RECONSTRUCTING THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY: DELINQUENCY PSYCHOLOGIES IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY.

by

Bruce J. Sarbit

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

This historical analysis broached an ignored subject matter, using methods different from all traditional history of psychology. Contextual history, following from assumptions, alternative to ones which have directed traditional history, was employed to study the unheralded past of early twentieth century American delinquency psychologies. The absolutism and objectivity assumptions of traditional histories were replaced with relativism and subjectivity, respectively. Non-positivistic and externalistic perspectives supplemented the traditionally used positivistic internalism, where cumulative growth of disciplinary knowledge is viewed as the only worthwhile subject of historical study.

The emphasis of the thesis was not on determining the causes of delinquency psychologies, but rather on placing them in a variety of contexts, against different backgrounds and in different settings. Three main contexts were employed: 1) the scientific structure context (subject matter, scientific method, theory of causation, measurement) highlighted the predominant features of the delinquency psychology programmes; 2) the disciplinary-internal context viewed delinquency psychology in terms of events and ideas in the fields of psychology and criminology; 3) the nondisciplinary-external context attempted to understand delinquency psychology in terms of events and ideas in social, political, moral, etc. spheres.

Each context engendered new and valuable insight into the meaning and operations of the delinquency psychology programmes.

Throughout the historical analyses, two programmes of delinquency psychology were compared and contrasted. The psychologies of H. H. Goddard and William Healy pertaining to delinquency were found to assume fundamentally diverse scientific structures, and to be understood within totally divergent internal and external contexts.

The delinquency psychologies studied herein, are not likely to be of much concern to current psychologists and criminologists, despite the fact that many present-day issues are reflected in them. The purpose of this historical thesis, however, was neither to expose the roots of modern psychology and criminology, nor to advocate the present use of past philosophy or method. It was, rather, to challenge historical processes which could all but forget aspects of the discipline that were important to their time, and to provide an alternative historiographic framework for reconstructing the history of psychology.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Sciences have been esteemed as supreme achievements in the realm of knowledge. They have fostered images of their practitioners as experts, privy to truth, able to suspend judgment, emotionally neutral or objective, and above selfish interest in their accomplishments (Merton, 1973). In recent years, however, there has been an increasingly widespread and spirited reaction against this conception of Science as Good and True. It has been found in the writings of scientists (Ravetz, 1971; Mitroff, 1974), philosophers of science (Feyerabend, 1975; Toulmin, 1972; Lakatos, 1970), historians of science (Agassi, 1963; Kuhn, 1962; Young, 1973), social scientists (Churchman, 1968; Myrdal, 1969), cultural anthropologists (Whorf, 1956; Douglas, 1975), sociologists (Mendelsohn, 1977; Merton, 1973) and psychologists (Braginsky and Braginsky, 1974; Royce, 1975; Koch, 1969). Despite dissimilarities in their contentual concerns, they are united by their conviction that scientists do not abide in behavior as above. By force of numbers and rhetoric, these critics are beginning to push back the walls with which science has insulated itself. Their direction and drive has been eloquently captured by the anthropologist, Mary Douglas (1975, p. xvii):

> The present concern is focused on subjective truth; this is the day of consciousness. A sophisticated

> doubt dogs other forms of truth when they are presented as god-given objective facts with the right to exclude from and to control the discourse. This is a generation deeply interested in the liberation of consciousness from control. It is normal radical criticism to enjoy unveiling the fetishes of past generations.

As the "liberation of consciousness" is experienced, as the view of Good and True science is challenged, one is forced to choose between the old view, with its absolutistic tenor and an alternative view, with associated denial of intellectual security.

In making a selection between the two views, the nature of the context in which they are embedded should be considered, since an a priori stand for or against a particular view of science does not do justice to the subtleties that colour a particular field or context. The context herein is the history of psychology. The discipline which it has tried to describe and advance historically, has, thus far, paid limited attention to it, treating it as a museum of facts and origin myths, unnecessary, but sometimes interesting. Still, the history of psychology could prove to be important to its discipline, particularly if the trends against views of science as Good and True continue. The discipline may increasingly doubt the trustworthiness of its assumptions, locating and examining them in the history of its endeavours, thinking

"maybe we took the wrong turn," or "maybe we founded on shaky ground."

No less, maybe more, than the histories of other disciplines and the disciplines themselves, the history of psychology has been governed by a Good and True conception of science. Its literature, despite small shifts in emphasis, is essentially uni-dimensional. History that in any way departs from the mould has recently appeared in two texts (MacLeod, 1975; Robinson, 1976), and a third author (Weimer, 1974, 1976a, 1976b) has been pioneering non-justificationist explorations into the conceptual foundations of psychology. Nevertheless, there is much that needs to be done at all levels: to challenge the rigidly embedded view of science as Good and True, to formulate alternative assumptions to guide historical enterprise, and to produce history grounded in these new assumptions.

Thus, this study constitutes a deliberate departure from the traditional approach to the history of psychology. It challenges the narrow scope of psychology's histories within this century, before creating and assuming an alternative historiographical perspective. The study then, fundamentally reconstructs the history of a specific area of psychological endeavour as an example of how alternative conceptions of science may produce new and valuable histories of psychology.

Delinquency[1] psychology is not the subject proper of the thesis. However, as the subject of the historical recon-

structions herein, its selection was made for important reasons. Traditional histories of psychology, with limited exceptions (Reisman, 1966; Shore, 1971) do not discuss delinquency psychology at all, so that one might surmise, as a subject matter, it was insignificant. This was not the case. Historical reconstruction from non-traditional perspectives demonstrates that delinquency was substantially more important to psychology in the early twentieth century than its current status within the discipline, or than histories from traditional perspectives permit us to assume. The reconstruction, therefore, confirms that traditional histories produce less than adequate representations of psychology's past, and provides the rationale for historical reconstruction from non-traditional perspectives.

No era in psychology's past has generated as much historical interest as the early twentieth century. Origin myths (Samelson, 1974-1975) or the presumed causes of much of modern psychology are frequently located, by traditional histories, in the movements and important discoveries of this time period. This thesis, however, examines the early twentieth century because it contains the subject of our historical reconstruction, and not because it supposedly holds the roots of modern psychology. No historical study need appeal to the influence of a time period itself. A time period or era is intrinsically valuable. Early twentieth century psychology, our concern herein, was too young to be bound by the constraints

of disciplinary regulations. But it was well enough along to have formulated some schemes and schools of thought to deal with contentious and pressing issues and problems, of which delinquency was one - an important one.

The earliest histories of psychology (e.g., Peters, 1953; Rand, 1912) were bent upon distinguishing psychology's content from that of philosophy. Their aim was to justify psychology as a discipline with unique and separate subject matter. Arguing that psychology had roots in, and emerged from, philosophy, these historians typically discussed philosophers such as Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, etc. showing how aspects of their writings were psychological, or how they anticipated, and thereby justified, psychological inquiry.

While also concerned with content issues, later historians such as Boring (1950), Watson (1968), Kantor (1963), Murphy (1949), Klein (1970) and others, were as, if not more, intent, upon portraying psychology's methodological connections to the physical sciences. Their accounts had to do with psychology's scientific origins, of its rise to what they portrayed as "objectivity" and "methodological sophistication." They frequently attempted to show how various persons fathered and founded branches, contentual or methodological, of psychological science (e.g., Galton as the "Father of Individual Differences"; Fechner as the "Father of Psychophysics"; Wundt as the "Father of Experimental Psychology"). These histories have dominated the discipline, providing the substantive basis for psychology's

historical understandings.

This type of history has had a variety of adjectives applied to it: "Whig" (Kelly, 1979), "justificationist" (Weimer, 1974), "inductivist" (Agassi, 1962), "didactic, expository" (Young, 1966), and "presentist" (Hull, 1979). Each adjective has slightly different emphasis. But they all describe history that assumes emotional neutrality and that tells a story of incremental fact gathering, continuously and cumulatively progressing toward justified, and usually idealized, psychology in the present.

This storybook image (Mitroff, 1974; Mahoney, 1976) of psychology's past is not a straw man; it is an image encountered in textbooks, journals, and popular accounts of psychology too frequently to be easily dismissed. Until recently, all the factors involved in the production of histories of psychology seemed to operate together toward development of an approved and strengthened storybook image. The sources of biographical materials in elegies, memoirs, sourcebooks, etc., the fairytale histories prepared for particular technical fields, the supposition that objective discoveries of the past are transscribed in our current textbooks, and the enduring belief in psychological science as a champion of Reason against metaphysical and religious conceptions of man, all merged to generate a storybook image and practice in the history of psychology. The whole process of historical analysis and writing, from the choice and interpretation of primary source documents,

through the establishment of accepted facts, has been permeated with the image such that it has been extremely difficult to escape its influence.

Quite understandably, historians of psychology and psychologists as well, have accepted the story book mythology and historiography of psychology. It is, also, little wonder that they have often held self-righteous attitudes toward their discipline, particularly in its confrontations with other forms of knowledge (especially philosophy), and in its efforts to become scientific. By focusing on the achievements of positive knowledge within the scientific framework, and by studying in great detail the lineage of the discipline, they have reinforced the Newtonian vision of the way science has proceeded. Standing on the "shoulders of giants," they have looked down the decades from one marvelous accomplishment to another.

Such history has severely limited our understanding of psychology's past. What it omitted may have been as valid and as valuable as what it included. The following dimensions of the discipline, for instance, have been unjustifiably ignored by traditional histories of psychology: interests and activities of the discipline that are not reflected in present-day psychology (Stocking, 1965); activities (e.g., parapsychology and phrenology) which took place beyond "the edge of objectivity" (Walsh, 1970); social, intellectual, political, religious, and "every-day" factors (Braginsky and Braginsky, 1974; MacLeod, 1975), and, the influence of perspective or philosophy on the

historical study of psychology (Weimer, 1974; MacLeod, 1975; Kelly, 1979; Young, 1966).

There is small but growing dissatisfaction with history of psychology which, unwittingly or intentionally, ignores such dimensions. A crisis of values and challenge to cherished assumptions is mirrored in a new breed of histories of which Robinson (1976) and MacLeod (1975) are examples. Having escaped, in some senses, the compelling features of traditional historiographies, they have refashioned the history of psychology in accordance with alternative assumptions. But, their important steps in this fresh direction invite not only recognition, but reinforcement and extension. This study, while different from MacLeod and Robinson in many respects, adds to their ranks, by offering alternative assumptions concerning the nature of history and growth of knowledge:

1. Historical truth is not possible. Lenin's view of revolutions in history paraphrased by Feyerabend (1975), is an excellent declaration of this assumption: "History ... is always richer in content, more varied, more many-sided, more lively and subtle than even the best historian and methodologist can imagine." There are two reasons for this assumption, the first quantitative, the second qualitative. On the one hand, one can always add to the work done by even the most painstaking historian, since no single descriptive system can ever be exhaustive. On the other hand, one can generate variant historical knowledge by placing a given historical datum in a

different context.

Traditional history of psychology has ignored the qualitative differences, the impact of theory on data, operating as though all its writings contribute to a truth-revealing cumulation of facts concerning psychology's past. It has supposed a final and fixed truth, and therefore, appeals to intellectual security. But it depends on too naive a view of history, nature and human nature, having, in essence, confused particular viewpoints with absolute truth.

A history constitutes nothing more, nor less, than a product of theory-laden analysis and organization of source material. As such, it denies the possibility of truth by demanding awareness of alternative theoretical stances. The history will bear the stamp of the historian's theory-laden principles. While it may be consonant, legitimate and fruitful from a single point of view it cannot ever be alleged to be true in an absolutistic sense.

2. The history is constructed by the historian, and as such is not value free discovery, but, rather, is imbued with the historian's ideology and beliefs. While the historian cannot escape the language, culture, and audience of present context (Hull, 1979), the role of value and bias, where they might shape the historical study, must be recognized (MacLeod, 1975). But, traditional history of psychology has, in the main, been written by practicing psychologists who have not perceived the influence of their interest in the welfare and enhancement

of the discipline. Kelly (1979), O'Donnell (1979), and Weimer (1974) have all shown how Boring's historiography was shaped by his role as psychologist; his history was geared to meet the needs of his discipline. Boring never admitted to the effect of this bias on his work. However, acknowledgement of bias and value in the processes of science and history (Braginsky and Braginsky, 1974; MacLeod, 1975; Mendelsohn, 1977) has been a rather recent phenomenon, associated with rise in opposition to the positivistic science which Boring not only followed, but strove to breed in psychology.

Not having recognized bias and value in the affairs of science and history, the historians of psychology have assumed that historical data need only be perceived to make satisfactory inductions to the truth. Thinking of themselves as passive receptors of information, the historians have believed that they contributed nothing to the process, but instead, that they shared with fellow historians and scientists a common nature, objectivity, as the basis for common experience and knowledge.

When, instead, value and bias are regarded as inherent in the scientific and historical endeavour, the historian is considered to be active and projective. Ideologies, whether individual or social, are articulated. The historian is viewed as culture bearing, and is also realized to see only through the distorting lens of a narrowly-delimited perspective (Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1962).

The historian's values and bias always operate in the reconstruction of psychology's history. There can be no pretense to "objectivity", appropriately decried as "one of the most absurd myths of the social sciences" (Churchman, 1968, p. 86). Despite deliberate use of primary source material and careful avoidance of historical distortion, the historical reconstruction will reflect its author's purposes and principles.

While the preceding assumptions operate at a general philosophical level, serving as foundation for historical endeavour, they do not directly translate into method. The historian who abides in the first two assumptions will accept principles of relativism (in the denial of absolute truth) and subjectivism (in the denial of value-free objectivity). History, so established, will undoubtedly differ in a decided manner from histories that have been grounded on absolutism and objectivity. However, there is no way of knowing how it will differ until assumptions related to method have been delineated and pressed into service.

The following two assumptions are, in essence, historiographic (i.e., have to do with the way of doing history), and thus, lay a procedural basis for historical study. Together, they address an issue that has been critical to discussions of methodology in the history of science, but only mentioned in passing (Weimer, 1974) within the history of psychology. Identified as the "internal - external" dichotomy, it is concerned with which factors should be included in science and in the

history of science.

The internal program seeks to reconstruct the development of science and to explain its history as products of reason and logic. It assumes a history of scientific structure and forms of knowledge independent of cultural evolution. The external program does not regard social and cultural structures as exclusive of, but rather as constitutive of, the environment of science, currently and historically. The differences lead to the following question: Should the historian separate out external, non-disciplinary factors and concentrate solely on internal history as represented, for example, by the progressing edge of objectivity (Gillespie, 1960), by paradigmatic revolutions (Kuhn, 1962), or by progressive demarcation of science from pseudoscience and contextual factors (Lakatos, 1970); or, on the other hand, should the historian study science as it relates to social, political, religious, etc. factors as is done within the sociology of science (Merton, 1973; Mendelsohn, 1977)?

An answer to this question may depend on the historian's field of interest and on what has gone before, on the availability of literature or on one's side in an ideological discordance (e.g., do social forms dominate mind, or does mind determine social forms?). In this thesis, the choice was prompted by the state of the history of psychology traditionally approached from a restrictive, internalist position. The history of psychology has concerned itself with material deemed properly scientific, and has substantially ignored, on the one hand,

ideas about science (content and method) that do not fit this conception, and on the other hand, factors that fall under the auspice of external history. Because the history of psychology has been so narrowly circumscribed in these respects, this thesis does an internal history from a non-positivist position and an externalist history of social factors, believing both to be valuable in undermining domination by the positivist, internalist approach which has governed historical studies thus far.

3. History of psychology has been construed as a chronological account of progressive, unidirectional cumulation of facts. But, it also may be viewed as an account of scientific change through any one or more of: "pigeon-holing" (Duhem, 1954), problem-solving (Laudan, 1977), conjecture and refutation (Popper, 1962), revolution (Kuhn, 1962), evolution (Toulmin, 1972), competition (Lakatos, 1970), controversy (Young, 1966), error and accident (Feyerabend, 1975), etc.

