COMMUNITIES AND REGIMES:

The CSCE / OSCE and

the Future of European Security

by

Robert I. N. Dick

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Political Studies

University of Manitoba

Winnipeg, Manitoba

© 1998 by Robert I. N. Dick
The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author’s permission.
THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

COPYRIGHT PERMISSION PAGE

COMMUNITIES AND REGIMES:

THE CSCE/OSCE AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

BY

ROBERT I.N. DICK

A Thesis/Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

ROBERT I.N. DICK  ©1998

Permission has been granted to the Library of The University of Manitoba to lend or sell copies of this thesis/practicum, to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film, and to Dissertations Abstracts International to publish an abstract of this thesis/practicum.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither this thesis/practicum nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.
University of Manitoba

Abstract

COMMUNITIES AND REGIMES:
THE CSCE / OSCE AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

by Robert I. N. Dick

Department of Political Studies

The thesis employs Deutsch’s theory of security communities and regime theory in order to contribute to an understanding of the role of the OSCE in the European security architecture. It is found that while much of the language used to describe the institutionalisation and role of the OSCE is that of regime theory, Deutsch’s theory of security communities, and especially the conditions which contribute to the formation of a security community, provides an understanding of the idealism which drives the OSCE and thus of the role which it plays in contributing to “soft” security in Europe.
# Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................ III

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 1 .............................................................................................................................. 10

SECURITY COMMUNITIES AND SECURITY REGIMES ......................................................... 10

CHAPTER 2 .............................................................................................................................. 40

THE CSCE ............................................................................................................................... 40

CHAPTER 3 ................................................................................................................................ 72

THE OSCE .................................................................................................................................. 72

CHAPTER 4 ............................................................................................................................... 103

THE OSCE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE ...................................... 103

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 118

APPENDIX 1 ............................................................................................................................ 123

DEUTSCH’S ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS FOR SECURITY COMMUNITIES .................................. 123

APPENDIX II ........................................................................................................................... 124

SIGNATORIES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT ................................................................... 124

APPENDIX IV ........................................................................................................................... 126

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 127
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to extend my greatest appreciation to Professors Davis Daycock and Paul Buteux, whose insights, guidance and advice greatly enhanced the quality of this thesis and my overall graduate programme; to Professors Ken Reshaur and James Fergusson for making both my undergraduate and graduate years intellectually stimulating, challenging and fun; to Eleanor Stardom and Cathy Dunlop of the Department of Political Studies for their counsel and assistance; and to my parents, Alan and Rosalind, and brother, Graeme, for their continuing support and encouragement.
GLOSSARY

CDE  Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
CFE  Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe
CIO  Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States
CPC  Conflict Prevention Centre
CSBM  Confidence and Security Building Measure
CSCE  Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EBRD  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC  European Community
ECE  UN Economic Commission for Europe
EFTA  European Free Trade Area
EU  European Union
FSC  Forum for Security Cooperation
INF  Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
MBFR  Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
N+N States  Neutral and Non-Aligned States
NACC  North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
ODIHR  Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PA  Parliamentary Assembly
PfP  Partnership for Peace
START  Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
UN  United Nations
WEU  Western European Union
WTO  Warsaw Treaty Organisation
Introduction

In the field of international relations, and particularly in the area of security, Europe has always occupied a privileged position. This is in no small part due to the fact that the study of international relations has its origins in the two World Wars, conflicts which despite their names were really European conflicts, at least at their outset. Moreover, the field developed and matured in an era in which global politics were dominated by the East-West divide known for better or worse as the cold war. It is, then, hardly surprising that international relations literature has tended to be, and still is largely, driven in its development by events in Europe and by international relations among European powers. Indeed, it is significant that literature in the field has been dominated by European and North American scholars.

The somewhat narrower focus of this thesis, security studies, has been similarly influenced. International relations theories, especially those pertaining to security, have more often than not been developed as a result of either empirical observation of events and relations in Europe, or out of a desire to control or manage events and relations in Europe. It is telling that the “great debates” within international relations theory, most notably the traditionalist-behaviouralist debate of the 1960s, and possibly the so-called

1 It should be noted here that “Europe” is employed in accordance with the CSCE definition. That is to say, Europe is considered to extend from “Vancouver to Vladivostock.” Canada and the United States, as well as Russia (and the Soviet Union if the appropriate period is being referenced) are therefore encompassed by this definition.
realist-idealistic debate of the 1930s could, with only slight generalisation, be described as European-American debates.

Typically, it has been the institutions which have been created in Europe to manage international relations in that region which have served as the focus of discussion and debate in international relations and security literature. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, and the European Union (EU) have all been the subjects of intensive study and the sources of elaborate theorising. Each entity has its own legion of devoted scholarly followers. Many important theories of international relations and security studies, including integration theory, functionalism, neo-functionalism, interdependence theory, and regime theory have drawn heavily upon the study of relations among European states, as well as upon the development, evolution and interactions of the aforementioned organisations.

In view of the pre-eminent role played by Europe and its institutions in the fields of international relations and security studies, it is interesting to observe the paucity of literature and analysis devoted to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which came into being August 1, 1975 and which has been known since January 1, 1995 as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The CSCE / OSCE has generated neither the same interest nor the same level of study, analysis and theorising as have NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the EU. Thus no theories have evolved which, by design, are tailored towards explaining and understanding the OSCE.
This is not to say, however, that theories have not and cannot be applied towards understanding the role and function of the CSCE in European security. Indeed, this thesis does precisely that. While it is highly improbable that participating states let their action be governed by any specific theory, there is some evidence, primarily within CSCE documents, that first integration theory and, more recently, regime theory, have had an influence in the development and evolution of the Organisation. No attempt will be made here to determine whether this influence was intentional or otherwise, nor even conclusively to demonstrate its existence. Rather, this thesis seeks to make a modest contribution to the study of the OSCE by demonstrating that although the structure and role of the Organisation do not completely fit the models offered by integration theory and regime theory, aspects of these theories, and in some instances their more recently developed successors, can help us better to understand the new OSCE and its role in the modern European security architecture.

The first chapter of the thesis develops the theoretical framework for the subsequent analysis of the CSCE. The particular theory of integration which is employed is that of Karl Deutsch, who studied the conditions of integration in the 1950s and 1960s, and who developed the concept of the pluralistic security community described in Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Deutsch sought to work backwards, examining relations among states for whom war with each other had come to be thought of as impossible in order to identify the specific conditions which had led to the existence of this pacific co-existence which he labelled a security community. The aim of his study
was to learn the conditions in order to replicate them, thereby creating a model under which security communities could be established and war abolished.

Deutsch's integration theory, or functionalist theory, essentially argues that if two or more states can collaborate in economic, social and other functions to the point where some integration of those functions occurs, and then that integration "spills-over" into other functional areas, the conditions necessary for the formation of a security community will begin to manifest themselves. Because Karl Deutsch's writings were concerned specifically with the North Atlantic area, and because he is one of the most influential authors on the subject of integration, his theory will be most heavily relied upon here.

Deutsch is not alone in his explorations of these subject areas, however. Others, especially more recently, have written in the same vein or have elaborated upon Deutsch's ideas. The neo-functionalist work of Ernst B. Haas, from The Uniting of Europe in 1958 to "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process" in International Organization, Vol XV, No. 4 in 1961 is very similar to Deutsch's, but focuses more on the "accommodations" that must occur in the negotiation of international conflict among the political elites in order for there to be a "revolution of interests on both sides." As Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi put it, Haas "directed his efforts not

---

toward understanding conflict among states faced with a security dilemma but toward understanding how states achieve collaborative behavior.3"

By 1975, when he writes The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, Haas had modified his position. According to this text, the international security game has changed to interdependence, but Haas is careful to note that interdependence can still “profit from incorporation of aspects of the theory of regional integration.”4 The theory of integration, Haas writes, has “a tendency not to predict very accurately the events which come about,” and to be “least applicable” in the “empirical setting of Western Europe” in which it was developed.5 In short, Haas concludes that “the familiar regional integration theories are obsolete in Western Europe and obsolescent—though still useful—in the rest of the world.”6

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, authors of Power and Interdependence, are two of the primary advocates of the concept of interdependence, which is very closely linked with theories of integration and of regimes and regime change. According to Keohane and Nye, “where there are reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) costly effects of transactions, there is interdependence.”7 Interdependence relies on the notion of

6 Ibid. p. 1
mutual dependence, and under this theory states may be perceived to be both vulnerable and sensitive to one another’s interests. It may seem from this that there is very little difference between integration and interdependence. Haas addresses this issue well:

Differences become very apparent, however, when we talk of ‘policy interdependence’ and ‘policy integration’… Policy interdependence … is concerned with activities and events which can be described as economic and social. Political interdependence is a condition – both physical and perceptual – under which governments are so sensitive and vulnerable to what their partners may or may not do that unilateral action becomes unwise and dangerous to their survival. … The notion of ‘integration,’ however, refers to institutionalized procedures devised by governments for coping with the condition of interdependence… …

Regional integration theory, therefore, can be properly seen as a component of a larger analytic framework, dealing with a special case within the overall scheme. Another important distinction to be made is that integration theory, and not just policy, is primarily concerned with security. The aim of Deutsch’s study is to learn how to make war obsolete. Theories of interdependence, in contrast, manifest a “decided absence of hierarchy among issues such that socioeconomic issues may be as or more important than security issues,” and, “when such complex interdependence exists, military force tends to have less utility in the resolution of conflicts.”

The idea of interdependence also hinges on the notion of regimes which was described first by Krasner and later by many others, although mainly by Robert Jervis, albeit inadequately, with relation to security. Keohane and Nye suggest that when interdependence prevails, “governments regulate and control transnational and interstate

---

8 Haas. The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory. P. 88-89
relations” by “creating or accepting procedures, rules, or institutions for certain kinds of activity.” They call these “governing arrangements” international regimes. The concept of regimes will be more fully described in the body of the thesis. It should be noted that although one naturally falls into the language of regimes when discussing the OSCE, the closer examination which the thesis attempts to provide shows that rather than suiting the requirements of regime theory, the OSCE is better understood within the parameters of Deutsch’s ideas.

The thesis also relies on the notion of weak, partial, or incipient regimes, as the conception is advanced by Nye and Buteux. Unlike the narrower conception of regimes offered by Krasner and Jervis, according to which a regime must form by consensus in response to a common goal and typically a common approach to a problem, a weak, partial or incipient regime is more loosely conceived of as being able to form around a common aversion - to nuclear war or war in general, for instance - possibly even without the necessity of explicit agreement on how to achieve the aversion.

The thesis goes on to trace the origins and development of the CSCE, and subsequently the OSCE to determine whether or to what extent the theoretical models apply and can be used to understand the role of the Organisation. The second chapter describes the origins of the Helsinki Process, and traces the development of the CSCE up to and including the Stockholm Conference in 1986 while beginning to apply the analysis

---

9 Viotti and Kauppi. P. 244.
and framework set forth in the first chapter to the Conference. A case begins to emerge that, at least at one level, the language, theory, and idealism of Deutsch are best employed for understanding the role of the Conference, despite the fact that the OSCE member states can clearly not be considered a security community.

The third chapter describes and analyses the significance of the institutionalisation of the CSCE into the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Increasingly in its descriptions of itself and in its own literature, the CSCE / OSCE describes itself as a regime. Indeed, it is found that the Organisation takes on many “regime-like” characteristics and that, appropriately, regime theory can be employed in a limited way to explain certain aspects of its operation. Overall, however, it is argued here that the role which the OSCE seeks to play, and which is demanded by its stated idealist aims and manifested in many of its humanitarian activities, is more thoroughly understood by Deutsch’s idealist theory of security communities.

The CSCE / OSCE has a positive, somewhat idealist approach to security problems whereby peace is based on collaboration and integration. Ultimately, the same principles and ideals of lasting peace, the expectation of peaceful change, common values, mutual responsiveness, and mutual predictability which Deutsch mandates for security communities underpin and guide the OSCE.

---

10 Keohane and Nye. P. 5
Finally, the role of the OSCE within the current European security architecture will be examined, and conclusions will be drawn about the continued utility of both theories as they pertain to understanding the role of the OSCE, and about the continued utility of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation itself.
Chapter 1

Security Communities and Security Regimes

The aim of this chapter is twofold: first, to describe the theory of the pluralistic security community as laid down by Karl Deutsch; and second, to lay a foundation for using this theory in subsequent chapters better to understand the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). To a lesser extent, the theory of security regimes according to Stephen Krasner and Robert Jervis will also be examined, since it, too, can contribute to a better understanding of the CSCE.

It is useful to begin by delineating the boundaries for this undertaking. Both theories are situated within larger bodies of theory which need not, and indeed cannot, be considered here; in the first instance because they are not directly applicable due to the narrow security focus of this thesis, and in the second due to the sheer amount of space that would be required.

In the case of Karl Deutsch's work, this thesis will focus on his writings, done in conjunction with others\(^{11}\) under the auspices of the Princeton Project,\(^ {12}\) on the subject of

\[\text{\textsuperscript{11}}\] Sidney Burrell, Robert Kann, Maurice Lee Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond Lindgren, Francis Loewenheim, Richard Van Wagenen.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{12}}\] A project undertaken by the Center for Research on World Political Institutions.
pluralistic security communities, as put forward in the 1957 publication, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*.

Deutsch has been described as a pioneer in integration studies\textsuperscript{13} and has written extensively on the subject. His work is often divided into two categories: methodology and theory. Arend Lijphart, in an article entitled, “Karl W. Deutsch and the New Paradigm in International Relations” says the following of his contribution to the discipline of international relations:

Deutsch’s role as a methodological innovator in international relations and, more generally, in political science has, of course, been widely recognized. \ldots Less recognition has been given… to Deutsch’s intellectual leadership in the major *theoretical* [italics in original] reorientation in the discipline of international relations…\textsuperscript{14}

Donald Puchala goes further, stating that “it is unfortunate that for many years Karl Deutsch the methodologist was confused by critics with Karl Deutsch the theorist.”\textsuperscript{15}

This thesis is concerned with Karl Deutsch the theorist.

Deutsch’s methodological writings were known for being quantitative, which is not surprising given the “prevailing social ‘scientism’ of the 1950s and 1960s.”\textsuperscript{16} In his methodological work, examples of integration were studied exhaustively in an attempt to


\textsuperscript{14} In *From National Development to Global Community*. Ed. Richard L. Merritt and Bruce M. Russett. P. 233.

\textsuperscript{15} Puchala, p. 150.

\textsuperscript{16} Puchala, p. 145.
arrive at a means of measuring the degree of integration within, between, or among states. For example, one source of data to be considered in determining how well an area is integrated is the volume of mail sent domestically versus internationally. This methodological study results in two conclusions, both of which contribute toward an explanation of the theoretical approach being taken in this thesis.

First, one of the general findings elaborated in Political Community and the North Atlantic Area is the idea of “thresholds of integration.” According to this finding, integration is not an “all-or-none process, analogous to the crossing of a narrow threshold,” which is what the authors had originally expected in devising their methodology. Rather, it was discovered that “integration may involve a fairly broad zone of transition.” The study, employing the social science methodology of the period, intended to subject areas being evaluated to both subjective and objective tests. The former took into consideration the opinions of political decision-makers and elites, and the latter recorded “opinions by the measurement of the tangible commitments and the allocation of resources with which people backed them…” This analysis resulted in the conclusion that integration is a broad concept, and that various states or groups of states can be integrated to differing degrees. This is of direct concern to the examination of the area covered by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, because the

18 Deutsch et al. P. 31-35
19 Ibid., p. 31
20 Ibid., p.33
21 What Deutsch et al call the “politically relevant strata.” P. 31
conclusion to which Deutsch et al were led regarding the state of integration in the North Atlantic Area continues to be true today both in that area, and in the CSCE area from Vancouver to Vladivostock: "...integration has by now reached different levels in different parts of the area, and ...we cannot in this study explore the situation in these subregions at all thoroughly."23

When Deutsch was writing, for instance, he argued that Canada and the United States and Norway and Sweden had a very high level of integration (and were pluralistic security communities), but that other states within the North Atlantic area were not as highly integrated, if at all. Now, one could make a strong case for the view that the sixteen North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) states form a pluralistic security community, yet there are different levels of integration among them as manifested in the different ways in which Canada and the United States behave towards one another compared to Greece and Turkey. When all of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact are thrown into the mix, it is evident that there are numerous different levels of integration among the states of the CSCE area, and certainly all the permutations and combinations of relationships among these states cannot be examined here to determine levels of integration. Deutsch’s conclusion makes the task at hand both more simple and more difficult. On the one hand, it makes the ‘target’ of integration easier to ‘hit’; on the other hand, it makes it more difficult to discern the boundaries of the target. In other words, because identifying integrated states is not “black and white,” but rather is

22 Ibid., p. 32
somewhat ambiguous, it is easier to put forward the case that two or more communities display a degree (or level) of integration. It is also, however, more difficult to discern the "boundaries" of integration, that is, to pin-point a time when the communities can be considered to be integrated, or to isolate a "trigger" to integration.

The second conclusion which affects this undertaking is not arrived at by Deutsch, but rather by others who observed the consequences of the methodological approach that he employed. It is, quite simply, that the approach does not work. Degrees of integration, or even whether or not integration is present in a given territory or area, cannot be determined quantitatively. As Donald Puchala writes, "...the metrics that would permit accurate assessment of degrees of amalgamation and integration could not be devised. Operationalization proved insuperable." Integration can neither fully nor adequately be measured, nor placed on any meaningful scale.

