues. Probably, however, thought proceeds in systems so far remote from the original perceptual residues that they have no longer retained anything of the quality of those residues, and, in order to become conscious, need to be reinforced by new qualities (ibid. 208).

8It is only through word presentations that thing presentations can become Pcs., or Cs., 'object presentations'. Word presentations possibilize Pcs.. They have this privilege because the relation between word presentations and thing presentations is a purely infrapsychic one that does not require for its meaning a correspondence to a further, extrapsychic actuality, subject to reality testing: the word presentation immediately refers to the thing presentation, not the thing presented. This is
It is with this conception of the relation between 'thing presentations' and 'word presentations' in 'conscious why words can name relations between object presentations, as well as thing presentations in themselves. Indeed, it is only thus that the thing presentation can be subject to reality testing. In this respect it is significant that Freud assumes that presentational relations can only be realized through words, and not through gestural relations, for example. It is, in all likelihood, for this reason that Freud feels that 'internal perception' is more available to analysis than 'external perception'. In this respect his affinity with Kant is significant, acknowledged, and striking (especially so when we consider Freud's many disavowals of any relation to philosophy). In a letter to Marie Bonaparte, on August 21, 1938, after reading her manuscript on time, he writes:

There is an area whose frontiers belong both to the outer world and to the ego: our perceptual superficies. So it might be that the idea of time is connected with the work of the system W.-BW. (Pcs.). Kant would then be in the right if we replace his old-fashioned 'a-priori' by our more modern introspection of the psychical apparatus. It would be the same with space, causality, etc. (Jones 1957 466).

Or again, in The Unconscious:

Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are subjectivly conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is perceived though unknowable, so psychoanalysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious mental processes which are their object. Like the physical, the psychical is not necessarily in reality what it appears to us to be. We shall be glad to learn, however, that the correction of internal perception will turn out not to offer such great difficulties as the correction of external perception - that internal objects are less unknowable than the external world (Freud vol. 11 1987 173, my emphasis).

Clearly, the Kantian deduction of the categories must assume this as well.
object presentations' that we come to the core of the difficulties synonymously fraying the concept of reality testing, and the topology and conditions of psychic life, and therefore of psychoanalysis, which is also the site of the repression to which I have previously alluded.

Here, again, it is Wittgenstein who makes the crucial contribution to our critique, which will be decisive for our re-orientation of what has been called 'psychoanalytic' research, and all the consequences that this will have for our concept of 'psychic-life': object relations, inter-exteriority, and therefore, our understanding of the nature of scientficity in general.

As noted, above, Wittgenstein understood language to be based on contingent species regularities, of relative duration, in non-cognitive primitive responses to the environment, which, are elaborated on and refined through training into what he sometimes called 'associations of practices' (Wittgenstein 1989 13a), and, many other times, called 'rules' (Wittgenstein 1983 80-83). The existence of such training and refinement procedures, and the consistency of social maintenance of the status of individual deployments (whether cognitive or not), constitutes the only solidity of the relative duration of a particular behavioral-grammatical institution in an elaborated form. This is also to say, that what constitutes a correct, or an incorrect application, an appropriate elaboration, or abrogation, of a rule, has no necessary relation to any
individual psychic, condition.

Hence, it must also be understood, for example, that 'understanding' is not something that is understood through introspection on, or about, some supposed inner process of understanding. The word 'understanding' does not require for its operation any reference to a thing, or an 'inner process', either mental or neurological (though it may well be related to neurological events in a similar way to that in which the structure of the hand is related to the indefinitely over-determined field of its possible deployments; deployments, in which, any single gesture, as an aspect of an operational chain of gestural sequences, can never be strictly reduced to a simple physiological state, or, significance). Rather, for the answer, or answers to such inquiries we must direct our attention to the public linguistic world; to the grammar of 'understanding'; which, is in part, the investigation of how primitive responses are part of grammar while also constituting the contingent conditions of its possibilities.

The acceptance of this view of the social elaboration of common primitive responses into a more contingent collective grammar has significant implications for any theory which assumes that words derive their meaning through relations to things, or 'sense impressions' of things. In fact it entails that 'words' do not derive their meanings from relations to 'things', or 'sensations', primarily, at all. Rather, they find their meanings in their embeddedness
in, and as, public social practices, which are themselves extensions of primitive responses, constituting the mastery of techniques of behavior (ibid. 82). That this is so, appears most powerfully when Wittgenstein gives consideration to what one might think of as most intimately 'one's own', and how one expresses it to others - one's own pain:

How do words refer to sensations? - There doesn't seem to be any problem here; don't we talk about sensations every day, and give them names? But how is the connection between the name and the thing set up? This question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations? - of the word "pain" for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensations and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain behavior.

"So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?" - On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it (ibid. 89, my emphasis).

Operating on Wittgensteinian lines, A.I. Meldon, articulates this point well, with respect to such spontaneous non-cognitive primitive responses in infants as blinking when exposed to bright light, and the raising and waving of arms:

In short, the behavior in question is the physiological response of an organism; and if we are to speak of the actions of such a being we are employing a concept of action stripped of many of the features of our familiar concept of human action - 'action' as applied to the very young infant can be dealt with, very largely at any rate, in physiological terms. Now if the term 'learning' is to be applied to developments that ensue from these circumstances - in consequence of which the infant comes to attend and respond to its immediate surroundings, and in doing so begins
Even given these considerations, one may be inclined to suppose that there must be some kind of private, subjective, experience of pain that underlies such possibilities, gives them their sense, and, to which pain behavior and the vocabulary of the self-ascription of pain must refer. Wittgenstein anticipates the strength of these convictions and repeatedly goes to great lengths to show that such supposed inner states can have no effective role in the actual understanding and use of our linguistic concepts. His constant target is the idea that meaningful behavior is the result of, or derives its meaning from, the presence to consciousness of a word or a thing, or some combination of these:

When one says "He gave a name to his sensation" one forgets that a great deal of stage setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed (ibid. 92).

The supposed designatory of pain derives its significance from its role in a grammar of pain; an association of practices elaborated out of a grouping of physiological to achieve a measure of control over the movement of its limbs - the 'learning' in question cannot be identified with the familiar learning of skills by relatively mature human beings. And in point of fact what psychologists often have in mind when they apply 'learning' to the changes that take place in the very young infant is nothing more or less than the physiological development or maturation that takes place in the nervous system (Meldon 1967 70).
regularities. Such a "grammar of pain" is in no way attached, or dependent for its significance on any infrapsychic state. Nor can any infrapsychic state have the result of designating a pain.

Continuing on in his discussion of 'pain', Wittgenstein presents one of his most forceful, and perhaps uncanny, remarks in this regard, in his celebrated 'private language argument', where he shows that the relation between a 'word' and a 'thing', for example, is in no way based on ostensive connection, nor is the meaning of either, separately, or in relation to the other, based on a representational, referential, or serial, relation. As he says:

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! - Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. - Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. - But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? - If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language game at all: not even as a something; for the box might even be empty. - No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box: it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant (Wittgenstein 1983 100 my emphasis).
This is another way of saying that the meaning of object language is not based on reference to things, or sensations, but rather, that such language has meaning by virtue of its embeddedness in complexes of associated social activities - of actions and practices - of which its use is a part. We may usefully understand such practices as constituting the 'depth grammar' of that aspect of our language, if we keep in mind that marks, sounds, or gestures of other kinds, are not essential starting points of reference in themselves, but are only possible points from which such indexes, whose 'content' would always be differentially defining, might proceed. We must also note that Wittgenstein is not exactly denying the fact of personal experience - we express our personal experience - and some times do not - but that the meaning of 'experience' is not based in personal cognitive sensations etc.: "An 'inner process stands' in need of an outward criteria (ibid. 153)." "We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here (ibid. 102)." There can be no meaningful grammar, or experience, for a 'subject', or otherwise, that is purely 'inner'. In fact, the idea of the 'inner' is an 'outer' idea. Cognition, and the acquisition of cognition, therefore, cannot be based on 'object relations' per se': nor, could something like 'object-

\[10\] We will give some further critical consideration to certain 'anthropomomic' aspects of Wittgenstein's conception of 'use' in chapter V below.
relations' conceived in a Freudian fashion, ever emerge as an aspect of the acquisition of cognitive functions.

Thus returning to Freud, we note that the assumptions of the 'infrapsychic' 'word-presentations', and 'thing-presentations', co-joined in hyper-cathetic correspondences in the 'object presentations' of reality testing, as the medium of signification, systematically preclude consideration of active, spontaneous behavior as an essential component of the 'psyche', and, or, the cognitive. An active component that cannot be reduced to 'object', 'word', or 'presentation' etc. If we accept the interpretation of Wittgenstein sketched above, the concepts of 'object relations', 'reality testing', and the essentially internal locus of the psyche, would then be fundamentally misleading derivatives of this failure. The social elaboration of non-cognitive primitive responsiveness into associations of practices in public grammar through training, 'replaces' the 'infrapsychic' as the 'origin' and 'locus' of meaning.

As I noted above, this assumption of the infrapsychic origin of affectivity, with respect to interpretable object relations, is contiguous with the assumption of a phylogenetic template, for behavioral organization, somehow preceding actual behavioral deployment: extending, as it does, beyond the 'strictly observational': an inchoate repository of undeployed and undeployable 'meaning'. With the infra-psychic division between 'thing-presentations' and
'word presentations', the physical body seems to drop out of language, and with it the predominance of the graphical - gestural - behavioral - pluridimensional - components of our possible cognitive deployments, in respect to the 'ontogenetic' development of so called 'object relations'.

Here I wish to contest that we must begin not with the infra psychic, but with the actual biomechanical behavioral-gestural organization and its social elaboration. We must not begin with the assumption of infrapsychic affectivity, or with the assumption of a prior organizational template for behavioral deployment, but with the biomechanical, and behavioral-gestural-grammatical organization itself: 'the common behavior of mankind'. Not associations of ideas, unconscious, or otherwise, but associations of practices, or operational sequences, whether these be gestural, verbal, written, or otherwise; none of which, constitute an object, relate to an object, or, represent an object, or sensation.

The upshot of this, is that human beings must be understood to relate to themselves, each other, and their environments, not in terms of infrapsychic 'object relations' established on an individual basis, but rather in terms of patterns of activity, or associations of practices, that constitute forms of life, into which physiologically pre-disposed individuals are intimated. Freud has traced and mistraced some partial forms of 'external' grammar, while exhibiting a philosophical symptom, which only seems to be the repression of philosophy (in this regard we may
significantly recall our previous linkage of Kant to Freudian assumptions). We will call this repression and this distinction, the 'empirical/conceptual' distinction, and treat of its social evolution and significance in the history of western social grammar and philosophy, systematically, in a subsequent chapter. For now, I will merely note in passing that the 'object presentation' relates to the 'empirical', while the 'word presentation' relates to the conceptual side of the distinction. Whatever distinction, or relation, exists between 'words' and 'things', we may be sure, that it is a grammatical, and not, an infrapsychic, or ontological one.

The above stated, and accepted, one might be tempted to think that the gig is up for psychoanalysis. But this, however, would be to throw out the baby with the bathwater. Indeed, it is my contention that there is much that Freud is not fundamentally wrong about, and on the whole his errors are largely a function of mistaken emphasis on the supposed meaning relation between words and things, and the mistaken designation of the consignment local of meaning function in the infra-psychic.

But what could be left of - the body of psychoanalysis - of Freud - after such significant dismemberment? Surely it has been castrated! Quite the contrary. We shall see - are seeing already - that the body of psychoanalysis was only always already castrated by its assertion of the infra psychic: the repression of the active body, and of the deed.
We will begin with that: "Im Anfang war die Tat".

To facilitate an appreciation of how a more detailed consideration of the nature and status of spontaneous non-cognitive primitive responses and their social elaboration into cognitive and non-cognitive behavioral arrangements pertains to psychoanalysis I will now turn to relate our discussion of Freud and Wittgenstein to certain central aspects of the thought of the great French polymath Andre' Leroi-Gourhan, as laid out in his monumental Gesture and Speech.

Initially, there are three essential points of Gourhan's work that mesh structurally with the 'Wittgenstinian' critique of psychoanalysis given above, which we will discuss immediately below: first, the status of phylogeny in Gourhan's work, second, and immediately linked to this, his conception of 'operational sequences', specifically with respect to Wittgenstein's understanding of the relation between primitive responses and rules, and third, Gourhan's conception of the structure and relation of three tiers of operational sequences as they pertain to the three tiers of Freud's topology of the psyche.

With respect to the status of phylogeny, Gourhan's position corresponds in all essentials to the one we have articulated above. Atavistic memory is specifically precluded as a factor in organizational behavior, and in its place, the idea that primitive bodily responses (here 'hereditary neurovegetative mechanisms') are elaborated into
more complex action sequences, or operational procedures, is advanced:

The parallelism between the innate aptitudes of human individuals and those of animal species helps us to understand the nature of instinctual behavior. In neither case are we dealing with mysterious programs transmitted by atavism and developing automatically under favorable circumstances, but rather with hereditary neurovegetative mechanisms that permit the constitution of a memory recorded in action sequences (Gourhan 1993 225).

Gourhan's approach provides a unique way of understanding organizational behavior in general that is not species specific. The concept of an operational procedure, or action sequence, applies as much to the technical competence of an amoebae for organizing its relation to its environment as it does to the most advanced forms of human social-technical organization:

The physiological/technical/social order...is a very general biological schema applicable to the life of an insect as much as to that of a rodent or a human, since, all species, even parasites display - for a time at least - sufficient technicity to ensure a supply of food and as much social behavior as will assure their reproduction (ibid. 274).

This is to say, that operational sequences are essentially technical sequences, and this applies as much to the activity of defecating as it does to walking, speaking, or writing. Such a generic notion of technics, however, does not imply that the field of bio-technical actions is in any way homogenous.

Within the field of bio-technical operational
sequences, Gourhan makes a point of noting; the classical distinction between instinct and intelligence is not applicable. Instead he distinguishes between strictly genetically channeled action sequences and those involving the use of language grafted onto the genetic basis through training. This further allows him to divide the operating behavior of Homo sapiens into three related, but relatively distinct spheres. The first "is an automatic form of behavior directly connected with our biological nature (ibid. 230)". The second "is that of mechanical behavior and includes operational sequences acquired through experience and education, recorded in both gestural behavior and language, but taking place in a state of dimmed consciousness (ibid.)". The third is "that of lucid behavior, in which language plays a preponderant role, either by helping to repair an accidental interruption of the sequence or by creating a new one (ibid.)". The first sphere corresponds to the Wittgenstinian concept of the 'deed', or of primitive responses, and the second and third spheres, would, on his view, occupy the field of socially acquired, linguistically determined, rule governed behavior.

Having articulated the above noted division of operational behavior in Homo sapiens, Gourhan goes on to make an explicit comparison of it with the Freudian topology of the psyche, which he does not pursue, but which is very important to us here:
Like any attempt to divide a continuum, the division of operational behavior into these three stages is arbitrary, but it coincides with the psychologists' categories of the unconscious, the subconscious, and the conscious, which in turn correspond to three levels of operation of the human neuropsychological apparatus. This distinction is certainly more important than one that might be drawn between instinct and intelligence in that it separates strictly instinctual, genetically channelled actions from sequences in which language and consciousness do not intervene in an ordered manner and do not express themselves through symbols. Psychological terms could no doubt be applied to technical operations, but they carry all kinds of implications that it would be better to avoid in the present context. In speaking of operational sequences, we therefore propose to use the terms "automatic," "mechanical," and "lucid" or "fully conscious." (Gourhan 1993 231, my emphasis).

Though Gourhan could not note it, the consequences of his analysis of operational sequences has similar, if not identical, consequences for the psychic locale of the Freudian topology, as that implied by our Wittgenstinian critique above, and this is why his comparison is so significant for us. The exteriorization of meaning does not destroy the topology, it re-deploys it. Effectively, Gourhan asserts the sheer exteriority of the 'psyche'; which is not to say that such collective behavior is not based in a certain general configuration of the bio-mechanical, neurological mechanism of the body. Adopting the combined insights of Gourhan and Wittgenstein with respect to psychoanalysis, we may then speak of a social 'psychic' grammar of operational sequences, or associations of practices. As Wittgenstein said, "Language itself is the
vehicle of thought (ibid. 329)". In adopting and exploring the significance of the re-deployment of these determinations in externality, below, we shall not only show that the most fundamental species defining operational sequence for Homo sapiens is that which constitutes upright gait. We will show further, both 'figuratively' and 'literally', that the intervention of the step in the inherent disequilibrium of the gait, constitutes a delay in the fall from upright posture, which is itself the vehicle of language. This shall then be related to what have been called 'primary' and 'secondary repression', or 'primary' and secondary 'processes'. Indeed, it will emerge below that such a thought is not far from some thoughts of Freud's own. Thoughts that Freud, would not, could not, completely, own, because they were only 'speculations'.
Chapter II

Groundwork

In the previous chapter, by combining insights from Wittgenstein, Freud, and Leroi-Gourhan, we established grounds for conceiving an externalization of the psyche in tiers of operational sequences, or associations of practices. We further intimated that the most basic operational sequence, from which all other specifically human socio-technical behavior developed, was that of upright gait. This chapter will initially focus on substantiating this latter intimation. It will do this, first, by giving consideration to some of Leroi-Gourhan's arguments to this effect in Gesture and Speech. We will then turn to relate this evidence, in the context of our earlier discussion of the exteriorization of the psyche, to certain little remarked speculations of Freud's on the significance of upright posture for the evolution of culture, which also concern primary and secondary processes and the Oedipus complex.

