The Concept of the Security Regime: Theoretical Roots, and a
Case Study using the
Treaty of Brussels, 1948.

by

BEN WILLIAM ANGELO LOMBARDI

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- my Parents.

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PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the efficacy
of explaining the Treaty of Brussels as an example of what
the literature has termed the international security regime.
Utilising a modified mtructuralist interpretation of the re-
gime model, the research aims to determine whether or not
this type of political analysis is a worthwhile undertaking
in the study of international security affairs.   In so do-
ing, the thesis examines the viability of the concept of the
security regime with reference to the Treaty of Brussels.
By means of historical analysis it endeavours to determine
if that pact can legitimately be considered to have repre-
sented a model of a security regime at the time of its cre-
ation.   The research attempts to explain the theoretical
aspects of the regime model and, at the same time, attempts
to investigate its applicability in a given historical peri-
od.

The organisation of the thesis is based on a division of
the research area into seven separate chapters.

The initial chapter comprises basic introductory materi-
al; it attempts to explain the political environment which
is usually termed the international system.   This chapter
examines the environment within which sovereign States act

according to the implicit rules of that arena. Generally termed the traditional paradigm, concepts such as international anarchy, sovereignty, and self-help are introduced. In explaining this environment the Hobbesian model of the international system is discussed and contrasted with the less commonly employed Lockean model of the state of nature. The value of the Lockean model flows from the inclusion of a "law of nature" in the state of nature. Although natural law is rejected as inappropriate, the tradition of thought that philosophical outlook generated is entirely applicable to a study of State interaction. In rejecting the Hobbesian model it is the author's contention that the accuracy of the Lockean model is aided by the concept of ethos which is directly linked to a particular political context. The means of determining this ethos lies in the application of systems theory, Hedley Bull's concept of order in an international society,[1] and Friederich Kratochwil's perception of a "public interest" among States.[2] To that extent, the discussion in Chapter One is theoretical and constitutes a set of assumptions on the part of the author.

Chapter Two introduces the model of the security regime. As with the Lockean model in general, the concept of the international regime attacks the exclusivity of analyses that

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[1] Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society., London, MacMillan, 1977., p.10.

[2] Friederich Kratchowil, "On the Notion of 'Interest' in International Relations" in World Politics., Vol.36, No.1, Winter 1982., pp.1-30.

assume States only practice <u>Realpolitik</u>. Employment of the regime model means a blending of the "power politics" approach with other conceptual paradigms.

The theory adopted for study, which is best described by the term "modified structuralism",[3] can be understood as a rational synthesis of many ideas. An effort is made to address the modified structuralist perspective of the international regime by means of a dissection of the theory into its component parts. In undertaking this investigation one's reference works include the writings of Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Stephen Krasner, John Ruggie, and to a lesser extent, Robert Jervis. These academics do not often agree on specifics, save on terminology, but running through all their works is a common understanding of the theoretical base of international regimes.

The theoretical base, denoted by the label of "modified structuralism", represents a State-centric approach to international regimes. In the study of international relations, structural realism is usually meant to refer to the restrictions placed on either policy options or actions which are directly attributable to the structure of a particular international system. According to Kenneth Waltz

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[3] The term "modified structuralism" emerges in the literature through an article by Stephen D. Krasner. See "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences; Regimes as Intervening Variables" in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., <u>International Regimes</u>., Ithica, New York, Cornell University Press, 1983., pp.1-22.

the structure of a system is determined by three basic factors; the ordering principle, the types of units involved and their functions, and the systemic distribution of capabilities.[4] In the context of modified structuralism it is implied that, contrary to structural realism, the international system may not precisely reflect its actual or existing structure. Instead roles for intersubjective values and of an international society, as suggested by Hugo Grotius and later by Hedley Bull, may perform valuable functions. International agreements, such as regimes, are often able to institutionalise relationships that would otherwise be unlikely if not impossible. modified structuralism is therefore a bifurcated approach to the field. First it conceives of international regimes as being representative of the structure of the system, as it is defined by Kenneth Waltz and Raymond Aron. Second, it supports the supposition that there exists certain intersubjective values held in common by a self-conscious grouping of States. These values serve to influence, and make reasonably predictable, those States' actions in prescribed issue-areas.

Chapter Two also examines the more specific application of the regime concept to the issue of international security. In order to accomplish this task a definition of security as the protection of a State's already-acquired values is offered: these values may include wealth, military power,

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[4] See Kenneth L. Waltz, Theory of International Politics., New York, Random House, 1979., pp.88-99.

or even culture and social outlook. Additionally, the con-
cept of security is then examined with regard to the tradi-
tional devices employed,   and described by the prevalent
views expressed in the scholarly literature, by States in
their confrontation with threat however it manifests itself.

Security regimes most closely resemble complex collective
security organisations, however the relationship between
them and Karl Deutsch's security community is almost non-ex-
istent.[5] The difference between the two seems to lie in
Bull's conception of the international society; a group of
States that are conscious of sharing interests and values,
and who, therefore, strive to create and maintain common in-
stitutions.   In other words, there is a distinct "social
purpose" behind security regimes which is totally absent
from Deutsch's security community.   Nevertheless, as this
section asserts, the nature of the self-help system makes
the acquisition and maintenance of the "common good" very
difficult for States.

Chapter Three describes and discusses the Treaty of Brus-
sels (1948) as an example of the security regime model.   It
examines the actual text of the treaty in an effort to de-
termine the extent to which it meets the agreed criteria to
be deemed an appropriate example of a security regime.   It
is the opinion of the author that a reading of the Treaty of

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[5] Karl Deutsch,   Political Community in the North Atlantic
   Area., Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press,
   1957.

<u>Brussels</u> does indeed seem to provide supporting evidence of the existence of a security regime.

Chapters Four through Six constitute a detailed examination of the historical background to the signatory States' national security policies prior to the final drafting of the <u>Treaty</u> <u>of</u> <u>Brussels</u>. There is one chapter each for the British, French, and the Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg) policies. These chapters address the particular political milieu from which each State's perception of its national security interests, and hence threats, were derived. The examination of the national policies for the period 1944-1948 terminates with the signing of the <u>Treaty</u> <u>of</u> <u>Brussels</u> on March 17, 1948.

Directly addressing the conclusions of Chapter Three these chapters are based on the author's opinion that the mere existence of a treaty, or any other type of political agreement embodying the four generally accepted regime criteria,[6] does not, nor can it, presuppose the existence of an international regime. It is quite obvious that the national policy aims of the member-States must closely match, or at least resemble, the principles contained within and expressed by a particular international regime. An examination of the roots of the five security policies is essential

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[6] "International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area." See Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences; Regimes as intervening variables", p.1

to determine if the Brussels Pact emerged from commonly held ideals and goals, or whether it was created to satisfy several different national objectives.

False interpretations can be read into a document, such as the Treaty of Brussels, especially as events recede into the past. This study hopes to avoid an inaccurate rendering of history and, in that sense, is very period conscious. The effort being made is to review the political and diplomatic foundations of this organisation at the time of its creation to see if it would be academically justified to envisage the Brussels Pact as a security regime.

Chapter Seven will constitute the conclusion of the work. Its purpose is to state the results produced by the testing of the author's hypothesis that the Brussels Pact represented a security regime when it was created in 1948. This is essentially a drawing together of the research findings of Chapters Two through Five. However, in addition to summarising the findings of this research, this chapter attempts to extrapolate from the conclusions and draw inferences which will reflect on the overall viability of modified structuralism as it relates to International Relations theory.

It should be noted that this research does not make an effort to determine, or to examine, if the Brussels Treaty ever actually functioned as a security regime. A study of

that nature must be far more comprehensive and is clearly beyond the scope of this work. Therefore, although Chapter Two discusses the modified structuralist interpretation of the regime model, for the purposes of this thesis, the definition will have to be restricted to the mere presence of its four basic contituent parts; principles, norms, rules of action, and decision making procedures.

The _Treaty of Brussels_ (1948) is not often studied today. As an alliance, and as a political institution, it exists in the shadow of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) which was formed less than a year after the _Treaty of Brussels_ was signed. The reason for this overshadowing are likely twofold. First, there is the matter of membership; since its creation in January, 1949, NATO has had a larger membership than the Brussels Pact. In that sense, NATO has truly been the Western Alliance in the post-war era. However, it is likely that the principal cause for the "backseat role" assigned to the _Treaty of Brussels_, both politically and academically, is due to a second reason. Unlike the Brussels Pact, NATO has the United States as a signatory. In other words, it is NATO, alone, which is usually understood as having functioned as the vehicle for the maintenance of West European security. For most writers, studying the North Atlantic Alliance is perceived to be more efficacious simply because that organisation seems to have played a greater role in post-war European affairs. While this is no doubt an

historically accurate judgement, nevertheless it does a disservice to the role performed by the _Treaty of Brussels_. As the first post-1945 multilateral security pact in Europe, it deserves further study: both for what its formation reveals about that particular historical context, as well as how it, as a political institution, addressed the ever-present desire for international security.

CONTENTS

Chapter I

THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this introductory chapter is to integrate two conceptual variables that are usually deemed incompatible for the study of international relations. These two variables are the environmental definition of the international system as a state of nature and the belief that States may interact at a normative level. The traditional interpretation of the international system, based as it is on a Hobbesian state of nature, precludes the existence of common values other than survival itself, which could serve to guide States in the conduct of their foreign policies. The primary objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that an alternative model of the state of nature, such as is provided by John Locke's writings, definitely permits an analysis based on the premise that normative State interaction is a regular occurrence. A secondary objective is to provide a buttress to the theoretical legitimacy of the concept of the security regime which is discussed and deployed in succeeding chapters. Security regimes are founded upon an accented appreciation for the normative interaction of States; the regime model includes system-wide intersubjective elements

not normally considered relevant within a Hobbesian structure. To that extent this chapter is both an introduction to the general theoretical basis of the security regime and, a partial rejection of the "value-less" approach common to the literature and properly understood as Structuralism.

The chapter is organised into two sections. The first, addressing the concept of the state of nature, compares and contrasts the Hobbesian model with that proposed by John Locke. The second section is devoted to an examination of the concept of "ethos" and its relevancy in international relations. Beginning with a brief discussion of natural law, an effort is made to reveal the accuracy of a Lockean model of the international system. Under the rubric of natural law, Hedley Bull's "international society", and Friederich Kratochwil's "public interest", are particularly relevant to an understanding of an ethos among States. Working within the State-centric "traditional paradigm" this chapter seeks to provide the necessary theoretical backdrop to the thesis' study of the origins of the Treaty of Brussels.

1.2   THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AS A "STATE OF NATURE"

This first section is concerned with demonstrating that it is theoretically possible for intersubjective values to exist, and normative interaction among States to occur, in the international system. Such a possibility can exist if an alternative to the prevalent model, that is the Hobbesian

state of nature, is employed for the analysis of international relations. Therefore this section examines, and contrasts, the selected writings of two Seventeenth Century English political philosophers; Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704).[1] Although they were contemporaries, as well as countrymen, their conceptualisations of the state of nature are quite dissimilar. These two models are dissimilar in the manner by which States' values, interests, and obligations are perceived to operate, and are operated upon, by the international system. Both the Hobbesian and the Lockean models of the state of nature can be applied to the study of world politics. Admittedly, each provides an enhanced understanding of the international system. However, the modular limitations of the Hobbesian state of nature, through its wholesale rejection of systemic intersubjectivity leading to normative interaction, suggests that Locke's model is more accurate.

Among political scientists it is generally accepted that the international system is anarchical in nature. This quality of anarchy is induced by the absence of a universal sovereign, or authority, which would otherwise establish and enforce a common set of rules of interaction. The lack of a recognised system-wide authority means that the principal

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[1] See Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan. Markham, Ontario, Penguin, 1980. Also see John Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature. W. von Leyden, ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1954., and The Second Treatise of Government. Thomas P. Peardon, ed., Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1980.

international actors are States.[2] Therefore, by default, it is the sovereign State which possesses the ultimate systemic authority. National sovereignty of States, and its recognition by the other members of the State system, has been the fundamental ordering principle since the Peace of Wesphalia(1648).[3] While sovereignty accords the legal right to act as each State deems necessary, both in domestic as well as foreign policy, it also appears to exact a price in return for such freedoms. This price is paid in the form of varying degrees of insecurity. In the absence of a catholic authority, insecurity arises because sovereign States can rely only on themselves, or their devices, for protection and ultimately for their very perpetuation. Kenneth Waltz has termed this understanding of the international environment

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[2] Martin Wight wrote that the reliance on the conceptual framework provided by, and allowing for the existence of, the sovereign State serves to stifle academic discourse. He argued that speculation about international relations could not proceed in the same manner by which political theory generates debates about various aspects of civil society. (See Martin Wight, "Why is there no International Theory", in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations., Cambridge, Ma., Harvard University Press, 1966., pp.17-34..) Wight may indeed be correct in his statement of the implications of a State-centric approach to the study of international affairs. However, one could also argue that theoretical speculation at the international level is not at all comparable with that conducted at the level of civil society. To challenge the continued viability of the political units under scrutiny, which is inherent in Wight's analysis, does not happen in the many writings of classical political theory. Sovereign States, like Men, perform similar functions at their respective levels of political interaction. At each of those levels they are the principal political actors. According to Wight the "right to life" of the State should not remain unquestioned if an International Relations theory is to be generated. However, classical theorists

the "self-help system".   The sovereign nature of the State,

and the systemic implications of that principle, together

comprise the conceptual basis of any theorisation within the

parameters of the traditional paradigm.[4]

   Within the literature the traditional paradigm and all of

its subtleties is best represented by the analogy of the

"stag-hunt" as proposed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau;

> Assume that five men who have acquired a rudimen-
> tary ability to speak and to understand each other
> happen to come together at a time when all of them
> suffer from hunger.   The hunger of each will be
> satisfied by the fifth part of a stag,   so they
> "agree" to cooperate in a project to trap one.
> But also the hunger of any one of them will be
> satisfied by a hare, so,   as a hare comes within
> reach, one of them grabs it.   The defector obtains
> the means of satisfying his hunger but in doing so
> permits the stag to escape.   His immediate inter-
> est prevails over consideration for his fellows.[5]

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have always assumed the continuity of Mankind in their at-
tempts at devising a more just polity.

[3] The demise, or withering-away, of the State as the ulti-
mate arbiter in international affairs has been suggested
many times in the literature. The view that "growing" in-
terdependence and the advent of nuclear weapons have
struck at the bases, and legitimacy, of State power is
widespread, even if it is mistaken. The State remains the
primary actor in the international system for it is the
only political unit which is able - i.e. possesses legiti-
macy and capabilities - to decide on questions of war and
peace. States also retain their positions as the principal
actors because they, alone, determine the code of conduct
within which international relations occur. Economic ent-
winement and nuclear arsenals are not politically unimpor-
tant, however the impact of these relatively new factors
has only been to force States to be more prudent in their
diplomatic intercourse. For an informative, and succinct,
presentation of this conventional viewpoint, see Kal J.
Kolsti, "The Necrologists of International Relations", in
Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol.18, No.4, De-
cember 1985, pp.675-694.   Stanley Hoffmann also asserts
the primacy of the State in his article, "Reflections on

By way of an understatement, Waltz has noted that Rousseau's
"story is simple [but] the implications are tremendous." If
one equates Rousseau's "fellows" with sovereign States, each
hungering for security, then the analogy is a useful illus-
tration of the international system: in other words, the
"stag-hunt" is the everpresent security dilemma by another
name. For those whose research is conducted within the pa-
rameters of the traditional paradigm, Rousseau's analogy is
a focal point; it represents an understanding of world poli-
tics to be examined for historical accuracy or one to be
criticised as inadequate.

The environment within which the "stag-hunt" analogy op-
erates is usually understood to resemble most closely the

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the Nation-state in Western Europe Today", in the Journal
of Common Market Studies, Vol.21, Nos.1-2, September/De-
cember 1982, pp.21-38.

[4] The scientific concept of the paradigm defies a precise
definition. Much of the available literature on the sub-
ject are commentaries of Thomas S. Kuhn's seminal work on
paradigms; The Structure of Scientific Revolutions., Chi-
cage, University of Chicago Press, 1962. In her essay on
Kuhn's work, Margaret Masterman has suggested three gener-
al categories from which an understanding of paradigms can
be derived: these are, a method of limited analytical vi-
sion with which to perceive "reality", a set of scientific
habits for handling data and, construct paradigms which
act as metaphors for increasing explanatory power. (See
Margaret Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm" in Imre La-
katos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of
Knowledge., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970.,
pp.59-79.) The term "traditional paradigm" is borrowed
from Arend Lijphart's "The Structure of the Theoretical
Revolution in International Relations" in International
Studies Quarterly, Vol.18, No.1, March 1974, pp.41-74.

[5] Quoted in Kenneth N.Waltz, Man, the State and War., New

state of nature described by Hobbes.[6] In Hobbes' major work,

The Leviathan, the state of nature is postulated as the nat-

ural condition of Mankind unrestrained by any of the laws,

customs, and other moderating influences which are to be

found in any civil society. Stripped of those influences

Hobbes opined that Man was aggressive, greedy, proud, and

destructive. The most famous line in The Leviathan encapsu-

lated its author's feelings by asserting that life, bereft

of societal standards, would be "solitary, poor, nasty,

brutish, and short."[7] For Hobbes the state of nature was

nothing less than the existence of incessant conflict;

> Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men
> live without a common Power to keep them all in
> awe, they are in that condition which is called
> Warre; and such a warre, as is every man against
> every man. ... For as the nature of Foule weather,
> lyeth not in a shower or two of rain; but in an

York, Columbia University Press, 1959., pp.167-168.

[6] In applying the Hobbesian model to the study of interna-
tional relations certain adaptations have been made by an-
alysts. For example it is common place to ignore Hobbes's
description of the state of nature as one where there is
an equality of insecurity. (See Thomas Hobbes, op cit.,
p.183.) Clearly such a description does not reflect the
present international reality; Nicaragua does not threaten
the security of the United States to the same degree as
the reverse scenario. Likewise, one usually ignores
Hobbes' statement that there are no arts, culture or in-
dustry in his state of nature. (See ibid, p.186.) In his
critique of the Hobbesian model Hedley Bull addressed
these, and other, discrepancies. On the question of in-
dustrial sectors, he noted that State-based, and even mul-
tinational, industries exist in the international state of
nature. Were one to apply this model it would still be
necessary to account for the annual expenditures of vast
sums of money, by States, for the creation and maintenance
of national armed forces to protect those very industries
from plunder. (See Hedley Bull, "Society and Anarchy in
International Relations" in Herbert Butterfield and Martin
Wight, eds., op cit., pp.35-50.) The application, in

inclination thereto of many days together: So the
nature of War, consisteth not in actual fighting:
but in the known disposition thereto, during all
the time there is no assurance to the contrary.[8]

The application of the Hobbesian state of nature to anal-

yses of the international system stem from the apparent co-

incidence of the aforesaid conceptual imagery with existing,

and indeed historical, realities. The Hobbesian model sug-

gests that States are engaged in a never-ending quest for

security. International conflict, while not always involv-

ing the violent clash of armed force, is nonetheless ev-

erpresent;

[T]hough there had never been anytime wherein par-
ticular men were in a condition of warre one
against another; yet in all times, Kings, and Per-
sons of Soveraigne authority, because of their In-
terdependency, are in continuall jealousies, and
in the state and posture of Gladiators; having

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toto, of the Hobbesian model without taking these analyt-
ical liberties would generate several inconsistencies be-
tween it and reality. Hobbes based his philosophical state
of nature upon a retrospective examination of civil socie-
ty. In Leviathan Hobbes wrote "it may peradventure be
thought, that there was never such a time, nor condition
of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally
so". He does suggest that the "savage peoples in many
places of America" may live in an environment akin to a
state of nature. (See Thomas Hobbes, op cit., p.187.)
For Hobbes, therefore, the state of nature is not an in-
terpretation of history. In creating his model of Man's
natural state, he removed all of the moderating influences
of Government and society from Mankind, endowed as Man is
with passions and vices, and arrived at the very logical
state of nature. (See ibid, and also C.B.Macpherson, The
Theory of Possessive Individualism., Toronto, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1962. pp.17-18.) However, International
Relations does not require the capability to make this
type of retrospective examination. As an explanatory model
the state of nature must be compatible with an interpreta-
tion of the historical record of inter-State relations,
and possess some measure of accuracy in forecasting future
actions by States in the world arena. Unfortunately, as

> their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on
> one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and
> Guns upon the frontiers of their Kingdomes; and
> continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a
> posture of War.[9]

In this type of environment fear naturally dominates and the rational action of States will be consistently characterised by selfishness, egoism, and an intense mutual suspicion. Stanley Hoffmann has written that the international system mirrors, in many aspects, the incessant state of war which Hobbes described. Risk is understood to be both constant and pervasive.[10] As in the analogy of the "stag-hunt", actions taken by a State to eliminate risk in one area of concern could, paradoxically, serve to generate equal or greater hazard in another area.[11] Robert Jervis has described both the operations of the security dilemma, and how, in a system of sovereign States, this dilemma must come to dominate the

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> with any model, there is a certain friction between it and
> the reality it purports to represent; no model is exact,
> for if it were it would be reality itself. The result of
> these qualifications is that the Hobbesian model must re-
> ally only account for the natural dynamics of world poli-
> tics which were, for Hobbes' analysis, an unnecessary fea-
> ture.

[7] Thomas Hobbes, op cit., p.186.

[8] ibid, pp.185-186

[9] ibid, pp.186-188.

[10] See Stanley Hoffmann, State of War. New York, Praeger, 1963.

[11] In the same vein, one is reminded of Thucydides' memora-
ble line that "what made war inevitable was the growth of
Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta."
See Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Rex Warner, ed.,
Middlesex, Penguin, 1954., p.49.

foreign policy formulations of those States. Utilising a wide range of historical examples, Jervis has noted that without the guarantee of a commonly recognised authority, the system seems to propagate a belief structure which stresses that misplaced trusts could exact an intolerable political price. As a result, distrust becomes a system-wide institution;

> Because there are no institutions or authorities that can make and enforce international laws, the policies of cooperation that will bring mutual rewards if others cooperate may bring disaster if they do not. Because States are aware of this, anarchy encourages behaviour that leaves all concerned worse off than they could be, even in the extreme case in which all States would like to freeze the status quo. This is true of the men in Rousseau's "Stag Hunt."[12]

Within the Hobbesian state of nature it is completely unrealistic to assume that States are motivated by anything other than necessity.[13] In explaining why Germany had to sign the extremely harsh Treaty of Versailles (1919), the Reichsminister for Finance, Mathias Erzberger, underscored

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[12] Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", in World Politics, Vol.30, No.2, January 1978., pp.167.

[13] In his controversial work, The Origins of the Second World War, A.J.P.Taylor (p.14) supports this interpretation; "...in British eyes, their government only wanted to keep things quiet, while Hitler wanted to stir them up. To the Germans, the status quo was not peace, but a slave treaty. It all depends on the point of view. The victor Powers wanted to keep the fruits of victory with some modifications, though they did it ineffectively. The vanquished Power wanted to undo its defeat. This latter ambition, whether "aggressive" or not, was not peculiar to Hitler." As Taylor correctly points out, the self-help system does not promote one State's feelings of necessity in a way which readily allows empathy to arise in foreign quarters.

the fundamental role of necessity in the decision-making
process;

> Who of us, if bound hand and foot and ordered at
> the point of a revolver to sign an agreement to
> fly to the moon in forty-eight hours, would refuse
> our signature? It is exactly the same with the
> peace treaty. When one signs under duress there is
> no question of sincerity.[14]

National interests, as defined by each State individual-
ly, are each State's paramount concern. In the Hobbesian
system a State's continued survival can only be assured
through a calculated maintenance of its own national inter-
ests:

> He [the prince] must not mind incurring the scan-
> dal of those vices, without which it would be dif-
> ficult to save the state, for if one considers
> well, it will be found that some things which seem
> virtues would, if followed, lead to one's ruin,
> and some others which appear vices result in one's
> greater security and well-being.[15]

The arch-nationalist German historian, Heinrich von
Treitschke, once wrote in explaining State sovereignty that
a "defenceless state may still be termed a kingdom...[but]
in point of fact such a country no longer ranks as a
state."[16] Since sovereignty is every State's primary nation-
al interest, it is far too precious a tangible asset to be

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[14] Quoted in Sir John Wheeler-Bennet, Nemesis of Power, The
German Army in Politics, 1918-1945., Toronto, MacMillan,
1967., pp.50-51.

[15] Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince. New York, The Modern
Library, 1950., p.57.

[16] Quoted in Christopher Brewin, "Sovereignty" in The Commu-
nity of States., ed. James Mayall, Boston, Allen and Un-
win, 1982., p.43.

kept viable only through the actions of another. In the "stag hunt" the decision to defect from the group venture, grab the hare, and by doing so guarantee himself sustenance, while denying it to others, was a rational decision on the part of the defector. To do otherwise required the would-be defector to exhibit unwarranted faith that none of the other "fellows" would grab the hare, and thereby sentence him to starvation. Not to defect would have been especially irrational if he knew of similar events happening in the past. Likewise, in the self-help environment of world politics, it is irrational for a State to place unreservedly the guarantee of its sovereignty in the hands of another selfish State. As Machiavelli wrote;

> [N]o prince is secure without his own troops, on
> the contrary, he is entirely dependent on fortune,
> having no trustworthy means of defence in time of
> trouble.[17]

The ancient Romans with their attitude of _si vis pacem para bellum_ would not have disagreed with the application of Hobbes' model to the international arena.

The writings of Machiavelli, like Von Treitschke, absolve States of the moral necessity for policies leading to systemic normativism. The Florentine argued that to pursue one's interests, and thus make one's country more secure, was a laudatory action;

> The desire to acquire possessions is a very natu-
> ral and ordinary thing, and when those men do it
> who can do so successfully, they are always

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[17] Niccolo Machiavelli, _op cit._, p.52.

praised and not blamed...[18].

Machiavelli's view is entirely consistent with the <u>raison d'etat</u> school of politics. The State's first "Law of Motion" must be to administer to its own interests, its individual structure, and its characteristic way of life. For Friederich Meinecke, the great student of <u>raison d'etat</u>, as for Machiavelli and Von Treitschke, there is a separation of what the system ought to be from how it is actually perceived;

> The "intelligence" of the State consists in arriving at a proper understanding to decide the principles which are to guide its behaviour. These principles are always bound to be at the same time both individual and general, both constant and changeable. They will change subtly as alterations take place in the State itself and in its environment. But they must also tally with what is lasting in the structure of the individual State, as well as with that which is permanent in the laws governing the life of all States. Thus from the realm of what is and what will be, there constantly emerges, through the medium of understanding, a notion of what ought to be and what must be. The statesman <u>must</u>, if he is convinced of the accuracy of his understanding of the situation, act in accordance with it in order to reach his goal.[19]

It would, however, be incorrect to assume that the Hobbesian model excludes international cooperation. By a strict interpretation of Von Treitschke there are perhaps, today, only two States capable of defending themselves; that is the Superpowers. Against each's individual might all other ex-

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[18] <u>ibid</u>, p.13.

[19] Friederich Meinecke, <u>Machiavellianism, The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and its Place in Modern History</u>., New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962., p.1.

isting polities are quite defenceless. Some, like Von Treitschke, might argue that given their defence capabilities there is no need for either the United States or the Soviet Union to cooperate with other members of the international system. Yet the two Superpowers are presently members of military alliances in which their membership might be assumed to be largely self-serving.

Raymond Aron has identified Von Treitschke as an idealist of power politics.[20] Von Treitschke's views reflect a Hegelian interpretation as to role of the State. As such, that German writer represents the most extreme position possible within the Hobbesian _state of nature_. Indeed, because of its Hegelian roots, it almost becomes morally requisite for a State to pursue ambitious, and aggressive, objectives to the detriment of other, less-conflictual policy options. Few historical examples exist to support such a lop-sided interpretation of State interaction. To rely solely on Von Treitschke's imagery would be to create a "straw-man" of little analytical value.

Hobbes clearly meant, when he wrote "or by confederacy with others",[21] that his model should not preclude a restricted degree of inter-State cooperation. In the _state of_

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[20] See Raymond Aron, _Peace and War._, Malabar, Florida, Krieger, 1981., pp.585-591. See also H.W.C.Davis, _The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke._, London, Constable and Company Ltd., 1914.

[21] Thomas Hobbes, _op cit._, p.183.

<u>nature</u> the principal actors are responsible for the administration of their interests, by whatever means; this cannot exclude diplomatic undertakings to which all States may aspire. A careful reading of the full implications of Rousseau's analogy seems to suggest that cooperation can occur, albeit limited and permeated by apprehension; for despite the defection there was initially an agreement to hunt the stag together. A.J.P. Taylor's work on the Munich Agreement(1938) demonstrates that Rousseau's analogy is quite applicable to the modern world;

> When the policy of Munich failed, everyone announced that he had expected it to fail; and the participants not only accused the others of cheating, but boasted that they had been cheating themselves. In fact, no one was as clear-sighted as he later claimed to have been; and the four men of Munich were all in their different ways sincere, though each had reserves which he concealed from the others.[22]

Hobbes also recognised this. Given the inherent selfishness of States in the international arena, both cooperation and obligation must, and are perceived to be based only on self-interest;

> From this equality of ability arises equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies.[23]

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[22] A.J.P.Taylor, <u>The Origins of the Second World War.</u>, pp.232-233.

[23] Thomas Hobbes, <u>op cit.</u>, p.185.

Since self-interest reigns, the Hobbesian state of nature
dictates an interpretation which fails to allow a role for
supranational normative elements;

> To this warre of every man against every man, this
> also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust.
> The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injus-
> tice have there no place.[24]

The belief that States, like people, are "self-interested,
optimizing actors who define morality in terms of what is
best for themselves",[25] is perhaps Hobbes' most important
contribution to political thought, and the most valuable
aspect of his state of nature. Though his work was predated
by almost a century by that of Machiavelli, the writings of
that Sixteenth Century diplomat support those of the Seven-
teenth Century philosopher;

> A Prince being thus obliged to know well how to
> act as a beast must imitate the fox and the lion,
> for the lion cannot protect himself from traps,
> and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One
> must therefore be a fox to recognise traps, and a
> lion to frighten wolves. Those that wish to be
> only lions do not understand this. Therefore a
> prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by do-
> ing so it would be against his interest. .... If
> men were all good, this precept would not be a
> good one; but as they are bad and would not ob-
> serve their faith with you, so you are not bound
> to keep faith with them.[26]

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[24] ibid, p.188.

[25] Ronald J.Terchek, "Conflict and Coalitions: The Hobbesian
Foundations of Formal Theory", in Political Science Re-
view, Vol.23, Nos.1-2, January-June 1984., p.1.

[26] Niccolo Machiavelli, op cit., p.64.

In other words, States are limited only by what they, alone, perceive to be incorrect. Even then, actions "beyond the Pale" may be considered acceptable if they are serving to realise a State-justifiable end. Others may judge but the assumption that similar moral imperatives motivate, constrain, or should even do so, would be incompatible with Hobbes. Action is based only on self-interest. As there is no universal set of values, there is neither a reason, nor a need, to assume one's own values are indeed morally correct or binding upon others.[27]

Machiavelli went even further than Hobbes: he was firmly of the opinion that Christian values, which honoured humility and modesty, were dangerous for State leaders to follow. For if a leader was fundamentally a "good" man, there was no systemic guarantee that other leaders, including his country's opponents would be of the same moral persuasion. Therefore Machiavelli believed it was necessary to instruct these political actors as to the method of divesting themselves of any "spiritual harness" imposed by their values.[28] The political doctrine of _raison d'etat_ answers the needs of

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[27] Or, and just as important, that other's values are binding upon you. Hobbes wrote, in this regard, that "these words of good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that uses them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves." See Thomas Hobbes, _op cit._, p.120.

[28] See Friederich Meinecke, _op cit._, pp.25-48. See also J. W. Allen, _The History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century_. London, Methuen, 1928., pp.458-460.

Machiavelli's philosophy by providing the means of not doing
"good" without being immoral.   Conversely,   as there is no
expectation that other States,   in the same anarchic system,
will comply with any set of proffered values,   to do so vol-
untarily is to expose one's State to the potential of unnec-
essary injury,   and even death.[29] As Hobbes correctly noted,
the only law of nature in a value-free environment is sur-
vival,   and not to exert oneself in an effort to survive is
itself an immoral act.[30]

There is another equally important reason for the exclu-
sion of normative factors from the Hobbesian state of na-
ture.   This interpretation is closer to that extreme posi-
tion taken by Von Treitschke and other Nineteenth Century
nationalist historians.   It also serves effectively to un-

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[29] Hobbes envisaged the state of nature as an all-out life
and death struggle without any rules save that of surviv-
al of the fittest.   In The Leviathan, Hobbes wrote "[f]or
as long as every man holdeth this Right, of doing any-
thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of
Warre.   But if other men will not lay down their Right,
as well as he; then there is no Reason for any one, to
devest himselfe of his: For that were to expose himselfe
to Prey...". See Thomas Hobbes, op cit., p.190.

[30] The notion that it is wrong to render oneself or one's
State insecure is contained within the Hobbesian model:
it is his first Law of Nature; "a precept, or generall
Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to
do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh
away the means of preserving the same." (See ibid,
p.189.)   It is important to note that it is exactly at
this point that the difference between the civil and the
international implications of Hobbes' thought are re-
vealed.   Man creates a civil society - modern States - in
order to escape from the state of nature where his vi-
ability is questionable and constantly threatened.
States, on the other hand, operate under the understand-
ing that it is only in the state of nature that their

dermine the notion of natural law upon which alternate models, such as the Lockean _state of nature_ are based.