The implication of this latter conclusion for the present study is that here the focus will be on the theory which Deutsch advanced. Although that theory was formulated in part on the basis of Deutsch's attempts to quantify and measure integration, no such attempts at measurement will be made here.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 121}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{24} "Integration Theory and the Study of International Relations," in From National Development to Global Community. Ed. Richard L. Merritt and Bruce M. Russett. P. 153.}\]
This seems an appropriate place to note that, as should be evident from the above discussion, the work of Deutsch and his colleagues on integration is open to criticism. In fact, the work has been extensively criticised, particularly on the basis of gaps and flaws in the methodological approach. The validity of many of these critiques does not detract from this study however since Deutsch’s methodological approach is not being employed. Instead, Deutsch’s theory of integration will be employed in an attempt to understand the CSCE / OSCE and its role in European security. The fact that Deutsch’s methodology for measuring integration cannot be implemented feasibly does not invalidate the theories which he formed.

It should be equally evident that there are critiques of Deutsch’s theory, which seeks to explain integration and the conditions of peace among states, just as there are those who disagree with his liberal idealist philosophy which underpins his theory that lasting peace, peaceful change, and the abolition of war are attainable in international relations. Whether or not one agrees with the philosophy underpinning the theory, or even with the theory itself as a proscription to action, the study of integration which Deutsch puts forward can be used as an analytical tool to shed light on security relationships among states in the area delineated by the membership of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. As Haas might have it, an analysis can still benefit from the “incorporation of aspects of the theory of regional integration.”

25 Ernst Haas. The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory. P. 1 Haas argues that “the familiar integration theories are obsolete in Western Europe and obsolescent — though still useful — in the rest of the world.” (ibid) They would seem to be applicable in the more broadly defined CSCE Europe.
The purpose of Deutsch's study in *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* is made clear in the very first sentence: "We undertook this inquiry as a contribution to the study of possible ways in which men some day might abolish war." The authors sought to study the "conditions and processes of long-range or permanent peace," and to apply those findings with the aim of discovering how permanent peace could be brought about within the North Atlantic Area.

The North Atlantic area with which Deutsch *et al* were concerned is not as broad as the area covered by the CSCE. In *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, the area is said to include "all the countries bordering upon the North Atlantic Ocean of the North Sea, along with their immediate land-neighbors in Europe, except the Soviet-dominated countries." The East-West struggle was to be avoided, and therefore the authors chose to deal only with those countries which, broadly speaking, fell within the same ideological bloc. Specifically, the following nineteen states were considered to fall within the North Atlantic area: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

---

26 Deutsch *et al.*, p. 3
In the chapters that follow, it is the CSCE area which will be examined. This area includes all those states which Deutsch and his colleagues excluded because of differing political ideologies and market systems. Specifically, Deutsch excluded the Soviet Union and the states of eastern Europe on the basis that they were simply too different from the democratic, free market states in western Europe, Canada and the United States. Since the end of the cold war, however, this basis for exclusion is to say the least tenuous. These issues will be dealt with in greater detail later.

The basis of Deutsch’s study was the observation that very little effort has been devoted towards explaining “how and why certain groups have permanently stopped warring.” It is important to note that from the very beginning Deutsch avoids limiting the discussion to states. Instead, he refers to “groups” and, as he becomes more specific, “political communities.” In integration theories and functionalist literature, states do not occupy a privileged position in the hierarchy of actors on the international stage. Political communities, Deutsch posits, can be regarded as “social groups with a process of political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance.”

It does now follow, however, that political communities can prevent war from occurring within their area: the United States at the time of the Civil War was a political

---

29 Ibid., p. 4
30 Ibid., p. 4-5
31 Ibid., p. 5
community and was unable to do so.\textsuperscript{32} At the time he was writing, Deutsch concluded that the North Atlantic area was a political community, but not what he would term a security community because it could not be said with certainty that there would be lasting peace within the area.\textsuperscript{33} It was those political communities which had managed to ensure lasting or permanent peace within their area that were the object of Deutsch's study, and he called them peaceful political communities or, more commonly, security communities.

The notion of "lasting" or "permanent" peace introduces the troublesome question of time-frames and contributes to the ambiguity already discussed in determining levels of integration and even the presence of integration. For how long must there have been peace among communities before they become eligible for consideration as integrated communities? And for how long into the future must there be the expectation of peace and peaceful change in order for a security community to be said to exist? Since no one can ever say with certainty that there will be lasting peace, one is limited to examining conditions and making a judgement about whether there is a reasonable expectation of peaceful change based on the manner in which the communities involved interact with one another in situations of conflict.

As Deutsch notes, the use of the term "security community" starts a whole chain of definitions, and it seems most expedient simply to quote at length here to explain:

\[1\textsuperscript{st}\] Ibid., p. 5
\[2\textsuperscript{nd}\] Ibid., p.118
A SECURITY COMMUNITY is a group of people which has become ‘integrated.’

By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its populations.

By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by a process of ‘peaceful change.’

By PEACEFUL CHANGE we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large scale physical force.

A security community, therefore, is one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way. In areas where a security community exists, the United States and Canada or Norway and Sweden, for example, not only is there an expectation that conflicts will be resolved without resort to violence, but also that members of the security community will not even raise the alternative of military force or the threat of military force. In short, because of the responsiveness and sense of community (or “we-feeling”) among the groups, the

---

34 Ibid., p. 5
military option is given up, and the "basic realist assumptions about power, military capabilities and security in interstate relations" no longer hold.\textsuperscript{36}

Deutsch's use of the term "integration" can at times be problematic because it is easily confused with the more general theories of integration put forward by others in which the term is most frequently used to mean the union of states or groups. For Deutsch, integration does not necessarily mean union of peoples, states or governments. Instead, he refers to two types of security communities: amalgamated and pluralistic.

An amalgamated security community exists where two formerly independent units form into a single larger unit, typically with a common government regulating both internal and external relations.\textsuperscript{37} The modern United States is an example of an amalgamated security community. In contrast, states in a pluralistic security community such as Canada and the United States retain their sovereignty and legal independence. There are, in Deutsch's words, "two supreme decision-making centers."\textsuperscript{38} Groups in a pluralistic security community can be at various stages of the "threshold of integration," but they share at a minimum the expectation that change will occur peacefully, and that conflicts among them will be resolved without resort to the threat or actual use of force.

\textsuperscript{36} Starr, p. 211; Lijphart 233-251; Puchala 145-164
\textsuperscript{37} Deutsch \textit{et al}, p. 6; Puchala, 152
\textsuperscript{38} Deutsch \textit{et al}, p. 6
In Deutsch's usage, "the crossing of this threshold, and with it the establishment of a security community" is called integration.\textsuperscript{39}

What, then, is the relationship between these two forms of security community, pluralistic and amalgamated, or, put another way, between integration and unification? The relationship cannot be considered to be causal,\textsuperscript{40} for if it were, two groups such as the United States and the United Kingdom, which Deutsch considers to be in a pluralistic security community, would resist, since neither likely wants to proceed towards unification. If integration inevitably led to unification, then it is unlikely that the former would often occur. Deutsch does not deal with this issue in his work, but one can infer that although there is not a causal link between integration and unification, the two ideas are not entirely disconnected.

In detailing the conditions which must be met for the creation of amalgamated and pluralistic security communities, Deutsch observes that while twelve conditions appear to be essential for the success of the former\textsuperscript{41}, the latter only requires the presence of two, or possibly three conditions.\textsuperscript{42} He also notes that "pluralistic security communities turned out to be somewhat easier to attain and easier to preserve than their amalgamated counterparts." Finally, the Benelux Union is held out as an example of an "intermediate

\textsuperscript{39} Deutsch \textit{et al}, p. 32
\textsuperscript{40} See Pachula, 156-157 for an elaboration of this view.
\textsuperscript{41} See Appendix
\textsuperscript{42} Deutsch \textit{et al}, p. 66
entity between a pluralistic and amalgamated community." All of this would seem to suggest that even if pluralistic security communities do not necessarily lead to amalgamated security communities, there is nonetheless an idea that the former is a precondition to the latter. A pluralistic security community is therefore a necessary but not a sufficient condition for amalgamated security communities.

The idea of "progressing" from pluralistic to amalgamated security community which is outlined in Donald Puchala's developmental model of the unification process should be avoided in that the first is not necessarily better than the last. Indeed, the fact that pluralistic communities are considered to be easier to attain and to preserve suggests that they are stronger and more effective at maintaining peace and avoiding war than the amalgamated types, and that they are therefore in fact better than amalgamated security communities (Assuming as a basis of judgement, of course, that the maintenance of peace and the avoidance of war are the desired goals).

The relationship between pluralistic and amalgamated security communities is quite simply that the same two (or possibly three) preconditions described by Deutsch must exist before either one can exist. Communities which satisfy these preconditions may choose to follow one of two paths to integration, depending on their respective aims. States which are prepared to give up their sovereignty to a single Leviathan may choose the path towards the amalgamated security community, in which instance they will have

---

43 Pachula, 153
to satisfy numerous conditions, and, once achieved, work hard to maintain. Other states seeking integration may determine that a pluralistic security community can achieve their aims of ensuring peaceful change among sovereign entities. In both cases, the groups involved will have met the minimum preconditions for integration set down by Deutsch, and both will be considered to be integrated. Only the amalgamated security community can be considered to be unified.

According to this way of looking at Deutsch’s theory, while pluralistic security communities do not necessarily develop into amalgamated security communities, nor cause unification in the long-term, an amalgamated security community which evolves peacefully develops out of a pluralistic security community. This is not to say that there cannot be amalgamation without integration. Two communities or states can be unified (amalgamated in the conventional sense) through the use of force without satisfying the conditions of integration. However, amalgamation in the Deutschian sense is not deemed to be successful unless the amalgamated area also becomes integrated (i.e. becomes a security community). It is deemed unsuccessful if it breaks down into secession or civil war.45 Deutsch and his colleagues conclude, for instance, that the Habsburg Empire was “an amalgamated but no longer an integrated political community when it was destroyed by the strains and stresses of the first[sic] World War.”46 Nevertheless, it may generally be concluded that successful integration into an amalgamated security community is

---

44 Pachula, 156
45 Deutsch et al., p. 6
46 Deutsch et al., p. 34
preceded by existence as a pluralistic security community. This can be demonstrated from the cases of the United States, Switzerland, Great Britain, and others.

When Deutsch's study was published in 1957, it concluded that although there were pluralistic security communities within the North Atlantic area, such as Canada and the United States, the United States and the United Kingdom, and Norway and Sweden\textsuperscript{47} the area could certainly not be considered to be integrated.\textsuperscript{48} Today, such a conclusion cannot be drawn so hastily. It is evident though that neither the CSCE area nor the smaller North Atlantic area with which Deutsch was concerned is an amalgamated security community. Consequently, no detailed examination of the conditions required for amalgamated security communities will be conducted in these chapters. Instead, the focus will be on pluralistic security communities, since throughout the development of the Helsinki Final Act into the CSCE and finally the OSCE, the area covered by the member states has increasingly \textit{appeared} to exhibit many of the characteristics of a minimal pluralistic security community. Certainly the area which Deutsch initially examined now seems to meet the criteria for a pluralistic security community. Like Deutsch and his colleagues, however, this thesis will be unable to deal with all of the sub-regions of the area defined by CSCE membership.

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{47} Deutsch \textit{et al.}, p. 118  See also p. 65 for a complete list of security communities in the North Atlantic area.

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Ibid.}
The study of background conditions necessary for the formation of security communities found twelve conditions that seemed essential for the formation of amalgamated security communities, of which two, or possibly three, were necessary for the creation of a pluralistic security community. More generally, it was concluded that the attainment of a pluralistic security community was favoured by any of the conditions which had to be present for the creation of an amalgamated security community, and that pluralistic security communities could be hindered by conditions or processes which had a detrimental impact on amalgamated security communities, but that the former was generally more resilient than the latter.\footnote{Ibid., p. 65-66}

The first condition which was found to be essential for the creation of a pluralistic security community was the “compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 66, 123-129, 46-50} The concept of “major values” is troublesome in that it is very nebulous, and subject to circular reasoning. In an attempt to avoid this, Deutsch defines it as “those which seem to be of major importance in the domestic politics of the units concerned.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 123} Moreover, “no value will be considered important in the relations between political units unless it is important within each of them, and is also considered important in their common relations.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 123} Deutsch further posits that “values were most effective politically when they were not held merely in abstract terms, but when they were incorporated in
political institutions and in habits of political behavior.”\textsuperscript{53} In other words, in many respects the idea of compatibility of major values can be summed up with the phrase compatible “way of life.”\textsuperscript{54} In each area, the way of life must provide the “motivations for political behavior.”\textsuperscript{55} If a pluralistic security community exists, then, the political elites of each group must genuinely be motivated by the same values and intentions; they must intend to act in the interests of a compatible way of life. In this, Ernst Haas concurs with Deutsch.

What exactly is meant by “way of life” and “compatibility of major values?” Deutsch is describing conditions that are necessary not just in a security community, but that in fact are requisite in any community. What Deutsch is getting at is similar to the “common meanings” which Charles Taylor describes as the “basis of community” in Interpretation and the Sciences of Man.\textsuperscript{56} The survival of a national identity as francophones is a common meaning of Québécois, for instance, “for it is not just shared, and not just known to be shared, but its being a common aspiration is one of the common reference points of all debate, communication, and all public life in the society.”\textsuperscript{57} Among the NATO states, one could make a strong case that the preservation of free market and democratic conditions is a common meaning which forms part of the common reference world. Genuine acceptance of these values is a condition of entrance into both

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., p. 47  
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 47  
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p. 46  
the European Union and NATO. There is a common way of life, and compatibility of major values and, therefore, these countries can be considered to form a community.

In instances where there remain incompatible values, Deutsch concludes that these can be overcome with a tacit agreement to “deprive of political significance” the incompatible values in order to achieve their “gradual depoliticization.” Religion, for instance, has often been depoliticized prior to the successful creation of a security community, such as in the case of Switzerland and Germany. Given the intense ethnic and partly religious-based conflict in some parts of the CSCE area, this idea bears closer examination.

The main values which Deutsch and his colleagues identified as crucial in the North Atlantic area are equally important for a present day analysis of both the North Atlantic and CSCE areas. They asserted that the basic political ideology and economic systems in the area had to be compatible. Specifically, they held that in their area of study, the former was exemplified by constitutionalism and democracy, and the latter could be described as modified free enterprise (or “non-communist economics”). When Deutsch released the study, Spain and Portugal were exceptions in the North Atlantic area. Today, the North Atlantic area which he defined shares these main values. Moreover, the examination of the CSCE and OSCE which follows seems to indicate that

---

57 Ibid., p. 30
58 Ibid., p. 46
59 Ibid., p. 46-7
the states in the CSCE area at least nominally share these values. Whether these values are in fact shared by the political elites in each state is more difficult to determine, and would need to be scrutinized to a greater extent than is possible here.

The second condition which Deutsch deemed essential for the formation of a pluralistic security community is “mutual responsiveness.” This is defined simply as “the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other’s needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence.” This means that there must exist a “sense of community,” of “we-feeling,” trust, mutual sympathies and loyalties, consideration, and “at least partial identification in terms of self-images and interests,” as well as an “ability to predict each other’s behavior and ability to act in accordance with that prediction.”

The sense of community must entail “much more than simply verbal attachment to any number of similar or identical values.” This, too, bears mentioning, because just as there is some question as to the motivation of political elites with respect to the first condition for the formation of a pluralistic security community, there is some doubt about the real commitment behind the words uttered by all states in the CSCE area concerning their devotion to the principles of the CSCE and in fact the Helsinki process itself.

60 Ibid., p. 124, 126
61 Ibid., p. 66, 129-133
62 Ibid., p. 66
63 Ibid., p. 66
64 Ibid., p. 129
Another important aspect of the idea of mutual responsiveness is the idea that governments have to react in a timely fashion to the “social, economic, or political reforms” expected by people in the area. According to Deutsch, it is important that governments be prepared to react both domestically, and internationally to demonstrate international responsiveness. The examples of the American Marshall Plan and Canada’s unsolicited [sic] loan of a billion and a quarter dollars to the United Kingdom in 1946 are held up as examples. Failure to exhibit mutual responsiveness without “excessive delay” was found to have disintegrative effects on the formation of security communities, and on existing security communities. In the final chapter, mutual responsiveness will be discussed in the context of verbal commitment of OSCE states to the concept of “indivisible security” versus their actions in the face of internal strife in the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Finally, Deutsch notes that a third necessary condition for pluralistic security communities may be the mutual predictability of behaviour. This ties in closely with the previous condition, but is given less emphasis because “member states of a pluralistic security community have to make joint decisions only about a more limited range of subject matters, and retain each a far wider range of problems for autonomous decision-

65 Ibid., p. 131
66 The historical accuracy of this statement is questionable, yet it is the example cited by Deutsch.
67 Ibid., p. 131
68 Ibid., p. 131
making within their own borders.” This aspect of security communities will be discussed with particular attention paid to the confidence and security building measures put in place under the auspices of the Helsinki Final Act and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Not many groups are likely to meet the difficult conditions required for a security community. As Deutsch and others have found, among states, security communities are rare indeed. The idea of mutual predictability outlined by Deutsch has much in common with the idea of security regimes, and since that concept, too, will become important to an understanding of the CSCE, it will now be examined.

