DEPERSONALIZATION: A BASIS FOR THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY

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ABSTRACT

What follows is an inquiry into science via an analysis of certain concrete occurrences, situated in both a medical and academic setting. The analysis allows me to explore the distinction between individual experience and collective experience or unified experience. And more specifically, it allows me to inquire into science as grounded in the ideal of unified experience.

The concrete happenings cover-over necessary conventions, conventions which can be detected via a consideration of such themes as: The Subjectivity-Objectivity Distinction: A Call for Unified Experience; Authority: A Function of Group Membership; Criticism: A Function of Group Membership; and Research Requirements: A Call for Unified Experience. To organize discussion about the occurrences in this way, allows me to reveal the achieved character of the occurrences; it makes thematic what is assumed concretely.

Chapter One focuses on the inattentiveness of a nurse as an occasion to recognize the subjectivity-objectivity distinction. The distinction reflects the separation of adequate from inadequate speech. Adequate speech is within the legitimate frame of scientific speech and requires the unification of the structure of experience.

Chapter Two focuses on an instance of layman speech which

is couched in the scientific mode but dismissed as invalid. Authoritative speech within medicine is a function of the speaker rather than the nature of the speech. We see that membership within the medical community is important in how statements are perceived and in whether speech is considered authoritative.

Chapter Three further considers the importance of membership as a basis for "serious" speech. The possibility of distinguishing serious from non-serious speech introduces the possibility of criticism. We see that criticism becomes restricted to members, and functions in preserving community. It is a method of making reference to the authority of the community.

The final chapter deals with research requirements as another instance in which the unification of the structure of experience is required. Reviewing the literature is considered as a research requirement which preserves the relevance of problems for community members. So the very existence of a literature review serves to remind us that our problematic must be communally problematic.

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INTRODUCTION

It is when we find ourselves facing a group or community that we become aware of the existence of a larger concern than that of one individual for another. It is when we hear such remarks as: "That's the way the system works", "I don't make the rules", "That's not sociology", "You're not a doctor", that we become aware of a concern for the very preservation of community. It is through such remarks that we hear the voice of a particular vision of reality; a voice which informs us as to the way things 'really' are, and hence a voice suggesting law. It is a voice responsible for a history of heresies, as it bears witness to our intolerance of different fundamental structures of experience. It is the voice of consensus, and concern for community; a voice which makes certain claims to what 'is' and what 'is not'.

It has been noticed by many social theorists that the accent of reality (social reality) are given to those experiences which are beyond the individual, i.e., general, collective experiences.[1] But as reality is attributed to aspects of experience which are collective, this occurs at the expense of other aspects: those which are individual. By pointing to the distinction between individual

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[1]Among those who have suggested this, are such writers as: E. Durkheim, T. Kuhn, A. Schutz, P. Berger, and S. Freud.

experience and collective experience, we establish domains where the different versions of reality can be addressed. But what of the tension between these domains? Simmel (1950) has suggested that the essential feature of human life is precisely this tension between the individual and the group. The distinction between individual experience and collective experience can be localized in terms of their prominence in different situations. For example, the condition of being a hospital patient is one which represents individual experience. The patient is concerned for his personal recovery, and not for the preservation of a community. On the other hand, the scientist, as an ideal type construct, is involved in a practice which is said to exclude personal interest. The priority of individual lived experience is relegated to the background. Science stresses the significance of de-personalized or collective experience. In science general or law-like experience takes on the force of reality, and is perceived as 'real' while those of other kinds are seen as 'unreal'. The concern of one individual for another becomes overshadowed by a concern for membership within a community, as well as one's faithfulness to it. This replacement can be a source of anxiety for the individual. Every actual "fulfillment of relation between men means acceptance of others" (Buber, 1970:69). What happens to the status of a person when one's concern is for preserving the unity of community? The personal becomes uninteresting. It is relevant only in so far as it secures community. If what guides one's attention is a

concern for membership, then the individual as individual becomes overshadowed. Personal qualities become a burden in dealing with others. The life between person and person appears to be retreating in the face of the collective. This is nowhere better manifested than in the tension between an individual who cares for the other as a person, and the collective which is indifferent to everything personal. This conflict is a source of anxiety, the appeasement of which serves to produce the relevance of this discussion.

What follows is an analysis of certain tension laden situations;[2] situations which relate to the tension between the individual and the group and more particularily, the tension between the individual and the scientific community. I wish to suggest that a community such as the scientific community, values a certain way of relating, which in turn, presumes a certain relationship to our experiences. By focusing on those situations in which individual concerns conflict with a collective's conception of reality, I hope to expose their respective"forms of life".[3]

In this inquiry I will explore the distinction between individual experience and general experience or experience-under-law, by examining examples of it. This distinction can be stated

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[2]According to Kierkegaard, a 'situation' has to do with a certain stage in a life-journey, filled with circumstance and other people, which is brought to the focus of that person's care and concern.

[3]My reference "form of life" relies upon Ludwig Wittgenstein's similiar usuage. For clarification see his Philosophical Investigation, trans. G.F.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), p.8 and p.11.

as a distinction between those experiences which are externalized by science (collective experience), and those which orient directly toward the continuous awareness of one's own existence (individual experience). This thesis treats individual experience and collective experience as a topic of empirical inquiry by analyzing actual concrete happenings. Hence it is tied to the author's personal experiences of life, and is not removed from human concerns.[4]

This inquiry reflects the author's personal experiences with the scientific community. And these experiences occur within both, an academic and medical setting. Experiences in a hospital and university, provide me with the opportunity to address the analytic features of scientific practice. It provides a way of exploring the social character of scientific practice. This inquiry can be seen as an exploration into science as it is encountered in a hospital and university. Through an analysis of actual occurrences, the social character of this scientific world can be addressed. I hope to display its visibility via a consideration of such themes as:

I The Subjectivity-Objectivity Distinction: A Call for Unified Experience

II Authority: A Function of Group Membership

III Criticism: A Function of Group Membership

IV Research Requirements: A Call for Unified Experience

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[4]Here, personal experiences have unity with the experiences of others in so far as we feel the tension between the individual and the group.

Each theme is a way of talking about the concrete occurrences such that the reader can see those occurrences in some grounded way. To locate each theme, is not to find anything but to reveal the necessary conventions prefigured by the concrete occurrences.[5] We will see that each actual occurrence represents an occasion of collectibility, and unity; how human beings show themselves and at the same time conceal themselves. Each, is a way of talking about the problem of reality. And each serves to emphasize that reality is brought into being by human activity, and hence stands in vivid contrast to the belief that reality is 'there' to begin with. Each theme shows that 'reality', that which exists or simply 'is', is a matter of convention. The rules are more or less arbitrary, and have been collectively agreed upon.

To suggest that reality is socially organized, introduces the idea of competing versions of reality. It introduces the awareness that things could be otherwise; that our view of the world is actually one among many. Yet the possibility of legitimating one distinctive view of the world over another has appeared, so as to allow us to act 'as if' things were real. The selection process is invested with an air of mystification, to use Berger's terms. "Let the institutional order be so interpreted as to hide,

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[5] In the language of Goffman, each theme is a way of seeing the "frame" of each actual occurrence. "Frames" refer to the belief that "definitions of situations are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events and our subjective involvement in them" (1974:10).

as much as possible, its constructed character" (Berger, 1967:33). The one selected view of the world is seen,in practice, as the only possible view of the world; and hence is identified with the 'real' world. It seems that our sense of reality rests on the absence of alternatives. Other competing views are therefore discredited, and invalidated.

Nothing has greater discrediting power today, than the demonstration that a given assertion has been scientifically disproven. By showing that an assertion is scientifically disproven, we show that it is unreliable, since reliable knowledge is associated with scientific knowledge. As Roszak (1968:208) says:

> ... reliable knowledge is knowledge that is scientifically sound, since science is that to which modern man refers for the definitive explication of reality ... Scientific knowledge is not just feeling or speculation or subjective ruminating. It is a verifiable description of reality that exists independent of any personal considerations.

A scientist, or expert, is one who 'really' knows what is what, because of his specific way of knowing, since whatever flows from this way of knowing qualifies as knowledge, and nothing else.

It seems that in our present historical period, society has invested a sense of meaningfulness and value into the scientific way of knowing. Today, all areas of specialization strive to become scientific. And because the 'experts' know and we, as laymen, do not, we seek their guidance. Science insists that it alone has a monopoly on the methods of finding out what is true and what is false;

what is real and what illusory.

Scientists try to mask the nature of their decisions with an air of legitimacy and validity. But science's rules, concerning what is 'real' and what is not, what is 'true' and what is 'false', are matters of human decisions.[6] These decisions reveal much about a certain tradition or form of life. What's 'real' depends on the lives we lead. However, within this scientific tradition lies a particular ontological stance. Roszak (1968:222-23) expresses it well in the following passage:

> I can perceive no more than your behavioral facade. I can grant you no more reality or psychic coherence than this perception allows. I shall observe this behavior of yours and record it. I shall not enter into your life, your task, your condition of existence. Do not turn to me or appeal to me or ask me to become involved with you. I am here only as a temporary observer ... I assume that I can adequately understand what you are doing or intending without entering wholly into your life. I am not particularly interested in what you uniquely are; I am interested only in the general pattern to which you conform.

This stance places the accent of reality not on individual experience, but on law-like experience or unified experience; and holds unified experience as the standard of intelligibility. The inquirer is not an

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[6]Although scientists may be aware of the arbitrary nature of their conceptual framework, as Feyerabend suggests in his article "Against Method: An Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge", the doing of science still requires an unquestioned conceptual framework. That is, in order to engage in the practice of solving scientific problems, scientists behave as if their theoretical framework was non-arbitrary.

author but a messenger of nature. He is not responsible for originating the word but only for transmitting it. An adequate messenger reports or passes on nature's speech without altering it. Scientific speech, then, is speech which issues from nature, from that which is independent and external to the inquirer. This inquiry attempts to formulate the social character of this tradition via an analysis of certain tension laden occurrences.

Treatment of the Topic

Treatment of the topic reflects the belief that living and learning are inseparable activities. The topic becomes formulated via an inquiry into actual concrete occurrences, which are situated in a hospital and university setting. It is only upon finding myself within tension laden situations, does the problem of rendering intelligible that which is taken for real, become pressing. We must experience social reality as a problem before we can formulate it. Only upon feeling anxious while involved in particular happenings in the hospital and university, is there a need for attention. Attending to problems stem from individual lived experienes. We come to understand our predicament in the mood that Heidegger calls 'anxiety', which presupposes involvement. What one understands (formulates) then becomes a matter of reflective inquiry, or regression.

Therefore it must be mentioned at the outset, that while this discussion is an inquiry into science, it is not a scientific inquiry.

Scientific work does not require individual anxiety or personal (personalized) involvement but quite the contrary. Science operates with anonymity as a standard. That is, scientific inquiry requires that we be detached from personal experience, so as to share in the externalized collectivity. This discussion then, is unscientific, in so far as science suggests a mode of existence devoid of personal involvement and human anxiety.

Scientific inquiry requires we move forward, not backward. We must progress, not regress. This is made possible given our methodological security. So long as we feel secure in our ways of establishing 'sight', in our activities of proving, then we have some standard for the recognition of knowledge. This concern is expressed in the separation of theory and methods, which reflects the conventional and authoritative belief in a distinction between our activities of speculating and our activities of proving. Conventional usage considers theory as mere speculation; theory must be either verified or refuted via some testing procedure. The testing procedures or methods are our activities of proving which allow us to accumulate knowledge. This presumes security in our methods which is absent in our theories. And the security is possible so long as we selectively forget that proof itself depends upon theories of how to prove things. Our activities of proving becomes the consensually validated route to knowledge, and the possibility of consensually validating knowledge gives us confidence in our activities of proving.

The history of sociology clearly preserves different conceptions of the social world, each with its own methodological implications. For example, compare the Durkheimian tradition with the Weberian. Durkheim suggested that social facts can be viewed as things for the purpose of sociological analysis, and the investigator should examine them from the perspective of an investigator of nature. Weber suggested that the social world is 'meaningful', and that the researcher should examine it from the perspective of those being studied. In both cases verifiable knowledge has to do with knowledge which others can independently arrive at. And one's perception of verifiable knowledge depends upon one's security in the activities of proving. It depends upon equalized experience.