In the Hobbesian conception, the emphasis attached to the State as the primary actor is drawn from Hobbes' belief in the individual "as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them." Hobbes applied Galileo's theories of physical motion to politics where they served to deny a common teleological force behind movement.[31] When denied this teleology, movement is self-willed and therefore must serve a purpose defined solely by self-interest.

The absence of a universal purpose behind political activities is an important aspect of the Hobbesian model. Hans Morgenthau classified this denial of a unifying teleology as one of his "Six Rules of Realism".[32] And even before Hobbes, Machiavelli addressed this point in his lengthy discussion of _fortuna_ and its role in politics;

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survival is guaranteed. The Sovereign created to protect the individual would destroy the "sovereign" State were a similar device to be deployed in the international system. See _ibid_, p.188.

[31] Hobbes wrote that "when a body is once in motion it moveth (unless something else hinder it) eternally ...". See Thomas Hobbes, _op cit._, _p.88_. On Galileo's impact on Hobbes' thought see C.B.MacPherson, _op cit._, p.78. For a discussion of Galileo's theory see Herbert Butterfield, The _Origins of Modern Science._, Toronto, Clarke Irwin, 1968., esp. Chapter One, "The Historical Importance of a Theory of Impetus".

[32] Hans J. Morgenthau, _Politics Among Nations_, 4th edition., New York, Alfred Knopf, 1967., pp.10-12.

> I would point out how one sees a certain prince
> today fortunate and tomorrow ruined, without see-
> ing that he has changed in character ... two men,
> acting differently, attain the same effect, and of
> two others acting in the same way, one attains his
> goal and not the other.[33]

The proprietary nature of the State, understood as the only legitimate holder of sovereignty, means that it is actuated by calculations leading to its own advantage. To do otherwise is to oppose what the theoretical basis of Hobbes' model sees as natural, if not moral. Any qualification of sovereignty, as expressed by treaties et al., is a calculated exchange undertaken to preserve or increase this property. The medieval notion of Christendom, that there existed an international society possessing common values, and existing to serve an end from which all will benefit, is categorically rejected. In sum, politics in the state of nature is atomistic in structure and simply "consists of relations between proprietors."[34] In the state of nature Hobbes argued that man does not, nor need he, base his assumed obligations on anything other than self-interest. Thucydides records the Athenians, in their response to Sparta prior to the outbreak of war, as expressing astonishment that policy would be guided by anything other than self-interest:[35]

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[33] Niccolo Machiavelli, op cit., p.92.

[34] C.B. Macpherson, op cit., pp.1-4.

[35] "The Spartans voted that the treaty had been broken and that war should be declared not so much because they were influenced by the speeches of their allies as because they were afraid of the further growth of Athenian power." See Thucydides, op cit., p.81.

> [W]e have done nothing extraordinary, nothing con-
> trary to human nature in accepting an empire when
> it was offered to us and then in refusing to give
> it up. Three very powerful motives prevent us from
> doing so - security, honour, and self-interest.
> And we were not the first to act in this way. Far
> from it. It has always been a rule that the weak
> should be subject to the strong.[36]

In the Hobbesian conception of the international system, sovereignty precludes a hierarchy of common values and, therefore, the only objective that can be pursued is surviv-al. To the extent that this end can be effectively real-ised, States do so through the possession and continued maintenance of their sovereignty. Although the state of nature was, for Hobbes, only an example of theoretical inter-polation, there are many who would agree with Taylor when he wrote that while "individuals have never lived in this state of nature, the Great Powers of Europe have always done so."[37]

It is quite true to state that Hobbes' analysis is an im-portant model of the structural constraints acting upon States in the international system. However the absence of commonly held beliefs and values is the principal weakness of the Hobbesian model in its application to the interna-tional system. As a result there are many writers over the centuries who have taken issue either with Hobbes' work spe-

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[36] ibid, p.55.

[37] A.J.P. Taylor, Struggle For Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1954., p.xix.

cifically, or similar interpretations of the workings of world politics and practices therein. These critics include jurists such as Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Emmanuel de Vattel (1714-1767), as well as political theorists like John Locke; the similarity of their critiques is demonstrated by the interchangeableness of many of their main arguments. The alternative approach, proposed by Locke, postulates that even in a state of nature there can exist common understandings of acceptable objectives and forms of behaviour.

It should be noted at the outset that there are two points of agreement between the Lockean and Hobbesian models of the state of nature. The first accord, and perhaps the most obvious, is that Locke agreed with the conception of the state of nature as one of "perfect freedom to order their [men's] actions and dispose of their possessions as they think fit...without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man."[38] Locke, like Hobbes, conceived of Man's natural state as one of "equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another."[39] The second point of agreement between Locke

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[38] John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, p.4.

[39] ibid. However, it should be noted, that just as with the Hobbesian model there is not an exact "fit" between the international system and Locke's model. Certain qualifications of Locke's state of nature are therefore required. One such qualification is to ignore his concept of equality. It does not exist except in a legal sense, reflected in such bodies as the United Nations General Assembly; though it is not applied throughout the United Nations, viz, the Security Council.

and Hobbes is that the former also envisaged the interna-
tional system as constituting a veritable <u>state</u> <u>of</u> <u>nature</u>.
As Richard Cox has written, Locke believed that "all common-
wealths are in a state of nature with one another":[40]

> It is often asked as a mighty objection, "Where
> are or ever were there any men in such a state of
> nature?" To which it may suffice as an answer at
> present that since all princes and rulers of inde-
> pendent governments all through the world are in a
> state of nature, it is plain the world never was,
> nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that
> state.[41]

In his description of the international system as a <u>state</u> <u>of</u>
<u>nature</u> Locke is far more expansive than Hobbes was in his
works. Locke is explicit in his opinion that treaties, or
other international agreements, do not affect the existence
of the <u>state</u> <u>of</u> <u>nature</u>. States remain in their natural
state until such time as a single political entity emerges
and the previously independent political actors voluntarily
subordinate themselves to it;

> [F]or it is not every compact that puts an end to
> the state of nature between men, but only this one
> of agreeing together mutually to enter into one
> community and make one body politic; other promis-
> es and compacts men may make one with another and
> yet still be in a state of nature.[42]

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[40] Richard H. Cox, <u>Locke</u> <u>on</u> <u>War</u> <u>and</u> <u>Peace</u>., p.136.

[41] John Locke, <u>The</u> <u>Second</u> <u>Treatise</u> <u>of</u> <u>Government</u>, p.10., De
Vattel also wrote that States lived in a <u>state</u> <u>of</u> <u>nature</u>.
See Emannuel de Vattel. <u>The</u> <u>Law</u> <u>of</u> <u>Nations</u>., translated
by Charles Fenwick, Washington, Carnegie Institution of
Washington, 1916., p.4.

[42] John Locke, <u>The</u> <u>Second</u> <u>Treatise</u> <u>of</u> <u>Government</u>., p.10.

However, these points are the sum total of the similarities between the two models of the state of nature.

The Lockean model is distinguished from that of Thomas Hobbes in three fundamental ways. First, Locke differentiated his concept of the state of nature from a separate environment which he termed the state of war. It will be recalled that Hobbes defined Man's natural circumstances as one of incessant conflict. However Locke asserted that violent hatreds were only found in the state of war which he described as,

> a state of enmity and destruction; and, therefore,
> declaring by word or action, not a passionate and
> hasty but a sedate, settled design upon another
> man's life, puts him in a state of war with him
> against whom he has declared such an intention,
> and so has exposed his life to the other's power
> to be taken away by him or anyone that joins with
> him in his defence and espouses his quarrel.[43]

Violent clashes occur in both of Locke's states of being. In the state of nature conflict is not everpresent and, when it does erupt, it is regulated and limited. At the same time the Lockean model asserts that premeditated violence in the state of war is not to be considered a legitimate form of political intercourse;

> [W]ant of a common judge with authority puts all
> men in a state of nature; force without right upon
> a man's person makes a state of war both where
> there is and is not a common judge.[44]

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[43] ibid, p.11.

[44] ibid, p.13.

In the state of nature sovereign States, like men, are the possessors of a natural liberty and are only subject to an external authority when consent is given to an hierarchical arrangement of political relations. Therefore for Locke, an attack on the basic freedoms provided for by the state of nature is the worst form of aggression, and must be interpreted in the same manner as one directed against viability itself. When such an attack occurs, Locke argues that a state of war has devolved.

The second divergence from Hobbes is that Locke explicitly defends the state of nature as a satisfactory form of political existence. Life in the state of nature is not seen as "solitary, nasty, brutish, and short". Unlike Hobbes who perceived a need for the elimination of Man's natural state through the creation of a "leviathan", for many of the same reasons as those held by world government advocates, Locke contributed an opposing view. In the Second Treatise he wrote, in the defence of the state of nature, that;

> [I]f government is to be the remedy of those evils
> which neccesarily follow from men's being judges
> in their own cases, and the state of nature is
> therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what
> kind of government that is, and how much better it
> is than the state of nature, where one man com-
> manding a multitude has the liberty to be judge in
> his own case.[45]

The "peace and security" which God had provided for Mankind in the state of nature meant that, for Locke, there was no

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[45] ibid, pp.9-10.

real incentive to abandon hastily that condition.[46]

The third difference present in the Lockean model is un-questionably the most important. For the purposes of this work the fundamental philosophical characteristic which dis-tinguishes the two models is Locke's belief that in the state of nature there exists a law of nature. It is this law of nature that accounts for the separation of the two states of being, and which serves to deny the Hobbesian im-perative for Man to quit his natural state;

> But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license; though men in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of na-ture has a law of nature which governs it.[47]

Locke's law of nature, which is understood "by the light planted in us by nature",[48] serves an important function in overcoming the atomism of a Hobbesian state of nature. Like Grotius, Locke saw Man as a social animal; that is one that desires a peaceful and ordered society.[49] Grotius wrote, in this regard, that "[the] maintenance of the social order ... which is consonant with human intelligence is the source of

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[46] ibid, p.7.

[47] ibid, p.5.

[48] John Locke, Essays on the Laws of Nature, p.111.

[49] Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, translated by Fran-cis W. Kelsey, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1925., p.11., See also John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, p.44.

law properly so called."[50] Because of the absence of a commonly recognised sovereign there cannot be a binding positive law in the state of nature described by Locke.[51] The concept of community to which Man naturally aspires, and which is present in the state of nature, cannot be based on a form of sociability but must instead rely on the "common source of power and right in the rules of the law of nature."[52] The concept of justice, which is nonexistent in the Hobbesian model, is made implicit by Locke due to the presence of natural law. The pursuit of the "good", which all Men desire, can only occur in a social setting in which the interactions are judged according to the law of nature. Locke's position is similar to that of Grotius who wrote that "men act justly only when they act in conformity with their natural attraction to and desire for society."[53]

In the Second Treatise the law of nature is expressed in three basic principles. Each individual has the right to self-defence; "he is bound to preserve himself and not to quit his station wilfully." That in their interaction in the state of nature, each individual should aim for peace and the promotion of harmony; "when his own preservation

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[50] Hugo Grotius, op cit., pp.12.

[51] Richard H. Cox. Locke on War and Peace, p.162.

[52] ibid, pp.137-139.

[53] Richard H. Cox. "Hugo Grotius" The History of Political Philosophy, eds. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, Chicago, Rand McNally and Co., 1963., p.345.

comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind." Lastly, that in the state of nature each individual is the just, and rightful executioner of the law of nature; "the executioner of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man's hands, whereby everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation."[54] None of the three precepts, which Locke affirms as comprising the law of nature, violate the structural conditions of the traditional, or Hobbesian, image of the international system. The basic theoretical underpinnings of the self-help system are retained.

While the basic tenets of the self-help system survive intact the transition from the Hobbesian to the Lockean model, the presence of a law of nature is a consequential aspect of the Lockean model. The introduction of moral concepts to behaviour in the state of nature means that political actors possess natural obligations. These obligations are considered natural because they are not voluntarily assumed but exist as duties or responsibilities by reason of one's nature alone; "truth and keeping of faith belongs to men as men, and not as members of society."[55] In his Essays on the Law of Nature, Locke wrote that the law of nature was inescapably binding;

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[54] John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government. p.6.

[55] ibid, p.10.

> [I]t is pretty clear that all the requisites of a
> law are found in natural law. For, in the first
> place, it is the decree of a superior will, where-
> in the formal cause of a law appears to consist
> ... . Secondly, it lays down what is and what is
> not to be done, which is the proper function of a
> law. Thirdly, it binds men, for it contains in
> itself all that is requisite to create an obliga-
> tion.[56]

Hypothesised normative interaction among States springs en-
tirely from this single factor. States, like men, are per-
ceived to possess obligations, not only to themselves in the
form of self-preservation but also, to abide by the dictates
of the law of nature as it pertains to their relations with
other "living" political entities. A century after Locke,
De Vattel elaborated on this concept when he wrote that the
rights of States, as political actors, are derived from
their natural, or "passive", obligations;

> [F]or since a right is nothing else but the power
> of doing what is morally possible, that is to say,
> what is good in itself and conformable to duty, it
> is clear that right is derived from duty, or pas-
> sive obligation, from the obligation of acting in
> this or that manner.[57]

And it is not only jurists, or philosophers, who have as-
serted the existence of a set of normative constraints act-
ing continually upon States. Edmund Burke, in his Letters on
a Regicide Peace, demonstrated a statesman's conviction that
a "non-positive law", very akin to the natural law proposed
by Locke, bound nations;

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[56] John Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature., pp.111-113.

[57] Emmanual De Vattel, op cit., p.3.

> The writers on public law have often called this
> aggregate of nations a Commonwealth. They had rea-
> .son. It is virtually one great state, having the
> same basis of general law, with some diversity of
> provincial customs and local establishments.[58]

1.3   NATURAL LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

For both Locke and Grotius, the equation of the existence of
a law of nature with the Divinity was essential to their
thinking; this was so, despite Grotius' comment that natural
law would exist with, or without, the presence of a deity.[59]
Locke compensated for the absence of a common source of po-
litical authority, in a system of sovereign States, by pos-
tulating a law of nature derived from the will of the Cre-
ator himself. It was a logical argument, for he took the one
Being universally recognised to be superior to any political
entity on Earth, and abstracted a code of conduct from the
teachings of Christianity. Nevertheless, while such an in-
terpretation may be acceptable at the domestic political
level, it is not compatible with the contemporary interna-
tional system. There is no supranational agency able to
guarantee a particular interpretation of natural law if it
is indeed founded upon God's will. The possibility that
such an agency could exist in the Western World dissipated
in the age of Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformation.
For the Lockean model to provide a viable understanding of

[58] Edmund Burke, The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke –
Volume Five. Boston, Little-Brown, 1901., p.318.

[59] Hugo Grotius, op cit., p.40.

international affairs, something other than a divinely ordained system of law must be its basis.

While the concept of natural law, alone, is inappropriate for an understanding of the international system, the intellectual tradition to which it gave rise is not. This tradition, while not conclusive, is a valuable base on which to build. The tradition is itself firmly founded upon a basic understanding of law as a social institution. The English philosopher, Richard Hooker (1553-1600), who Locke described as "judicious", defined law as "any rule or canon whereby actions are framed."[60] In a more legal sense, the purpose behind any law is "to give rights and create obligations."[61] Laws establish behavioural rules which their subjects are bound to follow whether those subjects are men or States:

> [J]ust as men could not live together in a society
> without laws and customs to regulate their actions
> so states could not have mutual intercourse with-
> out rules to regulate their conduct.[62]

The belief in the existence of a distinct set of rules to guide societal behaviour did not begin with either Locke or Grotius. In Ancient Greece, Aristotle believed that rules were absolutely essential for the continuity of any constructive political association. States, like men, require these same parameters which Locke saw as provided by the law

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[60] Quoted in T.J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law., Boston, D.C. Heath, 1910., p.10

[61] ibid, p.2.

[62] ibid, p.3.

of nature.   Without these basic laws of interaction, it is implied throughout the literature that the existence of States would be characterised by the qualities which are to be found in the Hobbesian state of nature.   A system based on State sovereignty naturally undermines both the possibility and the efficacy of an international positive legal system.   Nevertheless, and somewhat paradoxically, sovereign States require sets of rules to guide them in their relations with one another.   To a certain extent natural law theory fulfils this requirement. However among States, just as with religion, there is neither a commonly accepted definition of natural law, nor a common acceptance of natural legal principles.   With the single exception of survival, which Hobbes recognised, there are no other norms which can be assumed to exist in any voluntaristic code of conduct.

In De Cive Republica, Cicero (died 43 B.C.) stated that "true law is right reason which conforms to nature."[63] More recently, in The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart has argued that traditionally natural law has recognised a relationship similar to that stated by Cicero; the law of nature is a medium between morals and laws without specifying a particular relationship.[64] A general connection exists between morals and laws in much the same way an individual conducts his daily

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[63] Quoted in Paul Foiriers and Chaim Perelman, "Natural Law and Natural Rights", Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Volume Three Philip P.Wiener, ed., p.16.

[64] H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law.   Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961., p.181.

business with other members of society.[65] In other words there is no "tit for tat" structure present; for example, the reason one does not steal is not necessarily because of a fear of being caught. Hart believes that natural law represents a conjoining of moral imperatives and reasons without being the directly attributable cause for any subsequent response:

> [U]nless young children are fed and nurtured in certain ways within the family no system of laws or code of morals can be established, or that only those laws can function successfully which conform to a certain type. Connexions [sic] of this sort between natural conditions and systems of rules are not mediated by reasons; for they do not relate the existence of certain rules to the conscious aims or purpose of those whose rules they are. Being fed in infancy in a certain way may well be shown to be a necessary condition or even a cause of a population developing or maintaining a moral or legal code, but it is not a reason for doing so.[66]

Within a given polity one can surmise that a direct relationship does exist between natural law and domestic positive laws. For within a State's boundaries, natural law may function as a model for, and an inherent limit to, positive laws.[67] It is only through positive law that the dictums of natural law can be effectively transformed into a legal institution supported by the threat of State-initiated punitive sanctions in the event of violations. Again, however, the concept of sovereignty prevents any similar positive law

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[65] This connection is stated in St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans 2:14-15.

[66] H.L.A. Hart, op cit., pp.189-190.

[67] Paul Foiriers and Chaim Perelman, op cit., pp.23-24.

from emerging in the international system.

The concept of a natural law is linked with the belief in an ordered universe, much like that suggested by the Greek idea of "cosmos":

> [A]s soon as the idea becomes clear that there exist laws governing natural phenomena, there develops immediately the conception of a general principle and ubiquitous organiser of the initial chaos.[68]

The Second Treatise reveals that Locke was heavily influenced by the publication of Newton's De Principia which likewise suggested that the physical universe could be comprehended according to three Laws of Motion.[69] The effect of this epistemological structure underlying natural law is to turn Hobbes' thought "on its head". Hobbes believed that chaos and disorder were the norm in the state of nature whereas Locke believed that interaction between people, as with States, was normally ordered and contained a degree of predictability. The order in the universe was provided by God's natural laws as revealed by Man's inherent reason; epistemologically, Cicero and Locke are not that far apart.

A significant problem with natural law theory is that its adherents cannot brook an alternate system of natural laws; it is an intolerance fully grounded in logic. The writings of Locke, like Grotius, demonstrate that they perceived only

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[68] ibid, p.14.

[69] See also John Dunn's discussion of the influence Netwon's discoveries had on Locke; John Dunn, Locke., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984., p.81.

one such system;

> The promises and bargains for truck, etc., between
> the two men in a desert island...or between a
> Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are
> binding to them, though they are perfectly in a
> state of nature in reference to one another; for
> truth and keeping of faith belongs to men as men,
> and not as members of society.[70]

Locke's argument is not only logical but also philosophically sound. It is based on a strict application of the principle that "justice exists outside of Man." However Locke has failed to account for those who might not agree with his interpretation of what exactly natural law is saying. A study of history quickly reveals that conflicts of this sort have occurred, and that no individual society has willingly yielded to another group's interpretation of morality and the concommitant rules of daily contact. One's perception of what natural law stands for is inextricably linked to one's culturally-based outlook on life and its fundamental purpose as is understood in that society. Gaines Post has suggested that the only political milieu in which natural law was most complementary was the medieval period. In that peculiar world the shadow of Rome, _romitas_, and especially Roman unity, hung over all of Western Europe for nearly a thousand years giving rise to the idea of a single legitimate polity known as the "regnum".[71]

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[70] John Locke, _The Second Treatise of Government_, p.10.

[71] Gaines Post, "Medieval and Renaissance Ideas of Nation", _Dictionary of the History of Ideas_, Volume Three., pp.319-321.

To attempt to separate natural law from its socio-cultural environment dooms the concept from the very beginning. Many modern writers have noted that the concept of natural law is unknown outside of the general context of Western civilisation. And, even within that context, there are several different schools of natural law; Aristotelian, Thomist, and Protestant. As applied by Locke, natural law reflects, in a kuhnian sense, a society's paradigmatic outlook. It is the product of both the social environment and the socialisation processes at work in that society. Locke's writings demonstrate the extent to which he was culture-bound in his interpretation of politics. The world within which he lived - Seventeenth Century Europe - was in a state of political transition. Three major influences, in particular, bear on the discussion of natural law and the international system. These are the rediscovery of the Aristotelian notion of the organic polity, the Roman right to exclusivity of private property, and the emergence in the early Sixteenth Century of the Protestant interpretation of Scripture. These three factors are of no small import as they directly led to the emergence of State sovereignty as a legitimate, and hence legitimising, political concept. The reliance upon the law of nature is apparently an attempt to limit this emerging "independence" of Man. In this sense, one can envisage the Lockean model as employing a law of nature partly through a desperate fear of the onset of a Hobbesian environment; perhaps Locke saw Hobbes' analysis of

human nature as too accurate. This interpretation of Locke's use of natural law is buttressed within the text of his Second Treatise, when he wrote that,

> I shall endeavour to show how men might come to
> have a property in several parts of that which God
> gave to mankind in common, and that without any
> express compact of all the commoners.[72]

From his application of natural law, it can be deduced that Locke failed to abandon the basic Christian belief that Man had fallen and was therefore inherently "bad" requiring laws to restrain him. At the same time, Locke believed that Man had an innate potential to determine the ways in which God meant him to live; reason would unlock the secrets of Divine inspiration.[73] The result is that the Lockean model of the state of nature reflects the Seventeenth Century intellectual environment in that it is a combination of the passing Medieval mindset with the emerging Enlightment's view of Man.[74]

In general, natural law can be envisaged as an expression of political authority, or legitimacy, in a given society at a given time. In that sense, it functions in much the same way as does an ideology or a "Weltanschauung".[75] As a form

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[72] John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, p.17.

[73] See John Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature.

[74] "Locke's philosophy is grounded in Medieval thought, though he, like Descartes, turned away from it as much as possible." See Gordon Clapp, "John Locke", Encyclopedia of Philosophy, pp.487-502.

[75] See Willard A. Mullens, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science", American Political Science Review,

of political authority natural law represents a fusion of power with social purpose.[76] St. Thomas Aquinas understood this when he taught that "human law is a projection of natural law through the fulfilling of social needs."[77]

Utilising the example of the medieval world, the writings of John Randall support the interpretation that the effectiveness of natural law is determined by its compatibility with a given social structure. In the Middle Ages, man believed that the Earth had been created solely "that he might work out his life and destiny."[78] Everything around him, and all that he experienced, were seen as examples of God's will in motion. A noted medievalist, Walter Ullman has called this particular mindset "Christocentrism". The world was seen as a single sovereign community under God and guided by

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Vol.66, No.2, June 1972, pp.498-510. See also Ben Halpern, "'Myth' and 'Ideology' in Modern Usage", History and Theory, Vol.1, No.1, 1960., pp.129-149.

[76] John Ruggie has noted that the prevailing view in Political Science is to concentrate on the power aspects of authority and to ignore social purpose. However, power relations may determine the type of political regime, but it can not determine its purpose. (See John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order", International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner, Ithica, Cornell University Press, 1984., pp.382.) A modern example of the relationship between power and purpose can be found in the Interwar Period's fascination with the concept of collective security. See George W. Egerton, "Collective Security as Political Myth: Liberal Internationalism and the League of Nations in Politics and History", The International History Review, Vol.5, No.4, Novenmber 1983, pp.496-524.

[77] Quoted in Paul Foiriers and Chaim Perelman, op cit., p.19.

his law of nature which guaranteed the safety and welfare of everyone.[79] The implication was a true internationalisation of political power through the agencies of the Roman Catholic Church. The existence of a united Christendom - the res publica christiana - was believed despite, and alongside, the many fraticidal wars which would have suggested otherwise. Christocentrism allowed for a common body of law that was based on usages and customs rather than codified. Among the era's political leaders, all of whom were nominally Christian lords, there was no need for a separate supranational law such as Locke suggested exists in the state of nature: the sanctity of treaties, for example, was due to the presence of sworn oaths, the breaking of which ran counter to basic Christian beliefs to which they owed allegiance.[80] In other words, natural law was the transformation of the Christian faith and hierarchy into an international legal system.

Unlike the modern world. which is based on the equality of sovereign States, the medieval environment was solidly founded on a hierarchical ordering. This hierarchy ran from peasantry to Pope, through the various orders of angels to

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[78] John Randall, The Making of the Modern Mind, Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1940., pp.18-76. See also Walter Ullman, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, London, Methuen, 1966., pp.67-72.

[79] Gaines Post, op cit., p.319.

[80] Garret Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, London, Penguin Books, 1955., pp.16-19.

God himself;

> Society is a great hierarchy of ascending orders,
> in which every man has his God-appointed function
> and recognised obligations, and at the same time
> his rights and obligations.[81]

At the top of the terrestrial pyramid sat the Papacy.[82] One writer has described the greatest of medieval popes, Innocent III (1198-1216), as the "suzerain of all earthly kings and arbiter of Christendom."[83] As one of St.Peter's successers, and like all medieval popes, Innocent derived his legitimacy from the text of Scripture, especially Matthew 16: 18-19 which reads;

> And I say also unto thee, that thou art Peter, and
> upon this rock I will build my Church; and the
> gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I
> will unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven;
> and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be
> bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose
> on earth shall be loosed in heaven.[84]

The result of this hierarchy was that there could be no higher earthly Power in Christendom than the Papacy; and the Papacy was a final court of appeal for all because it was recognised as the highest earthly Power. Papal decrees, on

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[81] John Randall, op cit., p.58

[82] The title which all popes, past and present, hold as "Christ's Vicar on Earth" summed up the hierarchical position of those men who wore the papal tiara. See Sidney Painter and Brian Tierney, Western Europe in the Middle Ages, 300-1475., New York, Alfred A.Knopf, 1978., pp.321-347. See also Brian Tierney, The Middle Ages, Volume One: Sources of Medieval History., New York, Alfred A Knopf, 1978., pp.233-236.

[83] Garret Mattingly, op cit., p.19.

[84] See also Jeremiah 1:10 which reads "I have set thee over the nations and over the kingdoms."

basic political issues such as questions of succession, were treated as next to Scripture itself.

One quickly perceives that, because of this strict hierarchy, the medieval world was one of very precisely defined rights, obligations, and social relationships;

> [D]ependence of the lower rank upon its immediate superior rank, so however that all ranks and orders are eventually subjected to One Supreme Being, to God, whuich is the "principium unitatis".[85]

The world of medieval Catholicism experienced a complete unity of life combining Christian morals with Roman jusiprudence.[86] It was, in the words of Herbert Butterfield, an "amazing structure" which saw a "marriage of Christianity and the world...[which] produced a supra-national religious society."[87] As a result there was no room for any political concept like State sovereignty. The medieval Papacy was the only existent sovereign State, although to assign that title is to do so incorrectly. As Garret Mattingly observed;

> The fifteenth century was no more ready to accept the moral egoism and moral responsibility of the sovereign state than our society accepts the sacred egotism and moral irresponsibility of the sovereign individual.[88]

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[85] Walter Ullman, op cit., p.46.

[86] Garret Mattingly, op cit., p.22.

[87] Herbert Butterfield, "Christianity in History", in The Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Volume One., pp.373-412.

[88] Garret Mattingly, op cit., p.47.

Because views such as these were the norm in medieval socie-
ty, the holding of them was not an act of idealism. It was
intensely realistic for the same reasons that modern Man be-
lieves in the political sanctity of the sovereign State.

The manner in which these people interacted was deter-
mined by their mindset, or what one might address as the me-
dieval paradigm. Even the most powerful secular rulers were
forced to submit to the prevailing norms that were institu-
tionalised in this era. The classic example of Papal su-
premacy is Gregory VII's humbling of the German king, Henry
IV, at Canossa(1076). There is considerable historical evi-
dence to indicate that Henry IV did not willingly accept the
overlordship, or the legitimacy therein, of the Papacy. Nev-
ertheless, he was forced to submit for fear of punitive
sanctions such as excommunication or Papal interdiction.
The medieval world was eschatological in nature, there being
little separation between the lay world and that of the
clerics. The legitimacy of temporal political power, such
as Henry IV's, was derived from the proper exercise of that
power within the parameters established by the Christocen-
tric heirarchy.[89]

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[89] For a discusion of the implications of the "Investiture
Contest" between Henry IV and Gregory VII, see George Sa-
bine, A History of Political Theory., New York, Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1966., pp.231-242. For a history of
the origins of the dispute, see Sidney Painter and Brian
Tierney, op cit., pp.207-214.

There exist implicit, or "embedded", values in all polit-
ical institutions. They are pervasive, even if largely un-
noticed.[90] The political legitimacy of prevailing values is
likely to be challenged, or even altered, by the impact of
events or alternate ideas; ideas that can not be accommodat-
ed given the epistemic basis of existing social institu-
tions. This is exactly the point that Thomas Kuhn makes in
his discussion of paradigm shifts.[91] John Ruggie has noted
that the modern international economic order, which gradual-
ly emerged after the two world wars was a political response
to public demands that the State intervene to protect its
citizenry. The public efforts and sacrifices during wartime
demanded a form of recompense; in a sense, the legitimacy of
the welfare State is derived from the horrors experienced in
modern war. Whereas the legitimate economic role of the
State, prior to the first conflict, had been to stand aside
and allow the "hidden hand" to govern international trade,
the post-war environment demanded otherwise. The result was
economic chaos and the Great Depression. The liberal notion
that the Second World War was directly related to the in-
tense economic competition among the major trading States
resulted in the creation of the various international insti-
tutions which now allow States to be actively competitive in
a non-destructive manner. Ruggie hypothesises that it was a

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[90] John Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World
Polity: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis", World Politics,
Vol.35, No.2, 1982-83., pp.261-285.

[91] Thomas Kuhn, op cit., pp.52-91.

new understanding of the primary functions of the State, as the basic provider of security and welfare rather than protection alone, that legitimised its new role in the international economic order.[92] Ruggie's "embedded values" suggest States respond to a particular ethos generated by historical circumstance. This view rejects the notion of the law of nature as employed by Locke. In The Second Treatise, John Locke's writings suggest the existence of a single value system uniting all of Mankind, be they Swiss or North American Indians. Philosophers may argue that as human beings there is a basic code of conduct. As States, however, the Swiss Confederation and the Iroquois League could not have shared any such code.

The catholicity of natural law theory clearly creates analytical problems in its application to studies of the international system. However in his writings, Hedley Bull recognised the utility of natural law's intellectual tradition. As an empiricist, Bull approached the subject from the direction opposite to that taken by Locke. To a certain extent, one can assume that Locke and Grotius imposed a law of nature on the state of nature. In doing so, the two philosophers would simply have been meeting the imperatives of their own belief structures, and so do "good" for Mankind. This assumption can be confirmed no more clearly, or explicitly, than in the explanation Grotius offered for his compo-

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[92] John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change", pp.386-404.

sition of <u>De Jure Belli Ac Pacis</u>:

> Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack
> of restraint in relation to war, such as even bar-
> barous races should be ashamed of: I observed that
> men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at
> all, and that when arms have been taken up there
> is no longer any respect for law, divine or human;
> it is as if, in accordance with a general decree,
> frenzy had openly been let loose for the commit-
> ting of all crimes.[93]

Unlike Grotius, Bull examined the international system it-
self, and perceived certain regularities in the behaviour of
sovereign States. His book, <u>The Anarchical Society</u>, is an
attempt to offer an alternate interpretation of the Lockean
model of the <u>state of nature</u>. The international system is
understood to exhibit a certain degree of order, which Bull
defined as the "arrangement of social life such that it pro-
motes certain goals and values." The universal goals of
natural law theorists are categorically rejected because
Bull did not believe that a system of sovereign States and
myriad cultures would be able to see a law of nature as ei-
ther evident or binding. Bull argued that natural law is too
vague to be applied to international relations. This vague-
ness stemmed from the lack of clarity as to which political
actors natural law was to be applied. As the concept of nat-
ural law does not traditionally contain a developed idea of
the State, it is therefore uncertain whether it is States,
or men, who are subject to God's will. Therefore, according
to Bull, all that natural law can realistically provide is a

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[93] Hugo Grotius, <u>op cit</u>., p.20.

"useful insight into the idea of society.[94]

Bull, like Aristotle, believed that human behaviour adheres to certain rules of conduct. These rules allow for the realisation of collective political goals, and serve to remove the systemic uncertainty that one would find in a Hobbesian-type environment;

> One of the consequences of a situation in which elementary or primary goals of social existence are upheld is that regular patterns of state behaviour become known, are formulated as general laws, and afford a basis for expectations about future behaviour.[95]

This goal-achieving interaction occurs through the creation of the "international society", which is based on a normative understanding of the "system".

Unlike Bull, most of the literature is based on a structuralist interpretation of the concept of the system.[96] Perhaps the most prominent structuralist theoretician is Kenneth Waltz. Waltz envisages the system as the environment wherein States act as a conscious set of actors rather than

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[94] Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society., Toronto, MacMillan, 1985., pp.1-6.

[95] ibid, p.7. See also Hedley Bull, "The Twenty Years' Crisis Thirty Years On", International Journal, Vol.24, No.4, Autumn 1969., pp.625-638.