Regime theory first surfaced in international relations in the early 1980s when a series of papers devoted to the subject was published in the journal, International Organization. In 1983, Stephen Krasner edited a book entitled, International Regimes which was comprised mainly of the articles which had been published in the journal issues. In this book, many views on the utility and role of regimes and of regime theory are offered, from various theoretical and philosophical perspectives. Additionally, the articles apply regime theory to a number of aspects of international relations, but most frequently to economic dimensions. For the purposes of this thesis, the articles by Stephen Krasner, which set out in broad terms a definition of regimes and regime

---

69 Ibid., p. 67
70 Ibid., p. 67
71 Volume 36, Number 2 and Volume 35, Number 4
formation, and the submission by Robert Jervis, which discusses the specific concept of security regimes, are of interest.\textsuperscript{72}

The most frequently employed definition of regimes is offered by Stephen Krasner in "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables:"

Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.\textsuperscript{73}

In his discussion of security regimes, Robert Jervis narrows this definition somewhat, defining a security regime as "those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate."\textsuperscript{74} Both Krasner and Jervis agree that in instances when a regime is at work, it functions as an intervening variable, between basic causal variables and the related behavior and outcomes.\textsuperscript{75} Jervis is of the view that regimes must "facilitate cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is

\textsuperscript{72} It may readily be acknowledged that focusing on these two authors narrows the formulation of regimes which will be employed, and fails to take into account the many critiques of regime theory and the role played by regimes in international relations which are offered by such eminent authors as Susan Strange. This thesis, however, is concerned with examining from a security perspective the CSCE and OSCE, and not with an investigation of regime theory, and Jervis is the author who deals specifically with the notion of security regimes. Regime theory is simply one other tool which will be employed to achieve a greater understanding of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and of its successor, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and its place in the security architecture of Europe.

\textsuperscript{73} In International Regimes, p. 2

\textsuperscript{74} "Security Regimes," in International Regimes, p. 173
more than the following of short-run self-interest.” Regimes cannot be one-time, short-term arrangements; they must persist over a period of time, and demonstrably affect outcomes, as, for example, the Concert of Europe did in the nineteenth century.

Regime formation is especially difficult, Jervis argues, in the realm of security, for there the security dilemma is at work. The pursuit of a state’s rational self-interest and power maximisation are most acute, competitive and unforgiving in the security arena, and the “result is that security regimes, with their call for mutual restraint and limitations on unilateral actions, rarely seem attractive to decision makers.” For these reasons, Jervis concludes that for most behaviour in the security arena, “there is a direct link between basic causal variables and related behavior; but under circumstances that are not purely conflictual, where individual decision making leads to suboptimal outcomes, regimes may be significant” factor. In the case of interactions among states in the CSCE, it is understood here that the circumstances in CSCE Europe at the time were not necessarily conflictual, and that, if not regimes themselves, structures that were remarkably regime-like played a role in mediating relations among member states in general, and between the United States and the Soviet Union in particular.

---

75 “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables,” in International Regimes, p. 5-10; Jervis, 173-194.
76 Jervis, 173
77 Jervis, 175-176
78 Krasner, Stephen. “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables,” in International Regimes, p. 8
On the surface, it appears that regimes, by constraining the behaviour of states and decision makers, are inimical to their interests in power and self-interest maximisation. Jervis makes the point, though, that on the occasions when security regimes are created they are especially valuable.\(^{80}\) Using the Concert of Europe as an example of a security regime, Jervis argues that it in fact became a cause of national behaviour. For example, states were willing to "invest" in the Concert "in the sense of accepting larger short-run risks and sacrifices ... in the expectation of reaping larger gains in the future."\(^{81}\) States often made concessions readily because the norm of reciprocity was expected to guide their behaviour, when such actions outside the regime would risk being perceived as weakness.\(^{82}\) Jervis is arguing, whether or not one accepts his interpretation of history, that state behaviour is altered by regimes: the immediate needs of power maximisation and self-interest are in many instances restrained in favour of longer-term outlooks.

This does not mean, however, that power maximisation and self-interest were not at work, but rather that the conception which states held of these concepts was "broader than usual" and "longer-run than usual."\(^{83}\) During the period of the Concert of Europe, the view of security changed somewhat from being a zero-sum game, to the view that each state would be more secure if all were more secure.\(^{84}\) In other words, each state's

---

\(^{80}\) Jervis, 174, 181-184  
\(^{81}\) Jervis, 182  
\(^{82}\) Ibid., 182-183  
\(^{83}\) Jervis, 180  
\(^{84}\) Ibid.
security was tied to that of the other states who belonged to the Concert of Europe, very much according to a principle what will be seen in later chapters to be associated with the CSCE: security was considered to be common, comprehensive, and indivisible. Jervis also makes the case that "others were seen as partners in a joint endeavor as well as rivals, and unless there were strong reasons to act to the contrary their important interests were to be respected."85 This is reminiscent of the principle of mutual responsiveness which Karl Deutsch concluded is essential to the formation of pluralistic security communities.

The conception of regimes and regime formation offered by Jervis serves as a basis for helping to understand the security architecture in Europe, but by itself it is too constrained, too limiting to provide a full explanation. Jervis is of the view that regimes must be created with the concurrence of states, and that this is not likely to be given in conflictual situations where states regard anything which interferes with their ability to act and to react in a Hobbesian state of nature as inimical to their best interests. The ability of regimes to come into existence, to emerge out of repeated patterns of behaviour is not considered by Jervis, and is a significant hindrance to using regime theory to understand the CSCE and OSCE within the security architecture of Europe.

The idea of security regimes and their relationship to security communities can perhaps be illustrated here by referring again to Charles Taylor. Just as communities

85 Ibid., 180
have as their basis common meanings, regimes may be thought of as relying on the presence of intersubjective meanings. According to Charles Taylor, intersubjective meanings may be thought of as common terms of reference, or that which allow two actors to understand one another. Neither consensus nor convergence of beliefs can occur without the presence of intersubjective meanings, without the presence of agreed-upon meanings for actions, structures, institutions and practices within a given context. In fact, Taylor suggests that the most profound cleavages or disagreements occur where there are intersubjective meanings, such as in the case of the American Civil War, precisely because "both sides can fully understand the other."  

To demonstrate intersubjective meaning, Taylor uses as an example the idea of negotiation. Two people cannot enter into negotiation without sharing the idea of negotiation; if they did not share the idea, actions which signified, for example, breaking-off negotiations, would be meaningless. Actions are given a certain meaning because of their context, and within that context actors' expectations converge, and rules, procedures and practices emerge. For a security regime to be present, then, there must be a shared understanding of the security context in order to give actions their specific meaning. Nuclear deterrence, for instance, as Joseph Nye illustrates, could not occur without a

---

87 Ibid., p. 28
shared "awareness of nuclear destructiveness which makes [the Soviet Union and the United States] avoid war with each other."88

One can pursue this idea further, and extend it to an understanding of the entire East-West relationship during the cold war period. Arguably, the idea of managing relations so as to preserve security by maintaining the status quo in Europe was an intersubjective meaning or "weak regime" whose "broad principles and norms [were] the division of Germany, the legitimate role of the United States and the Soviet Union in European security, and the mutually recognized spheres of concern."89

Jervis' narrow conception of security regimes does not allow for the idea of a weak regime characterising East-West actions during the cold war. In contrast, Nye argues that in the post-World War II period, "both the United States and the Soviet Union gradually redefined their interests away from their early positions" and their "expectations gradually converged around the existing principles"90 as the two states 'learned' the new cold war context and a "weak" or "partial" regime formed.91

Paul Buteux, in Regimes, Incipient Regimes & the Future of NATO Strategy, advances the similar notion that an "incipient" East-West security regime exists "based

89 Ibid., p. 393
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., p. 393, 394
on 'common aversions'; procedures, rules and norms have been developed in order to avoid an outcome that all wish to avoid - viz. - nuclear war."92 Further, Buteux refers to the "high level of satisfaction with important, if not all, aspects of the status quo," and in particular, the territorial division of Europe.93 Similarly, Allen Lynch in The Cold War is Over ... Again, states that "the two 'superpowers' and their allies have formed a limited security partnership in the most vital theater of world politics-Europe-since the late 1960s."94 In contrast to Jervis, Nye, Buteux and Lynch all suggest that if nothing else, a "weak," "partial," or "incipient" regime existed and characterised East-West relations during the cold war period.

Security regimes, then, are especially valuable once in place because they create a "common understanding"95 permitted by intersubjective meaning and because they mediate to some extent normal, potentially dangerous actions motivated by short-term interests and power maximisation. Security regimes can restrain a state's behaviour and affect outcomes due to expectations of reciprocity and peaceful change. Pluralistic security communities exist where there is a long-term or permanent expectation of peaceful change, when political communities have major values in common or common meanings, and when groups are mutually responsive to each others' needs. The two concepts are not entirely dissimilar, yet they are not exactly alike either.

93 Ibid., p. 11
95 Ibid., 174
Security communities rely on a “sense of community” or “we-feeling” and trust among the political communities involved. Moreover, they lend a sense of permanence, and Deutsch’s discussion of security community formation often discusses changes in thinking spanning generations. Most fundamentally, Deutsch’s theory of security communities and integration minimises the role played by rational self-interest and power maximisation. Security regime theory suggests that regimes can affect the way a state calculates its interests from a short-term to long-term outlook, and can broaden its conception of power-maximisation and security, but that it is still motivated by these factors. While some sense of “we-feeling” may occur among the parties to a security regime, they are not necessary to regime formation, since states are still essentially acting in their own interests. Finally, a regime need not have the same permanence which Deutsch suggests is necessary for a security community.

In general, it would seem that a security regime is more focused on a particular issue-area than a security community and has fewer conditions required for formation. Security regimes in this sense might be considered by some to be lesser entities, but by others to be more realistic and effective.

For this study of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, however, although regime theory is useful for contributing to our understanding, Deutsch’s integration theory and theory of security communities provide insight into the idealism and drive of the institution. Deutsch’s theories more closely describe and explain the
intent, or at least the stated intent, of the CSCE, and its ideals. This will become clear as chapter two traces the history and development of the CSCE.
Chapter 2

The CSCE

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was conceived, born, and, as it were, raised in an environment of conflicting short-term and long-term views and interests. The CSCE's development and the role which it came to play in European security can be understood only in the greater context of this European security environment. If it was the East that conceived the idea of the Conference, then the West was initially the reluctant parent. The West agreed to the idea only because of linkage politics, and even then, was less than enthused. From the beginning of negotiations and on through the process, East and West, not to mention the neutral and non-aligned states, seemed to hold diverging views on what the role and utility of the Helsinki process should be, and on how the Conference should develop - if at all.

It is useful to examine the divergent interests of the three groups of states - members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Allies and European Community states, and neutral and non-aligned countries - going into negotiations. This is interesting and valuable for two reasons. First, it will contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of the process, Conference, and ultimately Organisation which emerge from the Helsinki Accords. Second, and of particular relevance for this essay, the notion of conflicting short-term and long-term visions of, and interests in, the process from its very beginnings undermines and
discredits not only the possibility that the CSCE/OSCE is a security community, but also that it can ever become one. Nevertheless, each group of states for one reason or another came to want the process to go forward.

What becomes clear as the origin and history of the CSCE are traced is that it evolved more by accident and coincidence of circumstances than anything else. The original Dipoli talks and Helsinki meetings, and the follow-up Belgrade and Madrid meetings occurred because, for a variety of reasons, it was in the interests of the East (driven by the Soviet Union) or the West (led by the United States). What is critical to note, in anticipation of a later analysis, is that what motivated these two parties, and also the neutral and non-aligned states, to come to the table were usually very different specific interests. These different interests and motivations are reflected in the different goals and outcomes which were sought from the negotiations and agreements, not just at Helsinki but also at later follow-up meetings, and also from the different interpretations placed on the resulting documents. The diverging interests of the various parties can be attributed to their different geo-political situations, their political ideologies, and economic systems. It is also interesting to note that as the CSCE develops, the objectives and interests involved progress from being, at the beginning, of an extremely short-term outlook to taking into account the possibility of longer-term interests.

It is generally accepted, in the official CSCE history and by others, that the origins of the Conference can be traced to numerous proposals in the 1950s from the
Soviet Union and other eastern European countries, including Poland. Some, including John J. Maresca, the only senior American diplomat involved in the entire negotiation process of the Helsinki Accords, and James Goodby, are more specific.

Maresca suggests that serious consideration of the idea of a European security conference emerged following a 1954 proposal by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov which aimed at working out a collective security agreement for Europe with a minimal observer role for the United States. James Goodby states that the impetus to form the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe came from Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, who sought to legitimise the territorial status quo in Europe, and particularly the post-World II divisions of Europe and of Germany. Since numerous people spoke at various times in support of the idea, it is difficult to attribute it to a single person. The goals ascribed to the Soviets by Maresca and Goodby share common aims.

Three main motivating considerations are often attributed to the Soviet Union in order to understand its push for the Conference. First, it was hoped that the role of the Soviet Union in Europe, along with the post-war division of Europe, would be

96 CSCE. From CSCE to OSCE: Historical Retrospective. Http://www.osceprag.cz/info/facts/history.com
Second, if the United States could be excluded, the Conference could be used to weaken the trans-Atlantic link and the American role in Europe. Finally, "the Soviet Union thought, the Conference might give fresh impetus to East-West economic cooperation and thus spur the economic development of the Soviet Union and its allies." The second point is especially interesting, since it represents a recurring theme in Soviet foreign policy. Soviet policy after the Second World War called for the isolation of the United States from Europe. Although Soviet attempts to exclude the United States from the Helsinki process proved unsuccessful, further efforts would be made at various times in the Conference's development to highlight and encourage a split between western Europe and the United States.

It is an interesting contradiction that on the one hand the Soviets wanted to deepen and strengthen economic relations, while on the other they were trying to divide the West (the United States from Europe). It was in the military security interests of the Soviet Union to have this divide, but was detrimental economically. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union seems to have had a full and consistent grasp of the Helsinki Process, nor to have followed a clear and unified objective.

100 ibid
101 ibid
Thus, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, talk of a European conference to discuss security issues became a "recurring theme in Soviet and eastern European pronouncements." In 1964, a proposal by Poland that a conference be held, and that it include the United States, was endorsed by the Warsaw Pact. Later, in July of 1966, the Warsaw Pact issued the Budapest Declaration expanding on the idea of a conference and of collective security. In 1969, the same group of states issued the Budapest Appeal, an Appeal to All European Countries, "...renewing their efforts to assemble a 'general European conference to consider questions of European security and peaceful cooperation.'"

Initially, the West had little interest in working to develop the Conference. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the political climate between East and West was tense, and there appeared to be little to be gained from such a conference. The warming of relations between the East and the West which accompanied the period of détente changed the western attitude somewhat however, and "...it appeared tempting ...to exploit the strong

\footnotesize{103 At the Madrid meeting of 1980-1983 for instance, the Soviets sought to put forward new disarmament proposals in the context of the CSCE where "divergences in the security interests of the United States and the western European countries would become apparent." Lehne, p. 19}

\footnotesize{104 Maresca, p. 5.}

\footnotesize{105 Ibid.}

\footnotesize{106 Germany, and West Berlin in particular, was becoming less of a problem with the Four Power Agreement on Berlin. Also, the Soviet Union agreed, shortly before talks began in Helsinki, to talks on Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) and to "renounce its demand for the withdrawal of US troops from Europe." In CSCE: N+N Perspectives. Laxenbug, Austria: Austrian Institute for International Relations, 1987. p.9}
Soviet desire for the conference...” The West wanted to give the Conference what is now labelled a “human dimension:” normative issues such as the free movement and exchange of people, ideas and information were on the western agenda. These normative elements were codified in “Basket III” of the Helsinki Accords, and throughout the twenty years following their signing, the West rarely missed an opportunity to demonstrate that the Soviet Union was failing to live up to its commitments on human rights matters.108

According to John Maresca, the West (and particularly the United States), pursued four goals during the negotiations leading up to the preparatory talks, and later during the talks themselves. The West sought

(1) to maintain western unity and to exclude a growth of Soviet influence in western Europe; (2) to keep open the possibility of peaceful evolution, such as peaceful changes in frontiers…; (3) to achieve some concrete improvements in relations between East and West, particularly some what would result in freer movement of people and ideas,…, and enhanced military security; and (4) to use the Soviet desire first to convene the CSCE, and later to conclude it at the summit level, to obtain Moscow’s agreement to a variety of desiderata.109

107 Lehne, p. 2
108 As recently as 1994, Russia has acknowledged the effect which this had on the regimes of eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union: “The contribution of the all-European process, of the Helsinki Final Act principles, of a number of texts, agreed upon within the CSCE, especially in its ‘third basket’, to launching reforms in eastern Europe is obvious. Those arrangements were undermining the totalitarian regime in our country too.” “Perspectives for the CSCE: A View From Russia” by Yuri V. Ushakov, Chief of the directorate for European Cooperation of Russia’s Foreign Ministry in Studia Diplomatica, Vol. XLVII 1994 No. 4, p.114
These "desiderata" consisted chiefly of negotiating a successful quadripartite agreement on Berlin, and agreeing upon a date for the opening of the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks. In fact, there is one school of thought which argues that U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger "saw the talks only in terms of leverage to obtain Soviet agreement" on these items.\textsuperscript{110} Thus, the United States was linking the MBFR talks to the CSCE, and demanding \textit{a quid pro quo}. Other western European countries, even those in NATO, did not necessarily share this view of the meetings. The view was certainly not shared by the neutral and non-aligned (N+N) states. They had their own agenda.