Although we are encouraged to believe that there are different ways of proceeding, as is seen in the possibility of utilizing a variety of research techniques, proceeding means moving forward. Our community believes it is important to encourage an appreciation, in the graduate student, of the greatest possible range of research techniques (Kaplan, 1964). This suggestion would appear to encourage differences. That is, we are sometimes told that as investigators we can use qualitative methodology or quantitative methodology depending upon our conception of social reality (Filstead, 1970). But in both cases, our methodology allows us to move forward or proceed via an accumulation of knowledge. And the accumulation of information must always presume unquestioned methods of accumulation. Our methods of accumulation (research techniques)

result in verified knowledge, which serve as building blocks for science's progressive movement forward. A movement forward is a movement ahead, a progression. Says Blum (1974:247):

> Positivism is the decisive moving forward of a discipline march, it neither moves backward nor circles repetitively around its origin, but moves ahead. The positivity of positivism lies in its ability and in its desire to move ahead and it moves ahead by laying down a path for itself.

And no matter whether we use quantitative or qualitative methodology, we require a secure starting point from which to proceed, or move. Our community provides this security in establishing, in advance, what knowledge looks like. We feel secure in our activities of proving. By establishing a beginning from which direction will follow we negate alternative beginnings.

A direction is an authorial conception of what needs to be seen as 'fact'. But how does this direction come to be established? The direction points to a collective who decides to limit their speech. To set a direction is a recognition that our work can never start unless we limit our concern to what is at hand; unless we agree to begin within limits. Blum (1974:248) writes:

> Without a positive spirit towards one's speech, there is wavering and delay; nothing moves ahead, no work gets done. It is only by the positive acceptance of the authority of the beginning that one moves ahead, that work gets done, that results appear.

And a recognition of limits is observable in one's faithfully

following the route layed out in advance. To establish, in advance a way of 'searching' is to reconstruct the many ways (beliefs) into the way of finding (knowledge). It is to establish authority for oneself, and silence the visibility of alternative possibilities.

Science seems to be concerned with making the world intelligible, and secures this project by pre-establishing categories of intelligibility. Investigation of the world remains unproblematic so long as our methods remain unquestioned. We feel methodologically aware as we have pre-established a path in advance. By establishing a path or method we guarantee scientific knowledge. In stipulating the criteria and following them, we achieve our end. But knowledge of what? If we set up a way of knowing which gives us certain knowledge, then it becomes a matter of mechanically following the rules we've constructed. What we've done, is to stipulate how the phenomenon will appear for others in the community, so that together, we can have 'knowledge' of it. We predetermine boundaries, to tell us what we see. We set out, in advance, a route which we go about following; we set out a way of seeing so we'll know what we see.

To set a method in advance is like categorizing the world in advance. To categorize helps us to know, and once we have knowledge we needn't take a second look; we needn't re-search. Perhaps we should be suspicious of 'knowing' too quickly.

An alternative to this form of inquiry is an inquiry in which we become methodologically aware as the result of a backward gaze. Instead of pre-establishing in advance our way of rendering something

intelligible (method) we discover it by looking back. We first feel confident in the intelligibility of something, and only then reflect on how we got there.

One who sets a path in advance and then proceeds to follow it seems to be involved in another question than the one who finds his path after reaching his destination. The first can be heard as saying: "I want to go there, and this is the way to go." The other says: "I'm here," and asks, "How did I get here?" They seem to be in different worlds. The difference can be observed in the consideration given Georg Simmel by the sociological community.[7] The sociological community viewed Simmel's work as contemptible in so far as it lacked a methodological system. The doing of science as seen by the sociological community required a 'disciplined' form of inquiry; hence Simmel fails to be seen as scientific. The community has epistomological certainty given a pre-established way of knowing (method). Scientific knowledge is obtainable by virtue of following the scientific method. We can recognize 'knowledge' as we have pre-determined its nature. Against this background Simmel appears 'undisciplined', as he isn't ruled by a concern for method. His methods of investigation are not imposed beforehand. He grasps the intelligibility of a situation and, via reflection, becomes conscious of his method of rendering it intelligible. In other

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[7]For further details as to Simmel's position in relation to the sociological community, consult C.D. Axelrod, "Toward an Appreciation of Simmel's Fragmentary Style", The Sociological Quarterly, 1977, pp. 185-196.

words, he recognizes that he is already somewhere, but how he got there is uncertain, and therefore, of analytic concern.

The process of this inquiry is not guided by a concern for method, but by a concern for understanding what is actually experienced. Method would not rule the work, but the work would rule one's method. Husserl (1965:102) says: "True method follows the nature of the things to be investigated and not our prejudices and preconceptions." He criticizes psychology for having adopted the methods of natural science, for in doing so it has given a "content that is not simply taken from what is actually given in experience but is applied to the latter" (Husserl, 1965:101). "It (psychology) has not considered what lies in the 'sense' of psychological experience and what 'demands' (in the sense of the psychical) of itself makes on method" (Husserl, 1965:102). What is suggested is that inquiry is not imposed from without but is derived from and grounded in the things themselves to be studied.

The determination of evidence requires us to go to the thing about which a claim is made. To check the evidence is to turn to the things themselves. If evidence is a matter of turning to the affairs in question regarding a specific claim, then it will differ with each particular kind of affair. What we count as evidence is not pre-determined before approaching the thing to be studied. Husserl's dictum "back-to-the-things-themselves" suggests we focus on our immediate experience as we live it. It calls us to return to the phenomenon as given in immediate experience.

According to Husserl (1965:106-107), "a phenomenon is no 'substantial' unity, it has no 'real' properties, it knows no real parts, no real changes and no causality.... To attribute a nature to phenomena, to investigate their real component parts, their causal connection - that is pure absurdity,no better than if one wanted to ask about the causal properties, connection etc. of numbers". A phenomenon qua phenomenon becomes available when we cease treating an object as real-in-itself, and begin treating it as meant or intended. In other words, phenomenon qua phenomenon becomes available when we cease being concerned with whether or not things exist, and begin attending to the possibility of their being as they appear. If we suspend our belief in the existence of things or in the world as 'there', we are forced to ask ourselves how it is possible that we experience 'this' rather than 'that'. We come to recognize the intentional character of experience. The decision to suspend the belief in the existence of things ("natural attitude")[8] is a decision not to deny them, but rather to understand them and make them explicit.

This analysis is concerned with the grounds of a particular socially constructed reality: science. It is not interested in affirming or denying that construction but in explicating the hidden dimension, lying within the obvious. It is interested in revealing

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[8]According to Husserl and Schutz "natural attitude" means that something is to be treated as naturally given, whether or not it is.

the very possibility of the actuality.[9] To engage in questioning the grounds of anything is to be interested in its hidden or unspoken dimension. The grounds or foundation, like 'roots', are hidden from view. What is it, to go to the roots of something? What kind of project is called for in the notion of seeking foundations? One that would make explicit, the implicit or latent. The implicit, as with roots, is covered-over. Thus the process of making explicit the implicit is an uncovering process.[10] It is a process of explicating the presupposed or taken-for-granted foundation of any epistemic claim. Seeking foundations means seeking presuppositions; seeking that which is responsible for securing our claims. It dissolves what is in hand by treating its security as covering over and concealing its history (McHugh et al, 1974).

Husserl in his concern for the unclarified[11] status of science begins a radical searching of foundations. The manifest or concrete, is viewed as an area of revealability, an area of opening-up. We search[12] through the concrete to dis-cover the forgotten or

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[9]This conception of analysis can be found in the work of P. McHugh, S. Raffel, D. Foss, and A. Blum. See their "Introduction", in On the Beginning of Social Inquiry, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1974), pp. 1-20.

[10]Kant used the term 'analytic' to refer to that which is inherent to a subject. So an analytic project, in the sense in which I intend to use it, would be ruled by the inherent nature of things.

[11]Husserl suggests that an unclarified science is one which is unaware of its foundations.

[12]The very idea of searching localizes the contradiction that, convention is both responsible for perception and impedes it; a

covered-over. The act of uncovering poses the problem of beginning, because it implies that any manifestation is an achievement; it is preceeded by a past or history. Every beginning necessarily leaves its own ground or foundations unspoken. So to be concerned for grounds is to continually question any point of departure. We are condemned never to start with certainty. We stay with the question which we can break out of, only by a leap that would establish a place of departure. A concern for the grounds is therefore always a matter of re-commencing, since every beginning is necessarily an achieved pre-supposition, a prejudice.[13] We become involved in a constant regression or movement backward. "If all beginnings are ends, then the work never progresses, for it never goes anywhere" (Blum, 1974:250). But this regress is not necessarily damaging. It represents and exhibits a structural feature of inquiry itself; its ongoing and ever-tentative character.

Analysis takes the concrete, familiar world, as a point of departure since that is where we find ourselves.[14] We see the

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contradiction which creates a tension implicit to research. Searching suggests both, the familiar and the unfamiliar. That is, one searches for something, which presumes the possibility of recognizing what we are looking for. If it is recognizable, then we must be familiar with it. Yet searching is an activity of questioning, and this very act acknowledges the unfamiliar; acknowledges our 'not knowing' and 'need to know'.

[13]Blum suggests that every writer has a point where he stops doubting.

[14]If analysis has to do with a concern for what is fundamental to a phenomenon, then we would use whatever we could that would allow

familiar before we see what is beneath it, but we understand or stand-under[15] the familiar only when we have come to know what is beneath it. This implies that our everydayness must be re-searched. It suggests that the familiar forgets its achieved character, forgets its past or history. As Blum says, to do analysis is to recollect and re-think its history. If thinking resembles a way of living rather than an act, as Heidegger suggests, then we come to know what it means to do analysis by analyzing. We learn by doing. Galileo did scientific research without being able to state clearly what he was doing. It is by doing analysis that analysis becomes formulable. How we do analysis is shown by dealing with our topic not with talk about what is to be done. Heidegger, in his concern for determining

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us to formulate the grounds, leading us to see how it is possible that the phenomenon comes to look like whatever it looks like. The concern for uncovering what lies hidden underneath the appearances, demands our use of the imagination. An act of the imagination is required to dis-cover the invariant in all variations. This thesis is therefore restricted to the limitation of the author's imagination. That is, imaginative variation allows us to do analysis by allowing us to formulate the grounds that lead us to see how it is possible that any situation comes to look like whatever it looks like. By imaginatively varying an actuality we can uncover alternative possibilities, and hence be in a position to observe the necessity of the actual occurrence. Variations of a scene serve to bring the actual scene into focus. Weber refers to this as 'mental experiments'. And the movement of inquiry is continued to the extent that we are able to conceive of alternatives, i.e. to the extent of our imaginative powers. Imaginative variation allows us to perceive that things as they usually are in everyday life have dimensions and depths never before suspected.

[15] Neitzsche reads 'understand' as 'standing-under'. For this reference see the "Prologue" of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in the Portable Nietzsche, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: The Viking Press, 1954), pp. 121-137.

what is called thinking, does not begin with a formulated topic. But his topic is formulated through the inquiry. This means that we do not distinguish what we know from our knowing it. This view of knowledge is not that of a product independent of us. The researcher's individuality becomes an important feature rather than a bias in doing analysis. The knower is not independent of the known. In constituting the known, it matters who we are and where we stand.

The metaphor of a journey is apt as a schema for inquiry. Journeys begin from here, where we are standing now; the journey of understanding can only begin from where it is we stand. Socrates simply begins. He dissolves the issue of a starting point by starting a conversation. The fuel for the journey is provided by the opinions commonly shared; with what people hold, think, and say. Socrates patiently unfolds the opinions and confronts us with ourselves. We realize the relativity of our opinions. The undergirding structure of language allows him to reveal to us the things to which we are already committed. We come to realize that one chooses to follow certain paths, not because those paths are more valid or true, but because we can live with the tradition which prefigures them.

The organization of this thesis reflects a journey in understanding tension laden situations in both a medical and academic setting, which will be treated as examples of scientific rationality. There is a sense in which a journey charts its own course; the sense given to us by Socrates. The metaphor of journey implies the idea

that direction is set by both, the driver and the passage. Direction is given not only by the viewer but also by that which is viewed. Explorations are given direction not only by the explorer but also by that which is explored. One tends toward that which calls for attendance. And attendance is a form of being present.

A 'journey' into the subjectivity-objectivity distinction, authority, criticism, and research requirements, reveals that each theme rests on a particular way of thinking about scientific knowledge, and its particular tradition. This tradition is one which formulates relevant speech as speech which requires a certain relationship to the speaker; as speech which is independent of a speaker de-authored speech.