As the North American reader may have had little, or limited exposure, to the work of Leroi-Gourhan, and the general range of his thought and research interests, before attempting to summarize the pertinent aspects of his arguments from Gesture and Speech, we shall give his background some brief consideration. Andre' Leroi-Gourhan
(1911-1986) published widely on a broad range of subjects over the course of his career. An accomplished linguist, he obtained his first degree in Russian in 1931, followed shortly thereafter by a degree in Chinese in 1933, at which point he began studying for a Certificate of Ethnology in a program established by Marcel Mauss and Paul Rivet. There he became acquainted with many of the great lights of French ethnology, including Claude Levi Strauss. These studies subsequently took him to the Department of Ethnology at the British Museum for a period of a year, where his long-standing interest in the history of technology began to emerge as a dominant theme in his work. Aside from some earlier publications, this period of study bore fruit in the 1945 publication of his important work *Evolution et Techniques*, which has yet to be translated in English.

During the same period Leroi-Gourhan also traveled to Japan for two years, where he engaged in a study of the Ainu, and also commenced his first archaeological excavations. On his return to France he was made a member of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, and in 1944 he finished his *These de lettres, Archeologie du Pacifique Nord*, as well as a complimentary thesis *Documents pour l'art compare de l'Eurasie septentrionale.*

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1 According to Randall White, in the introduction to *Gesture and Speech*, from which we also draw Leroi-Gourhan's biographical information, "This work sensitized him to a lack of cross-cultural correspondence between form and
1946 saw Leroi-Gourhan appointed assistant director of the Musee de l'Homme, where he was soon joined by Claude Levi Strauss. While occupying this position Leroi-Gourhan taught ethnographic techniques and museology, as well as establishing archeological field training for students, particularly at Arcy-sur-Cure, which local, contained rich remnants of Mousterian and early upper Paleolithic occupations. Importantly,

In this context he was the champion of broad-scale excavations that treated archeological sites as spatially complex human occupations. He was among the first in Western Europe to ask ethnological questions of archeological sites—a major theme in his teaching was that even the most concrete aspects of technology contributed to more general ethnographic understanding. In other words, the analysis of items of technology meaning in material representation (Leroi-Gourhan 1993 xv)". In other words, Leroi-Gourhan came to distinguish between the form of expression and the meaning, as its context specific use. The form of expression can be multiply over-determined, as Nietzsche had already noted in the second part of his Genealogy of Morals. A point, we may note, which pertains immediately to our earlier comparison of certain aspects of Leroi-Gourhan's work to the thought of Wittgenstein. This becomes more clear to us when White continues:

He was thus led to distinguish explicitly in his analysis of Paleolithic art between recurrent associations of certain symbols, on the one hand, and the ideology behind the representations, on the other. For him this ideology (or meaning) was probably unknowable and was specific to a time period and place. The critical distinction between knowable formal patterning and unknowable meaning of constituent symbols...(ibid. xvi).
is tied directly to an understanding of social structures and belief systems (ibid. xvi).

In the following years, Leroi-Gourhan continued to expand the horizons of his research and publication, and in 1954 he defended a thesis on patterns of mechanical equilibrium in terrestrial mammals, a work which was not actually published in French until 1984, but which paved the way for some of the insights he would develop in Gesture and Speech, ten years later, on the significance of bipedalism for human development.

We have gone over but a small aspect of the resume' of Leroi-Gourhan, but sufficient to see the significance of his emphasis on the biological and technical for the development and direction of his work. As well, we have noted in relation to this, some of his views on language. We are now, therefore, in a better position to appreciate a more detailed explication of certain aspects of Gesture and Speech.

Though there are other aspects of Leroi-Gourhan's thought that will concern us later, our focus here is on the basic argument from which all other aspects of his work proceed: the assertion that the determining species characteristic, which defines Homo sapiens development from the anthropoids, is upright gait. For Leroi-Gourhan, the acquisition of upright gait is not a simple change in style of locomotion. Rather, what we term 'upright gait' entails a whole suite of evolutionary changes that develop in
tandem, but which we are here constrained to elaborate sequentially.

Perhaps the best way to introduce this set of relationships is to note how Leroi-Gourhan's perspective on these matters debunks two linked pieces of received wisdom pertaining to our anthropological development. The first of these, Leroi-Gourhan terms 'the myth of the ape ancestor', and the second, is the idea that evolution from the ape ancestor towards Homo sapiens was driven by a big brain. To put it crudely, the two assumptions combine in the notion that the ancestor of modern humans was a highly intelligent ape, with a big brain, which, at some point, realized the advantages of bipedalism and decided to walk upright and use tools. The facts of the matter, however, indicate that the situation was quite the contrary. In fact, Leroi-Gourhan demonstrates conclusively that it is the acquisition of upright gait which decisively distinguishes us from other primates, by driving and making possible cerebral development, and the construction and use of portable tools.

The reasons why this had to be so, are quite clear when they are elaborated, and what is most surprising is the extent to which this evidence has been repressed or ignored in the development of our relationship to our own fossil record. Starting from a starkly bio-technical point of view, Leroi-Gourhan examines the mechanical relationship between the skull structure of animals who are specialized
oral graspers, and those in which aspects of manual technicity are taken over by the forelimb.

In animals, such as quadrupeds, the existence of a muzzle reflects the fact that their mode of locomotion constrains their technicity largely to that of oral grasping. This in turn requires that the fulcrum of the jaw be situated so far back in the skull, that the entire skull, for reasons of mechanical stress, is a dedicated hinge, leaving very little of the skull uninvolved in mechanical operations, and thus available for expansion and cerebral development. Even in cats, which show a high degree of manual technicity with respect to their forelimbs, when yawning their heads can be seen to nearly split in half. In other words, there is a direct relationship between the length of the face, size of cranial cavity, and the extent of independent motericity of the forelimb. The skull structure of Homo sapiens reflects this, in that, as the only species capable of grasping while engaged in locomotion, it also has the shortest face and the least amount of mechanical involvement of the skull in oral technicity. Equally the mechanical limit to the cortical development of specialized oral graspers, corresponds to the fact of the relatively limited range of operational environmental relations enabled by such an apparatus, as compared, say, to that of the human hand. Its selective trajectory would not therefore be conditioned by a species drift toward ever-greater complexity of organizational
behavior. The shape of the skull, and the extent of cranial freedom from mechanical involvement in oral technicity, seamlessly reflect its range of possible technical deployments, conditioned by its mode of locomotion. As Leroi-Gourhan tells us,

Those whose body structure corresponds to the greatest freeing of the hand are also those whose skull is capable of containing the largest brain, for manual liberation and the reduction of stresses exerted on the cranial dome are two terms of the same mechanical equation (ibid. 60).

Thus, the consequences of upright gait include the freeing of the forelimbs from locomotion, enabling a vastly extended range of manual technicity, the freeing of the mouth from grasping, allowing its re-specialization as an organ of communication, while simultaneously freeing the cranial cavity from mechanical involvement in the use of the mouth, with a concomitant, gradual, foreshortening of the muzzle, and the recession of the sagittal crest. All this enables Leroi-Gourhan to say:

It is possible to regard mobility as the significant feature of evolution towards the human state. Paleontologists have not been unaware of this. It came more spontaneously to them to characterize humans by their intelligence than by their mobility, and the first concern of their theories has been with the preeminence of the brain. This has often falsified their interpretation of fossils, especially from the primates onward. The conquest of air-breathing,

\[^2\] We may also note that the significant fact of the foreshortening of the muzzle has the added consequence of the freeing up of facial motility, thereby allowing complex and variegated expressive responsiveness.
the release from crawling, and the achievement of bipedalism are topics that have been studied thoroughly for the past half-century; nevertheless, it is worth noting that barely ten years ago the idea of a quadruped possessed of a human brain would have been accepted almost more readily than that of a biped as cerebrally backward as Australopithecus. The "cerebral" view of evolution now appears mistaken, and there would seem to be sufficient documentation to demonstrate that the brain was not the cause of developments in locomotory adaptation but their beneficiary. This is why locomotion will be considered here as the determining factor of biological evolution, just as in part III (entitled Introduction to a Paleontology of Symbols) it will be seen as the determining factor of modern social evolution (ibid. 26 my bracket).

It is the position of this thesis that the above assertion of bipedalisim as the prime, determining, factor in both biological and social evolution is in fact correct. The perspective developed here, however, will not simply be a re-statement of Leroi-Gourhan's position, and, though we will have cause to refer to part III of Gesture and Speech, mentioned above, its content will not be our primary concern. Indeed, much of my position had already been elaborated before my encounter with Gesture and Speech, which none the less, provides an anthropological and biological basis for it, and, points towards some of its conclusions. Leroi-Gourhan states: "I believe that although a paleontology of symbols might have more to do with psychoanalysis than with comparative anatomy, the principle of creating one should at least be debated (ibid. 275)". It is our purpose to join these together.
At this juncture, then, we turn to note a fundamental symmetry between the thought of Leroi-Gourhan and a little noted and undeveloped 'theoretical speculation' of Freud's, the most significant references to which occur in two long footnotes in *Civilization and its Discontents*. These speculations consider the significance of the acquisition of upright posture for the evolution of man and civilization as a single process. To the best of my knowledge, there is no other mention of these, or related ideas, except for a few sentences on the significance of upright posture in *A Case of Obsessional Neurosis* in 1909 (Freud 1982 vol. 9 127), and an even briefer mention of it, in the fairly early (1912) *On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love* (Freud 1982 vol. 7 258). The significance of the two long footnotes from *Civilization and its Discontents* for the orientation of this thesis is such that they must both be quoted together almost in their entirety:

The organic periodicity of the sexual process has persisted, it is true, but its effect on psychical sexual excitation has rather been reversed. This change seems most likely to be connected with the diminution of the olfactory stimuli by means of which the menstrual process produced an effect on the male psyche. Their role was taken over by visual excitations, which, in contrast to the intermittent olfactory stimuli, were able to maintain a permanent effect. The taboo on menstruation is derived from this 'organic repression', as a defense against a phase of development that has been surmounted. All other motives are probably of a
The conjecture which goes deepest, however, is the one which takes its start from what I have said above in my footnote on p. 288 f. It is to the effect that, with the assumption of an erect posture by man and with the depreciation of his sense of smell, it was not only his anal eroticism which threatened to fall a victim to organic repression, but the whole of his sexuality; so that since this, the sexual function has been accompanied by a repugnance which cannot further be accounted for, and which prevents its complete satisfaction and forces it away from the sexual aim into sublimations and libidinal displacements...Thus we should find that the deepest root of the sexual repression which advances along with civilization is the organic defense of the new form of life achieved with man's erect gait against his earlier animal existence (Freud 1985 vol. 12 296 my emphasis). (C.f.: Leroi-Gourhan 153).

Though there are a myriad of paths we might take in commenting on these citations, whose content we cannot unreservedly endorse, their immediate significance for us is fourfold. Firstly, we must note, that, like Leroi-Gourhan, what Freud is speculating about, is a bio-

secondary nature. (Cf. C. D. Daly, 1927). The fateful process of civilization would thus have set in with man's adoption of an erect posture. From that point the chain of events would have proceeded through the devaluation of olfactory stimuli and the isolation of the menstrual period to the time when visual stimuli were paramount and the genitals became visible, and thence to the continuity of sexual excitation, the founding of the family and so to the threshold of human civilization. This is only a theoretical speculation but it is important enough to deserve careful checking with reference to the conditions of life which obtain among animals closely related to man (Freud 1985 vol. 12 288-289, my emphasis).
mechanical determinant of ontogony that is not phylogenetic. Secondly, Freud, like Leroi-Gourhan, grants upright gait the status of both a species criterion, and a condition for the possibility of civilization. Thirdly, we must indicate the contiguity of the reconfiguration of the orientation of the sensory apparatus, from the dominance of the olfactory and oral, to that of the visual and manual, in both Freud and Leroi-Gourhan, and the complementarity of the recession of the muzzle and the sagittal crest with 'organic repression'. Lastly, it is significant for us that immediately following the footnote on page 288-9, Freud continues on to say: "In this primitive family one essential feature of civilization is still lacking. The arbitrary will of its head, the father, was unrestricted (Freud 1985 Vol.12 288-9)." Let us examine the significance of this claim for psychoanalysis, before continuing on to question its validity.

Freud is telling us that the acquisition of upright posture is, in and of itself, only a condition for the possibility of civilization and not the criteria for its initiation. This, in that it provides the motivation for the formation of the family, and is thus a pre-condition for the development of the Oedipus complex, from which the super-ego emerges, and which, for him, constitutes the full
step onto the path of civilization:

These earliest instinctual renunciations already involve a psychological factor which remains important for all further instinctual renunciations as well. It is not true that the human mind has undergone no development since the earliest times and that, in contrast to the advances of science and technology, it is the same to-day as it was at the beginning of history. We can point out one of these mental advances at once. It is in keeping with the course of human development that external coercion gradually becomes internalized; for a special mental agency, man's super-ego, takes it over and includes it among its commandments. Every child presents this process of transformation to us; only by that means does it become a moral and social being. Such a strengthening of the super-ego is a most precious cultural asset in the psychological field. Those in whom it takes place are turned from being opponents of civilization to being its vehicles (Freud vol. 12 190, my emphasis).

Freud gives two complementary accounts of the development of the super-ego out of the Oedipus complex, one predominantly ontogenetic and the other predominantly phylogenetic. The first is the classic sort of exposition of the Oedipus complex as it develops in the life of 'any' child\(^3\), and the second is the totemic Oedipal situation as described in Totem and Taboo. These are no doubt to be understood as inter-woven, with pre-historic ontogenetically conditioned phylogentic memory somehow

\(^3\) We will give consideration further below to the asymmetrical development of the Oedipus complex with respect to sexual difference and castration.
informing present ontogenesis. Common to both accounts are a 'family', the prohibition of incest, and the idealization and internalization of dependence relations with the parents, primarily the father, as super-ego. The reader is, in all likelihood, familiar with both these accounts; we will therefore forgo their narration here. As a preliminary to a re-examination of the suppositions of the Oedipus complex in relation to upright gait, and a re-reading of the Oedipal myth, to follow in chapter three, we will instead give some consideration to the structural significance of these Freudian claims for the status of psychoanalytic discourse.4

4 To the best of my knowledge, this is a line of thought that Freud never explicitly explored. The closest he comes to it is in the late, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, where he notes that the science of psychoanalysis is conducted from within the same perimeters that it depicts, i.e.; our 'psychical apparatus', he never considers the implications of this:

Every science is based on observations and experiences arrived at through the medium of our psychical apparatus. But since our science has as its subject that apparatus itself, the analogy ends here. We make our observations through the medium of the same perceptual apparatus, precisely with the help of the breaks in the sequence of 'psychical' [conscious] events: we fill in what is omitted by making plausible inferences and translating it into conscious material. In this way we construct, as it were, a sequence of conscious events complimentary to the unconscious psychical processes. The relative certainty of our psychical science is based on
Initially, what it is important for us to indicate in this regard, is the continuing role of the super-ego, and thus of the father, across the three phases of mental evolution articulated by the psychoanalytic schema. These being animism, religion, and science. Indeed, on the continuity of these we need only note the following remark:

If we are prepared to accept the account given above of the evolution of human views of the universe - an animistic phase followed by a religious phase and this in turn by a scientific one - it will not be difficult to follow the vicissitudes of the 'omnipotence of thoughts' the binding force of these inferences (Freud 1986 vol. 15 390, Freud's emphasis).

It is hardly necessary for us to argue that the primary idealization of the father is a dominant recurring theme in Freud's work:

The derivation of religious needs from the infant's helplessness and the longing for the father aroused by it seems to me incontrovertible, especially since the feeling is not simply prolonged from childhood days, but is permanently sustained by fear of the superior power of Fate. I cannot think of any need in childhood as strong as the need for a father's protection (Freud 1985 vol. 12 260).

Or again:

The child's parents, and especially his father, were perceived as the obstacle to a realization of his Oedipal wishes; so his infantile ego fortified itself for the carrying out of the repression by erecting this same obstacle within itself. It borrowed the strength to do this, so to speak, from the father, and this loan was an extraordinarily momentous act. The super-ego retains the character of the father... (Freud 1987 vol. 11 374 my emphasis).
through these different phases. At the animistic stage men ascribe omnipotence to themselves. At the religious stage they transfer it to the gods but do not seriously abandon it themselves, for they reserve the power of influencing the gods in a variety of ways according to their wishes. The scientific view of the universe no longer affords any room for human omnipotence; men have acknowledged their smallness and submitted resignedly to death and to the other necessities of nature. None the less some of the primitive belief in omnipotence still survives in men's faith in the power of the human mind, which grapples with the laws of reality (Freud 1985 vol. 13 146, my emphasis).  

The significance of this linkage is not incidental, just as the teleological structure of the above is not accidental. The process of human evolution, essentially unfolds as the gradual repression of the projection onto the external world of the unlimited wish fulfillments of infantile narcissism - i.e.; the omnipotence of thoughts - by the exigencies of instinctual frustration and prohibition, which open up the division between inner and outer, allowing the internalization and advancement of reality testing. Thus, the animist, the religious man, the philosopher, and the paranoiac, all reflect varying degrees

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6 On the significance of this view of the results of 'science' the reader is referred to the third book of The Genealogy of Morals where Nietzsche connects up this tendency towards masochistic self-belittlement with the evolution of the ascetic ideal as the will to truth: the will that underlies religion, philosophy, and science. In Freud this is continuos with the "faith in the power of the human mind, which grapples with the laws of reality."
to which psychical reality may be overvalued in respect to the external world. The scientist is he, who having systematically renounced such wish fulfillments, is able to relate to the world purely from the perspective of an indifferent, systematic, reality testing, and is also, therefore, as we noted in chapter one, insusceptible to the uncanny.

Such is the strictness of the developmental linkage between these phases as Freud understands them, that he is willing to posit an isomorphy between phylogeny and ontogeny in relation to them:

If we may regard the existence among primitive races of the omnipotence of thoughts as evidence in favor of narcissism, we are encouraged to attempt a comparison between the phases in the developments of men’s view of the universe and the stages of an individual’s libidinal development. The animistic phase would correspond to narcissism both chronologically and in its content; the religious stage would correspond to the stage of object-choice of which the characteristic is a child’s attachment to his parents, while the scientific phase would have an exact counterpart in the stage at which an individual has reached maturity, has renounced the pleasure principle, adjusted himself to reality and turned to the external world for the object of his desires (Freud 1985 148, my emphasis).