For the neutral and non-aligned states\textsuperscript{111}, the Dipoli talks and Helsinki Accords were an opportunity to gain influence and to play a role in matters which were typically played-out between East and West. Generally speaking the N+N states shared the views of the western (NATO and European Community) states. It must be pointed out, however, that within this group there were considerable differences in domestic political and economic systems, security concerns, and foreign policy priorities.\textsuperscript{112}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{110} Lehne, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{111} The N+N states consist of the following nine states: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Liechtenstein, Malta, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia.
\end{flushleft}
In terms of domestic polities, for instance, Switzerland and Yugoslavia could not be more different. The former is described as "staunchly pro-western," and as a "classical pluralist," while the latter was very much socialist at the time. From the standpoint of security, the interests of the nine countries vary considerably according to each of their respective geo-political situations. Finland's very real concern that it would be a welcome mat on Europe's doorstep was not shared by Switzerland, which is on nobody's route from point A to B, nor by a country such as Greece, which was more concerned with Turkish troop movements than those of the Soviet Union. Finally, the nine states all had (and continue to have) very different levels of militarisation.\(^{113}\)

In spite of all of these differences among the neutral and non-aligned states, they nonetheless pursued three common objectives during the Conference and the talks that preceded it. First, they wanted to participate in the détente process. Second, the nine countries wanted to "express their own views on East-West issues."\(^{114}\) Or, as Neuhold puts it, "the N+N countries did not want the two blocs to settle the future of Europe behind their backs and over their heads."\(^{115}\) Third, in order to ensure that the roles described in the first two points continued beyond the initial meetings, the N+N states were aiming for a successful Conference.\(^{116}\) During the negotiation period prior to

---


\(^{114}\) Maresca, p. 25.

\(^{115}\) Neuhold, 27.

\(^{116}\) Kalevi Ruhala of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs explains that "safeguarding the continuity of the negotiations which came to be known as the CSCE process, assumed a central role in the
preparatory talks, the N+N states served a useful purpose in offering neutral territory for the meetings (Helsinki, Geneva, Belgrade), but were mostly unsuccessful at getting specific items placed on the agenda.\textsuperscript{117}

In response to the more receptive attitude towards the conference on the part of the NATO countries, and the United States in particular, on April 5, 1969 the Government of Finland invited all European states, and the United States and Canada, to preparatory talks at Dipoli, in Helsinki. A number of stumbling blocks remained, and it was not until 1972 after the quadripartite agreement on Berlin was concluded, and a date agreed upon for the MBFR talks that the last obstacles to official meetings were removed.

Between 1969 and 1972, discussions aimed at setting an agenda for the preparatory talks in Helsinki were held. The Warsaw Pact proposed two agenda items: security, and the expansion of economic, scientific, and technological relations.\textsuperscript{118} The NATO communiqué of May 1970 put forward a somewhat different agenda: "(a) The principles which should govern relations between States, including the renunciation of force; (b) The development of international relations with a view to contributing to the foreign policies of the European N+N countries." "The CSCE Process from the Finnish Viewpoint," in \textit{CSCE: N+N Perspectives}. P. 37.

\textsuperscript{117} For example, Austria wanted to include Middle Eastern problems on the agenda, and Switzerland was calling for a mandatory system for the peaceful settlement of disputes which included the compulsory arbitration of legal conflicts. Neither was successful. Neuhold, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{118} Maresca, p. 6.
freer movement of people, ideas and information and to developing cooperation in the cultural, economic, technical and scientific fields as well as in the field of human environment." Thus the stage was set for the preparatory talks in Helsinki from November 22, 1972 to June 8, 1973, and already a fundamental divide was evident: the East’s priority was in security, with emphasis placed on gaining recognition and legitimisation of the status quo; the West’s was to increase freedoms through peaceful change. The East, the West, and the neutral and non-aligned states, as well as sub-groups of these states and indeed individual states had acted in accordance with their own interests. These states and groups of states used the talks and the CSCE to further their own interests during the negotiations, but the talks and the Conference were nevertheless driven at least in part by idealist integrative theory.

In a sense, though, the United States had already achieved its aims and priorities (associated with the quadripartite agreement and the MBFR talks) by linking them to participation in the Helsinki Conference. Moreover, to the United States, the agenda of the Conference was less important than the Soviet concession that the United States (and Canada) be allowed to participate in the Conference. This was an implicit acknowledgement by the Soviets that at least for the time being, the United States could not be excluded from European security issues, and from Europe itself, and that the Conference could not be used to weaken the trans-Atlantic link and the American role in Europe.

\footnote{Ibid.}
That this apparent conflict was able to exist however, and that important political and security issues could be linked and used as leverage without fear of military conflict erupting, says much about the environment or context in which the negotiations occurred. Specifically, it lends credence to Allen Lynch’s idea that a “limited security partnership”\textsuperscript{120} existed between the superpowers and their allies in Europe from the late 1960s - the same time that support for the Helsinki talks really gained momentum. As Buteux and Nye argue, an incipient regime existed between East and West based on the common aversion to war and, increasingly, on a “tolerance” or “preference” for the “division of Europe as the basis of East-West relations.”\textsuperscript{121} In the language of Charles Taylor, the desire for military conflict avoidance in Europe served as a common term of reference or as an intersubjective meaning between East and West, allowing them to have a limited understanding of one another.

It is interesting to make reference here to Lynch’s thesis that by the late 1960s the cold war was in fact over. Lynch makes the case that the cold war was “fought” over the central issues of the “division of Germany and of Europe and the establishment of a stable balance of power in Europe and East Asia”\textsuperscript{122} from the end of the Second World War until sometime in the late 1960s, and that its cause was the “growth of U.S. power

\textsuperscript{121} Lynch, p. 18
\textsuperscript{122} Lynch, p. 24
and the fear this caused in Russia; and conversely, the growth in Soviet power and the fear this caused in the United States.\textsuperscript{123}

A structural-functionalist or level-of-analysis approach is useful in illuminating what is being said here. In essence, during the period which Lynch characterises as the cold war, there were two potential sources of conflict. First, there was the ever-present system-level Thucydian security dilemma which is characteristic of the anarchic international system. Second, there was state-level conflict. Specifically, “the United States and the Soviet Union were profoundly at odds over how the countries of Europe should be governed as well as over the distribution of power and influence on the European continent.”\textsuperscript{124} Mandelbaum adds that historically, conflicts have rarely arisen “solely out of pure anarchy, wars in which state-level causes play no role….”\textsuperscript{125}

If then, as Lynch argues, the cold war was over in the late 1960s, it means that the state-level conflicts which Mandelbaum describes over the East-West division of power, territory and influence in Europe were essentially resolved. This is precisely what Lynch argues, and the case can be made that the resolution is evident during the lead-up to the Helsinki negotiations in the Four Power talks, the acknowledgement of the American role in Europe, the agreement to a date for the MBFR talks, the refusal of the West to block

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 24
the building of the Berlin Wall, and western inaction during the Hungarian revolution of 1956.

In a sense, then, the Helsinki talks, the Final Recommendations, and the Helsinki Accords represented the settlement of the cold war in Europe. The talks and the settlement could not have occurred were it not for the existence of at minimum a “partial” or “weak” security regime in Europe. The actions of the United States and the Soviet Union particularly, and East and West generally, during the negotiations, political linking and political positioning leading up to the Helsinki talks indicate a common desire for security and an implicit recognition of the division of territory, power and influence in Europe. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, then, was conceived and born in the context of an adversarial relationship which neither side wanted to see deteriorate into armed conflict in Europe, and this characterises its dynamics for some time.

At this point, it may certainly be concluded that Deutsch’s condition that political elites share genuine motivations and intentions is not met. Nevertheless, Deutsch remains helpful in understanding what has been achieved and what might emerge in the

---

125 Ibid., p. 72-3
126 East and West disagreed not only about what was meant by security but also about how best to achieve it. Generally, however, an incipient regime or intersubjective meaning may be considered to exist surrounding the desire to avoid war and maintain the territorial status quo in Europe by peaceful means.
future because certain qualities of a security community have begun to manifest themselves. Specifically, some mutual predictability in terms of Confidence and Security Building Measures, and a shared interest in war avoidance are in evidence.

The preparatory talks among the thirty-five participating states\textsuperscript{127}, also known as the Dipoli meetings, culminated on 8 June, 1973 with the release of the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, or the “Blue Book” which “outlined final recommendations for the scope and rules of procedure for the Conference.”\textsuperscript{128} The Final Recommendations called for the establishment of a three stage process and set an agenda which was divided into four main areas, or baskets. In the first stage, the Foreign Ministers of the participating states were to meet and agree to the agenda and procedure, as well as to outline their respective governments’ outlooks on European security. This stage was accomplished successfully in Helsinki during the period of 3-7 July, 1973.

Stage two, held in Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975, was a meeting of experts whose task it was to draft an acceptable Final Act. More than two thousand official meetings were held, in addition to countless bi-lateral and multi-lateral talks, in accordance with the procedures established by part six of the Final

\textsuperscript{127} The participants in the preparatory talks and the original signatories to the Helsinki Accords are as follows: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, The German Democratic Republic, The Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America, Yugoslavia.
Recommendations. The Rules of Procedure delineated in Sections 64 through 88 of the Final Recommendations assert that “all states participating in the Conference shall do so as sovereign and independent States and in conditions of full equality.” Furthermore, “the Conference shall take place outside military alliances.” These principles form the basis for the declaration in Section 69 that all “decisions of the Conference shall be taken by consensus” and for the rotating Chairmanship described in Sections 70 and 71. While the principles of sovereignty and equality underpinning these procedures remain the foundation for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) today, in many respects the consensus rule is a fundamental flaw, leading to paralysis and inaction during crises, and severely limiting the ability of the CSCE to enforce norms and decisions.

On August 1 1975, the thirty-five states met in Helsinki to sign the Helsinki Final Act, also known as the Helsinki Accords, marking the completion of the third phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The first “Basket” of the Final Act, concerned with questions relating to security, embodies ten politically binding

---

128 OSCE. OSCE Fact Sheet. p. 1
129 Neuhold, p. 11
133 According to Stefan Lehne, the term, “basket” was employed “to organize the diverse subjects of the conference without prejudicing their relative importance.” The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1986-1989. P. 3.
principles (the so-called “Decalogue”) which sought to govern behaviour among participating states:

1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force;
3. Inviolability of frontiers;
4. Territorial integrity of States;
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes;
6. Non-intervention in internal affairs;
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief;
8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
9. Co-operation among States;
10. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.¹³⁴

Thus the CSCE became the first forum for the discussion of pan-European security, spanning from Vancouver to Vladivostock and encompassing the broadest range of security concerns. It is apparent from the first basket that the issues on which East and West differed in the negotiations prior to the Dipoli talks was carried through into the Final Act, with important implications.

Throughout the negotiations, political trade-offs and linkages between issues continued to be made by both East and West, revolving around a central disagreement about the desired outcome of the talks. The East essentially sought a generally worded document that would make few commitments, that would legitimise the territorial status quo in Europe, and that would allow for high level conferences of heads of states to

¹³⁴ OSCE Newsletter
Occur. In contrast, the West sought normative commitments, particularly on issues related to human rights and what came to be known as the “human dimension.”

Throughout this process, what was communicated and negotiated is less important than the fact that communications and negotiations occurred. That this was possible was due to the existence of at least a weak regime.

Stephen Lehne calls the inclusion of Principles III and VII the “central political trade-off of the CSCE.” For the Soviet Union, incorporation of the principle of the “inviolability of frontiers” (Principle III) was an acknowledgement by the West of the legitimacy of the status quo, and of the post-World War II division of Europe in the absence of a formal peace treaty in Europe at the conclusion of that conflict. Although this still allowed for the peaceful change of frontiers, the East still regarded it as “a major diplomatic success.” The “trade-off” was the Soviet concession to Principle VII, “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.” Principle VII is crucial to the future development of the CSCE and to the perception of security in the CSCE area in that it recognises the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as essential in strengthening international security. The end result for member states of including this in the context of

---

135 Lehne, p. 4
136 Ibid., p. 4
137 Lehne, p. 2, 6.
138 Ibid., p. 6.
the Final Act is to provide "a basis for the international community to address internal matters."\textsuperscript{139}

Basket One also contains the Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament. Although this document is very minimal in terms of actual measures which it prescribes, it established a framework for future work on these measures, such as the later negotiations at the Stockholm Conference of the CSCE to make military activities more transparent (open and predictable) and the Madrid Mandate. Sections 107 through to 113 mandate the prior notification of major military manoeuvres. Notification of any military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops within 250 kilometres of the frontier of another participating will be given 21 days or more in advance. Other voluntary measures for confidence-building follow, including the exchange of observers and notification for minor military manoeuvres, and the exchange of military personnel. In attempting to establish predictable patterns, and to create expectation of mutual predictability, the Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament in particular, and Basket One in general, might be viewed as an embryonic satisfaction of Deutsch's condition of mutual predictability and, to a lesser extent, of mutual responsiveness in that any ongoing discourse among parties contributes towards a greater understanding and predictability.

\textsuperscript{139} Goodby, p. 314.
Basket Two, which begins with Section 138 of the Final Act, considers Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment. For the argument that is presented here, Basket Two is of less importance. Neither, for that matter, is it of great significance to the CSCE. Negotiations on the Second Basket were, in the words of Ljubivoje Acimovic, "the least controversial subject at the Helsinki Conference from the very beginning." 140 John Maresca explains that virtually everything covered in Basket Two was a duplication of existing multilateral agreements. Furthermore, the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) had virtually the same membership, including the United States and Canada, and its mandate covers most of the subjects in Basket Two. 141 In fact, throughout the development of CSCE, the economic and other concerns of this Basket never take on any real significance to the process.

The Third Basket of the Helsinki Act is Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields. As the Final Act states, this Basket desires "to contribute to the strengthening of peace and understanding among peoples." 142 Although it is an important elaboration of the ideas contained in Basket One's Principle VII, of human rights and freedom of ideas, it is essentially redundant for the same reason; it offers nothing more than an elaboration.

141 Maresca, P. 175-180
142 Section 416.
Its inclusion in the Final Act may largely be explained by the fact that full compliance with Principle VII was not expected.\textsuperscript{143}

The Final Act addresses military, economic and humanitarian concerns within the four "baskets." Although it is Baskets I, II and III which deal with the substantive issues of security, economic and environmental cooperation, and humanitarian cooperation respectively, it is Basket IV, the Follow-up to the Conference, which prevented the CSCE from becoming nothing more than "a historical footnote."\textsuperscript{144}

During the preparatory phase of the Conference, "the Warsaw Pact countries repeatedly tried to establish a permanent organ to oversee peace and security in Europe," but most NATO governments "rejected any institutionalisation that would give the Soviet Union a droit de regard over developments in western Europe."\textsuperscript{145} The West did, however, see certain advantage to having a follow-up meeting to "monitor and promote the implementation of the human rights and Basket III provisions of the Final Act."\textsuperscript{146} The reluctance of the West explains the somewhat ambiguous wording of this section of the Final Act, which merely allows for subsequent meetings to be held to discuss "the improvement of security and the development of co-operation in Europe, and the

\textsuperscript{143} Lehne, p. 11
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid, p. 11-12
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid, p. 12
development of the process of détente in the future...”

Nevertheless, it is Basket IV which left the door open for the evolution and ultimately the institutionalisation of the CSCE.

Despite the fact that issue linkage and trade-offs permitted the resolution of these issues and the agreement on the Final Act, it is important to note that the East and the West subsequently interpreted the document differently. Lehne, among others, states that “from the East’s point of view, the document essentially confirmed and legitimised the existing geopolitical situation on the Continent,” but that from the point of view of the West, the Final Act “constitutes a set of normative commitments with which the situation in Europe should be brought in conformity.”

This and the other fundamental disagreements which were evident during the preparatory talks lend credence to the view that at its inception the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was neither a security regime nor a security community in Deutsch’s sense. That is not to say that the CSCE was not born into the context of at least a weak security regime however, as Buteux, Nye and others have argued. Indeed, if Charles Taylor’s view of intersubjective meanings is applicable, East and West could not even have entered into negotiations about security issues were there not some form of incipient regime present. Although the CSCE at its inception was not a security regime, it did begin to take on many regime-like

---

148 Ibid., p. 5
characteristics as East and West came to adopt less conflicting interpretations of its founding document, its role, and its future.

In accordance with the Basket Four provisions, the first follow-up meeting was held in Belgrade from October 4th, 1977 to March 9th, 1978. Substantively, it was less than a resounding success. The Concluding Document is an astoundingly brief four pages, and masters the art of understatement. It describes how détente “has continued since the adoption of the Final Act in spite of difficulties and obstacles encountered,” how “consensus could not be reached on a number of proposals,” and that “different views were expressed as to the degree of implementation of the Final Act so far.”

The latter is not surprising giving the attitudes of the Soviet Union and United States at the time. Under President Carter, human rights issues were being given substantial attention, and Principle VII was being used to comment frequently and at length on eastern European abuses. “Documenting and criticising the unsatisfactory implementation record of Warsaw Pact countries became the exclusive goal of [American] participation...; the United States’ support for substantive negotiations on new normative commitments was at best lukewarm.” In view of the ongoing criticism, and the focus on Principle VII and Basket Three, the less than enthusiastic response by the Soviet Union is understandable.

---

150 Lehne, p. 15
Despite these tensions, and the lack of substantive developments at the Budapest meeting, an important outcome did result. The Concluding Document announced the intention of participants to hold various meetings of experts at Bonn, Montreux, and Valletta in accordance with the provisions of the Final Act. With each successive meeting, no matter the substantive outcome or lack thereof, the CSCE began to establish certain norms and expectations, even if they rested solely on the understanding that the participants would meet again under the auspices of the Helsinki Accords. On this if nothing else, East and West were coming to agree and share an understanding.