With the recent rise of relativistic thinking, philosophy of science has begun to challenge positivistic domination of science and history. A number of alternative philosophies of science, with corresponding implications for historiography (Wykstra, 1978), have vied to explain how science works, all agreeing that positivism, defining scientific change so narrowly, does not permit satisfactory treatment of issues encountered in primary source material. But, rather than accept the relativism that spurred their creation, these

alternative philosophies, ironically, have engaged in justificationist polemics that smack of the absolutism they reject in positivistic conceptions of science (see for example, Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970). Each attempts to install itself as the correct view of science and as the successor to positivism.

The lesson from relativism, simply stated, is that truth depends on one's viewpoint (Elkana, 1978; Douglas, 1975). If one viewpoint is no more true or correct than another how does the historian decide to choose, from among variant perspectives, the one in which to portray the history of science and psychology?

The problems associated with an answer have been amply demonstrated by recent discussions of such matters in psychology. There have been many claims that psychology is a paradigmatic science agreeing with Kuhn's (1962) account of scientific growth (Palermo, 1971; Weimer & Palermo, 1973; Weimer, 1974; Krantz, 1965; Segal & Lachman, 1972; Kirsch, 1977). Conversely, there have been many offerings in the literature which deny, for various reasons, the applicability of the Kuhnian concepts to psychology (Warren, 1971; Royce, 1975; Koch, 1975; Briskman, 1972; Mackenzie, 1977; Watson, 1971). Feyerabend (1975) has argued that the products of different viewpoints are incomparable and incommensurable, so that there are no rational and impartial criteria for choosing from among them, for supporting or rejecting viewpoints. All the disputants could do was to apply the philosophy, like a template,

to the past, and observe whether the resultant history was internally consonant and persuasive according to criteria such as exhaustiveness, reliability, fruitfulness and interpretability (Royce, 1975). Because historical data are products of the historian's selective processes, and since the template itself is subject to interpretation (in Kuhn's case, see Shapere, 1971; Toulmin 1972), acceptance and rejection, in the final analysis, depend on arbitrary use of such criteria. The correctness of, or logic in using Kuhn's model, as opposed to others, does not become an issue, since there are no empirical grounds by which to know whether it is more correct or more logical. That is, there are no rules, only opinion and value, for accepting and rejecting or for choosing between historiographic frameworks. What is important is whether or not the argument produced by a given framework is more persuasive than arguments produced by alternative historiographies.

Thus, we see that historical accounts accord with the philosophy of science and the historiographic principles by which the historian operates. If, for example, one assumes that psychology has progressed through a process of fact-accumulation, one adopts the tenets of positivist philosophy of science (Feigl, 1970; Stevens, 1939) enabling consideration of psychology's past in such light.

The historical reconstruction in psychology, thus, not only follows from, but also helps to construct a philosophy of knowledge growth. It demands that they proceed together in

a chicken-and-egg fashion, mutually and delicately dependent on one another: philosophy determining history determining philosophy, etc., one never losing touch with the effect of the other (Wykstra, 1978), always moving toward a more persuasive position.

4. History of psychology must not merely be concerned with psychologists, events within psychology and psychological ideas. It must, alternatively, consider the contexts (whether they be social, intellectual, institutional, religious, political, economic, moral, psychological, etc.) within which psychology (practitioners, events and ideas) evolved.

Traditional history of psychology, as presented thus far, has worn a homogeneous uniform. Inherent differences between histories have not, yet, been discussed. We do not, however, wish to leave the impression that histories of psychology have been without difference. Debates have ensued (Wertheimer, 1970; Boring, 1963), for example, over which agency of change, Zeitgeist (Boring, 1950) or Great Man (Watson, 1968; Zusne, 1975), has predominated as cause of changes in psychological knowledge. While other historians of psychology are less well known for their views, they nonetheless, have donned similar historical principals and have aligned themselves with one side or the other in the debate.

Weimer(1974) argues that the Zeitgeist-Great Man debate skims the surface, and in effect masks the essential similarity of the positions. Both positions, he believes, are

products of positivist philosophy, and internalist historiography. Both are involved as causes to account for disciplinary change described in terms of people and events. Neither acknowledges the importance of ideas except as extensions of people in given times and places, and neither is much concerned with extra-disciplinary factors which might have provided impetus to ideas, people, and events. Finally, neither considers non-rational factors in the development of knowledge.

Thus, the Great Man, as studied by history employing a view of science as Good and True is conceptualized as an exemplar of science's highest standards. He or she is depicted as objective, intelligent, logical, flexible, humble, sharing of knowledge, skilled in the experiment and able to suspend judgment until all the facts are in (Mahoney, 1976; Mitroff, 1974). In short, the Great Man, if a scientist, is portrayed as the emotionally neutral provider of truth, a paragon of unbiased wisdom and logic.

This conception of the scientist, which has enabled the Great Man approach to thrive historically, has not been supported. The saintly image of the scientist, on which a Great Man approach must be grounded, has been effectively undermined by studies from the psychology of science, which establish that scientists are often prejudicial and dogmatic, irrational in their support of discredited theories, secretive, and eager to disparage competing theories and hypotheses (Mitroff, 1974; Mahoney, 1976; Braginsky & Braginsky, 1974).

If the scientist fails to operate according to the ideals of scientific behaviour, he or she is much less reliable than can be assumed by an operative Great Man theory in history. If the historian cannot depend on scientists to be rational and logical, then there are no criteria for deciding upon the attributes and conditions of scientific greatness and, thus, for doing history of psychology using a Great Man approach.

If Boring's first edition of A History of Experimental Psychology reflected a strong individualistic (Great Man) orientation to historical analysis (Kelly, 1979), his 1950 revision of the text assumed a more critical stance toward individualism or "Great Man" history. In the revision, the great men are deemed to be neither causes nor symptoms, but rather "agents of progress" (Boring, 1950, p. 744). On the other hand, the concept of Zeitgeist or "naturalistic theory" took on central, even dominant, importance in the 1950 edition. Defined as "the habits of thought that pertain to the culture of any region and period" (Boring, 1950, p. 3), Zeitgeist was, potentially, so broad in scope as to preclude over-simplified analysis in its terms. It was to be thought of as the "current of belief" or "psychosocial matrix" within which science operates (Boring, 1963, p. 14). So conceived, it was able to embrace any and all of the social, intellectual, institutional, political and other non-disciplinary factors that might be mirrored in scientific work.

While his stated intent was to show that Great Man

and Zeitgeist theories of thought development "are not mutually exclusive but obverse and reverse of every historical process" (Boring, 1950, p. xiii), in actuality, his history emphasized the dominance of Zeitgeist in order to undermine simplistic causal accounts in Great Man terms. That is, in practice, Boring employed Zeitgeist more narrowly, as the causal counterbalance to the view-distorting Great Man or "eponym" theory of history. He engaged a strictly disciplinarian Zeitgeist, leaving the reader to assume that only factors within the province of psychology needed consideration. Consequently, in his zeal to supplant the Great Man theory, to dispel its "screen of names," Boring offered a limited history that did not do justice to his own historiographic purposes and conceptions.

Boring was well aware of the effect of non-disciplinary factors, psychological and sociological, on the development of knowledge. In his paper, "Psychological factors in the scientific process" (Boring, 1954), he discussed the effect of implicit assumptions and value judgments on scientific progress. One year later, in a discussion of the helping and hindering function of Zeitgeists, Boring (1955) considered external, non-disciplinary influences on knowledge growth. While he agreed that such influences should be discussed, his historical studies never incorporated them.

In one of his final contributions to the literature, Boring (1963) wistfully considered the historical enterprise rid of the bogey of Great Men. Without the mask of individualism, history

would, he proposed, be construed in terms of "trends" (experimentalism, positivism, measurement, motivation, the unconscious, schools and systems). Constituting a framework for categorizing the non-oponymous Great Events, the trends were also meant to comprise the entire Zeitgeist for understanding the history of American psychology. Boring's proposal for historical study thus failed to consider lessons from the psychology and sociology of science - that non-disciplinary, external factors affect progress in science and that development of psychology has not always been rational or logical. Replacing the Great Man with a strictly disciplinarian Zeitgeist failed to do justice to the complexity of factors in history; it merely replaced one distorting, overly-simplistic, view of history with another.

In summary, the Great Man theory, failing to account for evidence which negates the view of scientist as rational and logical, has no standards for the determination of greatness. The Zeitgeist theory, as employed by Boring, considers only disciplinary factors, and thus ignores arguments against simplistic internalism. Internalistic history as practiced in psychology, has, thus, been rather naive, trying as it does, to account causally for knowledge growth by reference to disciplinary factors alone.

The histories using external factors to account for the development of science, provide an important alternative to the strictly internalist histories of the Great Man and Zeitgeist varieties. Two books (MacLeod, 1975; Robinson, 1976) in the

history of psychology stand apart from all that we have labelled "traditional", representing a departure from, and alternative to, the internalist histories which have so strictly confined perception of psychology's past. R. B. MacLeod's Persistent Problems in Psychology emphasizes the value in studying the history of ideas in context. Ideas, he argues, outlast the men, times or places with which they might be associated. They have inspired efforts to be dealt with (as persistent problems of metaphysics, epistemology and logic, ethics, aestetics and politics) within five contexts or "classical doctrines" (relativism, materialism, idealism, teleology, religion). Daniel Robinson's Intellectual History of Psychology accents the roles of culture and philosophy as factors in the production of psychological knowledge. As in MacLeod, psychological ideas, rather than events and men, are the foci of his integrative initiative. More important, however, he recognizes the need for external history. Thus, MacLeod and Robinson provide significant options to traditional histories because they alert us, firstly, to the importance of ideas, and, secondly, to the function of external factors such as culture in shaping the forms that ideas take. While traditional histories of Great Men and Zeitgeists provide some insight into the development of psychological knowledge, adherence to them alone leads one to ignore other factors that may potentially give form and meaning to the historical study. MacLeod and Robinson demonstrate that ideas and cultural factors (social, intellectual, institutional,

religious, political, economic, moral, practical, etc.) as applied in the historical study, accord new and rich meaning to psychology's past. "We review the history of ideas to remind ourselves of the powerful role of belief, symbol, metaphor, and custom in those affairs that we might otherwise consider to be separate, personal, and independent" (Robinson, 1976, pp. viii-ix). This reconstruction concurred that the history of psychology alternatively approached, must entertain a complex of intertwined, external factors. Analysis employing only internalist accounts of change, in terms of psychologists, events and ideas, is insufficient.

Each new context for the psychology under study fosters a different history, reflecting that context, and adding to the complexity of relations between the psychology and factors in its development. The result, then, of contextual history, which accounts for factors beyond, as well as within, the purview of biographical and disciplinary conditions, is an intricate web of interrelated components making simplistic causal analysis much less plausible: no longer is the historian as able to presume undeniable causal links between supposed agents of change (e.g., upbringing and education of the "Great Man"; the disciplinary "Zeitgeist") and changes in the knowledge of psychology. Histories of lineage, origin myths and roots become much less credible, and the historian might choose to take a less deterministic approach, to refrain from attributing cause, and, instead, to be stimulated by the increased richness

with which psychology's history can be reconstructed. Despite a compelling, ever-present, lure to assume that cause is known, inference to it was usually avoided in this reconstruction. Instead, delinquency psychologies were reconstructed in various contexts, background and setting factors for the subject that seemed to have some, albeit loosely determined, likelihood of having influenced the delinquency psychologies, and that were judged to be well suited to historical reconstruction.

Within each of the chosen historiographic frameworks, two programmes of delinquency psychology will be compared and contrasted. This approach is rare in historical analysis and may continue to be so despite Lakatos' suggestion for the historiography of science (1970), wherein knowledge growth would be assumed to occur through competition between "methodological research programmes." This study disagrees with much of the Lakatosian model. However, it approves of the comparison-contrast procedure in the case of delinquency psychology, where the two programmes were virtual opposites and competitors on almost every substantive issue. Reflecting extremely diverse background and contextual factors, and espousing flagrantly different brands of science, the two programmes polarized psychology of delinquency, so that almost all psychologists in the area were allied with one or the other of the two programme philosophies.

The two programmes of delinquency psychology will be studied primarily through the writings of their main proponents,

H. H. Goddard and William Healy,[2] though other psychologists supportive of one or the other programme will be included from time to time. Before engaging in more thorough analysis of the historiographic frameworks, the programmes will be very briefly introduced:

> The GODDARD Programme: H. H. Goddard, student of G. Stanley Hall at Clark University in the late nineteenth century, became, in 1906, the first psychologist in America attached, in a research capacity, to an institution for retardates. In search of a method for studying the population of the institution, he tried a number of psychological measuring devices (e.g., ergograph) before becoming thoroughly enamored of Binet's Scale. Within short order he used the test on categories of persons outside the institution, and was convinced that it could accurately diagnose feeblemindedness. His use of the scale in the Law Courts produced the conclusion that large percentages of delinquents (he estimated, at different times, between 25% and 80%) were feebleminded. He further believed that feebleminded persons, who were not properly controlled, would most likely commit crimes. Agreeing with a theory of inheritance based on Mendelian genetics, Goddard was convinced that feeblemindedness was mainly hereditary. Not surprisingly, as an actively polemical member of the Eugenics Society,

he advocated institutional segregation to keep feeble-minded persons from living without stringent controls, and, furthermore, promoted the use of sterilization to keep them from transmitting genes presumed to be defective.

The general popularity of the movements with which he was associated (testing, genetics, eugenics), gave Goddard's programme widespread credibility and acceptance. Between 1912 and World War I, thousands of delinquent children were given tests of intelligence[3] in order to determine the extent of the relationship between feeblemindedness and delinquency. These years were in some ways a period of cumulative science where psychologists gathered data in support of an already agreed upon programme. The scales were modified, improved and new scales were developed. They were used, wherever possible, in institutions for the feebleminded, in jails and institutions for delinquents, in schools and mental hospitals. During this period, Goddard published several books where his widely accepted beliefs were explained in greater detail.

World War I interrupted this progress in the testing movement, as well as in other facets of Goddard's programme. But like other mental testers (e.g., Yerkes, Terman), Goddard turned the situation to his advantage, participating in the development of methods

to measure the intelligence of the Army draftee. The results of the Army testings proved to be extremely critical to Goddard's programme and to his personal status since, in time, they generated major criticisms of his belief in the hereditary basis of feeblemindedness.

One of the outcomes of the Army Intelligence Studies was a realization that questionable norms had been applied to the populations in studies prior to World War I. As a result, several researchers reviewed the old studies of delinquency using the new norms, while others studied delinquency in correlations with the Army data. The results were, generally, that delinquents were not found to have excessive numbers of persons in the ranks of the feebleminded or even below normal in intelligence. Studies of the intelligence of delinquents continued, but with less vigor than before World War I: intelligence was less trusted as a concept, and Goddard's theory of feeblemindedness as cause of delinquency drew less supporters.

Despite these results, Goddard's psychology of delinquency has never quite perished. Intelligence tests are yet applied to delinquent groups. Sterilization laws, though unused on delinquents in many years, are still in the books of many states. The

hereditary basis of delinquency is not frequently mentioned, but is, often still, an implicit assumption in the Courts and institutions.

The HEALY Programme: William Healy, a psychiatrist, was hired in 1909, as first director of Chicago's Juvenile Psychopathic Institute. Only ten years before, Illinois had established the first Juvenile Court in America. While several other states were quick to follow suit, Illinois further pioneered with recognition of the need to understand delinquents in order to deal with them effectively. Healy, believing the field was "virgin," refused to suppose the validity of hastily formulated theories. His approach to the problem was painstakingly slow. He gathered data and more data on individuals who were referred by the Court for assessment. He was the second person (after Goddard) to use the Binet Scales in America, but unlike Goddard, he continued to search for and to develop other methods for assessment. Refusing to set up classification systems for delinquents (as a category), Healy only spoke of causative factors in the individual case.