Now the origin of the projection of the ‘omnipotence of thoughts’ through infantile narcissism is nowhere argued for in any of Freud’s writing that I know. It is mentioned
and deferred, at least twice. Strangely so on the second occasion. Strangely, because he speaks of ‘avoiding’ the problem in such a way that it almost sounds as though he were making a virtue of it. The reader may judge the tone:

I propose to avoid (as I have already done elsewhere) entering into the general problem of the origin of the tendency to project mental processes into the outside (Freud 1985 vol. 13 150).

Freud footnotes his bracket to let us know that the other avoidance occurred in his paper on Schreber, where his language was also resolute in this regard:

Having thus been made aware that more general psychological problems are involved in the question of the nature of projection, let us make up our minds to postpone the investigation of it (and with it that of the general mechanism of paranoid symptom formation in general) until some other occasion... (Freud 1985 vol. 9 204-5).

This occasion never arises. The editor inserts a footnote here: “[There seems no trace of any such later discussion] (ibid.)”. What could be going on here, and why has the consideration of this problem been refused by the Freudian pleasure-ego? It is hard to say. Perhaps we are approaching ‘a dark-continent’.

The origin of ‘reality-testing’ when examined will be found to be almost equally obscure. We will however in that case be able to show what must follow from the intersection of various lines of Freud’s thought in
relation to it, and in the course of this we will also uncover the origins of projection within the projection of the Freudian infra-psychic schema.

Below, we will re-interpret these themes and their consequences in relation to Freud's assumption of the primacy of the infra-psychic, and the concept of scientificity as systematic reality testing derived from it. We will come to see that the continuity of the development of the super-ego with the idea of scientific 'reality testing', and its divided relation with the 'actual', is the symptomatic manifestation of the continuing force of an incest prohibition within psychoanalysis itself. That is, the origin of the projection of the infra-psychic itself. The 'reality-ego' which both forbids and demands 'contact with reality', is amongst other things, the repression of actuality.

To understand the significance of this, and how it is so, we must again refer to Freud's view on the nature and significance of language, particularly speech, for psychological development. For Freud, the need for the 'special apparatus' of 'reality testing' only arises with the acquisition of language, first and most importantly in the form of speech. This is because it is only when the process of speech gives rise to associations between word
and thing presentations as Pcs.-Cs. object presentations pertaining to both the sensory apparatus and to the inner thought processes of the ego that a means of distinguishing between the 'inner' and the 'outer' becomes necessary. Originally there was no infra-psychic distinction between 'inner and outer' (though according to Freudian assumptions the infra-psychic itself somehow proceeds the instantiation of this distinction). Further, the fact that word and thing presentations can continually be re-presented as conscious object-presentations, in the absence of the stimuli that conditioned their original formation, requires this as well:

Conscious processes on the periphery of the ego and everything else in the ego unconscious—such would be the simplest state of affairs that we might picture. And such may in fact be the state that prevails in animals. But in men there is an added complication through which internal processes in the ego may also acquire the quality of consciousness. This is the work of the function of speech, which brings material in the ego into firm connection with mnemic residues of visual, but more particularly of auditory, perceptions. Thenceforward the perceptual periphery of the cortical layer can be excited to a much greater extent from inside as well, internal events such as passages of ideas and thought processes can become conscious, and a special device is called for in order to distinguish between the two possibilities—a device known as reality testing. The equation 'perception = reality (external world)' no longer holds. Errors, which can now easily arise and do so regularly in dreams, are called hallucinations (Freud vol. 15 1986 393-4, my emphasis).
It should be obvious what the first word was, how it is connected to the 'inner-outer' distinction, the possibility for error, the need for reality testing, and, the super-ego. In this 'beginning' was the word: "NO".

According to Freud, in his article *Negation*, a condition for the possibility of reality-testing is the creation of the symbol for negation, which must also therefore be the origin of the 'inner-outer' distinction. Interestingly, the idea that the origin of the function of judgment - which includes the ascertainments of the existence or non-existence of qualities in Cs. object presentations, and reality testing - lies in the acquisition of the symbol of negation, occurs to Freud in the context of viewing this acquisition as a partial liberation from repression, and, from the compulsion of the pleasure principle:

...the performance of the function of judgment is not made possible until the creation of the symbol of negation has endowed thinking with a first measure of freedom from the consequences of repression and, with it, from the compulsion of the pleasure principle (Freud vol. 11 1987 441).

Negation may be the token of repression, but according to the Freudian dynamic the activity of negating - and being negated - must be a condition for the possibility for the
origin of its symbol as well. There is only one thing from which the symbol for negation could arise, and that is the activity of negating. Negation as an act ("external coercion gradually becomes internalized Freud vol. 12 190") comes from 'outside', from the 'father'. As we noted above "In this primitive family one essential feature of civilization is still lacking. The arbitrary will of its head, the father, was unrestricted (Freud 1985 Vol.12 288-9)." For the band of brothers in the totemic Oedipal situation the unrestricted will of the father is their negation: there is as yet no distinction between the 'symbol' and what it 'symbolizes', there is only a being negated. The collective negation of the father by the band of brothers combines in the totem meal, in this dynamic, in, and as, the father's 'internalization' as super-ego, and as the opening up of the distinction between 'inner' and 'outer', and the 'symbol' and what it 'symbolizes'.

'No' would then be the name of the father, and of what the sons must now not be, and, also must want to be. For what could the 'origin' of the creation of the symbol of negation be in this context but incest prohibition: taboo.

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7 We may note as well, in Freudian terms, that the ambivalence of negation and libidinal investment characteristic of oral mastery of objects is repeated in this format.
It is evident then, that the remark on negation cited on the page above is exactly symmetrical with the results of the primitive totemic oedipal situation. With the internalization of the 'No' in the totem meal, the members of the band of brothers gain a partial liberation from the compulsion of the pleasure principle, and a measure of freedom from mutual repression in sanctioned libidinal satisfactions. In both cases, it further allows the application, or misapplication, of the symbol for negation, to the 'inner' and the 'outer', opened up by this internalization, in the activities of reality-testing, and (legal) judgment. Incest prohibition as the origin of the symbol of negation is therefore a condition for the possibility of reality-testing as well as that of taboo and law generally.

This is a conclusion that Freud never explicitly draws with respect to reality-testing. The origin of the symbol for negation is never considered, nor is it ever connected to incest-prohibition, or incest-wish. Freud seems to forget that the creation of the symbol of negation itself constitutes a repression, a condition for the possibility of which, must also be the repression that it partially liberates. In this case, the repression that constitutes incest prohibition constitutes the super-ego at the same
time as it makes reality-testing possible, and the repression it partially liberates is repression at the hands of the father.\(^8\) Is this the repression of a repression? If so, a repression of what repression? It is, we may note, the origin of the empirical-conceptual distinction within the projection of the infra-psychic. The 'outer' constituting the 'empirical' while the 'inner' constitutes the 'conceptual'. The emergence of the inner-outer distinction controls the develoployment of the 'empirical-conceptual' distinction as reality testing. Let us turn then to give further attention to the manner in which Freud characterizes the emergence of the distinction between 'inner' and 'outer':

It is, we see, once more a question of external and internal. What is unreal, merely a presentation and subjective, is only internal; what is real is also there outside. In this stage of development regard for the pleasure principle has been set aside. Experience has shown the subject that it is not only important whether a thing (an object of satisfaction for him) possesses the 'good' attribute and so deserves to be taken into his ego, but also

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\(^8\) Freud discusses the topographical location of reality-testing on a number of occasions, at one time locating the function in the super-ego, and at another later date asserting the correct 'location' of this function to be in the ego. It is probably safe to say - again from within the context of the Freudian dynamic - that one of the relationships established between the ego and the super-ego, in its internalization, constitutes reality testing. But it is probably preferable to dispense with such 'entities' entirely.
whether it is there in the external world, so that he can get hold of it whenever he needs it. In order to understand this step forward we must recollect that all presentations originate from perceptions and are repetitions of them...The antithesis between subjective and objective does not exist from the first. It only comes into being from the fact that thinking possesses the capacity to bring before the mind once more something that has once been perceived, by reproducing it as a presentation without the external object having still to be there. The first and immediate aim, therefore, of reality-testing is, not to find an object in real perception which corresponds to the one presented, but to re-find such an object to convince oneself that it is still there...But it is evident that a precondition for the setting up of reality-testing is that objects shall have been lost which once brought real satisfaction...This postponement due to thought has also been discussed by me elsewhere. It is to be regarded as an experimental action, a motor palpating, with small expenditure of discharge (Freud vol. 11 1987 439-441, my emphasis).

Just as it is “a precondition for the setting up of reality testing” “that objects have been lost which once brought real satisfaction”, the creation of the symbol of negation, and the perception of the absence of the ‘object’, must be the pre-condition for the projections of incest-wish-fulfillment. Indeed, the desire to “re-find such an object to convince oneself that it is still there”, this “pre-condition for the setting up of reality-testing”, seems the paradigm for the projection of wish-fulfillment as the ‘omnipotence’ of thought. It is also, therefore, the paradigm for psychoanalysis, as the condition for the
possibility of science, which inherits the mantle of truth, from our past religious illusions, and their infra-psychic super-egoic functions.

What then is the 'wish' of psychoanalysis, as the avatar of reality-testing? To have contact with reality. But it is only the assumption of the infra-psychic that 'prevents' this. Let us observe the way the 'infra-psychic' behaves with respect to reality. Observe the repeated fort-da of Freud's feelers in their futile attempt at 'contact' with reality and their 'hasty withdrawal' upon the sampling of 'excitations', in this solipsistic, and thus masturbatory, infra-psychic intercourse:

I do not think it to far-fetched to compare the celluloid and wax paper cover with the system Pcpt.-Cs. and its protective shield, the wax slab with the unconscious behind them, and the appearance and disappearance of the writing with the flickering-up and passing-away of consciousness in the process of perception...cathectic innervations are sent out and withdrawn in rapid periodic impulses from within into the completely pervious system Pcpt.-Cs. So long as that system is cathected in this manner, it receives perceptions (which are accompanied by consciousness) and passes the excitation on to the unconscious mnemonic systems; but as soon as the cathexis is withdrawn, consciousness is extinguished and the functioning of the system comes to a standstill. It is as though the unconscious stretches out feelers, through the medium of the system Pcpt.-Cs., towards the external world and hastily withdraws them as soon as they have sampled the excitations coming from it...I further had the suspicion that this discontinuous method of functioning of the
system Poct.-cs. lies at the bottom of the origin of the concept of time (Freud: vol.11 1925 433-4, my emphasis).

In a result that could almost be described as artful psycho-analysis protects itself from actual incest and the threat of castration through the device of reality-testing, as virtual incest. Indeed, the projection of the 'infra-psychic' is the projection of virtual incest. If not with the body, at least within the psyche, reality-testing will achieve 'contact' with reality. A contact immediately qualified and denied. It 'samples excitations coming from' 'reality' and retreats, all the time touting its contact, while immediately denying that it could ever take place. Even 'incest prohibition' can be ambivalently - or should we say 'speculatively' - conquered in 'thought'.

Above we showed how the creation of the symbol for negation (incest prohibition) as a condition for the possibility of reality-testing, is also a condition for the possibility of the projection of the omnipotence of thoughts through infantile narcissism, i.e.; incest-wish-fulfillment. Really, 'reality-testing' is the quintessence of the omnipotence of thoughts, just as 'Science' occupies that role in the history of the will to truth, in the third part of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals. The projections of the 'inner' and the 'outer', 'empirical' and
'conceptual', are in 'actuality' continuous. Psychoanalysis wishes for the really real - that is the phantasy of reality testing - while denying itself this consummation. No doubt, the projection of a distance between a sensitive psyche, and the actual configurations of bodies in space, is also somewhat anesthetic and intoxicating.

That the projection of the psyche as the 'empirical' 'conceptual' distinction is itself the compromise formation of castration-anxiety follows directly from the creation and 'internalization' of the symbol for negation in incest prohibition within the Freudian dynamic. The threatened punishment is castration. What we shall demonstrate below is that 'castration anxiety' is in fact a screen overlaid on a repressed home-sickness that results from the acquisition of locomotory independence, and that locomotery independence is the actual cause of the incest prohibition. But this is an incest prohibition that does not involve the threat of castration, or the father, for that matter. Indeed the 'primal father', of the 'unrestricted will', as

9 The reader will note that we are not so much asserting that the threat, or even the act, of castration never occurs, or occurred, but that it is unconnected to the instantiation of the incest prohibition. We shall see in chapter four that the significance of 'castration' for
Freud describes him, could never even have existed.

Above, we came to see the connection between the Oedipus complex, Freud's infra-psychic assumptions, and his concept of scientificity. We are now in a position to understand how this problematic is related to his interpretation of the Oedipus complex, the idealization of the father, and the repression of the step.

If the reader will refer back to our two long footnotes from *Civilization and its Discontents*, on pages 46-7, s/he may note that at no point does Freud give any attention to the psychological significance of the gait itself, or of its ontogenetic acquisition; his primary focus is on the fact of erectness and its relation to the ascendance of the visual at the expense of the olfactory, effectuating a continuity of sexual stimuli. We do not specifically contest this, but note that the step of considering actual locomotion - the gait and its acquisition - is never taken, and it might even appear that upright gait is standing still gazing on its object(s). Perhaps, standing in the light of Truth, of Science. Only the 'psychic' gaze is under consideration. Freud sees the oedipal eyes and not the hands or feet. For 'Truth' cannot

social evolution is a much later development connected with
be 'on the move'. Yet it is always only in the distance. Does not this signify the castration of psycho-analysis? And what if it is as Nietzsche said: "Supposing truth is a woman? - What then? (Nietzsche 1966 20)", whither 'truth'?, whither 'science'? Contrary to Freud, we will find that the incest prohibition is synonymous with the ontogenetic acquisition of upright posture, and that it is the relation to the mother, not the father, which constitutes the first step on the road of civilization, but this step does not constitute an ideal interiorization. 'Idealization' does not take place. Rather, a chain of operational procedures, or configurations of the body in relation to space, 'takes place' through what we shall call auto-affactive cathactivity. Here, what we term 'auto-affactivity' and 'cathactivity' are 'external' economic notions, which act in the same way, and with the same force, as debt and credit do. Indeed, credit and debt, presence and absence, fort and da, are, or have been, the general format and motor for the development of social-organizational behavior generally, on the model of the step as the delay in the fall. The physical format for the deployment of 'reality-testing' is in fact that of upright gait. Initially what the emergence of sedentary agriculture.
we call measure is the configuration of the body in relation to the environment. It arises through the advent of this gestural technology in the separation from the mother, the disequilibrated gait of which also establishes the basis for the repetition compulsion, which is the step in the gait as a delay in the fall from upright posture. We shall also find that the fundamental defining relation between the separation of the child and the mother, and the establishment and relations of primary and secondary repressions and processes is conditioned by locomotery development. And we shall see further in chapter four that it is from upright gait that the possibilities of modes of measure derive.

The next step in our continuing demonstration of these assertions is to consider the logic of the process whereby the father assumes his privileged role as sovereign of the psyche, a privilege strongly asserted but highly ambivalent. This ambivalence manifests itself in the qualifications, which almost always accompany Freud’s assertion of the psychic supremacy of the father: the mother may have some small role to play in the constitution of the ego ideal. But first, the father:

This leads us back to the origin of the ego ideal; for behind it there lies hidden an individual's first and most important
identification, his identification with his father in his own personal pre-history. This is apparently not in the first instance the consequence or outcome of an object-cathexis; it is a direct and immediate identification and takes place earlier than any object-cathexis (Freud 1987 vol. 11 370, my emphasis).

Now this idealizing introjection can in no way be argued for, and it is not. Indeed it seems highly improbable. No ontogenetic process could perform, or indicate, such an ideal internalization, nor can we understand how such a gender specific identification could proceed prior to an understanding of sexual difference. So, at the end of the first sentence, Freud inserts a footnote: "Perhaps it would be safer to say 'with the parents'; for before a child has arrived at a definite knowledge of the difference between the sexes, the lack of a penis, it does not distinguish in value between its father and its mother...In order to simplify my presentation I shall discuss only identification with the father (ibid.)."

This assumption is of tremendous importance to Freud and is also plainly contradictory even on Freudian terms. It has a significance that is equal and continuous with the assumption of the projection of the omnipotence of thought in the structural organization of the psyche. Further, the asymmetry of the Oedipal situation with respect to sexual difference and castration rests on this as well. As
interpreted by Freud, the development of the Oedipus complex rests on two basic tendencies of the ego in its earliest relationships. The first of these relationships is that of 'identification' and the second is that of the class of 'object-cathexis'; which can only subsequently, as a result of loss, be internalized as an idealized identification. Identification is conceived of as primary, prior to any possible object-cathexis, and is concerned with the father and with modeling (in the sense of emulation). Object-cathexis are secondary, based in sexual desire, and directed at the mother, the prototypical cathexis being the breast (ibid. 371). It is indeed difficult to imagine how the idealizing identification of the father could possibly proceed the cathexis of the breast. More likely, is that for the child, the order of rank of persons is determined by the presence or the absence of a breast. Freud's explanation of these matters is mysterious and tortured to say the least. He takes back everything as he puts it forward, even before he says it:

At the very beginning, in the individual's primitive oral phase, object-cathexis and identification are no doubt indistinguishable from each other. We can only suppose that later on object-cathexis proceed from the id, which feels erotic trends as needs. The ego, which to begin with is still feeble, becomes aware of the object-cathexis, and either acquiesces in them or tries to fend them off by the process of
repression (ibid. 368, my emphasis).