The Madrid meeting, held from November 11, 1980 to September 9, 1983, occurred during one of the ebbs in détente. The Soviet Union had recently invaded Afghanistan and was restricting the freedoms of people, ideas and information in clear violation of virtually every principle elaborated in the Helsinki Accords. This did not go unnoticed on the part of other participating states, and during the meetings hundreds of individual instances of human rights violations and other infractions by the East were brought forward. The United States delegation alone raised one hundred and nineteen cases.\textsuperscript{151} The Soviet Union sought to narrow the focus of the Conference to concentrate on the issues of military security with which it was more traditionally concerned. In keeping with earlier Soviet attempts to separate the United States from western Europe,

\textsuperscript{151} Freeman, p. 82
the Soviet Union planned to introduce disarmament proposals which would bring to the
fore diverging European and American security interests.\textsuperscript{152}

As it turned out, the West also wanted to increase the focus on aspects of military
security "so as to challenge the East on its own favourite ground and mould future CSCE
provisions as far as possible in the West’s image.”\textsuperscript{153} Once again, as happened so often
with the CSCE, the various parties found themselves working together towards a
generally common end, but for completely diverging reasons, motivated by very different
intentions. In spite of intense political pressure brought to bear on the issue of human
rights, the Soviet Union did not abandon the CSCE. Nor did the United States, in the
face of repeated attempts on the part of the Soviet Union to introduce issues which would
divide western Europe and North America, seek to withdraw from the CSCE. Neither
East nor West was finding the CSCE a completely satisfactory mechanism for obtaining
optimal outcomes on all issues. However, both sides had come to value the CSCE as a
forum in which it was expected that each would achieve some level of success on matters
of importance through issue linkage and political trade-offs during negotiations. At the
very least, there was a shared expectation that no matter the political climate and issues of
the day, the CSCE meetings would continue, and that they would at least allow for the
possibility of compromise in order to preserve the greater shared goal, shared by East and
West, or military peace between East and West in Europe. The fact that the Madrid

\textsuperscript{152} Lehne, p. 19
\textsuperscript{153} Freeman, p. 83
meeting was held and did not collapse during an ebb in détente represents a success -
even if the specific outcome was less than spectacular, and is indicative that the members
of the CSCE by this time shared at least some of what Deutsch would call compatibility
of major values and mutual responsiveness. Certainly these qualities were not present to
such a degree that one would consider a security community to have formed, but some of
Deutsch's pre-conditions for a security community were evident, if only in a very
preliminary, rudimentary and embryonic stage of existence.

What emerged from the Madrid meeting was a mandate for a Conference on
Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). The
CDE would be an integral part of the CSCE\textsuperscript{154} and was to develop confidence and
security building measures which "will be of military significance and politically binding
and will be provided to adequate forms of verification."\textsuperscript{155} These measures were to be

In Stockholm, different approaches to the task of developing confidence and
security building measures (CSBM) were taken by the Warsaw Pact countries, the
Atlantic Alliance countries, and also by the neutral and non-aligned states. The Warsaw
Pact states (except Romania), submitted a proposal which essentially focused on political

\textsuperscript{154} The CDE is "a substantial part of the multilateral process initiated by the conference on
\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Madrid Document}. 1983. Sixth paragraph.
measures, such as the non-use of military force, reduction in military spending, and the creation of de-nuclearized zones.\textsuperscript{156} In contrast, member states of NATO and EC adopted a narrow military and technical approach. Their working paper put forward the idea of increased information and communications measures, including the forecasting of military activities, strengthened notification requirements, and increased methods of verification.\textsuperscript{157} Finally, the neutral and non-aligned states agreed on a combination of measures which reflected their varied individual interests based on geo-political considerations. Their proposal “coincided with western ideas on many matters,” but did not rule out some of the measures outlined in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) proposal.\textsuperscript{158}

Motivations and interests at the Stockholm Conference differed significantly, but the role of the CSCE as a forum for negotiations in which trade-offs could be made and issues linked was strengthened by the political environment. NATO deployed Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) to Europe mid-November 1983 and, at least partially as a result, the Soviet Union “broke off the INF and the START negotiations and interrupted the MBFR talks.”\textsuperscript{159} Thus the main forum for political dialogue between East


\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{159} Lehne, p. 24
and West became the CDE meetings initiated under the auspices of the CSCE following the collapse of three other important fora for dialogue.\textsuperscript{160}

The Stockholm Document, released at the conclusion of the meetings on September 19, 1986 made significant advances in developing confidence and security building measures. The original confidence building measures of the Helsinki Final Act strengthened and elaborated (the notification period for major military manoeuvres was doubled to 42 days, and the 25,000 troops threshold almost halved to 13,000), with new, mandatory requirements that observers be invited to military activities involving more than 17,000 troop and that all notifiable activities be declared by November 15 of each year. The Stockholm Document went further, placing for the first time constraints\textsuperscript{161} on military activities, and allowing on-site ground and/or air inspections without right of refusal. Political provisions on the non-use of force were also included, as a result of a trade-off between the United States, which had been reluctant to discuss political measures, and the Soviet Union, which had not wanted to agree to such concrete military CSBMs.\textsuperscript{162} If all of these provisions were implemented and adhered to, the result would be increased openness and predictability:

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., p. 24

\textsuperscript{161} Activities which exceed 75,000 troops are not permitted to occur if two years notification was not given; activities exceeding 40,000 troop cannot occur if notification is not given at least one year in advance.

\textsuperscript{162} Freeman, p. 101; Lehne, p. 24-28
The exchange of annual calendars and the notification regime helps to establish a stable pattern of routine military activities. Together with the invitation of observers, this reduces the risk of misunderstanding and promotes confidence.\textsuperscript{163} Certainly the necessity of these measures illustrates that a security community does not yet exist, but the same measures could contribute towards the establishment of the conditions which Deutsch cites as necessary for the formation of a security community. In fact, the degree of specificity and the attention to detail in the notification conditions and schedule underscore the importance ascribed to mutual predictability and shows that Deutsch’s case for mutual predictability as a condition of a security community is borne out here.

In the development of the CSCE, not only did the Stockholm conference spawn a Confidence and Security Building Measures regime, but more significantly, it also became a CSBM in and of itself.\textsuperscript{164} The success of negotiations within the CSCE context at a time when the INF and START negotiations had failed, and the coming-together of Soviet and American policies\textsuperscript{165} which permitted the successful outcome increased confidence in the CSCE process. Expectations that issue linkage and political trade-offs could be made within the context of the CSCE to result in reasonable, if not optimal, negotiated outcomes on the part of both East and West were strengthened. Most importantly perhaps, during a period of somewhat frosty relations between East and West

\textsuperscript{163} Lehne, p.27
\textsuperscript{164} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 28
first at Madrid and then at Stockholm, the shared value or expectation that what were essentially state-level conflicts in Europe could be resolved within the CSCE framework was first sustained and then strengthened.

The final meeting which will be dealt with in this chapter is the Vienna meeting of November 4, 1986 to January 19, 1989. The Vienna meeting was significant for a number of reasons. First, it recognised that the Stockholm Document was a “politically significant achievement and that its measures are an important step in efforts aimed at reducing the risk of military confrontation in Europe.”\(^{166}\) This stands out among all the other language about “reaffirming”, “noting”, “stressing” because it narrowly defines the aim of the CSBMs in terms of military security. The quantifiable norms which were created were of a military nature. Second, “for the first time all participants, including the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact States, accepted a continuous monitoring mechanism..., allowing other States to raise suspected human rights abuses at any time.”\(^{167}\)

This was very relevant to the strengthening of the CSCE because disagreement over the normative nature of the human dimension and whether they were an internal

\(^{165}\) Of particular significance was the Soviet shift in arms control policy under Gorbachev’s Glasnost, and an increased willingness to deal with concrete CBSM issues. See Lehne, pp. 24-28

matter or something which affected common security had always been one of the fundamental issues between East and West. This convergence of understanding, expectations and shared values (at least rhetorically) significantly strengthened the CSCE. Finally, the Vienna meeting set the stage for another series of follow-up meetings further to develop confidence and security building measures and conventional arms control, as well as for on-going meetings on human rights.

Until this point in its development, the CSCE had been little more than a series of meetings. With each meeting, there seemed to be a greater expectation that a future follow-up meeting would be scheduled. Up to and including the Madrid meetings, the participants had little in common; the most they shared was that they each wanted to achieve an objective, and the CSCE provided an opportunity for negotiations to occur. With the possible exception of the N+N countries, who wanted the Conference to be a success and to continue from the outset, the states of East and West were fulfilling short-term goals at the meetings.

The same might be argued of the Stockholm meetings, in which each group of states pursued its own goals in accordance with its own interpretation of the importance of confidence and security building measures. The East, on the one hand, sought to gain

---

political measures, and the West, on the other hand, pursued military and technical objectives. Despite the constant unity of rhetoric about “peace and security” as common aims, the motivating factors, intentions, and differing objectives clearly undermine any suggestion of unity of purpose or common values, with the possible exception of the desire to avoid armed conflict and war. Although there is no security community à-la-Deutsch, the process of the meetings and the CSBM outcome do contribute towards and strengthen the pre-conditions of mutual responsiveness and mutual predictability which Deutsch describes.

However, as the CSCE moved towards institutionalisation, the likelihood of follow-up meetings depended less and less on the moods and agendas of the superpowers. In Madrid, then Stockholm, and finally Vienna, the CSCE demonstrated that it was a forum in which eastern and western actors' could pursue their individual interests by linking issues in negotiation and accepting a ‘give and take’ with the expectation that the other side would reciprocate based on similar expectations and, if not a shared value, at least a shared desire for the avoidance of war. Moreover, there was a shared interest and desire in preserving the system and the status quo. The shared expectation that state-level conflict would be resolved through issue linkage and political trade-offs within the CSCE in order to maintain military security in Europe would ultimately permit the OSCE model for common and comprehensive security in Europe. The opportunity to build a model for

---

168 Negotiations on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) opened in Vienna two months later, on the 6 of March, 1989
common and comprehensive security in Europe along the lines of the OSCE received a powerful impetus with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakdown of the cold war order.
Chapter 3

The OSCE

The collapse of the Soviet Union, the tearing-down of the Berlin Wall, and the end of the division of Europe into eastern and western blocs changed the security landscape in Europe dramatically. Many have called this change the end of the cold war. Michael Cox has labelled it the end of the second cold war and the beginning of the second superpower détente, and Allen Lynch calls it the collapse of the post-cold war order. Confronted with this change in the security landscape, regardless of whether it was desirable, groups, organisations, institutions and alliances concerned with security in Europe, including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), were forced to re-examine and re-evaluate their roles and missions.

For the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the re-examination and re-evaluation resulted in efforts to change the CSCE’s role and structure, beginning at the Paris Conference of 1990. At meetings in Paris, Helsinki, Rome, Budapest and Lisbon between 1990 and 1996, an institutional framework was created, lending permanence to what had until then been little more than a series of meetings. At meetings held in 1994, it was decided that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe be renamed the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to reflect its institutionalisation. During this period of institutionalisation, the OSCE’s role in crisis management and conflict prevention was expanded, as was its membership. This was made possible by the new politico-security environment in Europe. The OSCE grew to encompass fifty-five states, consisting of all the states of Europe, all of the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Georgia, Canada, and the United States.\textsuperscript{171}

The CSCE was the manifestation and consolidation of the cold war settlement of the early 1970s which Lynch describes in \textit{The Cold War is Over ... Again}. Specifically, both East and West came to see the CSCE as forum in which the \textit{status quo} of the division of territory, power and influence in Europe could be preserved, and in which matters of \textit{realpolitik} could be negotiated and resolved peacefully by linking issues. The neutral and non-aligned countries, while having slightly different perspectives, also came to see the CSCE as a mechanism for preserving the \textit{status quo} and for negotiating issues through linkage politics. The CSCE developed, and some argue became “regime-like” because it was the only security forum in which all states of Europe had an interest and a stake and was therefore the only forum in which negotiation based on the linkage of issues of relevance to all states of Europe could occur. In fact, although the CSCE may in fact have developed many “regime-like” characteristics, it is not a regime, but instead is

\textsuperscript{171} See Appendix for a detailed list of member states and the dates when they signed the Accords.
an organisation which, to use a developmental metaphor, was socialised by the politico-security environment in which it was born and raised and which inherited its characteristics from that environment.

The CSCE continued to be susceptible to changes in the politico-security context in which it operated, and thus the dramatic events of 1989-1991 had a significant impact. The opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the unification of Germany in 1990, and the disbanding not only of the Warsaw Pact but also of the Soviet Union in 1991 have greatly affected the politico-security environment in Europe, and therefore the CSCE. Contrary to the rhetoric, however, these changes did not introduce what the Charter of Paris calls in its subtitle a "new era of democracy, peace and unity." Rather, as we have witnessed in recent years, there has been an increase in fractious tensions based on ethnicity and nationalism, not to mention a resurgence of more traditional security concerns among the states of eastern Europe. Walter Lippmann makes an interesting observation:

> We can best separate appearance from the reality, the transient from the permanent, the significant from the episodic, by looking backward whenever we look forward. There is no great mystery why this should be: the facts of geography are permanent...thus successive generations of men tend to face the same recurrent problems and to react to them in more or less habitual ways.\(^ {172} \)

Although there were great changes in Europe between 1989 and 1991, these resulted in many ways in a less rather than more secure security environment. Thus despite a new

---

political environment which was conducive to a more cooperative approach, issues of *realpolitik* such as the re-establishment and division of influence and power, and the preservation of interests, continued to motivate actors. The United States (and western Europe generally) and Russia especially were motivated by what might be called their traditional cold war interests, and the states of eastern Europe which had not had much of a say during the cold war were greatly affected by their desire to preserve their security and to influence any new division of Europe. Similarly, the neutral and non-aligned states were interested in the preservation of peace and of the *status quo*, and continued to see the CSCE as a forum in which they could influence issues in European politics and security.

The CSCE / OSCE is primarily concerned with *realpolitik* - with matters of security and the maintenance of peace. With the collapse of the post-cold war settlement described by Lynch and the resurgence of ethnic tensions, nationalism and the general condition of greater instability, security concerns were in many respects more important than ever. The rules and procedures, the operation of the CSCE, however, changed significantly as it was institutionalised.\(^{173}\) This was possible because of the more cooperative political environment in Europe. Thus the institutionalisation of the CSCE demonstrates that although operational change occurred within the CSCE in response to a new political environment in Europe, the over-arching function and aims of the

\(^{173}\) Of course, the understanding of regime as used here, and elsewhere in this chapter, is essentially that of the OSCE itself. Strictly speaking, this rather loose use of the term regime and the
organisation itself remained unchanged because the principles and ideals which had originally underpinned it were more important than ever in a security environment which if anything was more complex and less secure than that which previously existed.

In 1990, two critically important agreements were reached within the framework of the CSCE process. On 12 September, 1990, the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany was signed in Moscow, paving the way for the unification of Germany in October 1990. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), a significant arms control agreement concerned with placing limits on non-nuclear ground and air forces from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains, was signed on 19 November 1990. The CFE, for which the OSCE was not solely responsible, is in some ways a natural extension of the confidence and security building measures negotiated in Madrid, Stockholm and Vienna, and it is often referenced in CSCE documents with reference to its role in increasing confidence and security-building measures within the CSCE area.

The success of these negotiations, which grew partially out of previous Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) developed within the CSCE process, provided an impetus for negotiations to institutionalise the CSCE and to give it

---

associated language is because the Organisation constantly uses it itself, when in fact it needs considerable qualification.

174 OSCE. Fact Sheet
continued relevance in the new European security environment. There was a will not only to ensure that the CSCE continued to work, but also to attempt to make it work better. Russia sought an increased role for the CSCE in managing European security and hoped to use it to weaken the role of NATO. The United States in particular and the West in general employed it to divert the attention of the eastern states from the issue of NATO and especially of NATO expansion. The uncertainty regarding the future role of other European security organisations such as NATO and the WEU also hastened the institutional process, especially with many central and eastern European states applying for membership.

The British Information Service calls the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, “sometimes dubbed the ‘European Magna Carta’ and adopted on 21 November 1990 at the first summit meeting since Helsinki, “the most significant document since the Final Act itself.” OSCE documentation agrees, stating that the Charter of Paris “marked the turning point in the history of the CSCE in the post-cold war era, serving as a transition for the CSCE from its role as a forum for negotiation and dialogue to an active operational structure.” In reading the Charter, it becomes evident from the tone that the CSCE is attempting to shift from discussion to action. The document retains the original principles of sovereignty, equality, security, economic cooperation and human rights, and expands upon them. The declaration, subtitled, A New Era of Democracy, Peace and

Unity is forward-looking with an eye to ensuring that participating nations abide by the principles of the Final Act and of the Charter, not only in words, but also in deeds. These claims to some extent lack credibility in that the Organisation continued to lack viable enforcement capabilities, and, in spite of the unity of rhetoric, there was not agreement on the role that the OSCE should play in European security.

Apart from the establishment of an institutional structure for the CSCE, the Charter of Paris is not terribly momentous. In spite of the rhetoric about the transformations occurring in Europe and the great potential for the “New Europe” to which the title alludes, all of the changes put forth are essentially functional. That is to say, while many of the operational procedures and processes are altered and strengthened by the creation of an institutional structure, in the language of regime theory, these represent changes within a regime. The aims and ideals of the CSCE remained unaltered in any significant way. The CSCE was a forum in which negotiation and linkage politics could occur; it was concerned with the maintenance of security and order in Europe; it sought peaceful change; and it recognised and legitimised the participation of the United States and Russia (as the successor state of the Soviet Union) in European security affairs. On this latter point, for instance, the Charter of Paris states clearly that “the participation of both North American and European States is a fundamental characteristic of the CSCE.”\footnote{CSCE. Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Paris, 19-21 November, 1990. P. 6} The CSCE, throughout its institutionalisation, would remain very much...
concerned with the allocation of roles, the division of power, the prevention of hegemony, and the maintenance of peace (arguably, the maintenance of many aspects of the status quo) in Europe.