Each theme represents an occasion of collectability, of how human beings show themselves - or rather conceal themselves under the guise of community member in the community of science. Each is grounded in the ideal of communality and unified experience. It is hoped that this will be displayed via an exploration into actual happenings.

Concerning Problems

Many recognize that we 'see' upon finding situations problematic.[16] Problems (suffering) take us from the unreflective following of convention to where we are forced to think about what is problematic.

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[16]Among those who have suggested this are: T. Kuhn, P. Berger, and A. Schutz.

But how do problems come about? Do we find ourselves in problems? Or do we go about finding problems? Do problems originate from within or without - with us or without us?

Perhaps the manner in which they become observable is important to our way of knowing, to our inquiry. How they come about may call for a corresponding way of knowing them. It may have direct bearing on our methodology. Does sociology readily provide us with recognied 'problem areas'?

Many sociology departments today, offer courses in social problems. Typically in these courses, we are informed about "poverty, war, overpopulation, drug addiction, mental disorders, alcoholism, etc." (University of Manitoba General Calender: 1976). By giving a name to something, we put it into a category, and we think we have understood it. Words are a way of structuring, manipulating and controlling; thus when they are absent the specter of loss of control arises. We tend to think that if we cannot name something we cannot control it. [17] Hence silence suggests the surrender of control. We avoid silence so as to preserve the idea that we live in a world we control and avoid confronting our fear of being out of control. This is observable in the organization of our everyday lives. Experiences which could possibly challenge our commonsense knowledge of the world, are usually categorized so as to take the sting out of them.

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[17] This is supported by comments from aphasics; comments such as: "It's as if I did not have enough names."

Categorizing or labelling is a way of making the threatening, familiar and safe.[18] Hertzler (1965:52) says:

> The language symbols can also give the feeling of certainty and comprehension, when such feeling is entirely inappropriate. This is because we get the feeling of comprehension by applying a symbol for something we know (or think we know) to something we do not know. This is because the feeling of comprehension comes from the feeling evoked by the symbol, and not from the 'something' that is unknown.

That which is named is not unknown to us anymore, and is therefore familiar. But what if we do not give something a name? Are we then not forced into acknowledging the individuality of the unfamiliar? Defining is a very convenient way of disposing of problems; by saying that some people are poor, addicted, mental, or homosexual, we give them a label and destroy the label. Our labels allow us to standardize differences, so if we do not give a label to people we are forced to look at them as individuals, and to consider our relationship with them.

If we solely look for conclusions to our problems we avoid the problem. The conclusions become all significant and not the problem. The answer is not separate from the question; the solution is in the problem, not away from it. Scientists, in their search for 'causes', seek a solution not in the problem, but away from it. In their

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[18] For a detailed discussion of the major functions of categorization see, J. Hertzler, The Sociology of Language, (New York: Random House, 1965).

attempt to render something intelligible, they direct their attention outside the thing investigated, rather than to the thing itself. Causal explanations are not shown to be inherent to the problem. A search for what causes an object to be is a search for what acts on the object. This presupposes that the object (problem) doesn't act. What is 'acted-upon' comes from outside, and is necessarily away from the object (problem). To seek an answer away from the problem is to create distance between it and its solution. If one looks at a problem with the hope that it will give an answer, then are we looking?

Socrates never tired of discussions that opened up questions which never led to conclusions or answers. He never offered definitive explanations, as that would suggest that the question ceased to be a question.[19] His constant reflective concern, never produced an answer, as to do so would be to supply an explanation. Socrates directs our attention to the structure of the dialogue, to the deeper depths of questions. We see the conduct of inquiry as an activity of continual formulation. He exhibits his understanding by continuing to try to understand. His experience of ignorance is essential to this activity.[20] His very unknowing or uncertainty means that he is

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[19] In his article, "The Oversocialized Conception of Man", D. Wrong (1961:122) suggests that the questions which sociologists address are not "questions which lend themselves to successively more precise answers as a result of cumulative empirical research, for they remain eternally problematic". He believes that the answers which "previous thinkers have given become narrowly confining conceptual prisons".

[20] In contrast, science operates on the notion of provisional

underway. He says:

> For the partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the question, but is anxious only to convince his hearers of his own assertions. And the difference between him and me at the present moment is only this - that whereas he seeks to convince his hearers that what he says is true, I am rather seeking to convince myself. (Plato, 1969:84)

He dwells in a relationship with ideas and persons; a relationship in which there are always possibilities for reflection, clarification, and deeper understanding. This suggests an openness to what problems reveal. What often distracts us from looking at the problem is an answer. The preconceived idea of an answer is the cause of distraction. If the answer is established then the problem ceases to be a problem. When one does not know the answer, one is ready to receive what the problem reveals.

To look at a problem would mean what? To learn from it, to enter into a direct experiencing of that problem. And depending on the experience the answer differs. As Heidegger suggests: "We come to know what it means to think when we ourselves try to think." The

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uncertainty. This can be detected in such statements as: "Given these conditions, we can infer ... Further research in the field may show ... As far as present research has gone ..." Science accepts ignorance or doubt only to destroy it. Knowledge involves the destruction of ignorance. Ignorance is something which should diminish with increasing knowledge. One has valid knowledge when we do not question what we know. This means that we are not open or attentive to the doctrines we reject.

knowing is in the doing. There is an intimate connection between learning and experiencing. What is learning?

> To learn means to make everything we do answer to whatever essentials address themselves to us at the given time. Depending on the kind of essentials, depending on the realm from which they address us, the answer and with it the kind of learning differs. (Heidegger, 1968:14)

The beginning point for each of the following chapters, is fixed in the confines of the author's own concrete problem of existence.

Chapter I

THE SUBJECTIVITY-OBJECTIVITY DISTINCTION: A CALL FOR UNIFIED EXPERIENCE

The life experience I wish to be attentive to in this chapter involves a hospital situation during the summer of /75. My sister, having contracted encephalitis (a viral infection of the brain) has been in the hospital since June 1975, which means that she is an object (patient) for applied science. One day her mother addresses the nurse: "Son pauvre petit coeur ne peut pas prendre ça."[1] The nurse responded by literally looking in the other direction. The mother's statement went unacknowledged.

It so happened the next day, my sister did have a heart arrest. But I do not, wish to argue for the objective validity of my mother's subjectively situated claim, since that would be taking an after-the-fact position and saying 'see'. Rather, I want to be attentive to the very inattentiveness displayed by the nurse, in hopes of understanding how the nurse's response becomes intelligible. What does the nurse's response mean?[2] It seems that it is here that the subjectivity-

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[1] "Her poor little heart can't take it."

[2] To be concerned with identifying the 'cause' for the nurse's response is an illegitimate way of easing pain, as it shifts attention

objectivity distinction can be seen. That is, the nurse's inattentiveness serves as an occasion for recognizing the subjectivity-objectivity distinction.

Since the medical profession can be seen as adhering to the scientific way of knowing, my sister is seen as an object possessing certain properties. That is, temperature, blood pressure, pulse rate, electro-encephlogram readings, brain scans, etc. characterize and define the object (patient). Statements about the patient are meaningful only in terms of this language; a language of which agreement is essential; a language which is situated publically within the medical profession. Dealings with patients resemble our dealings with inanimate objects. The patient is not confirmed as the person he is, but as an entity which requires investigation. In our dealings with objects the concern is only with the observer's experience of things, and never with the "way things experience us" (Laing, 1967). We are not interested in recovering the wholeness of being human through the relationship, since objects are simply objects. Likewise the patient within a doctor-patient relationship is perceived as an object-to-be-changed. What becomes interesting about the individual patient are symptoms or signs pointing to his condition. In other words, the individual is of interest in so far as he conforms or deviates from the known statistical generalizations about illness.

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from subjective uncertainty towards something external. The source of suffering is not outside.

What could the mother's statement mean within such a context? For the nurse it serves as an incident of subjectivity; an incident of inadequate speech. The statement is based in private subjective feeling and hence is not recognized as credible within the medical community.

For the mother, the patient is seen as her daughter whom she loves very much. As Buber says: "Feelings one 'has'; love occurs.... love does not cling to an I, as if the You were merely it's 'content' or object; it is between I and You" (1970:66). What the mother says is understandable within the context of a certain kind of relationship; a mother-daughter relationship. The nurse hears the mother's speech as particular to that relationship and on that account treats it as uninteresting. The nurse 'hears' scientifically; that is, she participates in an institution whose conception of adequate speech is the speech of any man,[3] whose conception of adequate speech rests on the interchangeability of speakers, and not the speech of individuals. What is credible depends on the possibility of comparing meaning (method) within a community. Ability to communicate a meaning within a community (a community open to any man) is necessary for determining whether one has 'knowledge' or simply some private innerness. In other words, how one sees is what commands attention. If one sees anonymously, i.e. the act of seeing is not particular to the

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[3]A. Blum sees the essential feature of science as 'what anyone could know', if he only used the scientific method of knowing.

viewer, then one's speech can be made official and hence acknowledgeable.

To quote Kaplan (1964:128):

> What is reported as an observation can be used in subsequent inquiry even if the particular observer is no longer a part of the context. I ask 'Do you see what I see?' to help decide whether what I see is to be explained by self-knowledge or by knowledge of the presumed object.

Objectivity seems to demand a certain treatment of everything that experience presents to the person; a treatment such that the undertaking to know does not involve an investment of the person's person in the act of knowing, i.e. a treatment such as to demonstrate "that the time-space locality of the speaker is irrelevant to what he speaks about. Nature is assumed as an object present to all if they abandon constraints of locality" (McHugh et al, 1974:54).

In contrast, subjectivity involves the investment of the person's person in the act of knowing; i.e., the notion that the act of seeing is particular to the seer. Because the mother's statement is understandable only within the relationship between her and her daughter; it is not interchangeable. For the nurse, this serves as an occasion for the charge of subjectivity (bias) within the context of scientific understanding. "Her poor little heart can't take it" surfaces outside the legitimate frame of scientific speech, and is therefore uninteresting and trivial.[4]

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[4]My interpretation of the nurse's inattentiveness allows me to address the analytic features of scientific practice. The nurse

Perhaps, it is the implications of the words "poor little" in the claim "Her poor little heart can't take it" which establishes the charge of subjectivity. Within the scientific way of knowing, how could a heart be referred to as "poor little"? How could the notion of a "poor little heart" make any sense? The heart, as a biological organ has a standard regular size and the notion of it being "poor" is simply out of context. The words, "poor little" do not allow for the interchangeability of the statement between speakers. That is, the words "poor little heart" are understandable only within the particular relationship between the mother and daughter.

But it is not simply the concrete words used, that produce their subjective status. Suppose the doctor had uttered that very same statement. He would not have been treated in the same way as the mother, as he would have been seen as making reference to another language. That is, the words "poor little" coming from

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is representative of science, and as such her inattentiveness is essentially science's inattentiveness. I am not interested in maintaining one interpretation at the expense of others. Nor am I concerned in securing the 'correct' interpretation of the actuality, as such a concern would presume that the author and reader are interchangeable observers, with identical access to the world. That is, a concern for convincing an other of the correctness of my interpretation would mean that the conception of the work is that of a report, which might have been issued from either the author or the reader. By assessing the correctness of an interpretation we become limited to an attempt to replace the author. Perhaps, we should not be so much concerned with the correctness of an interpretation as with what the interpretation allows us to question. We could ask ourselves whether our interpretation opens up realms of inquiry. What does it allow us to do?

the doctor would have been seen as metaphoric for official language, a language in which there are agreed-upon meanings, a language which presupposes a community to which any member can orient. In this case, the nurse, knowing that the doctor holds membership in the medical community,[5] would actively respond to the claim by appealing to standards, standards that are communally available. In other words, the response would have been a recognition of the statement's metaphoric appearance; a recognition of adequate speech glossed over.

The mother's speech is uninteresting. The idea that it could be factual or purport what is the case is not even entertained. Within the context of science the claim "the moon is made of green cheese" can be seen as more relevant and interesting than the claim "Her poor little heart can't take it". The claim "the moon is made of green cheese" may be wrong, but at least it is testable, while the claim "Her poor little heart can't take it" is not testable, and therefore not verifiable. It is more like saying "I love cheese". It is to speak without 'data' and without the possibility of generating data; hence for science it is trivial and uninteresting. It does not contain a statement of validity as a depiction of communally available facts-in-the-world. But rather, the claim speaks only of the speaker as author of his speech and not of the facts as 'any-member' might see.

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[5]Credentials serve to indicate membership in a community. It's authority in validating speech will be discussed in Chapter Two.