[96] See Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics; Structural Realism and Beyond", in Political Science, State of the Discipline, ed. Ada W. Finifter, Washington, The American Political Science Association, 1983., pp.503-540. See also W.G. Runciman, "What is Structuralism"., British Journal of Sociology., Vol.20, No.3, September 1969., pp.253-265., and Peter Caws, "Structuralism"., in the Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Volume Four., pp.322-330.

as a "mere collection".[97] For Waltz the international system possesses a Durkheimian structure which is composed of three primary attributes. Ruggie has suggested Waltz understands these attributes as distinct levels of analysis.[98] The most basic level is the systemic ordering principle which is realised by the nature of the system's fundamental actors; in the modern world these are sovereign States. The secondary level addresses the functions of those actors in the system. Lastly, the tertiary level is concerned with the distribution of capabilities - military and economic power - among the basic actors in any system. Waltz argues that State behaviour is determined, in the contemporary international system, by an understanding of the last level of structural analysis.

The difficulty with Waltz's approach is his rejection of the secondary level as relevant to the modern world. The secondary level of his structural analysis is perceived to be irrelevant because there is no perceptible difference, in functional terms, among sovereign States;

> [S]o long as anarchy endures, states remain like
> units. International structures vary only through
> a change of organising principle or, failing that,
> through variations in the capabilities of units.[99]

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[97] Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics., New York, Random House, 1979., p.40

[98] John Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity", pp.261-264.

[99] Kenneth Waltz, op cit., p.93.

Such an understanding fails to recognise the value-laden interaction of certain groupings of States in an atmosphere less-determined by calculations of power. Because Waltz utilises the idea of systems theory, and even attempts to refine it, his approach is basically Hobbesian. A Waltzian model could not understand Ruggie's argument about the international economic order, nor could it theoretically comprehend the political role of the medieval paradigm.

Less distant from Bull's understanding, is that of Martin Wight. In his work, entitled <u>Systems of States</u>, he identified several types of international systems. Wight's definition, simply stated, suggested that one could conceptualise a system as a group of States that, while nominally independent, are in regular contact with one another.[100] Although Wight, too, fails to recognise normative State interaction in his definition of system, his view agrees with that expressed by Oran Young. Like Waltz, and unlike Wight, Young is a structuralist. However Young's definition of system is a useful bridge between structuralism and normativism;

> [a system] embodies the idea of a group of objects or elements standing in some characteristic structural relationship to one another and interacting on the basis of certain characteristic processes.[101]

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[100] Martin Wight, <u>Systems of States</u>., Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977., p.15.

[101] Oran Young, <u>Systems of Political Science</u>., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1968., pp.21-29.

States "interacting on the basis of certain characteristic processes" is ambiguous enough to be accommodated within a "Bullian" understanding.

Bull differentiated the concepts of a system of States from a society of States. He defined a society as a self-conscious group of States who are aware of sharing common values and common interests; in other words, an understanding of a particular system's ethos. In his less popular and posthumously published writings, entitled Letters on a Regicide Peace, Edmund Burke demonstrated an understanding which resembles that of Hedley Bull;

> In the intercourse between nations we are apt to rely too much on the instrumental part, we lay too much weight upon the formality of treaties and compacts. ... Men are not tied to one another by papers and seals. They are led to associate by resemblances, by conformities, by sympathies. It is with nations as with individuals. Nothing is so strong as a tie of amity between nation and nation as correspondence in laws, customs, manners, and habits of life. They have more than the force of treaties in themselves. They are obligations written in the heart. They approximate men to men without their knowledge and sometimes against their intentions. The secret, unseen, but irrefragable bond of habitual intercourse holds them together, even when their perverse and litigious nature sets them to equivocate, scuffle, and fight about the terms of their written obligations.[102]

Bull might not have entirely agreed with Burke's eloquent analysis of States as servants of their sub-conscious. However Burke's perception of a community of States based on more than "scraps of paper" and slide-rule calculations of interest strongly aligns him with normative theorists such

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[102] Edmund Burke, op cit., pp.317-318.

as Hedley Bull.

Any society, even a society of States, possesses three principle objectives which are concerned with the State's survival as an actor; just as with natural law, the most basic desire any voluntary set of rules must meet is survival. Bull believed that the basic rules of an international society did likewise, interelated as they are. First, all members seek their own security through the reduction of risk and the enhancement of predictability in their foreign relations. As with Waltzian structuralism, the nature of the self-help system dictates this logical concern. Second, all members desire the other actors to respect their property and right to the possession of that property; in other words, respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial inviolability. Third, all members of an international society desire the exhibition of good faith on the part of the other members. The introduction of "trust", although limited, can be accomplished through the adherence of States to principles like _pacta_ _sunt_ _servanda_. It is only after the realisation of these three primary goals that additional behavioural norms may be generated by the society of States.[103]

The role of behavioural norms is, according to Bull, to bind States to one another by a set of commonly understood rules, which are perceived to be in the States' inter-

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[103] Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society., pp.18-19.

ests.[104] The realisation of an international society's
goals, or intersubjective values, flows from that system of
States adhering to the rules it has established for its mem-
bers.   The values the behavioural norms represent need not
be written on paper, in the form of treaties or accords. The
values do not even have to be publicly announced.   As Henry
Kissinger has noted, in a legimimate order obligations among
States are taken for granted and seldom discussed;   it is
only the revolutionary regime that publicises its values,
for it is only the differences of principles which separate
it from the existing system.[105] The Allied War Crimes Tribu-
nal at Nuremburg argued that there were standards of con-
duct, despite not being written or codified, which States
were obliged to follow as members of the international com-
munity. Such actions as genocide, or scientific experiments
on humans, could not be considered legitimate policies even
if undertaken with the assent of a sovereign State's govern-
ment.   To do so, as Hitler's regime did, is to violate an
existing ethos.   Of course, the Nazi crimes were an extreme
which occurs but infrequently in international affairs.
However, at certain times, States may find it useful not to
assist in the generation of international order by promoting
Bull's three basic objectives.   Revisionist States, such as
Hitler's Germany, have often proven unwilling to accept the

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104 ibid, pp.71-74.

105 Henry Kissinger, A World Restored., Boston, Houghton-
   Mifflin, 1957., pp.1-5.

existing rules because their leaders did not perceive those rules to be coincident with their country's national interests as they defined them.

Possessing a thorough knowledge of history, Bull employed the concept of the system as he defined it to buttress his understanding of the international society. He hypothesised that an essential precondition for a society was the logical existence of a system of States; the opposite, however, is not true.[106] The example he employed was that of Turkey (the Ottoman Empire before 1918) which, while a member of the system from the Fifteenth Century, was not a member of the society of States until the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). The example is an extremely appropriate one to choose. The reasons for Turkey's exclusion can be understood from two different directions. First, because that land was Islamic in religion, the Christian society of States in Europe did not trust, nor desire, an infidel member:

> The considering the Turkish empire as any part of the balance of power in Europe was new. ... He had never before heard it held forth, that the Turkish empire was ever considered as any part of the balance of power in Europe. They had nothing to do with European power; they considered themselves as wholly Asiatic. Where was the Turkish resident at our court, the court of Prussia, or of Holland? They despised and contemned all christian princes as infidels, and only wished to subdue and exterminate them and their people.[107]

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[106] Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp.11-13.

[107] Edmund Burke, Speech in House of Commons, February 29, 1792, in T.C.Hansard, as quoted in Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power., New York, Norton, 1955., pp.14-15.

The second perspective is that of the Turks themselves. Like the Europeans, the Ottomans also operated within an ethos; an ethos determined by their culture, dominated as it was by Mahommedism. This was demonstrated when the Sultan condescendingly refused Lord Castlereagh's February, 1815, invitation to send a representative to the Congress of Vienna, and participate as an equal member of a European security guarantee. The Sublime Porte was unable to conceive of relations with Christian European Powers on a secular basis, and according to principles of equality and reciprocity.[108] Nevertheless, Bull apparently believed that the European Empires, and influences therein, had spread the idea of the State system, and its basic values, to the far reaches of the world. He believed a result of the now-faded European political hegemony was that, for the very first time in history, one international society spanned the globe.[109]

Bull's conception of the international society has been partly supported in the literature by the writings of Friederich Kratochwil.[110] Kratochwil argues that the national interest of States is best understood by envisaging each as

[108] Hedley Bull, "The Emergence of a Universal International Society", in The Expansion of International Society, eds. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984., pp.118-121. See also Edward Vose Gulick, op cit., pp.15-19.

[109] ibid.

[110] Friederich Kratochwil, "On the Notion of 'Interest' in International Relations", International Organisation, Vol.36, No.1, Winter 1982., pp.1-30.

a "common core of understanding" within a recognised "public interest."[111] There is some historical evidence to support Kratochwil's definition of the national interest. The <u>Pilnitz Declaration</u> of August, 1792, for example spoke of the restoration of "order" in Europe.[112] Additionally, in more modern times, support for Kratochwil's conceptualisation can be found in the famous <u>Eyre Crowe Memorandum</u> of January, 1907;

> The general character of England's foreign policy is determined by the immutable conditions of her geographical situation on the ocean flank of Europe, as an island with vast overseas colonies and dependencies, whose existence and survival as an independent community are inseparably bound up with the possession of preponderant seapower ... The danger [of loss of independence] can in practice only be averted - and history shows that it has been so averted - <u>on condition that the national policy of the insular and naval state is so directed as to harmonise with the general desires and ideals common to all mankind, and more particularly that it is closely identified with the primary and vital interests of a majority, or as many as possible, of the other nations.</u> [emphasis added] Now, the first interest of all countries is the preservation of national independence. It follows that England, more than any other insular Power, has a direct and positive interest in the maintenance of the independence of nations, and therefore must be the natural enemy of any country threatening the independence of others, and the natural protector of the weaker communities.[113]

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[111] <u>ibid</u>, p.3.

[112] The <u>Pilnitz Declaration</u> of August 4, 1792, was jointly announced by the King of Prussia, Frederick William III, and the Holy Roman Emperor, Francis II. The communique stated that the two monarchs were committing their countries to a war with Revolutionary France "for the purpose of preserving social and political order among all polished nations." Quoted in the <u>Annual Register, 1792.</u>, Rivington, London, 1798., p.289.

[113] Sir Eyre Crowe, "Memorandum on the Present State of

This somewhat lengthy quotation from Crowe's memorandum to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, demonstrates the perspective that Kratochwil is arguing; the national interest of States must be compatible with the "public interest" of the system within which that State is operating. As the primary-system hegemon throughout much of the Nineteenth Century, due to its "possession of preponderant seapower", Great Britain's interest was that of preserving the basic national interest - survival - of the individual States. Perpetuation of the existing system was perceived to be in the "public interest". Kratochwil argues from a position very much akin to Bull's, and suggests that the concept of the "public interest" better describes State interaction in the international system;

> Implicit in this notion [of the public interest]
> was the recognition not only that political action
> was constrained by an international system but
> that the failure or success of a policy could cru-
> cially depend on its compatibility with certain
> "rules of the game", which served as a common
> framework for all sovereigns and allowed decision-
> makers to pursue conflicting goals without falling
> into a totally unregulated struggle.[114]

It would be redundant for this work to review Kratochwil's arguments in depth as they are, by and large, very similar to those put forward earlier by Hedley Bull. The

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British Relations with France and Germany - January 1, 1907", in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Volume Three., eds. G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperly, New York, Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1928., p.402. Friederich Kratochwil also uses this source which I have examined further.

[114] Friederich Kratochwil, op cit., p.4.

principal difference between these two scholars - Bull and Kratochwil - seems to lie in the limited scope of the concept of the "public interest". Kratochwil does not share Bull's Grotian belief that a global international society exists at present. Instead, and through the application of his works, one can quickly perceive that Kratochwil believes a less all-encompassing perspective would be more useful for modern analysis.

Essentially, the "public interest" is characterised by two basic requirements. First, States must recognise that "what is right (or wrong) for one actor must be right (or wrong) for any actor under similar circumstances." For the particular system to maintain any order there must be a generalised application of intersubjective understandings. Second, the "principle of consequence" must be evident. By this, Kratochwil suggests that in determining their own policies States investigate the implications of their actions with regards to its possible impact on community values.[115] As Eyre Crowe noted in his memorandum, the principle of consequence is an ever-present reality in the foreign policy deliberations of States;

> Whenever the government of a country is confronted with external difficulties by the opposition of another state on a question of national rights or claims, the probable attitude of third Powers in regard to the point in dispute must always be a matter of anxious concern.[116]

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[115] ibid, pp.6-8.

[116] Sir Eyre Crowe, op cit., p.398.

As Kratochwil asserts, and Bull implied, the actions States undertake are not necessarily morally correct, but are instead justifiable given the societal (or international-societal) ethos as defined by the "public interest";

> It would be neither just nor politic to ignore the claims to a healthy expansion which a vigourous and growing country like Germany has a natural right to assert in the field of legitimate endeavour. ... It cannot be good policy for England to thwart such a process of development where it does not directly conflict either with British interests or with those of other nations to which England is bound by solemn treaty obligations.[117]

The effect of the concept of the "public interest" is to reject, yet again, the universalist approach so often pursued by theorists of natural law.

For the purposes of analysis, Kratochwil's "public interest" is a refined concept for use in a Lockean model. There are essentially two reasons for this statement. First, the concept of the "public interest" allows for an intermingling of normative, or intersubjective, values in a given political community of States while at the same time admitting a reasonable degree of <u>raison d'etat</u>. When questions of conflict arise between the two, principles or State, the "principle of consequence" allows for the introduction of several additional variables into a State's policy calculations.[118]

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[117] <u>ibid</u>, p.417.

[118] "Modern History demonstrates the application of the principle of solidarity and equilibrium ... and of the united efforts of States against the supremacy of one power in order to force a return to the common law ... What then becomes of egotistical policy, of the policy of fantasy and of miserable gain?"; Prince Metternich,

Prince Metternich, the father of the European Concert, sup-
ported the viewpoint that States had to consider more than
their own interests when they pursue their national objec-
tives;

> Politics is the science of the vital interests of
> States, in its widest meaning. Since, however, an
> isolated State no longer exists and is found only
> in the annals of the heathen world...we must al-
> ways view the "society" of States as the essential
> condition of the modern world. The great axioms of
> politics proceed from the knowledge of the true
> political interests of "all" States; it is upon
> these general interests that rests the guarantee
> of their existence.[119]

In order to partly overcome the inherent contradictions of
principles and interests, Kratochwil has suggested that a
systemic conception of the environment is needed for States
to separate their decisions from their particular interests.
One must, therefore, return to Bull's concept of a society
of States, though its use will be more limited in scope. A
State would apply the principle of consequence with regard
to its policy's impact on a "self-conscious grouping of
States"; however, the grouping may not be global as Bull im-
plied. Examples of these limited-membership "societies"
might include Metternich's Concert of Europe, and the modern
British Commonwealth.

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quoted in Henry Kissinger, op cit., p.13.

[119] Quoted in Harold Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna.,
London, Methuen, 1946., p.37.

The second advantage to implementation of the "public in-
terest" conceptualisation is that it allows for alteration
of the status quo. Standards of the "public interest" and
the contradictions between it and a State's perceived na-
tional interests mean that often-times an incentive is cre-
ated to subvert the rules of the game.[120] An example of this
is provided by Frederick the Great's "rape of Silesia" in
1740; he needed strategic surprise, and an excuse, to seize
that province so he resurrected his House's ancient claim to
that land in the midst of the controversy enveloping Austria
at the time of the Pragmatic Sanction. Frederick's objec-
tives, for glory and territorial aggrandisement, could only
be realised by breaking the existing standards of conduct
and so appear to be attempting to subvert the entire system.
Prussia's attack in 1740 was legitimate in the sense that it
had the explicit right to undertake such an action as a sov-
ereign State. However, many of Frederick's contemporaries
believed his conquest was illegitimate as he had no prior
"right" to Silesia: the Hohenzollern's "incontestable
claims" had gone unrecognised among the Powers for centu-
ries.[121]

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[120] Friederich Kratochwil, op cit., p.27.

[121] See Robert B. Aspery, Frederick the Great: the Magnifi-
cent Enigma., New York, Ticknor and Fields, 1986.,
pp.154-158.

Implicit within the concept of the "public interest" are expectations of a State's future behaviour. It was for violations of existing values, and the expectation of continued violations, that led Burke to resist, with such vehemency, the proposed peace with Revolutionary France;

> We are in a war of a "peculiar" nature. It is not
> with an ordinary community, which is hostile or
> friendly as passion or as interest may veer about,
> - not with a state which makes war through wanto-
> ness, and abandons it through lassitude. We are at
> war with a system which by its essence is inimical
> to all other governments, and which makes peace
> and war as peace and war may best contribute to
> their subversion.[122]

The European "balance of power", which was an intersubjective value from the _Treaty of Utecht_ (1713) to the mid-Nineteenth Century is also an example of the "public interest" generating certain expectations of behaviour.[123] During those two centuries States were expected to maintain it for its own sake. When rulers, like Louis XIV, strove militarily to expand their domains beyond acceptable boundaries, great armed leagues were formed to crush such attempts. And, of course, the costs of what appeared as the subversion of the "public interest" could often be both extraordinarily high and rather long-lasting. As Frederick the Great wrote in this regard;

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[122] Edmund Burke, _op cit._, p.250.

[123] See Herbert Butterfield, "The Balance of Power", in Butterfield and Wight, eds., _op cit._, pp.132-148. See also Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power", in _ibid_, pp.149-175.

> [A] daring stroke such as the siezure of Silesia
> resembles books which are successful in the origi-
> nal version, but their imitation is lackluster.
> Through the seizure of Silesia we directed the
> envy of all of Europe towards us. All our neighb-
> ours were alarmed by it: there is not one who does
> not mistrust us. My own life will be too short to
> put them at ease as it is advantageous to our in-
> terests.[124]

The Lockean model originally employed the theory of a law
of nature which guided States in their interactions. In the
period in which he was writing, Locke's use of natural law
was both logical and understandable. For the analysis of
the modern international system, natural law is not an ac-
ceptable concept; Bull's reasons for rejecting it are more
than a little convincing. Nevertheless, the belief that
there are values, even if inchoate, which guide States, is a
reasonable assumption: like most "facts" in the social sci-
ences, the existence of a value system is only ever an as-
sumption even if it seems to be supported by overwhelming
empirical evidence. Such an assumption is directly related
to the natural law tradition in three ways. First, and most
obviously, a value system, or ethos, shared by States is
supranational. The values the ethos incorporates are linked
ideologically to the national interests of the member-
States, but are also politically separate from them. Sec-
ond, the existence of an international ethos suggests that
order is the prevailing condition in an international sys-
tem. One of the principal difficulties in describing the in-

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[124] Quoted in Friederich Kratochwil, op cit., p.17.

ternational system as anarchical is that it immediately gives rise to a belief that it must be disorderly. The theoretical innovations of empiricists, such as Bull and Kratochwil, demonstrate that anarchy and disorder do not necessarily share a causal relationship. The existence of an ethos prevents that sort of occurrence by establishing clearly understood parameters among States who usually desire order and security. The third reason addresses the roles of values themselves in any political community. Values serve to define common social purpose. Like Locke's deistic law of nature, Bull's societal interests, and Kratochwil's "public interest", all demonstrate purpose. In the self-help system of world politics, purpose expresses itself in a quest for security however that concept happens to be defined by a particular State's national interests. An international ethos introduces an element of predictability to the system which is an essential element in any State's security calculations.

Of course, there are two important qualifications to the applicability of the natural law tradition to the study of intersubjective values in the modern States system. The principal disagreement with that tradition is a categorical rejection of the universal approach of natural law. Although most of Mankind's great religions share common perceptions of right and wrong, these moral imperatives have been tempered by the national, regional, or ideological her-

itage of each political actor in which they have been incul-
cated. Bull may be correct in asserting that an internation-
al society of States exists which pursues the primary goals
he listed. However, it is Kratochwil's localised, systemic
idea of the "public interest" which is more accurately rep-
resentative of the political vagaries of the international
system when States pursue secondary goals and values. For
this author, Burke's understanding of cultural and ideologi-
cal affinities among a small "family" of States seems quite
viable.

The second qualification to the natural law tradition
deals with the question of justice and morals. Framed with-
in the belief in natural law is a conception of one univer-
sal code of justice. In abandonning the universal applica-
bility of natural law, the single code of justice is
rejected, and logically so. The ethos of the particular sys-
tem determines what is, or is not, just; that ethos is, how-
ever, restricted to that system of States alone. It may ap-
pear flippant, but ethos is all a matter of perception;

> [H]e who says that honey is sweet does not lie,
> just because to sick people it may seem other-
> wise.[125]

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[125] Andronicus of Rhodes (Rhodius) quoted by Hugo Grotius,
op cit., p.43.

1.4   CONCLUSION

Although the Hobbesian model is the most prevalent in the scholarly literature, and therefore the most commonly accepted conceptualisation of the international system, it is not the only model available. This chapter has demonstrated that at least one other, that is the Lockean, exists and is quite viable. The Lockean model is well-grounded in political theory and, more importantly, incorporates the belief that Man, the political animal, is motivated by more than simply self-interest: Locke's model refutes the notion of homo economicus.

The purpose of this chapter was neither to denigrate the Hobbesian model, nor to call into question the academic worth of research conducted under its aegis. When states can only find security in the destruction of their opponents, as is often the case with conflicting ideological perspectives that brook no compromise, the Hobbesian model is probably more accurately representative of the international system. The absence of common values between those States probably makes this so. Of course, in such situations, it should also be recalled that Locke's own state of war resembles, in many ways, the Hobbesian state of nature.

In other instances, to automatically assume that States act only in a cold calculating manner appears to be erroneous and misleading. E.H. Carr wrote, in his classic work The Twenty Years' Crisis, that,

> the realist, in denying the "a priori" quality to
> political theories, and in proving them to be
> rooted in practice, falls easily into a determi-
> nism which argues that theory, being nothing more
> than a rationalisation of conditioned and predet-
> ermined purpose, is a pure excrescence and impo-
> tent to alter the course of events. ... Political
> science must be based on a recognition of the in-
> terdependence of theory and practice, which can be
> attained only through a combination of utopia and
> reality.[126]

Locke's model of the state of nature follows the condition

of establishing such a balance between theory and reality.

By finely tuning the model, through the elimination of the

law of nature, its applicability is immeasureably aided by

concepts such as "systems", Bull's "international society",

and Kratochwil's "public interest". The utility of the

Lockean model is especially evident, if not necessary, for

an understanding of the concept of the international regime.

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[126] E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis., London, MacMillan,
1946., p.13.

Chapter II

SECURITY REGIMES

2.1   INTRODUCTION

Within the Lockean model of the international state of na-
ture it is possible for order to exist even when self-help
is presumed to be the principal characteristic of a system
of sovereign States: as Chapter One demonstrated, sovereign-
ty need not preclude order.   The prevalent Hobbesian ap-
proach to the study of international relations does not al-
low   for   order,   except   through   conquest.   Among
self-interested, self-maximising actors periods of conflict
are understood to be inevitable within the Hobbesian per-
spective. Equally inevitable are the periods of respite be-
tween conflicts during which preparations are made by States
for the next round of warfare.   From an academic vantage,
the purpose of applying the concept of the international re-
gime to the study of international relations is to explain
how the risk factor is reduced, a useful degree of predict-
ability is provided, and order is generated, within an in-
ternational system. Therefore the objective of this chapter
is to introduce the concept of the security regime; this
specialised use of the regime concept is a relatively recent
theoretical innovation, having emerged in the literature
only about a decade ago.   This chapter is divided into two

sections. The first section provides a brief introduction to the theoretical construct known as the international regime by delineating its basic "building blocks". The second section examines the complex political nature of "security", and the demands it places upon the concept of the security regime.

2.2 THE COMPOSITION OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

Chapter One demonstrated that, in the study of international relations, there is a legitimate analytical reason for presuming the existence of intersubjective values among a "society of States". Chapter One also stressed that in making such a presumption the analyst must be operating within a Lockean understanding of the international state of nature. In many ways, international regimes can be seen to be representative of the Lockean approach, for the concept involves far more than just a structural interpretation of the international system. The purpose of this section is to list those elements which must be present to suggest that an international regime is indeed a viable conceptualisation for the analysis of a particular system of states.

There exists a conventional definition of the international regime within the relevant literature. It is provided by Stephen D. Krasner in his edited work on this subject;

> [Regimes] are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor

expectations converge in a given issue-area.[1]

Principles are understood as basic system-wide interpretations of fact and historical causation. In effect, it is the principles which provide, and detail, for States the social purpose underlying the individual international regime. An example often cited in the literature is that of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): the spread of nuclear weapons is perceived to be "bad", therefore the principle of the NPT-regime is to prevent horizontal proliferation. Norms are explained as the basic rights and obligations binding States through their regime membership; within the NPT-regime, signatories are obliged "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...".[2] Rules of action are specific - both prescriptive and proscriptive - types of State behaviour; these tend to be far less restrictive than norms as there may be several different methods of realising principles within a regime setting. Decision-making procedures are the regime members' agreed methods of implementing collective choice.[3] Impor-

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[1] Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences; Regimes as intervening variables", in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes., Ithica, New York, Cornell University Press, 1983., p.1.

[2] Article 1, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as printed in Louis Henkin, et al., Basic Documents Supplement to International Law: Cases and Materials., St.Paul, Minnesota, West Publishing Co., 1980., p.436.

[3] Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences; Regimes as intervening variables", pp.1-2.

tantly, regimes need not exist as treaties, or other types of documented international agreements; although treaty-based regimes, such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), are not excluded, neither are unwritten conventions or other tradition-based forms of interaction.[4]

Relying solely upon this conventional definition, supplemented by Krasner's explanation of a regime's four components, one can associate the concept of the international regime with that of Kratochwil's "public interest". Indeed, regimes function in a manner very similar to that suggested by a "public interest": they provide order by reducing risk and enhancing predictability in a systemic setting. Additionally, and just as with Kratochwil's understanding, regimes are envisaged as a voluntary association of States: voluntary to the extent that, in a world characterised by a vast inequity with regard to the distribution of resources, any State action is not of a compulsory nature. An international regime's principles and norms are created by, and serve to perpetuate, a particular cooperative mind-set within which a member-State devises national policy, and interprets other members' policies in the same issue-area. In other words, regimes function as a cognitive screen: its erection and maintenance is believed to be wholly compatible with the preservation of, and is conducive to, the enhance-

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[4] For a discussion of both types of international regime, see Jack Donnelly, "International Human Rights: a regime analysis"., International Organisation., Vol.40, No.3, Summer 1986., pp.599-642.

ment of national interests, however they are defined.

There are five basic factors required for the analyst to postulate the existence of an international regime. First, international regimes are far more analytically specific than Kratochwil's "public interest" which is, it will be recalled, a set of all-inclusive assumptions about a State's behaviour on a system-wide basis.[5] Regimes, on the other hand, are solely issue-area oriented:

> Issue-areas are best defined as sets of of issues
> that are in fact dealt with in common negotiations
> and by the same, or closely coordinated, bureauc-
> racies, as opposed to issues that are dealt with
> separately and in an uncoordinated fashion.[6]

The basic function of the regime is to avoid an international political relationship which would resemble a Hobbesian state of nature. Because of the scarce resources of the planet, their inequitable distribution, and the common desires for the possession of those resources, international conflict among States is made inevitable; the absence of a common sovereign in the self-help system makes this so. Therefore in issue-areas where States often interact, such as trade or security, they may find it useful to construct rules, or adhere to unwritten conventions, in order to guide, regulate, and make predictable, their interaction. It is even hypothesised that in cases where an issue-area may

[5] See Friedrich Kratochwil, "On the Notion of 'Interest' in International Relations", International Organisation., Vol.36, No.1, Winter 1982., pp.1-30.

[6] Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony., Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1984., p.61.

overlap with another important issue-area, for example trade and foreign aid, the presence of different regimes may be essential so to allow States to address those issues one at a time. Regimes can address these inherent problems, caused by the nature and objectives of State interaction, by making "specific agreements on matters of substantive signifigance within the issue-area covered by a regime."[7] It stands to reason, therefore, that regimes may be over-arching so that several specific agreements are contained, or "nested", within a single regime; examples of this would include bilateral trading arrangements within the parameters, and consistent with the principles, established by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).[8]

The second "building block" of international regimes is the recognition that they must be considered within the context of a delineated international system. By this description it is meant that an international regime is not necessarily all-encompassing; not every State is a member. This approach is consistent with Hedley Bull's description of an

[7] Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes", in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., op cit., pp.148-152.

[8] Keohane's definition of issue-area is, of course, unavoidably ambiguous. In the modern world many issue-areas, which might otherwise represent different issues, are nevertheless left to the responsibility of a single government department. There are some overlapping issues which cannot be separated as was done with trade and aid; one thinks especially of a State's national security concerns which is discussed in the next chapter. It is perhaps for this reason that most regime-analysis has occurred in areas related to international economics.

international society, where the specific society is separate from the general system of States.[9] In other words, the member-States of an international regime perceive the "existence of a diplomatic fence" differentiating them from non-members.[10] Edward Gulick employed this metaphor to describe the European "balance of power" in the Nineteenth Century;

> [A] certain cohesiveness - derived largely from common cultural experiences in the past - which bound them [the European Powers] together and which meant that they had more in common with one another than they had with others which lay ouside the group.[11]

In a sense, therefore, international regimes represent an attitudinal phenomenon on the part of States which is expressed through their national policies within a context determined by the issue-area. A "diplomatic fence" serves a functional purpose: a basic cognitive homogeneity among the member-States is essential if the regime is to give rise to, or maintain, stable expectations of behaviour. As John Ruggie has suggested, regimes represent an intersubjective "language of state action."[12]

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[9] See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society., London, MacMillan, 1982., pp.8-16.

[10] Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power., New York, Norton, 1955., p.10.

[11] ibid, p.5.

[12] John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order", in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., op cit., p.196.

The third component of international regimes is that they must not be perceived as altruistic constructions; it must be understood that they are a response to a State's perceived self-interest in a particular issue-area. In other words, the voluntaristic association with a regime is a rational decision on the part of a State. William Riker, in his study of political coalitions, has defined rationality as one involving the maximisation of a utility, and a politically rational actor is one who "would rather win than lose, regardless of the stakes."[13] These same criteria are applicable for comprehending a State's membership in a regime. The creation of the regime "coalition" is perceived, by the individual States, to be of assistance in the realisation of their policy objectives, and the protection, if not the augmentation, of their national interests.

Robert Keohane has suggested that a State's regime membership can be traced not necessarily by "rational choice" alone, but can be explained also by means of "constraint choice" analysis. Keohane has noted that alterations to the membership and structure of the international system can affect the opportunity costs of States. These substantive changes then impact upon, and logically influence, a State's behaviour. From this perspective, regimes can be conceived of as a form of international business contract between States;

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[13] William Riker, <u>The Theory of Political Coalitions</u>., New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962., pp.20-22.

> [T]o establish stable mutual expectations about
> others' patterns of behaviour and to develop work-
> ing relationships that will allow the parties to
> adapt their practices to new situations.[14]

As with any international agreement, the contract-nature of

the international regime cannot be understood as binding in

the sense of a contract in a civil society: the basic role

of sovereignty is in no way challenged by the existence of a

regime. Instead, States must be understood to "subscribe"

to a regime which aids them the most in the pursuit of their

objectives by providing the greatest return for the least

political cost: by Riker's definition, a State still at-

tempts to "win" when working within the context of a regime.

Self-interest is not necessarily tied directly to an

equation regarding the distribution of capabilities - mili-

tary and economic - within a system. Such an interpretation

leans very heavily on an argument akin to that made by Ken-

neth Waltz's structuralist analysis which was effectively

refuted in Chapter One. From his writings one can discern

that Keohane, too, tends to think along a similar set of

structuralist guidelines.[15] The main criticism of interna-

tional regimes is derived from this analytical approach to

State interaction and those same States' calculations of

what elements constitute their national interest. Susan

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[14] Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Re-
gimes", p.148.

[15] See Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics; Struc-
tual Realism and Beyond", in Ada Finifter, ed., Political
Science - State of the Discipline., Washington, American
Political Science Association, 1983., pp.503-540.

Strange has argued that, as a result, regimes obscure the basic power and economic relationships among States.[16] However, as a structuralist, Strange fails to place any analytical distance between State actions and the capabilities which are distributed throughout the system; States are no more coldly logical than individual men are.

Nevertheless, "constraint-choice" analysis should not be interpreted to exclude the possibility of inter-State normativism. Regime analysis specifically allows for the possibility of an important role for normative interaction through devices known as "feedbacks" and "lags". Intersubjective elements, introduced by principles involving understandings of "good" or "bad", are a basic regime phenomenon and provide a clear conceptual link to both Locke's law of nature, and Kratochwil's "public interest".

The structure of the system, as defined by its distributive quality, may play a fundamental role in the determination of a State's initial preferences as Arthur Stein has suggested;

> [T]he distribution of power between states determines the context of interaction and the preference orderings of the interacting states and thus determines the incentives and prospects for international regimes.[17]

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[16] Susan Strange, "Cave! hic dragones", in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., op cit., pp.337-354.

[17] Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world", in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., op cit., p.135.

Of course, to attempt to ascertain which is the principal influence on a State's actions, normative principles or systemic structure as defined by Waltz, involves one in a "chicken and egg" analysis; interesting and entertaining, but pointless because it is impossible to prove either position. However, it must be recognised that any political institution which serves a social purpose, involves principles and, therefore, must contain both normative and empirical aspects; normative elements determine objectives, while empirical data allows for the assessment of the rate, or degree, of success in achieving those aims. Additionally, the regime literature suggests that the presence of normative factors may actually serve to redefine a State's definition of a "national interest".[18] Normative factors, assessed in different circumstances, may also alter the motivational impact of the basic structurally-induced "constellation of preferences" to which Stein refers:

> [O]nce nations begin to coordinate their behaviour, and even so, once they have collaborated, they may become joint-maximisers rather than self-maximisers. The institutionalisation of coordination and collaboration can become a restraint on individualism and lead actors to recognise the importance of joint-maximisation. Those who previously agreed to bind themselves out of self-interest may come to accept joint interests as an imperative.[19]

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[18] John Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation; Toward a neorealist synthesis"., World Politics., Vol.35, No.2, 1982-83., pp.261-285.