Despite the fact that regime theory has made such an enormous contribution, and despite the fact that the OSCE saw itself as an organisation moving towards becoming a regime, or as having regime-like aspirations, the earlier, if less precise, theory of pluralistic security communities remains very useful in explaining the role of the OSCE in the new European security architecture. This new security architecture requires more commonality, mutual understanding, and mutual responsiveness. The security community literature draws attention to and underscores the hopeful prospects associated with the OSCE. The OSCE, at least at the rhetorical level, is the only organisation that has the support of all everybody and which is, if not a security community, a rudimentary community nonetheless. The vague organisational form of this community is the OSCE. While regime theory can at times be used to explain many of the regime-like qualities of the OSCE, and in some instances the way in which it functions, and even its place in the so-called “interlocking web of security regimes” in Europe, Deutsch’s theory enables a better understanding of the role which the OSCE strives to play, and the optimism and idealism which drive the missions and activities coordinated by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the High Commissioner on National Minorities.
Implicit in the Charter of Paris for the first time was the notion of common or cooperative security. Although it was not to be labelled as such and linked to the CSCE until the 1994 Budapest Conference, the idea first appears in 1990: "Security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is inseparably linked to that of all the others."\(^\text{178}\) Of course, this recognition did not convert the CSCE into a viable organisation for imposing security (or even order). The institutions which were created under the Charter of Paris strengthened cooperation and facilitated and enhanced CSBMs. They were all, however, based on consultation, discussion, and observation. At best, they aim for preventative security measures. Thus the CSCE remained unable to provide hard (military) security guarantees. The institutions created did, nonetheless, strengthen the CSCE, and the increased emphasis on active preventative measures and strengthened cooperation were permitted by the new political context. That these measures were necessary was indicative of the increasing, rather than decreasing, pressure of security concerns within the CSCE area in this new era of apparent peace and stability.

As part of the move towards institutionalisation, the foundation was laid in the Charter of Paris, in keeping with Basket IV of the Helsinki Final Act, for follow-up meetings of the Heads of State or Government. In 1990, it was determined that the next meeting would be held in Helsinki in 1992. Later, in the Helsinki Decisions section of

the 1992 Helsinki Summit Declarations, it was decided to formalise the follow-up meeting process:

(1) Meetings of Heads of State or Government, as laid down in the Charter of Paris, will take place, as a rule, every two years on the occasion of review conferences, (2) They will set priorities and provide orientation at the highest political level. 179

Review conferences were established to prepare policy documents for adoption by the Heads of State or Government, and to consider steps for strengthening the CSCE process. 180 The last summit meeting, held at Budapest in 1994, formalised the institutionalisation of the CSCE by changing its name to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) effective January 1, 1995.

The language of the Charter of Paris is ambitious in contrast to that of the Final Act: The Helsinki Accords had member states “reaffirming their commitment to peace, security and justice and the continuing friendly relations and cooperation;” 181 the Charter of Paris says that these and other precepts of democracy and fundamental human rights form the “bedrock on which we will seek to construct the new Europe.” 182 The CSCE will “develop mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts among the participating states” and will “intensify consultations at all levels.” 183 In these first stages

180 ibid
181 Section 15 of the Helsinki Final Act in Maresca, p. 250
182 Charter of Paris, p. 3
183 Ibid. p. 4, 13
of the institutionalisation of the CSCE, the Charter still referred to strengthening the
CSCE Process, but it is evident that the structures and mechanisms which are put in
place by the Charter contributed greatly towards making the CSCE into a viable
(although not necessarily effective) international organisation. It is worth noting that the
language employed is more reminiscent of the hopeful, idealist language of the security
community literature, which tends to be firmly embedded in liberal idealism, than it is
that of regime theory.

Under the section, “New Structures and Institutions of the CSCE Process,” the
Charter of Paris established standing institutions such as the Conflict Prevention Centre
in Vienna, the Office for Free Elections in Warsaw, and the Secretariat in Prague.
Additionally, three main political consultative bodies were established:

The Council of Ministers consisting of foreign ministers
from the participating States; a Committee of Senior
Officials to assist the Council and manage day-to-day
business; and regular summit meetings of heads of State or
Government.¹⁸⁴

Finally, “recognizing the important role parliamentarians can play in the CSCE process,”
the Charter called for the creation of a CSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) “involving
members of parliaments from all participating States.”¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ OSCE Fact Sheet.
¹⁸⁵ Charter of Paris, p. 15
The Parliamentary Assembly met for the first time in Budapest in 1993, after a preliminary meeting in Madrid in April of 1991. Sessions are held once annually in July, and a series of declarations and resolutions “which serve to bring attention to important international issues and reinforce governmental compliance to OSCE commitments” is issued. The fact that resolutions in the Parliamentary Assembly are passed by simple majority, and not by the consensus rule required in the OSCE Council, often results in declarations on topics more controversial and future-oriented than those with which other OSCE bodies are dealing. The Assembly does much of its work in three committees, each of which mirrors one of the first three Baskets of the Helsinki Accords.

Within this committee structure, the Parliamentary Assembly undertakes a variety of missions and reporting. The aim of the missions varies, but they are typically directed at fact-finding or building-up contacts with parliaments, governments, organisations, and representatives of ethnic communities in member states. In recent years, for instance, there have been missions to Turkey and to the Former Yugoslavia. More commonly, the Parliamentary Assembly conducts election monitoring designed to assess the political and legal background of an election, as well as its democratic character. Although it is labelled “monitoring,” this process is effectively one of “soft” enforcement of the norms

186 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Creation of the Parliamentary Assembly. OSCE Home Page
187 ibid
188 ibid
and principles of the OSCE. Members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly have monitored and reported on elections in a variety of countries since 1994, including three Russian elections, and have duly reported on what they have witnessed. For many of the new governments, a negative report indicating that an election was not fairly and democratically elected could lead to withdrawal of international recognition and is therefore a very real concern. Conversely, a favourable report lends legitimacy to the process and the outcome. It is this international scrutiny and sanction which serves as a form of "soft" norm enforcement which the OSCE can wield.

The necessity of a mechanism, even one as weak this, for enforcing the norms of human rights and democratic values is important. Notice how when it comes to the need for mechanisms to enforce the values of the Organisation, the mechanisms and their terms of reference are sufficiently vague that they are better understood with the security community framework, than by the security regime model, under which one would expect more formal, rigidly structured arrangement. Although all of the states of the OSCE profess to adhere to the same core values, and although the newer members from eastern Europe may in fact aspire to those values enunciated in the Helsinki Accords and more recent documents, it is clear that within many of those states there is not yet a compatibility of major values, nor a common "way of life." Official international election monitoring is not, for instance, required to lend credence and legitimacy to the

---

190 In alphabetical order: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus (twice), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia (twice), Estonia, Macedonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan (twice), Latvia, Moldova, Romania,
results of elections in either the western European or North American OSCE states.

There, it is accepted by the international community, democratic values are what Charles Taylor calls a "common meaning." The same is not felt to be true in the eastern European states, nor in Russia; it is still felt that without careful supervision and scrutiny, many will still attempt to return to the "old ways of doing things." Witness, for example, the difficulties encountered in Albania in mid-May of 1997 when several parties threatened to boycott elections scheduled for 29 June.191 Similarly, a recent report makes a "hard-hitting assessment of the Belarusian authorities' attitude towards and treatment of human rights, democratic institutions and media freedom."192 Evidently the very first condition which Deutsch stipulates must be present prior to integration, the compatibility of major values, cannot yet be considered to exist among all of the states of the OSCE area. However, through its mechanisms of norm enforcement, the OSCE may contribute towards the creation of such a compatibility; that is to say, the OSCE may help to bring about a shift in values.

Continuing with the examination of the structure of the OSCE, its central decision-making and governing body is the Ministerial Council, consisting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs who are required to meet at least once a year. The location and chairmanship of the meetings is rotated through the member countries in keeping with the procedures established by the Final Recommendations. This Council, originally known

---

as the CSCE Council when it was established by the Charter of Paris, has been strengthened by both the 1992 Helsinki Summit Declarations and the 1994 Budapest Document, Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era. It is this latter document which changes the name to the Ministerial Council. The Helsinki Document tasks the Council with ensuring that “the various CSCE activities relate closely to the central political goals of the CSCE.” Essentially, it is the Ministerial Council which provides direction to both the Permanent Council and the Senior Council.

The Senior Council, which meets a minimum of two times per year in Prague, “discuss[es] and set[s] forth policy and broad budgetary guidelines.” It continues its duties of overview, management and co-ordination as prescribed by the 1992 Helsinki Document (Sections I-9-11). When the Senior Council is not in session, the Permanent Council, meeting in Vienna and composed of the permanent representatives of the participating states, is the regular body for political consultation and decision-making.

---

192 Ibid., p. 4
195 The 1994 Budapest Document renamed the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) the Senior Council. The Permanent Committee became the Permanent Council by virtue of the same document. Sections I-17-18, in “Strengthening the CSCE.”
196 The Senior Council is also convened as the Economic Forum.
197 CSCE. Budapest Document 1994. p. 2 Section I-17
198 CSCE. Budapest Document 1994. p. 2 Section I-18
The Permanent Council was created in December 1993 to expand "the possibilities for political consultation, dialogue and decision-making on a weekly basis." These frequent meetings, and the establishment in both the Permanent Council and the OSCE as a whole, of well-defined predictable decision-making procedures contribute towards an increasing capacity for mutual responsiveness, which Deutsch cites as a condition of integration. Moreover, these measures build confidence and security in the OSCE as a regime, and as a consequence also within the OSCE area.

The Helsinki Summit Declaration in 1992 established the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC), which was to work closely with the Conflict Prevention Centre. The forum meets weekly in Vienna and is to consult on "concrete measures aimed at strengthening security and stability throughout Europe." The objectives of the FSC are outlined in the 1992 Helsinki Document, Sections I-4-14:

(8) ...to start a new negotiation on arms control, disarmament and confidence and security building,
(12) They [states] will address the question of the harmonization of obligations agreed among participating States under the various existing instruments concerning arms control, disarmament and confidence and security-building. In addition, the FSC is to undertake regular consultations on matters of security and is to endeavour further to reduce the risk of conflicts.

---

199 OSCE. Fact Sheet.
200 ibid
Coordination, consultation and executive decisions are made on behalf of the Senior and Permanent Councils by the Chairman-in-Office (CIO), who is the Foreign Minister of the State which arranged the last Ministerial Council Session.\textsuperscript{202} The CIO, presently Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, is assisted by the Troika, consisting of the preceding and succeeding CIO, by \textit{ad hoc} committees and steering groups, and, finally, by personal representatives chosen by the CIO and given a specific mandate. The term of the Chairmanship is typically one year, at the end of which time a meeting of Heads of State and Government is held.

In December 1993, the CSCE Council established the post of Secretary General, and strengthened the Vienna Secretariat. "The Secretary General is appointed by the Ministerial Council for a period of three years ...and acts as the representative of the CIO... in all activities aimed at fulfilling the goals of the OSCE."\textsuperscript{203} The Secretary General, currently Ambassador Giancarlo Aragona of Italy, who was appointed in June 1996, is the OSCE’s Chief Administrative Officer and thus manages all OSCE structures and operations.

\textsuperscript{202} Paris, Helsinki and Budapest Summit Declarations
\textsuperscript{203} OSCE. \textit{Fact Sheet}. 
Operating immediately under the Secretary General and responsible for all quotidiant operations is the Secretariat in Vienna. It is divided into four departments: Conference Services, responsible for all interpretation, documentation and protocol; Administration and Budget, which manages personnel policies, finances and administrative services; Chairman-in-Office Support, which handles the preparation of meetings, press and public information, the economic dimension and contact with other organisations; and the Conflict Prevention Centre which is responsible for confidence and security building measures (CSBM), mission support, the peaceful settlement of disputes and support to conflict prevention activities.204

At the 1992 Helsinki Summit, the participating states decided to establish a High Commissioner on National Minorities, operating out of The Hague. Netherlands Minister of State Max van der Stoel was appointed as the first High Commissioner in December 1992, and the office began operations in January 1993. The 1992 Helsinki Declaration mandates the High Commissioner to act as an “instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage,” and to “provide ‘early warning’ and, as appropriate, ‘early action’ at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues...”205 The 1994 Budapest Declaration calls for increased support to the High Commissioner, and further effort on the part of states to implement the recommendations of that office.206 In 1995, the Ministerial Conference decided to renew Mr. Van der Stoel’s mandate until

---

204 See Organisational Chart
the end of 1998, and he is presently actively involved in eleven situations, mostly in
eastern Europe. The High Commissioners role has been reaffirmed, and he is mandated
to “conduct on-site missions and to engage in preventative diplomacy among disputants
at the earliest stages of tension,” and to “…promote dialogue, confidence and cooperation
between them.” It is difficult to determine what substantive impact the High
Commissioner on National Minorities has actually had, though it can be said that the
active role which he is trying to play has succeeded in creating the expectation that areas
of tension will be kept under scrutiny and will be reported upon to the member states.
This constitutes in many ways another means by which the OSCE can enforce its norms,
which is important for the preservation and enhancement “soft” security.

The Office for Free Elections, created by the Charter of Paris in 1990, became the
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) when its mandate was
expanded by the meeting in Prague of the CSCE Council in January 1992. The ODIHR
was directed in 1992 to “act as a clearing house on a broad range of human rights topics,
establish contacts with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and cooperate with other

---

206 CSCE. Budapest Document 1994 Section 1-21 p.2
207 In alphabetical order: Albania (Greek population), Croatia (inter-ethnic relations), Estonia
(Russian speaking population), Hungary (Slovak minority), Kazakhstan (inter-ethnic relations), Kyrgyzstan
(inter-ethnic relations), Latvia (Russian speaking population), Romania (Hungarian minority), Slovakia
(Hungarian minority), Macedonia (Albanian population), Ukraine (situation in Crimea).
208 High Commissioner on National Minorities Fact Sheet.
Http://www.osceprag.dz/inst/hcnm/hcnm3.htm
institutions engaged in similar work.” Subsequently, the 1992 summit at Helsinki assigned the additional task of monitoring the “implementations of commitments in the Human Dimension,” including the building of democratic institutions. Both the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights have been active in virtually every country in central and eastern Europe, including Russia.

It is interesting to note that the 1992 Helsinki summit sought to enhance the role of the CSCE in aspects of “hard” security. Section III of the Declaration provided the necessary foundation for the CSCE to initiate fact-finding and rapporteur missions, as well as peacekeeping operations to prevent and manage conflicts. The 1992 Summit Document envisioned peacekeeping operations being employed to, *inter alia*, “supervise and help maintain cease-fires, to monitor troop withdrawals, to support the maintenance of law and order, to provide humanitarian and medical aid and to assist refugees.” This is a long way from the origins of the CSCE when there was hardly even agreement on whether or not to meet again, and is possibly due to the increased cooperation which is possible in the new political context.

---

210 *ibid*
212 Section III-29, p.26
The participating states were readily implementing changes which implied the existence of some common values, beliefs norms and expectations that facilitated cooperation. The institutional structure which was created served to strengthen the Organisation by enhancing rules and operating procedures, and by providing mechanisms and bodies for carrying out the mandate of the institution. Additionally, the formal organisational structure increased communications and contacts and thereby served as a confidence and security building measure. However, the realpolitik interests of the member states of the Organisation are rarely compatible on issues more specific than the general desire to avoid war, and this fact, in spite of the changes cited here, makes it difficult for even the institutionalised OSCE to be considered a strong security regime or a security community. Nevertheless, a weak “security community” might be considered to be present on the basis of very limited common values, mutual responsiveness, and mutually predictable behaviour. Unlike security regime theory, Deutsch’s approach permits a minimisation of the role played by rational self-interest, and thus enables an understanding of the continued idealistic drive of the OSCE and its contribution to general conditions of “soft” security which the institution can make in the face of apparent conflicts among the national interests of member states.

Prior to outlining the developments in the OSCE resulting from the Budapest Summit in 1994 and the Lisbon Summit in 1996, it is important to observe that despite all of the changes made during its institutionalisation since 1990, the role of the Organisation vis-a-vis other security organisations in Europe had not yet been determined. In the
greater context, in other words, no new "settlement" or division of influence and power in Europe had yet been agreed upon. The specifics of the debate surrounding this division and a discussion of the role of the OSCE with respect to other security organisations in Europe will be elaborated in the next chapter. For the moment, it is important to recognise the importance of the fact that this debate and negotiation was able to occur within the OSCE, and that the settlement is put forward and later consolidated in 1994 Budapest Summit Declaration, and the 1996 Lisbon Summit Declaration, respectively.

At issue were the various perceptions of the OSCE's utility, and these were and continue to be linked to the political and military context of European security. More precisely, debate about the OSCE's role and utility in European security occurred within the context of the issues surrounding NATO and its expansion, and these will be discussed at greater length in the following chapter.

In the 1994 Budapest Summit Declarations, the OSCE puts forward its goal of building a "genuine security partnership among all participating States, whether or not they are members of other security organizations." The paragraph continues, putting forth the guiding principle of common and comprehensive security: "...we will be guided by the CSCE's comprehensive concept of security and its indivisibility, as well as by our commitment not to pursue national security interests at the expense of others." This is

---

214 Ibid.
strengthened by the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security issued December 3, 1994, in which it is stated that OSCE:

...remain convinced that security is indivisible and that the security of each of them is inseparably linked to the security of all others. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States. They will pursue their own security interests in conformity with the common effort to strengthen security and stability in the CSCE area and beyond.  

The rejection of the realist notion of zero-sum security which is implicit in these statements is permitted by the conceptualisation of common security.