II

How could the mother's claim become interesting? To become interesting, it would have to speak about what any member would recognize as 'facts' or 'things' (data). It would have had to have been grounded in what is publically observable. That is, she would have had to have taken my sister's pulse rate and blood pressure, and reported these in the appropriate language, in official speech. In other words, only by orienting herself to her speech in an anonymous way could her statement have been acknowledged (de-authored speech). Only by taking a step back, away from the exclusivity of her relationship with her daughter, and a position of over-and-against, could she have been seen as being 'in touch' with reality. That is, only by taking the vantage-point of a Not-I[6] could she have been seen as accurately perceiving reality.

The anonymity of speech is achieved through standardization. The possibility of anonymous or impersonal de-authored speech is achieved with the possibility of standardization. What is there to be seen can only be decided communally, for without such a standard it would only dissolve into what is seen for oneself. Standardization is identified with impersonal speech and impersonal de-authored speech grounds the notion of objectivity.

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[6]Theodore Roszak gives us the notion of a "Not-I" as a place within an individual that has been "cleansed of all those murky passions, hostilities, joys, fears and lusts which define my person" (1969:219).

Within the scientific way of knowing, the tool for standardization is measurement or quantification. Such and such a temperature, such and such a blood pressure, or such and such a pulse rate serve as standardized meanings to which anyone can orient. For example, if the needle on the electro-cardiogram machine indicates that you have had a heart attack within the last twenty-four hours, then it makes no difference if you are feeling fine; you've still had a heart attack within the last twenty-four hours. Or if the mercury level in a thermometer reads 33°C then, you are obliged to say "It's hot today" even though you may be standing in a wet bathing suit, shivering on the beach. What is actually the case, and what serves as facts are what medical staff interpret from the electro-cardiogram machine and the thermometer. In these cases the quantified readings serve as standards which make anonymity possible.

III

Kuhn (1962), suggests that what is a fact for one paradigm[7] may not exist at all for another. He says: "Successive paradigms tell us different things about the population of the universe and about the population's behavior. They differ, that is, about such questions as the existence of subatomic particles, the materiality of light and the conservation of heat or of energy" (1962:102).

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[7]Kuhn defines 'paradigm' as "universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners".

Kuhn can be seen as suggesting that reality is relative, and hence the question "What does it mean to see?" becomes of major concern.

Since what is a fact may vary with different paradigms, our observational judgements may also vary. The observation of a machine, however, may remain the same, but the judgement derived from the observation will be different. What counts as neutral data varies with the situation. How one sees the world is not in a direct one-to-one correspondence with our senses. According to Kuhn, what one judges to be, is a function of three things:

1. retinal impressions, i.e. sensations
2. background categories, i.e. one's conceptual scheme
3. immediate concerns and expectations, i.e. the observer's state.

He maintains that with changes in one's conceptual schemes the world itself changes. "What were ducks in the scientist's world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards.... Looking at a contour map, the student sees lines on paper, the cartographer, a picture of terrain. Looking at a bubble-chamber photograph, the student sees confused and broken lines, the physicist a record of familiar sub-nuclear events" (Kuhn, 1962:111). What this indicates in that two men with the same retinal impressions can see different things. For the student to see what the scientist sees, would require that he become converted to the scientist's conceptual framework or way of seeing. In other words, it involves the unification of the structure of experience.

In order to 'see' this or that, we must already possess certain types of knowledge. What a man sees does not depend only upon what he looks at. Man is not a passive receptor of information about an outside external world. So what is the relation between 'seeing' and the things 'seen'? It seems that a particular way of seeing participates in the constitution of the things-as-they-are. Man's brain allows past experience and anticipation of the future to play a large part in augmenting sensory information, so that we do not perceive the world merely from the sensory information available at any given time. What is out there is a function of a paradigm, according to Kuhn. There is no neutral 'data' waiting for interpretation of the scientist. Kuhn argues that it is impossible to talk of nature independently of a particular theory; independent of a particular way of looking at things. For example, Pirsig (1974) mentions that nature as that which is real in the Indian tradition is different from that which is real in the scientific tradition.

> It's completely natural to think of Europeans who believe in ghosts or Indians who believe in ghosts as ignorant. The scientific point of view has wiped out every other view to a point where they all seem primitive, so that if a person today talks about ghosts or spirits he is considered ignorant or maybe nutty...Those Indians and medieval men were just as intelligent as we are, but the context in which they thought was completely different. Within that context of thought, ghosts and spirits are quite as real as atoms, particles, photons, and quants are to a modern man. (1974:32)

We can talk of something being true or false within a single paradigm, say, the system of physics. This provides the context in which our experiments can take place. Physics itself however cannot be said to be justified or unjustified, and those who adhere to a different system cannot simply be said to be wrong. We have no grounds for saying so, which do not derive from our own system or way of looking at things. The propositions of physics cannot be called true if this implies that they have a validity which extends beyond our system of physics. For us to insist that they are valid even for those who reject them is merely to reaffirm our commitment to them. We can only decide whether there is evidence for or against something using our notion of what counts as evidence. Since another system may not accept our notion of what counts as evidence, what we say cannot necessarily be considered to have any application outside our system of thought.

Am I then suggesting that the mother's claim belongs to another paradigm? No. The claim "Her poor little heart can't take it" does not suggest a paradigm in the sense that it does not attempt to secure a community around it.[8] There is no community which can serve as the final arbiter of the goodness (validity, accuracy) of the mother's claim. There is no community which displays the achievement of consensus about the rule-governed character of her claim as

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[8]But it does serve as an occasion for the charge of subjectivity within the paradigm of science, and hence serves to secure a community that excludes it.

the standard of seriousness of that claim. The statement "Her poor little heart can't take it" is understandable only within an exclusive mother-daughter relationship.

IV

That truth might reside in some thing, universally and eternally there for the discovery, is rejected by Kuhn. McHugh (1970) also suggests that the truth of a statement is not independent of the condition of its utterance, and so to study truth is to study the ways truth can be methodically conferred.[9] This amounts to saying that no object, event, or circumstance determines its own status as truth. No sign automatically attaches a referent, no fact speaks for itself. What we see as 'facts' are not held independently of the procedures we use in order to decide that they hold. "We agree that something is objectively true if independent observers with different subjective orientations conclude that it is true" (Babbie, 1975:40).

If, as Kuhn suggests, facts or things are different according to the perspective we view them, then perhaps the important question to be asking is: "What is a thing?" Heidegger poses this question and suggests that the question with which we begin is already a result of and is formulated within a certain context

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[9]For a further discussion of truth as socially defined see "On the Failure of Positivism", by Peter McHugh, in J. Douglas, Understanding Everyday Life, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970).

and a certain way of conceptualizing things. How we find the things to be, already depends upon our approach. The question "What is a thing?" is one way of putting the basic question of approach.

The 'thing' is a certain sort of approach. That is an approach that renders whatever is studied as some thing in space, located over there, subsisting separate from and over-and-against us, and having certain properties of its own. Heidegger (1967), for example, discusses the difference between the things of common sense and those same things as rendered by science, to clarify that the things we encounter are not simply given, as they seem; but have already involved a certain approach. He considers the example:

> The English physicist and astronomer Eddington once said of his table that every thing of this kind - the table, the chair, etc. - has a double. Table number one is the table known since his childhood; table number two is the 'scientific table'. This scientific table, that is, the table which science defines in its thingness, consists, according to the atomic physics of today, not of wood but mostly of empty space; in this emptiness electrical charges are distributed here and there, which are rushing back and forth at great velocity. Which one now is the true table, number one or number two? (1967:13)

To decide this, requires that we know what it means to-be-a-thing; it requires that we know what a thing is. The ways in which science and everyday common sense present things are not at all the same. What a thing is, depends on some approach, on some interplay with us.

To summarize, the life experience which served as an occasion for recognizing the subjectivity-objectivity distinction is embedded in the approach of science. This approach (form of life) then determines what the facts are, and what will count as facts. Whether my sister is on the verge of having a heart arrest is seen as a fact or not will rest on judgements about pulse rate and blood pressure. That is, if it is possible that more than one nurse (a member of the applied scientific community) with different subjective orientations, can conclude that there is evidence of a heart arrest, then we have a fact. It is essential that there be the possibility of public agreement, of collectability. The mother's statement "Her poor little heart can't take it" is considered as grounded in private subjective understandings. In science what counts as evidence is publically agreed-upon. It calls for the possibility of unified experience.

Chapter II

AUTHORITY: A FUNCTION OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP

Are we so scientifically oriented that we cannot conceive of alternative ways of establishing our statements? Will no other form of life command our attention? Today, it appears that science is the way of understanding the world, as is evident in the kinds of questions the various disciplines ask as well as the types of articles published in 'recognized' journals. Will nothing else qualify as knowing?

The scientific tradition has become the commanding form of life in our society, and the most authoritative way of regarding the self, other, and the whole of our reality. Should anyone challenge science as a way of understanding the world, they are faced with the question, "but is there any other way of knowing?" And depending upon one's definition of knowledge, which today appears to make reference to the accumulation of verifiable propositions, one can find himself struggling for another way of knowing which actually produces the same results. In other words, the scientific community merely locates knowledge and science as residing in the same domain, and only really asks "are there other ways of knowing scientifically?" How is it possible, to show the 'authority' of an alternative form

of life, an alternative way of knowing, when our notions of what is authoritative, of what we can safely rely on, is grounded in the scientific way of knowing? Are there other 'authoritative' ways of knowing? Members of the scientific community recognize alternatives but the recognition is devoid of authoritative status. The status of knowledge is exclusive to the realm of science. For example, faith as a way of knowing, is not recognized as knowledge since one's definition of knowledge seems to rest on the possibility of empirical verification.

So to request an authoritative alternative form of knowledge, is a request that presupposes that knowledge must be authoritative. It is already a request for a certain way of knowing, a certain approach - the approach of science. Thus we may address science by asking, what is 'authority' such that it is a request for the scientific way of knowing?

As an example which will allow me to generate inquiry into authority, I'd like to reconsider the particular instance of doctor-layman interaction, described in Chapter One. The medical profession rests on a body of systematic scientific knowledge. It is concerned with the prediction and explanation of events on the basis of natural laws, and hence is seen as adhering to the scientific way of knowing.

Any doctor-layman encounter contains something like Friedson (1972:202) suggests when writing about professionals:

> Clients, unlike colleagues, are not usually in the same social world as the professional;...And of course they have not undergone the same

> training and socialization as the professional. Clients, therefore do not 'speak the same language' as the professional; the two do not share the same phenomenological meanings, assumptions, or concepts.

The encounter contains a readily recognizable authority structure.

The statement "Her poor little heart can't take it" spoken within a medical setting, serves as the occasion for recognizing speech which is commanding or authoritative. "Her poor little heart can't take it" is medically uninteresting and irrelevant. The statement is not worthy of medical attention. Clearly it takes more than the words being spoken 'seriously' to be taken seriously. One must speak seriously in the appropriate mode of serious speech. Any speech which is not couched in the language of science does not command attention. But let us examine this more deeply. If the mother had instead said "Her heart can't take it", would she have gotten the nurse's attention? Probably not. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, "poor" and "little" in the original statement seem to be but confirming indicators of the subjective nature of her speech. It is more likely a matter of who is doing the speaking rather than what is said, or how one says what is said, which invalidates her speech. It would appear that it is the speaker rather than the nature of the speech which invalidates the statement.

This points to the idea that a mother as non-doctor, does not have the 'authority' to 'see'. That is, as a mother, she does not have credentials to substantiate her ability to see the heart

through the symptoms. She does not have the credentials for 'in-sight'.

It is conceivable that she could have drawn attention say, to a red mark on the patient's cheek, but only to a thing which is visible by anyone who has not studied medicine. In this case, the nurse would pay attention to the speaker, so long as the uncredited speaker (mother) did not infer from her observation a condition whose character, the medical community believes requires a training to link symptoms with conditions.

As I suggested in the first chapter, had the doctor uttered that very same statement, he would have been seen as making reference to another language; a language which presupposes the medical community. The nurse then, as a member of this community would actively respond to the claim by making reference to standards that are communally available.

How is it possible that the very same statement can command attention in one case and not in another? This possibility appears to have bearing on the speaker rather than the speech. The doctor, who is viewed as one possessing the training required to link symptoms with conditions (i.e., as one with 'in-sight'), is recognized as the right kind of person to make certain inferences. He is qualified to see, whereas a mother is not. One could ask, what would it mean to possess sight? In the claim to 'see' the heart, it would mean that one possess the credentials which authorize one's claims.