In 1915 he published the results of his researches in The Individual Delinquent. Hailed by psychologists and criminologists as the definitive text in

the psychology of delinquency, the book meant the firm establishment of Healy's programme.

The effects of Healy's programme were subtle, but profound. Due to his work, the Courts realized the value of studying the individual from a number of vantage points before prescribing treatment. His researches were instrumental in the eventual demise of uni-dimensional theories of causation such as the "moral imbecile", the "born criminal" and the "feebleminded delinquent." However, his warnings against hasty and simplistic causation never stopped psychologists, sociologists and biologists from propagating new theories of causation in later years.

Healy followed The Individual Delinquent with several other books along a similar theme, with books on further research and with interpretations of delinquency in psychoanalytic terms. Although revered as "founding father" of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, Healy is virtually unknown in psychological circles except as the developer of the Healy Form Board Test.

CHAPTER II

THE SCIENCES OF GODDARD AND HEALY

This section explores the specific operations and ideas of delinquency psychologies constructed by Goddard and Healy. In the early twentieth century, scientific procedures were relatively new in social science and entirely novel in psychological approaches to delinquency. This examination of the programmes, in their scientific aspects, should, therefore, prove revealing with respect to content and method in the psychology of delinquency specifically. But, it should be, as well, instructive as a case study in the development of scientific quests for knowledge within the more general realm of social science. We will analyze and interpret programmes in terms of their subject matters, methods, theories of causation, measurements and applications.

A) Subject Matter

Although both Healy and Goddard claimed to be studying "the delinquent," their particular emphases totally transformed the subject matter. Thus, "the delinquent" in Healy's framework had only minor resemblance to "the delinquent" in Goddard's formulations. Yet, both Healy and Goddard rejected Lombroso's then-popular conception of the "Born Criminal." While many others before then had levied attacks on Lombrosian criminology, Healy and Goddard impugned Lombroso even further, almost as if by so doing, their own, alternative constructions would

then have room to develop and flourish.

From the start, Healy boldly disputed systems which characterized crime as a disease or as due to one grand influence. He further offered hope that labels based on Lombrosian atavism or other conjecture would be dispelled, so that preconception would not confound other novel views of the delinquent person. Still, for the first several years of his research on delinquency, Healy rigorously amassed and reviewed anthropometric data of the kind on which Lombroso had based his ideas, later to conclude that the American population showed no evidence of delinquency as a correlate of degeneracy (based on anthropometric measures of physical features). Instead, Healy argued, that persons labelled "born criminals" would be better thought of as individuals with "mental defect and mental aberration" (1915a, p. 782).

Goddard, too, was dissatisfied with the theory that a person is fated from birth to behave in a criminal manner. Like Healy, he introduced mentalistic conceptions to the considerations, as intervening variables productive of delinquent behaviour. For both Healy and Goddard, then, crime and delinquency were to be explained psychologically, with reference to mentalistic constructs.

This, however, was where any similarity ended. Healy's conception of the mental was adaptable, and could be construed to mean anything of the mind that might affect behaviour. Goddard considered but one mentalistic variable, that being

"feeblemindedness". The criminal, he surmised, was not born, but was, rather, produced by his feebleminded condition. Not necessarily burdened with stigma of degeneracy, the delinquent, in Goddard's view, could be well developed physically and have every outward appearance of health and sanity. However, Goddard argued, if one probed beneath the physical features to the level of intelligence, then one would ascertain that delinquency frequently followed from feebleness of mind.

Goddard (1912-1913a) did not specifically deny the Lombrosian connection of degeneracy stigmata to crime. Still, he insisted that the "born criminal" theory was inadequate, that Lombrosian diagnosis would fail to detect those in the "normal population" with "fair face" and other physical signs of normalcy, who were, in fact, potential delinquents by virtue of their feeblemindedness. This, for Goddard, was a "fatal fallacy", fraught with undesirable implications for society. Failure to recognize persons as feebleminded meant allowing them to carry on as normals. Standards of normalacy would be lowered by having to include many persons who would, in time, behave in a troublesome and criminal manner.

Both Healy and Goddard rejected the well-regarded (Stedman, 1904), long-standing, theories of "moral insanity" and "moral imbecility" in similar fashion to their dismissal of the "born criminal." Healy (1913-1914, p. 115) found that there was no evidence to support the continued use of such concepts, despite his pre-research hypothesis that classic

examples of morally bankrupt individuals would be found. Goddard concurred with Healy that the moral imbecile, a unique condition fitting no other form of unsoundness, had not been discovered.

Healy's rejection of moral insanity again followed from his desire to push back popular conceptions which might inhibit alternative understandings of delinquency. Goddard's repudiation of the concepts, on the other hand, was not so much denial of moral deficiencies as conviction that diagnosis of intelligence would be inclusive of moral concerns. While neither Healy nor Goddard was sharply critical of the "morality" concepts, they nonetheless, protested a separate existence for them. By so doing, they expanded their scope for alternative ways to conceptualize the delinquent.

Having rebutted the theories of major, extant competition, Goddard and Healy propounded their own, positive conceptions of the subject matter, that is, of ways to discuss the delinquent. Healy argued that by studying the repeat offender, the recidivist, he could all but eliminate conclusions based on accidental delinquencies frequently found in first-time offenders. Furthermore, the recidivist as subject would allow him to generate information on emergent patterns of crime that might help predict whether a person would become a "menace to society" (1911, p. 61).

Until Healy, no one had paid much attention to the concept of age or to its association with other variables in-

cluding crime. The term "juvenile delinquency" was not coined until the mid-nineteenth century (May, 1973); the child-saving movement only began to have significant effect just prior to the arrival of the twentieth century; "adolescence" was a completely unexplored area of study (Bakan, 1971) prior to G. S. Hall's (1904) treatment of the subject. Certainly, no theories of criminology (or as Healy called it, "criminalistics") had addressed, in any systematic way, the question of differences between age groups. Healy (1915a), however, was from the outset, forced by the conceptual dissimilarities between the adult and the new juvenile legal systems to develop understandings that considered youth as distinct, or having unique qualities requiring examination. His rationale for the study of youth incorporated the following arguments: childhood is the starting point for criminal careers; conditions of childhood are important determinants of delinquency; "prime causative factors" are more readily specified in youth than in later years; and, finally, therapeutic efforts are most likely to be effective with youth.

Healy made one other clarification of subject matter that he believed to be of crucial importance. And, on no point was he more unequivocal than in his argument for study of the individual:

> The dynamic center of the whole problem of delinquency and crime will ever be the individual offender---no general theories of crime, sociological, psychol-

> ogical or biological, however well founded, are of much service when the concrete issue, namely the particular offense and the individual delinquent, is before those who have practically to deal with it (1915a, p. 22).

Healy believed that general laws and theories of delinquency resulting in "snap-shot diagnosis" (1915a, p. 159) were of little value to the Court and its agents of treatment. Each delinquent, instead, ought to be considered sui generis in terms of his/her particular combination of weaknesses and strengths, limitations and potentials. A thorough examination of the individual, antecedents and environments, Healy believed, would shed "a quite unexpected degree of enlightenment upon the causative factors" (1910-1911, p. 50) of the delinquencies before the Court, and, furthermore, aid efforts to make disposition in the best interests of the juvenile and society.

While Healy advocated study of recidivism, age and individual difference in delinquency, Goddard viewed the delinquent in one way only: as feebleminded. Not that all delinquents were feebleminded (the percentage was to be determined[4]); rather, feeblemindedness, as established by tests of intelligence, was to provide the orientation for understanding. Choosing one hundred cases at random from among detained children appearing in Court, Goddard, used the Binet scale he had recently imported from France. He found "that the ninety-seventh child tested was normal and the only one in the whole group" (1912-

1913b, p. 368). Thirty-three were "backward" (below normal by as much as four mental years), while sixty-six were more than four years behind, and hence, feebleminded. Goddard did not seem to be certain of his own results, for he then explored other avenues to determine the percentage of feebleminded delinquents, settling on the arbitrarily developed conclusion that at least twenty-five percent of the children before the Court were feebleminded.

Healy was not only aware of, but affected by, Goddard's emphasis on feeblemindedness in delinquency. The public , swayed by rampant enthusiasm concerning the tests, categorized Healy as one of the new breed of mental testers, in the same mould as Goddard (Healy's major statement of policies and perspectives did not controvert these impressions until their publication (1915a), some six years after he began to use mental tests). While he commenced his research with no particular affinity for the concept of "intelligence", he soon became entrenched in discussions of problems (conceptual, methodological, standards) that plagued the scales of intelligence and those who used them as nosological tools for classifying delinquents and others.

Healy's studies of delinquent intelligence (Bronner, 1914-1915) indicated that a mere 10% of the delinquents were feebleminded. When he compared this result with all available studies, including that of Goddard, Healy found his figure was the lowest (1915a, p. 129) of all. He was understandably con-

fused, since his subjects, by virtue of their recidivism and easily discerned mental defect, should have shown, if anything, more gross impairment of intelligence than others. Yet, his results were, for instance, 56 percent lower than those of Goddard, and a colossal 85 percent lower than the results of Bridgman (1913).

With statistics such as those garnered in his Court study (see above), Goddard, not surprisingly, was disturbed by the high potential for crime among feebleminded persons. He believed that without adequate supervision and control, the feebleminded person would fall into criminal ways. Because institutions housed only a fraction of the population of feebleminded persons, society, in his opinion, faced a grave and difficult problem. But, supported by statistics, and armed with a test that promised to ferret out the intellectually sub-normal, Goddard purveyed his theory as a means to defend and guard society against the scourge of delinquency.

Healy was not nearly so worried as Goddard at the threat of the feebleminded, though he was, of course, as concerned with the problem of delinquency. Because he did not focus on one factor for all delinquents as did Goddard, but viewed the individual from a profusion of perspectives which might be relevant, Healy was able to avoid taking a contentious stand concerning the subject matter to be studied by the psychology of delinquency. Because many of his perspectives allowed an environmental explanation, Healy's delinquent was

viewed as malleable; Goddard's delinquent, on the other hand, was usually, or frequently anyway, doomed by the fixed and troublesome nature of intellectual feeblemindedness.

B) Scientific Method

Psychological science was, we have seen, too fresh to have settled into any restrictive, disciplinary mould when Healy and Goddard commenced their programs. In fact, the lack of demand to behave this way or that, left the scientists and therapists relatively free to employ methods at the more extreme ends of dichotomized issues (e.g. nature vs nurture). Psychologists, trying to establish their programmes, not only touted the contentual benefits of their diverse systems, but also asserted the advantages of their various methodological schemes. The latitude of choice of content and methods was evident in the thoroughly contrasting programmes of Goddard and Healy.

Methodological issues fundamental to the practice of science and psychology are found in an analysis of the nature of causation and the different modes of theory construction. Then, as now, these concerns were unresolved within disciplines (and often within the individual scientists), and, thus, provided substantive issues, often argument and debate. Despite the fact that the nature of causation is intricately entwined with the use of frameworks for the construction of theory, they will be dealt with separately herein.

Goddard and Healy used fundamentally distinct modes of theory construction, understood equally well in terms of two related but slightly different dichotomous categories. The first, following Kant, divides judgments, propositions and knowledge types into a posteriori (empirically based truths) or a priori (not empirically grounded, therefore transcendent, shown by "pure reason"). (Lana, 1969). The second involves a distinction between inductive and deductive methods of theory construction. Induction holds that by gradual accumulation of factual data, truths in the form of general, theoretical explanations will be manifested; it specifically denies any theory-to-data effect, thus sponsoring a view of the scientist as objective. Deduction, in vivid contrast, is characterized by the two way relationship of data and theory. It emphasizes the influence of theoretical structures on data gathering and interpretation (Marx, 1976).

These dichotomous categories were active and highly reflected in the psychology of delinquency. Goddard operated in a fundamentally deductive manner, seeming to be convinced that he had developed or found a theoretical framework which encompassed all data in need of classification. While his framework was not given the status of the a priori (unalterably determined by the nature of human reason), but rather remained within the realm of free convention (choice determined by logic, etc.), it, nonetheless, became so certain and rigid in its interpretation of subject matter, that new data had no

impact. His framework, consisting in an interconnected web of explanatory propositions from his understandings of genetics and intelligence, provided him with a position having persuasive powers in such amounts that he resolutely curtailed any two-way relationship of data-to-theory that might allow falsification (Popper, 1962). Zealously wary of theoretical influence, Healy, on the other hand, portrayed himself in a manner entirely consistent with the a posteriori and inductive extremes of the dichotomies: as the disinterested empiricist meticulously and patiently compiling non-conjectural facts.

The Binet scale of intelligence, when applied to persons in institutions for the feebleminded and in the Courts, supplied such "amazingly accurate results"[5] that Goddard (1916, p. 232) could not grasp why anyone would ever doubt Binet's wisdom or go over ground that Binet had already covered. For Goddard, Binet's philosophy and measure of intelligence was perfectly sufficient perspective; with inimitable confidence, he assumed that all contentious issues, interfering with the progressive current of mental testing, had been adequately answered by Binet.

In his attempts to win over converts to the intelligence test view of delinquents, Goddard sought to explain why feeblemindedness had not been invoked to account for delinquency prior to his time. The reason, he contended, was that people had been accustomed to using apperceptual lens that precluded the fact of feeblemindedness. "We have not only not

been looking for mental defect, but we have not been having our eyes open to see it when it was before us, because we have been looking for wickedness." (1912-1913b, p. 372).

Almost a decade later, Goddard began to doubt the soundness of his earlier conclusions on the strength of relationship between feeblemindedness and delinquency. His framework, once thought unassailable, had been weakened by new and contradicting data. In a rare, almost pathetic, reflection on the restrictive nature of his theoretical framework, Goddard recalled some studies, done during the heyday of his programme, where the data generated had not been accounted for by his theory. He explained how he handled the results: "Well, with a true scientific spirit, when I came to look it up, not finding that it proved my theory, I never published it. (Laughter). Of course my excuse was that I didn't understand the result, and I didn't." (1920-1921, p. 172). His insistence upon the continued employment of his theory despite, disconfirming data, is an excellent example of the common consequence of rigidified deduction.

This was, in essence, what Healy sought to avoid. In fact, he frequently condemned theoretical frameworks inasmuch as they confined understandings. The "born criminal", and "moral imbecile", "heredity as a cause" and Goddard's "feeble-minded delinquent", were subjects of his severe evaluations. The "outlook for the science of criminalistics", he (1914-1915, p. 542) maintained, depended on how free it kept itself

of one-pointed outlooks on the delinquent, on how well it steered clear of the contentions between extant delinquency theories, and, finally, on how well it resisted the temptation to publish results before they had been established satisfactorily. An "intensely empirical" science of criminalistics, would be disencumbered of "combat concerning free will and determinism, the insoluble metaphysics of responsibility, the generalizations from superficial surveys" (1913-1914b, pp. 208-209).

Healy was not the paragon of empiricism that he claimed to be, though not for lack of trying so much as the general futility of efforts to eliminate theoretical bias. He referred to the field as "virgin" territory, he spoke of facts as if they had existence separate from human value or theory, and he purported that his science always proceeded from the particular to the general. Yet, within his work are contradictions to all of these contentions. The case is that Healy had constructed an ideal image of science-as-empirical that was impossible to fulfill.