Significantly, we now observe that this partial role which the mother qualifiedly occupies in ontogenetic development is nowhere reflected in the primitive phylogenetic totemic Oedipal situation. This is especially interesting, when we note that in a footnote following the end of the previously quoted sentences, and almost immediately before the passage in which Freud asserts a primary identification with the father prior to any object-cathexis, he makes direct reference to the totemic situation with respect to identification subsequent upon the loss of an object-cathexis (369-70 vol. 11). Clearly, all this expresses a fundamental incoherence and a positive resistance to consideration of the role of the mother in the development of the child.

From a performative bodily perspective, in the relations of proximity and dependence, the body of the mother is the original 'reality', the primordial terrain, which, gradually becomes evident in its loss in the deployment of independent locomotion. The mother 'stands the child up' and sends its feet stepping in the fall, every step delaying the return to horizontality. Such incest can never be entirely prohibited. Freud misidentifies the origin of the incest prohibition. The
specific pre-maturity of birth with its protracted
dependence, preparatory to the deployment of bipedal
locomotion, ensures that the will of the 'father' was
always already restricted when he was a baby. In this
context, the following quote is almost too painful to
reproduce:

The child's sexual researches, on which limits
are imposed by his physical development, lead to
no satisfactory conclusion; hence such later
complaints as 'I can't accomplish anything; I
can't succeed in anything'...His own attempt to
make a baby himself, carried out with tragic
seriousness, fails shamefully...Patients repeat
all of these unwanted situations and painful
emotions in the transference and revive them with
the greatest ingenuity...instead of the
passionately desired baby of their childhood,
they produce a plan or a promise of some grand
present--which turns out as a rule to be no less
unreal...What psychoanalysis reveals in the
transference phenomena of neurotics can also be
observed in the lives of some normal
people...such as the benefactor who is abandoned
in anger after a time by each of his protégés
(Freud 1987 vol. 11 291-292).
Chapter III

The Delay in the Fall

Oedipus. Let all come out,
However vile! However base it be,
I must unlock the secret of my birth.
The woman with more than woman’s pride, is shamed
By my low origin. I am the child of Fortune,
The giver of good, and I shall not be shamed.
She is my mother; my sisters are the Seasons,
My rising and my falling march with theirs,
Born thus, I ask to be no other man
Than that I am, and will know who I am

The problem of the value of truth came before us
- or was it we who came before the problem? Who
of us is Oedipus here? Who the Sphinx? It is a
rendezvous, it seems, of questions and question
marks (Nietzsche 1966 9).

"It is an observed fact that the universal mother
is also the common grave" (Lucretius 1966 178).

We will have begun with the delay in the fall that is
'up-right' post-ure. For, such is the delay in this fall,
that we have always already found-our-selves-falling from
the 'up-right', and always already taken steps to right the
post. Thus 'up-right' post-ure is always already sent as a
re-posting of itself, as it finds it-self falling. It
'sets it-self up for a fall' in the fall; always already
'stuck-up', 'sticking it-self up', in a speculative bet,
at finding yet another foothold: - until death. The delay
in the fall 'itself' is the fall; the fall is destiny-
destining.
Strangely, this repression, and it is a repression of falling, and of the desire to fall, is not just a pushing down, but a rhythm, a fort da of the feet: a pushing down as a holding up, a holding off, and a moving on; a hold up, as a push down, as a step off-on, and on. Which is to say, that it falls on the feet to keep us 'up-right'. These dogs won't heel. There's no rest for the wicked. It falls on the feet to 'hold up' the fall, which, as always still falling, in the foot-falls of an indeterminate detour of delays, while it constitutes, our destinings, requires steps and a gait. Within this context, then, as we shall see, it will all be a question of the number of feet, their position, condition, and gait; and of foot-work (for with feet it is always a question of meter, measure, and therefore of binding, and of foot-binding, punctuation and rhythm).

T/hence, with all these steps in the fall, we must not be surprised at a certain swelling of the feet, with possibilities for both pain and pleasure - perhaps more pain, perhaps. Is this 'swellfoot' that of Oedipus? We cannot say no: or can we? Let us examine him again (I cannot not say 'again'). Perhaps it is we who have been blinded by Oedipus.

Significantly, the riddle with which the Sphinx confronted Oedipus (whose name means 'swellfoot') pertains precisely to the feet in the fall. In it, the feet in the fall divide into steps composed of three sets of feet,
almost three creatures, unified by one name. The Sphinx asked Oedipus the riddle that delayed its own fall: "What is it that has one name that is four-footed, two-footed, and three-footed? (Morford & Lenardon 1973 27, my emphasis)". Was Oedipus really right when he answered: "Man..is the answer: for as an infant he goes upon four feet; in his prime upon two; and in old age he takes a stick as a third foot (ibid.)."? Was the Sphinx's leap at this response perhaps a little hasty?

What makes the Sphinx's question a riddle is its silent announcement that 'death' is in every foot-fall. That the foot is in the step and that the fate of man is in the fall of the feet in the fall, as the measure of man and the origin of man's measures. The question incorporates techne' as death and difference into the living body of 'man', or into the 'is' of the 'it', or the 'it' of the 'is', of that with three sets of feet and one name. It is not just that the old man's dead foot falls in rhythm with live feet, that t/his foot seems to point toward the grave more than the others; it is that for fate, all the feet in the fall are interchangeable; the step remains the same. Because the stick steps it is a-foot. The prosthetic foot, then, which is no longer simply prosthetic, not only points out that the 'representation' of 'death' is always already in every step, but that this repetition is always already our relation to the step as techne'. All feet that fall are prosthetics of the step, and are only feet as such.
This is to say that the techne' of the step, as the fate of the feet in the fall, is understood as the difference of 'death' in 'life' stepping. 'Death' holds up the fall of 'life', so that 'life' may delay 'death'. Indeed, the three steps of the three sets of feet, taken together, describe a life as a single step: rising, up from the child to the man, and descending with the old man, who will soon follow his dead foot into the grave in the ground on which all feet fall.

So there is, after all, a tenth foot, outside-in the fall, a step beyond man, the foot in the grave, whose silent step commands his feet to fall and defines him. The Sphinx's riddle represents the representation of death as holding up the fall, she does not speak 'death', she merely points to it, representing the representation of death in life as life, as the riddle. She is the riddle, a riddle of honey, the flavor of which, as Lucretius says, is a mixture of both pleasant and unpleasant sensations (Lucretius 1966 151):

The Greek word for bee-bread, cerinthos, is Cretan; and so must all the related words be, such as cerion, 'honey-comb', cerinos, 'waxen', and ceraphis, 'bee-moth' - a kind of locust. Cer, in fact, whose name (also spelt Car or Q're) came generally to mean 'fate', 'doom', or 'destiny' - multiplied into ceres, 'spites, plagues, or unseen ills' - must have been the Cretan Bee-goddess, a goddess of Death in Life. Thus the Sphinx-goddess of Thebes is called by Aeschylus (Seven Against Thebes 777) 'the man-snatching Cer' (Graves 1957 280, my emphasis).
As the goddess of Death in Life the Sphinx is the frame for the riddle of the feet in the fall and thus constitutes their horizon as 'fate', 'doom', or 'destiny'. She both asks and is the riddle. Having recognized this, we will not be surprised that the Triple-goddess herself divides in relation to the three sets of feet in the fall in the riddle:

The anecdote of the Sphinx has evidently been deduced from an icon showing the winged Moon-goddess of Thebes, whose composite body represents the two parts of the Theban year—lion for the waxing part, serpent for the waning part—and whom the new king offers his devotions before marrying her priestess, the Queen. It seems also that the riddle which the Sphinx learned from the Muses has been invented to explain a picture of an infant, a warrior, and an old man, all worshipping the Triple-goddess: each pays his respects to a different person of the triad (Graves 1957 13, my emphasis).

With this information we have broken open the path to seeing the Triple-goddess of the riddle as a representative, or condensation, not of the Three Muses from whom she supposedly learned the riddle, but of the Three Fates. For each of the Three Fates again corresponds to one of the three sets of steps of the nine feet in the fall with one name:

The fates were originally birth spirits and often came to be depicted as three old women responsible for the destiny of each individual.

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Graves confirms this linkage in a different connection: "The Muses...originally a triad...are the triple goddess in her orgiastic aspect (Graves 1957 55).
Clotho (the Spinner) spins out the thread of life which carries with it the fate of each human being from the moment of birth; Lachesis (the Apportioner) measures the thread; and Atropos (the Inflexible), sometimes characterized as the smallest and most terrible, cuts it off and brings life to an end (Morford & Lenardon 1973 57).

'Life-death' is spun, measured, and cut. Fate is a measuring machine: Fate is techne', and each fate just a step. 'Death' is 'life's' measure. Yet each step also signifies a relationship to a woman, and taken together seem to say that fate is a woman, or that woman is fate. By this reckoning then, and according to the previously mentioned picture - in which an infant, a warrior, and an old man each pay their respects to a different person of the Triple-goddess - the infant on four feet would pay its respects to Clotho, the warrior on two feet would pay his to Lachesis, while the old man on three feet bows to Atropos. It is this relation of the three spinners to the three steps of the three sets, composed of nine feet, with one name, that fabricates the structure of the 'life-death' of a man, to women, Fate, and techne'. This relation inhabits the body of 'man': it makes it walk and talk and run and hop and skip and limp; all to stop the trip(,) and fall.

Keeping this in mind we turn to consider certain of Freud's observations regarding the Three Fates, in The Theme of the Three Caskets, which are germane here. Of their names Freud states:
The names of the three spinners, too, have been significantly explained by mythologists. *Lachesis*, the name of the second, seems to denote 'the accidental that is included in the regularity of destiny'- or, as we should say, 'experience'; just as *Atropos* stands for 'the ineluctable'- Death. *Clotho* would then be left to mean the innate disposition with its fateful implications (Freud 1985 vol. 14 243).

As can be seen, Freud's interpretation of the meaning of the names of the Fates fits well with our linkage of them to the three steps of the three sets of feet in the riddle of the feet in the fall. He also elaborates on their significance in terms of man's relationships to woman:

We might argue that what is represented here are the three inevitable relations that a man has with a woman- the woman who bears him, the woman who is his mate and the woman who destroys him; or that they are the three forms taken by the figure of the mother in the course of a man's life- the mother herself, the beloved one who is chosen after her pattern, and lastly the Mother Earth who receives him once more. But it is in vain that an old man yearns for the love of woman as he had it first from his mother; the third of the Fates alone, the silent Goddess of Death, will take him into her arms (Freud 1985 vol. 14 247, my emphasis).

Freud doesn't say it explicitly here, but it is obvious that what we are dealing with is incest. It will come as no surprise, therefore, that the riddle of the feet in the fall is also, equally, the riddle of incest, and of its three posts. Of course the Sphinx knew all about that:

ECHIDNE bore a dreadful brood to Typhon: namely, Cerberus, the three-headed Hound of Hell; the Hydra, a many-headed water-serpent living at Lerna; the Chimaera, a fire-breathing goat with
lion's head and serpent's body; and Orthrus, the two-headed hound of Geryon, who lay with his own mother and begot on her the Sphinx and the Nemean Lion (Graves 1957 130, my emphasis).

But from where did it rise, this 'up-right' Oedipus-incest-edifice, and to where does it fall? Let us not forget the feet of old 'swell-foot' himself; he who's very name derives from his 'foot condition'. Oedipus's feet were run through and permanently marked by a spike, or a nail, when he was an infant. This links him obviously to the old man in the third step of the riddle, and they link him too, to the 'old man' his father in a double sense. For not only was Laius responsible for this wound in his attempt to avert the fate of death and (as) incest, but interestingly, on the road to Thebes, he also gives Oedipus the answer to the riddle.

When Laius and Oedipus meet at the junction of three roads, Oedipus a-foot, and Laius on wheels, the parricide is instigated by the wheel, that is techne', injuring the Oedipal foot yet again (Graves 1957 10). As well, in this same encounter, the father, who is now an old man, strikes Oedipus right between the eyes with the stick-foot of techne', now in the form of a goad (Morford & Lenardon 1973 270). Unknowingly the old man had already given his son

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2 Our connection of the various 'sticks' to the Fates, death, and techne', is strengthened when we consider that not only does Lachesis measure the thread of life with a rod, but that also the Fates are credited with inventing the five vowels of the first alphabet and the consonants B and T (Graves 1957 182). Even more intriguing is the suggestion that,
the feet, now just as he meets the fate he had taken so many steps to avoid he gives Oedipus all the clues he needs, to answer the riddle of the Sphinx. "Oedipus, approaching Thebes fresh from the murder of Laius, guessed the answer (Graves 1957 10)". So it seems that Oedipus could not have answered the riddle except that he was indeed always already a 'swell-foot'. The father merely marked what was already there, completing his complicity with it. The Oedipal feet are always already swollen, pregnant even, with incest and the techne' of the step, on which both father and son march at the command of 'death'. In a sense they are interchangeable, they are the same. Oedipus could be the father, or the father Oedipus.

This spike through the feet, then, indicates techne' and 'death' at the site of the physiological inscription of this fate, and its eventual repression, in the infant Oedipus body. The restriction of independent locomotion, first imposed, and then implied, by the pin and the wound, signify the utterly dependent plight of a child before it has developed enough to learn to crawl, but also the fate

There is evidence...that before the introduction of the modified Phoenician alphabet into Greece an alphabet had existed there as as religious secret held by the priestesses of the Moon - Io, or the Three Fates; that it was closely linked to the calendar, and that its letters were represented not by written characters, but by twigs cut from different trees typical of the year's subsequent months (Graves 1957 183).
of the feet in the delay in the fall. The spike in the
infant Oedipus's feet, like the old man's cane in the
Sphinx's riddle, foretells incest as its own repression.
The spike and the feet are three in one: 'death',
'pleasure' and 'difference', they are interchangeable, they
are the same. This tenth foot is the ten feet of the
machinery always already in the body of the child, with all
its posts and steps, so that the outside is the inside and
inside outside. (Though it is not so much the difference
between inside and outside, but that difference is the
relations of outsides to outsides - and here all sides fail
us). The articulation of this machine in time is time.
Fate is even in the arches of t/his foot to cushion its
steps. Just so, the machine and all techne' are extensions
of our organs, just as our organs themselves are always
already already this tenth 'swell-foot', and the child an
old man. Behind the relation of man to the representation
of 'death', 'pleasure' and 'difference', lies the real
relation to techne' understood as incest as fate. But this
causes the concepts of both body and techne', animal and
machine, etc., to lose their sense, and to be conceived now
as negative metaphysical markers.

This foot as the site of the physiological fate
signified in the inscription by the nail, is, however, also
the site of ontogenetic repression and incest. Simply put
the relation between incest, upright posture, and the step
is this: the mother 'stands the child up' and sends its feet stepping into the fall. She sets the child up for a fall, in the fall. Thus she is both 'death' and 'pleasure'; with 'difference' being distance and the steps an indeterminate series of substitutes for an incestuous equilibrium on all fours, or before all fours, as the horizon of a final return.

There is thus falling anxiety and the repressed longing to fall constituting the disequilibrious gait. This is the cusp of primary repression, for you can't master mother. Mother gives measure for measure as the matrix of modeling. The period during and prior to which the child is constantly engaged in affectively involved correction of the inherent disequilibrium of upright gate corresponds to the 'time' of primary repression. From the onset of auto-corrective modification of the gate on, the process of auto-affactive division can be considered to be cathacted in secondary formations. But, better than repression, we should speak of primary and secondary modeling. Put somewhat differently, in other Freudian

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3 On this point with respect to the emergence of the reality principle in the separation of from the mother in the acquisition of locomotery independence, we find a nearly perfect psychic equivalent in Freud:

Since the later care of children is modeled on the care of infants, the dominance of the pleasure principle can really come to an end only when a child has achieved complete psychical detachment from its parents (Freud vol. 11 32).
terms, we might say that the post of pleasure is Clotho, the post of reality is Atropos, and the difference that sends between them in 'up-right' experience is Lachesis'.

Three Mothers, three sets of feet, three Fates, three Deaths, incest and techne'. Perhaps, Oedipus blinded himself because he then knew that even actual incest could never assuage his longing - it is just another step. Or, perhaps he 'realized', as the one that answered the riddle of the Sphinx, that he could never stop having 'incest', that 'fate', is an incest-machine, that incest is destiny; that 'life-death-incest', are merely posts; three feet perhaps, in the step of fate as techne'.

Here, we clearly breach the question of the prothetely of all doing, of the wheel, and indeed of all 'Truth'.

For our purposes we need only substitute the word physical for the word 'psychical' in the above. We may also note, as has already been effectively demonstrated in chapter two, that even on Freudian terms, such a complete 'psychical' separation from the parents, particularly the father, could never actually occur.

4 Here, we must note that what is said to apply to 'man', must also apply to 'woman'. The Oedipal situation is, in this case, not the asymmetrical one of Freud, but a machine that ignores gender.

5 Prothetely: ...[prob. fr. Gk protithenai to put before (fr. pro- + tithenai to put) + telein to complete, perfect, fr. telos end - more at DO, WHEEL]: relatively precocious differentiation of a structure usu. associated with a later stage of development (Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 1965 686).

6 Do: ...[ME don, fr. OE don; akin to OHG tuon tp dp, L - dere to put, facere to make, do, Gk tithenai to place, set]
vt 1: to bring to pass: carry out 2: PUT - used chiefly in do to death 3a: PERFORM, EXECUTE ~ some work> b: COMMIT <crimes done deliberately> 4a: to bring about: EFFECT <sleep will ~ you good> b: RENDER, PAY ~ honor to his memory> 5: to bring to an end: FINISH - used in the past particle 6: to put forth: EXERT <did his best to win the race> 7: to bring into existence: PRODUCE ~ a biography on the general> 8: to play the part of 9: to treat unfairly; esp: CHEAT <did him out of his inheritance> 10a: to deal with or put in order by cleaning, arranging, or preparing for use ~ the dinner dishes> b: DECORATE... (Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 1965 245).