How could a mother's claim become interesting within the medical context? Let us say that the mother had taken the patient's (daughter's) pulse rate, blood pressure etc., and reported these in the appropriate language, i.e., in official speech. Would her report then have been treated as uninteresting? Probably not. Her report would likely draw attention, but only as a disruption. That is, her speech would be listened to, but would still probably remain invalid, since she is not seen as one capable of sight. Even though her speech could appear in the scientific mode, she may not be considered as one qualified to speak in that way. Hence the attention which she may receive would dismiss the seriousness of the speech. It would not attend to the contents of what is said, but only to the disruptive occurrence of one speaking 'out-of-place'.

This becomes clearer upon a consideration of a doctor-layman interaction which occurred in the winter of 1976. A layman within a medical setting makes the judgement: "She is over-sedated", to which the doctor replies "You're not a doctor". We see that the layman is perceived as having no right to speak on matters requiring qualifications. Although the speech draws the doctor's attention, the content of the speech is discarded. Treatment of the layman's judgement reflects the belief that one must be in a position to speak before the content of the speech is treated seriously. In the actual happening, we can see that the judgement does not receive recognition as potentially having validity. The content becomes uninteresting, given who it is that is speaking.

However, should the same exchange had occurred between two doctors, then the judgement "She is over-sedated" would have been seen as criticizing medical procedure. Doctors wish to convey messages in a detached manner. They are interested in informing one another as equals. Since both are members of the medical community, both are bound to its rules of relevance. This means that they are to be detached and uninvolved in their relationships, so that others can arrive at their conclusions. Although both are communally the same, or have equal status as interlocutors in relation to the community's activities, there is the possibility of differences of opinion. There is the façade of individuality. But concretely we have a situation where a member, in a position to criticize, faces another member, in a position to criticize, which is to say, that criticism becomes possible. Membership becomes metaphoric for 'being in position'.

Should a member or another doctor have made that very same judgement, the original doctor's response ("You're not a doctor.") would have made no sense. The judgement, "She is over-sedated", coming now, from a doctor, would have been seen as worthy of serious consideration; as doing criticism. Given that both have allegiance to the same community, we can observe disagreement in terms of individual action. Since member's conceptions of what 'should be' usually coincide, we can ask why there is disagreement? The disagreement suggests that an other ought to be doing something else, and should know better. The

appropriateness of action or 'what one should do' is shared by community members. The statement "She is over-sedated" from a doctor, intends to criticize a member.

How is it possible that the very same judgement can be seen as worthy of serious consideration in one case and not in the other; as criticism in the one case and not in the other? This seems to bear on the difference in the speakers rather than the speech. One is a member and hence qualified to speak whereas the other is not. What is it, about the doctor-layman exchange that prevents the layman's judgement from being seen as worthy of consideration. The layman's judgement is treated as a 'complaint' rather than as 'criticism'.

Criticism, the nature of which will be discussed further in the next chapter, has to do with judging human creations. The object of criticism must be seen as interchangeable with an alternative. In other words, it must be possible that present conditions could be otherwise. And the relative status of the present state of affairs is based in human interchangeability. Criticism originates from 'reasonable' objections. In contrast, 'complaining' originates from one who complains, from one who is difficult to 'get along with', from one who is 'unreasonable'. One 'gets along' in so far as we stay in place and find the same things 'natural'. The weather, for example is an object of complaint as it is seen as 'natural'. Its creator as interlocutor is hidden from view, and hence we find ourselves unable to perceive nature as socially

constructed. Medicine also places the layman in a position of seeing its creators as hidden from view. Says Berger and Luckman (1967:88):

> It is not enough to set up an esoteric subuniverse of medicine. The lay public must be convinced that this is right and beneficial and the medical fraternity must be held to the standards of the subuniverse. Thus the general population is intimidated by images of physical doom that follows 'going against doctor's advice'; it is persuaded not to do so by the pragmatic benefits of compliance and by its own horror of illness and death. To underline its authority the medical profession shrouds itself in the age-old symbols of power and mystery, from outlandish costume to incomprehensible language, all of which, of course, are legitimated to the public and to itself in pragmatic terms.

Medical procedure is hidden from view in the sense that its corpus of support is not given to the layman. Its constructed character is kept from him. Thus the layman is expected to treat medical procedure as natural in the same way as he treats the weather. So we 'get along' in so far as we take the same things for granted, find the same things as 'natural', and follow the same unquestioned recipes.

According to Husserl and Schutz, the world we take for granted characterizes the "world of the natural attitude".[1] Husserl's (1931: 106) description is valuable:

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[1]Recall that 'natural attitude' means that something is to be treated as naturally given, regardless of whether or not it is.

> I find continually present and standing over against me the one spatio-temporal fact-world to which I belong, as do all other men found in it. This fact-world as the word tells us, I find to be out there, and also take it just as it gives itself to me as something that exists out there. All doubting and rejecting of the data of the natural world leaves standing the general thesis of the natural standpoint.

Man's perception and thinking in the natural attitude are turned towards things which are given to us as unquestionably obvious. The world of the "natural attitude" is a public intersubjective world. We assume that this 'fact-world' is common, i.e., that it confronts others as well as ourselves. Hence, the "natural attitude" is preconstituted and preorganized, whose structure is the result of historical processes. Interpretation of the commonsense world is based on a stock of previous experiences of it - our own or those handed down to us by our predecessors. These experiences in the form of "stock of knowledge" serve as a frame of reference. And the "stock of knowledge" is responsible for our perception of typicals.

For instance, I know I am a patient and that therefore I cannot expect to engage in self-diagnosis. This knowledge is shared by patients as well as doctors. It is sharable because of our "social stock of knowledge" which allows us to deal with our world in a typificatory fashion. According to Schutz (1962), our "stock of knowledge" serves as a frame of reference or a familiar category which help us interpret reality. It provides us with our world-view. It permits the location of individuals in society and the handling

of them in an 'acceptable' manner. It serves as establishing a common sense. This common sense then lays down the 'given' as the 'obvious'. The taken for granted rules of life are resources we employ in our mutual construction and negotiation of everyday practical activities. Schutz suggests that they comprise the rationalities of common sense.

The layman's judgement, "She is over-sedated" may be perceived as pointing to one not willing to 'get along'; as one who does not know better not to speak. Speaking where you should remain silent is trouble-making rather than the result of perceived trouble. Hence one need not treat the content of the speech seriously.

Although the judgement, "She is over-sedated" points to dissatisfaction on the part of the layman, it is dissatisfaction resembling that of complaining. It is seen as unnecessary to ask why one is of such an opinion. The doctor necessarily omits to ask for the reasons or justifications for the layman's judgement, as doing so would suggest equality. It would suggest that the layman is in the position of giving reasons for his judgement, which would in turn suggest the possibility of the judgement's reality. By asking 'why', we open ourselves to being convinced of the reality of the judgement. Refusing[2] to ask 'why' means

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[2]Doctors refuse to ask 'why' because to do otherwise would be to open up a medical discussion to one without credentials - and therefore to disavow the credentials as that which grants a person the license to speak medically.

that this is not a question. It is to say that there is no truth in the layman's judgement, and therefore attention is not called for. Since the layman is perceived as a person who has not the right to speak medically, one need not seriously concern himself with what he says 'medically'. Dissatisfaction, which is seen as 'complaining', allows the medical staff to consider the speech as only making reference to the speaker's attitude, not to the content of the speech. The content of the speech is dismissed by virtue of being a non-doctor.

How could the statement be treated seriously from an institution whose conception of adequate speech, or serious speech, is a member's speech. Supposing, that the layman had responded to the doctor's comment "You're not a doctor", with "True, but I've read the signs of overmedication in the Compedium of Pharmaceutical and Specialties."[3] In other words, the layman suggests that his speech is based on communal evidence. But to count as evidence one also assumes that the subject is in a position to interpret the evidence or see the evidence, as evidence. The layperson is not in a position to quote authorities which require authoritative interpretation before it can be seen as evidence. So the appeal to the Compedium of Pharmaceutical and Specialties is to no avail.

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[3]This is not only a hypothetical suggestion, as the response actually occurred in the winter of /76, within a conversation between a doctor and myself.

Credentials may serve as the establishment of authorization for the right to speak as well as to see or make the unobservable observable. The connecting of symptoms with conditions becomes valid upon possession of the 'ticket' or 'license'. The license becomes essential to validate speech, as it assures us of an acceptable way of seeing; not only acceptable but also reliable. The mother cannot see the condition of the heart through the symptoms, nor the layman detect an overdose, as they do not have the recognized training required to make that sort of observation. Their statements are therefore invalid by virtue of being seen as 'blind' or incapable of 'sight'; by virtue of being non-doctors.

Simmel (1950:303) is helpful in pointing to the notion of creating the right kind of person via achievement of a 'ticket':

> But instead of the slowness with which heredity and education, that is commensurate with rank, may succeed in this training, there also are acute procedures, so to speak. They serve by means of authoritative or mystical edict, to equip the personality with the capacity of leading and ruling irrespective of his previous quality.... This tension between everyone's a priori lack of qualification for a certain superiority and the absolute qualification which he requires a posteriori through the interference of a higher authority, reaches its peak in the Catholic clergy.... the personal quality of the candidate is unimportant in comparison to the spirit which exists in mystical objectivity and which is bestowed upon him through consecration to priesthood.... The principle of God giving an office and the required competence along with it, is here realized in the most radical fashion, in both

> of its dimensions. - unfitness prior to the occupancy, and subsequent fitness created by the 'office' itself.

Also an empirical study done by Feld (1959) on information and authority in the military organization, indicates that the assertion of superior knowledge and the assertion of authority are often one and the same act. Says Feld (1959:17):

> The decision as to whose information is the most accurate amounts to a judgement of the kind of assignments that are the most authoritative. Within the military hierarchy the type of intelligence possessed by a superior by definition is considered of a higher order than that available to a subordinate....Since each superior invariably has several subordinates he enjoys the sum of their information which by definition is greater than any of its parts. By virtue of his position in the organizational structure, the superior is the best informed and therefore the best equipped to give orders.

It seems that obtaining credentials or a ticket serves as an invitation to establish and maintain differentiation, stratification, and specialization. It serves as an indicator for the creation of differences. It rests on the idea that anyone cannot engage in 'doctoring' since special knowledge, i.e., differentiated knowledge, is required. One must be a doctor. It would appear that credentials have the status of excluding, differentiating, discriminating, and separating. Credentials serve to acknowledge the idea that what one's eyes see, is dependent upon who one is.

The mother-nurse interaction which served as an occasion for

addressing authority is embedded in the medical world, which is based on the scientific approach. This approach (form of life) then determines what is authoritative and what will count as authoritative. For the statement, "Her poor little heart can't take it", to command attention, i.e., for it to be seen as authoritative it will have to depend upon the member's perceptions of what counts as authority. And as Berger and Luckmann (1966) point out, by virtue of being a member one creates and maintains the authority structure. Hence the statement is invalid by virtue of not belonging, of being different. In medicine, only doctors are seen as having the ability to see the heart through the symptoms; and hence are the only ones seen as legitimately 'doctoring'.

The doctor-layman interaction served to show that the closer a non-doctor gets to using medical language, the more of a disruption he becomes. The judgement, "She is over-sedated", coming from a layman does receive attention, but the speech appears threatening to those holding credentials. Doctors display the worth of their credentials through their ability to speak the language. By speaking the language of medicine a layman confuses the clearly marked demarcations between those who hold credentials and those who do not. This puts the doctor in the position of having to assert his claim to truth by his credentials alone. By treating the judgement, "She is over-sedated", as a complaint rather than as criticism, the doctor avoids becoming engaged in a struggle with nothing for support except

credentials. The doctor's response, "You're not a doctor", clearly maintains the exclusivity of his own claim to credibility. As a non-doctor we do not have the right to speak in the medical mode.

We have to exist in a certain way before we are seen as existing. Membership in the medical community is essential before speech is heard as authoritative.

Chapter III

CRITICISM: A FUNCTION OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP

In the last chapter we saw that membership is crucial to whether or not we are taken seriously. I would now like to further consider this issue of membership by addressing our everyday notions of criticism.