Despite the contradictions, Healy should not be viewed as a false inductivist or unwitting deductivist. He may be convincingly viewed as a serious scientist and student of criminalistics, who, being dissatisfied with previous understandings, sought to construct a factual base of data on the individual so that informed disposition and <u>treatment</u> would be promoted.[6] In these terms, his criminology is vastly

different from those, including Goddard, whose theories and classifications for purposes of diagnosis and prognosis, were, he claimed, totally inadequate (1915a, p. 160).

C) Theory of Causation

Psychology at the beginning of the twentieth century was confronted squarely by the issue of causation. In large measure, the issue was a consequence of the discipline's philosophic lineage, its inheritance of persisting problems whose ever-tentative solutions merely assumed more scientific expressions in the newly formed discipline. As influential, the focus on causation resulted from an increasing complexity in American social structure (Haskell, 1977), upshot of many factors including high rates of immigration and industrialization. Psychology and the other social sciences enthusiastically promised, through vigorous application of scientific process, to understand the causes of disturbing social and individual problems and to effect remedy of them.

Causation models frequently alligned with the psychologist's views on application. Those psychologists primarily impressed by the immaturity of psychology usually warned against premature application of half-baked theories and knowledge, while psychologists, motivated by desire to help others were often prone to foresake rigid experimentalism for application grounded in less established assumptions. Healy and Goddard differed significantly along these lines, even though both were motivated by the need to serve others. Goddard took a macro-

scopic, all-encompassing approach to the problem; he considered variables as they accounted for large numbers of delinquents. Healy, to the contrary, was governed by needs of the Court, specifically to understand and treat the individual delinquent; the causes he sought required no generalizability to other delinquents, but were judged by their ability to lead to effective treatment of the individual. Goddard's work was afflicted by his predilection for making hasty attributions, for assuming the effect of factors as causes in the absense of sufficient evidence. While he was alert to the difficulty in establishing causation, arguing that elimination of the profusion of possibilities was essential prior to "real understanding" (1915, p. 310), Goddard frequently overshot the mark, presuming to know "real causes" and to have "real understanding" in issues as complex as delinquency. Not unlike Lombroso before him, Goddard took a simple-minded approach to causation, seizing on one factor, which he presumed, ever and always caused a phenomenon to occur (Curti, 1926). His hasty and simple-minded attribution policy was invariably reflected in conclusions such as that a large proportion of delinquents are feebleminded (1912-1913b, p. 374) and that feebleminded persons are all potential delinquents (1911, p. 64).

The effects of Goddardian attribution were profound. His supposedly scientific understandings, held in high esteem by the American Association for the Study of the Feebleminded, were mirrored, for a decade, in pessimistic attitudes toward

treatment of the feebleminded now defined by the intelligence quotient (Fernald, 1912-1913, p. 127; Fernald, 1923). What Goddard had done, by virtue of his persuasive arguments, was to transform emphasis in the field of feeblemindedness (and in delinquency as well) from one of potentiality and hope to one of limitation and hopelessness. The difference, in the main, one of accent, was profoundly felt by those who worked with and for the feebleminded. They became less enthusiastic about treatment and education, more enamoured of programs for segregation and sterilization of the feebleminded and delinquent population.

In later years, Goddard felt compelled to re-evaluate his conceptions and attitudes toward feebleminded persons. Others had, long before, recovered from the debilitating effects of his negative programme (Fernald, 1923), but Goddard waited until 1928 before announcing that he had "gone over to the enemy" (1928, p. 224). His new position reflected his characteristic tendency toward over-zealousness in attribution, and in promotion of simple-minded, unidimensional causes of complex phenomena. He called for an education system such that all moron-level retardates would be able to manage their own affairs and compete in the system with intellectual normals. Where in his original formulations feebleminded persons were incurable and ever unable to manage their lives, under his new plan they would all be improved through education, so that they might take care of themselves.

While Goddard threw caution to the wind so to speak, Healy was usually the model of prudence in his attribution-causation policy. His critical evaluation of previous etiologies "that we have been prone to generalize about the whole situation too liberally, as is our human tendency" (1919-1920, p. 69), applied much more readily to Goddard and others than it ever did to himself. In fact, Healy directed fierce castigation at those psychologists who, like Goddard, had analyzed the delinquent solely in terms of intelligence level. His own researches, having reinforced his contention "that the psychological study of delinquency involves very much more than the discrimination of the feebleminded" (1914, p. 302), he cautioned against "too rapid pigeon-holing" and warned of the danger of scientific pronouncements in quarters where psychology had been or might be used. Instead, he promoted an understanding of the individual delinquent grounded in cautious inference from intensive and extensive study of the individual; he never failed to consider the complexity of criminalistic issues and diligently avoided hasty and unsafe conclusions. He consistently argued that adequate practical study meant unearthing all of the interwoven influences at work in the individual and that only rarely could one factor be specified as solitary cause of a delinquent's behaviour (1915a, p. 23; 1922; 1948, p. 28).

Healy's view, that "causative factors" were always multiple, precluded his bringing to bear the commonly used

medical explanations of psychiatric orientation. So he found statements such as "crime is a disease" to be "dubiously cheap in the light of our experience" (1915a, p. 4); they led to descriptions of crime as a single, specifiable issue, having single and specific treatment. Instead, he depicted crime as one of an array of abnormal actions of the individual which might ensue from any of a myriad of factors. Employing the medical explanations, one treatment might be prescribed for all occurrences of a given disease. But, in Healy's model, treatment if rational, would be based on diagnostic examination of all possible etiological factors operating on the individual delinquent.

Goddard portrayed feeblemindedness as a congenital illness, the product of defective genetics in a substantial majority of cases. Crime, too, was treated as if it arose largely from one inborn and irreversible causal determinant. When, post-1920, he allowed that feeblemindedness might not be the only cause of delinquency, he proposed a second, nameable cause--psychopathy; together, the two would account for all delinquency. The difference between them, he postulated, was that feebleminded persons were incurable having been born with fixed, genetic limitations, while psychopaths being sick or diseased, could be relieved of their problem. They were recognizable by the manner in which they responded to successive administrations of intelligence tests: feebleminded persons had consistently low mental age, while psychopaths showed marked

fluctuations in levels of intelligence.

The substantive dissimilarity in causal models is mirrored in their different uses of heredity and environment as factors in the onset of delinquency. Goddard's psychology of delinquency was, in large part, grounded in explanations of behaviour by Mendelian genetics. While he gave cursory consideration to environmental influences on delinquency, he dismissed them as minor in light of his studies of genetics (1912) which proved that feeblemindedness bred feeblemindedness in an "expected" two thirds of the cases. The other "causes are small compared to the one cause -- heredity" (1911, p. 510).

Healy found no proof that criminalism could be directly inherited (Spaulding and Healy, 1913-1914), having always revealed an intervening factor which mediated the effect of heredity. Thus, in cases where, for example, feeblemindedness or epilepsy were found, heredity was assumed to be, at best, indirectly causative of the crime. In essence, he concluded that a person may inherit a physical or mental condition that could influence the onset of delinquency, but that this was very different from direct inheritance of criminalism as postulated by Lombroso (1911).

Healy and Goddard were, thus, in agreement that criminal tendencies were not inherited. They, furthermore, concurred that physical and psychological characteristics, acquired genetically, can influence the person in the direction of crime. However, where Goddard focused on crime as the all but inevitable by-product of feeblemindedness (inherited as a unit character-

istic in the same manner as hair colour or stature), Healy insisted that many factors, environmental as well as hereditary, may be considered as instrumental in the onset of delinquency. Goddard (1911a, p. 510) had little to say on the influence of environment, except negatively, that compared to heredity of feeblemindedness, it was of little consequence in the production of crime. In direct contrast, Healy (1919-1920, p. 70) argued the importance of environment, citing as proof the fact that higher grade feebleminded persons (i.e. morons) are virtually free of delinquency if sheltered in a good institution.

While he (1928, p. 765) lauded the "scientific student of behavior causations" who recognized the intricate and potent influence of environment on ideas and conduct, Healy did not want to become embroiled in the argument over which of nature or nurture was dominant. More important to him was "the fact that all conduct, good or bad, is an attribute of mental life" (1913-1914b, p. 209). He argued that study of mental conditions was the surest way toward development of remedial measures (1915a, p. 31), and, along the same lines, that "the fundamental considerations are the immediate mental antecedents of the delinquent act" (1928, p. 764). Delinquency, then, was to be suitably regarded as falling within the domain of psychology inasmuch as it was a "science of mental life" (1914, p. 298). Those who failed to reckon with mental-psychological factors failed to apply well-rounded and adequate studies to understanding of the delinquent. Healy wrote:

> ---it must never be forgotten that crime is conduct

> and that conduct is an attribute of mind. Whatever may be the influences which shape mentality, whether they be environmental, hereditary, physical or what not, it still remains that, when directly considered, conduct and therefore crime, is a psychological matter (1911-1912, pp. 856-857).

Goddard, like Healy, advanced the psychological argument considerably, by bringing the concept of intelligence to bear on the subject of delinquency. Narrower in scope than Healy's programme, Goddard's only regarded, as causative, the mental states of feeblemindedness and, later, psychopathy--both determined by use of the Binet Scale of intelligence. Since his understanding of mental life was merged so completely with his conception and measurement of intelligence, Goddard saw no reason to consider other mental phenomena; they were completely extraneous to his psychological programme for delinquency.

D) Measurement

Causation and measurement are so thoroughly connected within science and psychological science, that knowledge of one may often reveal the nature of the other. They are, in a sense, two sides, content and method, of the same coin. If there were no significant distinctions, this section would be rendered useless by the foregoing discussion of causation. There are, however, important differences which, considered,

help to give the scientific sides of the programmes new meaning. They are found in the starting point: which comes first, causation or measurement? Very different sciences follow from systems with different starting points and emphases.

When the theory of causation takes precedence, measurement, serving a subservient function, caters to explorations of relationships between factors of potential causative value. Measurement tools, such as tests, scales and statistics, are employed as required to prove or refute hypothesized relationships between factors. There is, presumably, no need to vest interest in a given measurement. When, however, the relationship is reversed, so that programmes are established on the basis of particular measurement, the dynamic is altogether different. The measurement, or emphasis on it, actually precedes and often becomes more important than what is measured.

Goddard's psychology of delinquency gives evidence of both directions for the relationship of causation and measurement. In a previous section, his programme was characterized as deductive in nature. That is, his belief, that delinquency followed from feeblemindedness, determined that he collect data on intelligence of delinquents. Measurement of intelligence became, in Goddard's rigidified deductive framework, the quantitative proof of his belief. Since his system postulated a single causal relationship, Goddard felt he only needed to appraise the two variables deemed to comprise the relationship, then to measure, statistically, the extent of the connection.

Because his measurement of intelligence in delinquents repeatedly found them to be feebleminded, Goddard rashly assumed causal ties, that feeblemindedness caused delinquency. His measurements and interpretation of them, thus, confirmed his antecedent assumptions about delinquency. A splendid example of this deductive process is illustrated in the following argument, which Goddard used to reinforce the persuasive power of his own data wherein he had ascertained that 66% of delinquents were feebleminded:

> The whole point of this part of my paper is to show that we have every reason to expect that a relatively large percentage of these defective children will fall into crime or into offenses which will bring them before the Juvenile Courts. There are 404,546 children in the public schools of Manhattan and the Bronx.---Two percent of this number would give us 8090 feebleminded children.
>
> There were in round numbers 10,000 children in the Juvenile Courts of Manhattan and the Bronx last year. If this includes every feeble-minded child in these boroughs, we have the fact before us that 80% of the children in Juvenile Court are feeble-minded. This is, of course, a truly gratuitous assumption and contrary to reason, for one knows---that not all feeble-minded children get into the court for the reasons mentioned. On the other hand, not all children

> that commit offenses get into the court whether normal or feeble-minded. To what extent these would offset each other no one of course knows. We have, however, a bit of exact data which is interesting in this connection (1912-1913b, p. 367).

In order to fortify his conviction that mental defect caused crime, Goddard took two figures, which happened to have similar magnitude but no other common features, and not only correlated them, but broadly hinted at a potential causal association.

Goddard's system may, with equal justification, be viewed as one in which measurement preceded all else, including what he, so strongly, viewed as causative. As the pioneer and herald of the Binet Scale's use in America, Goddard directed its application to thousands of persons (especially children in institutions, courts and schools), taught its use to hundreds of teachers and psychologists and reaped the esteem of members of the scientific community. His faith in the scale was understandably resolute: "We cannot get away and never will get away from mental levels as established by Binet" (1916, p. 232). His confidence in the scale as measurement device, not surprisingly, went a long way toward structuring the nature of his psychological programme of delinquency. While he always invested the Binet scale with vast efficacy, on occasion he delicately criticized it as being less than "absolutely correct in itself", as measuring a somewhat poorly defined concept, and as being unworthy of absolute reliance on

its findings (1913-1914, pp. 114-116). Such criticism was hardly damning. It certainly failed to repress his esteem for the Binet Scale reflected in his descriptions of it as "entirely satisfactory" (1911b, p. 64), "remarkable close estimate" (1912-1913b, p. 374), and "so reasonably accurate" (1920-1921, p. 172).

Healy generally agreed with Goddard's more critical reflections. In fact, when Goddard (1913-1914, p. 114) observed that the Binet scale was less than "absolutely correct in itself", and further, that it should not be taken alone, Healy commented, "The Binet scale does not tell the whole story, just the point I want to bring out" (1913-1914a, p. 114). Healy's criticism of the scale, however, had a slightly different twist. Where Goddard's prime concern was with the scale's correctness (whether it gave an accurate picture), Healy's point was that, no matter how correct or accurate the Binet scale was or might become, it did not, by itself, yield adequate understanding of the delinquent person. Full understanding for prognostic purposes required that many other factors be considered in the reckonings. Abilities (other than intellectual ones), personality traits, environmental conditions and past experiences were all judged by Healy to be important to the determination of causes of delinquent behaviour (1919-1920, p. 72). Thus, Healy's programme required the development and use of a system for measuring the multiplicity of variables (physical, moral, social, psycho-

logical; genetic and environmental) which might act as causative agents (1915a, p. 52n).

The nature of Healy's non-psychological measurements (e.g. social history, anthropometry, medical) does not concern us here. However, his use of mental tests interests us greatly, especially when judged against Goddard's use of the Binet scale. Healy always excitedly sponsored a catholic attitude to the problem of delinquency, supporting open-minded development of novel approaches including, in the early years, the Binet scale. In 1911, he spoke of the scale in glowing terms, as having been "an epoch making advance" (1911, p. 62) in the study of delinquency. But, as the scale became more and more widely used, as its construction was subjected to extensive evaluations and numerous revisions, Healy moved ever more toward the camp of the critics. He (1914, pp. 299-300) expressed reservations about methods that depended on language, believing that many social skills and value differences would be overlooked. To work with delinquents, one needed to know not only how they scored in general intelligence, but also how they fared on non-linguistic, performance oriented measures of perception, apperception, self-control, ability to learn from experience, vocational aptitudes and, so on.

By 1916, Healy had become even more disillusioned with the Binet scale. In a symposium on mental tests in the Journal of Educational Psychology, he and his psychologist-associate (later wife), Augusta Bronner, argued that the paramount concern

was to determine the scale's validity, that is, "how the findings on tests correlate with results in life" (Healy and Bronner, 1916, p. 238). Their evaluations of the Binet scale, original and revisions, led them to conclude that it was insufficient alone, that its separate tests were unsatisfactory and, furthermore had not been placed at the appropriate age level, that tests depended exclusively on language and information, and that the concept of intelligence age-level was not appropriate for adults. They proposed their own procedure as preferable to grading by the Binet scale alone: where with young individuals and particularly feebleminded persons they used the Binet scale with school performance and a few other tests, in other cases they felt "the urgent necessity of using a wide range of tests for special abilities." (1916, p. 239). They suggested that their work was not of much help in the development of norms, having focused on the individual. However, it did provide considerable opportunity for a "practically critical outlook" (1916, p. 239) on delinquency. Recommending the development of more reflection on method and interpretation in testing, Healy and Bronner concluded with a call for more cooperation between psychologists to take sufficient cognizance of each other's methods and norms in the use of the Binet scale of intelligence.