[19] Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world", p.138.

This view is entirely compatible with the conception of the international system as a Lockean state of nature. National interests are not so much determined by what a State wants, as by what a particular system of States is willing to allow a member-State to pursue and acquire. As a result, application of the regime concept encourages the analyst to envisage a State's interests as being both dynamic and flexible.

The fourth factor that must be present for an international regime to be presumed to exist is that, within that particular issue-area, there must be a perceived interdependence among member-States. By this it is meant that the achievement of basic policy objectives, and a State's acquisition of desired values, cannot be accomplished by independent, unilateral action. States must believe that the realisation of their own objectives is inextricably linked to the cooperative enterprise of other States. Pareto-optimal outcomes are not possible through independent actions. As Mancur Olson has noted,

> there is no purpose in having an organisation when individual, unorganised action can serve the interests of the individual as well as, or better, than an organisation.[20]

States are understood to have both "common interests" and "common aversions" which, in order to be realised, efficaciously, require the abandonment of isolated policy-making.

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[20] Mancur Olson, Theory of Collective Action., Cambridge, Ma., Harvard University Press, 1965., p.7.

Krasner has suggested that the model one might use to describe the international environment, in cases where interdependence is manifest, is that of the "tectonic plates" used by geo-physicists, rather than the traditional Hobbesian "billiard ball" model.[21] In other words, an understanding of international regimes is that they are generated by, and seek to maintain, a systemic environment within which States may seek to realise a greater return from their policies than otherwise would be the case. Therefore, the earlier assertion that the reliance on a regime, by States, can be considered to be a rational action is supported:

> Given the range of risks and costs, one would suppose that rational governments would attempt to structure national participation in international enmeshment with a view to ensuring if not maximising, the receipt of net gains. It would be clear to the rational actor that some disadvantages of interdependence are the price paid for deriving the benefits and he would choose a level and structure of interaction in different functional areas that promised a satisfactory, if not the best possible, overall outcome in the longer run.[22]

Indeed, the most common type of interdependence can be found in Bull's discussion of the three fundamentals of any international society of States. At that general level of interaction, all States are interdependent because the most minimal of common objectives – basic survival – requires

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[21] See Stephen D. Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: regimes as autonomous variables", in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., op cit., pp.355-368

[22] Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations., New York, Basic Books, 1975, p.216.

adherence by a group of States to those principles.[23]

The fifth, and last, factor required to postulate the existence of an international regime is that they must be understood to have been created to facilitate cooperation among States. Keohane has rightly argued that cooperation does not imply the absence of conflict, but rather must be comprehended as a determined effort to overcome differences.[24] Cooperation only occurs when "states perceive that their policies are actually or potentially in conflict, not where they are in harmony."[25] Therefore, regimes serve to create expectations of cooperative patterns of State interaction; these patterns make future cooperation possible. In the self-help system, regimes allow States "to expect" that in times of conflict, adjustments can be made which ultimately will be of mutual benefit. In this sense, regimes closely resemble the concept of the "policy arena" as the term has been applied by Stuart Scheingold; "a collectively distinctive foreign policy, even if it is in the form of policy coordination rather than real joint policymaking."[26]

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[23] See Hedley Bull, op cit., pp.65-76.

[24] Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony., p.53.

[25] ibid, p.54.

[26] Stuart Scheingold, "The North Atlantic as a Policy Arena". International Studies Quarterly., Vol.15, No.1, March 1971., pp.51-55.

International regimes function to reinforce expectations of cooperation in two ways. First, cooperation within a regime setting creates a history of repeated experiences which provide a State with a particular type of reference system: every act of cooperation is lodged in an historical context which builds-up trust in another State.[27] Second, regimes allow States to gather and dispense information relevant to continued cooperation in the particular issue area;

> [R]egimes that make it easier to gather information about the activities of other states are particularly important in situations where it is tempting to cheat.[28]

One can, therefore, argue that international regimes resemble a perpetual motion machine; by providing rules for inter-State cooperation they establish a perceptual environment which encourages further cooperation.

States must always believe that they are benefitting, or will benefit, from membership in the regime. Not to hold this belief undermines the rationale for membership. In that sense, cooperation is defined by the principle of reciprocity. However, regime reciprocity is not characterised by the "tit for tat" cooperation which Keohane has termed contingent cooperation. It is instead based on "equivalence" as the principal standard of measurement:

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[27] Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony., p.56.

[28] Stephen D. Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: regimes as autonomous variables", p.362.

> [T]o contribute one's share, or behave well toward
> others, not because of ensuing rewards from spe-
> cific actors, but in the interests of continuing
> satisfactory results for the group of which one is
> a part, as a whole.[29]

Of course, equivalence as a means of regulating cooperative interaction among States cannot be immediately institutionalised within a regime setting, nor can it really be manufactured by an international agreement. It must emerge over time, drawing upon, and embedded within, an historical understanding of just who one's partners really are.

Additionally, it should be noted, that equivalence does not necessarily entail equal returns all of the time. Instead, a long-term perspective of national interests is encouraged by regime membership; one can refer back to Arthur Stein's discussion of the emergence of joint-maximisation as a determinant of a State's definition of "interest". As Keohane and Nye have pointed out, mutual dependence must exist, but even-balanced mutual dependence is not a requisite for an international regime.[30] It is these imbalances which are the sources of States' influences in a regime. However, in attempting to realise some benefit from their influence, a State must exercise its policy options within acceptable parameters determined by the principles and norms of the regime of which they are a member.

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[29] Robert O. Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations". _International Organization_. Vol.40, No.1, Winter 1986., p.20

[30] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, _Power and Interdependence_., Boston, Little-Brown, 1977., pp.8-9.

2.3 SECURITY REGIMES AND THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY

The purpose of this section is to introduce and discuss the concept of the international regime as it can be applied to the State's everpresent quest for greater national security; this section addresses the viability of the idea of the "security regime". As with any international regime, all of the five basic components that were identified in the previous section are also requisites for security regimes. However, unlike other issue-areas such as trade, security concerns are not as easily defined within precise, and concise, parameters. It is because of this basic uncertainty as to what constitutes a State's security that "security regimes are thus both especially valuable and especially difficult to achieve."[31]

Robert Jervis, who first applied the concept of the regime to problems of international security affairs, has noted that security regimes face fundamental obstacles to their creation. First, security issues, however they are defined by a State, are usually of greater importance to States than other possible regime-influencing areas. The result is consequently both a greater awareness and competitiveness among States to maintain what each feels to be a very minimum of security. There is a perception that the failure to adjust

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[31] Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes", in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., op cit., p.174. See also Janice Gross Stein, "Detection and Defection: security 'regimes' and the management of conflict"., International Journal., Vol.40, No.4, Autumn 1985., pp.599-627.

national policies to accommodate changing security needs may
actually jeopardise the continuity of the State itself: once
again, the nature of the self-help system logically leads to
this perspective. Second, in their pursuit of security,
States find it extremely difficult to distinguish defensive
from offensive actions and intentions of a fellow system-
member. Predictability and trust are thus less easier to
come by as the stakes are much greater for States within the
realm of security. Third, the viability of perceived
threats to a State's security are often of such an impre-
cise, or immeasureable, form that the outcome can only be
correctly guaged in time of actual war: in effect, the only
certainty is that uncertainty reigns until battle is eventu-
ally joined. Jervis suggests that, because of these three
basic factors, security regimes are too uncertain an instru-
ment to utilise, and are consequently deemed by States as a
largely unattractive political institution.[32]

Jervis' conclusions are valid qualifications to the vi-
ability of the security regime concept. However, they are
only necessarily valid in regard to a system, rather than a
society of States. As was discussed previously, a "society"
of States shares certain primary goals which allow for the
generation of an appreciable order in inter-State relations.
Both primary and secondary goals meet the requirements to be
considered as collective interests (or aversions) of the

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[32] Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes", pp.174-177.

"society" coincident as they are with the individual State's perceived security needs. Therefore, it seems to follow logically that it can be only within the setting of a Bullian "society" of States that a security regime can be considered.

It should be noted at the outset that security is a very relative concept. Arnold Wolfers wrote that security

> like national interest, is well enough established in the political discourse of international relations to designate an objective of policy distinguishable from others...although used without specifications it leaves room for more confusion than sound political counsel or scientific usage can afford.[33]

It can be surmised that an evaluation of national security is primarily based upon a State's peculiar interpretation of its own, or other countries', historical experiences as they are understood to be indicative of possible future happenings. The United States might perceive its international position to be less secure in 1987, than in 1887, despite the impressive array of both nuclear and conventional armaments it possesses today. The systemic position of the United States, the political and technological constraints within which it must exercise policy, and the perceived types of threat, may have given rise to this belief. The nature of the self-help system ordinarily dictates that States pay extreme attention to their security. With very few exceptions, all States are affected by the latency of the threat

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[33] Arnold Wolfers, <u>Discord and Collaboration</u>., Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1962., p.149.

generated by the principle of sovereignty: even one of the least overtly-threatened of modern States, that being Switzerland, maintains the capability for an armed forces establishment of nearly one-half million strong. The frame of reference for determining if one is secure is each State's interpretation of history. All States make these interpretations which are constantly referenced to a particular system within which that State is operating, or to which it is targeting its policy: in other words, Kratochwil's concept of the "public interest" acting as a measuring device for systemic tolerance seems to explain quite accurately States' appraisals of policy options.

In acting as a guide for policy-makers, a State's appreciation of its security is, and must be considered to be, inherently mutable: just as international politics are incredibly dynamic, so too, and logically, is any understanding of national security. Essentially there are two interrelated factors, within that history-based episteme, which are considered together when calculating a State's national security. First, external or structural factors such as the system-wide distribution of capabilities and the current political alignments of States within that system must be considered; in other words, "who is with us, and who is against us?", and "how strong are those who we consider our adversaries?". One quickly appreciates that Raymond Aron's definition of an international system — "that ensemble con-

stituted by political units that maintain relations with each other and that are capable of being implicated in a generalised war"[34] - is particularly applicable in the realm of security affairs. Second, internal factors such as the adversary's promotion of economic disparity or ideological outlooks aimed at discontinuing a State's domestic political structure. An example of this factor is the present domestic political turbulence occurring in the Republic of South Africa: the South African Government believes it to be basically a foreign-based challenge to the existing political status quo, and devises its security policy accordingly.

To separate internal, from external, factors is an academic prerogative for it makes analysis more comprehensible. However, no such separation according to the typology of threat occurs among policy-makers. External factors often directly impact on the internal composition of States to varying degrees. This is especially the case in times of ideological rivalry or, and more correctly, when States are guided by irreconcilable ideological outlooks and also find themselves in a politically conflictual situation. In such cases two types of threat to a State's security are manifest: explicit, or military, threats to a State's external security vis a vis the other members of the State system, and; an implicit, or revolutionary, threat to a State's institutional relationship with its own citizenry. The aware-

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[34] Raymond Aron, Peace and War., Malabar, Florida, Krieger, 1981., p.94.

ness of this duality of threat is one of the pillars upon which the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is founded:

> Bearing especially in mind the situation in Eastern Europe, member governments [of NATO] recall that any lasting improvement in international relations presupposes full respect for the principles of the independence and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in their domestic affairs, the rights of each people to shape its own future, and the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force.[35]

A cursory examination of History provides many other examples of the fusing of the two types of threat: the Persian invasions of Ancient Greece (Fourth Century B.C.); the Ottoman challenge to Western Christendom (Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries); Nazi hegemony in Europe (1939-1944); as well as the presently perceived threat emanating from an expansionist USSR imbued by the anti-democratic doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. The concept of security can, therefore, be understood as a State's "measuring-stick" determining the degree, and type, of threat to its existing social values.

Wolfers has also suggested that security is a value which all States are compelled to possess. The level of a State's perceived security indicates a corresponding intensity of political commitment and confidence in an existing state of affairs. As this intensity varies, owing to revised inter-

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[35] Paragraph 4, Final Communique issued after the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Washington, D.C., April 10, 1969., printed in Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1954-1977., General Affairs Committee, Twenty-Third Ordinary Session, Western European Union Assembly, Paris, 1978.

pretations of, or perceived threats to, existing social values, so too does the need to protect those values. In other words, security is a value which States possess in different quantities over time, and which they "can aspire to have in greater or lesser measure."[36]

For the purposes of academic study, there are two fundamental problems with the basic abstractness of the political concept of security. First, because there is no objective understanding of security it must remain subjective in nature. The result of this subjectivity is that perceptions of security are always changing relative to such factors as the environment, the method of historical interpretation, and the availability of historical data. Thus, the two factors of threat are understood only within the confines of a particular political ethos, that is itself undergoing consistent transformation: this means that States may differentiate between political relationships depending upon the security of their own social values. The second problem is that the very abstractness of the term "'security' covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security."[37] It is precisely because of this reason that the seemingly obvious connection of security with the accretion of power and wealth can only be inconclusive.[38]

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[36] Arnold Wolfers, op cit., p.150.

[37] ibid.

While recognising the ambiguity of the concept of national security, a simple definition is nonetheless necessary. Therefore, security can be defined as the protection of those values already possessed by a State; this definition incorporates security, the "value", with security "the measuring-stick". A security policy, by extension, then becomes any policy aimed at the protection of that State's "already acquired" values.

To maintain already-acquired values States must be aware of the operations of the everpresent security dilemma. For States sharing a membership in the same system, security cannot be augmented to an extent which thereby threatens the security of other States; Aron's definition of system underscores the need for caution. Each system contains a Pareto-optimal level for system-wide security which cannot be surpassed unilaterally without adverse consequences, counterproductive to the objectives of the individual State's security policy. Therefore, the "public interest" of the system will not allow an individual State to achieve absolute security without the outbreak of system-wide warfare. This was the fault of Germany prior to World War Two. Hitler defined German security on both a racial and territorial bases; as additional, some might say absolute, security was sought, other States in the European system perceived a grave threat to their national, and State, survival.

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[38] See Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security"., _International Security_., Vol.8, No.1, Summer 1983., pp.129-153.

If States are members of the same "society", where shared values exist as a common interest, they will not likely pursue policies that challenge the possession of those same social values; to undermine another State's possession of them is, logically, to threaten one's own hold.[39] Instead, States may try to have their own particular values, and hence viewpoint, adopted by a grouping of States as a common interest. The pursuit of that aim is a logical reaction to the security dilemma. By its very nature, the security dilemma prohibits the emergence of absolute security. Therefore, the system-wide adoption of values is, perhaps, the closest any system allows a State to approach a degree of absolute security. Metternich's success in convincing the Great Powers, or Concert, to accept the Austrian perspective at the Congress of Vienna (1815) is a case in point. By stressing dynastic legitimacy, rather than national self-determination, as the political determinant of the post-Napoleonic settlement, the Concert of Europe assured the Austrian State of its security vis a vis the threat nationalism posed for that country, if for no other:

> Starting from the assumption of the special requirements of the Austrian central position and peculiar domestic structure, Metternich had succeeded in building a coalition around the sanctity of treaties and the legitimacy of sovereigns. ... [H]e had led Austria into war for a cause which would ensure a peace compatible with Austria's structure...As a multi-national state, Austria could not fight a national war; as a financially

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[39] Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power". International Security., Vol.9, No.4, Spring 1985., p.20.

> exhausted state, it could not fight a long war. The "spirit of the age" was against the continuation of a polyglot Empire, but it is too much to ask statesmen to elevate national suicide into a principle of policy. ... <u>Its</u> [<u>Metternich's policy's</u>] <u>crowning accomplishment was its success in identifying the domestic legitimising principle of Austria with that of the international order.</u> [emphasis added].[40]

Some States may even provide those values unilaterally if they happen to possess the political will, and muscle, to do so. In other words, a system hegemon may perceive it to be in its best interest to assure the existence of those social values as a collective good. The best example of this is undoubtedly Great Britain ensuring the "freedom of the seas", during the period 1815-1914 and thereby guaranteeing itself access to all of the world's markets.[41]

Semantically, insecurity is simply the opposite of security. If security is the protection of "acquired values", then insecurity is the existence of a perceived threat to their continued possession. The sovereign nature of the State means that insecurity is endemic in two distinct ways. First, the absence of a universal sovereign means that threat is exuded by the system as a whole. Because there is no powerful systemic assurance to the contrary, there is a

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[40] Henry Kissinger, <u>A World Restored</u>., Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1957., pp.82-83.

[41] See Robert O. Keohane, <u>After Hegemony</u>., pp.135-181., Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory"., <u>International Organisation</u>., Vol.39, No.4, August 1985., pp.580-614., and Bruce Russet, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?"., <u>International Organisation</u>., Vol.39, No.2, Spring 1985., pp.207-231.

basic lack of surety or predictability even in times of relative peace. Thus war, and the loss or damage of a State's values, is always a possibility. As a result, States must logically assume the worst and prepare to meet all eventualities; this is the basis of Jervis' point, which was cited earlier, about the competitiveness of the security arena. The second type of threat is more specific, in that it is generated by a particular conflict with another sovereign State. This type of threat emerges due to historic enmity between States, or a basic conflict over the division of the Earth's scarce resources. However, it is important to note the conceptual differences between these endemic forms of threat; for a State to acquire security, confronted by both types, requires two different types of response.

Robert Jervis has suggested that security regimes can be defined as "principles, rules, and norms that permit States to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate."[42] In other words, Jervis is suggesting that security regimes create a political environment conducive to a long-term appreciation of a State's national interest; national interest naturally incorporates the most basic aim of survival. The implications of the concept of security, as defined by the protection of "acquired values", means that security regimes must be founded upon principles that incorporate both common interests and common aversions.

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[42] Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes", p.173.

Since social values imply purpose, members of a security regime will logically desire to preserve those values they already possess, as well as see them furthered: essentially, this is the same explanation for Metternich's emphasis of dynastic legitimacy. The principles and norms of the security regime exist, in effect, as a collective good; within the regime-membership their provision, however effected, can be enjoyed by all member-States, without exception, and is to no one's detriment.[43] These principles and norms, however they are defined, can be understood as constituting the vehicle for the provision of order, predictability, and reassurance, to States and thus offset the endemic insecurity in their relations. It is only through the provision of this collective good that States can "let their guard down". The "good", understood by member-States of a security regime as commonly-defined purpose and common obligations in a systemic setting, counters those divisive elements which are perceived to threaten their security.

In addressing perceived threats, States have traditionally formed military alliances with one another. Indeed, within the traditional paradigm it is impossible to study international relations without confronting the very considerable role played by alliances; they are a crucial instrument available to States in the pursuit of security in the self-help system. Although the historical impact of alli-

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[43] See Mancur Olson, op cit., pp.5-46.

ances has been all but pervasive, there is no real agreement in the relevant literature as to an accepted definition.[44] Despite this uncertainty, perhaps the best available definition is that provided by Robert Osgood;

> [An alliance] is a formal agreement that pledges states to cooperate in using their military resources against a specific state or states and usually obligates one or more of the signatories to use force, or to consider (unilaterally or in consultation with allies) the use of force in specified circumstances.[45]

At first glance, Osgood's definition of an alliance seems to be almost identical to that of a security regime. However, differences in the literature suggest that any such conceptual complementarity is not the norm. George Liska has written that alliances are created by like-minded States to overcome rivals:[46] that is, alliances exist for the provision of security from a threatening State or States. Alliances are created, not because of common interests per se, but rather as a result of an aversion shared by more than

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[44] Ole Holsti has noted that, "the literature on alliances is marked by competing explanations, none of which appears sufficient for a general theory. ...Indeed, it is not impossible to find contradictory propositions coexisting in the same source." See Ole Holsti, P. Terrence Hopman, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, Comparative Studies., New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1973., p.41.

[45] Robert Osgood, "The Nature of Alliances", in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, ed., Politics and the International System., New York, Lippincott, 1972., pp.481-82.

[46] George Liska, Nations in Alliance., Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1968., p.3. See also George Modelski, "A Study of Alliances; a review". Journal of Conflict Resolution., Vol.7, No.4, 1963., pp.769-776.

one State, in addition to an individual's singular needs:

> Every power which enters into an alliance with an-
> other wants not only to gain that power's help in
> case of need, but also seeks to exercise a greater
> influence over his partner's policy and to re-
> strain him from using the alliance for illegiti-
> mate or dangerous ends.[47]

An excellent example of this is the DreiKaiserbund (Three
Emperor's League) of 1881 which Bismarck created as much to
prevent war between two antagonistic German allies - Austria
and Russia - as to maintain solidarity among the three East-
ern Powers in face of a commonly perceived threat from
France.[48]

That an alliance is largely created as a result of a com-
mon aversion is supported elsewhere by analysts. In a re-
cent journal article Robert Kann has written that a "major
function - indeed "the" major function in the opinion of
some - is its [the alliance's] deterrent affect."[49] The ra-
tionale for this line of argument is logical and, in its
simplicity, conceptually elegant. Because of the perceived
demands of the self-help environment, States only pursue
policies of raison d'etat and conclude alliances "based on
expediency, not principle":[50]

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[47] Paul Schroeder, "The "Balance of Power" System in Europe,
1815-1871". Naval War College Review., Vol.27, No.5,
March/April 1975., pp.23-24.

[48] See A.J.P. Taylor, Struggle for Mastery in Europe,
1848-1918., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1954.,
p.270.

[49] Robert Kann, "Alliances versus Ententes". World Poli-
tics. Vol.28, No.4, July 1976., pp.615-616.

> Alliances are a necessary function of the balance
> of power operating within a multi-state system.
> Nations A and B, competing with each other, have
> three choices in order to maintain and improve
> their relative power positions. They can increase
> their own power, they can add to their own power
> the power of other nations, or they can withhold
> the power of other nations from the adversary.
> When they make the first choice, they embark upon
> an armaments race. When they choose the second and
> third alternatives, they pursue a policy of alli-
> ances.[51]

Indeed, as Christopher Bladen has pointed out, alliances very often can be termed as a form of "antagonistic coopera-tion."[52]

The best, and certainly the most recent, example of "an-tagonistic cooperation" must be that of the Grand Alliance during World War Two (1941-1945). The United States and Great Britain followed aims set forth in the Atlantic Char-ter, whereas the bases of Soviet politics prevented the USSR from doing likewise. The result was a veritable marriage of convenience which strove during the war years to overlook inter-Allied ideological discord and irreconcilability. This cooperative attitude was exemplified by Churchill, who, although a staunch anti-Communist, stated his desire for an alliance with the Soviet Union without regard to Stalin's ideological outlook:

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[50] Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (4th Edi-tion)., New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1967., p.175

[51] ibid, p.185.

[52] Christopher Bladen, "Alliance and Integration", in Julian Friedman, Christopher Bladen, Steven Rosen, eds., Alli-ance in International Politics., Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1970., pp.121-122.

> I have only one purpose, the destruction of Hit-
> ler, and my life is much simplified thereby. If
> Hitler invaded Hell I would at least make a fav-
> ourable reference to the Devil in the House of
> Commons.[53]

However, with the defeat of the Axis forces the marriage
broke down: after the war it became obvious that the Western
Powers and the Soviet Union had different definitions of se-
curity, and had fought together only because they all feared
the Axis Powers. As Churchill stated, in this regard; "The
only bond of the victors was their common hate."[54]

John Baylis has termed this predominant approach to alli-
ances as the "balance of power school" where only common en-
emies and dislikes are allowed to reign.[55] Due to an empha-
sis on expediency, the role of intersubjective principles
and behavioural norms is downgraded. Liska and Morgenthau,
in addressing normative interaction, suggest that without
reference to specific material interests a purely ideologi-
cal alliance would prove ineffective.[56] Cohesion among alli-
ance partners is deemed to be largely, if not entirely, de-
pendent on an adversary's actions: the emergence of an
independent "we" feeling, unrelated to the conflict, is com-

[53] Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance., Boston, Hough-
ton-Mifflin, 1951., p.370.

[54] See Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin.,
Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1957.

[55] John Baylis, "The Anglo-American Relationship and Alli-
ance Theory". International Relations., Vol.8, No.4, No-
vember 1985., p.373-374.

[56] George Liska, op cit., p.17., and Hans J. Morgenthau, op
cit., p.178.

pletely absent because coalitions can only form if a common adversary materialises.[57] As Stephen Walt has written in this regard;

> In the 1920's, Germany's weakness made it possible for Britain, France, and the United States to treat the Soviet Union with disdain, a revulsion based largely on ideology and echoed by the Soviets. Only when Nazi Germany began to pose a significant threat did these ideological preferences lose their power. In other words, security considerations take precedence over ideological preferences, and ideologically based alliances are unlikely to survive when more pragmatic interests intrude.[58]

Walt argues that States can afford to let ideological considerations guide them in their selection of alliance partners only when their security is assured. However if security is the protection of already-acquired values, and may include more than territory or wealth, then certain types of States must always be unacceptable partners.[59]

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[57] See Robert Osgood, op cit., p.485., George Liska, op cit., p.88., Ole Holsti, op cit., pp.11-13.

[58] Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power", p.24.

[59] Walt's example is of an extreme type: two types of government, one democratic and the other Marxist revolutionary, confronting a third type which was both anti-democratic, and anti-Marxist. If one examines the case of Polish policy in 1939, a different conclusion can certainly emerge. Non-democratic, and anti-Marxist, Poland was not willing to side with the Soviet Union even as late as August of 1939, when such an alignment might very well have deterred Hitler. One of the reasons suggested for this reluctance is that Polish leaders were well aware of the threat the Soviet Union posed to Poland's social order. See Anna Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers., Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1968., pp.233, 245-247.

As was noted in the previous section, there are five basic components for regimes. Of these only two - the presence of self-interest and a rudimentary systemic conceptualisation - are all that is present in an alliance as understood by the "balance of power school". Alliances are then envisaged as nothing more than a function of the balance of power.[60] The "balance of power" approach means that of the two types of threat endemic to States - systemic and specific - alliances are only able to confront successfully the specific threat; that is a threat emanating from a State, or States, which are members of the existing system. In such a case, an alliance cannot be considered a security regime. Within that type of institution there is no logical means for States to be restrained in their inter-relations, nor for them to take a long-term perspective of national interests: Rousseau's "stag hunt" analogy returns as the threat of State defection is everpresent. As a result, no expectation of long-term cooperation can be generated since, as conditions change and capabilities are redistributed, so too will alignments.

Perhaps the most complete theoretical expression of the security regime is contained within the concept of collective security. Collective security addresses both types of threat, confronted by sovereign States, by effectively

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[60] See Francis Beer, "Introduction", in Francis A. Beer, ed., Alliances, Latent war communities in the contemporary world., New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970., p.4-5.

transforming the specific adversarial challenge into an overall systemic threat. The cornerstone, and the means by which this transformation is effected, is the universal obligation to collective defence; as a result both neutrality and self-help are incompatible with collective security.[61] Kenneth Thompson has suggested that, conceptually, collective security is an effort to create and maintain a type of social order in the international system equivalent to that which is found in any civil society;

> [A] conflict anywhere has some effect on conditions of peace everywhere. A disturbance at one point upsets the equilibrium at all other points, and the adjustment of a single conflict restores the foundation of harmony at other points throughout the world.[62]

Therefore collective security functions in a manner akin to that of natural law in the Lockean state of nature. Locke used natural law to regulate conflict in the same sense that collective security has been touted since 1919 as the only possible replacement for the system known as the Balance of Power, and which was blamed for the outbreak of World War One, and possibly World War Two:

> The new system as they envisaged it involved the establishment and operation of a complex scheme of national commitments and international mechanisms designed to prevent or suppress aggression by any

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[61] "Neutrality", Address by Dr.Herbert Lauterpracht, London, 6 June 1935. Minutes of a General Study Conference on "Collective Security"., Paris, League of Nations International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, 1935., pp.139-142.

[62] Kenneth Thompson, "Collective Security Reexamined". American Political Science Review., Vol.47, No.3, September 1953., p.755.

> state against any other state, by presenting to
> potential aggressors the credible threat and to
> potential victims of aggression the reliable prom-
> ise of effective collective measures, ranging from
> diplomatic boycott through economic pressure to
> military sanctions, to enforce the peace.[63]

It is important to note that, embedded within the entire concept of collective security, is the principle that war can no longer be utilised as an acceptable or legitimate instrument of a State's foreign policy, and and that all member-States are obligated to uphold the collective security system. Unfortunately it is only possible to discuss collective security at the theoretical level. The historical record of its implementation, first in the League of Nations, and presently within the format of the United Nations, has not been one of success in gathering the world's Powers together to either preserve peace, or to recognise an obligation to do so.

In 1919, the Paris Peace Conference accepted the principle that collective security required some form of "institutional expression". Accordingly the victorious Allied Powers created the League of Nations. The idea of a concert of States working to solve international problems, without resort to armed force, had been first proposed by Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, and later was successfully advocated by the American President, Woodrow Wilson.[64]

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[63] Inis L. Claude,Jr., *Swords into Ploughshares*., Toronto, Random House, 1971., p.247

[64] George W. Egerton, "Collective Security as Political Myth: Liberal Internationalism and the League of Nations

At first glance, the articles of the <u>Covenant of the League</u> <u>of Nations</u> seems to demonstrate the type of political commitment required for a system of collective security. Article Two, addresses the requisite interdependence of States' security; "Any war, or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any Members of the League, or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League." Article Sixteen specified the basic obligation of the League's membership upon which collective action was to be taken to preserve a system of collective security; "Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants...it shall <u>ipso facto</u> be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League." However, as early as 1921, both the principles and obligations had been effectively undermined. A resolution passed by the Assembly of the League left the decision as to whether, or not, a State had violated "its covenants" as a member of the League, up to the individual States themselves. If security was no longer deemed to be interdependent requiring immediate counter-measures for the benefit of all, then neither were obligations assumed with a long-term perspective; although it lingered on until 1945, the League was really a stillborn enterprise. As one author has written,

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in Politics and History". <u>The International History Review</u>., Vol.5, No.4, November 1983. See also Inis L. Claude, Jr., <u>Power and International Relations</u>., New York, Random House, 1971., pp.110-154.

> [b]asically, the drafters of the Covenant seemed
> to rely on the principle of where there is a will
> there is a way. As the will was rarely present,
> the way was never found.[65]

Essentially the same thing has happened with regard to the United Nations. The <u>Charter</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>United</u> <u>Nations</u> concentrates the reactive, and enforcing, power of the organisation within the Security Council. Those States most often in conflict, or that possess the most widespread interests with the greatest potential for conflict, are the sole members of the United Nations able to decide for, or to "veto", any collective action.

For a system of collective security to function as an effective security regime, in its dual capacity of deterrent and defender, certain basic preconditions must be met. First, member-States must be committed to the maintenance of the <u>status quo</u>. Second, States must, at all times, be able to muster overwhelming strength for the collective defence. As Lord Lytton, a British supporter of the League, once stated;

> [A]bsolute security could only be achieved by un-
> questionable superiority of force....[I]f a system
> of Collective Security was universally and sin-
> cerely applied, absolute security could be ob-
> tained by all, for, overwhelming strength - wheth-
> er moral or material - could be guaranteed by
> all.[66]

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[65] Otto Pick and Julian Critchley, <u>Collective</u> <u>Security</u>., London, MacMillan, 1974., p.26.

[66] "The Prevention of War", Address by Lord Lytton, London, 4 June 1935., <u>Minutes</u> <u>of</u> <u>a</u> <u>General</u> <u>Study</u> <u>Conference</u> <u>on</u> "<u>Collective</u> <u>Security</u>"., p.63.

The last precondition, and the most overlooked, is that the major Powers, at least, must share a "minimum political solidarity and moral community."

Paradoxically, it is for precisely these same three reasons that collective security systems must inevitably fail; to quote an oft-used phrase, "it contains the seeds of its own destruction." Since 1919, attempts to maintain a "frozen" political status quo have proven fruitless. The Axis Powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) and the USSR before World War Two, gave repeated demonstrations that the attempted institutionalisation of any existing state of affairs was unacceptable: the Third World through the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement, and its demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), have reasserted that position though less violently. The impracticability of trying to preserve a particular status quo is made impossible when such an attitude is not accepted by all of the Great Powers. One Italian academic made just this point to a League-sponsored conference on collective security;

> The war had closed with a peace as was inevitable was imposed by the victors on the vanquished. But this had been presented as a product of impartial and universal justice. The Covenant [of the League] had become the new charter of the new religion....In fact, the Covenant had merely constituted for the victors an assurance that the results achieved would be maintained.[67]

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[67] Francesco Coppola, London, 6 June 1935., Minutes of a General Study Conference on "Collective Security"., p.158.

The fact that Italy was one of the victorious Powers in-
volved in the imposition of the peace of 1919, and yet was
unsatisfied enough to emerge as a revisionist State under
Mussolini, underscores the difficulty of preserving a polit-
ico-stasis. Politics is far too dynamic a field, and basic
security interests are too important to States for them not
to try often to take advantage of opportunities when prof-
fered to them.