To criticize is to judge, but in everyday speech there is the further suggestion that the judgement is negative; that one is disfavorably dispositioned toward an other. For example, if a person is described as critical it is generally meant that he is likely making adverse judgements on people, their actions, or their work. While we may evaluate a sunset as more awesome than another, (we can compare sunsets) we cannot say that we criticize sunsets. Although we can criticize the customs of a country, we cannot criticize its weather. We can however, complain about the weather, which shows a dissatisfaction or displeasure with present conditions. But criticism has to do with judging people, their actions, or their work.

It seems that criticism requires the possibility of 'taking exception' based on human interchangeability. That is, we are not seen as criticizing sunsets, as there is no chance of suggesting

an alternative which satifies our notions of excellence. An alternative is a suggestion made to one whose activities are interchangeable with an other's. We aren't able to criticize a sunset, as it isn't created by one who appears replaceable. Should a person create a sunset, then criticizing it becomes possible. The possibility of replacing the activity of creating, allows for the possibility of criticism.

In the doctor-layman relationship, can the layman be seen as voicing criticism or are his dissatisfactions interpreted as 'complaining', i.e., as dissatisfaction, the likes of which one expresses regarding the weather? What could the face of criticism look like within a medical setting? In order to address this question, I refer to the personal experience cited in the previous chapter. Frustration with the problem of communication in a medical setting serves as the concrete incentive that provokes the following collection of ideas around criticism.

Recall, the occasion where a layman within a medical setting makes the judgement, "She is over-sedated", to which the doctor replied, "You're not a doctor". It is irrelevant to the doctor to consider whether or not what the layman said is true or not, since it appears that he is perceived as having no right to speak on matters which require qualifications. Furthermore with the layman replying, "True, but I've read about the symptoms of over-medication in the Compedium of Pharmaceutical and Specialties", we've seen

that his ability to understand what he has read without special training, is questioned. This suggests that it is necessary to possess knowledge of what one is criticizing, in order to be seen as criticizing, and not complaining. The person who can claim that someone is over-sedated must have more than good eyesight and an ability to descriminate red pills from green pills; he must also know about the effects of drugs. Pre-knowledge is required and it is this pre-knowledge that makes a difference to what one looks for, and hence perceives. What qualifies someone to judge the look of one over-sedated, is a range of knowledge and experience that many people have not had. 'Seeing' requires more than good eyesight.

Not only knowledge is required but one must also be in the position of criticizing, and from the doctor's remark this means that only doctors can criticize doctors. The layman's right to criticize is blocked by the doctor's suggestion that only if one is a member can one criticize. As an 'outsider' or 'non-member' to the medical world, one has no right to criticize, no right to judge. To judge is to rule, which suggests an authoritative status. It is to take a stand, (i.e., position that rules), one which affirms itself as authorized speech. To rule is to command assent. And hence, it intends to silence any voice external to the community. By passing judgement one eliminates the grounds for uncertainty. One knows.

Doctors seem to assume the position of 'knower' in the medical context. They announce the 'truth' in such a manner that no room is left for questioning, in that they define the 'way things are'. The patient is depersonalized. He is interesting not as an interlocutor, but as a representative of a certain general pattern of medical objects. He is given information and is instructed about what he should think or see, but is not allowed to develop as a judge in his own right. This manner of relating prohibits mutual exchange, as the doctor claims to have answers, i.e., to have certainty.

Should the opportunity for discussion have been provided, it would imply that value is attached to gaining agreement from one's interlocutor by means of reasoned persuasion, and that one is not regarding his interlocutor as an object but suggesting that he is a reasonable actor (i.e., subject). And to agree to discuss medicine with the patient would mean a readiness to see things differently; to see beyond the 'obvious'.

II

What would it mean to give a reason for your judgement? It would suggest that perhaps you are reasonable. Whenever you give reasons for critical judgements you rely on standards. And the relevance of a reason correlates with a rule or standard. That is, you share a concern for what is 'true'. And if we see what

you point to then we verify its presence by perception; we accept the same standards as authoritative, as ruling. If I see what you are saying, then you have induced a sameness of vision.

Did I say that giving reasons opens oneself to being persuaded? But how is it that reasons persuade? McHugh (1974) suggests that the preoccupation with reason is licensed by a conception of 'judging' as having to be backed by reasons. It is the idea of the necessity of a reason which gives 'judging' a distinctive feature.

Within this conception of judging, to express oneself via a judgement is to make reference to the authoritativeness of a community, of some authoritative standard. With the possibility of defending (by giving reasons) one's judgement, there must be something that requires a defense. An attack would call for a defense. A judgement to be defensible rests on authoritative notions of what is intelligible. Within the scientific and medical world, communally accepted understandings provide the rationale for any judgement's intelligibility, and hence provide the possibility of a defense. A reason then, seen as a defense, appeals to members' shared assumptions as to what counts as a reason in the first place. Giving reasons, serves to reinstate agreement; it serves to silence disagreement by appealing to a shared authority.[1]

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[1]But does criticism in which two interlocutors assume similiar foundations actually criticize? Heidegger suggests that a critique of science cannot proceed simply through a logical analysis of scientific language, since such an analysis assumes the foundations of science (logic and mathematics) as its basis, and therefore criticizes science only to itself.

Criticism looks like a police force whose task it is to keep order by judging members' activities. The critic can be seen as protecting the identity of his community by holding members' activities to a set of standards or criteria. He can be seen as affirming the community by displaying the recognizable rule-governed character of their business, and sustains the community by judging whether other members measure up to the standards of the community.

To be critical according to this conception is to be on the look-out for a member's failure to follow communal rules. It is to be concerned with dis-membering. It looks like a guardian with a certain task. First it utilizes criteria upon which validity can be determined, with an intention of evaluating others. That is, the criteria become standards which allow one to measure Other against it, from which one can then judge good and evil, relevance and irrelevance, strengths and weaknesses. However, the authority of the criteria are not to be questioned, if one wishes to pass judgement. It is only because of one's unquestioned assumptions, that you can proceed to rule. To criticize (judge) you must remain uncritical of shared assumptions.

III

Criticism requires a certain conception of 'member' and 'responsibility'. It rests upon a particular conception of knowledge and this conception formulates relevant speech as speech

which requires a certain relationship to the speaker.

'Members' of a community assume other 'members' to know the rules of membership; to know what he or she is doing. Both members as members are oriented to the rules of membership. One is a member and therefore knows what he is doing given his positioned relation to communal rules. This is not to suggest that all members must agree in their conclusions but only that they share an authoritative notion of what is relevant to look at, how it is to be looked at, and what it means to look. One could ask, "Why is there then disagreement, given an essential sameness?" If we assume the similarity of authors (de-authored observers of nature) how is it that our products often differ? This problem allows for the possibility of recognizing the nature of criticism. What we hear is, "I do not see what you see, and I should be able to,since we share common membership". One may not necessarily agree in individual conclusions but one should be so positioned as to agree to disagree. That is, since both have a similiar methodical frame of reference, a shared standard by which one can judge, is possible. It is then conceivable that a member remind another member of his social responsibility; of his allegiance to the community. Although members are assumed to know what they are doing, man deviates from the rules and hence needs to be reminded of the standards.

The charge of "I don't see it, and I should" is, in turn organized around a particular conception of speech, nature, and community. Speech is a 'thing'. It should be impersonal and

de-authored in order to show the anonymity of its source. Nature is its source; it is the author of speech, and is therefore responsible for it. Accurate speech accords with the community rule of anonymity. By obeying the rule of anonymity, we construct unified experience. That is, we de-author speech. The conception of man, is that of a messenger who will solely transmit speech. The author of speech then becomes nature. Speech is seen as naturally occuring from nature, given that we are but nature's mouthpiece.

The rules Durkheim outlines, reflects the necessity of anonymity. A fundamental assumption of science is that there is an objective reality which can be studied.[2] Phenomena are real things, hence Durkheim suggests, "treat social facts as things". Things are independent and external to us. Nature therefore, as an external entity, takes on the authority to be oriented to. One must be outer-oriented rather than inner-oriented, which requires we abandon our impressions for nature's impressions.

An adequate speaker, is a speaker who personifies nature itself by speaking in a natural way. In other words, speech should

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[2]Although scientists may be aware of Kuhn's suggestion that our conceptual framework is responsible for our perception, they proceed to treat the assumption of an objective reality as secure. For example, we are told in research method courses, that our study will have greater validity when more than one 'perspective' has been employed and has resulted in the same conclusions. Here, the notion of 'perspective' implies a view of different parts or from different angles; and hence is quantitative. Also the whole idea of 'testing', rests on the belief in the correspondence of a tangible concrete reality capable of being observed, measured and evaluated.

be external and independent of a particular speaker; it should be anonymous. Nature is assumed to be oriented to in the same way by all; hence, the idea of "I don't see it, and I should be able to" becomes intelligible. If nature authors speech, then speakers should agree. With the possibility of discriminating adequate from inadequate speech, criticism becomes possible. Adequate and relevant speech is interchangeable speech. It can be oriented to, in standard ways. It stands to the speaker as an object. Relevant speech is therefore speech which corresponds to things in the world. And an account becomes relevant if it shows that it is in accord with a community-rule by generating consensus about the nature of things addressed. In other words, the standards of the community are taken as a secure starting point of inquiry. The standards then are the final arbitor of the goodness (validity, accuracy) of any account. They are the criteria which provide for the possibility of criticism; that is, a certain conception of criticism, one which reinforces communality.

Supposing one were to disagree with the results of a colleague; this disagreement (refutation) like agreement (confirmation) serves to reinforce communality since the authority of both derives from shared communal methods for generating consensus. Although there is the appearance of difference in disagreement, it is a difference which preserves community. Being a member, whether you agree or disagree you partake of the same 'mind'. Can you be seen as criticizing if you partake of the same 'mind' as

with those you are criticizing? I suppose, within a certain world. A world in which there is good and evil and the idea that one must not sin against the commandments. The commandments are the standards or rules of goodness. And so long as you are a faithful member of a community, you have a social responsibility to be bound by them.

IV

Does one necessarily have to claim not to see what another is saying, to be seen as criticizing? One could conceivably claim to see further than the other. As members, the assumption of knowing what you are doing and not seeing further is to charge one with neglect. If by general consent (a voice of a faithful member) one should see further, then the other has failed in his claim to knowledge. One is in a position to 'know' only by general consent.

Possessing membership also allows the standards to which one member makes reference in the course of his evaluation, to be applied to his own criticism. That is, he must practice what he preaches if his words are to have any credence. This suggests, that we do not have the right to criticize a fault in an other if our criticism has the same fault. But the possibility of fault-finding rests on the security of commandments, on communal rules.

Fault-finding, or judging an other, asserts a right to evaluate the other. It is easy to become concerned with fault-finding, and forget to ask why an other speaks as he does. "...we

are only too ready to take and judge what we read by those ideas which we ourselves have brought along unnoticed" (Heidegger, 1968:76). It is an easy course, to accept or reject what is handed out. It is always easiest to stand over as a judge. It not only saves the effort of trying to understand what one judges but it also places responsibility on someone else - usually a community. It is easy to hold a claim to an authoritative standard without questioning the right to speak with authority.

To stand-over and apart, is to be concerned with judging an other, rather than with asking why the other is of a particular opinion. It is to be concerned with laying authority for oneself. You do not make room for the other. There is no desire to make contact with the other, no readiness to view the situation as otherwise. What seems implicit is that you become closed to the other.

By not attending to the other, or by not attending to difference, restriction is placed on creativity. Creativity is highly valued in science, when the 'creation' is seen as a 'discovery'. Scientists will admit that it takes an individual who is not solely concerned with following community rules (a person not restricted only to one paradigm) to make major contributions. For example, consider the 'discovery' of the D.N.A. molecular structure as an instance of men open to difference.

Watson was a man driven by the desire to know what the gene was. Given his uncertainty, there was no limitations to what

could be relevant for an understanding of genetic structure. Although he had no training in crystallography, he did not rule out its potential significance for his concern with genetics. He says: "The fact that I was unable to interpret it [X-ray photograph] did not bother me" (Watson, 1968:30). He had no intentions of becoming a "stifled academic who had never risked a thought".

His concern was not in doing genetics, nor did he feel that evidence could be found solely within the particular realm of biology. He decided to learn crystallography. Furthermore, he had always detested chemistry, but at one point in his work we hear:

> [there is] a problem of what neutralized the negative charges of the phosphate groups, of the D.N.A. backbone. Frances [Crick] as well as I knew almost nothing about how inorganic ions were arranged in three-dimensions. Thus if the crux of the problem was to deduce an unusually clever arrangement in inorganic ions and phosphate groups, we were clearly at a disadvantage. (1968:56)

In other words he recognizes that the crux of the problem could lie in chemistry, that which he had always feared to tackle. He then pursued a rapid reading of The Nature of the Chemical Bond without thinking that one must be a chemist before a correct interpretation of a chemistry text is possible.