Goddard's thoughts in the same symposium were entirely incongruous with those of Healy and Bronner and others who argued for and against mental tests on the basis of their

apparent strengths and weaknesses. Goddard took an ad hominem approach, suggesting that psychology benefit from Binet's "wonderful insight" and "amazingly accurate results" (1916, p. 232). Rather than question a man who was "almost universally wise and correct in his theories" (1916, p. 232), Goddard believed that one should profit from Binet's erudition and proceed from where he left off. At no point did Goddard suggest that the Binet scale was problematic or in need of alterations.

The extreme contrast, between Healy and Goddard in their emphasis on and use of measurement, was readily reflected in their symposium strategies. While Goddard's glorification of Binet assumed an unequivocal correctness of the latter's views, Healy and Bronner were extremely critical of almost every facet of Binet's scale. Where Goddard failed to understand those who "begin at the beginning" (1916, p. 232), Healy and Bronner called for an open-minded empiricism through "development of a more critical attitude towards method" (1916, p. 240). Where Goddard left one with the impression that, as regards mental tests, the Binet scale was all that was needed, Healy and Bronner clearly advocated the use of an extensive array of measurements.

CHAPTER III

THE DISCIPLINARY CONTEXTS OF DELINQUENCY PSYCHOLOGIES

In this section, the internal or disciplinary contexts for the development of delinquency psychologies are examined in some detail. Disciplinary background and setting factors are, here, essentially of two kinds, psychological and criminological. Under both, the delinquency psychologies of Goddard and Healy are viewed to determine the degree to which they reflect prevalent ideas and philosophies of those psychologists and criminologists who might have influenced them.

A. The Psychological Context

Joseph Royce (1975) contends, with some dismay, that contemporary psychology is multi-: methodological, variate, epistemic, world view, paradigmatic, theoretic and disciplinary. Some disagree, contending that subtle but pervasive homogeneity is hidden by the multiplicity (e.g. Mackenzie, 1977; Rychlak, 1975). But other authors concur with Royce that no coherent unity graces the field. They disparage the pluralism, claim that it ill-suits a scientific enterprise, and proceed to explore cracks in conceptual foundations (e.g. Royce, 1975; Giorgi, 1975; Riegel, 1978; Koch, 1975).

Psychology in the early twentieth century was also characterized by multiplicity. Only a hundred years before, Kant had declared that psychology could not possibly be a science (Mischel, 1967), inspiring positivistic psychologists,

even to the present, to prove him wrong. Despite some success in this respect by Herbart, Fechner, Wundt and others, an experimental science of psychology was, at the turn of the century, still seeking to establish contentual and methodological roots. Psychologists, then as now, sought unanimity. But, where current lack of homogeneity and unanimity is often associated with disciplinary despair, the pluralism of 1900 not only was tolerated, but frequently was encouraged.

Two features, both associated with the relative infancy of the discipline in 1900, distinguish its multiplicity from that of current psychology. Firstly, because the field was still relatively compact, the psychologist was able to keep in touch, and, thus, to assume a degree of kinship, with the entire discipline. Secondly, there was a belief, often explicit, that diversity of content and method was conducive to healthy development, and that scientific explorations in various fields would eventually be coordinated. Despite irreparable differences, the psychologists were confident that if scientific psychology persevered in its collection of facts, that truth would be revealed and that the person would be understood.

Thus, despite growing diversity, there was a pervasive aura of unity born of the new and common venture to free psychology of metaphysics through application of science. Both Goddard and Healy were swept up by the scientific thrust, so that their work reflected unabated enthusiasm for positivistic inquiry in

the psychological domain. Moreover, both exhibited deep confidence that their work had found the mark, that it deserved reinforcement and extension as well as use in the treatment of human problems.

While the spirit and confidence of psychology at the turn of the century undeniably permeated their work, specific antecedent influences were not as easily located. This might, to some extent, be an expected consequence of the new and unsettled state of the discipline. There were always few, and frequently no, precursors in the psychological literature, often because no work had been done in the field. In large measure, this was the case with Goddard and Healy who were, for example, among the first to bring psychology to bear on the subject of delinquency and to use intelligence tests in America.

Without overextending our inferential rights, we found that their programmes reflected the philosophies of various psychologists whom they knew, who had taught them or who had written on related matters. However, the contextual approach that we use here attempts to circumnavigate the issue of cause (which might still be inferred by the reader) by focussing on the issues in relation to the background rather than as a result of it.

1. Goddard and Psychological Contexts

A. G. Stanley Hall, Genetic Psychology and Child Study:

In 1893, Goddard attended Hall's lecture at a meeting of the

Maine teacher's association, and not previously having heard of "an idiot asylum", was interested by Hall's description of one (1943, p. 154). Twelve years later, having completed his doctoral training under Hall during the interim, Goddard left a teaching position to become the first psychologist of laboratory research on mentally defective children. Struck by the lack of psychological knowledge on the topic, he solicited ideas from Hall, among others, on how to study it. Hall's reply obviously disappointed Goddard, who recalled many years later: "His visit to the idiot asylum in 1893 he had found 'wonderfully suggestive,' but apparently had never found time to act upon the suggestions" (1943, p. 155).

Hall was at the forefront of psychology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Ross, 1972). His extensive accomplishments are too numerous to list herein; however, it may be said that like William James, he was a dominant force in the discipline during its formative years. His philosophy, a "genetic epistemology" relying on both Darwinian and Lamarckian approaches to evolution, (Grinder, 1967), was applied to an impressive array of topics including adolescence, senescence, race and sex differences in both psychology and education. Moreover, his "Child Study Program", which generated the data for much of his prodigious output of written works, was itself so profuse [Wilson (1975) counted 4,519 studies between 1898 and 1912] that it gained status as a "movement." Concerned with children's behaviour in various

settings (school, home and court), the child studies were, at once, a patchwork of controlled, experimental inquiry, observation, case history, anecdote and speculation, since all of these were possible given the loosely structured questionnaire method employed by Hall and his students. Child study members answered the questionnaires from their different experiential bases using diverse terms of reference, so that phenomena could not be coherently categorized and understood in an encompassing framework. Common dimensions and classifications of experience and behavior were simply not possible. Despite its abundant production, Hall's methodology, thus, failed to generate sufficient "social proof" (White, 1977) to convince empirically-oriented, mainstream psychologists, many of whom were attracted to the "brass instrument" variety of research imported from Wundt's laboratory in Germany. James, Thorndike, Baldwin and Munsterberg, all levied severe criticism at the methods of the program, arguing that they miserably failed according to scientific criteria.

Not all studies under Hall's aegis were of the questionnaire variety. In fact, two very thorough studies of delinquents were done by students of Hall (Dawson, 1896; Groszmann, 1899) during the same period that Goddard attended Clark University. Dawson's paper, entitled "A Study of Youthful Degeneracy", was published in Hall's Pedagogical Seminary (later the Journal of Genetic Psychology). Agreeing with the Lombrosian or positivist school of criminology, Dawson believed that arrested

human development and crime could be inherited. His data from anthropometric measurements, observations of behavior and physical features, measures of perception and reaction times, surveys of family life and home environment, were gathered on sixty reform school juvenile delinquents, and a control group from the public schools. In all respects, Dawson observed, the delinquent was found to be inferior, his condition readily explained by Lombroso's concept of inherited degeneracy. Groszmann's study, in most respects like Dawson's, went even further in its allegiance to Lombrosian criminology (Fink, 1938), finding delinquency to be a savage condition.

Hall's thoughts on juvenile delinquency, no doubt enhanced by his students' researches, were expressed in his two volume study Adolescence (1904). Noting the world-wide increase in crime, especially during the onset of adolescence, Hall considered it to be one of the diseases of society (1904, p. 406). While he identified degenerate children by their neurotic character, irritability, vanity, lack of vigor, mood changes, sexual perversion and shyness (1904, pp. 335-337), and claimed they were more likely to commit crime than other persons, Hall also noted the importance of an alienating environment in the onset of crimes of youth. While adolescence was to be viewed as an essentially antisocial period, a recapitulation of earlier primitive states of humanity, the delinquency was, nevertheless, brought on by circumstance or immaturity, and deserved our "pity and hope" rather than condemnation. Hall recommended that juvenile

delinquency be studied more scientifically, arguing for psychological, pedagogical and physical examination of individuals, especially youth, and their connection to social influences, so that crime, by being understood, might be prevented.

Goddard's delinquency psychology programme showed telling similarities, and sometimes allegiances, with Hall's philosophy and methodology. In significant ways, however, it was quite different, reflecting the difference in times, and ideas, other than Hall's.

The early years of Goddard's research work at Vineland, New Jersey, did not reflect Hall at all, but were, instead, very much attuned to the experimental psychology of the time. The laboratory, described by Baldwin (1911), was equipped with all the appropriate "brass instruments" among which were a Mosso ergograph to measure muscular fatigue, a chronoscope measuring intervals of time to one thousandth of a second, a dark room for photographic work, an automotograph for recording involuntary movements of hand and arm, a test of motor control precision, an apparatus for testing ability to recognize objects by touch, a psychometer to measure physiological changes accompanying emotion, a maze test for motor control and a test of reflex action. By use of such instrumentation, by use of the recently imported mental tests, and by studies of heredity, Goddard would fully understand mental defect. The impression left by Baldwin was that Goddard's methods would win the day. However, shortly after his initial applications of the Binet

scale, Goddard stopped using the laboratory instruments and never referred to them again in his writings. Despite the inability of the Binet Scale to provide the information on sensory, perceptual and motor processes that had been supplied by the laboratory apparatus, Goddard concentrated exclusively on the concept of intelligence as measured by the Binet scale and in conjunction with findings on heredity.

The results of his methodological narrowing, in combination with rapid American approval of the Binet scale, were profound. Just like Hall's Child Study programme, Goddard's programme for mental testing came to be known as a "movement", and was productive of hundreds of studies, with applications to thousands of persons in the first few years of its use. Like the Child Study programme, it did not restrict its use to the psychological expert, but instead, at annual summer school sessions, taught the layman (usually teachers) how to use the Binet Scale. Also like the Child Study Program, the mental testing crusade was applied in every possible situation, home, school, court and institution. There were no limits to its dominion.

Both Hall's questionnaire method and Goddard's mental testing were subjected to considerable criticism. However, where Hall's critics had been well-established philosophers and laboratory-based psychologists from outside the child study movement, the critics of Goddard's mental testing were, more often than not, wholely entrenched in the movement, if not

Goddard's brand of it. The criticism, that Hall's questionnaire failed to produce common dimensions and classifications of experience and behavior, did not apply to the Binet Scale which demonstrated reasonably close scores between different raters. Thus, while Hall's programme died as a consequence of its scientific bankruptcy, Goddard's movement prospered from the attempts of critics to repair and improve the accuracy of the instrument. Within six years of its American début, there were modifications to the Binet Scale authored by Kuhlmann, Healy, Wallin, Yerkes, Terman, Huey and even Goddard.

The works of both Hall and Goddard were solidly grounded in evolutionary principles. Hall's "genetic psychology" linked the sequential development of the individual to the evolutionary sequence of all life forms (phylogeny recapitulates ontogeny),giving him a biological basis for scientific psychology. Man was to be understood in terms of stages of development, genetically based, and parallel to the stages of natural life (Ross, 1972). Goddard's evolutionary schema was not as explicit as was that of Hall. However, his belief in the genetic base of behavior was clearly proclaimed. And, implicit in his use of Binet categorizations (moron, imbecile and idiot) was a belief in stages of development, with an associated fixing of intellectual ability. The age-based concept of intelligence (i.e. mental age), later replaced by the Intelligence Quotient, assumed that a person of normal intelligence was so endowed at birth, and that development proceeded

with age through all the lower levels until the person's capacity had been reached (Wolfe, 1973).

Goddard's thoughts on juvenile delinquency matched Hall's concern that it constituted a great burden to society. Moreover, he took up Hall's suggestion that the subject be studied more thoroughly by science. But, Goddard's programme so narrowly defined the causative factors that its assessment of cause bore little similarity to Hall's very broad consideration of psychological, physical and environmental conditions which might be associated with crime. Where both saw the genetic-biological predisposition as important to the stimulation of crime, Goddard's beliefs in this respect precluded hope except through stringent exercise of control measures. Hall's system allowed that with scientific study, delinquency might someday be prevented through changes in environmental circumstances.

B. Francis Galton and Individual Differences: A short ten years after the publication of Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species (1859), Galton's book Hereditary Genius (1869) applied evolutionary principles to the inheritance of human traits. His study of family lineage had determined, to his satisfaction, that specific rules of genetic transmission governed the acquisition of talents and stigma. With an ardent desire to improve the genetic base of England and humanity, Galton proposed "eugenic" measures (selective breeding and sterilization) to accord with the principles of inheritance

that he had unveiled.

Related to the eugenic proposals was his study of the individual and his development of bio-statistical techniques. His work in these respects as well as in anthropology and geography, his invention of the ticker tape and studies in fingerprinting, led Lewis Terman (1917) to rate him, in a ridiculous application of intelligence quotients to deceased persons, as one of the great geniuses of all time. In more psychological domains, he studied imagery associated with various sensory mechanisms by use of a quantitatively based questionnaire, he experimentally measured "free association" responses to standard items, and developed statistical instruments including the coefficient of correlation and percentile values.

His psychological explorations were taken by psychologists in America to be basic to the study of individual differences. J. McKeen Cattell, for instance, who later called Galton the "greatest man I have known", (1930), specifically used Galton's work to develop his own mental tests for study of individual differences (1890). While Galton did nothing to alter the image, but rather nurtured it (1883; Cattell, 1890), his purposes were primarily normal such that individual differences were transformed within his eugenic ideology into totalitarian means for state control of genetic factors (Buss, 1976).

In virtually every aspect of his programme, Goddard reflected the philosophy of Galton though the actual relation-

ship between them was negligible. While they were contemporaraneous for a short period, it is not likely that Goddard was much aware of Galton's importance to psychology. No doubt, he was informed of Galton's eugenics and this helps to account for the similarity in position. While the connection, in other respects, was inappreciable, Galton, still, provides an extremely helpful context for reviewing Goddard's work.

Goddard, like Galton, was keenly interested in the use of mental measurements. Both applied them with a strongly normative emphasis. Galton wished to justify his eugenic policy. Goddard had similar intent and was also motivated by his needs to care for the feebleminded and delinquent populations. Mental tests were not, in either usage, meant to shed light on characteristics of individuals, but instead were primarily geared to social and political purposes.

The mental tests of Galton were basically psychophysical, his Fechner-like thesis being that for discriminable differences in physical dimensions, there would be corresponding psychological changes. He assumed that measured differences between people in terms of talents and stigmata would be well-correlated with class distinctions. And, he argued, in a democratic country such as England, these talents and stigmata, rather than inheritance itself, accounted for divisions between classes. While Goddard was not particularly concerned with class differences per se, his tests, too, were presumed to measure innate potential. Because he found intelligence test

score differences highly associated with poverty, ethnicity and, delinquency, he confidently recommended the segregation and sterilization of those with particularly limited intelligence. He did not question bias within the test that may have kept the poor, the immigrant and the delinquent from gaining higher mental ages; furthermore, he did not, for a moment, doubt that the test measured innate capacities rather than the effect of environment.