Equally important has been the fact that no State has
been willing to make sacrifices for the common defence be-
cause there are no generally accepted principles for the as-
sumed obligations. For many States the status quo is not
perceived as an environment which guarantees the security of
their individual social values: no common purpose, or raison
d'etre, for the existing state of affairs can thus emerge.
This problem first manifested itself in the League. Although
the Covenant was quite specific, there was no common under-
standing of its purpose even among the former wartime Al-
lies:

> He [Wilson] presented it to the Americans as the
> idealistic covenant for the preservation of peace,
> while Clemenceau, when he could summon up any in-
> terest in it, thought of it as more or less a con-
> tinuation of the war-time alliance against Germa-
> ny.[68]

The problem of interpreting principles, and assuming obliga-
tions, continues unabated. The multi-angular clashes of
States influenced by various, often hostile, ideologies

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[68] Otto Pick and Julian Critchley, op cit., p.27

means that a common outlook is nearly impossible to envisage. As a result, a common definition of what State actions constitute "aggression", and thereby trigger the collective security system's defences, is wholly absent: "for unless there was some means of determining the aggressor it was useless to go into the question of sanctions."[69] In effect, the overall result of pursuing collective security, in both the League of Nations and the United Nations, has only been to brand war as an illegitimate policy action by States. Flowing from their membership in those organisations, States have, therefore, been collectively pledged to oppose aggressive war, without being able to distinguish collectively between aggressive and defensive actions. Peace has thus become an international watchword without an organised, collective, coercive Power to preserve it: war has not been made impossible nor even, because of the existent conflict of interests, improbable. Without a system-wide manifestation of political will, the legal instruments of collective security serve only to exacerbate collective insecurity. Henry Kissinger has noted the paradox involved:

> Those ages which in retrospect seem most peaceful
> were least in search of peace. Those whose quest
> for it seems unending appear least able to achieve
> tranquillity. Whenever peace – conceived as the
> avoidance of war – has been the primary objective
> of a power or a group of powers, the international
> system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless
> member of the international community. Whenever
> the international order has acknowledged that cer-

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[69] "Regional Agreements", Address by Senator Roberto Forges Davanzati, London, 5 June 1935., Minutes of a General Study Conference on "Collective Security"., p.124.

tain principles could not be compromised even for the sake of peace, stability based on an equilibrium of forces was at least conceivable.[70]

Inis Claude has noted that it is a widespread view that the "bigness and heterogeneity of the wide world" seems to preclude effective multilateral organisations.[71] The reason for this view is that it is perceived that common loyalties can only arise within a regional basis where common cultural foundations exist.[72] The verity of this opinion is easily ascertainable; Claude has noted that the greatest upsurge in regional approaches to problems has occurred in the field of "high politics and security" where the need for international trust is of utmost concern to States.[73] In recognition of the implicit problems of collective security in a world of diverse cultures, Thompson has suggested that States may create agencies for the production of "partial collective security."[74] This view was raised in 1935 by the British statesman, Sir Austen Chamberlain, who suggested that regionally-based pacts were a more realistic, and more reali-

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[70] Henry Kissinger, op cit., p.1.

[71] Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Ploughshares., pp.102-103.

[72] See Friederich Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An inquiry into the formation of the State system"., World Politics., Vol.39, No.1, October 1986., pp.28-52.

[73] Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Ploughshares., pp.115-116.

[74] Kenneth Thompson, "Collective Security Reexamined", p.757.

sable, objective:

> The original idea of the League was to bring all
> the nations of the world into one common system of
> mutual guarantee. I earnestly hope that the League
> will maintain its world-wide character, and even
> extend it by the re-entry of Powers which have
> left, or the addition of new ones; but I do not
> think that we shall find the kind of security
> which we need against the dangers of which I have
> been speaking in guarantees which are equally
> binding for every war, wherever, however, and what
> subject whatsoever it may arise....For obligations
> so widely spread, so universal, and yet requiring
> - potentially at least - such immense sacrifices
> from the nations which undertake them are, I
> think, beyond the strength of humanity and call
> for sacrifices that the peoples of the world will
> not make until the whole outlook of the world has
> changed....I, therefore, incline...to those re-
> gional arrangements, which concentrate the obliga-
> tions of each country more narrowly in an area
> where it at once feels that no disturbance of the
> peace can take place without its own security be-
> ing in danger. I feel that the remedy lies rather
> in such local arrangements, always working within
> the scope of the League and in accordance with the
> Covenant of the League.[75]

It is not surprising that Chamberlain would hold this view.

As one of the authors of the Locarno Pact (1925), which it-

self was a regional security system, he would naturally have

believed in the efficacy of similar accords.[76]

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[75] "Address of Welcome to the Members of the Conference",
Address by Sir Austen Chamberlain, London, 3 June 1935.,
Minutes of a General Study Conference on "Collective Se-
curity"., pp.8-9.

[76] The Locarno Pact, itself, is evidence of the British and
French lach of confidence in the ability of the League to
maintain the inter-war status quo. By recognising the
need for a regional security system along the banks of
the Rhine River, the Locarno Pact effectively announced
that collectively security was not realisable. See F.S.
Northedge, The League of Nations: its life and times,
1920-1946., New York, Holmes and Meier, 1986., pp.95-97.
and also E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939.,
London, MacMillan, 1946., pp.105-106.

Chamberlain's perspective was not accepted during the remainder of his life. However his views on regional security pacts are largely reflected in Article 52 of the _Chater of the United Nations_ which explicitly permits "the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to maintenance of international peace and security." Since 1945, a plethora of regional security organisations has been created. Many like the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) are no longer in existence; others like NATO or its putative adversary, the Warsaw Pact are quite viable. In support of Chamberlain's viewpoint, Paul Buteux has noted that groupings, such as NATO, act as regional mutual security organisations.[77] A regional mutual security organisation combines the two types of threat, though insecurity is addressed on only a limited, or regional, basis; in the case of NATO, the geographic region is specified to be the area occupied by the sixteen signatories, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean above the Tropic of Cancer.

Equally important, NATO has provided the opportunity for most of its member-States to increase their awareness of their common-heritage; phrases such as the "Atlantic Community" reflect an understanding of their membership within the Western ethos. In this vein, it is far more realistic to

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[77] Paul Buteux, _The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO, 1965-1980.,_ Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982., pp.4-6.

hypothesise a "war to save democracy" in Western Europe, with NATO pitted against the Warsaw Pact, than in the Middle East against the same foe; Arab culture would not emphasise the democratic tradition as a value to defend. A sense of identity, regionally-bound, is contained within the text of the "Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO";

> While fear may have been the main urge for the creation of NATO, there was also the realisation - conscious or instinctive - that in a shrinking nuclear world it was wise and timely to bring about a closer association of kindred Atlantic and Western European nations for other than defence purposes alone; that a partial pooling of sovereignty for mutual protection should also promote progress and cooperation generally. There was a feeling among the government and peoples concerned that this close unity was both natural and desirable; that the common cultural traditions, free institutions and democratic concepts which were being challenged, and were marked for destruction by those who challenged them, were things which should also bring the NATO nations closer together, not only for their defence but for their development. There was, in short, a sense of Atlantic Community, alongside the realisation of an immediate common danger.[78]

It might be argued, therefore, that security regimes closely resemble Karl Deutsch's concept of the "security community". Deutsch has argued that there are international systems where the threat of war, or any lesser form of interstate violence has faded while not undermining sovereignty as the basic ordering concept. As he expanded upon the

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[78] Paragraph 12, Chapter One of the "Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO", printed as Appendix 6 in The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Facts and Figures., Brussels, NATO Information Service, 1984., p.271.

term, Deutsch's understanding of security community could go

far to explain the concept of any security organisation;

> [a security community] is a group of people who
> possess institutions and practices which are
> strong enough and widespread enough to assure for
> a "long" time that there will be only peaceful
> changes among the populations.[79]

Deutsch also stressed that three basic conditions had to be

met before a security community could evolve. First, the

existence of a set of compatible values among its member-

ship. Second, an ability of the membership to respond to

each other's needs must exist. Third, the membership must

view intra-community war as unattractive, improbable, and

illegitimate; in other words, a "no-war" mentality must have

emerged.[80]

The analytical relationship between Deutsch's security

community and the more recently contrived security regime is

not as obvious as might first be believed. The fundamental

difference between the two concepts is the acute absence of

any political purpose underlying a security community. The

concept of the security community therefore remains, despite

Deutsch's extensive research, little more than a description

of a state of being. Deutsch's purpose, from his introduc-

tion, is to discover the means by which Man might abolish

war.[81] Because of this approach, Deutsch is primarily con-

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[79] Karl Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North At-
lantic Area., Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University
Press, 1957., p.5.

[80] ibid, p.66.

cerned with what he terms the process of "integration":

> [T]he achievement of a security community would
> [the author expected] involve something like the
> crossing of a threshold from a situation where war
> between the political units concerned appeared
> possible and was being prepared for, to another
> situation where it was neither. It was the cross-
> ing of this threshold, and with it the establish-
> ment of a security community, that we called inte-
> gration; and it is in this sense that we are using
> the term in this book.[82]

It is the concentration of effort on examining the causes for the "threshold" that undermines the complementarity of the two concepts – security community and security regime.

Political relations in a security community are under-stood as being peaceful because war is no longer perceived as either rational or legitimate among a particular grouping of sovereign States. However, no explanation is offerred which would account for this perception arising: a basic compatibility of social values cannot account for peace as the many wars in the history of a uni-ideological medieval Christendom attest. A principle cause for the fundamental lack of purpose in a security community, is Deutsch's belief that "threat" is not a very effective political coagulant:

> [W]here foreign threats were present, their ef-
> fects were transitory. Most often they provided an
> impetus toward temporary military alliances, while
> more permanent unions derived their main support
> from other factors.[83]

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[81] ibid, p.1.

[82] ibid, p.32.

[83] ibid, p.45.

In effect, Deutsch has perceived threat only according to the criteria stressed by the "balance of power" school; threats to the bases of power and wealth. His analysis does not include any potential for an international society which lies at the heart of the security regime concept.

By definition, security regimes are posssessed of a political purpose understood and shared by its members. The title, security regime, is not a descriptive title alone, but also a conceptualisation of the dynamics within an international society of States. Within the regime concept specifically, as was indicated in the previous section of this chapter, reference is made to the past, present, and also the future interactions within that society. For Deutsch, peace in the security community exists because there is a lack of conflict among States; intersubjectivity does not exist, for the more backward-looking compatibility of values is instead substituted. In that sense, security communities are only an intermediate analytical device, halfway between "balance of power" alliances and security regimes. Unlike the "balance of power" approach which envisages alliances as providing security only on a specific adversarial basis, security regimes provide security at both levels - systemic and specific adversarial - as well as in response to both types of threat - internal and external. For long-term restraint and cooperation, among States, values must be shared and not just compatible in order to in-

ject long-term predictability into their relations with one another. It seems relevant to note, as Paul Schroeder has written, that "We must remember peace is caused just as war is caused."[84]

Since security regimes operate at both levels of threat perception it is essential that its membership include at least one of the Great Powers of the day:[85] by the term "Great Power" it is meant to refer to a State which is as powerful as its most powerful potential adversary. The role of the Great Power in a security regime is twofold. First, because of its military capabilities, it protects the regime membership from extra-societal intervention. Second, because it adheres to the regime's principles, it provides less-powerful member-States with protection at both levels of threat. The expense of the provision of this "good", as borne by the less-powerful States _via_ a reduction of influence, is limited by the compatibility of the Great Power's actions with the principles of that particular regime. This is so since the most basic undertaking of a security regime is to guarantee a member-State's already acquired values. The Great Power's latent role is, therefore, that of a guarantor of the membership's values. In such a setting, war is no longer acceptable nor allowable among the membership: to maintain its membership, the Great Power must perceive a

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[84] Paul Schroeder, "The "Balance of Power" System in Europe, 1815-1871", p.21.

[85] See Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes".

particular regime to be in its best interests and, logically, will exercise leadership to prevent fraticidal warfare.

When there is a relatively equal distribution of capabilities among several Great Powers, who share basic political principles, as was the case with the Concert of Europe, the Balance of Power system is capable of maintaining order:[86] the events of the Nineteenth Century seem to verify this interpretation. In a system motivated and restrained by similar principles, there is no need for a hegemon;

> To Metternich, security required not only military preparedness but also a compromise between the powers. He fully realised that the absolute security of one power is in purely military terms a threat to that of the others. While it is true that in an age of codified great-power dominance his concept cannot be described as collective security in the broad modern sense, it is entirely proper to refer to Metternich's security concept as based primarily on the consensus of the joint powers.[87]

In the pursuit of its principles, norms may be generated that mean a disregard for the rights of small States. During the period of the Concert of Europe, if a security regime can be said to have existed, then its only members were

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[86] In all fairness, it should be noted that there is an alternative viewpoint that holds the belief that the Balance of Power was a fundamentally unstable political system. Schroeder argues that the instability is inherent since its maintenance requires unpredictable acts such as preventative wars, and secret diplomacy, which serve to undermine State restraint, predictability, and hence, international order. See Paul Schroeder, "The "Balance of Power" System in Europe, 1815-1871", pp.20-21.

[87] Robert Kann, "Metternich: A Reappraisal of his Impact on International Relations". Journal of Modern History., Vol.32, No.4, March-April 1960., p.335.

the Great Powers themselves; a principle-based order was generated but States such as Saxony, not to mention Poland, were disregarded.[88]

In the time of an unequal distribution of power capabilities, States cannot be secured, regionally, from both systemic and specific adversarial threats without the protection of a Great Power. The absence of a Great Power from an embryonic security regime means that there is at least one non-member State able to threaten, on an individual basis, the regime's members. The Great Power provides the shield behind which a regionally-based "partial-collective security" system can be constructed and maintained; this equation is especially the case in the modern age where there are two Superpowers each alone greater in strength than any combination facing them that excludes their counterpart. It, therefore, stands to reason that in our age a security regime cannot be said to exist if it does not list one of the Superpowers among its members. It is only with the assistance of a Great Power that the potential for a security community is created, and a security regime can be said to exist; only in that shaded environment can a "no-war" mentality develop, emerge, and theoretically become one of the security regime's principles.

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[88] For a discussion supporting the view that the Concert of Europe functioned as a security regime, see Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes", pp. XXX. See also Richard B. Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: a fresh look at an International System"., World Politics., Vol.28, No.2, January 1976., pp.160-174.

2.4 CONCLUSION

The prevalent interpretation of the manner by which sovereign States address threats to their security is through the construction of military alliances with other States. Within the literature: in works by Morgenthau; Liska; Wolfers; and Walt, it is assumed that the alliance arrangements States enter into are based on little more than expediency. This group of analysts, who have been called the "balance of power" school interpret security threats as comprising aggressive intentions, expressed by one State to another, towards territorial or economic values; there is no role for ideological threats to a "way of life"

If, however, one interprets a State as numbering its societal structure as a value worth preserving, one must also allow for the possibility that aggressive States might challenge the continuity of that social structure; in other words, threat becomes both military and revolutionary. The failure of the "balance of power" school to account for both types of threat has given rise to the concept of the international security regime. Utilising the security regime, both the structural variables, as well as the potential intersubjectivity of regionally-based normative beliefs, are perceived as important elements in the calculations of international security among a particular grouping of States.

The awareness of the possibility of a "community of values" among a delineated group of States replaces the natural

law of John Locke, and recalls the "public interest" approach of Friederich Kratochwil: a community of values suggesting a common international purpose among those States. The presence of purpose, defined in security regimes as the preservation of social values in the presence of a perceptible threat, allows States to interact with less emphasis on contingent reactions. Instead, within the membership of a regime, States perceive their interests in a manner which accounts for the collective interest of which they are an appreciable part. As a result a security regime is a system of mutual security among themselves, and with the system as a whole.

The purpose behind this chapter was that of introducing the concept of the international regime. This task was undertaken with particular emphasis on that concept's explanatory powers with regard to the manner by which States organise themselves to deal with the problem of international security. Because of its emphasis on the intersubjectivity of social values among States, and their normative interaction, regime analysis is not usually considered to lie within the mainstream of political science research. In any case, by redefining security to include all types of social values, the role of the security regime becomes obvious. For example, the "balance of power" school can not explain the threat to the "democratic tradition" as a motivating agent for States in the determination of their alignments, or the

construction of alliances; this is despite the fact that or-
ganisations, such as NATO, base a large part of their legit-
imacy on the principle that they are defending democracy.

Although this chapter is, by no means, the "last word" on
the subject of security regimes,   it has essentially accom-
plished four tasks: defined international regimes and ex-
plained their component parts;   provided a more realistic
definition of security which is compatible with the Lockean
model of the international system; described and discussed
security regimes by contrasting them with traditional inter-
pretations of alliances and security communities; and, pre-
pared the concept of the security regime for empirical test-
ing.   Chapters Three to Six are left to examine the
viability of the security regime through the application of
the concept to a study of, and the national policies leading
to, the Treaty of Brussels (1948).

Chapter III

THE TREATY OF BRUSSELS AS A SECURITY REGIME

3.1   INTRODUCTION

In his book, the Theory of International Politics, Kenneth

Waltz rightly asserts that a "[t]heory explains some part of

reality and is therefore distinct from the reality it ex-

plains."[1] In essence that dialectic is also pursued in this

chapter: its purpose is to understand a part of the reality

that was post-war Western Europe at the time the Treaty of

Brussels (1948) was drafted, by theorising that the actions

of the five signatory States can be explained by an applica-

tion of the concept of the security regime.   This chapter

represents an attempt to dissect the actual treaty document

into its separate clauses and other analytical components to

observe whether or not it can be envisaged as a model of a

security regime.   To that end, this chapter is divided into

two sections. The first section briefly describes the polit-

ical and social environment that characterised Western Eu-

rope in 1948, and from which the Treaty of Brussels emerged.

Three overlapping influences on Western Europe are identi-

fied and examined as products of the post-war period.   The

second section is an analysis of the text of the treaty doc-

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[1] Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics., New
York, Random House, 1979., p.7.

ument.   Utilising the regime-elements discussed in Chapter

Two, this section identifies those requisites found within

the clauses of the <u>Treaty of Brussels</u>.

3.2   THE POST-WAR ENVIRONMENT

The defeat of Germany in 1945 marked more than the end of

the Second World War in Europe: it also heralded the end of

the European predominance in world affairs which that conti-

nent had enjoyed for over four centuries.   The amicable

meeting of American and Soviet troops at Torgau, on the Riv-

er Elbe, symbolised the division of Europe between the nas-

cent Superpowers.   The meeting also signalled the advent of

a new global balance of power.   The demise of the particular

international States system in which the European Powers had

long held primacy, and which Germany had twice tried to dom-

inate, coincided with the Reich's total defeat.

The Europe of 1945 differed substantially from that of

1939.   As a result of the agreements of the Casablanca Con-

ference in 1943, Germany had been destroyed as a sovereign

State and completely occupied by the victorious Allies.

However in their efforts to defeat Hitler, the Allies sub-

jected the rest of Europe to substantial, and often substan-

tive, political change. As the major Allied armies liberat-

ed Europe they left in their wake social and political

systems which reflected their own beliefs.[2] These actions,

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[2] This was more so in the case of the Red Army's drive west-
ward; however, it also occurred in Western Europe though

by the three major Powers, were undertaken to administer to their own security interests in those regions of Europe. It is ironic that in doing so they created new tensions and a renewed feeling of insecurity which has lasted to the present.[3] In that sense, the Second World War did not change anything.

In examining the period out of which the Treaty of Brussels emerged, three different aspects of the general post-war West European political perspective can be distinguished: acceptance of the presence of a threat emanating from the policies of the Soviet Union; the emergence of a supranational understanding of the bases of European civilisation; rejection of the concepts of nationalism, and of the self-assertive nation-State. Although each of these strands present in post-war Europe is different with regard to the subject each addressed, they are not distinct, for, at any given time, each appears to overlap with the other two. Together, these three threads helped create a different type of political environment in Western Europe; an environment which was largely due to the war. In that sense, the Second World War changed a great deal.

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to a much lesser extent. The countries of Western Europe did have some democratic institutions upon which to build, and therefore the Western Allies (the United States and Great Britain) resolved to support these.

[3] A.W.DePorte, Europe Between the Superpowers., New Haven, Yale University Press, 1978., pp.42-169., and G.F.Hudson, The Hard and Bitter Peace., New York, Praeger, 1968., pp.13-65.

The alterations to the international system were an important influence in the post-war political environment. The extensive restructuring of the system that occurred as a result of the War had no real precedent in 1918, which had witnessed the last major systemic transformation. Whereas upon the outbreak of war in 1939 there had been seven Great Powers - Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States - in 1945 there were only three. The "Big Three" consisted of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. It was an exclusive club, for as Stalin had quipped at Yalta, the membership dues were five million men under arms. It was a fee which only those three Powers could afford or were willing to pay. Nevertheless, the title of the group was deceptive as Britain was far removed from the positions occupied by the other two. This discrepancy was to become an increasingly salient international concern in the chancelleries of Western Europe. The military and economic weaknesses of Great Britain meant that there was no West European Power capable of successfully resisting, on a continent-wide basis, the Soviet Union's intentions, however they manifested themselves. The result was that Europe was effectively helpless. As one author has noted, the immediate post-war period witnessed the replacement of the European system of autonomous States with a "bipolar system of global hegemony jointly exercised by the United States and the Soviet Union."[4] Importantly for

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[4] Walter Lipgens, <u>A History of European Integration</u>: <u>Volume</u>

Europe, the United States, which could have balanced the Soviet Union, was less interested in maximising its power in Europe. Instead, Washington followed a policy whereby the Soviet Union was advised that explicit territorial advances in Europe would not be tolerated.[5]

The seriousness of the weak position of Europe relative to the Superpowers was intensified by the rapid breakdown of the Big Three alliance. The military power and apparent expansionist political designs of the Soviet Union meant that Western Europe's anxieties about its external security had not dissipated with Hitler's defeat. As Charles Bohlen, a senior American State Department official responsible for Soviet affairs, wrote in 1943 regarding Soviet ambitions;

> Stalin's opposition to federations is sufficiently clear to afford a glimpse of the Soviet idea of post-war Continental Europe. Germany is to be broken up and kept broken up. The states of Eastern, South-Eastern and Central Europe will not be permitted to group themselves into any federation or association. France is to be stripped of her colonies and strategic bases beyond her borders, and will not be permitted to maintain any appreciable military establishment. Poland and Italy will remain approximately their present territorial size, but it is doubtful if either will be permitted to maintain any appreciable armed force. The result would be that the Soviet Union would be the only military and political force on the Continent of Europe. The rest of Europe would be reduced to military and political impotence.[6]

One, 1945-1947., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982., p.6. See also Walter Laquer, Europe Since Hitler - the Rebirth of Europe., New York, Penguin, 1982., pp.27-32.

[5] See Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945., London, Longman, 1982., pp.9-10.

[6] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, The Confer-

Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and Germany, and its attitude toward the West in general, seemed to support Bohlen's negative view, and consequently cast a pall over the entire immediate post-war period. Soviet intransigence in many fields of considerable importance to all three Powers only served to exacerbate the uncertain and tense atmosphere. As a result, disagreements in the Council of Foreign Ministers' Meetings became increasingly acerbic and non-productive.

Additionally, the size of the Soviet armed forces was a concern to all of Western Europe, since there did not appear to be any need for that country to keep so many men under arms after the cessation of hostilities. It particularly concerned the British who had, unlike the other West European States, demoblised a sizeable wartime armed forces of their own; with an armed force of 5.1 million men in 1945 they had reduced that number to 1.4 million by 1948. The only other major Western Power, the United States, had also managed to move from 11.6 million to 1.3 million men in the same time; by 1948 they had fewer than five combat divisions in Europe. However the Soviet Union which had had 7 million men under arms in 1945 still maintained an disquieting armed force numbering 3.9 million as late as 1948.[7] Alarmed by the

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ences at Cairo and Teheran., Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1955., p.601.

[7] These figures are from a November 1955 release of the British Information Service and are cited in Vance M.Holland, Selected National Policies Regarding European Military Integration., University of Washington, Ph.D., 1965. The statistics for force levels in Europe as provid-

rapid disintegration of the wartime Grand Alliance of the Big Three, the governments of Western Europe felt that the Soviet figure was far too high.

In addition to the anxiety caused by the presence of large numbers of Soviet troops in the heart of Europe, there were disputes over German and Italian reparations, the imposition of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the Soviets' consistent use of the veto-power in the United Nations' Security Council. By the time of the unproductive Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers (March 10 to April 24, 1947), it was generally agreed that the wartime idea of a concert of Great Powers was moribund. In Moscow the Foreign Ministers may have been able to agree as to their common purpose, but the conference produced little else:

> The Foreign Ministers agreed that their task was to lay the foundations of a central government for Germany, to bring about the economic unity of Germany essential for its own existence as well as for European recovery, to establish workable boundaries, and to set up a guaranteed control through a four-power treaty...Agreement was made impossible at Moscow because, in our [the Western Powers'] view, the Soviet Union insisted upon proposals which would have established in Germany, a centralized government, adapted to the seizure of absolute control of a country which would be doomed economically through inadequate area and excessive population, and would be mortgaged to turn over a large part of its production as reparations, principally to the Soviet Union. Such a plan... could result only in a deteriorating economic life in Germany and Europe and the inevita-

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ed by the NATO publication, <u>Facts</u> <u>and</u> <u>Figures</u>., are;

	1945	1946
United States	3,100,000	391,000 men.
Great Britain	1,321,000	488,000 men.
Soviet Union	in excess of six million	

ble emergence of dictatorship and strife.[8]

The refusal of the Soviet Union to allow the Eastern European countries to participate in the preparatory meetings that resulted in the European Recovery Plan (ERP), and the Communist-led and inspired strikes in France and Italy throughout 1947 only served to continue to heighten East-West animosity. After the London Conference of Foreign Ministers (November 25 to December 16, 1947), it was obvious that the Soviet Union and the three Western Powers - the United States, Great Britain, and France - were not working toward the same ends.[9] American Secretary of State Marshall stated;

> There is another and I think more fundamental reason for the frustration we have encountered in our endeavour to reach a realistic agreement for a peace settlement. In the war struggle Europe was in a large measure shattered. As a result a political vacuum was created, and until this vacuum has been filled by the restoration of a healthy European community, it does not appear possible that paper agreements can assure a lasting peace. Agreements between sovereign states are generally the reflection and not the cause of genuine settlements.[10]

[8] "Report by Secretary of State Marshall on the Fourth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Moscow Session, April 28, 1947", in Documents on Germany, 1944-1985., United States Department of State Publication, 1986., p.122.

[9] See "Notes of the Month". The World Today., Vol.4, No.1, January 1948., p.1.

[10] "Report by Secretary of State Marshall on the Fifth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, December 19, 1947", in Documents on Germany, 1945-1985., p.139.

The perception that the Soviet Union was "banking" on the economic collapse of any recovery programmes in Europe was shared by both the Truman Administration and the West European governments.[11]

Even before the London Conference, the existence of Winston Churchill's "iron curtain, stretching from Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic" was quite evident. This perception had also been confirmed by the Soviet Union when, in September of 1947, Mr. Vyshinsky, the Deputy Foreign Minister bluntly stated,

> that the world was now divided into two camps, the Soviet Union and her friends on one side, and the Anglo-Saxon bloc, led by America, on the other.[12]

His words were quickly followed by the establishment of the Cominform by Stalin which was perceived in the West as as a reemergence of the anti-Western Comintern.[13] Denouncing the West at a Soviet Communist Party gathering, the Cominform leader, Andrei Zhadanov proclaimed the existence of two hostile camps as a new, main tenet of Soviet foreign policy. Western concerns were heightened when it was recalled that it was Zhadanov who had led the successful opposition to the joint Anglo-French effort to form an alliance with the Soviet Union during the twilight of peace in August, 1939. The

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[11] David Thomson, <u>Europe Since Napoleon.</u>, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1965., pp.775-779.

[12] Quoted in Victor Rothwell, <u>Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947.</u>, London, Jonathon Cape, 1982., p.284

[13] Allan Bullock, <u>Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary 1945-51.</u>, London, Heinemann, 1983., p.485.

outcome of his opposition at that time had been the unexpected Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and World War Two.

The fear of another armed conflict was not all that occupied the minds of Europeans in the immediate post-war period. The second major influence operating in Western Europe flowed from the social consequences of the Second World War, which were quite profound. Among many Europeans there emerged a realisation that the economic, social, and political, progress which Europe had experienced from the time of the industrial revolution, had suffered a serious setback; a setback unprecedented in the modern age. The liberal belief in the equation of economic growth with constitutional, social, and political, reform was openly questioned: more so, since Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union both experienced increases in national wealth at the expense of democratic rights. In other words, the two wars had generated a recognition of the "mortality" of European civilisation as a whole. The French author, Paul Valery, had noted this in 1919, but his words were even more applicable in the atmosphere that envelopped Europe after 1945:

> We civilized peoples of Europe now know we are mortal. We had heard of entire worlds that disappeared completely, of empires that simply foundered with all of their inhabitants and artefacts... their gods and their laws...But these disasters, after all, did not concern us. Elam, Nineveh, Babylon were only glamorous names...Now we see that the abyss of history has room for everyone...We are aware that a civilization has the same fragility as a life. The circumstances that could send the works of Keats and Baudelaire to join the works of Menander are no longer inconceivable; they are in the newspapers...Everyone is

> aware of the danger. An extraordinary shudder has
> seized Europe to its very marrow. Europe has felt
> in its nerve-centres that it has become unrecogni-
> zable, that it has ceased to resemble itself, that
> it was about to lose consciousness...Then, as if
> in desparate defence of its very nature, its phys-
> iological substance, the fullness of its memories
> came flooding back in confusion...In response to
> this same anguish, civilized Europe has experi-
> enced the swift revival of its inexhaustible
> wealth of ideas.[14]

Paradoxically, it required, as Valery noted, the wholesale
social and economic devastation the two world wars had
wrought in Europe to make many Europeans aware of what their
civilisation represented: from that perspective, the two
chronologically-close wars were viewed as European "civil-
wars".

Although the Soviet Union appeared to present a military
threat to Western Europe during the post-war years, the
threat was also perceived to exist at a cultural – or inter-
nal – level; that is, it was felt that European civilisation
was threatened with the possibility of extinction, not just
through conquest alone, but by it being physically uprooted
and eradicated by the dictates of the Soviet Union's ideolo-
gy after a military conquest. As one writer noted in this
regard;

> Yet the numbers on the Russian side and the sup-
> posed monolithic structure of Russian power were
> perhaps not so frightening as ignorance of the
> real capabilities of the Russian forces and igno-
> rance of the subversive effectiveness of their
> communist fifth columns. There was something mys-
> terious about the Kremlin which contributed to the

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[14] Paul Valery, "The Crisis of the Mind", in History and
Politics., New York, Random House, 1962., pp.23-24.

awe which it inspired, and there was also the old terror of the uncivilized Russian horders who knew not the code of behaviour of the west and, now, not even the religion of the west.[15]

Although Imperial Russia had been accepted as a "Western" State, albeit an absolute monarchy, its revolutionary successor had purposely divested itself of any "Westernizing" influences. Soviet Russia, under Lenin and Stalin, had effectively destroyed what were termed "bourgeois elements" which had served as links between that country and the West:

> [A]ll "bourgeois elements", substantial farmers, men of property, and believing Christians were eliminated as further potential "transmission points" of European influence. Under Stalin any remaining European liberal and Christian values were completely replaced by a totalitarian despotism, an autocratic regime ruling over massess completely deprived of civil rights, a closely integrated Soviet empire whose basic features did not meet the most elementary requirements of European civilization in any respect.[16]

The basic human rights, and understandings of objective truth and social responsibility, were not to be found in Stalin's Russia. The social and political outlook of the Soviet Union could not meet the terms Valery established as a definition of being European:

> Wherever the names of Caser, Caius, Trajan, and Virgil, of Moses and St.Paul, and of Aristotle, Plato and Euclid have had simultaneous meaning and authority, there is Europe. Every race and land that has been successively Romanized, Christianized, and, as regards the mind, disciplined by the Greeks, is absolutely European.[17]

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[15] Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs, 1947-1948., London, Oxford University Press, 1952., p.107.

[16] Walter Lipgens, op cit., pp.14-15.

The expansion of the non-European Soviet ideology and in-
fluence into Western Europe, was of great concern to those
who were aware of the fundamental irreconcilability of the
two social doctrines.[18] This fear was heightened by events
in the Eastern European countries which had been "liberat-
ed", and then occupied, by the Soviet Union. Having fought
to preserve their independence after World War One, they
were effectively absorbed into the Soviet system after 1945;
the last to fall was Czechoslovakia in February of 1948. The
role of national governments behind the "iron curtain" was
underscored by Jan Masaryrk, the Czechoslovakian Foreign
Minister, who after returning from Moscow where he was or-
dered to refuse the Anglo-French offer to participate in the
ERP, remarked; "I went to Moscow as the Foreign Minister of
an independent sovereign state; I returned as a lackey of
the Soviet Union."[19] To many in post-war Europe, the Soviet
attempts to destroy traditional institutions east of the
Elbe appeared to be meeting with success. Their apparent
desire to control all of the continent of Europe, as was
suggested by their policies, impressed upon West Europeans
that determined efforts were necessary to save what was left

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[17] Paul Valery, "The European", in History and Politics.,
p.322.

[18] For a succinct explanation of the basic theoretical dif-
ferences between the Western World's liberal-democratic
tradition and the Soviet Union's Marxist-Leninist ideolo-
gy, see George Sabine, A History of Political Theory.,
New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966., pp.805-833.

[19] Quoted in Walter Lipgens, op cit., p.485.

of the Western way of life.