His concern for genetic structure, took him beyond the boundaries of his own specialty. Had he been concerned with staying within the limits of his discipline, and with following its rules, then his fate would resemble that of Rosalind Franklin, an expert

crystallographer. Rosalind Franklin was also interested in D.N.A. structure, but her concern was guided by a concern for following rules of appropriate procedure. She felt that only by staying within the limits of crystallography would she arrive at a solution to the problem. And she was very frustrated with Watson and Crick's unsystematic behavior. On more than one occasion, did she 'put them in their place', by suggesting that they had no right in judging her 'evidence' as they were not trained crystallographers. Rosy maintained that the "sugar phosphate backbone was on the outside of the molecule" which was in total disagreement with Watson and Crick. But as Watson says, "her past uncompromising statements on this matter thus reflected first-rate science" (1968:136). She was concerned with following the rules of membership, which gave her foolproof results, i.e., results she knew she could count on. But Rosy was not open to difference; she would dismiss those who were non-members, or not 'like her'.

I think openness is possible through tolerance. Tolerance suggests openness between persons and a readiness for relationships. What is there to be tolerant of, other than differences? What calls for tolerance? Does tolerance amount to allowing another to be so positioned as to agree with you; allowing another to be like you? Then what is there to be tolerant of? One is not tolerant of differences simply to reach unity or a state in which tolerance is no longer needed. Rather, it is more like dwelling in a relationship with persons; one which is open to encounters. And one who is

open, is attentive to the otherness of the other.

To be attentive, suggests that you are receptive in relation to an other. And it is through being receptive that one directs oneself towards possibilities. This involves uncertainties, since what is merely possible is not assured; it is not positive. Could we say that those who are assertive and claim certainties or those who are concerned with controlling the future (scientists) are unreceptive in their approach. Receptivity, it seems, is a way of leaving the future alone without being unconcerned with it - an openness to what's ahead, an openness to the idea that things could be other than what is 'obvious'.

To live with uncertainties, would suggest an alternative conception of community. When I am uncertain, I make room for the otherness of the other. I acknowledge that someone else may have understanding that I lack and hence am attentive to him. When I am uncertain other persons have to be encountered, as answers may lie anywhere with anyone. Nothing is automatically irrelevant when we are uncertain. Only with certainty, do we see the relevances and irrelevances of things.

On the other hand, if I am sure, I force the other into a position which precludes communication.[3] If the other disagrees with me, if he does not merge with me by possessing the same assumptions I possess, then he is treated as 'unreasonable' or as an

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[3]Communication as I intend to use it, involves a union which preserves difference and results from a sharing of uncertainty, or a readiness to entertain the differentness of the other.

inanimate object that is known. There is no occasion for communication, as we do not treat the difference as an opportunity for union. But rather that which is different or apart from us, is treated as external, and knowable via observation. But to grant that others may have insights different from mine (difference), is to make room for the differentness of others.

To live a life of uncertainty would be to live with insecurity. One is not secure in anything. How could you therefore rule or judge? It's like being an unstable chemical solution. As drops of another solution (experiences, encounters) hit the surface of this solution it sets off a reaction of sufficient strength as to chemically alter the nature of the solution. Tolerance reflects a willingness for the other to be unsettling; which is essential to the idea of uncertainty and making room for the other. It expresses a willingness for others to be incomprehensible and unstable, and a willingness to live with doubt, since you recognize that the truths on which you rely most heavily may not be truths at all, and can at any time be replaced by other formulations. To question our fundamental truths (assumptions) is unsettling. The idea that we have a definable place in a comprehensible world is tied to these basic assumptions which in turn is tied with our sense of knowing where we are and what we are about. Such assurance is lost when assumptions are questioned. And such assurance and security is necessary, for the doctor to function in the medical world.

Questions which place medical procedures in question (out-

sider's questions)[4] would necessarily disrupt medical practice itself. If medical practice is concerned with the treatment of disease, it is concerned with prescribed courses of action. And action requires that at some point we cease asking ourselves why we're acting. Treatment as action, is then a decision to stop questioning fundamental assumptions, to stop questioning one's procedures.

If doctors found themselves continually questioning their procedures, then they would be involved in the activity of questioning at the expense of doctoring. Doctors undoubtedly ask themselves questions as to what is the best course of treatment for individual patients; but those questions always gear toward the termination of questioning. They call for a solution for the purpose of acting. The question is concerned with what is to be done for a sick person. The doctor is concerned with making the sick well, and this concern finds itself bound by the restrictions of time. Practitioners are interested in perceived 'results' within the immediate present or very near future. Any reflective activity which maintains no concern for time is not feasible within the medical domain.

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[4]A doctor would not ask a layman why he is of a certain opinion, as the layman is an 'outsider', and hence is seen as one who could never make the incomprehensible, comprehensible. Furthermore as an 'outsider' he may serve to remind the doctor of the decisiveness of his practice.

Chapter IV

RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS:

A CALL FOR UNIFIED EXPERIENCE

So far, it has been suggested that 'seeing' within a medical setting, is a feature of a doctor's gaze, supported and justified by an institution. And in medicine, expression or speech can be understood only by those initiated into 'true' speech. Therefore, what is visible is exclusive to certain 'chosen ones'; to those holding membership in the medical community. What can be expressed is visible. The correlation between the visible and the expressible reveals the use of scientific discourse.

Medicine sees man as an object of positive knowledge. Medical knowledge involves an examination of 'data' in order to provide an explanation of disease. It involves a devotion to the 'facts' and an insistence on the unification of the structure of experience. Says Aristotle (1952:596b-c):

> Medicine, for instance, does not theorize about what will help to cure Socrates or Callias, but only about what will help to cure any or all of a given class of patients: this alone is its business: individual cases are so infinitely various that no systematic knowledge of them is possible.

The medical world has faith in science as the sole method of obtaining knowledge. Thus any question that is not answerable by the empirical methods of science is not verifiable and hence is not really answerable at all. Significant problems get their meaning from operations of scientific observations, experiment, and measurement, by which they can be solved. The solutions, arrived at by the method of science are seen as better than guesswork or opinion. The answer is supported by 'fact' and are subject to further verification. Medicine accepts the view that one can claim to know only what can be demonstrated or verified by empirical research.[1]

Research activity is the expression of our scientific tradition. We inherit this tradition automatically when working by the rules of research. As I suggested in the previous chapter, when we accept the rules we accept a certain world. The world of science is a world under 'law'. The idea of outside-the-law is disturbing for science. Any experience beyond the rule-of-law, cannot be dealt with. To stand outside the law is to stand devoid of community support. It is to stand alone, and risk distance with 'reality', as 'reality' is a matter of consensual validation, a matter of

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[1] I am not suggesting that medicine should be conducted otherwise. That there could be a 'better' way of doing medicine, is not the issue. I simply want to provide for how we might understand the nature of medicine. Medicine is concerned with the explanation of phenomena (disease), and the conception of phenomena derives from Aristotle. He says in his Physica (184a): "When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained."

collectibility. If depersonalization becomes the basis of community or collectibility, then a person holding to individual experience, risks becoming irrelevant.

As graduate students learning to become sociologists, we learn that some projects are more relevant than others. We learn to confine and focus our insights within the conceptual framework and relevances which are given in the discipline. We learn a way of experiencing the world which is recognizable to its practitioners or what we come to know as the 'sociological perspective'.[2] We learn to treat the world as instances of a sociological body of knowledge. When we write a paper we know that the first thing to do is to attach ourselves to the discipline at some point. Often we demonstrate this in our claims to see problems or omissions within an existing theoretical framework. But the boundaries or limits of inquiry are set by the discipline.

My concern in this chapter is to explicate these limits in order to uncover the basis of the social scientist's knowledge and its accompanying form of life. Any inquiry into the research activity promises an awareness of the presuppositions of science. That is, a consideration of research requirements may reveal the scientific form of life. The value of this is nowhere better felt than for

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[2]Peter Berger tells us that the 'sociological perspective' can be understood in terms of such phrases as 'seeing through', 'looking behind', very much as such phrases would be employed in common speech - 'seeing through his game', 'looking behind the scene'. "We will not be far off if we see sociological thought as part of what Neitzche called the art of mistrust." (1963:30)

those questioning how they wish to live. The graduate student, choosing to become a social scientist, is really choosing a way of life that is scientific. As was mentioned in Chapter One the demands made in the scientific enterprise are demands which call for depersonalized, unified experience.

A major requirement of the researcher is that he review the literature existing around his specified topic. What does this mean? What is required is having read certain books on topic. It isn't the book that matters, nor even the reading, but one has to have read it. It is the 'having read' that counts (Verhoeven, 1972). This seems to suggest that a topic must belong to the past before it can have significance for the community. This means that what is topical is what is rooted in the past and not just created today. The obligation to have read something means that we are able to join in the communal conversation about what is past. To have read a book is proof that we have joined in; it secures our participation as a member of the community.

A review of the literature preserves conceptions and means of description which represent the world as it is for social scientists. It preserves the relevance of problems for community members, and hence provides an opportunity for exercising membership. A literature review sets the limits of one's world. It preserves community conceptions by establishing answers to the question of what is significant.

Doing research which requires a review of the literature,

perhaps suggests the recognition that where we stand today is a function of where we stood yesterday; of our past. But this recognition may be a moment in the larger activity of formulating a method such that anyone who uses it can arrive at knowledge. Descartes (1952:61b-c), convinced that the process of knowing could be routinized, says in his Discourse on Method:

> But having the intention of devoting all my life to the investigation of a knowledge which is so essential, and having discovered a path which appears to me to be of such a nature that we must by its means infallibly reach our end if we pursue it, unless, indeed, we are prevented by the shortness of life or by lack of experience, I judge that there was no better provision against these two impediments than faithfully to communicate to the public the little which I should myself have discovered and to beg all well-inclined persons to proceed further by contributing, each one according to his own inclination and ability, to the experiments which must be made, and then to communicate to the public all things which they might discover, in order that the last should commence where the preceeding had left off; and thus, by joining together the lives and labours of many, we should collectively proceed much further than any one in particular could succeed in doing.

The suggestion that knowledge can grow and accumulate presumes that method alone guarantees knowledge. Knowledge is not a matter of revelation or inspiration but derives from the careful application of method.

The stipulation of a review of the literature provides a reference point from which knowledge is seen as advancing. Our work

can be seen as a progressive movement beyond the existing literature review, or beyond the past. Yet, in any study, we are also required to define our terms, an activity which is anti-historical. In defining our terms we are not usually interested in discovering the movement of history but in 'starting-off' on the same level. That is, we assume that understanding one another requires our being on the same footing. In order for our colleagues to understand what we are saying we must provide them with a box which is big enough for both of us. Starting-off on the same level is possible by agreeing to identify phenomena in the same manner. By operationalizing our terms we organize the phenomenon solely in terms of our operations for measuring it. By defining our terms, we are not interested in revitalizing the past, but our concern is with how we are to be understood from this point on. If we want to understand, we must hold to the author's definitions, not allowing them to become replaced by our own. We must not allow them to pass away. In a review of the literature we acknowledge a past, but in our attempts at defining our terms we behave as if the past disunity didn't immobilize the present.

A review of the literature would suggest a topic's historical life and the present's involvement in its historical movement. But the literature review actually stops the movement so as to establish a progression from the past. What does it mean to acknowledge the past? Does it amount to a report of 'significant others' without

showing their significance? To be aware of our inheritance, is it simply to realize ancestral existence or does it also involve an awareness of our relationship to our ancesters?

To be related is to be in touch with others. Our work, as offspring, should show the connection to its origins. It should show its relatedness to the past. We could suggest that our topic serves as the connection between ourselves and our predecessors, as the activity of reviewing the literature suggests. But if we accept the idea that, because others have dealt with the same topic, it is a reason for our collecting them, then the topic becomes independent of the process of formulation. The topic becomes an external entity commanding acknowledgement of its own significant others. But how are topics related to their significant others? Simply by virtue of others having looked at the same topic? But in that case, one would be required to cite as relevant all those having dealt with the topic in the past.