Galton was, with Herbert Spencer, the backbone of early efforts to apply Darwinian evolution theory to social realms. While Darwin had carefully avoided such application in The Origin of Species, in later years he privately expressed his approval of Galton's conclusions (Himmelfarb, 1968). In a letter to Galton, he admitted to having been converted to Galton's point of view in Hereditary Genius, that inherited mental characteristics dictate eminence. Darwin did not publicly declare his position in this respect. Where others became "Darwinians" and advocated their applications of his evolutionary theory (Boring, 1956; Ghiselin, 1973), Darwin, himself, remained relatively aloof from its application to social and human realms. Goddard and Galton both, however, openly espoused Darwinian rationale throughout their writings on the human sphere. For example, in their use of genetics to account for generational metamorphoses, they agreed with the Darwinian principle of fortuitous variation whereby offspring display small but salient modifications from the form of their parents.

But, where Darwin concentrated on inter-generational differences and the production of species diversification, Goddard and Galton, their normative purposes to the fore, focused on the similarities between generations as a justification for eugenic control of breeding policies.

C. Mental Testing: The third and last psychological context in which Goddard is viewed is, in some senses, the most important. Goddard's expression of profound debt to Binet, whose test he imported to America, leaves little doubt that his interpretation of Binet profoundly influenced his work thereafter.

Having only begun his work with mental defect in 1906, Goddard was a novice in all the procedures that he applied to his situation. Needing some direction for his studies, he canvassed many psychologists (including G. S. Hall, as previously mentioned) for advice, but no one seemed to know what to do (Young, 1924). Realizing how immature the science of psychology was with respect to mental defect, Goddard combed the literature and found twenty-five tests which he thought might be of help in analysis and diagnosis. Once he had suitably equipped his Vineland laboratory, he began to standardize the tests for his population of mentally defective persons.

Goddard's reasons for using the laboratory instruments were different from those reasons for which they had been created. Other than some of the innovative work done by Witmer at his clinic in Pennsylvania, there were no traditions for Goddard's

use of laboratory apparatus in application to abnormal persons. The instruments were rather the products of two key streams in the experimental psychology of the time: the brass instrument psychology of Titchener (an extension of Wundt's studies of the elements of consciousness), and, of equal importance, the more functionalistic study of consciousness under the aegis of Cattell and others. Both of these otherwise different approaches to psychology were engrossed in the study of reaction time or other responses to stimuli, following their assumption that psychology must attend to the relations between physical and psychological phenomena. Goddard neither claimed nor had affiliation with either of these approaches, but nonetheless, found their laboratory instrumentation in his context to be helpful in structuring the research facilities at Vineland.

Before he had become fully attached to any one or more of the measures as particularly helpful in defining the problem of retardation, Goddard was introduced to the work of Binet during a trip to France. While his initial impression was not favorable, he later became extremely excited by the results of Binet scale application (1943). So pleased was he with the scale that he virtually forgot the laboratory tactics he had found promising. He concentrated all his energies on development and use of the Binet scale.

Goddard's approach to mental testing was, thus, shaped by his need to study mental defect. Unlike those experimentalists whose instruments were created for purposes of pure scien-

tific study, Goddard needed diagnostic tools for specific purposes. Not particularly interested in individual differences, reaction time, sensation, or any of the foci of functional and structural psychologies, Goddard chose his tools according to his purpose. Thus, when a tool became available that seemed to accurately place the problem of mental defect in intellect as measured, Goddard took up the tool with great vigor.

Binet's work had much appeal to Goddard for a number of reasons, some inherent in the work and some a result of Goddard's interpretations of the scale. While Binet's studies had, for the most part, concentrated on the individual in a more clinical sense than was intended by the American studies of individual differences, his scale, developed to predict success of children in the school system, was entirely normative. Denying its use as a "measure", he claimed, nonetheless, that it was able to categorize people in terms of the range of their abilities that would lead to success in school. Goddard was, consistent with his purposes, impressed with both features, with the normative side of the scale -- its ability to separate out persons, especially the mental defectives, from normal groups --, and its seeming ability to categorize persons, in clear and final ways, into distinct groupings. The latter feature, distinctly neo-Lamarckian in its reliance on hard and fast divisions akin to stages, likely appealed to Goddard's reliance on Hall's thinking.

Goddard's use of Binet's scale does not give a fair reflection of Binet's entire work, despite the fact that the Binet scale allowed such interpretations of itself as Goddard made. As previously mentioned, Binet's work prior to the scale had been non-normative study of the individual person. Binet's conception of intelligence had also provided opportunity for change and improvement through appropriate mental exercises. While Goddard did not negate the possibility of small behavioral changes, his concept of intelligence was opposed to that of Binet where intelligence was fluid. Goddard, also enamored of genetic epistemology and eugenics, had postulated an intelligence unable to go beyond a given level fixed at birth.

2. Healy and Psychological Contexts

William Healy's delinquency psychology in some ways absorbed minimal direct influence from psychologies of the day, largely because they failed to address themselves to clinical concerns such as those with which he contended. Given the spirit with which he had discarded previously conceived biological and moral theories of criminology, one suspects that if there had been a clinically oriented psychology of delinquency prior to him, Healy would have cleansed himself of its impact as well. Still, Healy's work reflected the spirit of the juvenile justice domain and the connected context of psychologies associated philosophically, if not more directly, to the Child Saving Movement.

A. Functionalism: The most enlightening psychological context in which to view Healy's work is framed by the so-called school of psychology, "functionalism". Healy's work mirrors its debt to functionalistic thought and to a number of persons associated with its formulation. In the 1890's, functional psychology was not a formal "ism", though it underscored the work of many who opposed the elementaristic approach of Wundtian psychology. While they seemed agreeable to the Wundtian laboratory, they differed fundamentally over the way to study consciousness. Where the Wundtians were interested in the introspected elements of conscious reaction to the physical world, the more functionally oriented viewed consciousness as the psychological side of reaction to stimuli. Rather than ask what are the components of consciousness, they inquired as to its purpose or its function.

The functional approach might not have been formalized without the polemic of its chief adversary, E. B. Titchener. Having removed Wundt's elementarism from a much broader and less well-known context [Wundt was not half as taken with laboratory-based elementarism as some presumed (Riegel, 1976, p. 177)], Titchener imported it to an America in search of formal methodology, becoming its most adamant spokesperson. In order to highlight the point of his work, he (1896) contrasted it with opposing thought: the concern of his own psychology was the "is" of consciousness, whereas another approach might be concerned with what it "is for." Titchener's

paper touched off a major debate within the field (Böhme, 1977) that not only affected laboratory instrumentation and methodology, but the entire scope of the discipline. Of importance herein is the unifying spur it elicited in those of the "is for" orientation. William James had already stated his philosophic objections to the Wundtian psychology by having Hugo Münsterberg, major critic of Wundt's work, hired to replace him in the laboratory at Harvard (Kuklick, 1977). James, with Münsterberg, and the Chicago school (Dewey, Mead and Angell) proposed that mind be studied in terms of its capacity to adapt or solve problems, that is, to function (Flower and Murphy, 1977).

In Dewey especially, the functional views were explicit (Heidbredder, 1933). Rejecting a dualism inherent in the prevalent fixed state psychology and stressing the need to relate knowledge to its context, Dewey proclaimed the importance of environment, calling limited, views which isolated the person or elements of existence from environment and which deemed human nature incapable of change. By giving greater purview to culture and less to biological factors, Dewey's psychology was essentially optimistic and allied to the spirit of democracy that pervaded America of the late nineteenth century (Dykhuizen, 1973; Curti, 1953). This spirit, represented in political, social and economic progressive movements, supported and was supported by Dewey's functionalism. Few arenas were untouched by the dynamic progressivism-function-

alism combination. The Juvenile Justice System in which Healy developed his delinquency psychology, was one of its exemplary results.

Jane Addams founder of Hull House, a slum-based effort to help new immigrants settle in America, was not only instrumental in having Chicago start the first-ever Juvenile Court and, later, Court Clinic, but was well acquainted with Dewey and his philosophy (Parker, 1976; Hawes, 1971). Addams and her reformist associates had set themselves tasks that demanded philosophy grounded in a view of the person as functional, as adaptive behaviorally or mentally (This distinction was not formalized until Watson's manifesto in 1912), to environment. Dewey's functionalistic view provided just the perspective they needed.

Healy was hired in 1909 to head the Juvenile Psychopathic Institute for research into delinquent child behavior. He had been recommended by three persons commonly associated with mainstream functionalism. William James met Healy when the latter was a Harvard undergraduate enrolled in his psychology courses. Adolf Meyer, a progressive psychiatrist, was engaged in important work in pediatric neurology while at Worcester State Hospital in Massachusetts; an interested Healy sought him out while he was attending nearby Harvard University. James R. Angell, associate and friend of Dewey at the University of Chicago, and prime spokesperson for functionalistic psychology, first met Healy when they both attended a James

seminar at Harvard. They renewed their relationship during Healy's medical training prior to 1900 in Chicago, and following 1903 when Healy set up his neurology practice in Chicago. The philosophies and influence of such persons (the latter two served on the advisory council of the Juvenile Psychopathic Institute) help to explain the directions taken by Healy. The new psychological theories of the functionalists suggested that delinquency might be more largely the result of environmental influence and conditioning, of specific experiences and situations, than of fixed, but faulty, faculties of reasoning or of morality. Despite his denial of theoretical bias, Healy's work reflected, from the outset, an affiliation with this functionalistic view. It was evident in his strong distaste for explanations of crime, such as the "born criminal", which eliminated hope by assuming the effect of innate and unmodifiable deficiencies.

In 1915, Healy showed his debt to Dewey's progressive education model, product of functionalistic thinking, when he and Augusta Bronner (1915) constructed an outline for a model correctional institution. The goal of treatment was, they argued, to help the individual learn to cope with all aspects of the social environment. They, then, proceeded to describe physical equipment, selection of staff, the need for follow-up after release and, finally, treatment.

They proposed treatment, in the institution, geared to help the person adapt to the outside through individualiza-

tion of procedure, flexibility of programs, reinforcement before, but not exclusive of punishment, abundant and stimulating vocational, educational and social activities, development of friendship, helpfulness, and self-expression. Their education program emphasized that in each case subject matters were to be taught in a manner relevant to the juvenile's life situation and goals. Standard school curriculums would be of little use to the usual delinquent, wise in ways of the street but not having much formal schooling. So teaching of skills in arithmetic and writing had to take account of the juvenile's use of them. Instead of instruction in subjects that would never be used, the juvenile would be engaged in a curriculum that included work on political issues, social welfare agencies, community resources -- subjects that were presumed to be relevant to the student, but reflecting more the reformist aspirations of the functionalist approach in education (Cremin, 1964).

B. Clinical Psychology: Healy's Juvenile Psychopathic Clinic grounded its treatment in an assumption of human malleability and a belief that delinquents need not assume and helplessly submit to uncontrollable, biological, fates. Postulating mental processes to be among the primary causative agents, Healy's delinquency psychology programme insisted that behaviour, in most cases, could be modified either by changing the mental processes or by modifying factors in the environment.

Thinking along these lines may not have been original, even as regards delinquents, but it was, nonetheless, extremely

different from what was prevalent. Before commencing his work in Chicago, Healy toured major cities in the United States, looking for ways to diagnose and treat juvenile delinquents. Visits to the only psychological clinics, those of Lightner Witmer at the University of Pennsylvania (founded in 1896) and H. H. Goddard at Vineland, New Jersey (founded in 1906), as well as talks with E. L. Thorndike, William James, Adolf Meyer and J. R. Angell, among others, were helpful to Healy in formulating his programme for study and treatment. Having also been to Europe during the academic year 1906-1907 Healy may have been exposed to the treatment orientations of Freud (whose works greatly influenced him in later years), as well as to the French psychiatry of Janet and Binet.

Witmer's approach had particularly strong individualistic orientations. He was not, for the most part, interested in normative science and the formulation of scientific generalizations, but rather in being of help to the person by using psychological knowledge and skills to nurture functional adaptations. Witmer's early career followed that of James McKeen Cattell. He studied under Cattell, then followed him to Leipzig to train under Wundt. He returned to the University of Pennsylvania to take charge of the psychological laboratory left vacant with Cattell's transfer to Columbia. But, while Cattell focused on the study of individual differences through normatively based mental tests, Witmer, with the founding of his clinic, broke with Cattell and American psychological science, establishing

an approach that focused on the individual and treatment and that deemphasized laws and pure science (Brotemarkle, 1931; Reisman, 1976; Sexton, 1965). Healy's delinquency psychology may or may not have been directly shaped by his visit to Witmer's clinic. But, Witmer's concern for the individual has a counterpart throughout Healy's work, exemplified in the title and philosophy of his book, The Individual Delinquent (1915a).

Goddard's clinic, in contrast to Witmer's, had a highly scientific approach, and was, in actuality, more laboratory than clinic (Baldwin, 1911). With his mandate to study mental defect, Goddard had structured his work to produce scientific generalizations and laws on the subject. Healy may have been impressed with Goddard's array of tests for he, too, developed an exceptional battery of scales and measures once he assumed the position in Chicago (Bronner, Healy, Lowe and Shimberg, 1927). But, Healy's work, always dictated by the needs of Court-referred, individual delinquents, did not, as we have seen, reflect much of the Goddardian philosophy and practice of normative science.

Healy's trip to Europe occurred prior to any consideration of work in a juvenile delinquency clinic. Nonetheless, it followed three years in Chicago during which time, while neurologist and associate professor at the Chicago Polyclinic, he also managed to acquire a reputation for ability to treat children referred by the Juvenile Court (Levine and Levine, 1970). His interest sparked, he may well have surveyed

European psychiatry with treatment of delinquency in mind, and, no doubt, considered what he learned in Europe in the formulation of his clinical practice.

The emphasis in European psychiatry and psychology was much less normative and scientific than the orientation in America. The focus of pioneer works by Freud, Binet and Janet, among others, was the individual case, and the primary goal was treatment. Healy's programme for delinquency psychology, a mere two years after his tour to Europe, took on similar focus and goals.

In The Individual Delinquent, Healy credits Adolf Meyer with suggesting the use of the case history. Healy, as mentioned before, knew Meyer from the 1890s when as a student at Harvard, he became interested in Meyer's work in child psychiatry. In later years, Meyer served on the board of directors of the Juvenile Psychopathic Clinic, and with both Healy and Goddard on the advisory board of the American Association for Study of the Feebleminded. Meyer's development of the case history was a natural bi-product of his holistic approach to diagnosis and treatment whereby he kept biological, sociological and psychological factors in balanced perspective. The person was portrayed as an integrated unit, so that psychiatric problems were thought to reflect maladjustment of the whole person rather than the mental or physical side alone. Adequate treatment required that all aspects of the patient's life, past and present, had to be understood;

neither biological nor psychological functions could be ignored. Meyer's non-dualistic approach, when applied to juvenile delinquency, countered the then-prevalent approaches grounded in biological-organic causation. Without overemphasizing psychological alternatives, Meyer's approach provided a balanced base for study of delinquency. Healy's programme not only used Meyer's case history, but assumed, with Meyer, the necessity in studying all aspects of the person. However, where Meyer's philosophy was holistic, stressing adaptation of the individual as a totality, Healy's orientation was analytic and multidimensional, dividing the person's problems and causes of them into biological, psychological and sociological spheres. Treatment in Healy's programme meant counteracting the effect of specific causative factors ranked as primarily and secondarily productive of delinquency symptoms. In Meyer's system, symptoms were regarded as merely inappropriate reactions of the whole organism; to alleviate specific symptoms attached to specified causes failed to treat underlying patterns of maladaptation which would have been countered by his psychobiological holism.