The third influence present throughout the period 1945-1948, questioned the political organisation of the European continent. The Second World War had revived also an awareness that the type of nationalistic States that had existed in Europe before 1939, were no longer capable of meeting the needs of their peoples. This attitude had first emerged in reaction to the after-effects of the First World War. In 1923, Count R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi founded the Pan-Europa Union which he called "an all-party mass-movement" and which aspired towards European supranationalism. However, the advent of fascist dictatorships in Italy and Germany, and the concomittant re-emergence of nationalism meant that any efforts aimed at European unity, accomplished within the parameters of the Western democratic tradition, were ultimately failures. In 1938 Coudenhove-Kalergi, foreseeing war, left Europe stating;

> We prefer to postpose European unification to a
> later date rather than see it accomplished in the
> near future under Hitler's tyranny...Pan-Europa
> has room for monarchies as well as for repub-
> lics...what it cannot accept is states which do
> not recognize human rights.[20]

Nevertheless, the movement Coudenhove-Kalergi and others represented did not go away: during the Second World War its ideals were preserved and propagated by the various Resistance groups throughout Western Europe. In 1942, at Geneva, the Conference of Resistance Fighters declared their

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[20] Quoted in Walter Lipgens, op cit., p.44

objection to "intellectual totalitarianism, state-worship, and nationalism."[21] By the end of the war, the Conference was alarmed by the weakness of Europe _vis a vis_ the two Superpowers;

> [W]e are being invaded by forces foreign to our soil and unaware of our problems: Russia and the United States.[22]

By 1945 all the countries of Europe had groups, similar to the Conference of Resistance Fighters, proposing plans for the political unity of the continent: despite this there was no real agreement on the approach to be followed to rectify this problem. Some people, like Winston Churchill, advocated a partial unity among the States of Western Europe, but only within the American sphere of influence. Others, such as the European Union of Federalists, (UEF) desired a federal Europe, or "third force", which would operate between, and be supported by, both Superpowers. However, the lack of agreement as to the means to be pursued, did not undermine the unity of purpose. No one in Western Europe, in the immediate post-war period, would have found objection to the basic thrust of Churchill's speech delivered in Zurich on September 19, 1946:

> [Europe is] a vast quivering mass of tormented, hungry, careworn and bewildered human beings, scanning the dark horizons for the approach of some new peril, tyranny or terror...Yet all the while there is a remedy which, if it were generally and spontaneously adopted, would, in a few

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[21] _ibid_, p.51.

[22] _ibid_, p.55.

years, make all Europe, or the greater part of it,
as free and happy as Switzerland is today. What
is this sovereign remedy? It is to recreate the
European Family, or as much of it as we can, and
provide it with a structure under which it can
dwell in peace, in safety, and freedom. We must
build a kind of United States of Europe. In this
way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be
able to regain the simple joys and hopes which
make life worth living.[23]

It was from this historical background, characterised by
these systemic, cultural, and political influences, that the
Treaty of Brussels (1948) emerged. The clauses of the Trea-
ty of Brussels reflected this uncertain and pessimistic po-
litical environment; though clearly it was one not entirely
deprived of hope and optimism. The treaty was a response to
the national concerns of the five signatory States linked as
they were, both States and issues, by the wholesale decline
of Western Europe. The Brussels Pact represented an effort
by the European Powers to respond to the systemic changes in
a manner which would continue to insure their national sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity: but it also reflected
an awareness of the type of threat confronting them, a
threat that was perceived to be directed at the very conti-
nuity of the European way of life.

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[23] For the text of Churchill's speech see Keesings Contempo-
rary Archives, p.8138.

3.3   THE TREATY OF BRUSSELS REVIEWED

The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Defence, which is the official title of the more colloquial Treaty of Brussels, was initialled on 13 March 1948 and signed four days later.[24] The five signatory States to the treaty were Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. The conference of representatives of these West European democracies, which led to the creation of the Brussels Pact, can be directly attributed to the British diplomatic initiative begun by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's Western Union speech of 22 January 1948, which was followed by the joint Anglo-French proposal (February 19) to the three Benelux countries to take part in the construction of Western Union. The timing of the conference was forcefully underscored by the disquieting Russo-Finnish treaty negotiations[25] and the swift and sudden success of the Soviet-backed Communist coup in Czechoslovakia that had occurred in late February.[26] The

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[24] Treaty of Brussels: Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Defence, printed in Documents on International Affairs, 1947-48., London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952., pp.225-227. Hereafter cited as the Treaty of Brussels.

[25] See "Finland under Pressure". The World Today., Vol.4, No.4, April 1948., pp.144-151. Also see Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs, 1947-1948., pp.157-160.

[26] "Czechoslovakia and Finland – the two countries upon which the Soviet jaw is closing – are more than two small countries engulfed by the tyranny of a powerful neighbour. They are symbols and portents in the mind of Europe – symbols of a former betrayal by the west, portents of war and destruction which might be in store. The wave of

question as to whether, or not, this document reveals the existence of a security regime can partly be answered by reviewing the clauses of the treaty signed in Brussels.

It will be recalled that the existence of a security regime is defined by the presence of principles and norms which encourage restraint in State interaction by seeming to promise reciprocal restraint on the part of other member-States. To this definition, Stephen Krasner has contributed the suggestion that specific decision-making procedures are required in order to give vent to collective opinion, and to implement collective choice.[27] Furthermore, because of the nature of security as a political concept, security regimes are predicated within a delineated systemic setting; a system surrounded by a "diplomatic fence" and determined by shared values, understandings, and an implicit social purpose. It can be argued that an analysis of the Treaty of Brussels reveals all of these requisites. Examination of the text of this treaty, by itself, supports an affirmative response to the original research question; whether, or not, the Brussels Pact can be considered to represent a security

grief and alarm that has swept over the free world draws some, at least, of its strength and bitterness from memories of 1939. So much bloodshed, so much sacrifice, so much suffering have been spent and borne to undue the injustices of that year. Now, barely a decade later, Europe is apparently back at that melancholy starting point": The Economist., March 6, 1948.

[27] See Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: regimes as intervening variables", in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes., Ithica, New York, Cornell University Press, 1982., pp.1-21.

regime on 17 March 1948.

The principles of the Treaty of Brussels are first stated in the treaty's preambular clauses. Unlike the operative clauses which form the bulk of any treaty, and list specific obligations that the signatories have assumed, the preamble is basically introductory. A preamble explains in general statements the purposes for the creation of the treaty, and can afford to ignore individual interpretations so long as the wording expresses basic and shared sentiments. Nevertheless, the preamble is a valuable section of the treaty as its terms must, as with all international accords, be unanimously approved. "A constitution", said Napoleon, "should be short and ambiguous", but it is understood that any ambiguity must be acceptable to all. Within the preambular clauses of this treaty certain basic sentiments are listed. The content of these sentiments is such that they meet the qualifications accepted to be representative of a regime's principles: principles of causation, relevancy, and rectitude. Through its preambular clauses, the Brussels Treaty gave expression to three principles which comprise its raison d'-etre.

The first principle was a reassertion of the widespread, and fundamental, elements found within the Western democratic political tradition. This principle was, in essence, a reaffirmation of democracy and democratic rights; a declaration that the political tradition upon which the signato-

ries' governments and societies were based, was morally
sound.   This tradition was defined in the first and second
preambular clauses by means of an expression of

> faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
> and worth of the human person...the principles of
> democracy, personal freedom and political liberty,
> the constitutional traditions and the rule of law
> which are their [the five signatories] common her-
> itage.[28]

To a large extent the inclusion of a defence of the demo-
cratic tradition can be understood as a by-product made nec-
essary by the Second World War and its outcome.   All five
signatories had been democracies, in some form or another,
for fifty years or more; in the cases of Great Britain and
Belgium constitutional democracy had existed from the time
of their emergence as States.   However, only Great Britain
had been able to resist successfully the hostile, and bla-
tantly anti-democratic, policies of Nazi Germany during the
period 1939-1945.   Ironically, the eventual triumph demo-
cratic forces enjoyed in the war had to be partly attributed
to the very substantial military contribution of the Soviet
Union: a State whose political ideology was both alien and
inimical to the Western democratic tradition.   Despite the
victory, there were many in Western Europe who asserted that
the outbreak of the war, the defeats of 1940, and the post-
war economic depression, were manifestations of the "weak-
ness" of democracy, and of a need for a different, more ef-
ficient and responsive approach to the modern problems of

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[28] _Treaty of Brussels_, p.225.

government.

The fact that the first and second preambular clauses began with the phrases, "To reaffirm their faith" and "To fortify and preserve the principles" suggests that there was a perceived need to express these sentiments in just that way. The semantics of those phrases, expressing emotional intensity and political conviction, can only lead one to believe that their intonation was far more than a perfunctory gesture. In 1948 the five signatories shared a belief in the basic rectitude of their common political tradition and obviously felt a need to assert that sentiment in the treaty. In other words, the Treaty of Brussels publicly anounced, for perhaps the first time in the post-war era, that five West European States were confident in their democratic ethos and had no intention of willingly, or wittingly, abandoning that value system.

The second principle contained within the preamble was that of encouraging the economic recovery of Europe. This objective was stated by the fourth preambular clause which read;

> To cooperate loyally and to coordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery.[29]

From a practical point of view, the principle being voiced in the fourth preambular clause is one, which given the breadth and degree of war-devastation, seems perfectly obvi-

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[29] ibid, p.226.

ous and sensible.   States seek economic prosperity for the
political stability and social progress which usually accom-
panies that condition: a redressing of the post-war economic
stagnation was thus a common interest of all five Powers.
From this standpoint, even the principles of the democratic
tradition were dependent on the achievement of this goal.
However this clause proceeded to go beyond a recitation of
an easily identifiable common interest continually addressed
during this period; especially in post-war initiatives such
as the Marshall Plan which was institutionalised within the
Conference on European Economic Cooperation (CEEC).

The fourth preambular clause's use of the phrase "[t]o
cooperate loyally and to coordinate their efforts" can only
be interpreted as deliberate.   The purpose behind the word-
ing of this clause was to give expression to the belief that
the economic nationalism and "beggar thy neighbour" policies
followed after World War One were no longer accepted as le-
gitimate State responses to the needs of individual economic
recovery.   The wording of the Treaty of Brussels, was far
stronger in intent and much greater in the scope of proposed
operations than the Treaty of Dunkirk's (1947) preambular
statement on economic cooperation: all it had stated was
that the two signatories - Britain and France - intended "to
strengthen the economic relations between them" with regard
to "their mutual advantage.[30] The Treaty of Brussels, by

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[30] Treaty of Dunkirk: Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assis-
tance Between the United Kingdom and France, in Documents

means of the fourth preambular clause, cited economic recovery as a common objective of the signatories, and restated the position that its realisation required a common enterprise: restates, because the West European-wide agreements concerning economic cooperation, following the Conference of Paris (July 1947) presumably demonstrated a prior acceptance of that approach.

The third, and last, principle the Treaty of Brussels exhibited was support for a regionally-based system of collective security. This principle was found within the fifth and sixth preambular clauses. The fifth clause stated that the signatories would,

> afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression.[31]

The sixth clause stated further that the signatories would,

> take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression.[32]

Taken together the two clauses revealed a complete rejection of neutrality as the basis of any signatory's policy toward conflicts involving any of the five Powers. The fifth clause can be accounted for as a logical response to the hinderance, and ineffectiveness, of Belgian and Dutch poli-

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on International Affairs, 1947-48., p.195. Hereafter cited as the Treaty of Dunkirk.

[31] Treaty of Brussels., p.226.

[32] ibid.

cies of neutrality before they were engulfed in the Second World War; both countries were invaded within days of each other in May of 1940. A reference to recent history would likewise account for Germany receiving specific mention in the sixth clause; it was a natural response given the rapidity of the post-1918 German recovery, and its re-embarkation on an expansionist policy in Europe. It was this third principle which directly addressed the question of military security through the principle of collective self-defence; the fifth clause explicitly supported the collective security system which the United Nations had been created to uphold.

However, as was discussed in Chapter Two, security entails both the identification of what values are to be made secure and against a designated adversary: security of what, and from whom. It seems quite obvious that the principle of collective defence was based on more than just the preservation of a territorial status quo. This interpretation is based on the positioning of the fifth preambular clause within the overall preamble. The fifth clause follows four other preambular clauses whose purposes were to reassert the common rectitude of democratic Europe and to reproach economic nationalism as a divisive element in the quest of the five Powers for a common recovery. Therefore, it can be surmised that it was these objectives - contained within the first two principles - which the principle of collective de-

fence was designed to secure. If this interpretation was not that of the original framers of the <u>Treaty of Brussels</u>, there would not have been any reason to state the obvious facts of their common democratic tradition and their united will to "fortify and preserve" that heritage, and to follow those clauses with the principle of collective defence. Security is defined as the "protection of already-acquired values", and the third preambular clause clearly illustrated that the five Powers regarded their common heritage as a value which needed to be protected:

> To strengthen...the economic, social and cultural ties by which they [the signatories] are already united.[33]

Indeed, this interpretation is further supported by the seventh preambular clause which determined the geographical, or territorial, extent of the Brussels Pact. The seventh clause noted that the five Powers were willing to admit new signatories to the Brussels Pact; however, any additional signatory had to be "inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination."[34]

It should also be noted that the five Powers were clearly seeking security from more than just the "German problem" as the wording of the sixth clause would seem to suggest. If the purpose behind collective defence was to protect the democratic tradition of the Western World then, clearly,

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[33] <u>ibid</u>.

[34] <u>ibid</u>.

States which possessed alternative, or opposing, social doctrines must have been envisaged as putative threats. In 1948 the most adversarial of political ideologies was no longer fascism, which had been severely weakened in 1945, but rather Marxism-Leninism. Although the fears of a re-militarised German Reich were quite sincere, had they been the sole cause for concern the sixth clause would have been sufficient to address them: or, the text of the treaty would have been worded to emphasise the Greman threat as it was in the 1947 Dunkirk Treaty.[35] The inclusion of the fifth clause, in addition to the third and seventh preambular clauses, was a clear assertion that the five Powers perceived that the threat to their security did not lie solely with the possibility of a revived, and hostile Germany. Therefore, the most evident threat, and against which the treaty's collective defence was targetted, was that of the Soviet Union; the terms of the fifth clause addressed that country's perceived threat toward the West.

In analysing the text of the <u>Treaty</u> <u>of</u> <u>Brussels</u> several other factors are relevant to support the contention that it represented a security regime at the time of its creation in March of 1948: the systemic nature of the Pact; the self-perceived interdependence of the signatories; the presence of obligations, or regime norms, and; the existence of decision-making procedures. All four factors are within that

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[35] See the text of the <u>Treaty</u> <u>of</u> <u>Dunkirk</u>, pp.194-197.

section of the treaty containing the operative clauses, and which list the specific obligations of the signatory States.

The existence of a collective self-perception that the signatories to the Treaty of Brussels were a distinct system of States was originally discussed in the preamble's reassertion of the Western political tradition. Additionally, the seventh preambular clause established that the membership of the Pact was to be determined, not by strategic or political expediency, but rather by the prospective member sharing the same ethos. Within the operative section of the treaty document, Article III completely endorsed the ideological thrust of the preamble;

> The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilization and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means.[36]

Although the Treaty of Brussels was concluded only one year after the Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk, the latter did not contain any similar clause.[37] Article III of the Treaty of Brussels demonstrated that the five Powers recognised that they belonged to a particular "society" of States. The "diplomatic fence" to which Edward Gulick referred[38] was effectively raised by Article III. Article III implied that

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[36] Treaty of Brussels, p.226.

[37] See text of the Treaty of Dunkirk., pp.194-197.

[38] See Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power., New York, Norton, 1955., pp.8-24.

States which did not share "the basis of their common civilization" were clearly external to the system represented by the Pact; the system being defined by States adhering to the principles contained in the first and second preambular clauses.

By way of comparison, Article III of the <u>Treaty of Brussels</u> was far more systemic then either the <u>Covenant of the League of Nations</u> (1919),[39] or the <u>Charter of the United Nations</u> (1945).[40] Neither one of these two documents, each a constitution of a world-wide organisation, discuss the concept of a common civilisation or mention the possibility of shared value systems. Article 1 of the <u>Covenant</u>, and Chapter Two (Articles 3-6) of the <u>Charter</u> address the question of membership in their respective organisations as being limited only by the qualification that members must be peace-loving States. Article 2, Section 6 of the <u>Charter</u> declares, for example, that the United Nations will attempt to ensure that States which are not members will, nevertheless, "act in accordance with those Principles as far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and se-

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[39] See <u>The Covenant of the League of Nations</u>, as printed in F.S. Northedge, <u>The League of Nations: its life and times, 1920-1946.</u>, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1986., Appendix A, pp.317-327. Hereafter cited as the <u>Covenant of the League of Nations</u>.

[40] See <u>The Charter of the United Nations</u>, as printed in H.G. Nicholas, <u>The United Nations: As a political institution.</u>, Oxford, Oxford University Press., 1967., Appendix, pp.207-239. Hereafter cited as the <u>Charter of the United Nations</u>.

curity."[41] Thus, in neither case, the League or the United Nations, is there a conception of the political entity being limited in their membership by anything other than the particular, chronologically-bound foreign policy outlooks of their member-States. The Treaty of Brussels differs from these two organisations' constitutions, not just in the limited scope of its membership, but also in the awareness of a time-honoured ethos to determine that membership.

The second factor, that is interdependence, was perhaps most evident in the preambular clauses of the treaty: this was demonstrated in the previous discussion of collective defence as a principle of the Brussels Pact. Nonetheless, interdependence was also perceived among the five Powers in the realm of economic recovery as revealed by the first paragraph of Article I;

> Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to promote the necessity of economic recovery in Europe, the High Contracting Parties will so organize and co-ordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, the co-ordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges.[42]

As noted earlier, abandoning economic nationalism was a reaction against the disastrous consequences of similar policies during the inter-war period, and was entirely in accord with the spirit of post-war European liberal political

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[41] ibid, p.209.

[42] Treaty of Brussels, p.225.

beliefs. One could even argue that, on a liberal basis, recognition of economic interdependence simply prefaced a more sophisticated belief: if political stability required the rejection of economic nationalism, then the maintenance of the democratic tradition, by means of intense economic cooperation, further pursued a collective interest of the five Powers. As the Belgian Prime Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, commented in London in January of 1948;

> This political accord we are wishing for should be accompanied by an economic accord. It is a good thing to unite to fight and to win in war. It is better, it is perhaps more difficult, to unite to live together and assure its prosperity.[43]

In effect, the particular type of systemic perspective adopted by the five countries of the Brussels Pact necessitated an acceptance, by those same States, of political and economic interdependence; the two ideas are halves of the same coin.

Article 4 of the Dunkirk Treaty (1947) between Britain and France had, like the Treaty of Brussels, earlier raised the issue of the willingness to cooperate within the economic sector:

> [T]he High Contracting Parties will by constant consultation on matters affecting their economic relations with each other take all possible steps to promote the prosperity and economic security of both countries and thus enable each of them to contribute more effectively to the economic and

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[43] "Extract from a speech by M.Spaak, Belgian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the British Chamber of Commerce in Brussels, 5 February 1948", quoted in Documents on International Affairs, 1947-48., p.225.

social objectives of the United Nations.[44]
The transformation of the economic cooperation of Dunkirk,
into the recognition of economic interdependence was perhaps
first voiced by the American Secretary of State, George Mar-
shall, when he stated that "without the return of normal ec-
onomic health" there could not be any "political stability
or assured peace."[45] This view was reinforced by the Soviet
intransigence at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers;
it was believed that the USSR was waiting for the West to
collapse economically in order to make extensive political
gains in Western Europe. Thus, it was in this same vein
that Ernest Bevin was able to link directly the independence
of democratic Europe with economic recovery in his Western
Union speech of 22 January 1948;

> If we are to preserve peace and our own safety at
> the same time we can only do so by the mobilisa-
> tion of such a moral and material force [emphasis
> added] as will create confidence and energy in the
> West and inspire respect elsewhere....[46]

The Brussels Pact therefore demonstrated a perception of
interdependence among the signatories to the treaty. The
five Powers recognised themselves to be interdependent be-
cause the eventual economic recovery of Europe required the

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[44] Treaty of Dunkirk, p.196.

[45] "Speech by the United States Secretary of State, General
Marshall, at Harvard University: The Marshall Plan, 5
June 1947", in Documents on International Affairs,
1947-48., p.25

[46] "Speech by Mr. Bevin in the House of Commons", in Docu-
ments on International Affairs, 1947-48., p.212.

active cooperation of all of Western Europe. As Harold Mac-
Millan, then an Opposition Member of Parliament, stated;

> The economic interdependence of Western Germany
> and Europe must be recognised. The Ruhr, the
> Saar, Lorraine and Luxemburg are interdependent,
> and together they form the greatest industrial
> unit in the world.[47]

They were are also interdependent because the political
goals their societies espoused, such as social progress, so-
cial justice, and an enhanced standard of living, could only
be achieved within a more affluent European community. The
treaty gave formal expression to a long-held view that, giv-
en the political and economic realities, the principles of
the Western democratic tradition were as interdependent as
the five Powers perceived their individual fates to be:

> The Resistance writers [during the Second World
> War] were realistic enough to judge that both the
> extra-European powers would be ideologically and
> economically self-sufficient, and would have
> enough resources to ensure their own internal
> peace, prosperity, and self-defence, in other
> words they would see no necessity to give up their
> sovereign rights in favour of any world organiza-
> tion that might be set up over them. ...The nation
> states in the much reduced Continent of Europe, on
> the other hand, would obviously not be able to
> guarantee peace and prosperity from their own re-
> sources because they would be outclassed in terms
> of technology, economy, and defence. Only by pool-
> ing their sovereignty could they safegaurd peace,
> prosperity, and human rights against the totali-
> tarian claims of the former national states.[48]

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[47] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons).,
Vol.441, p.1028.

[48] Walter Lipgens, op cit., pp.50-51.

The third factor was the presence of carefully-worded obligations to which the signatories acceded. These obligations fell under three headings: promises of military assistance; promises of economic cooperation, and; assurances of good faith and peaceful intent. International obligations which represent categoric responsibilities are found only in the operative clauses of treaties and other agreements among States. For traditional analysis, operative clauses are the backbone of treaties; without operative clauses the treaty would be little more than, as the German chancellor said in August of 1914, "a mere scrap of paper". For analysis employing the concept of international regimes, the operative clauses constitute the superstructure of the regime, resting, as it must, on its clearly understood set of intersubjective principles; in other words, treaty obligations are the regime's norms.

The agreement among the five States to provide military assistance to one another was stated by Article IV;

> If any of the High Contracting Parties should be
> the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other
> High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with
> the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the
> United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all
> the military and other aid and assistance in their
> power.[49]

The text of Article IV stipulated that the promised military assistance needed to meet two conditions. First, Article IV stressed that if any of the signatories should be attacked

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[49] *Treaty of Brussels*, p.227.

the others would <u>immediately</u> render both military and other types of defence-related assistance. Admittedly, the actual wording of Article IV did not make any reference to the establishment of a time factor. However, a comparison with other military pacts can only leave one with the opinion that the immediacy of response was implied.

Article 16 of the <u>Covenant of the League of Nations</u>, while noting that an attack on one member was <u>ipso facto</u> an attack on all, stated that military action was not to be considered an immediate response; economic sanctions were to be implemented against the aggressor Power or Powers.[50] League-sponsored military action was only to be taken as a last resort, and only after the Council of the League recommended the use of force to re-establish the <u>status quo ante bellum</u>. Article Five of the <u>North Atlantic Treaty</u> is extremely ambiguous on the type of aid NATO members are expected to render one another. Members of NATO agree that they

> will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.[51]

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[50] <u>Covenant of the League of Nations</u>, p.323.

[51] The <u>North Atlantic Treaty</u>, as printed in <u>The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Facts and Figures</u>., Brussels, NATO Information Service, 1984., Appendix 2, pp.264-265. Hereafter cited as the <u>North Atlantic Treaty</u>.

Although the lack of specificity was a deliberate measure to allow American and Danish[52] accession to the treaty, the implication is far more wide-ranging. Within the scope of obligations assumed by the sixteen members of NATO, there is no categoric imperative to provide military assistance to one another. NATO's command structure, strategic doctrine, and pre-positioning of troops, not forgetting the political reputations of the Sixteen, may have done much to strengthen Article Five. However Article Five neither promises, nor rules out, the use of armed force to assist other beseiged members of the alliance. In light of the wording of these two other military pacts, the Brussels Treaty seemed to imply that, in confronting armed aggression, immediacy of response was to be the expectation.

The second condition which qualified the signatories' obligations was that the promise of assistance was limited only to attacks incurred by the member-States in Europe; it explicitly excluded the overseas posessions of the European colonial empires which were extant at this time. Article IV established the regional limitations to the principle of, and obligations to, collective defence. In this case, the

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[52] See Sir Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO., Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1983.

[53] Article 10 read, in part; "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve, as against external aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." See the Covenant of the League of Nations, p.320.

Brussels Pact was quite unlike Articles 10[53] and 17[54] of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, which was universal in
its scope of applicability. However, a strict explanation
of the range of commitments undertaken is consistent with
the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article Six of that
document was devoted, in its entirety, to the specification
of territories protected by the NATO military alliance.[55]

One author has mistakenly called Article IV of the Treaty
of Brussels, the "heart of the Treaty."[56] The belief that
the single military clause within a document of ten opera-
tive clauses and a substantial preamble was the most impor-
tant, or the "heart", of the entire treaty over-emphasises
the formal alliance aspect of the Pact. Article IV did, in-
deed, involve the five Powers in a military alliance. It
created a common and united armed front to oppose any poten-
tial external or specific-adversarial aggression – German or
Soviet. Nevertheless, all that Article IV was designed to

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[54] ibid, p.324.

[55] "For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or
more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack
on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North
America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the
occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands
under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic
area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or
aircraft in this area of any of the Parties".: Article 6
of the North Atlantic Treaty, p.265. It should be noted
that since July 3, 1962, the clause "on the Algerian De-
partments of France" has not been in effect for NATO.

[56] Diane A. Kressler, Western European Union: A Study of the
WEU and its role in European Integration, 1954-1966.,
Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1967., p.13

thwart were the external threats; military threats to the principles upon which the Pact was based, from outside the particular system which the Pact itself represented. The five Powers could only have perceived Article IV as one aspect, albeit the most conventional, in addressing their security problems. The remaining obligations specified by the treaty directly addressed those threats of an internal nature which the signatories also had a collective interest in removing.

The second type of obligation present in the Treaty of Brussels was that contained within Articles I and II; that is, to promote and participate in a common economic enterprise aimed at accelerating the recovery of Europe.[57] As this has already been discussed earlier in this chapter, it would be redundant to examine this any further.

The third type of obligation comprised the assurances of good faith and peaceful intent among the signatories which were contained in Articles VI, VIII, and X. Semantically, assurances are not usually associated with obligations. In the case of these three articles, however, assurances constituted obligations because the signatories to the treaty agreed on the legitimacy of their existing good relations with one another, and specified the means of sustaining them. Article VI declared that none of the five Powers were signatories to

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[57] For the text of Articles I and II, see the Appendix.

> international engagements now in force between him
> and any other of the High Contracting Parties or
> any third State [which] is in conflict with the
> provisions of the present Treaty.[58]

However, it did not stop with this brief recitation of the good faith of the signatories. Article VI also prohibited the Pact's member-States from concluding any alliance or participating in any form of collective venture aggressively targetting any other of the member-States. In effect, Article VI was an effort to enhance predictability among the associated States by removing, and prohibiting, the type of machiavellian, or secret, diplomacy made infamous during the Nineteenth Century. Article VI is very similar in intent to Article 18 of the League's Covenant which proscribed secret diplomacy and obliged States to publish all international aggreements or treaties:[59] it is an obligation continued today within the format of the United Nations as stated in Article 102[60] of the Charter.

Article VIII of the Treaty of Brussels served to expand the purview of Article VI. Article VIII obliged all member-States to refrain from the use of force in their relations

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[58] ibid, p.227.

[59] Article 18 of the Covenant went so far as to state that "
[n]o such Treaty or international engagement shall be
binding until so registered": taken from the Covenant of
the League of Nations, p.324.

[60] "Every treaty and every international agreement entered
into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be
registered with the Secretariat and published by it.":
Article 102, the Charter of the United Nation, p.236.

with one another in areas of dispute that fall within Article 36 of the <u>Statute of the International Court of Justice</u>. Article 36 of the <u>Statute</u> authorises the Court to ajudicate in four areas; interpretations of treaties; on any question of international law; the breaching of international obligations; establishment of suitable reparations arising from the breaching of obligations.[61] Thus, all areas of intercourse among the five Powers, save the possibility of military invasion already addressed by Article IV of the <u>Treaty of Brussels</u>, were to be settled by peaceful means; Article VIII proscribes the use of force in those areas.[62]

Articles VI and VIII effectively obliged member-States of the Pact to abolish war among themselves. Because of the nature of the threat confronting the five Powers which they identified as one aimed at the continuation of the Western democratic tradition, in addition to their perceived interdependence in successfully combating that threat, the two articles addressed all of the principles stated in the preamble. Together, Articles VI and VIII can be envisaged as another brick in the diplomatic wall that the <u>Treaty of Brussels</u> constructed around the five Powers.

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[61] The <u>Statute of the International Court of Justice</u>, as printed in Louis Henkin, <u>et al</u>, <u>Basic Documents Supplement to International Law: Cases and Materials</u>., St.Paul, Minnesota, West Publishing Company, 1980., p.33.

[62] For the text of Article VII see the Appendix.

Article X of the treaty reinforced Articles VI and VIII, as well as Article IV, by establishing the initial duration of the _Treaty_ _of_ _Brussels_ to be fifty years: it was only an initial duration, because if the five Powers did not announce an intention to withdraw after fifty years, in 1998, the treaty was indefinite in its lifespan. Article X is important in two ways.

First, Article X obliged the member-States to abide by the terms of the Pact for fifty or more years. Therefore, the five Powers could expect that their individual actions, with regard to policy areas covered by the treaty, would have long-term implications. Since the five Powers regarded the _Treaty_ _of_ _Brussels_ to be in their best interests, collectively and individually, the fifty-year lifespan would likely influence States to view national interests from a concommitant long-term perspective. A short-term approach to the national interest usually results in States defecting from treaties, and treaty organisations such as the Brussels Pact quickly breaking down; it is, of course, assumed that States would not normally undertake policies, resulting in early defections if such actions were not in their long-term interest. The long-term nature of the Brussels Pact, founded upon a set of interdependent principles and objectives, can be understood as an effort to discourage the abandonment of those same principles.

The second way in which Article X's declaration was important was that membership in the Brussels Pact represented a commitment to a system of interaction that was planned to last for fifty, or more, years. As Robert Jervis noted in his discussion of the Concert of Europe, commitments by States represent convictions, or expectations of success.[63] One can, in this vein, recall William Riker's discussion of rational political action as activities aimed at winning.[64] The same rationale can be applied to the Treaty of Brussels: the five Powers were willing to sign the treaty, and participate in a regional security organisation because they must have expected it to succeed in its objectives.

In reviewing the Treaty of Brussels, the last factor to be noted is the decision-making procedures established by the treaty. It will be recalled that Stephen Krasner defined decision-making procedures as an international regime's mechanism for agreeing upon, and implementing collective choice. In effect, decision-making procedures are the means of generating mutually acceptable rules of action; Krasner defined these as prescriptive and proscriptive behavioural standards established within a regime in order to realise its principles. In applying the regime concept to the Treaty of Brussels, one quickly perceives that the deci-

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[63] Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes", in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes., Ithica, New York, Cornell University Press, 1982., p.183-184

[64] William Riker, Theory of Political Coalitions., New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962., pp.20-22.

sion-making apparatus of the collectivity was encapsulated within the treaty-designated Consultative Council.[65]

The Consultative Council was created by the first paragraph of Article VII of the Treaty of Brussels:

> For the purpose of consulting together on all the questions dealt with in the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will create a Consultative Council, which shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions unanimously. The Council shall meet at such times as it shall deem fit.[66]

The purpose for this administrative organ was stated by the second paragraph of Article VII:

> At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties, the Council shall be immediately convened in order to pwermit the High Contracting Parties to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise; with regard to the attitude to be adopted and the steps to be taken in case of a renewal by Germany of an aggressive policy; or with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability.[67]

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[65] While in Brussels, the representatives of the five Powers also agreed on the creation of a Permanent Commission for the Brussels Pact to be based in London. It was composed of the French, Dutch, Belgian, and Luxemburg ambassadors to the Court of St.James and a British official of ambassadorial rank. Originally intended to meet monthly, after its April 24, 1948 meeting the Permanent Commission met on a weekly basis. The purpose of the Commission was to examine areas of common interest, without regard to specific subjects, and suggest options for the Consultative Council. See Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs, 1947-1948., p.110.

[66] Treaty of Brussels, p.227.

[67] ibid, p.228.

As a result of Article VII, the Consultative Council was the only body responsible for the creation of policies to meet the needs of, or respond to threats directed at, the principles put forth in the treaty.[68]

Although not contained within the text of the Treaty of Brussels, the Consultative Council was during 1948 able to address the issues raised by the pursuit of its objectives. In response to the defence-related duties, specified in Article IV, four committees were established: the Western Defence Committee composed of the five Powers' Defence Ministers; an Allied Chiefs-of-Staffs Committee and Military Supply Board; a Western Commanders-in-Chief Committee, at Fontainbleau Palace, to study tactical and logistical problems associated with defending Europe; a Finance and Economics Committee which was to examine problems of both military production and the financing of the manufacture of armaments. By the end of 1948, the Consultative Council announced a comprehensive plan for the defence of Western Europe. Additionally they took several other defence-related

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[68] A.H. Robertson has suggested that the Consultative Council was never intended to function in this manner. He argues that the treaty contains no mention of an organisation because there was no desire by the five Powers to create an additional international agency: "in other words, the authors of the treaty apparently did not intend to create a new international organisation; nevertheless, the force of events was such that they did in fact do so, for the simple reason that the measures of international co-operation resulting from the treaty could not be realised without the necessary machinery." See A.H. Robertson, European Institutions, Cooperation, Integration, Unification., London, Stevens and Sons, 1966., pp.112-113.

initiatives: a plan for the production of armaments in Europe; establishment of standardisation procedures for weapons and training; agreements on joint military exercises; creation of a "nucleus for a joint command structure." However, military issues were not all that was addressed by the Consultative Council. In August 1948 four social committees and one cultural committee were created to examine cultural, social, and educational issues which fell under its mandate by the terms of Articles II and III of the treaty.[69]

3.4 CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to examine whether, or not, the regime concept can be legitimately applied to an analysis of the Brussels Pact when it was created in March of 1948. From an analysis of the treaty document, one quickly perceives that all of the requisite "ingredients" are either expressed within its preambular clauses, or are present within its superstructure of State-assumed obligations. If one were only limited to an examination and analysis of the text of the treaty alone, the answer to the original research question would have to be given in the affirmative.