1) Wheel: ...[ME, fr. OE hweogol, hweol; akin ti ON hvel wheel, Gl kyklos circle, wheel, Skt cakra, L colere to cultivate, inhabit, Gk telos end] 1: a circular frame of hard material that may be solid, partly solid, or spoked and that is capable of turning on an axle 2: a contrivance or apparatus having as its principal part a wheel: as a: a chiefly medieval instrument of torture designed for stretching, dis jointing, or otherwise mutilating a victim b: BICYCLE c: any of many revolving disks or drums used as gambling paraphernalia 3: an imaginary turning wheel symbolizing the inconsistency of fortune 4: something resembling a wheel in shape or motion; specif: a firework that rotates while burning 5a: a curving or circular movement b: a rotation or turn usu. about an axis or center; specif: a turning movement of troops or ships in line in which the units preserve alignment and relative positions as they change direction 6a: a moving or essential part of something likened to a machine <the ~s of government> b: a directing or controlling force c: a person of importance esp. in an organization <big ~> 7: the refrain or burden of a song 8a: a circuit of theaters or places of entertainment b: a sports league...

2) Wheel: ...vi 1: to turn on or as if on an axis: REVOLVE 2: to change direction as if revolving on a pivot <the battalion would have ~ed to the flank - Walter Bernstein> ~ed about and walked briskly aft - L.C. Douglas> ~ around to the other extreme - Liam O'Flaherty>... (Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 1965 1014).
It becomes clear that technology is not an artificiality, or an unnatural distinction dividing man from the animals. Rather it becomes possible to speculate that Homo sapiens, rather than being a tool user, is in fact a specific and malleable deployment in the evolution of technology: that is, of locomotery grasping. All grasping is itself a form of locomotion.

So there is, then, another name 'for' 'man', that exceeds man, exceeds the question of truth, and the relation to death, and that, is techne': 'life-death'—writing, re/writing the fall, interminably. For it is not man that is the measure, but the step in the fall, as the delay in the fall, that is the measure of man, and of all mans measures.

All 'three' stages of 'man' have their corollary in the three fates, who in turn are all differing and united in 'life-death'; just as in the relations of Oedipus to his mother, just as in the structure of the delay in the fall, and of speculation, just as in the relations of the two principles to difference.
Chapter IV

The Grammar of the Step:

Shelter - Terrain - Territory

If the origin of the incest prohibition does not lie in the father's threat of castration, but rather in the delay in the fall, how did psychoanalysis come to be castrated? And how did the idealization of the father emerge, with his projection of 'infra-psychic reality testing', on the model of the empirical-conceptual distinction, as the 'inner-outer' distinction? How could the idea of an inner to an outer that is not outside evolve?

What Freud articulates for us, both intentionally and inadvertently, is not an accident. The phenomena we have identified in his work have a long history, a history that is complicit with, though longer than, the history of western metaphysics. It is the history of what we will call 'ideal castration'. That is, castration of and by ideals in and as the projection of infrapsychic incest as ideal. A castration we earlier observed in the quandaries of reality testing, with respect to the empirical conceptual distinction: a sort of valorization of being negated. It is from this that the 'death instinct' arises.
In fact it is the death instinct: the repetition of the same, as an ideal step. It is death-life as incest-castration, rather than life-death-incest-techne'. The 'infrapsychic' itself is the doubled repression of the delay in the fall, and the mother. That is to say, it is the repression of actual spatiotemporal configuration in and through the projection of a psychic spatiotemporal integration (or more precisely, the goal of 'psychic' spatiotemporal indifference).

We suggest that such castration is continuous with the dominance of linear phonetic alphabetic writing. The connected conditions for which emerge in the establishment of sedentary agriculture, and more particularly the subsequent, structurally related, establishment of city-states with institutions of animal and human slavery, counting, metallurgy, and money.

As sedentary life implies a shift from the use of temporary shelters to the construction of permanent ones, our considerations will also necessarily involve aspects of the history and significance of architecture, of the shelter in relation to terrain and organizational behavior: of the heim and thus also the unheimlich. Again, it is shifts in the nature of locomotery deployment in relation to spatiotemporal integration and general socio-linguistic
behavioral configuration that are decisive. A situation that can also be seen to exemplify how such shifts can be perceived as analogous with actual species modification in the context of physiological evolution.

Leroi-Gourhan locates the emergence of this shift for us as follows:

Parallel with the extraordinary acceleration of the development of material techniques following the emergence of *Homo sapiens*, the abstract thought we find reflected in Paleolithic art implies that language too had reached a similar level. Graphic or plastic figurative representation should therefore be seen as the means of expression of symbolic thinking of the myth-making type, its medium being graphic representation related to verbal language but independent from phonetic notation. Although no fossil records of late Paleolithic languages have come down to us, evidence fashioned by the hands of humans who spoke those languages clearly suggests that their symbolizing activities—inconceivable without language—were on a level with their technical activities, which in turn are unimaginable without a verbalized intellectual supporting structure.

The parallelism continued at every stage: When agricultural sedentarization gave rise to a hierarchical and specialized social system, a fresh impetus was imparted simultaneously to technics and language. If the topographical structure of the cerebral cortex of primitive anthropoids accommodated the joint development of the material and the verbal, the topographical structure of the urban super-organism reflected the same contiguousness. When the economic system became transformed into capitalism based on metallurgy and grain, the transformation engendered both science and writing. When techniques within the city walls began to prepare the ground for the world of today, when space and time became organized within a geometrical
network that captured both the earth and the heavens, then rationalizing thought began to overtake mythical thought. Symbols were linearized and gradually adapted to the flow of verbal language until graphic phonetization finally culminated in the alphabet. From the beginning of written history, as in still earlier times, there has been a complete reciprocal linkage between technics and language, and the whole of human development depends upon this fact. The expression of thought through language found an instrument with infinite possibilities in the use of alphabets, which totally subordinated the graphic to the phonetic. All previous forms remain alive, however, although to varying degrees (Leroi-Gourhan 1993 215-16, my emphasis).

This subordination of the graphic to the phonetic, as the designator of the phonic substance, which designates an entity, or an act, implicitly contains the distinction between a symbol and what it symbolizes, and thus synonymously the idea of one to one relations and the exclusion of the middle conceived as a law, (which we understand as itself constituting the ideal of castration), in slavery, systematic measurement, written account keeping, division of property, and the institution of a monetary system. All are forms of notation, that is, writing. But this is also the form of the 'empirical/conceptual' distinction, which is the origin of the projection of the 'infrapsychic', as the ideal subject of designatory notations.

In the context of Leroi-Gourhan’s remarks we can see
this supposition to be precisely this transition to the organization of cognition around phonetic-alphabetic linearity. This shift that Leroi-Gourhan describes is preceded by a pluri-dimensional mode of cognition whose affective context is contiguous with that of non-liniarist graphic expression associated with phonation but not representative of it, that is not subordinated to the subject-object, empirical-conceptual distinction. It is in the subordination of graphism to phonetic linearity that these distinctions achieve dominance.

In Freud’s articulation of the relation of word and thing presentations in cs. object presentations in reality testing, we previously saw this psychic projection as a virtual castrated incest. Now we are in position to see that this structure is in fact also the structure of signification necessitated by the appearance of ostension and representation in linear phonetic notation. And, when we say that in phonetic writing, the graphic is subordinated to the phonetic we really mean subordination.

Freud is right, indeed, it is a father that castrates and threatens castration, who provides the conditions for the "Oedipus complex": a father in the form of the despot, who establishes the state and the conditions for writing. A writing of inescapable incest.
This signifying structure is the despotic repression of constitutive relations - i.e. patterns of activity - for the sake of a one to one relation, as in accounting. The master is he whose voice commands, and all writing issues from t/his voice. Speech comes to subordinate gesture at the level of both bodies and the graphic. A conquering master class subordinates the existing graphism of a newly enslaved population to the order of their voice, commanding the sequences of their spatiotemporal configuration; and so, writing itself becomes the instrument of deathcastration. The whole art of governance marks the ascendance of the voice over the hand and the techno-graphic - the despot dictates. The disdain of techne', which is a late aristocratic vice, emerges out of the externalization of these hand machines in the form of slavery and domination, and class divisions according to occupation.

Indeed the f/act (f/action, autoaff/action) of writing is itself something indicative of a division of labor. Some form of slavery is the requisite for the overproduction of foodstuffs required for the development of specialized technical trades, who in turn technically overprovision a master class as a condition of continued mastery of a larger population base, which in turn requires
a capital system (we might call this cas(h)tration, a cas(h)tration which will also be the despots eventual downfall, with the rise of the bourgeoisie); and indeed this is the origin of class systems generally (Gourhan 1993 164-171). The master class takes the mother’s place and establishes permanent erections around the breast of the granary.\(^1\) Nietzsche tells us of these men:

They do not know what guilt, responsibility, or consideration are, these born organizers; they exemplify that terrible artists egotism that has the look of bronze and knows itself justified to all eternity in its “work,” like a mother in her child (Nietzsche 87 1989).

On these matters The Genealogy of Morals is indispensable. And it is significant for us, that Nietzsche locates the origin of the master valuation of ‘good and bad’ and the slave valuation of ‘good and evil’ at this juncture. He also emphasis’s the significance of the restriction of

\(^1\) This seizure is continuos with the displacement of the mother in the context of written myth and religion. John A. Phillips tells us that:

There thus appears to be a more than coincidental relationship between the beginning of history - the writing of epic creation myths as the foundation of civilization - and the notably antifeminine plot of such myths. The beginning of civilization seems to require the seizure of religious power by male gods, in order to break the ties of humanity to blood, soil, and nature.

As craftsman-technician and wordsmith, God the Father assumes the place of the Mother of All the Living (Phillips 1985 13).
itinerancy, something which will become more important for us as this chapter progresses:

I regard the bad conscience as the serious illness that man was bound to contract under the stress of the most fundamental change he ever experienced - that change which occurred when he found himself finally enclosed within the walls of society and peace (ibid. 84).

Though Nietzsche does not connect this development with the origin of alphabets, he does connect it directly to the origin of language as an appropriative act on the part of the masters:

The lordly right of giving names extends so far that one should allow oneself to conceive the origin of language itself as an expression of power on the part of the rulers: they say “this is this and this,” they seal every thing and event with a sound, and, as it were, take possession of it (ibid. 26).

As the requirements of even the most primitive forms of ruling already presupposes a degree of technical capacity that could not exist without language we find the idea that rulers originated it incoherent. But that something like this is the case in the establishment of alphabets at the same time as states seems likely. The rulers seal every thing and event with sounds and signs. In Anti-Oedipus, making use of the work of Jean Nougayrol, Deleuze and Guattari make a similar suggestion, which involves a slightly different mechanics:
...the leveling operations...that constitute written language indeed presuppose two inscriptions that do not speak the same language: two languages...one of masters, and the other of slaves. Jean Nougayrol describes just such a situation: "For the Sumarians, [a given sign] is water; the Sumarians read this sign a which signifies water in Sumarian. An Akkadian comes along and asks his Sumarian master: what is this sign? The Sumarian replies: that's a. The Akkadian takes this sign for a, and on this point there is no longer any relationship between the sign and water, which in Akkadian is called mu...I believe that the presence of the Akkadians determined the phoneticization of the writing system...and that the contact of two peoples is almost necessary before the spark of a new writing can spring forth." (Deleuze and Guattari, 1992 208).

Though we cannot conclusively demonstrate the actual details through which alphabets came to be established in master/slave relations, we can trace the dynamic that led to this pass. Leroi-Gourhan tells us that cyclically itinerant herdsmen developed in a kind of synonymous and complementary interaction with agriculturally based communities, a relationship that reflected an earlier complementarity of males and females in hunting and gathering settings, with males typically hunting, and females typically gathering. The division of these roles

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2 Having mentioned Deleuze and Guattari we must say that we feel that in their haste to escape from the familialism of psychoanalysis, they overlook a structural relation to the mother which is not necessarily 'familialist' in their sense, i.e. the delay in the fall. For this, see Anti-Oedipus p. 172-4.
at a cultural level, however, laid the ground for the specifically historical conflict of war:

In the societies in which it originated, settled agriculture gave rise to a separation between farmers who also bred a small number of animals, and nomads who were large-scale stock breeders...Like the primitive man/woman couple, the community is divided into two complementary technical groups, and the same causes account for the greater or lesser mobility of each of the two groups living in symbiosis and dealing, respectively, with animals and plants. The new division of the technical and economic apparatus is functionally of the same nature as earlier ones, but its elements are radically different. The symbiosis between an agricultural and a pastoral society is no longer one in which each of the two elements belongs to the same culture and is at an equivalent technical level...That is the starting point of the complex history of the symbiosis between farmers and herders. Now one, now the other, of these two economically inseparable groups has dominated in different societies and different historical situations...War. Another feature reproduced in the economic apparatus of today is the tendency of this complementarity between farmers and herders to assume violent forms (Leroi-Gourhan 1993 166-7).

We posit that over a long period of interaction with various agrarian communities on their itinerary, groups of herdsmen acquired sufficient technical products, and possibly techniques, from them, to overwhelm a developing urban setting, which had become too tempting, and establish a state. The former occupants, now slaves permanently bound to the land by their conquering masters, while having but meager share of its fruit, bear the brunt of this re-
orientation and its castrative consequences. For the master class still retains its itinerancy in war, war games, and the hunt.

So we see, that in all likelihood the enaction of animal slavery was preparatory to the enaction of human slavery and continuous with the demise of totemism, as well as the subsequent idea that human beings are ontologically distinct from all animality. There is no connection between totemism and Oedipus, for as we have seen, there was no primitive totemic oedipal situation. Slavery is the condition of the Oedipus complex, as Freud understands it, equally it is the condition of psychoanalysis, and the origin of negation.

To understand the significance of this transition properly, we must first return to an earlier point of view and establish more clearly the structure and development of human spatiotemporal integration in relation to the body of the mother.

In the previous chapter we gave a re-reading of the Oedipus myth which allowed us, amongst other things, to understand it as relating to incest prohibition in the acquisition of upright gait. Earlier, near the end of chapter two, in accordance with our understanding of locomotion as the determining factor in human evolution, we
asserted the mother as the 'primordial terrain'. Now, for us to understand certain significant aspects of the evolution of human spatiotemporal organization, we must also emphasize, that even before this, from a performative bodily perspective, she is the primordial shelter, upon which and from which both terrain and territory open. She is the hinge upon which the relationship between the sedentary and the peripatetic, shelter and terrain pivot, which claim, we have already obliquely demonstrated above in *The Delay in the Fall*, and will continue to demonstrate and elaborate below. Toward this end we again find instruction through juxtaposing and inter-relating the thoughts of Leroi-Gourhan and Freud.

Freud makes the connection between the mother, absence, substitution, and architecture, for us on several occasions (though he never connects her as the source of itinerancy, i.e. in incest prohibition):

> Writing was in its origin the voice of an absent person; and the dwelling house was a substitute for the mothers womb\(^3\), the first lodging, for which in all likelihood mankind still longs, and in which he was safe and felt at ease (Freud 1985 vol. 12 279).

> It often happens that neurotic men declare that they feel there is something uncanny about the female genital organs. This unheimlich place, however, is the entrance to the former Heim [home] of all human beings, to the place where

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\(^3\) This conjunction is not fortuitous.
each one of us lived once upon a time and in the beginning. There is a joking saying that 'Love is a home-sickness'; and whenever a man dreams of a place or a country and says to himself, while he is still dreaming: 'this place is familiar to me, I've been here before', we may interpret this place to be his mother's genitals or her body. In this case too, then, the unheimlich is what was once heimisch, familiar; the prefix 'un' ['un-'] is the token of repression (Freud 1985 vol. 14 369, my emphasis).

Though both of these citations call for simultaneous commentary from multiple angles, for the nonce we will restrict ourselves to noting the connection between the heim and the body of the mother, and turn to Leroi-Gourhan, who explains for us how the "shelter/territory" relationship conditions the structure of human spatiotemporal integration:

That which expresses itself in the human through architectural or figurative symbols applies in animals to the most elementary forms of acquisitive behavior; the physical and psychic balance of a species which, like humans, draw a distinction between the refuge and the outside world rests upon comings and goings between the shelter and the territory. It is therefore only natural that the "shelter/territory" relationship should be the main term in the formula of spatiotemporal representation and that the form of the shelter should not simply meet the practical requirements of protection and economy but also serve as the hinge between shelter and territory, between humanized space and untamed universe, the twin terms of spatiotemporal integration both static and dynamic (Leroi Gourhan 1993 335, my emphasis).

In relation to this, from our performative bodily perspective, we must here concur with Freud, in that the
most humanized space, and the primordial shelter, is 'the former home of all human beings', the womb, and, then subsequently, the exterior of the body of the mother. Concomitantly, however, the body of the mother is for the child the primordial untamed universe; the terrain from which territory may emerge. On this point, we must refine our terms with respect to Leroi-Gourhan's remark cited above, in a fashion, with which we believe he would agree.