As Michael Mandelbaum describes it, common security\textsuperscript{216} is characterised by two defining features. The first is the “absence of state-level causes of conflict.”\textsuperscript{217} In other words, “the motives for fighting that are rooted in domestic politics are gone.”\textsuperscript{218} Second, under common security states recognise “the fact of anarchy and the potential for conflict to which it gives rise, leading to concrete measures to address it.”\textsuperscript{219} The concrete measures to which Mandelbaum refers in describing the “common security order in post-Cold War Europe” include the confidence and security building measures of the OSCE, and the series of arms control accords beginning with the agreement on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe of December 1987 and culminating in the second

\textsuperscript{216} There is some debate in the academic community about the distinctions, if any, among common, cooperative and comprehensive security. The OSCE seems to use the terms interchangeably here.
\textsuperscript{217} Mandelbaum, p. 75
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid., p. 76
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) of January 1993. Mandelbaum’s thesis is that in the absence of state-level offensive conflict, armaments are the main system-level cause of conflict in an anarchic system, and thus by adopting a posture of “defense dominance” - i.e. mutual reduction of armament types and levels to the point where there can be no doubt that they are purely defensive in nature - and by promoting transparency among those armaments that are left, conflict can be avoided and a common security order will result.

Mandelbaum’s conceptualisation is problematic in that it can be argued that a common security order does not exist among the states of eastern Europe beyond the level of rhetoric and that this fact and the consequent realities of realpolitik have led those states to seek membership in NATO. The result has been that linkage politics and negotiation can occur most successfully in the context of NATO and its affiliated councils and partnerships, and that together this combination of circumstances and consequences has resulted in a marginalised role for the OSCE within the European security architecture. All of this is not to say, however, that the OSCE cannot and does not play a role in helping to bring about the conditions which Deutsch establishes for the existence of a security community.

---

220 Ibid., p. 81
221 Ibid., pp. 81-94
The Budapest documents, including the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, and then the Lisbon Documents define, elaborate and consolidate this common, comprehensive and cooperative view of security in Europe. The OSCE can advance the notion of common security, and does so, because it necessarily accepts the view that the desire for state-level conflict in the OSCE area has been eliminated. By the very act of their accession to the Helsinki Accords and the OSCE states must declare their opposition to offensive, state-level conflicts. For the OSCE, to question this stated desire of its members would be to call into question the very premise of the Organisation. To do so would lead to the collapse not only of the Organisation, but also possibly of the failure of the common security order in Europe. It is this possibility of failure which ensures that member states remain concerned with “hard” security issues, and which places the OSCE in the shadow of NATO which is equipped to deal with those concerns.

As Mandelbaum points out, even or perhaps especially for the West

NATO is a source of confidence … in the event of the failure of common security. …if Europe again becomes a dangerous place, the Western Europeans can be confident that the political structure on which their security rested when conditions were similar, during the Cold War, will remain in place.  

The 1996 Lisbon Document is also pertinent to this analysis. In 1995 the institutionalisation of the OSCE was complete, in so far as the establishment of structures was concerned. The 1996 Lisbon Summit Declaration mainly reaffirms OSCE principles and the importance of the CFE Treaty, as well as the structures established during the past
six years. The member states also adopted the Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century. The Declaration commits members to “transparency” in their actions and relations, making it clear that all security arrangements should be “of a public nature, predictable and open, and should correspond to the needs of individual and collective security.” The arms control process is defined as a “central security issue in the OSCE region,” and the decision of participating states to adapt it to the changing security environment in Europe “so as to contribute to common and indivisible security” is welcomed. The Declaration also describes the fundamental elements of the common security space which it puts forward as the OSCE’s goal: “the comprehensiveness and indivisibility of security and the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour.” The language employed here, and the implicit aims and ideals of that language, are strikingly similar to those of Deutsch when he describes the conditions of security communities: compatibility of major values, mutual predictability, and mutual responsiveness.

These two documents, the Lisbon Summit Declaration and the Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, along with various appendices and statements, together form the 1996 Lisbon Document. The document builds upon and consolidates the framework established at

222 Ibid., p. 101
223 Paragraph 9 of The Declaration
Budapest in 1994. The Lisbon document emphasises the right of all member states to choose or to change their security arrangements, “including treaties of alliance,” at any time, and makes it clear that neither the OSCE nor any other organisation occupies a controlling or central role in European security: “Within the OSCE, no State, organization or grouping can have any superior responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE region, or regard any part of the OSCE region as its sphere of influence.” Further, the Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe “complements the mutually reinforcing efforts of other European and transatlantic institutions and organizations in this field [of security].” The use of the word, “complements” is again designed to highlight the non-hierarchical role which the OSCE plays in European security and among the web of interlocking security organisations and security regimes.

Finally, in examining the Lisbon Document, it is worth commenting on the language which is employed, for it is the language of regime theory and common security. The Lisbon Declaration “reaffirms that we shall maintain only such military capabilities as are commensurate with individual or collective legitimate security needs,” and refers repeatedly to transparency. With respect to the language of regimes, the text discusses “the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour,” and

---

225 Paragraph 4
lists the principles of the OSCE as “democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, market economy and social justice.” Thus the OSCE portrays itself as a regime, and puts forward its model for a common and comprehensive security model in Europe.

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in the end is not very different from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The new functions and language, and the new model for security were able to evolve because of the transformation of the political context: greater cooperation and openness could occur. The activities of the Organisation continue to be based on the same principles and ideals, concerned with maintaining peace and security and negotiating change and resolving issues peacefully through linkage politics and negotiation. Although the language has changed, the earlier language of Deutsch, his liberal idea of security community, continues to describe the OSCE and its aspirations. The OSCE now more than ever is quite idealistic, and Deutsch’s similarly idealistic language and theory help us to understand it.

Whether one interprets the changes which began to occur in 1989 in Europe as the end of the cold war, or like Allen Lynch as the collapse of the post-cold war order, it is clear that the status quo was transformed. New, autonomous, independent states emerged

in eastern Europe; economies collapsed; communism and planned economies were rejected in favour of democracy and capitalism. The OSCE, like other organisations and groups concerned with matters of politics, economics and security, had to adapt to the new politico-security context. Specifically, the new context entailed greater political cooperation and the attendant possibilities for stronger common institutional structures, but it was also characterised by a more unstable, fractious and tense security situation.

Thus, between the Paris and Lisbon summits, the CSCE sought to strengthen itself and to give itself structure. It recognised this change by saying that it had "institutionalised," and in confirmation of this institutionalisation it renamed itself the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) effective January 1, 1995. The OSCE expanded to encompass the new states of eastern Europe during this same period, and developed new internal offices, councils and structures to deal with its expanded membership and the role which it hoped to play. These changes were in response to the perceived new political environment.

The OSCE underwent no fundamental transformation. Its business was the same even if it went about it slightly differently, in a more "organised," structured fashion. In other words, while the means of operating changed, the function of the Organisation did not. New states signed-on to the Helsinki Accords and enunciated the original principles

229 Ibid., p. 6
and norms, and existing members continued to do so. The OSCE remained a forum in which issue-linkage and political trade-offs (e.g. NATO expansion, spheres of influence, role of security organisations including the OSCE, actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina) could be made to avoid state-level conflict and thereby attempt to build real (as opposed to rhetorical) common security.

Up to and including the Lisbon Summit, it is clear that the OSCE area does not represent a security community: there is only weak compatibility of major values despite much rhetoric to the contrary;\(^{230}\) and mutual responsiveness is still lacking, as evidenced by the reluctance to extend NATO and "hard" security guarantees or the lack of enthusiasm for military intervention in Bosnia, and despite increasing interdependence in political, economic and security areas. That being said, the mutual predictability of behaviour which Deutsch sets forth as a condition of integration continues to be enhanced by the OSCE, and the confidence and security-building measures with which it is associated. It is possible that a very weak "security community" exists among the member states.

Throughout its institutionalisation, then, the nature of the OSCE has not changed: it remains a confidence and security-building measure, albeit somewhat stronger than it

\(^{230}\) Even OSCE documentation such as the Lisbon Document, among others, and countless reports, acknowledge that human rights, freedom of the press, democratic values and social justice are not being respected in many countries who are members of the Organisation.
was in the past, in which states can pursue political and military objectives through issue-linkage and political trade-offs with the expectation of peaceful, negotiated resolution. While the institutionalisation of the OSCE and the concomitant modification of procedures and day-to-day operations within the OSCE were enabled by, and occurred in response to, the changes in the political context in Europe, no changes were made to the nature, function and underpinning ideals of the Organisation. In spite of the perceived changed in the security order in Europe, realpolitik concerns seem to continue to dominate state interests and to drive their actions.

In fact, because the changes in the security order emphasised issues of “hard” security in the new, less stable environment, OSCE states continued to be motivated, perhaps even more so, by realpolitik concerns. Since the OSCE could not satisfactorily address these concerns, the real change provoked by the new security environment was not in the nature of the OSCE, but rather in the importance ascribed to the role which the Organisation could play within the broader context of European security. This, then, is the question addressed in the next chapter. Where does the OSCE fit in to the broader European security architecture and the web of security arrangements in Europe?
Chapter 4

The OSCE within the European Security Architecture

"The revolutionary events of 1989 thus overturned not the cold war order but rather the post-cold war order in East-West relations, much to the surprise and consternation of nearly every government involved, including that of the United States. Consequently, those governments now confront forces, in the form of Germany unity and nationalism throughout Eastern Europe and the USSR, that the post-cold war order contained very efficiently (if at times brutally)."

- Allen Lynch, The Cold War is Over ... Again.231

Following the remarkable changes of 1989-1991, the OSCE established an institutionalised structure which its new name reflects in response to the new era of apparent political cooperation which the collapse of communism and the break-up of the Soviet Union ushered in. But in spite of the new rhetoric of political cooperation, shared values and goals, and despite the new political freedoms which states and individuals enjoyed, the OSCE area as a whole was more unstable, more fractious, and less secure than before. Thus the OSCE and the principles and norms of security upon which it is based, remained unaltered. As issues of "hard" security became of greater concern, however, and as it became increasingly clear that the OSCE could not deal, and was not going to be equipped to deal, with such concerns, the effect of this new security environment was to marginalise the OSCE. While the institution remains unchanged, its effectiveness has been undermined by the lesser role ascribed to it within the European

231 Lynch, p. 1
security architecture. In examining the security context, it is clear that the seemingly decreasing role of the OSCE is primarily due to the increasing emphasis and priority placed on NATO and NATO expansion.

During the same period in which the institutionalisation of the OSCE occurred, and due to the same cooperative political context, other organisations were being formed, strengthened, and expanded to encompass new membership from eastern Europe. Due to the often over-lapping membership among states in these organisations, an inter-locking web of institutions covering economic, political and security areas began to take shape. Together, this interlocking web of institutions constitutes confidence and security-building measures; it increases political contact and transparency; it builds mutual responsiveness and a sense of community; and contributes towards mutual predictability. In short, the inter-locking web of institutions helps to strengthen some of the characteristics and conditions which are necessary for common security, and which Deutsch cites as necessary for integration. In the terms employed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in delineating a model of complex interdependence, increasingly, "multiple channels connect societies."

Between 1989 and 1990, a veritable web of institutions had formed in Europe. On the economic side, the OSCE had, since the Charter of Paris, encouraged the
strengthening of ties among institutions and regimes such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the Bretton Woods Institutions, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and, primarily, the European Community. The relationship with these organisations vis-à-vis the role of the OSCE was relatively clear when compared with that of the many security organisations and agreements.

On the security side, the future of NATO was a contentious issue, and the West was delaying a confrontation over NATO expansion into the East with the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 and then the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1993, to each of which Russia and the states of eastern Europe were invited to accede. As Michael Mandelbaum argues, both the Council and the Partnership served as confidence building measures, as well as to promote transparency. Neither, however, offered the “hard” security guarantees which were being sought by the states of eastern Europe. Only NATO could offer those, and the West was using the PfP and the NACC to delay a decision on expansion and, if anything, was suggesting that expansion was not

---

233 See the *Charter of Paris*, p. 11
234 Mandelbaum, p. 101
likely in the near future.\textsuperscript{235} Further, under no circumstances did the West seek a role for the OSCE in areas of “hard” security which would diminish the utility and viability of NATO, especially if such as role would mean extending security guarantees. The reluctance of the United States, Britain, France, Germany and other NATO countries to become militarily involved in the Bosnian crisis, the discord among NATO allies over what would represent a “just” settlement, and the general ineffectiveness of NATO in Bosnia highlight the potential problems with which a much stronger OSCE offering “hard” security mechanisms would have to deal.\textsuperscript{236} The reluctance of the NATO states to become involved also demonstrates the lack of “we-feeling” in the OSCE area as a whole; there is little “mutual responsiveness” or “sense of community” in the Deutschian sense among these communities.\textsuperscript{237}

Even less anxious than the West to see NATO expand and extend its Article V security guarantees to states in eastern Europe was Russia. For Russia, the OSCE and the debate and proposals leading-up to the Budapest Summit in 1994 were an opportunity to re-shape the role of the OSCE and to give it a pre-eminent role in European security.

\textsuperscript{235} In fact expansion would not be approved until July of 1997 in Madrid, when NATO would authorize negotiations with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Still, this approval did not indicate the expansion of NATO as the states have yet to accede to the NATO at the time of writing.

\textsuperscript{236} See Mandelbaum, Chapter 3: “Expansion” for a discussion of the issues surrounding NATO expansion in the context of the Bosnian conflict.

\textsuperscript{237} Deutsch. P. 129
The proposals addressed Russia’s aims of using the OSCE to hinder NATO expansion and of re-establishing its sphere of influence, to borrow a relevant cold war phrase. Regarding NATO expansion, on January 18, 1994 Foreign Minister Kozyrev stated that the “Russian Army ‘should not leave those regions that have, for centuries, constituted the Russian sphere of influence’, specifying that not only the countries of the C.I.S., but equally the Baltic Republics constitute this ‘vital region of interests for Russia.’” The Budapest proposal seeks to give the OSCE a central role in European security, which is alternatively defined as being to “co-ordinate efforts of both the states-participant and the regional security structures - NATO, NACC, the EU, the WEU, the Council of Europe and the CIS,” or to ensure the “congruity and closer interaction of the CSCE with NATO, the EU, WEU or the CIS.” No matter, Ushakov makes it clear that strengthening the OSCE is regarded by Russia as a means to eliminate the need for NATO expansion: “Thus, the expansion of NATO does not seem to be fatally inevitable.”

It is interesting to take note of the fact that Ushakov’s presentation is written with the benefit of hindsight, in that it was delivered after Russia had received feedback from its Program for Improving Effectiveness of the CSCE, which was submitted in preparation for the Budapest summit. In the aforementioned document, Russia had

239 Rotfeld, 103
240 Ushakov, 115
outlined its idea for establishing an “Executive Committee” for the OSCE. This suggestion has led people like Adam Rotfeld and Vladimir Baranovsky to label the proposed Russian organisation a “mini-UN,” and to condemn it for being based on “irreconcilable” concepts. Specifically, Rotfeld states the following:

Let us be clear: qualitatively enhancing the operation of the CSCE, on the one hand, and the demand by the 53 states (as proposed by the Russian document) to maintain the consensus rule in decision-making, on the other hand, are irreconcilable (italics in original). While Ushakov displays some contrition over the “slightly futuristic character” of the security council aspect of the proposal, he nonetheless makes it clear that Russia does not regard the idea of a pseudo security council of the OSCE to be inherently contradictory for an organisation based on equality and consensus.

The OSCE then, would become the primary co-ordinating organisation in Europe. Ushakov is careful to avoid placing the OSCE in a hierarchy as such, suggesting instead that the proposal aims at “congruity and closer interaction in the all European process” and to sort out the “division of labour problem” especially as it pertains to “spheres of competence.” Naturally, Russia’s sphere of competence would be in its former sphere of influence. This contributes greatly to an understanding of this statement of 28 February 1993 by Boris Yeltsin: “I believe the time has come for authoritative

---

241 *ibid.*, 116
243 *ibid.*, 104
244 Ushakov, p. 115
international organisations, including the UN, to grant Russia special powers as guarantor of peace and stability in this region.”\(^{245}\) Yeltsin continues, “Russia has a heartfelt interest in stopping all armed conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union.”\(^{246}\) Russia sees an opportunity to develop as a sort of regional hegemon once again should the OSCE become the primary organisation of European security. *Realpolitik* continues to drive Russia’s interests.

In the OSCE, Russia has a veto and retains a degree of prestige. The OSCE does not have any functional enforcement mechanisms (apart from the “soft” methods of enforcement such as international pressure already mentioned), and thus would have to rely on regional organisations. Under this arrangement, NATO could remain a player in western Europe, and Russia would continue to have influence in eastern Europe. Furthermore, should Russia choose to intervene, the OSCE could lend the action legitimacy. That, after all, is what Yeltsin sought from the OSCE prior to the Chechnya debacle. Additionally, the third basket of the OSCE which was used to bludgeon the Soviet Union during the cold war can be used by Russia to protect Russian minorities in former Republics.\(^{247}\) Russia, it would seem, sees continued possibilities for the OSCE as an organisation in which it might continue to play a hegemonic type of role. It should be

\(^{245}\) Bjumer, p. 98; Hannes Adomeit in “Russia: Partner or Risk Factor in European Security,” in Adelphi 285, p.28-9

\(^{246}\) Adomeit, 28-9

\(^{247}\) Ushakov, p. 117
manifestly obvious why the states of Central and eastern Europe are less than enamoured with the notion.