However, in addressing that initial question only half of the task has been completed by this chapter. An analysis of a single isolated document is not sufficient evidence to

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[69] Diane A. Kressler, op cit., pp.12-17. See also Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs, 1947-1948., pp.113-114.

suggest an academically-honest response to the research question: it can only be answered by probing the official policies of the four principal signatory States of which the treaty is but a part. The next three chapters examine the historical and political attitudes as expressed by the British, French, Belgian, and Dutch governments respectively.[70]

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[70] In Chapter Six, Belgium and the Netherlands are treated first separately, and then together under the general heading of the Benelux Pact. Unfortunately, Luxemburg's policy is not examined in this study.

Chapter IV

BRITISH POLICY LEADING TO THE TREATY OF BRUSSELS

4.1   INTRODUCTION

Of the many Powers which participated in the Second World
War only Great Britain fought from the beginning to the end
of that conflict.   More importantly it was victorious as a
result of the fighting. Politically stable, and possessing a
large armed force, Great Britain was one of the "Big Three"
Powers in 1945. As a result of its status and capabilities,
its global interests,   and the willingness of both the
Churchill and Attlee Governments,   Britain had an important
role to play in the reordering of the post-war world.   How-
ever as one astute writer noted, his country had "emerged
from the war with added prestige, but much reduced economic
and military power."[1] British foreign policy towards Western
Europe was to reflect these facts; although Europe was, as
Churchill had said, Britain's "prime interest", its ability
to determine European affairs was not what it had been prior
to World War Two.

    The purpose of this chapter is to trace the development
of British policy towards the emerging problem of Western
security during the period 1944-1948. The chapter is divid-

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[1] The Times(London), March 7, 1946.

ed into three sections arranged according to chronological order. First, there is an examination of British policy from 1944 to early 1948 when Ernest Bevin delivered his Western Union speech in the House of Commons. The second section analyses the Western Union speech as it is usually credited with being the immediate impetus for the diplomatic process leading to Brussels in March of 1948. The third section is an examination of the purposes for Bevin's speech, as well as the conclusions that can be drawn from British policy with regard to the Brussels Pact.

4.2   THE BEGINNING

An analysis of British foreign policy toward Europe for the period of 1944-1948 reveals that its development was heavily influenced by three inter-related factors. First, there was a realisation that in order to be an effective international actor, Britain had to be linked more closely than before to Europe for political, economic, and security reasons: however, the precise mechanism to accomplish this linkage was not available until after the Marshall Plan proposals of June 1947. Second, the basic objective of continuing Three Power (or Four Power, after Potsdam) cooperation gradually devolved, despite a residual fear of Germany, into a policy primarily directed at countering a perceived Soviet threat. Lastly, British foreign policy, in light of Soviet preponderance in post-war Europe, aimed at "entangling" the United States in European affairs; this became an especially sa-

lient concern with the relatively rapid breakdown of Four Power cooperation.

During the war the British Foreign Office, under Anthony Eden, had established the interdepartmental Post-Hostilities Planning Staff (PHPS). The principal duty of this bureau was to investigate foreign policy options that Great Britain might pursue after the cessation of hostilities. The main contribution of the PHPS was the suggestion that Great Britain should take the lead in forming a Western European Security Group. It was conceived, Eden remarked, "as a kind of Locarno Pact without Germany."[2] Conscious of the probable limits of British power in the post-war world, the PHPS further stated that the interests of the proposed Western European Security Group lay in working closely with the Commonwealth and especially the United States.[3]

It is not surprising that a British government should have concerned itself with a policy option entailing closer links with Europe than had ever before been seriously proposed. In the days immediately prior to the collapse of France in June of 1940, Churchill had been both bold and imaginative in advocating a merger of Britain and France into a single State. The product of an unexpected crisis - the

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[2] Sean Greenwood, "Ernest Bevin, France and 'Western Union': August 1945-February 1946", in European History Quarterly., Vol.14, No.3, June 1984. p.324.

[3] John Baylis, "Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment", International Affairs., Vol.60, No.4, Autumn 1984. p.617.

impending defeat of France - the original plan was proposed by Messrs. Jean Monnet and Rene Pleven of France, and drafted by the British War Cabinet which Churchill chaired; in its breadth of design and political vision, it can be considered a prototype for total political integration in Europe. At that time French premier Paul Reynaud was forced to decline this unique offer. The French Government, beseiged at Bordeaux, immediately perceived the plan as a British sleight of hand; they saw it as a means of turning a prostrate France into another British dominion, rather than as a unique proposal to establish an equal bi-national partnership.[4]

The idea of a post-war linkage between Great Britain and Western Europe, as proposed by Eden's PHPS, was neither new nor was it even solely British in origin. As early as 1942, Paul-Henri Spaak, the Foreign Minister of the Belgian Government-in-Exile, had unsuccessfully suggested a similar plan to Prime Minister Churchill; he had added the proviso that Britain should assume its leadership.[5] In March of 1944 Spaak, with the agreement of the Dutch, Norwegian, and Belgian, Governments again proposed the establishment of a Western regional defence system; Spaak, himself, was very

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[4] Michael Charlton, The Price of Victory., London, BBC, 1983., p.37. See also Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War., London, HMSO, 1962., pp.67-68.

[5] Paul-Henri Spaak, The Continuing Battle, Memoirs of a European., Boston, Little, Brown and Co. Ltd., 1971., p.82.

much in favour of a system stretching from Norway to Spain,
and including Great Britain.[6] And in 1943, Field Marshal Jan
Smuts, the South African Premier, had likewise proposed a
plan whereby the Low Countries and France would join the
Commonwealth as British Dominions.[7] Not surprisingly the
"non-British" Europeans were less than enthusiatic with the
Smuts Plan.[8]

Although the Foreign Office was basically in favour of a
Western European security system, partly because it would
counteract the emerging Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe,
Churchill was opposed to any attempt to implement Spaak's
idea. He believed that the small countries of Europe would
be liabilities in any regional defence system as Britain
would have to protect them until they were rearmed; without
a rearmed French army such an undertaking would be "contrary
to all wisdom and self-defence."[9] As a result, little subs-

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[6] Sir Llewellyn Woodward, op cit., p.467.

[7] "The Smuts idea was to offer France, Belgium, Holland,
   Norway, and Denmark something in the nature of dominion
   status in the Commonwealth. it would involve such steps as
   the creation of a common foreign policy; coordination of
   military strategy; combined boards for finance, transport,
   production, supplies, resources, and raw materials; a cus-
   toms union; currency agreements; and a joint approach to
   civil aviation and colonial problems." Quoted from Foreign
   Relations of the United States, 1945, Conference of Ber-
   lin, Volume One., p.256. This series of published docu-
   ments is hereafter cited as FRUS..

[8] John Charmley,   "Duff Cooper and Western European Union,
   1944-47", in Review of International Studies., Vol.11,
   No.1, 1985. p.55.

[9] Sir Llewellyn Woodward, op cit., p.468.

tantive policy seemed, at that time, to come from efforts
aimed at formally linking Great Britain with the continent.
Nonetheless, Eden did inform the House of Commons in May of
1944 that the British Government was examining the possibil-
ity of closer ties with the States of Western Europe. How-
ever these relations, while they were to be "close, intimate
and friendly", were also to be complemented by "close polit-
ical and military co-operation between the United States,
the Soviet Union...and China."[10]

Despite Eden's considerable qualification of future An-
glo-European relations, soundings were taken amongst the
various Allied governments-in-exile, then residing in Lon-
don, in an effort to ascertain their feelings about "intense
cooperation" with Britain in the post-war world. In recall-
ing these events, Eden stated that these preliminary discus-
sions failed to produce any definite agreements because the
exiled governments felt that they did not possess mandates
to take the issue any further.[11] However, an equally plausi-
ble explanation for the lack of progress in realising the
PHPS's objectives may have been closely tied to Britain's
role in the Big Three alliance.

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[10] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons).,
     Vol.400, p.1042.

[11] Hans-Joachim Heiser, British Policy With Regard to the
     Unification Efforts on the European Continent., Leyden,
     A.W.Sythoff, 1959., p.21.

As the recognisably junior partner in the Big Three coalition, the development of a definite British policy which aimed at creating a role for Britain in post-war Western Europe was decidely handicapped by two major concerns; the reactions of the Soviet Union and the United States. With regard to the former of the two, there was a fear that the establishment of anything resembling a British sphere of influence in Western Europe, as was essentially being proposed by the PHPS, would serve only to encourage expansionist policies on the part of the Soviet Union. There was an awareness that any Western European security system which "the Russians came to regard...as a precautionary measure against themselves" would likely rebound on the West, and lead to a rupture in Anglo-Soviet relations.[12] As Eden wrote at the time,

> Were we to do so [establish a British sphere] we should be throwing away the considerable chances of the USSR pursuing a policy of collaboration after the war. More than that, we should be risking the deployment against us in Europe of Russia's immense capacity for power politics and disruption.[13]

The Churchill Government understood that Britain would not have the wherewithal, military or economic, to resist any such deployment by the Soviet Union. The Foreign Office's concern about possible Soviet moves into the heartland of Europe became increasingly important after the Yalta Confer-

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[12] Sir Llewellyn Woodward, op cit., p.468.

[13] Quoted in Michael Charlton, op cit., p.34. See also FRUS, 1945, Conference of Berlin, Volume One., pp.256-257.

ence (February -March, 1945). For it was at Yalta that the United States first let it be known that they did not intend to remain in Europe any more than two years after the achievement of victory. Without the guaranteed support of the United States, Britain could not afford to antagonise the Soviet Union; this position was maintained right up to January of 1948 and the Treaty of Brussels.

Of more important concern to the British Government was the expected American reaction to any attempt to create what resembled a British sphere of influence in Western Europe. There was also a realisation that existing British interests absolutely required a good working relationship with the United States, especially in the restructuring of the post-war world. American officials were known to be generally hostile to the post-war continuation of the British Empire; any semblance of imperial expansion was, therefore, absolutely out of the question as far as Washington was concerned. Equally opposed to the resurrection of the pre-war alliance systems, which they perceived as a cause of international conflict, the Americans advocated a global collective security organisation. As a result, there were some in the Foreign Office who believed that, if measures were taken to realise the Spaak or the Smuts plans, the United States might have imposed an unbearable political cost on Britain for having done so.[14] Given the parameters imposed by their

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[14] Michael Charlton, op cit., p.33.

decline, relative to the position occupied by the United States, Britain had to be both cautious in outlook and conscious of American policy objectives.[15]

Even though he considered the United States to be Britain's most important ally, Eden had no desire to sacrifice distinct British security interests in Europe. While hopeful concerning post-war cooperation with the Soviet Union, British policy under Churchill was basically guided by the belief that only Hitler's regime kept the Grand Alliance together. As the war progressed, and difficulties with the Soviets grew, the post-war outlook of Churchill Government became increasingly cautious and critical of Big Three cooperation. Eden continued, therefore, to see an Anglo-West European link as both politically viable and vital to Britain, and envisaged an Anglo-French alliance as providing it with a firm foundation upon which to build:[16] any such alliance was to be anti-German in character and thus pre-empt Soviet accusations that Britain was attempting to build a sphere of influence in Western Europe. As he wrote in a

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[15] Eden and the Foreign Office were correct in judging that the Roosevelt and early Truman Administrations would be hostile to the basic thrust of the PHPS's strategy. In a briefing paper prepared for President Truman entitled "British Plan for a Western European Bloc", one recommendation was that American policy "should be to remove the causes which make nations feel that such spheres are necessary to their security, rather than to assist one country to build up strength against another". See FRUS, 1945, Conference of Berlin, Volume One., pp.256-264.

[16] Anthony Adamthwaite, "Britain and the World; the view from the Foreign Office" in International Affairs., Vol.61, No.2, Spring 1985, p.226.

memo to Churchill, "Europe expects us to have a European policy of our own and to state it."[17] However attempts in 1944 and 1945 to conclude an Anglo-French alliance, and so begin construction of the Western European Security Group, failed; Churchill refused to meet de Gaulle's demand that the left bank of the Rhine should be subjected to permanent French control.[18]

The unexpected electoral defeat inflicted upon Churchill and the Conservatives in August of 1945, brought Clement Attlee and the Labour Party to Downing Street. Along with this change in government, came an expected shift in foreign policy. The new Labour Government, unlike Churchill and Eden, still believed in the possibility of cooperating with the Soviet Union on constructive enterprises in Europe. This attitude was no where better, or more succinctly, stated than in the Labour Party's election slogan that, in relations with the Soviets, "Left understands Left."[19] This open-minded approach was first revealed in practice by the performance of the new Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, at the Potsdam Conference where he had replaced Anthony Eden in the midst of the proceedings:

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[17] John Charmley, "Duff Cooper and Western European Union, 1944-47", pp.54-55.

[18] Walter Lipgens, A History of the European Integration Movement - Volume One, 1945-1947., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982., p.164.

[19] ibid, p.169.

> Having gone to Potsdam on his first day as Foreign
> Secretary, he tried during the last third of the
> conference to establish a man-to-man relationship
> with Stalin and Molotov by speaking frankly and
> honestly. Bevin's subsequent remarks make it
> quite clear that he had no illusions about the
> dictatorial character of Stalin's system; but the
> conference minutes show equally clearly that on
> every question he tried his utmost to reach firm
> and unequivocal agreements, being ready to compro-
> mise as far as humanly possible in order to safe-
> gaurd the permanent cooperation of the Big Three
> on a basis of full understanding.[20]

After the Potsdam Conference Bevin began to look favoura-
bly upon the general idea of an informal group of West Euro-
pean States under Britain's leadership. He agreed with many
of the main points of the earlier PHPS proposal, and even
suggested extending it to include the States along the Medi-
terranean seaboard. However, because of his belief in coop-
erating with the Soviet Union, he, unlike Eden, envisioned
any such grouping of States as more of an economic and com-
mercial bloc than a security alliance. As a result, Bevin
toned down the military aspects of the proposed West Europe-
an Security Group with a view to transforming it into a ve-
hicle to re-establish Great Britain's diplomatic stature
among the Big Three. This view was echoed in September of
1945 by a senior Foreign Office official who wrote in a mem-
orandum to Bevin;

> Because we are numerically the weakest and geo-
> graphically the smallest of the three Great Pow-
> ers, it is essential that we increase our strength
> in not only the diplomatic but also in the econom-
> ic and military spheres. This clearly can best be
> done by enrolling the Dominions and especially

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[20] ibid.

> France, not to mention the lesser Western European
> Powers, as collaborators with us in this tripar-
> tite system. Only so shall we be able in the long
> run to compel our two big partners to treat as an
> equal.[21]

The view that Britain should become linked in some way with the countries of Western Europe was one that found considerable favour in the post-war House of Commons as early as November of 1945. This was especially the case with regard to the position taken by most Opposition Members of Parliament. Many Conservatives argued that the absence of effective regional economic cooperation after World War One had helped lead the continent to disaster in 1939. Equally important was the growing distrust of the Soviet Union and its intentions in Europe. As a result, several Opposition Members termed Bevin's policy of "blindly" cooperating with that country as "appeasement":

> I do not think appeasement ever achieves the re-
> sult that I want to see, and this is a good under-
> standing...We shall reach a better understanding
> with the Russians if we make perfectly certain
> that our own policy is a very positive foreign
> policy. I do not want to see this country abstain-
> ing from positive action in foreign affairs be-
> cause the Russians may object. For instance, it is
> highly desirable that we should have the closest
> understanding with the Western liberal and social
> democratic countries who mean by democracy the
> same as we mean.[22]

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[21] Quoted in ibid, p.156.

[22] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons).,
Vol.419, p.1183.

The use of the term "appeasement", with its prewar connotation of weakness, was purposeful. The imposition of Soviet-style regimes in Eastern Europe, the issue of German reparations, and the unilateral redrafting of the boundaries in Eastern Europe, in contravention to existing Three Power agreements, seemed to question the legitimacy of Bevin's policy.[23] On the other hand, some Members, also Conservatives, opined that the "positive linkage" Bevin should pursue was based on an appreciation of the international political situation akin to that put forward by the Foreign Office;

> We had better face the realities of the situation, which are that between these two great federations, that of the Soviet Union on the one hand and the USA on the other, fortified by their satellite powers – because that is all you can call them either in South America or in Eastern Europe – the smaller nations of Western Europe, of whom we are one, cannot hope to survive, politically or economically, in isolation. Unless we get together in pursuit of a common political and economic policy we shall inevitably, sooner or later, be absorbed into one or other of these two great economic and political blocs which surround us, one in the East and the other in the West.[24]

Nevertheless, to many in Bevin's own Labour Party the PHPS's objectives, in any form, seemed to amount to an attempt to divide Europe into two blocs: one Soviet led, the other pro-Western. One Member of Parliament stated these views bluntly;

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[23] For a summary of Soviet actions after the cessation of hostilities, see Sir Llewellyn Woodward, op cit., pp.540-573.

[24] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons)., Vol.419, p.1254.

> It is an historical fact that blocs lead to coun-
> terblocs, that counterblocs lead to rival spheres
> of influence, which if unchecked, like arms races
> lead inevitably and ultimately to war.[25]

However the recognition of an ideology-based division of Europe and the maintenance of the Western half through a policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union, was clearly not the objective of linking Britain with the continent. On November 7, 1945, Bevin had explained to the House of Commons that it was only natural for the States of Western Europe to desire some semblance of unity;

> They are our cultural friends; they are our his-
> torical associates; they acknowledge the same de-
> mocracy as we do.[26]

Addressing his Labour Party critics, he further rejected, as spurious, the Soviet Union's charge that his policy was intentionally destroying their wartime alliance.[27] Simply stated, Bevin's advocacy of a western group did not presume the existence of an already-divided Europe. In the closing months of 1945 any policy based on that approach to the situation in Europe could only have hurt British security interests, a fact of which Bevin and his advisors were all too aware. Building upon the PHPS's ideas was perceived as a means of supplementing both the Big Three relationship and the concept of collective security within the structure of

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[25] Great Britain, _Parliamentary_ _Debates_ (_House_ _of_ _Commons_).,
Vol.416, p.629.

[26] Great Britain, _Parliamentary_ _Debates_ (_House_ _of_ _Commons_).,
Vol.415, p.1338.

[27] Hans-Joachim Heiser, _op_ _cit_., p.22

the United Nations.   As he noted in the Commons on November
23, 1945;

> I cannot accept the views that all my policy and
> the policy of His Majesty's Government must be
> based entirely on the "Big Three". I recognise ...
> that there are Great Powers which, if exercising
> aright and justly, can be a great umbrella for the
> security and peace of millions throughout the
> world. [28]

A serious, though optimistic, attitude that one could "do
business" with the Soviet Union characterised British policy
throughout 1945 and 1946.   In February of 1946 Bevin sug-
gested that the growing Anglo-Soviet tensions were not
caused by either State's insincerity with regard to a desire
for a mutually-acceptable peace settlement in Europe.   In-
stead, he argued that naturally suspicious attitudes in both
countries were being fed by misinterpretations of actions
and statements. [29] In March of 1946 he publicly expressed his
displeasure at the potential harm Churchill's "Iron Curtain"
speech might have caused. [30] Bevin's policy, which was based
on the possibility of a mutually beneficial, and sincere,
agreement with the USSR lasted until the London Conference
of Foreign Ministers in December of 1947.   Prior to that
date the PHPS's Western Security Group can only be under-
stood as consisting of informal international cooperation

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[28] Great Britain, <u>Parliamentary</u> Debates (<u>House</u> <u>of</u> <u>Commons</u>).,
Vol.416, p.762.

[29] The <u>Times</u>(<u>London</u>)., February 22, 1946.

[30] The <u>Times</u>(<u>London</u>)., March 18, 1946.

within the United Nations' framework.[31]

At that time cooperation among the Big Three was undoubt-
edly in Britain's best interest. The underwriting of the
war effort, meeting post-war domestic social needs, and the
increasingly expensive support required by the occupation-
zone in Germany, meant, that by 1946, Britain had accumulat-
ed debts totalling over 3.7 billion pounds sterling.[32] From
a purely economic perspective, and without a change in Wash-
ington's policy which would guarantee a continued American
military presence in Europe, cooperation with the Soviet Un-
ion was less costly and more feasible than a policy based on
confrontation. Furthermore, Bevin's emphasis on the econom-
ic aspects of the PHPS's proposals was not a deviation from
addressing Western Europe's emerging security problem. The
PHPS had not overlooked the impact of economics in their
wartime deliberations: given Britain's experiences follow-
ing World War One, it had understandably stressed that ef-
fective post-war diplomacy rested on careful management of
Western Europe's remaining economic power. Bevin agreed
with this line of reasoning, and further held that a stable
peace in Europe required a firm economic footing. It was in
this vein, that Bevin later explained to Premier Leon Blum
of France, British policy was "aiming at increasing economic
and cultural cooperation in the hope that out of such coop-

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[31] Elaine Windrich, British Labour's Foreign Policy., Lon-
don, Stanford University Press, 1952., p.190.

[32] Walter Lipgens, op cit., pp.157-158.

eration should arise a common outlook in defence matters."[33]

Although Anglo-Soviet cooperation was one of Bevin's basic objectives, it became increasingly obvious through the latter half of 1946 that the Soviet Union was attempting to expand its influence at the expense of clearly-defined British interests; this was the case with regard to Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Iran. As well, the Foreign Office had long been concerned about the threat posed by the indigenous, but Soviet-controlled, Communist parties of Western Europe.

This concern about the West European Communist parties was underscored by the uncertain political situation in France. The unexpected resignation of de Gaulle from the Provisional Government and the quite apparent chaos of French domestic politics loomed large in Bevin's foreign policy considerations. The Foreign Office believed that France was dangerously vulnerable to Communism. Anxiety about such an outcome became acute by January of 1946 when it appeared that the French Communist Party (PCF) might actually be capable of realising its political objectives through the use of the ballot box; undermining French democracy by means of utilising democratic institutions. This was a reasonable prediction given that the PCF was the largest united political party in the French Chamber of Depu-

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[33] Sean Greenwood, "Ernest Bevin, France and 'Western Union': August 1945-February 1946", p.325.

ties.[34]

The loss of France to Communism and preponderant Soviet influence, however the PCF came to power, was perceived to be disastrous for the security of Britain. Less than two years after preventing a Nazi hegemony, the image of the British Isles facing a united Communist Europe was by no means attractive. Just as before Napoleon's defeat in 1815, or as in 1940, Britain did not want to stand alone again. In expressing this concern one senior Foreign Office official wrote at that time;

> If as a result of elections, France fell under
> Communist and Soviet control, a most dangerous
> situation might arise to this country. Belgium
> would probably also be Communist, whilst a similar
> regime, probably accompanied by civil war, would
> be set up in Spain. Great Britain might find her-
> self a democratic outpost facing a Western Europe
> under Communist and Soviet control.[35]

Bevin also appears to have been aware of the potential mael-storm in French politics, remarking, somewhat laconically, that it looked "like Civil War within a year."[36]

The attempts of the PCF to breakup the coalition-based Provisional Government also alarmed French officials. Pre-mier Gouin, De Gaulle's immediate successor, stated his de-sire for an alliance with Britain on January 30, 1946; he

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[34] The Times(London)., November 11, 1946.

[35] Victor Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947., London, Jonathon Cape, 1982, p.420.

[36] Sean Greenwood, "Return to Dunkirk: The Origins of the Anglo-French Treaty of March 1947", in Journal of Strategic Studies., Vol.6, No.4, December 1983. p.50

repeated the offer on March 30. In both cases the Foreign

Office had responded favourably, but the differences of the

two countries with regard to the future of Germany prevented

any agreement from being reached.[37] It was only when the new

Blum Government offered an alliance without any precondi-

tions, apparently on the private urging of Duff Cooper the

British Ambassador in Paris,[38] that Bevin was able to ac-

cept.

The British believed that an alliance might serve to

strengthen Blum, a moderate Socialist leader, if not bolster

the anti-Communist forces in France generally. Furthermore,

an Anglo-French accord was still perceived as the first, and

necessary, step toward the achievement of their long term

aims as defined by the inchoate proposals of the PHPS.[39]

From Whitehall's vantage both, or either, of the two possi-

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[37] The Times(London)., January 30, 1946, and also April 2, 1946.

[38] Duff Cooper, an avowed francophile, believed that an An-
glo-French alliance would act as a "magnet drawing the
other countries closer". It was his hope that Britain
would seize the opportunity to lead a united Europe.
Therefore he urged Premier Blum to write Attlee in Janu-
ary 1947 proposing the alliance even though Bevin had or-
dered him to do nothing. At the end of 1947 he was forced
to resign and expressed his belief that the Dunkirk Trea-
ty was not sufficient to undertake the task of uniting
Europe. He left the British Foreign Service rather dis-
gusted that the primary concern of the Foreign Office was
to alienate neither of the Superpowers rather than adopt-
ing a progressive approach to the problem of Western Eu-
rope. See John Charmley, "Duff Cooper and Western Europe-
an Union, 1944-47", pp.52-65.

[39] John Baylis, "Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins
of NATO", in Journal of Strategic Studies., Vol.5, No.2,
June 1982. p.238.

ble outcomes were deemed to be worth the effort.

Although the Anglo-French Union proposed by Churchill in
1940 had implied the complete merging of of those two coun-
tries, the first real post-war step in the linking of Great
Britain with the continent was accomplished by the Treaty of
Dunkirk of March 1947. Officially entitled the The Treaty of
Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the United Kingdom
and France, it was, ostensibly, directed against a possible
reemergence of an aggressive Germany. Its stated aim, as
three of its six operative clauses attest, was to ensure,

> that Germany shall not again become a menace to
> peace ... [and] in the event of any threat to the
> security of either of them arising from the adop-
> tion by Germany of a policy of aggression or from
> action by Germany designed to facilitate such a
> policy, take, after consulting with each other and
> where appropriate with the other Powers ... such
> agreed action as is best calculated to put an end
> to this threat.[40]

The Treaty of Dunkirk was primarily designed, as its Ar-
ticle I stated, to prevent the re-emergence of an aggressive
Germany:

> [T]he High Contracting Parties will, in the event
> of any threat to the security of either of them
> arising from the adoption by Germany of a policy
> of aggression or from action by Germany designed
> to facilitate such a policy, take, after consult-
> ing with each other and where appropriate with the
> other Powers having responsibility for action in
> relation to Germany, such agreed action (which so
> long as the said Article 107 [of the Charter of

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[40] Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the
United Kingdom and France, Dunkirk, 4 March 1947., as
printed in Documents on International Affairs, 1947-48.,
London, Oxford University Press, 1952. Hereafter cited as
the Treaty of Dunkirk. p.195.

the United Nations] remains operative shall be ac-
tion under that Article) · as is best calculated to
put an end to this threat.[41]

In addition to confronting the "German problem", the treaty

also addressed certain economic considerations: these were

addressed under Article IV which called for "constant con-

sultation on matters affecting their economic relations."[42]

The inclusion of Article IV is not surprising given Bevin's

earlier expressed opinion on the PHPS proposal, as well as

the difficult French economic situation. Like any interna-

tionnal agrrement, the Treaty of Dunkirk is both significant

and revealing. As a result the anti-German character of the

Dunkirk Treaty can be explained in two ways.

First, there were very real concerns in both countries

that Germany would reemerge as a rearmed, revisionist State

as it had done after World War One. The Foreign Office be-

lieved that, even after the defeat of Hitler and the Nazi

regime, Germany could still pose a menace to the acquisition

of world peace. They did not believe in a "good Germany,

like a sleeping beauty only waiting to have the Nazi spell

broken by the rescuer from the West."[43] As Bevin related to

the Commons on May 15, 1947;

[I]n signing that treaty we have confirmed that,
while Germany may be down and out at the moment
and is not a danger, we do not forget what France

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[41] Treaty of Dunkirk, p.195.

[42] ibid, p.196.

[43] Victor Rothwell, op cit., p.4.

has suffered from Germany during the past years.[44]

Both Britain and France were apparently of one mind to take

pre-emptive action in the face of an emerging German threat;

having learned from their pre-war experiences, neither side

was willing to sacrifice basic national security interests

for a no-war policy. To prevent any reoccurrence of German

aggression, British foreign policy planning was based on an

alignment of that country with both France and the Soviet

Union. Importantly, the proposed policy was also founded

upon the belief that the USSR similarly perceived the threat

from Germany to be the most pressing security issue in the

immediate post-war era.

Second, the limited scope of the treaty can be understood

as a deliberate attempt not to create discord between London

and Paris with either of the Superpowers. The concern that

the Soviet Union should not misperceive British actions was

evident as early as September of 1945 when Bevin had origi-

nally raised the possibility of an Anglo-French alliance

with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov.[45] In November of 1945

a "Draft Cabinet Paper on the Proposed Anglo-French Treaty"

had stated;

> Whilst the desire for closer relations between the
> smaller Western countries has been frequently ex-
> pressed both by their leaders and in their press,
> the Communist Party and certain sections of the

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[44] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons).,
Vol.437, p.1742.

[45] John Charmley, "Duff Cooper and Western European Union,
1944-47", p.58.

> Socialist parties, notably in Belgium, have ev-
> inced opposition on the familiar ground that it
> would constitute an anti-Soviet bloc...Moreover,
> the Soviet Press have increasingly denounced the
> policy of the so-called Western bloc which they
> misrepresent as a move against Eastern Europe.
> The US Government and press are also critical. For
> these reasons I doubt the wisdom of pursuing for
> the present any further negotiations other than
> those for an Anglo-French Treaty, to which the So-
> viet Government do not object.[46]

Complementing these earlier efforts in January of 1947,

while negotiations were still in progress, Prime Minister

Attlee had stated that the British Government envisaged the

proposed Anglo-French treaty as a supplement to the Anglo-

Soviet alliance concluded in 1942.[47] As a result, both

States had been particularly careful to include mention of,

and continuing adherence to, their wartime treaties of alli-

ance and mutual assistance each had concluded with the Sovi-

et Union: these were mentioned in the fifth preambular

clause of the treaty.[48] And, at the post-signing ceremony

Bevin went out of his way to stress to both Superpowers that

the _Treaty of Dunkirk_ was not the initial stage in the con-

struction of a West European bloc. Concern for the domestic

situation in France,[49] and Italy, and desiring a peaceful

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[46] Walter Lipgens, _op cit._, p.171.

[47] Great Britain, _Parliamentary Debates_ (_House of Commons_).,
Vol.432, p.360.

[48] See _Treaty of Dunkirk_, p.196.

[49] It was quite successful in this regard as the PCF condi-
tionally supported the Dunkirk alliance. The condition
they set was that a respect for the French position on
Germany should be expressed in British policy. See _The
Times_(_London_)., February 7, 1947.

settlement of the German question, meant that Bevin consci-
entiously tried to assuage Soviet concerns.[50] Additionally,
Bevin was also careful to make sure that its basic objec-
tives and wording did not run counter to American policy
aims, hence the repeated references to the United Nations,
and Four Power cooperation. Indeed the joint communique is-
sued at Dunkirk read in part that both governments hoped,

> that these guarantees will soon be completed by
> the conclusion of a Four-Power Treaty laying down
> the conditions for the disarmament and demilitari-
> sation of Germany, and the methods of putting them
> into effect.[51]

Neither the United States, nor the Soviet Union, could or
did object to these general aims as they were entirely com-
patible with the stated objectives of the Potsdam accords.

The Dunkirk Treaty was strictly an intergovernmental al-
liance, and did not involve additional commitments by the
British beyond those they would likely have undertaken with-
out the treaty. At the same time it provided a necessary
impetus for future policy. This latter aspect was seized
upon by Anthony Eden, then in the Opposition, who suggested
to Bevin that the treaty was by itself important, but that
similar efforts needed to be taken with regard to the Ben-
elux countries.[52] However Bevin demurred from making any
further foreign agreements; a decision which supports the

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[50] David Thomson, "The Anglo-French Alliance", in World Af-
fairs., Vol.1, No.2, July 1947. p.246.

[51] ibid, p.244.

[52] The Times(London)., May 16, 1947.

interpretation of the treaty as a device to "shore up" the moderates in French politics. Nonetheless, in an historical context, the Treaty of Dunkirk was a clear statement by both governments of their weaknesses relative to the Soviet Union and the United States; it demonstrated that neither Britain nor France perceived themselves to be able to make policy without explicit references to the two Superpowers.

It was largely because of the uncertainty surrounding Germany's future role in Europe that during 1945-1947 the Attlee Government continued to try to make Great Power collaboration work in the post-war world.[53] It was an approach that retained popular support in Britain and was seen, at that time, as politically viable. As late as 1 January 1947, an editorial in The Times(London), was quite emphatic as to

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[53] It had been agreed at Yalta, largely at British insistence, that France would receive an occupation zone in Germany. This zone was to be carved out of the larger British and American zones; Stalin refused to allow the size of the Soviet zone to be adjusted. At Potsdam it had been further agreed that France would be granted equal membership on the Council of Foreign Ministers and in the Allied Control Council. Churchill had believed that a strong France was in Britain's best interests. He feared the likelihood that the United States, given its history and its outlook, would leave the management of European affairs to the European States themselves. If this did indeed happen France would be an undeniable asset in confronting a revanchist Germany or, as Churchill suspected, a powerful Soviet Union. France was not included at Potsdam, nor at any of the previous wartime summits, as a result of American and Soviet opposition. Besides purely political reasons, both Roosevelt and Stalin had felt that France had let the World down in 1940 and was subsequently not a Great Power any longer. See Sir Llewellyn Woodward, op cit., pp.493-496 and also Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy., Boston, Houghton, Mifflin Co. Ltd., 1953., pp.252-253.

the continuing utility of Great Power collaboration. It stated that any peaceful settlement of disputes required the agreement of the principal Powers, and that this was only to be achieved by maintaining "a balanced and equal partnership with the two Powers which, with Great Britain, were effective instruments of the victory over the Axis." It further derided those who suggested wholesale cooperation with the United States labelling such an approach as an "unacceptable substitute for an independent policy."[54] From a strategic vantage, it was even suggested by some members of the Foreign Office that a possible, and expected, tilt by Germany towards the Soviet Union could best be offset by maintaining good relations with the latter: there was no desire to see a resurrection of a Rapallo-type agreement between the two States.