Within the quotation, Leroi-Gourhan refers to the "shelter/territory" relation as the equivalent to the relation between shelter and the untamed universe. We, however, find the term "terrain" to be more general than "territory", in that we can traverse a terrain, which does not constitute a territory, and that all territory exists in the context of terrain. We therefore consider it best to use the phrase "shelter/terrain relation" to describe the twin terms of human spatiotemporal integration", rather than "shelter/territory relation", preferring the distinction between the shelter and the untamed

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4 It is notable, that these quotations are some of the few instances in which Freud does not immediately understand the female genitals as the lack of a penis, i.e. castration. Almost everywhere we see him referring to them as he does in our previous citation of him on page 68 above: "the difference between the sexes, the lack of a penis". Indeed, it would almost seem that Freud held, or
universe", inside and outside. It thus becomes possible for us to sensibly say, first, that the possibility of territory derives from the relation between shelter and terrain, and second, that the primordial shelter exists on, and as, terrain, which is not a territory: an unheimlich heim. For, as we noted above, in chapter three, mother can’t be mastered. She gives measure for measure as the matrix of modeling and 'stands the child up'. She is thus untamed. This shelter/terrain relationship is, in fact, the delay in the fall i.e., the techne' of spatiotemporal integration that exceeds death. The mother initiates the fort da format of the shelter/terrain relationship as the formula of spatiotemporal organization. For it is on the body of the mother that terrain, and territory, e-merge from the home, just as 'home' itself e-merges as such, in the ever more variegated spatiotemporal configurations of the infant’s body.\(^5\) First in relation to the mother, and

\(^5\) Here, there is much that could be said in commentary on Heidegger. Not just with respect to the many obvious connections with Being and Time, such as falling into temporality, being toward death, the uncanny, the concept of the region and the 'moment of vision', but perhaps even more importantly to certain, particularly violent, sections of the last part of the Introduction to Metaphysics (The Limitation of Being), where he analyzes the Greeks. Proper treatment of such topics, would, however, constitute
ultimately, with the acquisition of independent locomotion, in relation to a shelter and the reality of the 'untamed another book. Having mentioned this, however, we cannot forgo presenting the reader with three highly provocative citations:

For the poet, the assault of techne' against dike' is the happening whereby man ceases to be at home. In his exile from home, the home is first disclosed as such. But in one with it and only thus, the alien, the overpowering, is disclosed as such. Through the event of homelessness the whole of the essent is disclosed. In this disclosure unconcealment takes place. But this is nothing other than the happening of the unfamiliar (Heidegger 1961 140, my emphasis).

But woven into one with this violent excursion <Aufbruch> upon the overpowering sea is the never-resting incursion <Einbruch> into the indestructible power of the earth. Here the earth is the highest of the gods. Violently, with acts of power...man disturbs the tranquillity of growth, the nurturing and maturing of the goddess who lives without effort. Here the overpowering reigns not in self-consuming wildness but without effort and fatigue; from out of the superior power of great riches, it produces and bestows the inexhaustible treasure that surpasses all zeal. Into this power bursts the violent one; year after year he breaks it open with his plows and drives the effortless earth into his restless endeavor (ibid. 129-30, my emphasis).

Not-being-there is the supreme victory over being. Being-there is unremitting affliction resulting from defeat and renewed attempts at violence against being: at the site of its appearing, omnipotent being (literally) violates <vergewaltigt to do violence to, to rape) being-there; being indeed is this site, surrounding and controlling...being-there and so holding it in being (ibid. 149, my emphasis).
universe'. We must note, however, that, roughly speaking, from the point where the umbilical cord is cut to that in which independent locomotion is acquired, the shelter/terrain relation is emergent and therefore systematically confused. This is also symmetrical with the mother occupying the dual roles of shelter and the untamed. Thus, it is hardly surprising that we find the site of the division between the 'human' and the 'inhuman', to be not only the place where actual performative 'reality testing' emerges, but also the no-place-like-home-of-uncanny-incest as its own prohibition. Performativaly, the body of the mother is the hinge on which the fort da of the comings and goings of spatiotemporal integration pivot. Which is also to say that this fort da is the format for operational procedures generally. The fort da of falling as coming and going. It is thus that we come to have inside and outside, shelter and terrain – though they are both 'outside'.

On this point with respect to the emergence of the reality principle in the separation off from the mother in the acquisition of locomotery independence, we find a nearly perfect psychic equivalent in Freud:

Since the later care of children is modeled on the care of infants, the dominance of the pleasure principle can really come to an end only
when a child has achieved complete psychical detachment from its parents (Freud vol. 11 37). For our purposes we need only substitute the word physical for the word 'psychical' in the above, and 'mother' for 'parents'. The 'reality principle' comes into play as the performative bodily distinction between shelter and terrain opens up, in the acquisition of locomotory independence, with the first step that delays the fall from upright posture.

If the shelter/terrain relationship, the relation between inside and outside, human and inhuman, 'is the main term in the formula of spatiotemporal representation', and the form of the shelter serves as the hinge on which the comings and goings between shelter and terrain pivot, then it is necessary that shelter precede terrain. This requirement of spatiotemporal organization, as we have seen above, is achieved organically and is contiguous with the deployment of the generic program for the delay in the fall as the shelter/terrain relation.

The relation of shelter to terrain in the emergence of territory, however, is largely a matter of socio-linguistic behavioral configuration based in common primitive responsiveness, some significant aspects of which, we have already discussed. We must now try to understand the relation of this generic program to the two predominant
modes of dwelling that have characterized Homo sapiens.

Leroi-Gourhan elaborates on what he called dynamic and static modes of spatiotemporal integration at the end of the previous quotation, on page 89 above, terming them 'itinerant' and 'radial'. Though the shelter/terrain relation governs both, emphasis on the former is typical of the organizational modalities of hunting and gathering and emphasis on the later is typical of those of sedentary agriculture. For Leroi-Gourhan,

_We perceive the surrounding world in two ways, a dynamic one whereby we travel through space to take cognizance of it and a static one that enables us, while remaining immobile, to reconstitute circles around ourselves extending to the limits of the unknown. The first offers an image of the world linked to an itinerary; the second integrates the image within the two opposing surfaces of sky and earth meeting at the horizon. These two modes of perception are found separately or together in all animals...In the human the two modes are coexistent and essentially linked with vision. They give rise to a dual representation of the world in which both modes operate simultaneously but in relative proportions that are apparently reversed on settlement. The principle contents of the mythology of hunters and gatherers are images of trajectories - trajectories of celestial bodies and the travels of heroic figures...The mythologies of North American Indians provide fine examples of such "organizing" itineraries; among Mediterranean examples, the myth of Hercules suggests that the first urban civilizations probably assimilated the remains of an earlier ideology_ (ibid. 325-6, my emphasis).

\[\textsuperscript{6}\text{We suggest that this is also true of the Oedipus myth, particularly in the form given it by Sophocles, with}\]
Though Leroi-Gourhan does not explicitly note it in the above quotation, it is the mode of nutrition in relation to the mode of locomotion and the type of terrain that conditions the relative dominance of the two types of spatiotemporal integration in the human animal, which correspond to two different modes of dwelling (ibid. 150-1). Nevertheless this distinction is always a 'matter of relative proportions that are apparently reversed on settlement', with radial spatiotemporal integration achieving dominance in that instance.\(^7\) This reversal on settlement, however, with reversal of emphasis on mode of nutrition in relation to abode, locomotion and terrain, also re-orient the socio-linguistic structure of the relation to the mother and the incest prohibition, as well as the relation of language to spatiotemporal configuration generally.

Today, it is difficult for us to conceive the significance of such a reversal, which was as unnatural for

\(^7\) This is also why there is significant potential for achieving a more balanced integration and augmentation of these modes than the results of sedentary agriculture's emphasis on radial spatiotemporal integration at the expense of itinerant spatiotemporal integration have so far produced.
human beings, as it was for itinerant herd animals when they were first penned. Viewed this way, it is hard to conceive it otherwise, then as a great mutilation. To appreciate this, we must give further attention to the structure of the spatiotemporal integration of each.

As the first dwelling and source of nutrition the mother is also the first site of a predominantly radial spatiotemporal integration. She also, however, forbids the radial mode of nutrition and dwelling by enforcing an itinerant one in the establishment of independent locomotion in upright gait as the delay in the fall. A factor Freud does not note.

This is the paradox of incest as its own repression, as techne'. It is a program which commands itinerancy - that is the autoaffaction of the incest prohibition - but which also accommodates incest in rhythmic cycles of uprightness on terrain and horizontality within the erection of the temporary shelter as microcosm of the delay in the fall, and in the cyclical itinerancy of the shelter itself. Incest as its own repression is also its constant consummation. Sleep, death, sex, and incest, are not far apart, as both Freud and Nietzsche have noticed. But the techne' of the step is here cathacted not as castration, but as life-death-incest-techne' in the extension of
A independent spatiotemporal integration of terrain and territory. Indeed, in a sense incest is affirmed here as fate, as the condition and horizon of itinerancy, and we may recall the icon which pictures an infant, a warrior, and an old man, worshipping the Triple-goddess, whom we interpreted as representative of the three fates in the life-death-incest-techne' which constitutes the delay in the fall.

Continuous with the acquisition of upright posture Homo sapiens evolved the selective niche of territorial spatiotemporal integration in seasonally itinerant hunting and gathering. Physiology, the mode of human child bearing, and rearing, and seasonal change, conditioned operational programs to the rhythms of itinerancy and rest of the delay in the fall. The human animal was not 'designed' with the end of sedentary agriculture and its consequences in view.

As we can now clearly see, the delay in the fall expresses the formula for spatiotemporal integration as the shelter/terrain relation with an itinerant emphasis. We shall now turn to examine how this is reflected in the characteristic modes of graphism of itinerant groups.

8 Whom we also saw on page 76 above, to have originally been birth spirits.
In itinerant, seasonal, spatiotemporal integration, the duration of the patterned cycles of sedentariness and migration, and the use of durable portable tools - or even of rhythms associated with continuous migration in the case of human relationships to certain herd animals - exceed the life expectancy of individuals. That is, the cyclical patternings of the itinerary of group shelter/terrain relations, and the changes in behavioral configuration they entail, dominate and constitute the spatiotemporal integration and orientation of itinerant groups. Such deployments of the shelter/terrain relation exceed 'life/death' and are thus also uncanny. But they are thus also necessarily the focus of an organizing graphism, which exceeds 'life/death' as well. This myth ritual cycle, which typifies itinerant groups finds expression in a non-linear pluri-dimensional mytho-graphy, which is not just myth, but a configuration and relation of images to gestures, words, the structure of social relations, and the itinerary that constitutes the tribal territory through which it survives; i.e. it is the mnemonic index of the operational procedures which constitute its spatiotemporal integration (Leroi-Gourhan 1993 191-196).

Again this is simply the deployment of the functions of techne', in that techne' is fundamentally the
assimilation of the unheimlich-unfamiliar, to the heimish-familiar, i.e., a mechanical auto-cath/active operational procedure for extending spatio-temporal integration.

Sheltering, in the general sense, whether permanent or seasonal, is essentially an appropriative procedure whereby the ready to hand augments itself by overproducing for the sake of re-pose: i.e. the delay in the fall. Which is also true of operational procedures generally. It is thus coextensive with the mother as automaticity of shelter and nutrition. She is the 'ready to hand'.

To get a sense of how non-linear, non-designatory, pluri-dimensional graphism operates we offer the following comparison: Δ Α. Each graphic consists essentially of the same three strokes and differ little visually except that in the first, the legs of the angle are not joined by the bar, which lies below it. In the first, one might immediately be compelled to see a shelter, a terrain, and perhaps, the indications of a more primordial home; and with that, all at once, in a glance, all of the delay in the fall. On analogy, in the second graphic, the joining of the angle by the bar achieves a completely sealed interior shelter, without respect for the outside, which is
self-identical and associatively neutered. By taking up into itself the lower bar of the terrain the ‘A’ appears to stand on its own, repeating the A inside as a barring of the outside from the inside: an absolute reduction of terrain to shelter. For us, this is an allegory, firstly, in that, for the alphabetized, at least, the shackled ‘A’ can never be more or less than the phonetic ‘a’; and, secondly, in that, it is in the context of phonetic notation that the idea of such an ideal interiority arises.9

In regard to our allegory of the ‘A’, we cannot help but be reminded of Hegel, who says in a particularly chilling paragraph in The Phenomenology of Mind:

But now this category, or simple unity of self-consciousness and being, has difference within it; for its very nature consists just in this—in being immediately one and identical with itself in otherness or in absolute difference. Difference therefore is, but completely transparent, a difference that is at the same time none. It appears in the form of a plurality of categories...the many categories are species of the pure category, which means that the pure category is still their genus or essential nature, and not opposed to them. But they are indeed that ambiguous being which contains otherness two, as opposed to the pure category in its plurality. They, in point of fact, contradict the pure category by this plurality, and the pure category must sublate them to itself, a process by which it constitutes itself the negative unity of the different elements (Hegel 1967 276-7).

To complete our allegory of the ‘A’ with respect to this, we can imagine this sublation, as spirit gradually raising
Δ A

Inner and outer as the twin terms of spatio-temporal integration initially had nothing whatsoever to do with the psyche, or 'reference' to 'it'. Prior to the establishment of sedentary agriculture and the city-state, it was simply an itinerant relation between shelter and territory. With the establishment of the city-state and the restriction of itinerancy by the radial, this same relation between shelter and territory was gradually projected as the internal 'psychic' distinction between inner and outer...as incest...as the empirical conceptual distinction; which, continues to operate according to the over-determined format of the fort da, but according to a new emphasis on the linearity of the voice, the presence and absence of designated entities, and the representation of author-ity in writing. The Oedipus who we meet on the road, who can answer the riddle of the Sphinx, which is the riddle of locomotery incest, is a very different man than the Oedipus Rex of the permanent home, who must blind himself to the very same thing.

We postulate that there is a relation of direct proportion between the degree of restriction of itinerancy, whose performative maximum is found in imprisonment and,

the bar of the ∞, as the fate of philosophy within the confines of phonetic graphism.
or, slavery, and the projection of an idealization of the shelter/terrain relation as the empirical/conceptual distinction, that is, the 'psyche'. Continuous with this, we further posit that there is a relation of direct proportion between the degree of restriction of itinerancy and the extent of phonetic designation as opposed to graphical spatial configuration. In support of this view we offer the fact that itinerant dwelling is characterized by a radial graphism, or mytho-graphy, linked to bodily performance and speech, whereas radial dwelling is characterized by itinerant, linear graphism, subordinated to, and representative of, an abstract voice. This tendency coupled with the subsequent enslavement of an agrarian population yields phonetic alphabetic writing.

With the emergence of phonetic writing in the context of sedentary agriculture language becomes virtually peripatetic. It then seems as though meaning could exist independently of the contexts of patterned activities, in which they live and are embedded. With the Greeks this tendency towards idealization achieves acute form. Thus emerges a virtualization of the shelter/territory relation projected as the psychic inner/outer distinction, concerned with representation and designation, rather than with pluri-dimensional-graphical-gestural spatiotemporal
integration. But, in fact as we have seen in our analysis of the reality principle, this distinction is a step that goes nowhere. With the virtual, shelter and terrain become coextensive, and this is true even of the relation between writing and speech.

Simply put, the empirical/conceptual distinction is a function of phonetic notation, as is the 'ontological difference' and 'metaphysics'. The idea of entities arises from written transcription of phonetic designation as representation as in accounting. Ostension disconnects entities from their graphic; i.e. their embeddedness in the choreography of bodies in the context of terrains. Just as the idea of negation (not this) is symmetrical with the notion of one to one relations (entity-designation), which is in fact incompatible with pluri-dimensional graphical cognition, where absence does not equate with negation. The entitization of graphical-gestural autoaffaction translates as 'psychic auto-affection' which is the projection of the virtual as incestcastration. This projection of the ideal (ostension) is the repression of actual spatiotemporal configuration and the mother, that is, of the delay in the fall. With the delay in the fall, itinerancy is life-death-incest-techne'. Equally the virtualization of this relation as death-life-incest-
castration (rather than techne') - i.e. as the empirical/conceptual distinction - is the repression of the delay in the fall. That is, of actual spatiotemporal configuration. But we must keep in mind that there is a kind of techne' of the virtual, which is always already, therefore, only a virtual virtuality. The super-ego from Plato to Kant and beyond is slave morality. Our final chapter will briefly trace the vicissitudes of this distinction in the history of western Ø, before turning to consider the future terrain. A terrain, which can never be a territory, but which, perhaps, can extend the lure of the unfamiliar.
Chapter V
What Was Called Thinking:
The Freeing of Pluri-dimensional Cognition

Profound aversion to reposing once and for all in any one total view of the world. Fascination of the opposing point of view: refusal to be deprived of the stimulus of the enigmatic (Nietzsche 1968 262).

As we have seen, in cyclically itinerant hunter and gatherer societies, each movement of the temporary shelter is a foothold in the delay in the fall, whose rhythm itself is an ongoing itinerancy that mitigates, and affirms, incest. The significance of the step thus changes with the transition from temporary dwellings to permanent homes. With the establishment of permanent shelters in sedentary agriculture, there is no longer an itinerary for the shelter/terrain relation as such. With this, the command to itinerancy has been significantly countermanded and indeed, repressed. Permanent shelters are built, oriented around the breast, or perhaps the umbilicus, of the walled granary, from which the concentric circles of organizational space band like the rings of Jupiter into untamed space. It is a return to the forbidden mode of radial nutrition and dwelling, while access to the mode of nutrition is controlled by the tokens of the despot, or the master class, who come to represent free incest to those
who are thus castrated, thereby taking the mothers place as the regulator, and abstract source, of that mode of nutrition. Infrapsychic incest is also this castration by the 'father', who forbids the radial mode of nutrition while commanding it. Sedentary agriculture 're-establishes' incest, and doubles it, while repressing it, but in it's psychic mode, in the form of castration, as the repression of an actual incest, which is, in essence the extent of the repression of actual itinerancy.

Concomitant with these vicissitudes of the mode of nutrition, in the restriction of itinerancy, architecture assumes the form of a permanent erection: the wombphallus of deathcastration, as opposed to the temporary shelter of lifedeath. The two radial poles of incest nutrition and incest death merge, with castration by the father. The permanent shelter stands, it does not move. In 'exceeding' life-death in this way, rather than being 'stood up' by the mother, the wombphallus of the permanent shelter "stands itself up". Which is not to say that that it does not require maintenance - far from it - but that this maintenance is repressed by architecture's generational transcendence. Maintenance is the delay in the fall of the

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1 This ideal is eventually transformed into the more rarefied notion of free money.
shelter. Maintenance is the repression of its own requirement. Maintenance is incest. It is oriented on the fixed and on fixing from a fixed point: a radial fixation. For, though contemporary architecture still calls the base of a building its footprint, it is so in name only. It has become a foot without a step, a castrated foot that never leaves home, for it is the home. The familial home. The house of death-life-incest-castration, and generational inheritance: an improper property, a prop.