In the immediate aftermath of the cold war, the countries of eastern Europe were among the strongest supporters of the OSCE. In fact, many of the governments even “favored an expansion of the CSCE’s authority and resources...”\(^{248}\) The eagerness of these states, and most notably Czechoslovakia and Poland is manifested in their successful lobbying to take an active part in the institutionalisation of the OSCE. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), also known as the Office for Free Elections, was established in Warsaw. President Havel and Foreign Minister Dienstbier were among the strongest supporters of CSCE and lobbied hard to secure Prague as the home of the OSCE Secretariat. Perception of the OSCE, at least initially, by the eastern European countries, was that it would become the “main guarantor of European security.”\(^{249}\) At the time, the role of NATO was expected to decline, and the most likely organisation to fill the void was the OSCE. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were all very active in proposing expanded new roles for the OSCE, and in suggesting institutional reforms designed to give it greater power.


\(^{249}\) Larrabee, 116
According to Richard Witz, there were several main reasons why the east European governments were in favour of expanding the role of the OSCE. First, the OSCE was based on equality of states, and during the Yugoslav crisis the “east European states had the greatest effect on the international response when the world community dealt with the conflict mainly through the CSCE.” They later lost their voice when the UN, EC and NATO stepped into the fray. Second, the OSCE was the only security institution which could link them to the United States, and provide a forum for discussion with members of NATO. Third, the OSCE could be called upon to conduct fact-finding missions which neither France nor Russia would permit NATO to perform. Fourth, the OSCE’s “existence facilitated the east Europeans’ campaign to weaken the WTO [Warsaw Treaty Organisation].” Moreover, once the WTO disbanded, the OSCE was the only organisation which included the Soviet Union, thus preventing its isolation.

Finally, many east European officials had been active dissidents before 1989. They drew inspiration from the Helsinki process during their struggle for human rights. Having benefited so much from the CSCE before their revolutions, they expected the institution to provide additional advantages following the disappearance of the communist governments that had thwarted the attainment of CSCE norms.

Gradually, such idealism began to wear thin as the OSCE was confronted with situations which were simply beyond its scope and capacity. Moreover, the enthusiasm of eastern

250  Wietz, 346
251  ibid
252  ibid
253  ibid, 347
states for the Organisation has been somewhat tempered in recent years by the change in Russian attitude, and by the realisation that it is not as effective as they would have liked in dealing with issues of “hard” security - *ie. inter alia* Yugoslavia and Chechnya.

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe failed miserably in its attempts to handle the crisis in the former Yugoslavia; it simply did not and still does not have the resources necessary to engage in what in essence is a military operation concerned with “hard” security. The consensus rule, which has since been modified, made it impossible to take action against (or in) a country; and even now, the modification allows the Council to discuss a country without its consent (consensus - involved party), but not to take action. After witnessing the inability of the OSCE to deal with the crisis in Yugoslavia, not to mention Chechnya and the break-up of Czechoslovakia, as well as the Russian “peacekeeping” operation in Moldova\(^{254}\), the states of eastern Europe began to exhibit doubts. Although the OSCE “has enjoyed some success in providing non-threatening forums in which the Baltic states and Russia could discuss bilateral issues such as the pace of Russian force withdrawal and citizenship questions,”\(^{255}\) as a guarantor of military security it is ineffective.\(^{256}\) Eastern Europe did not abandon the OSCE; it simply began to see its potential more realistically as an

\(^{254}\) Adomeit, 29
\(^{255}\) Clarke, 35
institution which could help to co-ordinate the realisation of other security objectives, first among which is political stability.

Russia’s proposals did not prevail at Budapest in 1994, and the OSCE did not preempt NATO, nor did it become a real player in issues of “hard” security. The political significance of the debate and its outcomes are worth noting. First, a very contentious debate over the future role and utility of the OSCE was conducted within the established structure, and the structure survived, thereby demonstrating and in fact contributing to the strength of the Organisation. Second, as demonstrated by the text of the Budapest Declaration and later that of the Lisbon Document, with the resolution of this debate the OSCE became in essence ‘one of many.’ That is, it did not become the primary security organisation in Europe, and it was not permitted to adopt a “central role” as the Russians had desired in coordinating matters of European security. Beginning with the Budapest Declaration, OSCE texts emphasise the non-hierarchical nature of European security and similarly describe the role of the OSCE within that architecture. Finally, the OSCE was not given the capacity to exert itself in the area of “hard” security. Thus the path was set for the role and utility of the OSCE to become in one sense marginalised by NATO.

At the same time, however, this “marginalisation” helped us to see the real character of the OSCE and its real utility. In Deutsch’s scheme, after the triumph of NATO, the OSCE becomes a part of an interlocking community of security, which, although not yet a formal security community, has inclinations in that direction. The
OSCE is the primary organisation dealing with “soft” security issues, and the desire to pursue “soft” security is best described by the Deutschian model which relies upon mutual responsiveness, compatibility of major values, and mutual predictability.

It is true that in the face of very real “hard” military security concerns, and driven by realpolitik, the states of eastern Europe placed increasing importance on acceding to the NATO. The expansion of NATO was a very contentious debate, not only from Russia’s perspective, but also for the members of NATO. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace were formed, and states in eastern Europe were told that prior to acceding to the NATO they would have to join the Council and the Partnership which would bring them closer to NATO, encourage dialogue, and, essentially, build confidence and security. Quite simply, because NATO membership was what they most strongly desired, and because these were fora were closely linked to NATO and future NATO membership, linkage politics could be used very effectively within their frameworks.

The CSCE developed because signatory states were able to link issues and to hold-out the possibility of concessions in negotiations surrounding the most contentious issue of the time: the division of territory, influence and power in Europe. Following the collapse of that post-cold war order, these issues re-surfaced. When it became clear, following the struggle to determine whether NATO or the OSCE would play the pre-eminent role in European security, that NATO would be the only European security
organisation capable of providing “hard” security guarantees, the expansion of NATO became the most contentious. Consequently, NATO expansion also became the issue to which both existing NATO members and Russia could most effectively link other issues during negotiations to achieve their aims. It was not that the OSCE could not be used effectively as a forum for linkage politics and negotiation anymore, it was just that the NACC and PfP offered more effective fora due to the primacy of the issue of NATO expansion. Thus the OSCE continued to play its same role, but its utility vis-à-vis “hard” security issues was marginalised.

Despite competition from other organisations, however, the OSCE is still the pre-eminent forum for the discussing and acting upon “soft” security concerns. In the same way that the OSCE lacks the mechanisms to deal with “hard” security concerns, the other organisations in the European security architecture lack the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, its High Commissioner on National Minorities, and other bodies, missions and experience.

The OSCE is now one of many security organisations in Europe which forms part of a web of inter-locking security institutions with overlapping membership. Increasingly, the same language underpins all of these institutions. The text of NATO’s Madrid Declaration, for instance, refers to a “commitment to an undivided Europe,” and seeks “greater integration and cooperation” towards a “vision of a just and lasting order
of peace for Europe as a whole based on human rights, freedom and democracy." The Declaration enunciates the same principles of common security set forth in recent OSCE summit declarations and other texts.

Moreover, these institutions increasingly refer to one another, acknowledging the complementary nature of their efforts. The Budapest and Lisbon texts, among other OSCE documents, pledge to build stronger links to NATO and other security organisations. NATO documents such as the Madrid Declaration often reiterate that they adhere to OSCE principles in conducting their mandate, and share the OSCE vision for common security in Europe.

Commitments are made in the Founding Act between NATO and the Russian Federation, in which Russia and NATO proceed from the OSCE principle that "the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible." The Act in establishing another structure and forum for cooperation and consultation, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), emphasises that NATO and Russia, separately and together as well as through the PJC will continue work with NATO and the OSCE to ensure that the OSCE principles of common, cooperative and comprehensive security are upheld. By strengthening the links among organisations and their members, by

---

increasing the opportunities for cooperation and meetings, confidence and security are enhanced.
Conclusion

Since its establishment with the signing of the Helsinki Accords August 1, 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its successor, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, has played a significant role in European security. Since its inception, the OSCE has remained the only security institution to encompass all of the states of a very broadly defined “Europe” from Vancouver to Vladivostock. During the cold war, the OSCE was the only security institution in which both East and West were members. In recent years, the OSCE has become increasingly involved and structured to provide early warning of potential conflicts, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation in Europe by means of arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, election monitoring and economic and environmental security.259

In spite of the apparent primacy of its role in many of the “soft” security areas, very little has been written about the OSCE, apart from internal publications. Few have examined and questioned the past, present, future and desired roles of the OSCE within the European security architecture. For the most part, it has been left to the OSCE to reflect upon its role, and in doing so, it has tended to describe itself and its role within the framework provided by existing theories in international relations literature. More often
than not, literature about the OSCE lapses into the language of regime theory, which this essay has concluded is misleading.

Even if a common and cooperative security regime has not yet arisen in Europe, it is certainly the stated goal of the key actors. The Founding Act promises that NATO and Russia will act in such a way as to "enhance each other’s security and that of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area and diminish the security of none." As U.S. President Bill Clinton said on the occasion of the signing of the Founding Act in Paris on May 27, 1997:

We establish this partnership because we are determined to create a future in which European security is not a zero-sum game -- where NATO’s gain is Russia’s loss, and Russia’s strength is our alliance’s weakness. That is old thinking; these are new times. Together, we must build a new Europe in which every nation is free and every free nation joins in strengthening the peace and stability for all. Thucydides is replaced by common security, at least in rhetoric. Although the web of inter-locking institutions, of which the OSCE is one, may contribute towards the building a common and comprehensive security order in Europe, that has yet to be achieved and is a subject which cannot be explored here.

---

259 http://www.osce prag.cz/info/facts/factshet.htm
260 Ibid.
261 ______. "Remarks by President Bill Clinton, French President Chirac, Russia President Yeltsin, and NATO Secretary General Solana at NATO/Russia Founding Act Ceremony." White House Press Release of May 27, 1997 via NATODATA@CC1.JULEUVEN.AC.BE (NATODATA LISTSERV).
Increasingly, a common language is being used to describe the aims and intentions of the various security institutions in this interlocking web, and much of that language is, if not borrowed from, at least strongly similar to and reminiscent of, the language of the OSCE. Within this interlocking web of security institutions, the OSCE retains pre-eminence in dealing with "soft" security concerns, as the only entity with the mechanisms in place to do so. Deutsch's model of the conditions surrounding security communities may not be best for examining all aspects of the European security architecture; it must certainly be acknowledged that many of the dynamics of the "hard" security issues and relationship may be better explained by regime and other theories.

Nonetheless, many security issues in the "new" Europe are "soft" issues, and the OSCE provides an important forum and mechanisms to deal with them. The OSCE has played and continues to play an important role in bringing issues of "soft" security to the fore, and in working towards their resolution. Thus, to understand the particular role of the OSCE within the European security architecture, Deutsch's more optimistic model based on the promotion of "soft" security conditions such as mutual responsiveness, compatibility of major values and mutual predictability of behaviour is more appropriate and of greater use. While it certainly has not created what Deutsch would consider a security community, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe has contributed towards the establishment and strengthening of many of the conditions which Deutsch describes. Whether this will ultimately result in the formation of a security community is uncertain. It has, however, strengthened and improved security in Europe and continues to do so, even if it is "on the margins" of "hard" security.
This essay has sought to take a step back, and to provide the beginnings of an external examination of the OSCE and its predecessor, the CSCE. The thesis establishes that the OSCE can be looked at otherwise by relying on earlier writings and theories, especially those of Karl Deutsch on the subject of security communities, and, more particularly, the conditions under which security communities can be formed.

More than regime theory, Deutsch's model is imbued with an optimism and idealism which aptly describes the intentions of the OSCE, and is better suited to help us to understand the role which the OSCE plays in the broader, "soft" security areas. Using Deutsch's theories to examine the OSCE, one cannot readily conclude that the OSCE is marginalised in European security. Indeed, Deutsch's model suggests that the OSCE can and does play an important role in fostering the conditions of mutual responsiveness, mutual predictability, and common values goals among states which are conducive to establishing an expectation of peaceful change and an absence of war.

Regime theory can certainly be used to enhance our understanding of some aspects of the internal functioning of the OSCE, its offices, mechanisms and bodies. But Deutsch's theory provides the best understanding of the whole of the OSCE, its role, drive and aspirations. Regime theory remains useful in its contribution to our understanding of the OSCE, but in and of itself it does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the "sneaking-up" of the institutionalisation and even the success of the CSCE / OSCE.
What is quite clear, if nothing else, is that a great deal more work needs to be
done to determine how the OSCE will have to change in future to continue to play an
important role in European security as the only organisation which encompasses Russia,
Europe and North America in a single structure reflecting a common concern for security
and which contributes towards that security.
Appendix 1

Deutsch’s Essential Conditions for Security Communities

Deutsch cites the following nine essential conditions for an amalgamated security community in Section C, 6 of Political Community and North Atlantic Area:

1. Mutual compatibility of main values;
2. A distinctive way of life;
3. Expectations of stronger economic ties or gains;
4. A marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some participating units;
5. Superior economic growth on the part of at least some participating units;
6. Unbroken links of social communication, both geographically between territories and sociologically between different social strata;
7. A broadening of the political elite;
8. Mobility of persons, at least among the politically relevant strata; and
9. A multiplicity of ranges of communications and transactions.

A further three conditions may be essential according to Deutsch:

1. A compensation of flows of communications and transactions;
2. A not too infrequent interchange of group roles; and
3. Considerable mutual predictability of behaviour.
## Appendix II

**Signatories of the Helsinki Final Act**

### Original Signatories, August 1, 1975

1. Austria
2. Belgium
3. Bulgaria
4. Canada
5. Cyprus
6. Czechoslovakia
7. Denmark
8. Finland
9. France
10. The German Democratic Republic
11. The Federal Republic of Germany
12. Greece
13. Holy See
14. Hungary
15. Iceland
16. Ireland
17. Italy
18. Liechtenstein
19. Luxembourg
20. Malta
21. Monaco
22. Netherlands
23. Norway
24. Poland
25. Portugal
26. Romania
27. San Marino
28. Spain
29. Sweden
30. Switzerland
31. Turkey
32. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
33. United Kingdom
34. United States of America
35. Yugoslavia

### Recent Signatories

1. Albania - 19 June 1991
2. Andorra - 25 April 1996
3. Armenia - 30 January 1992
6. Bosnia and Herzegovina - 30 April 1992
7. Croatia - 24 March 1992
8. Estonia - 10 September 1991
12. Latvia - 10 September 1991
13. Lithuania - 10 September 1991
15. Slovenia - 24 March 1992
17. Turkmenistan - 30 January 1992
18. Ukraine - 30 January 1992

### Observer Status

1. Macedonia - 12 October 1995

Total: 55 (See notes I and II)

### Partners for Cooperation

1. Japan
2. Korea
3. Algeria
4. Egypt
5. Israel
6. Morocco
7. Tunisia

---

1 Since 1 January 1993, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic are separate signatories.

2 Since unification in 1990, Germany has a single representative.

3 The Russian Federation became the successor state of the USSR.

4 Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has been suspended since 8 July 1992.
Appendix III 262

**OSCE**

**STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS**

- **Secretary General**
  - Vienna

- **Permanent Council**
  - Regular body for political consultation and decision-making

- **Ministerial Council**
  - Meeting of OSCE Heads of Government

- **Senior Council**
  - Periodic high-level meeting of Political Directors and annual Economic Forum

- **Chairman-in-Office**
  - Poland (1998)
  - Trivika (Denmark, Poland, Norway)

- **OSCE Parliamentary Assembly**
  - Copenhagen

- **Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights**
  - Warsaw

- **OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media**
  - Vienna

- **Secretary General**
  - Vienna

- **High Commissioner on National Minorities**
  - The Hague

- **OSCE Secretariat**
  - Vienna

- **Line-issue Office in Central Asia**

- **Pregrus Office**

**OSCE Missions**

- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Croatia
- Estonia
- Georgia
- Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro
- Ukraine

**Other OSCE Field Activities**

- OSCE Presence in Albania
- OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya
- OSCE Assistance to the Peacekeeping Force on the Macedo
- The Facilitator Representative of the Ombudsman's Office for the Conduct of UN Peace

**High Level Planning Group**

**Planning Group**

**OSCE Assistance in Implementation of Bilateral Agreements**

- The OSCE Representative to the Eurasian Economic Community
- The OSCE Representative to the Presidential Committee on the Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

**OSCE RELATED BODIES**

- **Court of Conciliation and Arbitration**
  - Geneva

- **Joint Consultation Group**
  - Promotes implementation of CFE Treaty
  - Meets regularly in Vienna

- **Open Skies Consultative Commission**
  - Promotes implementation of Open Skies Treaty
  - Meets three times a year in Vienna

---

262 Source: http://www.osceprag.cz/inst/organix/organix.htm
Appendix IV

The OSCE and European Organizations

Source: http://www.osceprag.cz/info/facts/weborgs.htm
Bibliography

Primary Sources

_____. "Remarks by President Bill Clinton, French President Chirac, Russia President Yeltsin, and NATO Secretary General Solana at NATO/Russia Founding Act Ceremony." White House Press Release of May 27, 1997 via NATODATA@CC1.JULEUVEN.AC.BE (NATODATA LISTSERV).


HTTP://WWW.FSK.ETHZ.CH/OSZE/OSCE_E.HTM


OSCE. Documents concerning the ODIHR, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Parliamentary Assembly and the Presidency. April, 1996.

HTTP://WWW.FSK.ETHZ.CH/OSZE/OSCE_E.HTM.
OSCE. Fact Sheet. Secretariat, Department of the Chairman-in-Office Support. 1996.


Books


Haas, Ernst B. "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process" in


**Monographs**

British Information Services, Foreign and Commonwealth Offices. Background Brief.


NATODATA@CC1.Kuleuven.ac.be.


NATODATA ListServ. NATODATA@CC1.Kuleuven.ac.be.
NATODATA@CC1.Kuleuven.ac.be.


NATODATA@CC1.Kuleuven.ac.be.


Articles