B. The Criminological Context

Delinquency psychologies, to be understood in their disciplinary contexts, must deal with both theoretical and practical factors in work of a criminological variety. In the theoretical sphere, like other professional social sciences,

criminology constantly advanced during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as ever greater numbers turned to it for explanations of the phenomena of crime. The deterministic bent inherent in the positive criminology following 1870, negated free will and, instead, sought cause. It, moreover, turned emphasis, for the first time, from the offence to the offender, crimes being seen as the anti-social acts of dangerous classes. Following application of Darwinian principles to the criminological sphere, most theories sought justification for protection of the good members of society from the unfit criminals in causes that described significant differences between the two groups, the law-abiding and the deviant. In practical areas, especially in the United States, Court systems took on new looks in response to change in attitudes toward crime, especially crime committed by youth. The Juvenile Justice System raised to the fore the issue of responsibility for criminal action, asking - whether it lay in nature or in nurture, in the person or in forces outside the person, in fixed or in changeable factors. The progressively oriented, ever-optimistic persons attached to the Juvenile Courts stood solidly on the side of environmental causative factors that could be altered through appropriate treatment. On the other hand, persons outside the so-called progressive stream generally held a contrary view, tending to fix the problem in the nature of the criminal.

Healy and Goddard reflected the criminological factors

in varying amounts according to different contexts. On the whole, Healy was always much more keenly attuned to the spirit of the criminological field. Goddard backed into criminological topics such as responsibility (1914) and juvenile delinquency (1921) by virtue of other aspects of his programme. Healy met the issues as a first step. Where both were equally concerned with psychological matters, Healy was much more concerned than Goddard with criminological theories and legal topics. Healy's greater emphasis, in this regard, was understandable in light of their very different foci and goals: where his job was to diagnose and treat the delinquents referred to him by the Court, Goddard's purpose was first of all to research mental defect; it so happened that his studies in this area frequently found it to be correlated with delinquency, and, thus, Goddard's interest in delinquency was aroused.

1. Goddard and Criminological Contexts

Goddard's delinquency psychology could not be easily traced, in a causal sense, to previous criminological theories and developments. It, nonetheless, reflected in large measure, the attitude, the philosophy and many of the assumptions of antecedent criminological work. Curti (1926) held that Goddard's theory of delinquency as product of inborn mental weakness, measurable by psychological tests, merely supplanted the equally simple and analagous theory previously advanced by Lombroso in

the 1870s. Lombroso (1911) had formulated the principle of "criminal atavism", arguing that persons are born to crime when they are, physically, throwbacks to more primitive humans. Based on anthropometric measures of skulls, Lombroso concluded that characteristics of primitives, e.g. low foreheads, lobeless ears and receding chins, were more frequently found among criminals. Goddard's theory, advanced some forty years later, had been influenced by developments on many fronts, and, of course, differed in its particulars from Lombroso. But Curti's contention, as above, had much merit: in essential ways, Goddard's psychology of delinquency was merely a "New Lombrosianism" that still attributed crime to inborn, immutable characteristics. Goddard departed from Lombroso in his belief that the powers of mental deficiency, rather than atavism, created the criminal. But, the theories had so much in common otherwise that Goddard (1912) tried to reinterpret Lombroso's discredited theory in light of his own. He offered the opinion that the born criminal might have been a type of feeblemindedness, productive of crime by virtue of circumstances. And again:

> The so-called criminal type is merely a type of feeblemindedness, a type misunderstood and mistreated, driven into criminality for which he is well fitted by nature. It is hereditary feeble-mindedness, not hereditary criminality that accounts for the conditions. We have only seen the end product and failed to recognize the character of the raw material (1914, p. 8).

2. Healy and Criminological Contexts

While Goddard's delinquency psychology was more clearly understood in other contexts, Healy's program, through and through, reflected a criminological orientation. Even while he was casting off all previously conceived classifications and theories in favor of a Baconian accumulation of facts, Healy's work affected an attitude that was reminiscent of criminological precursors.

As observed in the previous chapter, Healy despaired of the state of criminology when he began his work with the Juvenile Psychopathic Clinic. He resolved to engage in research that would set matters right, feeling that while criminology had a plethora of theories, it offered very little help to those persons having to deal with the problems of criminals and delinquents. He sensed that theorists had too quickly formulated classification schema, and that they had failed to adequately research the phenomena of delinquency. In a letter explaining how he intended to explore the subject he (Parker, 1976) wrote:

> I have been over the field fairly thoroughly and I am convinced of the need for a work that may be as classical as that of Lombroso, that may be much more scientifically founded and a thousand times more practically beneficial.

Criminological theories, in themselves, provide less than optimal help in viewing Healy, simply because he assumed

so adamant an anti-theoretical stance. The criminology of Lombroso was reflected methodologically insofar as both he and Healy adopted hard determinism in their study of criminals. But, in content, attitude and other dimensions of scientific approach, they differed as much as Goddard and Healy, if not more. Healy did, however, reflect in his writings an awareness of, and sensitivity to, the criminologies of some who followed Lombroso. He praised the pioneer work of Lombroso and Ferri, and in concluding that delinquency was infinitely complex, he mirrored the criminological thought of Ferri (1917, p. 139) who had written: "Crime is a phenomenon of complex origin and the result of biological, physical and social conditions."

The initiation of the Juvenile Court led within a decade to the creation of Healy's position (Parker, 1976). While he was ever interested in the scientific study of delinquency, on the clinical level he was performing a helping function. His job was to recommend disposition and treatment to the Court after a thorough study of the delinquent. With this medical model orientation, it is not surprising that Healy mirrored its spirit, dispelling pessimistic notions about delinquency and ability to treat, replacing them with optimism born of scientific inquiry into the nature of delinquency causation and methods of treatment. Like the Juvenile Justice System designed to provide a child with the care, custody and discipline which should be given by its parents,

Healy's work reflected a desire to function as parent-figure providing individualized sympathy and an understanding of influences that bore on the child. He wanted society to expend more energy on bettering conditions for people, firmly convinced of the value of nurturant efforts. In a letter to the benefactor of the Juvenile Psychopathic Clinic, Mrs. E. S. Dummer, some years after he had left Chicago, Healy wrote: "My job seems to be plain, to continue to accumulate undeniable evidences of the benefit and sometimes entirely therapeutic effects of better nurture and better education" (Parker, 1976, p. 285).

Fink's (1938) history of criminological thought in the United States marked 1915, with the publication of Healy's The Individual Delinquent, as the point of transition from the old to the new criminology. Where prior to Healy's magnum opus, the criminal had invariably been classified as a fixed type whether anthropological, biological, moral, mental, etc., Healy introduced criminology to the need for individual case study, to a view of the human (and delinquent) personality as dynamic and essentially malleable, and to a larger emphasis on the psychological and environmental-social components in behavior. Where criminological theories and classification schema, before his book, had been largely founded on intuition and poorly constructed studies, Healy introduced scientific rigor to studies of the delinquent by advocating use of case histories, matched sample comparisons and follow-ups, and by carefully avoiding generalizations to cause except in the individual case.

CHAPTER IV

THE EXTERNAL CONTEXTS OF DELINQUENCY PSYCHOLOGIES

This section examines delinquency psychologies in contexts external to developments in the fields of psychology and criminology. That is, it attempts to highlight and to understand the works of Goddard and Healy by relating them to social, moral, political, etc. factors represented in various movements and "isms". The movements were purposefully chosen to provide the most encompassing ground for our view of the delinquency psychologies.

A. Progressivism and Environmentalism

The Progressive reform crusade, exemplified in the Child Saving Movement, in creation of reforms in the Juvenile Justice System, has traditionally been portrayed as benevolent, humanitarian, enlightened and socially responsible (Schlossman, 1977; Lubove, 1965; Hawes, 1971; Holl, 1971; Mennel, 1973). Commencing in the late nineteenth century, Progressivism is represented as an effort to remake certain segments (e.g. slums, immigrants, and delinquents) and environments (political, educational, legal) of society in the ideological mould of its mainly upper-middle class advocates. It optimistically believed that with sufficient application of reform policies, both American society and the individual would benefit. Histories that viewed the Progressive era in this essentially Whiggish manner have taken at face value the self-portrayals

of those who deemed themselves to be child savers or unselfish benefactors of children adversely affected by class, ethnicity and environment.

Some reformist historians of the American Juvenile Justice System (Platt, 1974; Rothman, 1979) have argued, from a Marxist perspective, that the spirit behind child saving and the Juvenile Court was actually coercive and conservative. They have demonstrated how the reformist actions were the product of economic policies construed by big business to preserve itself, rather than the humanitarian product of an enlightened and socially responsible middle class. The child saving movement, as applied to reforms in the Juvenile Justice System, was, in this Marxist view, an attempt by industrialists to achieve order and stability at all levels of American life -- without disrupting the existing class structure and distribution of wealth. The Juvenile Justice System toward this end, sanctioned stratification of the society by age, and, furthermore, reinforced the concept of parens patriac, placing responsibility for official action in a system of professionals not unlike parents in purpose, but with incomparably greater powers of control.

The Marxist account is convincingly borne out by much of the history of the Juvenile Justice System. However, it fails to make sense of the actions of those persons caught up in the spirit of reform, who steadfastly believed in their capacities to care and treat, and who were not aware that their

behavior implicitly maintained the position of the corporate elite (Empey, 1979). It fails, moreover, to distinguish between those persons, such as Goddard and Healy, whose utterly diverse psychologies sprang from different ground. Certainly, both may have served the corporate elite, but if treating them as such means ignoring the profound differences in their approaches, then historical reconstruction will have been too narrowly delimited.

Whether shaped by the corporate elite or by other more benevolent and progressive factors, the reformism of the child-care movement was fundamentally reflected in Healy's delinquency psychology. His work on delinquency was fully in the mainstream of Progressive thought, The Juvenile Psychopathic Institute having been founded for similar reasons, by many of the same persons responsible for the birth of the Illinois Juvenile Court. The Institute, as an extension to the Court, was, thus, testimony to its presumed ability to "reach into the soul-life of the child" (Mack, 1925, p. 315) for purposes of determining the best, most effective disposition. Healy's works argued that favorable changes in the social environments of youngsters could prevent delinquency and promote both mental health and social progress (Burnham, 1960). He protested against biological and hereditarian conceptions of the delinquent which denied all hope of progressive change, against normative conceptions failing to pay deference to the individual in treatment, and against premature theorizing and classification which

allowed one to ignore further information. Such actions and beliefs by Healy thoroughly exemplified the spirit and attitude which inspired his Institute and its allignment, personal and philosophical, with Progressivism.

Goddard's psychology of delinquency, by virtue of its contrast with Healy's, demonstrates that Progressivism operated in variant, even contradictory, manners. While he was not directly affiliated with the movement and advocated strategies entirely at odds with Healy's, Goddard, nonetheless, showed a strain of progressive thought. As a staunch member of the eugenics movement, promoting segregation and sterilization of feebleminded and criminal persons, to ameliorate social ills and improve the quality of American heredity, Goddard represented a progressive attempt to deal with the non-malleable aspects of people. He cherished a conviction that, by erasing the bogey of its feebleminded population, American society would suffer from less delinquency and would be a better place in which to live.

The difference between brands of progressive thought in Healy and Goddard lay in their disagreement over the roles of heredity and environment. Because Goddard emphasized the power of genetically determined mental defect as cause of social ills, his control programme was progressive for that portion of society with normal intelligence, but hardly so for the unfortunates who were rated as having some degree of genetic-fixed, mental debility. Healy's emphasis on the

healing potential of a favorable social environment was much more fully endowed with progressive orientation.

Environmentalism, reflected, more than any other influence the spirit and philosophy of the Progressive movement, although it also reflected evolutionary theory (especially Lamarckian) and the rise of Functionalist thought. Healy's confidence in the curative powers of appropriately modified environment ran deeper than anyone in the area of delinquency prior to him. After outlining a particularly thorough programme for use with delinquents in institutions, he and co-author, Augusta Bronner, justified environmentalism with child saving progressivism:

> If our ideas of constructive efforts appear complex and difficult, it must be remembered that they are not any more so than the details of education and home life in any well conducted school and family. As for ultimate values accruing from such efforts -- well, we are told that in Heaven there is much rejoicing over even one delinquent saved (Healy and Bronner, 1915, p. 316).

B. Social Darwinism, Hereditarianism and Eugenics

In the writings of the various persons associated with the philosophy, including Herbert Spencer, William Graham Sumner, and Lester Ward, Social Darwinism, like Progressivism,

assumed different, sometimes conflicting, shapes. While rarely the product of Darwin's own hand, or even a use of his work to which he would have agreed, Social Darwinism was the extension, interpretation and application, of his principles (the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest) to the social context (Hofstadter, 1945). In America, as with Progressivism, Social Darwinism served as the philosophical rationale and justification for a large number of reforms, in an expansive variety of social and cultural arenas. From business to education to the treatment of delinquents, the impact of Social Darwinistic thinking was felt (Loewenberg, 1969; Russett, 1976; Daniels, 1968).

Spencer's version of Social Darwinism (1896) advocated a policy of laissez-faire, following the belief that if left alone to struggle for existence, those most fit would prevail. It sponsored absolute freedom in individual enterprise, as well as diminished political and social interference with the evolutionary course of nature. Feeding upper-class justifications of democracy, that the eminent and rich were more meritorious, Spencer's philosophy was one which the corporate elite could embrace. It gave them hope that through capitalistic struggle and competition, America would become a far better society than had been known before -- without effecting great change, if any, in the class structure and distribution of wealth.

In its Spencerian design, Social Darwinism was Pro-

gressivism's opposite number. Progressivism, as seen in the last section, preached reform through modifications to environmental factors. Social Darwinism, on the other hand, advocated noninterference, believing that nature would run its course in the direction best suited to human needs. In this respect, the two philosophies were incompatible, if not mutually exclusive. One would expect them to be held by different persons. Yet, just as both Healy and Goddard were shown to be progressive, both, it will be argued, were Social Darwinians, albeit of different types.

The American business community welcomed Spencer's laissez-faire policy and, for sometime during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was in great vogue among the elite of American business. Yet, corporate leaders of the same time have been shown, by recent historians (Weinstein, 1969; Wiebe, 1967), to have backed reform called progressive. The resolution to this contradiction seems to be in the difference in levels at which the two philosophies operated. Laissez-faire was primarily engaged to prevent government sponsorship of hastily conceived, expensive reform projects. Reform, however, which promised to enhance business concerns through social and political change, drew the support of business and, thus, worked in concert with laissez-faire. The business person could pragmatically support both reform grounded in assumptions of human malleability, and laissez-faire based on belief in inherited, fixed characteristics and

survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence.

Reformism that functioned as Social Darwinism is frequently associated with the evolutionary sociology of Lester Frank Ward (1883). He disagreed with the position of Spencer and Sumner, that to eliminate social problems one need only wait for evolution to run its course, that reform and charity are useless, harmful (to natural evolutionary processes) and absurd. Ward agrued that by controlling its environment, society could and, even should, shape the processes of evolution in its own interest and in accordance with social purposes.

John Dewey, previously discussed as a Functionalist, was not surprisingly, a close friend and philosophical ally of the Chicago Progressives. To the extent, however, that he (1910) invoked Darwinian principles, he was also a member of the Social Darwinian cohort. He applied principles of evolution to the individual, especially in education, maintaining as Ward had done with respect to society, that by control and appropriate change in the environment, one could occasion beneficial evolution of the individual psyche. Children in his school were to gain social insight, responsibility and the capacity to function cooperatively (not competitively, as in laissez-faire Darwinism) in society. Education was thus, tailored to fit the needs of the individual child and, as well, the goals of the society, for, Dewey argued "in directing the activities of the young members of society, society determined its own future in determining that of the young" (1916, p. 49).

The person, in his system, was malleable under the influence of environment. Personality and behavior were not fixed and immutable from birth, but rather, as products of various social and cultural conditions, were capable of being altered to fit situational needs.