We have seen, that the despot, or a master class, instigates two types of abstract operational procedures for spatiotemporal integration, at the same time as itinerancy is restricted, in the context of the return to the forbidden mode of radial nutrition, both of which constitute castration: the subordination of bodily gesture and pluri-dimensional graphism to the abstract linear voice of peripatetic phonetic graphism, and the subordination of the mode of nutrition to representation in abstract capital. These converge in the reduction of territory to private property, as the practice of surveying legal land divisions, in which, we will see, the improper property, a mutilated territory, circumscribed by an ideal footwork.

In the same way that the evolution of the biomechanics of upright posture was a precondition for brain
development, the biomechanical possibility of repeatedly applying a standard, with an affective link, to a terrain, in upright gait, preconditioned and made possible, the secretion of measure in the standard foot: effectively an exteriorization of the organ:

In the human the treading motion that constitutes the rhythmic framework of walking is accompanied by rhythmic movements of the arm; whereas the former governs spatio-temporal integration and is the source of animation in the social sphere, the latter has to do with the individuals integration in what is not a time-and-space creating but a form-creating system. The rhythmicity of walking led eventually to the kilometer and the hour, while manual rhythmicity led to the capture and immobilization of volumes, a purely human construct (Leroi-Gourhan 1993 310, my emphasis).

More specifically, with respect to land measurement in emergent sedentary settings, Philip Wheelwright tell us in The Presocratics that:

As early man settled down to an agricultural way of living and developed his relation with the land, with the result that serious attentions had been given to geographic boundaries and property divisions, he found himself impelled by the need to devise means of measurement. In order to measure there must be an established and relatively stable unit. For small household purposes the outer joint of the thumb offered such a unit; but for the larger needs of land measurement more workable units were found in the length of a man’s foot and the length of his stride. Such units were not strictly unvarying of course; but at first they were doubtless close enough for ordinary purposes, and in time a community might find it advantageous to standardize the foot-length and stride-length by setting up publicly an ideal foot-length and
stride length to be used as norms. Thereby from the thumb-joint, the foot, and the stride came to be the standardized lengths of the inch, the foot, and the yard. The art of measuring, then, in its simplest form requires the acceptance of a standard unit; it requires also a technique of superimposing that unit repeatedly, without breaks or overlappings, upon the surface to be measured; and it requires a system of counting (Wheelwright 1983 6, my emphasis).

We have already seen how the empirical/conceptual distinction emerges in the context of phonetic graphism, and it is now instructive for us to observe its parallel emergence in systematically standardized measurement. Empirical judgment and conceptual judgment emerge as distinct at the same time, but they are at the same time related, in the way that a method of measure is internal to its application. While this internal relation is obvious to anyone who is measuring terrain by walking— for the method of measure is joined to its application at the pelvis— with the establishment of an ideal foot and an ideal stride, the relation of measurement to the human body becomes much more obscure and the foot itself becomes pure quantity, infinitely and identically iterable, and generationally transcendent, as the law of the excluded middle. With the pelvis thus excised in the name of identity, the method of measurement comes to appear as though it were external and indifferent to its application,
as it does when we say 'this shoe box is one foot long', instead of 'the shoe box is as long as her foot'. In the first, the foot has become an abstract noun that no longer has reference to actual feet, or even an ideal physical object, whereas in the second it is part of an act of comparison. And we must here note that it was the development of the class of abstract nouns, in continuity with the entitization characteristic of phonetic graphism that constituted the lure for ancient philosophical thinking, while they at the same time served as tools for social spatio-temporal configuration. In the first instance we need only recall the varied presocratic speculations as to the element, or element ratios, that constitute the cosmos, and in the second, property deeds, money, and applied measure issuing in technique. Nietzsche tells us that,

...the most diverse philosophers keep filling in a definite fundamental scheme of possible philosophies. Under an invisible spell they always revolve once more in the same orbit...Their thinking is, in fact, far less a discovery that a recognition, a remembering, a return and homecoming to a remote, primordial, and inclusive household of the soul...The strange family resemblance of all Indian, Greek and German philosophizing is explained easily enough. Where there is an affinity of languages, it cannot fail, owing to a common philosophy of grammar - I mean, owing to the unconscious domination and guidance by similar grammatical functions - that everything is prepared at the outset for a
similar development and sequence of philosophical systems, just as the way seems barred against certain other possibilities of world-interpretation...the spell of certain grammatical functions is ultimately also the spell of physiological valuations and racial conditions (Nietzsche 1966 27-8, my emphasis).

It is our contention, that the axis of the orbit of the grammatical functions that have controlled the history of western philosophy as the projection of the infrapsychic is the empirical/conceptual distinction, made possible by the position of abstract nouns within phonetic graphism. We will turn now to demonstrate how this operates in Plato in conjunction with a repression of actual spatiotemporal configuration, and the body, before continuing on to show how this format has been repeated in, and as, the history of western Ø.

For us, the Nietzsche of the Birth of Tragedy was correct when he said that Plato was a decadent aristocrat: from his slavish contempt for the body, which was synonymous with his turning away from the Homeric myths and their proud physicality, to the manner in which he treated language. Plato does not so much make names as an extension of his actual spatiotemporal extension, as did an earlier master class, he finds names and takes them to be representative of abstract things, and enacts an abstract spatiotemporal organization on the model of measure. For
his mastery lies in the 'discovery' and remembering of an ideal home with respect to which actual spatiotemporal configuration always falls short. In Phaedo, Plato tells us that:

And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a thing as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone with another, but that, over and above this, there is absolute equality?...yes...But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material equals? and what is the impression that is produced by them? Are they equal in the same sense in which absolute equality it equal? Or do they fall short of this perfect equality in a measure? Yes he said, in a very great measure too...Then we must have known equality previously to the time when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all these attempted equals strive to attain absolute equality but fall short of it? Very true...And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas; for we are speaking not only of equality, but of beauty, goodness, justice, holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process...will not the process which we call learning be a recovery of the knowledge which is natural to us, and may not this be rightly termed recollection? Very true (Plato 1937 458-460).

Now in this, Plato takes over an age-old characteristic of Greek saga and myth, as modeling the young male on the qualities of heroes.² But, which entails

²In his Paidea, Werner Jaeger makes a similar linkage, but does not note the significance, or the nature, of the shift in modeling that occurs here as we do:
a shift much like that in our comparisons involving the 
shoebox above. The sagas and the myths present programs 
for itinerant mastery of a terrain, the making of a 
territory, which thus consist in actual operational 
procedures. The idea of the Good, or of abstract equality, 
on the other hand, is not so much a procedure as an 
abstract entity, a fact that is symmetrical with the 
disconcertion of meanings from the social practices, in 
which they live and are embedded. Having fallen short of 
such ideality, the only vestige of an operational program 
that can be invoked is adequation to the ideality through 
the technology of the virtual, that is $\emptyset$; the active 
repression of actual spatiotemporal configuration and 
viscerality, in the cultivation of the soul, and of death:

...the body is always breaking in upon us, causing 
turmoil and confusion in our enquiries, and so 
amazing us that we are prevented from seeing the 
truth. It has been proved to us by experience 
that if we would have pure knowledge of anything 
we must be quit of the body - the soul in herself 
must behold things in themselves: and then we 
shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of 
which we say that we are lovers; not while we 
live, but after death; for if while in company 
with the body, the soul cannot have pure 
knowledge, one of two things follows - either

The whole of Greek paideia is founded on two very old Greek ideas - paradeigma and mimesis, the model and its imitation. Plato meant The Republic to be a new stage in the development of paideia (Jaeger 1944 vol. 1 259).
knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not till then, the soul will be parted from the body and exist in herself alone...the true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of dying. And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at death? (ibid. 450-1).

This restriction of the body in the name of death, and 'a worthy enjoyment', also has other motivations, for t/his dangerous body can seize control, and in 'unnatural' enjoyment commit unspeakable acts of madness and incest:

Certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites I conceive to be unlawful; everyone appears to have them, but in some persons they are controlled by the laws and by reason...Which appetites do you mean? I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and human and ruling power is asleep; then the wild beast within us, gorged with meat and drink, starts up and having shaken of sleep, goes forth to satisfy his desires; and there is no conceivable folly or crime - not excepting incest or any other unnatural union, or parricide, or the eating of forbidden food - which at such a time, when he has parted company from all shame and sense, a man may not be ready to commit. Most true, he said (ibid. 829).

Ø then, would save us from actual incest through a living death of virtual castration (for ideal castration is always simply castration), that consummates in a beyond. It would appear then, that an actual incest has here been exchanged for an ideal incest, which can never actually be achieved in life, but can only be projected as death. Thus we have our infrapsychic incest as death-life-incest-castration. But castration itself is not to be talked of:
First of all, I said, there was the greatest of all lies, in high places, which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too, - I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus retaliated on him. The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted on him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and thoughtless persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim; and then the number of the hearers will be very few indeed (ibid. 641-2, my emphasis).

Castration. Plato cannot even bear to mention it. Even if it were true! And the caveat of the requirement of a strangely ideal, 'huge and unprocurable victim' - a victim whom all actual potential victims must fall short of - insures that castration will be even less discussed than the noble lie. It must be forgotten. But then, on the other hand, Plato will never have been speaking of anything else, as when he tells us of the divided line, i.e., the empirical/conceptual distinction:

Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is what I would have you term the idea of the good, and this you will deem to be the cause of science, and of truth insofar as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge...you surely cannot mean that pleasure is the good? God forbid, I replied...you have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling powers, and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible...now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of them again in the same portion, and suppose the two main
divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible... (ibid. 771).

With Plato castration becomes complicated. One is reminded of Kafka's *In the Penal Colony*, which shows how little things have really changed:

But how quiet he grows at just about the sixth hour! Enlightenment comes to the most dull witted. It begins around the eyes. From there it radiates. A moment that might tempt one to get under the harrow oneself. Nothing more happens than that the man begins to understand the inscription, he purses his mouth as if he were listening. You have seen how difficult the script is to decipher with one's eyes; but our man deciphers it with his wounds. To be sure, that is a hard task; he needs six hours to accomplish it. By the time the Harrow has pierced him right through and casts him into the pit, where he pitches down upon the blood and water and the cotton wool. Then the judgment has been fulfilled, and we, the soldier and I, bury him (Kafka 1971 150).

"'BE JUST!' is what is written there," said the officer once more. "Maybe," said the explorer, "I am prepared to believe you" (ibid. 161).

Plato didn't even know he had been sentenced.

We have gone into some detail to express the relation between death-lifeincest-castration and the projection of the infrapsychic as the empirical/conceptual distinction in Plato, because it provides the format for the interpretation of the historical deployment of that distinction in the history of Ø, the tracing of which follows below. The reader will therefore forgive us if we restrict ourselves, for the most part, to locating the empirical/conceptual distinction in representative
philosophers, while indicating how it is related to the repression of actual spatiotemporal configuration, i.e. the repression of.

Unlike Socrates, who would stand utterly still for hours when thought came, even when late for dinner, Aristotle and his disciples, got around, albeit within the confines of the garden of the Lyceum. Perhaps, this is why there is the appearance of slightly more freedom in the manner in which the empirical/conceptual distinction is expressed in Aristotle, along with a slightly less hysterical attitude toward the body. Nevertheless, the distinction is clearly in force and we find it combined with the repression of actual spatiotemporal configuration in idealization:

It should be sufficiently clear by now that what we are seeking are the 'initiating principles'... and 'determining factors'...of whatever is, solely under the abstract aspect of its being...There is a modal distinction with regard to essences...and their formulation, which we should not overlook lest our inquiry become futile. Of things defined - i.e., of essences - some are like the term 'snub,' some like the word 'concave.' The difference here is that 'snub' is caught up in the world of matter - for 'snub' means a concave nose - whereas concavity itself [has a meaning that is] independent of the matter of perception. Accordingly, if all physical terms have meaning in a way analogous to 'snub' - e.g., 'nose,' 'eye,' face,' 'flesh,' and 'bone,' as well as the more general term 'animal' (for all these involve matter and it is impossible to define them without reference to motion) - it is clear what our method of investigating and defining natural objects should be...For natural science is
concerned with entities which, though separable, are still mutable, while certain parts of mathematics concern themselves with entities which are immutable but not perhaps entirely separable. **Primal Science, on the other hand, concerns itself with entities at once separable and immutable...all 'determining principles'...are necessarily eternal, but especially those belonging to the primal science, for they are the determining principles of as much as we can see of the Divine** (Aristotle 1951 81, my emphasis).

Given what we have seen so far, it comes as no surprise; the "'animal,'" "'nose,'" is not separable and immutable, it is therefore snubbed by the Primal Science, by the creation of this very distinction within itself.

At the risk of being somewhat precipitous, we turn now to consider a truly 'archetypal' expression of this tendency as manifested by Descartes in his bifurcation of res cogitans and res extensia, in his situating the 'I' as a 'thinking thing,' operating according to two modes: the perceptive operation of the understanding, and the voluntary operation of the will:

*That in us there are but two modes of thought, the perception of the understanding and the action of the will.*

For all the modes of thinking that we observed in ourselves may be related to two general modes, the one of which consists in perception, or in the operation of the understanding, and the other in volition, or the operation of the will. Thus sense-perception, imagining, and conceiving things that are purely intelligible, are just different methods of perceiving; but desiring, holding in aversion, affirming, denying, doubting, all these are the different modes of
willing (Descartes 1967 232, my emphasis).

Thus Descartes presents us with a clear distinction between the empirical and the conceptual, but it is a distinction that is 'in us', and is thereby, though he does not note this, itself a conceptual distinction. Already then, this simple distinction carries in it, 'in us', the seed of the skepticism which will condition his method of doubt. For if the distinction between empirical and conceptual is itself a conceptual one, the concept of res extensia, is just that, a concept. Mind\body dualism is in fact only an appearance that hinges on the fact that the distinction itself is a conceptual one. Materiality thus becomes suspect, and the conceptual finds only itself as itself in the doubting of its own representations:

I resolved to assume that everything that ever entered into my mind was no more true than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately afterwards I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that the 'I' who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that this truth 'I think, therefore I am'...I saw that I could conceive that I had no body, and that there was no world nor place where I might be; but yet that I could not for all that conceive that I was not...From that I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing (ibid. 1967 101, my emphasis).

Descartes thus finds that he has no need for the development of a specific spatiotemporal integration and obviously, therefore, no need for a mother either. The 'I'
stands alone. This mentalistic conception is always already presupposed in the supposition that what we have is a concept of res extentia, rather than, say, concepts that are extended. If the body, and extension, are first of all concepts, then they are perhaps only representations, and all that is certain is that the concept of conceiving is real. 'I' am a thing that thinks, and thinks about thinking about thinking; that is, thought (ibid. 152). We should note, as Descartes does not, however, that the 'concept' of a 'thing' is in no way intrinsic to the pronoun 'I', or the predicate 'think', it is rather drawn on analogy from the concept of extension; it is perhaps the ghost of res extensia, the residue of extension, inhabiting the mind. Indeed it was the opinion of David Hume, to whom we now turn, that 'thought' is always about particulars and that hence there are only thoughts 'about' x, or, y, there is no 'Thought' in general:

Descartes maintained that thought was the essence of the mind— not this thought or that thought, but thought in general. This seems to be absolutely unintelligible, since everything that exists is particular; and therefore it must be our several particular perceptions that compose the mind. I say compose the mind, not belong to it. The mind is not a substance in which the perceptions inhere. That notion is as unintelligible as the Cartesian, that thought or perception in general is the essence of the mind (Hume 1955 194).

Though Hume and Descartes obviously differ significantly on almost all points, we find again, at the
head of Hume's thought a distinction between the empirical and the conceptual; as he expresses it, the distinction between matters of fact and relations of ideas:

All the objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, "Relations of Ideas," and "Matters of Fact." Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic, and, in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain...Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe...Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner, nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness as if ever so conformable to reality (ibid. 40, my emphasis).

This distinction, so similar to the Cartesian one, has, for Hume, almost entirely different consequences, that derive from the displacement of its orientation. Though we may obviously ask of Hume a similar question as we did of Descartes, to wit: 'Is the distinction between matters of fact and relations of ideas a matter of fact or a relation of ideas?' we find in Hume that though relations of ideas appear to have a non contingent status and a certain ideality, and that in fact the distinction itself must fall under the heading of relations of ideas, relations of ideas derive from matters of fact. As he says:

...there is no such thing as abstract or general
ideas, properly speaking, but that all general ideas are in reality particular ones attached to a general term which recalls, upon occasion, other particular ones that resemble in certain circumstances the idea present to the mind (ibid. 166).

Though the form of the Cartesian distinction remains constant, the emphasis is on the external conditioning of this conceptual conditioning, which is in fact linked directly to the instinctual life of the body. After briefly discussing our amazement at the ordered, effective and apparently purposeful behavior of untutored animals, Hume remarks:

...our wonder will perhaps cease or diminish when we consider that the experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in common with beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power that acts in us unknown to ourselves, and in its chief operations is not directed by any such relations or comparison of ideas as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties (ibid. 1955 115-116).

Hence, in Hume, where the emphasis is on res extensia, as opposed to res cogitans, the concept of the subject and agency is no longer free floating, but is rather contextualized, by habit, context, disposition, the body and appetite:

We may, perhaps, find that it is with difficulty we are induced to fix such narrow limits to human understanding, but we can afterwards find no difficulty when we come to apply this doctrine to the actions of the will. For as it is evident that these have a regular conjunction with motives and circumstances and character, and as we always draw inferences from one to the other,
we must be obliged to acknowledge in words that necessity which we have already avowed in every deliberation of our lives and in every step of our conduct and behavior (ibid. 103, my emphasis).