We see in most reviews of the literature that the researcher selectively chooses to cite certain authors within the topical area. He is selective according to those studies he finds trustworthy, and demonstrative of a certain treatment. There is some rule of selection operating, to tell the researcher which authors to cite and which to exclude. The rule is seen in the researcher's selection of those seen as trustworthy. If his gaze into the past holds a concern for adherence to scientific method then this reveals his connection to

those he cites. From a past certain authors will be relevant or irrelevant, and the particular selection expresses a particular community. The individual will preserve community upon every occasion of citing the 'relevant' literature; citing the 'appropriate' ancestry. Should you cite 'irrelevant' sources then you become susceptible to rejection from the community who holds the source as valuable or relevant. An individual will preserve community in so far as he fears (Neitzsche, 1954).

What does having trust mean? Usually we associate reliability with trust. To know that someone can be trusted is to know that he is reliable, and can be counted on. Doubt is suspended. We feel secure that what we find trustworthy, will prove to be what we now anticipate of it. Trust builds on the expectation that the other on which we depend, will remain steadfast and reliable in his relation to us. Is there ever a question of our ancestors not having meant what they said, or having said what they meant? No, we trust that they present themselves as members of a community, a community to which we also belong. Because we share a similiar orientation to knowledge, insecurity is alleviated. Is there a need to mistrust someone who is like us? No, we are likely to mistrust strangers, which suggests that the unknown is peril. In trust we are able to act without fear of the outcome, since the object of our trust is taken as reliable and as presenting itself truly. If we trust, we are assured or secure in how the world appears. Our experience of

being able to rely (trust) is central to an object relationship and central to existence, since existence does not allow us to put everything to the test.

To infer that someone is trustworthy, is to have confidence in things as they appear. If appearance is controlled (operationalism) then we feel assured and secure. Likewise when we identify ourself with certain others we are likely to trust those that are 'comparable'. That is, those who are like us - "If I'm O.K. and I'm like you then you must be O.K. too; you're trustworthy." - But what does this say about our relationship to our ancestors? Is this what acknowledging our past means? A review of the literature then, displays our trust in what we cite. Our activity of trusting serves to operationalize the literature review, via a selection of authors with a similar orientation to knowledge.[3] It serves to display community, by bringing the past under control, and hence we express ourselves as 'man the controller'. After-all the world is created in the image of he who defines.

In a review of the literature we acknowledge our predecessors and this serves to provide a social context which renders our

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[3]Consider the following as exemplary of studies which are designed to overcome their predecessors' shortcomings: B. Baumann, "Diversities in Conception of Health and Physical Fitness", Journal of Health and Human Behavior, 2-4, (1961-63); M. Davies and Roberton Erchhorn, "Compliance with Medical Regimens:A Panel Study", Journal of Health and Human Behavior, 2-4, (1961-63); M. Rogers, "Instrumental and Infra-Resources:The Bases of Power", American Journal of Sociology, 79, (1973-74).

hypotheses intelligible. It provides the common sense for the study at hand. Further, it allows us to forget ourselves, by reminding us that our opinions (hypotheses) are related to knowledge (existing literature) and not merely to the knower (ourselves). It reminds us that our problematic must be communally problematic. And should we be particular to what we say, the charge of subjectivity is forthcoming.

The context shows community and thereby serves to eliminate the individual's authority over standards and boundaries of inquiry. The call for a review of the literature solidifies the separation of knower and known. It reflects the belief that should the knower be exclusively essential to what is known, then the knowledge produced is contaminated. It forgets that the 'I' is necessarily implied in the constitution of 'facts'.

A review of the literature constitutes the object known prior to the knower's entry into the relation. His relation to it, the act in which he knows it, has already a determinate structure. He first appears as an investigator, independent from what he investigates. Because of this, the body of literature becomes stable and external. As social scientists, we are required to review the literature, but the view must remain the same upon each occasion of its reading (unified experience). A body of literature is seen as 'existing' and its existence is grounded in efforts to appropriately cite its 'body' on various occasions of use. Those reading the literature

are held to be reading the same text (Smith, 1974). Readers are seen as interchangeable, which constitutes knowledge as the same before anyone. The body of literature should contain the same 'facts' for any one reviewing it.

According to Smith (1974), fact is a "practice of knowing, which constructs an object as symbolic artifact". A known is viewed as external to the knowers. It therefore provides a fixed coordinate for anyone. It is the same for 'anyone'.

> This 'sameness' is a product of a social organization in which the knower may treat her knowledge as what is or could be known by anyone else....It [factual organization] sets up relations of equivalence, therefore among knowers such that they are formally interchangeable (Smith, 1974, 259).

Through the 'fact' we are related to others and they are related to us, but this is not apparent. Because we constitute the known similarily it doesn't matter who we are, or where we stand. The separation of the knower and the known is created in the 'fact'.

But the 'fact' is socially organized. In Smith's words (1974: 258):

> The fact is not that actuality as it has been worked up so that it intends its own description. That actuality has been assigned descriptive categories and a conceptual structure... These categorical and conceptual procedures which name, analyse and assemble what actually happens become (as it were) inserted into the actuality as an interpretive schema;to organize the actuality does not appear as imposing an organization upon it but rather as a discovery of how it is.

The 'facts' appear to speak for themselves, to the extent that what counts as 'fact' is shared. 'Facts' become problematic when individuals have different orientations to the facts.

II

Methodological questions arising about studies previously done, are prevalent in many reviews of the literature. This suggests that it is important to concern ourselves with how our predecessors studied a problem, if we are interested in determining the validity of their findings. That is, before we grant any finding a factual status, we shall consider the study's methodology. This concern, however, takes for granted the organization which has already been dictated by our membership in the social science community. In other words, as members we already share a similiar orientation to knowledge, one which is based on the routinization of the process of knowing. "The method for deciding the presence of rule must itself be an instance of rule" (Blum, 1974). The concern in terms of methods, involves our participation in an authority structure; the authority structure of sociology. It involves our having received the interpretive procedures that tell us what we see is 'factual'.

This should become clearer upon a consideration of specific instances of methodological disagreements, say in the 'established' literature on professions. Many, for example, have asked themselves what characterizes a profession, and the 'sociological view' directs

the researcher into a certain realm. That is, as a sociologist, one's formulation of the problem will be dictated by the discipline, and not by individual experience. So somehow the body of literature exists by virtue of a commitment to the sociological community. It becomes another occasion of unified experience rather than individual experience. This becomes clearer upon a consideration of how members treat difference.

Members recognize different approaches to a topic, but underlying the differences is an essential sameness. Difference is treated so as to end up with a unification of experience; so as to end up with sameness. Consider, for example, authors interested in conceptualizing professions. Wilensky (1964) utilizes a comparison approach to determine the essential features of a profession. That is, he compares recognized professions to determine whether there is a common progression of events, a common path that they have all followed from which he could then determine the characteristics of a profession. William Goode (1972) disagrees with Wilensky's approach for the central reason that Goode observes occupations which have tried most of the steps suggested by Wilensky but without final recognition as a profession. The reason for disagreement would not, however, serve as an instance of essential difference between Wilensky and Goode. Empirical observations of instances which contradict the stated case, are seen as basic to the general growth of scientific knowledge. This is the essential sameness underlying members' talk of difference. Goode,

considers librarianship as an instance of non-professionals, claiming the status of professionals. He looks to non-professions in hopes of determining the essential features of a profession. This results in the suggestion that attitudinal attributes are important to the overall conceptual scheme of professions. Disagreement among writers is treated as necessary to the overall conceptual scheme, so long as each contributes to the unification of experience. It is then, a difference which serves an additive function. The conceptualizing of a profession, ties the writers together, in the extensive body of literature dealing with the characteristics of a profession. The conceptual scheme is rooted in the sociological discipline, and therefore a collection of authors serves as expressing community.

Goode's difference is seen as a contribution to those holding the belief that man's conceptions are important in how he behaves in situations. It is seen as a contribution to those in the 'interpretive paradigm'.[2] But would it be seen as such to those strictly adhering to the Durkheim position? Probably not. What is seen as contributing is grounded in a particular context, and expressed in the decision to cite certain others. Goode's study would likely be viewed as irrelevant to Durkheimians, and hence omitted from their literature review. Then one way of treating difference is by simply omitting it. In this case to treat difference as difference would mean opening up

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[2]Thomas Wilson (1970) tells us that the interpretive paradigm conceptualizes interaction as an interpretive process. This suggests that we act on the basis of our perceptions of what the others are up to.

an alternative realm of inquiry, one which results in our becoming irrelevant. For instance, should a researcher happen to stumble across a study which suggests an alternative inquiry into a phenomenon, then the question as to whether it 'really' offers an alternative, becomes apparent. The study is more likely to be omitted as it would prove irrelevant, given our commitment to a particular community. This means that the authority of alternative communities is silenced. For example, a study done by Blum and Rosenberg (1969) which deals with explicating the essential features of a professional, consistently fails to be mentioned in reviews of the literature. Why is this? Could it be that to utilize their conceptual scheme may involve a disruption of the already agreed-upon social structure? The authors locate differences between members of society and psychiatrists, in the types of knowledge which is used to formulate conceptions of interaction, rather than in the respective statuses or identities. The everyday person uses commonsense knowledge which is formulated in terms of the practical, personal relevances of people and is based upon intersubjective validation. In contrast, professionals are seen as suspending lay knowledge and the commonsense presuppositions which are usually employed by members of society, as well as treating social interaction and all of its problems as matters of theoretic rather than practical interest. Blum and Rosenberg suggest that, "professionals discard their commonsense knowledge of some special sphere of activity and replace such knowledge with

a theoretic interest in the problem". They can be heard as suggesting that the essential feature of a professional is the nature of their experiences, rather than their location in the usual statuses or identities. This conceptualization poses problems for an accepted notion of hierarchal structure, as one's position would no longer guarantee professional status. The essential feature of a professional no longer rests in occupying a certain position, but in an individual's interpretation of what is seen. Unlike the non-professional, the professional's interpretations are theoretical in nature, rather than pragmatic.

This way of distinguishing professional from non-professional, may involve finding irrelevant authors 'relevant'. That is,we may now find M. Foucault's (1973) distinction between 'officiers of health' and 'clinicians', interesting. He says (1973:81):

> On what was the distinction based among those practising the art of healing? The most important part of the training of an officier of health was his years of practice, the doctor on the other hand complicated his theoretical training with clinical experience. The practice required of the officiers of health was a controlled empiricism: a question of knowing what to do after seeing; perception, memory, and repetition; that is at the level of the example. In the clinic, it was a question of a much more subtle and complex structure in which the integration of experience occurred in a gaze that was at the same time knowledge, a gaze that exists, that was master of its truth, and free of all example, even at times it made use of them.

What would it mean if we found this interesting? Could it mean that

a new realm of inquiry has just opened up, and we now find ourselves unfaithful to the sociological community, since after-all the dominant view conceives of a professional as one who occupies a position within a division of labor. Of course agreement is not essential as an expression of faithfulness. And we could disagree so long as we share a common orientation to knowledge. But do we?

To contemplate Blum and Rosenberg's thesis that what distinguishes a professional is his interpretive scheme, we may find ourselves also contemplating Foucault's suggestion that the gaze of a professional collapes the distinction between knowledge and sight; and we may find ourselves in a different world of inquiry. Within this world, it becomes conceivable that one sees the visible, not because it is out there to see, but because one knows the language.

> ...things are offerred to him who has penetrated the closed world of words;...Description, in clinical medicine, does not mean placing the hidden or the invisible within reach of those who have no direct access to them; what it means is to give speech to that which sees without seeing - a speech that can be understood only by those initiated into true speech (Foucault, 1973:115).

By invoking language one creates a world in which one lives. The question of whether objects exist is precluded, as they become created via our use of language. This is in contrast with scientific inquiry, as science assumes that statements can only describe a world existing independent of us.

We are only too ready to question the 'reasonablness' of such a conceptual scheme. The concern as to whether it indeed offers an alternative model of professionalism reflects our commitment to a particular community, one whose notion of authority expresses itself by silencing others. If we are to be doing sociology we must cite the appropriate past, a past re-called by the community. What is therefore omitted from the body of literature, may reveal alternative possibilities. But alternative possibilities is a disruption; it may introduce alternative 'authorities', and doing sociology requires activity within the appropriate framework.

Not everyone wonders about the same thing, if our wonder is determined by the acquisition of our individual experiences. But it is precisely this, which will be controlled under the ideal of unified experience. Given our community's treatment of difference, we may well ask whether wonder can exist at all. Are we really motivated by the idea that things might be otherwise?

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