Elements of both laissez-faire and reform Social Darwinism were reflected in the delinquency psychologies of Healy and Goddard. Healy's programme, the epitome of Progressivism, showed a debt to the spirit and philosophy of Dewey's reformist use of evolutionary principles. Almost all programmes for delinquents prior to him had sponsored control or laissez-faire measures. But with his focus on the individual and, his concern with environmental effects, Healy generated an approach, diagnostic and treatment, to delinquency firmly grounded in human adaptability. He proposed explanations of, and proposed policies for, delinquents, inspiring optimism that positive and progressive change, through education and treatment, was possible in most cases of delinquent behavior.

Laissez-faire Darwinism, in the philosophies of Spencer and Sumner, represented an exceedingly pessimistic attitude toward attempts to help the individual delinquent. While it failed to go as far as Lombroso, whose criminal had been doomed from birth by inherited atavism, it dissuaded reform for delinquents by situating the problem in the relationship of less fit individuals to the demanding arena of existence. The resolution of the delinquency problem, if any, lay in the

fitness of the delinquent, that is, in his or her genetically determined capacity to adapt to the environment. The possibility of adaptation remained. But, given the dependence of laissez-faire Darwinism on inner, inherited factors, it could not be promoted or encouraged through treatment or like reform.

The delinquency psychology of Goddard mirrored the tone of laissez-faire Darwinism in its pessimism and belief that delinquents, ruled by inborn defects, were not likely to be helped. However, Goddard was not nearly so willing to let evolution run its course without interference. While his views on heredity discouraged the use of individual treatment for delinquents, they inspired him to advocate and support programmes for segregation and sterilization of feebleminded delinquents. The "laws of heredity", derived from Mendelian genetics and supported in the human realm by his study of the Kallikaks (1912), with the Binet test for detection of feeblemindedness, provided Goddard with a clearly functional order. By dividing people into two categories, feebleminded and normal, and explaining the difference genetically, Goddard was able to develop policies of particular value in the care of institutional populations. The delinquent, classified within the same framework that explained why hope for treatment was useless, was handily managed by eugenic policies of segregation and sterilization.

Heredity had not always spelled such finality and pessimism. Rosenberg (1974) maintains that during the second

third of the nineteenth century, the mood characterizing use of hereditarian ideas was one of confidence -- that's people's most fundamental attributes could and should be manipulated. Heredity was cause for striving, not despair, providing the means by which the well-informed could bring about improvement in individuals and society.

The transformation of hereditarian thought from such optimism to Goddard's negativism, reflected the influence on heredity concepts of factors such as the growth of institutional populations (Rothman, 1971; Tyor, 1979; Grob, 1973), an increasingly urban and secular society demanding professional explanations of alien phenomena (Haskell, 1977; Lubove, 1965) Lombroso's popular application of heredity and "degeneration" to the study of criminals (Fink, 1938; Rosenberg, 1974), and the lineage studies demonstrating the horrors and expense of inherited defect (Dugdale, 1877). As time passed, as these and other factors came to bear, hereditarian ideas were increasingly used to explain criminal phenomena in more deterministic terms. The optimistic environmentalism which had characterized mid-century usage of hereditarian conceptions was gradually undermined and replaced by deterministic, biological reductionism, pessimism, and emphasis on solutions involving authoritarian control through segregation and sterilization. By the end of the nineteenth century, the eugenics movement had come into being in all but name. And, by the time Goddard praised eúgenic policies as having "untold value for

the benefit of our present society and the humanity of the future" (1911, p. 516), there was no way that hereditarian concepts could be retrieved from their association with fixity and pessimism as regards the individual delinquent. Mendel's laws of genetics had been recovered and popularized, and Eugenic Societies had been formed in both England, under Francis Galton and Karl Pearson, and in the United States, under Charles B. Davenport, to protect their respective societies from the threat of hereditary contamination by those deemed racially and socially unfit (Pickens, 1968; Haller, 1963).

Goddard's understanding of the heredity of feeblemindedness, witnessed in his famous study of the Kallikaks (1912), clearly demonstrated how hereditarian concepts had been transformed. Claiming that his work constituted a perfect demonstration of the laws of heredity, Goddard was convinced that use of environmental factors as cause or treatment for feeblemindedness had been ruled out. Comparing his Kallikaks with the Jukes study done 40 years before, he argued: "If the Jukes family were of normal intelligence, a change of environment would have worked wonders and would have saved society from the horrible blot. But if they were feebleminded, then no amount of good environment could have made them anything else than feebleminded" (1912, p. 60). Goddard promoted the Kallikak study as proof positive that feeblemindedness was hereditary and that it was behind a large portion of the crime and poverty in American society. It justified the use of

eugenic sterilization and segregation measures to prevent further human suffering and deterioration of American heredity standards.[7]

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding history was a radical departure from traditional history of psychology. Not only was the subject matter one which had previously received negligible attention, but the methods employed were unique to the field. Contextual history, where the subject matter is viewed in various backgrounds and settings, was brought to bear on the study of the unheralded past of early twentieth century delinquency psychologies in America.

Our point of departure was in the assumptions behind traditional history of psychology. Inspired by similar movements in other fields, the thesis challenged and replaced the assumptions which have directed historical inquiries in psychology. An absolutist position and belief in objectivity, shown to be unfounded, were replaced by principles of relativism and acceptance of the role played by value and bias in science and history. Moreover, non-positivistic philosophies of science and externalistic, nondisciplinary perspectives were used to supplement and modify, where necessary, the positivism and internalism of traditional history, where cumulative growth of disciplinary knowledge has been viewed as the only worthwhile subject of historical study. The thesis argued that knowledge grows in many ways, not always logically or rationally and, certainly, not always cumulatively. And, it maintained that events, ideas and persons in unrelated, nondisciplinary

spheres (social, political, religious, moral, etc.) are frequently related to knowledge growth in important ways.

Throughout the historical analyses, two programmes of delinquency psychology were set against each other, compared and contrasted. The programmes of H. H. Goddard and William Healy related to the use of psychology in matters of delinquency, assumed basically diverse scientific structures and were best understood within totally divergent contexts.

The emphasis of the thesis was not on the determination of causes of delinquency psychologies. Rather, it concentrated on increasing understanding by coming at the subject matter from a number of different angles, placing it in as many contexts, backgrounds and settings as helped to create a well-rounded picture of the psychology of delinquency.

Three main contexts were employed. The scientific structure context looked at the work of Goddard and Healy in terms of their subject matter, scientific method, theory of causation, and their views on measurement. Goddard studied the delinquent as a product of feeblemindedness as measured by scales of intelligence; he failed to look at delinquency in other terms, gathered data to suit his already formed conclusions, saw delinquency as a simple by-product of feeblemindedness which, in turn, was a product of hereditary defect, and, finally, put all his faith in one measurement device -- the Binet Scale. Healy, on the other hand, throwing off the thinking of previous theorists, studied the individual delinquent

(recidivist) without preconceived notion as to cause of delinquency. The delinquent was viewed from a multitude of perspectives and with a battery of measurement devices.

The disciplinary-internal context viewed delinquency psychology in terms of events and ideas in the fields of psychology and criminology. In psychological contexts, Goddard's work was found to reflect the methodological style and evolutionary base of G. Stanley Hall, the normative and social (eugenic) purposes of mental tests as proposed by Francis Galton, and an extremely close relationship to Alfred Binet, if not all of his work. Healy's work mirrored the functionalistic thinking of John Dewey, J. R. Angell, Adolf Meyer, William James, and, furthermore, showed similarities to the individualistic orientation of the clinical psychologist, Lightner Witmer. In criminological contexts, Goddard was found to be uncannily similar to Lombroso, whereas Healy, by his own making, reflected no criminological theorists prior to him. In more practical terms, Healy, of course, reflected the philosophical leanings of his associates within the Illinois Juvenile Court System.

The nondisciplinary-external context attempted to understand delinquency psychology in terms of events and ideas in social, political, moral, etc. spheres as they were represented in movements and crusades. Where Healy was seen to be the ideal reflection of progressivist and environmentalist reform movements in the realm of delinquency, Goddard was the

quintessential Social Darwinist, hereditarian and eugenist. The portrayals were muddied by the fact that Healy did not fully deny the role of heredity, the import of evolutionary ideas or the value of eugenics; nevertheless, he strongly favored the opposing views. Our picture of Goddard is also made less than clear by his variety of eugenic progressivism; still the impact of Goddard's work was basically characterized by its pessimistic tenor.

The purpose of the preceding historical endeavours was neither to expose the roots of modern psychology and criminology, nor to make a case for the present use of past philosophy or method. It was, rather, to challenge the assumptions behind historical processes which could ignore or forget aspects of the discipline important to their time. The assumptions challenged, we provided an alternative historiographic framework, and an example of it in use, for reconstructing the history of psychology.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The words "crime" and "delinquency" have been used interchangably throughout the thesis. They are largely equivalent, with one important distinction: "delinquency" usually refers to the crimes committed by youth. The term "offence", in the main, has been avoided, since its intent is more legalistic. The term "delinquency" was not always associated with youth. But, in mid-nineteenth century Britain, the two were connected in the concept of "juvenile delinquency" (May, 1973). The concept became a formal part of American criminology with its applications to development of the Juvenile Justice System (Fox, 1970). Platt (1969), interestingly, argues that juvenile delinquency itself, not merely the term, was the invention of social reformers.

[2]The time period covered could not be exactly defined. In the main, however, the earlier works of Goddard and Healy provided the major source of data. For Goddard, the period 1909-1921 contained the materials that made up his programme in the psychology of delinquency. Following 1921, with increasing criticism of his work (e.g. Curti, 1926; Murchison, 1919-1922), Goddard took a respite from published polemic on matters of interest herein. But, in 1928, he readdressed the issue of feeblemindedness in light of attitude changes which had replaced his own earlier ones. He agreed that his criteria

(under 12 years) for feeblemindedness had been too high, that heredity was not a unit characteristic as he had assumed, that environment and education could create change in behavior. His revisions were not as radical as his disparagers might have desired. For instance, he still wondered if 12 years of age had appeal as criterion insofar as it signalled the onset of adolescence and physiological changes which might encourage mental functions transcending that of the feebleminded. He continued to insist that intelligence was inherited and, therefore, unalterable! His argument for use of educational and environmental factors applied to morons, (that is, to those adults who fell in the mental age range of 7 to 12 years), but it did not apply to those who scored below a mental age of 7 years. Renaming the latter group "mental cripples", he argued that they required "special attention and segregation" being "outside the pale of citizenship" (1928, p. 226). The 1928 paper was, thus, a negligible change from the programme reflected in his writings to 1921; it was Goddard's somewhat desperate attempt to salvage some respect for his discredited position. He was prepared to make small concessions, but was unwilling to give up fundamental assumptions which had been undermined in the years following publication of World War I Army Intelligence Test data. Goddard was not alone in the reticence to alter his attitude: Lewis Terman, Robert M. Yerkes, and others scorned all efforts to discredit the work they had done prior to the World War. (see Young, 1924; Tuddenham, 1962; Marks,

1976-1977; Pozovich, 1978; Samelson, 1977; Pastore, 1978; Cronbach, 1975; and Shephard, 1980 for histories of debates on the assumptions of intelligence tests).

While the official beginning of Healy's programme is readily fixed in 1908, with his assumption of the new position at the Juvenile Psychopathic Institute, an end date for his programme is much less easily determined. Healy's programme, at its end (see Healy and Bronner, 1948), was pretty much consistent with its origins, seeming to be a logical extension of the early work -- a continuous progression without radical shifts.

Still, this thesis focused on the earlier years of Healy's programme, up to approximately 1920, so that the time span would approximate and be consistent with that of Goddard, and because the philosophy of his work was much more explicitly stated in initial publications.

[3]The term "intelligence" is currently plagued by confusion and controversy, with psychologists taking sides on the issue of nature -vs- nurture in the production of racial differences in intelligence (e.g. Jensen, 1969; Kamin, 1975). Shephard (1980) holds that the operational definition of intelligence (that is, "intelligence is what intelligence tests test") has been effectively equated with the concept itself, so that, discussants of intelligence inevitably fail to observe that their data is based solely on intelligence quotients from

scales. The resulting problems have led psychology to the Courtroom where the tests have been convicted of racism (Shephard, 1980).

This thesis uses the term intelligence in its operational sense only: as the score or quotient on a test of intelligence. Being historical in its aim, it does not attempt to remove the concept from its operational trappings. It, instead, observes that the problems that now take psychology to Court were also present in the initial American usage of intelligence tests. Not surprisingly, Goddard and Healy have direct counterparts today.

[4]The percentage of feebleminded persons among delinquents had its topical beginnings as soon as the intelligence test was applied to delinquent groups. It was a natural and logical bi-product of the normative assumptions underlying the use of intelligence tests.

Answers to the issue depended on a huge variety of factors that were not accounted for in studies, such that percentages of delinquents found to be feebleminded ranged over the entire spectrum of possible results showing delinquents inferior to normals. Intrigued by the huge differences, a number of persons reviewed the literature prior to World War I, before the Army Intelligence Test data (indicating that 47% of the drafted men were feebleminded) had forced changes in criterion for feeblemindedness (Crafts and Doll, 1917; Miner,

1918). Once adjustments to new criterion (set by Army test data) had been made, many began to gather new data (e.g. Erickson, 1928), while others began to wonder what effect the new criteria would have on old (pre-World War I) studies (e.g. Sutherland, 1930, Zeleny, 1933). Sutherland's (1930) analysis of 342 studies of the "criminal intelligence" of 175,000 offenders, and Zeleny's (1933) similar analysis of 163 investigations of 62,000 offenders on whom the Binet scale had been used, showed the following percentages of feebleminded delinquents:

SUTHERLAND	MEAN PERCENT	ZELENY	MEDIAN PERCENT
1910-1914	51% (50 studies)	1911-1915	49.2%
1915-1919	28% (142 studies)	1916-1920	30.0%
1920-1924	21% (104 studies)	1921-1925	27.1%
1925-1928	20% (46 studies)	1926-1930	28.0%

The percentages of mental deficiency among delinquents and criminals, juvenile and adult, dropped with the dissemination of Army testing results and with the publication of Brigham (1923) which demanded re-evaluation of previous conclusions. Cautions against naive use of Binet testing procedures and results were not altogether new. They had been expressed prior to World War I by a few persons such as Wallin (1912; 1915-1916) and Healy in several places, including his test, Honesty: "We must confess to a lack of sympathy with highly colored statements and immaturely considered statistics that have been in the last few years before the public. The realities of the situation are bad enough: there is no need

of any propaganda by exaggerations" (1915b, p. 121).

[5]Goddard did not describe the criteria for his assessment of scale validity, but his writings left little doubt that they were merely his personal, non-scale, ratings of intelligence, his intuitions regarding the concept.

[6]Healy's orientation in this respect highlights an important difference between him and Goddard that is not adequately pursued herein. Healy may be viewed as operating out of a medical model, while Goddard's model may be thought of as primarily scientific. That is Healy's work was dictated by treatment initiatives, where Goddard, the researcher, aimed to establish norms and criteria for more social purposes. The "pure vs applied" dichotomy does not seem as useful as the medical vs scientific one insofar as both were guided ultimately by the aim to apply their understandings.

[7]Haller (1963) takes Healy's statement: "mental defect forms the largest single cause of delinquency" (1915, p. 447), and his use of a Binet Scale intimately connected with the eugenic policies of Goddard, Terman and Yerkes, to mean that he was a moderate eugenist for a time. Haller's data may be supplemented with Healy's argument that "through studies of the eugenists, and advances in medical and psychologic knowledge, crime will be found indirectly related to heredity in ways most important for society to recognize," (Spaulding and

Healy, 1913-1914, p. 857). Despite these grounds for Haller's reasoned contention, this thesis saw little to be agained from viewing Healy's work within the context of eugenics. It does not deny the probability that eugenics affected Healy's work. But, it holds that its effects were shortlived, of negligible impact, and not worthy of status as a historical context herein.

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