As we can see, with this acknowledgment of the animal and the step the undecided overlapping of the empirical/conceptual distinction becomes prominent and explicitly shudders.

Having briefly examined both Hume's and Descartes' use of the empirical/conceptual distinction, and the consequences of placing the analytic weight on either side, we now turn to the thinker who attempts to take both sides of the distinction in a dialectical relation that results in the world historical process of spirit as existent being coming to know itself through time. This is of course Hegel3; a 'great delayer' is his own right, for he sublates the trembling of the empirical/conceptual distinction to the historicizing deployment of the idea. He tells us that:

For experience just consists in this, that the content - and the content is spirit - in its inherent nature is substance and so object of consciousness. But this substance, which is spirit, is the development of itself explicitly to what it is inherently and implicitly; and only as this process of reflecting itself into itself is it essentially and in truth spirit. It is inherently the movement which is the process of knowledge- the transforming of that inherent nature into explicitness, of Substance into Subject, of the object of consciousness into the

3 We will turn to Kant below in the context of a consideration of the work of Lyotard.
object of self-consciousness, i.e. into an object that is at the same time transcended— in other words, into the notion. This transforming process is a cycle that returns into itself, a cycle that presupposes its beginning, and reaches it’s beginning only at the end. So far as spirit, then, is of necessity this self-distinction, it appears as a single whole, intuitively apprehended, over against its simple self-consciousness (Hegel 1967 800-801, my emphasis).

Hegel has indeed grasped the motor of history, and we see infrapsychic incest come full circle. The empirical/conceptual distinction is maintained, but only as the vehicle of its own self-overcoming in the full self-transparency of absolute spirit as absolute freedom. But this freedom, therefore, this free incest, a ‘beyond’ of the empirical/conceptual distinction, which, however, merely expresses its essence, must be paid for. In this Hegalian conception, the individual subject as agent is effectively sacrificed in the historical process of emergent spirit's self-knowledge. The ‘I’ is sublated to the ‘we’ in the spiritual totality of absolute incest:

With this we already have before us the notion of Mind or Spirit. What consciousness has further to become aware of, is the experience of what mind is— this absolute substance, which is the unity of the different self-related and self-existent self-consciousnesses in the perfect freedom and independence of their opposition as component elements of that substance: Ego that is “we”, a plurality of Egos, and “we” that is a single Ego (ibid. 227).

At this point, we recall a contemporary philosopher whom we have already considered, and shown to have taken
decisive steps in moving beyond the empirical/conceptual distinction, and such concomitant distinctions as those between 'I' and 'we', res extensia and res cogitans; whether one consider them as sublated to each other, or not. This thinker was Ludwig Wittgenstein. Rather than dividing up the self or the world along these lines in an ontological fashion, Wittgenstein considered such distinctions to have a grammatical function, and considered grammar as an orchestration of behavior, embedded in practices based in common human responsiveness.

As we have seen, the greatest emphasis by far in the history of western philosophy has been on the 'inner,' conceptual side of this distinction, so Wittgenstein took as his main target the idea that conception and sensation are 'inner'. This 'deconstruction' of the inner-outer distinction led Wittgenstein to articulate the following malleable, grammatical, temporally extended, formulation of what we have been calling the empirical/conceptual distinction:

95. The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules.
96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.
97. The mythology may change back into a state
of flux, the riverbed of our thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the riverbed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is no sharp division of the one from the other (Wittgenstein: 1969 15e my emphasis).

Though we feel this fluid manner of construing the empirical/conceptual distinction pedagogically valuable, we still find that Wittgenstein’s retaining of the form of the distinction, especially at such a general level, constitutes an unthought commitment to phonetic graphism. For, object language, and ‘propositions’ per se’, can only emerge in such a context. We believe that Wittgenstein meant these ‘propositions’ to be understood as composed of complexly linked fields of patterned behaviors of relative duration. We would not however be inclined to designate protracted operational regularities as necessarily empirical, any more than we would apparent contingencies as conceptual, or visa versa. And, we certainly cannot conceive of the affective context of pre-alphabetic pluri-dimensional graphism as reducible to such a distinction, however fluid. The affective interstitiality of the ^ is neither so. We shall return to this.

As a final constructive example, we turn to Jean-Francois Lyotard, as a thinker who critically acknowledges a debt to Wittgenstein, and who also criticizes traditional concepts of knowledge and subjectivity, but in whom, we find, again, a strict distinction between the empirical and the conceptual. Thereby, he obliquely demonstrates for us
the profound difficulties involved in giving consideration to, and of possibly extricating ourselves from, the domination of this distinction and its classical architecture.

Jean-Francois Lyotard's central concept is that of the Differend, a concept which itself is inhabited by difference and spacing. For him a differend may exist in the competition of varied genera's of phrases that are happening, to link up with an emergent phrase. Phrases emerge into the intersections of varied phrase universes. Phrase genre interactions, intersections, and differends constitute reality and experience itself:

The possibility of reality, including the reality of the subject, is fixed in networks of names "before" reality shows itself and signifies itself in an experience (Lyotard 1988 46).

That a phrase link up is necessary, how it links up and with what is contingent. A differend is also an inarticulate feeling, which results, when in the process of phrasing, some other linkage cannot be made and expressed at the time of that linkage. But for all these different nuances of the Differend, there is one more, which seems to me to be central and conditioning for all of Lyotard's work, and it is based in a certain interpretation of Kant and the conflict of the faculties. This is the conflict between prescription and cognition, or the faculty of judgment and the faculty of understanding:

...it should be made clear that it is not up to
us to *provide reality*, but to invent allusions to what is conceivable but not presentable. And this task should not lead us to expect the slightest reconciliation between "language games." Kant, in naming them the faculties, knew that they are separated by an abyss and that only a transcendental illusion (Hegel's)\(^4\) can hope to totalize them into a real unity (Lyotard 1993:15-16).

The blindness or transcendental illusion resides in the pretension to found the good or the just upon the true, or what ought to be upon what is. By *found*, I simply mean the seeking and articulating of implications which allow a prescriptive phrase to be concluded from cognitive phrases (Lyotard 1988:108, my emphasis).

For Lyotard, the smothering of differends, the disallowance of the 'is it happening,' and the 'terror' of ideological prescription, as well as metaphysics itself, results from this distinction not being respected: that is, when cognitives are given the form of prescriptives they become totalitarian in principle. Ethics is silent, ethics listens for the event, tries to allow the is it happening to happen by respecting the obligation indicated by the feeling for the differend that has yet to be expressed.

As admirable as this is, we however feel that Lyotard is inadvertently perpetrating the same problems that he inveighs against, and by the same procedure. The difficulty with this bifurcation (again, the empirical conceptual distinction) is the difficulty with Kantian philosophy generally, and that is its need to treat the

\(^4\) We observed the consequences of this above.
faculties as cognatives (i.e., empirical) in the process of their depiction. Thus the depictive process gives rise to the object of an idea rather than the idea itself, which then takes on the role of the determining determination. That is, it becomes totalitarian in principle as the principle of principles, a principle in itself which must always fall short of the in-it-self. As Kant says:

Pure reason does not in its ideas point to particular objects which lie beyond the field of experience, but only requires completeness of the use of the understanding in the complex of experience. But this completeness can be a completeness of principles only, not of intuitions and of objects. In order, however, to represent the ideas definitely, reason conceives them after the fashion of the cognition of an object. This cognition is, as far as these rules are concerned, completely determined; but the object is only an idea invented for the purpose of bringing the cognition of the understanding as near as possible to the completeness indicated by that idea (Kant 1988 73, my emphasis).

We have seen this pattern before. In conceiving the ideas after the fashion of an object Kant presupposes the distinction derived from the procedure, while also supposing an impossible representational relation. Further this operation has the tendency to make the 'ideas' appear as though they are conditions for the possibility of something from which they are themselves independent. It is in this ostensive idealizing that the repression of actual spatiotemporal integration persists. We may note further that the conception of an object independent of the
vast array of associated operational procedures which constitute and inform its display, as 'such and such', could have had no sense prior to the era of phonetic graphism, which, made possible its (merely) apparent neutrality. The rigid division between prescriptives and cognitives in Kant and Lyotard is simply another form of the transcendental illusion. It was so for Wittgenstein, for whom, as we have seen above, an ontological distinction of this kind could not be countenanced. 'Language games' are not 'ideal' perimeters. He tells us,

If we hold that people take pleasure in imagination, we should remember that this imagination is not like a painted picture or a three-dimensional model, but a complicated structure of heterogeneous elements: words and pictures. We shall then not think of operating with written or oral signs as something to be contrasted with the operation with "mental images" of the events (Wittgenstein 1989 7).

It seems that the attempt at 'determining determination' has always already pre-supposed a sort of troubled representational relation. This is because it attempts to ascertain 'entities', when in fact it should be looking for complex intersections of operational procedures and their biomechanical basis. All 'representation' is simply an aspect of a spatiotemporal integration and assimilation, situated in an economy that it does not represent, which is differential and dynamic.
This failure of 'representation' is of the sort that became clear to us when we saw that for Kant, the faculties and their conflicts are only ever the depiction of the object of an idea. And something like this will always occur, for the discourses of knowledge on the conditions of knowledge, of necessity must be complicit with such purported conditions, at the same time that they appear to exceed them in their depiction. That is, in such endeavors, they are performed by the conditions they purport to describe. Within the confines of what was called thinking, there is no escape from this circle except by becoming the wheel as Hegel did. Which is no escape at all.

But, as we have seen, the supposed gap between the figurative and the actual, the word and the object, the symbol and what it symbolizes, the empirical and the conceptual, is bridged by the behavioral, technical, and gestural; and this has consequences for the whole of science, as well as all object based modes of analysis and understanding. Firstly, we are confronted with the 'fact' resulting from our critique of the empirical-conceptual distinction, that what we call 'object language' is not fundamentally objectal at all. Grammar is a structure of environmental availability, i.e.; trajectories of possible
action sequences impose themselves as the field of
'experience'. Simon Weil remarks,

Every thing that we see suggests some kind of
movement, however imperceptible. (A chair
suggests sitting down, stairs climbing up, etc.)
(Weil 1979 31).

Chains of 'signification', operational sequences, fall into
step in the same way. This is why it is possible to
complete someone else's sentence. The concept of the
'objectal' has merely expressed a mode of appropriation.
The 'object' is not an object so much as an index in a
process. For example, the bare 'empirical' corpse of a pig
as an object of reference by no means exhausts our
'concept' of a pig, or 'the pig itself', though it may of
course properly be called one. Neither as a little trotter
may 'pig' be present for us. The 'pig' is not sequential
referential it is fundamentally pluri-dimensional. The pig
is f/acts, a/fact/tions.

Language is not a linear, objectal-referential system,
but an index of spatiotemporal integration. A differential
network of technical-gestural-behavioral performances,
whose relationship, or lack thereof, to 'actuality', is
structurally synonymous with the relation of our various
organs, in their various relative conditions of atrophy,
regression, or advance, are to it. They are as 'actual' as
any other 'actuality'. And the organs of other organisms act/ual interpretations of the act/ual are as act/ual as ours. Both our organs and our concepts are organic modes of appropriation. The organization of behavior is as fundamental as the organ that deploys it. An organ (an organ's development) is a mode of attempting to impose an environmental condition. Formation, or modeling, is embedded in appropriative aspects of biology, which far exceed any possible intentionality. Even in advanced technical operations, requiring long term planning, we are dealing merely with a matter of degree rather than a difference in kind, and the modified deployment of what is essentially a masticatory procedure. The presence absence of the bit: in the modeling of bits by bites, and bites by bits. This reminds us of Nietzsche's remark, found in the collection of his notes entitled The Will to Power, to the effect that life just is the conflict of interpretations of itself displaced along different biological lines:

The will to power interprets (it is a question of interpretation when an organ is constructed): it defines limits, determines degrees, variations of power. Mere variations of power could not feel themselves to be such: there must be something that wants to grow and interprets the value of whatever else wants to grow. Equal in that- In fact interpretation is itself a means of becoming master of something. (The organic process constantly presupposes interpretations) (Nietzsche 1968 342).
A map of selection according to a morphology of organs, rather than one of biological individuals and species, might well be revealing of what some of the most powerful actual organic 'interpretations' of scale are. But be that as it may, all this amounts to saying that we are no longer dealing with interpretation, but with ranges of actualizable possibilities.

And we can take this one step further. Leroi-Gourhan tells us, when referring to the reptilian achievement of quadruped locomotion that, "Once again, the advance was a step toward increased mobility, the expansion of the operational field, and the occupation of greater space...the general tendency of all living species to expand their sphere of activity... (Leroi-Gourhan 1993 47, my emphasis)", which is the will to power as the performative expansion and enhancement of spatiotemporal integration. The will to power is a/f/f/action:

Perspectivism is only a complex form of specificity. My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all of space and to extend its force (-its will to power:) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement ("union") with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: thus they conspire together for power. And the process goes on- (Nietzsche 1968 340, my emphasis).

Life is a differential imposition of life on life affected as an imposition. Constituted as differentiability, the will to power must dance as the fort da of techne'. Which we
now posit as the format of operational procedures
generally, manifested in the human animal, as the \_\_.
The differentiability of the will to power commands itinerancy:

Displeasure, as an obstacle to its will to power, is therefore a normal fact, the normal ingredient in every organic event; man does not avoid it, he is rather in continual need of it; every victory, every feeling of pleasure, every event presuppose a resistance overcome (Nietzsche 1968 373, my emphasis).

There are even cases in which a kind of pleasure is conditioned by a certain rhythmic sequence of little unpleasurable stimuli: in this way a very rapid increase of the feeling of power, the feeling of pleasure is achieved. This is the case, e.g., in tickling, also the sexual tickling in the act of coitus: here we see displeasure at work as an ingredient of pleasure. It seems, a little hindrance that is overcome and immediately followed by another little hindrance that is again overcome - this game of resistance and victory arouses most strongly that general felling of superabundant, excessive power that constitutes the essence of pleasure (ibid. 371, my emphasis).

Pain-techné'-power-pleasure: The delay in the fall is the repetition of the step for the sake of the repetition of difference. Such repetition of difference is the affirmation of the delay in the fall as actual spatiotemporal configuration: The eternal recurrence.

Death-life-incest-castration: The empirical/conceptual distinction as the repetition of difference as the repetition of the same, as mental nihilism, is its repression.
The status of the projection and withdrawal of values onto the world is coextensive with that of the projection of the psyche as the empirical/conceptual distinction, which is death/life/incest/castration. This appears to those dominated by the empirical conceptual distinction — sometimes known as the fact/value distinction — as the problem of nihilism: an urban itinerancy without itinerary.

Though the distinction between I and we is a grammatical one, just as that between the empirical and the conceptual, to some large extent, the question of ethics has been composed of the question as to what extent 'I' can legitimately say 'we'. We have shown in a sense to what extent this can be so, and I have been using 'we' all along in the writing of this thesis, as this thesis has been in some large sense an answer to that question. The will to power however, as the tendency of organic matter to extend the field of its spatiotemporal integration as techne', and the delay in the fall as the techne' of the step, as the mode of this operation in Homo sapiens, with all its vicissitudes, has at the same time destroyed this question.

In the face of this, 'we' are not authorized by the disclosure of our domestication by the empirical/conceptual distinction to revert to mythographic thinking today. Indeed, the nostalgia that wishes to do so is merely
symptomatic of the nihilism of those who having found their values de-legitimized, being habituated to such, and unable to create their own, seek a 'new' and more intriguing home, another pre-pre-digested virtual reality. But, in fact, there is much other competition in contemporary media to provide passive vicarious experience that simultaneously engages all our perceptive organs in a pluri-dimensional fashion; which loss of active engagement comes to make autoaffaction more and more resemble the 'auto-affection' of the phonographic myth. It took some time to breed an animal that could sit like this and enjoy it. And, given the fact that the cortex evolved in conjunction with the delay in the fall as engaged autoaffaction, there exists the real potential for a physical regression continuos with a loss of deployable operational procedures. Castration would then be complete (Leroi-Gourhan 1993 404).

The possibility of a future other than this for Homo sapiens will depend in some large part, therefore, on the future of aesthetics and the manner in which this interacts with the continuing extrusion of a global technoskeleton. This is fundamentally a question of the structure of spatiotemporal integration. And, rather than a regression to an uncritical mytho-graphy, or a reduction to the 'auto-affection' of stuptified consumption, I believe that,
through a continuity of the liberation of the body from ideal-castration, with the liberation of pluri-
dimensionally from the linearity of the voice, we have the opportunity to learn to construct and communicate exceptionally precise and complex relationships - visceral, graphical and otherwise - that may be affected contiguously, and with great economy. But it takes the power of eternal recurrence to embrace the alterity that informs it to the limits of our power in the depths of the uncanny. It is thus the condition for a will of knowledges and an ethic of itinerancy. We have been sheltered far too long. Eternal recurrence as the affirmation of actual spatiotemporal configuration is a prelude to greater and more comprehensive pluri-dimensional spatiotemporal integration. This is the hammer of which Nietzsche spoke, and this is its beyond:

The trust in life is gone: life itself has become a problem. Yet one should not jump to the conclusion that this necessarily makes one gloomy. Even love of life is still possible, only one loves differently. It is the love of a woman that causes doubts in us.

The attraction of everything problematic, the delight in an $x$, however, is so great in such more spiritual, more spiritualized men that this delight flares up again and again like a bright blaze over all the distress of what is problematic, over all the danger of uncertainty, and even over the jealousy of a lover. We know a new happiness (Nietzsche 1974 37).
As for incest, we affirm it. But incest was only ever this: incest is the tool of techne’. A tool re-tooled by castration. Even more than incest, castration was ever only this: (metaphysical) castration.
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