As an alliance with France, the Dunkirk Treaty had also, to some extent, reflected the early post-war objective of an effective "Third Force" between the Superpowers. Like the Western European Security Group, it had been based on closer cooperation with the West European States.[55] However unlike

[54] The author of this particular editorial, as well as others along similar lines, recalled in an interview in 1983 that he felt it very premature to talk of the division of Europe at that time. Attacking the fundamentals of Churchill's Fulton speech, Con O'Neill noted that there really was no apparent substitute for Three Power Cooperation. See Michael Charlton, op cit., p.39.

[55] The form the "Third Force" was to take was never specified. However given the capabilities of the West European States, and the Attlee Government's priority on economic reconstruction, it can be assumed that Bevin had to envi-

the original proposals of the PHPS, the concept of the
"Third Force" did not allow for a close alignment of Great
Britain with the United States. In envisaging the Third
Force, many high-level Foreign Office personnel as well as
leading British politicians, Bevin included, still assumed
that Great Britain was one of three Great Powers.[56] However
there was a recognition by many of these same people, such
as Bevin, that as a result of the war and its demands, their
country might not be able to maintain such a position. Fur-
thermore there was a continuing fear throughout this period
that the United States would absent itself from the problems
of European security as it had done after World War One.
Their Commonwealth connections, the prestige accruing from
their war-record, the July, 1946, American loan of $3.7 bil-

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sage it as a diplomatic, rather than an effective mili-
tary, coalition. This belief is further supported by the
results of the cabinet infighting which occurred over the
size of the armed forces to be maintained in peacetime by
the British. By early 1947, considerable cutbacks had al-
ready taken place and additional ones had been promised.
The absence of any expectation of an imminent Soviet at-
tack, as opposed to political subversion in the West,
meant that those who supported a large armed forces es-
tablishment - such as Bevin, the Defence Minister A.V.
Alexander, and Field Marshal Montgomery - usually lost
out to those opposing it. (See C.J.Bartlett, The Long
Retreat, A Short History of British Defence Policy,
1945-1970., New York, MacMillan, 1972., pp.45-47.) To
that extent the ambiguity of the Third Force suggests
that while there was no consensus in the British Govern-
ment as to its meaning, at the time of its promulgation,
the defence policy adopted meant that it was effectively
only a political force.

[56] Sir Orme Sargent, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State in
the Foreign Office likened Great Britain's postwar role
with that of "Lepidus in the triumvirate of Mark Antony
and Augustus".

lion, and the continuing American involvement in German affairs, only softened many of these concerns.

By late 1946 Britain was forced to initiate severe cutbacks in its overseas commitments due to the heavy drain on the Exchequer and other demand elsewhere. One of the areas affected by these cut-backs was Greece, which Britain had been assisting since its liberation in 1944. What had been scattered guerrilla actions in 1945-1946 had become an expensive full-scale civil war by early 1947. In February of 1947 the British government informed Washington that it was unable to continue to support the Greek or Turkish governments either financially or through the maintenance of military garrisons in those territories. It appealed to the United States to take the responsibility and to continue the subsidy to the two governments.[57]

The result of the British decision, which Bevin and the Foreign Office had initially opposed,[58] was the first statement of an American commitment to European security affairs outside of Germany. After extensive discussions it was recognised by the Truman Administration that it was in the best interests of the United States to take a role in preventing what they perceived to be a Soviet-sponsored attempt

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[57] Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs, 1947-48., London, Oxford University Press, 1952., pp.13-14.

[58] See Alexander Rendel, "One the Eve of the Truman Doctrine" in NATO Review., Vol.26, No.5, October 1978. pp.21-29.

at subverting another European country.   On March 12, Presi-
dent Truman announced what has since become known as the
Truman Doctrine.   He stated that the United States was pre-
pared to provide economic and financial aid to free peoples
defending themselves from "attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures."[59] In that political
context, Truman's words meant something altogether new: the
explicit promise of a commitment of American power and re-
sources to aid those resisting Communist expansion.

The declaration of the Truman Doctrine therefore created
new avenues for British foreign policy. It had been apparent
to Bevin for some time that Great Power collaboration was
increasingly untenable as the basis for British policy.
While there was no perceptible change in Britain's diplomat-
ic posture, there was a growing uncertainty as to whether
the Soviet Union or Germany constituted the principal threat
to British security.   Indeed as early as February of 1946
Bevin had remarked that "the danger of Russia has become
certainly as great and possibly greater than that of a re-
vived Germany."[60] And when asked in a private correspondence
with Attlee, as to Soviet intentions, Bevin replied that
they "have decided upon an aggressive policy based upon mi-
litant Communism and Russian chauvinism...and seem deter-

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[59] President Trumman's Message to the Congress: The Truman
Doctrine, 12 March 1947., as printed in Documents on In-
ternational Affairs, 1947-48., pp.2-7.

[60] Sean Greenwood, "Return to Dunkirk: The Origins of the
Anglo-French Treaty of March 1947", p.51.

mined to stick at nothing, short of war, to obtain her objectives."[61] The lynchpin of Britain's relations with the Soviet Union was the ultimate fate of Occupied Germany which Bevin made clear in his October 22, 1946, statement to the House of Commons;

> Agreement on Germany is at once the touchstone of the relations between the four Powers, and our opportunity to build a system of lasting peace and security for the world.[62]

The inability to achieve an agreement on Germany with the Soviet Union due to the perceived intractability of Soviet objectives, and the growing hostility of the German people to the British occupation can only have served to weaken his faith in, and his perseverance in realising, Great Power collaboration.[63] While Bevin was prepared to try and achieve good relations with the USSR, he was not prepared to mollify Soviet concerns to the extent that his foreign policy endan-

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[61] Raymond Smith and John Zametica, "The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee reconsidered, 1945-47", in International Affairs., Vol.61, No.2, Spring 1985. pp.245-246.

[62] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons)., Vol.427, p.1510.

[63] The fundamental reason for the growing hostility was the state of economic deprivation in Germany, and the near-starvation suffered by its people. The causes for these problems lay squarely with the Soviet Government, and their adamant refusal to export foodstuffs to the Western zones as per the Potsdam Agreements. This refusal was based on their illegitimate policy of extracting war reparations from current production rather than from surplus as had been agreed. See Barbara Marshall, "German Attitudes to British Military Government" in the Journal of Contemporary History., Vol.15, 1980, pp.655-684. Also see Robert W.Carden, "Before Bizonia; Britain's Economic Dilemma in Germany, 1945-46", in the Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.14, 1979, pp.535-555.

gered British national security interests.   As he explained

to British Government officials,   his policy would continue

to work towards,

> the closest cooperation and integration economi-
> cally, socially, and militarily with our Western
> neighbours, without at this stage creating any
> formal regional group. In accordance with this
> policy we are trying hard to get our relations
> with France cleared up first. Meanwhile we must go
> slow with Belgium – who is pressing for closer in-
> tegration of our military forces and for staff
> talks.[64]

However there were many in the Foreign Office who be-

lieved Great Power collaboration to be "somewhat unreal" and

the pursuit of an independent British foreign policy to be

dangerous.[65] Nevertheless, and despite their best efforts,

East-West relations continued to deteriorate and a degree of

emnity began to emerge.   In the Commons, on October 21,

1947, Attlee echoed the exasperation in Britain over Soviet

hostility to the West;

> I must say we are greatly disturbed at the in-
> creasing tension in foreign affairs and the atti-
> tudes of the USSR representatives which is greatly
> imperilling the work that was done in trying to
> build up the United Nations Organisation.[66]

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[64] John Baylis, "Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins
of NATO", p.239

[65] Victor Rothwell, op cit., p.270.   Surprisingly this view
was to emerge in a May 1947 Labour Party pamphlet enti-
tled "Cards on the Table". As an analysis of Anglo-Soviet
relations it stated quite explicitly that the USSR did
not perceive Britain as a friend since it often sided
with the USA, and that the Soviets would therefore act
accordingly. It further emphasised the importance of
maintaining a credible deterrent to prevent future wars.
See The Times(London)., May 22, 1947.

[66] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons).,

It was only after the failures of the Moscow (April 1947), Paris (July 1947), and London (November 25 - December 15, 1947) Conferences of Foreign Ministers that Bevin began to speak publicly about the East-West split.[67] One Foreign Office official noted that,

> the Secretary of State [Bevin] said that Europe, as he saw it, was now divided from Greece to the Baltic and from the Oder to Trieste. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to penetrate the countries east of those lines. Our task was to save Western civilisation. He himself felt that we should have to become some sort of federation in Western Europe whether of a formal or informal character.[68]

If the distemper of the Moscow Conference saw the beginning of a barrier between East and West, then the ill-fated London Conference completed the task. At its conclusion the Big Three alliance was no more, and Germany effectively began its permanently-divided existence;

> The failure of the conference did not take a dramatic form. At its end, a new meeting was agreed on. Yet the breakup of the wartime alliance was now an accomplished fact, and within a few weeks there were further rifts whose full import and scope did not immediately become clear. Toward the end of May, there were no longer any Communist ministers in Paris, Rome, or Brussels. On June 6, a conference of the minister-presidents of the German Laender took place in Munich. The five heads of government from the Soviet Zone did not participate. After a dispute, they had refused to attend the conference and left.[69]

Vol.443, pp.35-36.

[67] Alan Bullock, op cit., p.493.

[68] Victor Rothwell, op cit., p.454.

[69] Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance, European American Relations Since 1945., London, MacMillan, 1980., p.61.

Afterwards British policy became essentially bifurcated: one side aimed to prevent Soviet domination of Europe, while the other hoped to avoid a re-emergence of a hostile Germany. The failures at London and Moscow, as well as the Soviet efforts to scuttle the American-sponsored Marshall Plan at the Paris Conference, convinced Bevin that the division of Europe was a long-term problem for Europe.[70] Soviet preponderance on the continent and their growing anti-Western hostility therefore demanded a united Western European response. This belief was to be reflected in the drafting of the Treaty of Brussels in March of 1948.[71]

As early as September of 1947 Bevin had broached the idea of a West European security system with Georges Bidault, the French Foreign Minister. On the last day of the London Conference he elaborated on the idea, proposing to Secretary Marshall "some form of union" to be backed by the United States.[72] Bevin's proposal was entirely in accord with the formula put forward by Marshall in June, and adopted by Europe in July, for the provision of financial aid. The use of the Marshall Plan-formula as the means of linking Britain

[70] Walter Lipgens, op cit., p.491.

[71] In all fairness, it should be noted that Sir Roderick Barclay, Bevin's principle private secretary at the Foreign Office, believes that Bevin was convinced as early as 1946 that cooperation with the Soviet Union was impossible. See Michael Charlton, op cit., p.47.

[72] Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, "The Pentagon negotiations March 1948: the launching of the North Atlantic Treaty", in International Affairs., Vol.59, No.3, Summer 1953. p.XXX

with Europe, while at the same time formally drawing the United States into a European security system was a view supported by both sides of the House of Commons.[73] In his efforts, aimed at this end, he believed he had the moral support if not official agreement, of Secretary Marshall. However American support went no further at this stage. After the breakdown of the London Conference, Bevin revealed to the Canadian High Commissioner that, since the United States had no plans for dealing with the new tense international situation, it was up to the British to put one forward.[74] The feeling, amongst members of the British Government that something had to be done to confront what was perceived to be an increasingly hostile international environment was even apparently shared by a reluctant Clement Attlee.[75] Discussion continued between the British and the Americans as a discreet follow-up to Bevin's December, 1947, proposal. It soon emerged that Bevin's view had changed. No longer was there the unrealistic idea of an independent British-led Third Force operating between the Superpowers.

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[73] See Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons)., Vol.438, pp.2250-2407.

[74] Sir Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO., Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1983., p.1.

[75] Following Bevin's important Commons' speech of January 22, 1948, Attlee noted that while he did not feel war was imminent, "it is no good shutting our eyes to the possibility of war." His expression of uncertainty as to what was the "real object of the rulers of Russia" echoed the feelings of many in the Foreign Office, if not the West in general. See Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons)., Vol.446, p.614.

Instead Bevin now envisaged,

> [t]wo security arrangements, one a small tight
> circle including a treaty engagement between the
> UK, the Benelux countries and France. Surrounding
> that, a larger circle with somewhat lesser commit-
> ments in treaty form bringing in the United States
> and Canada also.[76]

As with previous British proposals the American Govern-
ment proved unwilling to agree with Bevin's "spherical" plan
for West European security. Their reluctance was probably
due to fear of a hostile public reaction in the United
States; isolationism was no longer official policy, but it
still enjoyed considerable popular support. However, it was
also perceived in Britain to be due to the Truman Adminis-
tration's principle that before the United States became in-
volved in any military arrangements with the West Europeans,
those countries had to demonstrate their willingness and re-
solve to work together to achieve their own common good. The
successful Marshall Plan was the model suggested to Western
Europe. This qualification of support by the American Gov-
ernment was to be of considerable influence in the creation
of the Brussels Pact.

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[76] John Baylis, "Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Conti-
nental Commitment", p.620.

4.3   THE WESTERN UNION SPEECH - 1948

On January 22, 1948, Ernest Bevin delivered a long-awaited speech to the House of Commons. When he had resumed his seat on the Treasury Bench, his words already constituted the most robust statement of British policy toward Europe during the immediate post-war period, and seemed to flow directly from the Foreign Secretary's revised understanding of the international situation. Due to the build-up of tensions between the Soviet Union and the West, his audience comprised far more than the assembled Members of Parliament. Bevin was apparently well aware of this factor;

> I am also so conscious that what I say can so easily be misinterpreted in other countries that I propose to exercise very great care in the presentation of the Government's position.[77]

Indeed it appears that Bevin hoped he was addressing both the United States as well as the other West European states. In relating the British efforts since the end of the war, Bevin raised five areas of concern.

First, Bevin rejected Britain's traditional "balance of power" approach to the question of security in Europe. The four-hundred year old strategy of avoiding long-term commitments, and carefully shifting alliances, so as to prevent the emergence of a continental hegemon, no longer made political or strategic sense. The power and the potential of the Soviet Union, relative to the other European States,

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[77] "Speech by Mr. Bevin in the House of Commons", 22 January 1948., as printed in Documents on International Affairs, 1947-48., p.201. Hereafter cited as Bevin.

meant that "Perfidious Albion" had to adapt to a wholly new situation. British power and prestige would have to be committed formally to the continent to even out the dangerous and expected long-term imbalance in military, as well as especially political, relations.

In abandoning what he called the "old-fashioned conception of balance of power", Bevin listed two other precepts upon which Britain's European policy was to be based. The first was the requirement that no single Power could be allowed to dominate Europe. In the event of such an occurrence, Bevin asserted that British independence, as well as essential viability as a nation, would be jeopardized. Within the speech's historical context this concern, although of a nature to be timeless, was clearly directed at the post-war machinations of the Soviet Union: in 1948 the USSR was the only State that appeared to possess both the capabilities and the political motivation to do so. The second tenet was that Four Power cooperation should be substituted for tendencies leading to the resurrection of the "balance of power" or the emergence of a continental hegemon.

Although Bevin was quite aware that this second proposal was untenable, given the political environment which his speech described at some length, his reiteration of that wartime ideal can be explained in two ways. First, it might very well exhibit a degree of hope-filled devotion to a conception of international affairs where the four Powers would

"render assistance to all states of Europe, to enable them to evolve freely in its own way."[78] Such an interpretation would in no way be inconsistent with Bevin's Socialist leanings, or his political optimism. Alternatively, the proposal to revive Four Power cooperation may have been an attempt to prove to his American audience that British policy was flexible in addressing the problem of security in Europe. Bevin must have been aware that British policy was not completely supported by the American public. Many Americans believed Britain's opposition to the Soviet Union was an example of the traditional rivalry among the Great Powers and that Whitehall's parochial outlook had not changed after 1945. Bevin's tendering of Four Power cooperation, as acceptable to Great Britain, may have represented an effort to dispel some of the ambivalence and animosity then resident in the United States.

In qualifying his hopes for Four-Power Cooperation in Europe, Bevin nevertheless went to some length to stress that Britain could not stand aside from the problems of its neighbours. He rejected any sort of British isolation from Europe as a policy option. Instead, Bevin asserted that Britain and Western Europe were interdependent, by nature of their democratic tradition, and by the dictates of economic necessity:

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[78] Bevin., p.203

> Our formal relations with the various countries
> [of Western Europe] may differ, but between all
> there should be an effective understanding bound
> together by common ideals for which the Western
> Powers have twice in one generation shed their
> blood. If we are to preserve peace and our safety
> at the same time we can only do so by the mobili-
> sation of such a moral and material force as will
> provide confidence and energy in the West and in-
> spire respect elsewhere, and this means that Brit-
> ain cannot stand outside Europe and regard her
> problems as quite separate from those of her Euro-
> pean neighbours.[79]

Stating that Britain had a role in confronting an obvious common threat, he placed the emphasis on the very necessary efforts to restore Europe's economic strength. The staged amity of Potsdam had dissipated, and the "sensible compromise of Yalta" had been rejected by the Soviet Union whose aim was to "use every means in their power to get Communist control in Eastern Europe and, as it now appears in the West as well."[80] In the wake of the problems being addressed by the Marshall Plan, and in the midst of the German currency dilemma, Bevin reasserted the prevalent belief that Stalin was "banking" on economic problems to undermine Anglo-American policy and will-power to further Soviet interests in the rest of Europe:

> [I]t is no secret that Mr. Molotov threatened both
> ourselves and France that we would have to look
> out for these squalls if we went on with the Euro-
> pean Recovery Programme...[however] We have not,
> nor has France or any of the other nations who as-
> sembled in Paris deviated from that course. The
> best evidence that what I am saying is cor-
> rect...is that the Cominform came into existence

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[79] Bevin., p.212

[80] Bevin., p.202

> very quickly...It has been clearly stated that the
> object of that body and of Soviet and Communist
> policy is to prevent the European Recovery Pro-
> gramme succeeding. I do not object to them coming
> to that conclusion, but because they came to that
> conclusion I do not see why I should be a party to
> keeping Europe in chaos and starvation. I cannot
> accept the proposition simply because the Comin-
> form says it in their proposals. The fact is there
> have been great political strikes in France. Who
> disputes that they are behind them?[81]

Second, in answering the critics of his policies in the left-wing of the Labour Party, and perhaps to some degree even Prime Minister Attlee,[82] Bevin attempted to explain the seriousness of the situation to the House. Often criticised for not having a "socialist" foreign policy, Bevin argued that after the war the Government had pursued as conciliatory an approach as was possible. He stressed that Britain had never been interested in creating the emergent blocs; "We did not press the Western Union, and I know that some of our neighbours were not desirous of pressing it...".[83] He argued that actions of the Soviet Government required prudent, appropriate, and timely counter-measures. Bevin rejected the idea that diplomacy alone could heal the widening breach that had opened between the USSR and the West. In a sense, that part of the speech relating the post-war record of treaty violations by the Soviet Union, and its obfuscatory tactics at international conferences, appears to have been

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[81] Bevin., p.209.

[82] See Raymond Smith and John Zametica, "The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee reconsidered, 1945-47", pp.248-251.

[83] Bevin., p.207

an appeal for support from a deeply divided Labour Party caucus – his "friends in this House" – who were often distracted by ideological and domestic issues. His target audience may also have been the American public to whom European problems were very far away and consequently received little support, or understanding. Employing the case of Greece, an example with which Americans and British were both acquainted, he noted;

> I have been pursued in this country on this Grecian question as if it were a question between a Royalist and a socialist Government or Liberal Government. It is nothing of the sort and never has been. I beg all my friends in this House to face the facts. This is a serious situation. It is a case of power politics. [emphasis added] We have been trying to leave Greece an independent country and to get out of it; but we also want her northern neighbours, and everybody else, to leave her alone and get out of it.[84]

Third, Bevin rejected the idea of supranationalism as the answer to the problems relative to European unity or integration. The traditional British dislike of the concept of a politically united Europe was to remain unchallenged;

> Now we have to face a new situation. In this it is impossible to move as quickly as we would wish. We are dealing with nations which are free to take their own decisions. It is easy enough to draw up a blueprint for a united Western Europe and to construct neat looking plans on paper. While I do not wish to discourage the work done by voluntary political organisations in advocating ambitious schemes of European unity, I must say that it is a much slower and harder job to carry out a practical programme which takes into account the realities which face us, and I am afraid that it will have to be done a step at a time.

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[84] Bevin., p.203

But surely all these developments which I have been describing point to the conclusion that the free nations of Western Europe must draw closer together. How much these countries have in common. Our sacrifices in the war, our hatred of injustice and oppression, our parliamentary democracy, our striving for economic rights and our conception and love of liberty are common among us all.[85]

By rejecting the concept of an all-embracing and sweeping design for Europe, and adopting instead a step-by-step approach, Bevin was advocating a more pragmatic outlook.[86] It was an attempt to enunciate, in as diplomatic language as possible, that national legislatures rather than "voluntary political organisations" would set the pace in the movement towards unity in Europe. Emphasising the "British approach" which must be interpreted as meaning strictly intergovernmental, Bevin stated that he foresaw Europe as "a spiritual union...more of a brotherhood and less of a rigid system."[87]

Bevin dismissed the notion that the Treaty of Dunkirk was the founding stone of any eventual Anglo-French union as had been proposed in 1940 by the Churchill Government. Responding to suggestions of that sort, which saw such an outcome as likely, he frankly stated that Britain was not

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[85] Bevin., p.210

[86] See Anthony Adamthwaite, "Britain and the World; the view from the Foreign Office", p.232.

[87] Bevin., p.220. The January 22 speech was not the first time he had suggested the idea of an informal, "spiritual union" for Western Europe. As early as December 17, 1947, he had made mention of it in a conversation with Secretary Marshall. See Alan Bullock, op cit., pp.498-499.

> proposing a formal political union with France, as
> has sometimes been suggested,   but we shall main-
> tain the closest possible contact and work for
> ever closer unity between the two nations.[88]

However Bevin did opine that the Dunkirk Treaty might well
serve as an acceptable model for Britain to pursue with re-
gard to the other West European States,   particularly the
Benelux countries.   Indeed, he indicated that he hoped it
would soon serve such a role and expressed a desire to con-
clude similar treaties with the Benelux countries.   Nor did
Bevin exclude other States such as the "new Italy", or "oth-
er historic members of European civilisation." While Bevin
did rule out any form of a grand design for Europe, it seems
that he was interested in a series of Dunkirk-type bilateral
treaties. Therefore, it is obvious that in concluding a se-
ries of bilateral security pacts, all with their focal point
in London, Bevin was actively pursuing his idea of a West
European grouping led by the British. It was, importantly
enough, to be accomplished without the sacrifice of any
measure of national sovereign rights.

Fourth, Bevin emphasised that his "spiritual union" was
not to be confined to Western Europe; Clearly, though, the
speech indicated that linkages with the continent were the
first stage in the overall task Bevin was presenting.   He
stated that since Europe had extended its influence through-
out the globe it was necessary not to forget those regions
for they too had much in common with the West European

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[88] _Bevin._, p.211

states.[89] In making that statement, Bevin was hoping to re-
inforce the Government's view that Britain was not only a
leading European State, but was also a true world Power:
British interests and commitments, such as the Commonwealth,
were global in character. Since, however, he appears to
have been basically realistic in his outlook, his words were
likely serving another purpose in addition to reasserting
Britain's position in the post-war world. Bevin wanted to
make it known to the Truman Administration and the United
States Congress that, regardless of European union, an acute
need would still remain demanding American political in-
volvement. There was a constant fear among European politi-
cians, that the more Europe did for itself, the less in-
volved and interested the United States would become. When
Bevin ambiguously said, "The power and the resources of the
United States ... will be needed if we are to create a sol-
id, stable and healthy world"[90], he was hoping to send a
clear signal to indicate that sentiment to the United
States.

Lastly, Bevin addressed the issue of Germany and British
policy towards that occupied country. After dismissing Sovi-
et demands for a centralised government as an attempt to
create a structure through which they could more easily im-
pose their rule, he stated that the door to his vision of a

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[89] Bevin., p.212

[90] Bevin., p.215.

"united" Europe was also open to Germany. It was the first explicit reference of its kind, made by a senior member of a British Government, in the post-war era: coming from the Foreign Secretary in a speech dealing with the reorganisation of Western Europe, the statement carried considerable diplomatic importance. Clearly his remarks highlighted the changing British policy towards Germany. Although he made reference to preventing that country from again being able to launch aggressive wars, he did state that a democratic Germany would be very welcome in his Western Union. The statement did not indicate a complete shift wholly in favour of the former enemy while stressing instead the Soviet threat: it does, however, suggest that a tilt had taken place in favour of Germany. This view is supported by the fact that Bevin submitted two memoranda[91] to the cabinet (January 8) and to the ambassadors in Paris and Washington (January 13) in which he explicitly stated his ultimate in-

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[91] The first, submitted to the Cabinet, was entitled "The First Aim of British Foreign Policy". It stated, the Soviet Government has formed a solid political and economic block. There is no prospect in the immediate future that we shall be able to reestablish and maintain normal relations with European countries behind their line. ... Indeed we shall be hard put to stem the further encroachment of the Soviet tide. ... This in my view can only be done by creating some form of union in Western Europe. ... I believe therefore that we should seek to form with the backing of the Americas and the Dominions a Western democratic system comprising Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, Italy, Greece and possibly Portugal. As soon as circumstances permit we should of course, wish also to include Spain and Germany without whom no Western system can be complete". This excerpt from the recently released Cabinet Papers of the Attlee Government is from Alan Bullock, op cit., pp.516-517.

tention of including both Germany and Franco's Spain in his union.[92]

4.4   BRITISH OBJECTIVES

Bevin's Western Union speech on January 22, 1948, constituted an obvious milestone in the formulation of post-war British foreign policy. However it also tended to raise new questions about British policy while leaving several lingering ones unanswered. The concept of Western Union and the means of realising that goal, which Bevin had attempted to address, were just as nebulous after his speech as they had been before. One noted British weekly's editorial asked "What is Bevin's Plan?", and then proceeded to suggest, somewhat imprudently, that the Foreign Secretary publicly elaborate a programme of action.[93] Equally important to the achievement of Western Union was the proposed role the United States would necessarily be expected to assume. However Bevin's speech made no specific mention of an American role which left the State Department's interested listeners uncertain as to what Britain envisaged.[94] There are essentially two reasons for the perplexing ambiguities and noticeable absences in what Bevin, the British Cabinet, Western Europe, and the Truman Administration knew beforehand was to be a

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[92] John Baylis, "Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment", p.620.

[93] The Economist., January 31, 1948.

[94] See FRUS, 1948, Volume Three, Western Europe., pp.9-12.

major foreign policy address.

The first reason is the most obvious. It can be supposed
that Bevin, himself, was uncertain as to both the concrete
objectives and the precise path to follow for their achieve-
ment.   There does not appear to be any positive indication
that either Bevin,   or his advisors at the Foreign Office,
had carefully considered the concept of Western Union in any
more detail than had the wartime PHPS.[95] Certainly the con-
cept of a new relationship between Britain and the countries
of Western Europe had existed in the backs of the minds of
Foreign Office personnel since the middle of the Second
World War and the inauguration of the PHPS's work.   However
in 1948, when Bevin raised the issue as an official British
policy aim, the essential staffwork needed to support a pol-
icy initiative of this magnitude does not appear to have
been completed if even commenced.

This speculation that the Western Union speech did not
reflect a carefully researched policy initiative is support-
ed by an official communication from Britain's ambassador to
the United States, Lord Inverchapel, to U.S. Under-Secretary
of State Robert Lovett.   It was written in response to an
American request for additional information on British in-
tentions arising from Bevin's speech. Written on January 27

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[95] Christopher Mayhew, Bevin's junior Minister at the For-
eign Office,   stated in an interview that the Foreign Of-
fice had not been consulted as to the contents of the
January 22nd speech.   See Michael Charlton, op cit.,
pp.53-54.

there is a conspicuous lack of certainty, even five days af-
ter the Western Union speech, on the part of the British
which one would not expect to find following a well-prepared
policy statement. Despite Bevin's remarks on the latent
strengths of Western Europe, and the need for a concrete
British commitment to Europe, Inverchapel's letter displays
neither;

> Great Britain is only in a position to supply
> Western European countries with a small part of
> their economic requirements and, of course, in ad-
> dition there are the arms and equipment which
> those countries will require for their own de-
> fence. Furthermore, the British Government are
> not yet in a position to give firm assurances as
> to the role Britain intends to play in operations
> on the continent of Europe. [emphasis added] They
> foresee that they will sooner or later be forced
> into admitting this situation or refusing to dis-
> cuss it. Either case is likely to land them in
> trouble.[96]

This apparent uncertainty is further supported by the
contents of a British diplomatic note delivered on February
19 to Paul-Henri Spaak in Brussels. Coming in the midst of
the developing Czechoslovakian crisis, the note's contents
belie the principal thrust of Bevin's speech. The note
stressed the British desire to desist from further isolating
the Soviet Union in Europe by any subsequent actions. Al-
though an anti-Soviet coalition was fundamental to the con-
cept of Western Union, the note urged that the Benelux coun-
tries concentrate on the "German threat".[97] Besides baffling

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[96] FRUS, 1948, Volume Three, Western Europe., p.15.

[97] Paul-Henri Spaak, op cit., p.147.

the three foreign ministries of the Benelux countries, the
note ran directly counter to both the Western Union speech
of January 22 and Bevin's two memoranda of the same month.[98]
In those memoranda, as in his speech, he had explicitly men-
tioned the necessity of eventual German membership in an
anti-Soviet Western bloc.

It would appear from the available historical evidence
that the emerging British policy on Western Union and Be-
vin's own statements were at times contradictory. They can,
however, be understood if Bevin's inability to address the
question of long-term considerations in his major speech was
due to the fact that they had yet to be fully explored and
formulated. The logical implication of Western Union was an
abandonment of all pretence of Great Power unity - especial-
ly Anglo-Soviet amity - and the sentencing of Europe to a
formal division made more permanent by the erection of anti-
Soviet barriers. Therefore the ambiguities which confused
so many people may have arisen because of a failure to think
through the full impact of Western Union beyond the rudimen-
tary points contained in Bevin's speech to the Commons. If
that is indeed the case, then the Bevin initiative was noth-
ing more than an ill-conceived "trial balloon" that was very
favourably received by a desparate, and anxious Europe.

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[98] See Alan Bullock, op cit., pp.516-517.

The question remains as to whom Bevin's remarks were directed, if at anyone, and for what political purpose. The second reason for the shortcomings in the Western Union speech was due to the fact that specifics were not yet required. The "trial balloon", floated by Bevin on the subject of Western European security, was not primarily directed at Western Europe. It can be surmised that that Bevin's principal target was, instead, the United States.

A major, if not the basic, purpose of Bevin's speech was to demonstrate the collective resolve of the British, in concert with the other affected West European States, in addressing their very real security concerns. During a December, 1947, conversation with Secretary of State George Marshall, Bevin had apparently understood Marshall to be supportive of his proposal that the principle then being applied to the American-sponsored ERP could also be implemented with reference to the question of European security: Western Europe should undertake to meet its security needs on its own, and then once they were organised they could turn to the United States for assistance in meeting the shortfall.[99]

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[99] See FRUS, 1948, Volume Three, Western Europe., pp.1-2, and Grethe Vaerno, "The Alliance and European Integration" in NATO Review., Vol.26, No.2, April 1978, p.24. It should be noted that according to the documentation available, Marshall did not make any such undertaking although it is quite likely that Bevin read that particular meaning into the Secretary of State's remarks. It is also apparent that the American officials knew from the beginning that Bevin had "misunderstood" Marshall. In authorising the release of the transcript of the conversation

This interpretation of Bevin's intent is supported by his letter of January 13 to Marshall detailing the content of his upcoming speech.[100] Much of the phraseology contained in the letter is identical to that of the Western Union speech delivered nine days later. The letter also made mention of the desire of the British Government to conclude a series of defensive alliances with the Benelux countries. Important also to this interpretation is the fact that the United States learned Bevin's intentions toward the Benelux before those three countries were first apprised of it in the Western Union speech.[101]

Also apparent is the measured sense of direction on the part of Bevin that his approach to Europe lacked. In the weeks that followed his Western Union speech Bevin repeated-

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to French Foreign Minister Bidault, the American representative in Paris was specifically instructed "to make it clear to the French that the US record showed that Secretary Marshall indicated that he had not definitely approved any particular course of action and he hoped to receive specific British proposals before making a final commitment". (See notes, FRUS, 1947, Volume Two, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Germany and Austria., p.815.) Despite this discrepancy I have retained Bevin's interpretation as it explains subsequent British actions. This decision was made regardless of the veracity of Marshall's disclaimer, as Bevin could still have conceivably based his policy on his misunderstanding of Marshall's intentions. Equally important, American documentation does not reveal any attempt to correct Bevin on what Washington knew to be a misinterpretation of Marshall's conversation.

[100] FRUS, 1948, Volume Three, Western Europe., pp.3-6.

[101] See Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, "The Cold Warrior; Clement Attlee reconsidered, 1945-47", p.xxx. See also Paul-Henri Spaak, op cit., p.101.

ly urged an American security commitment to Europe. On Jan-
uary 27 Lord Inverchapel again corresponded with Under-Sec-
retary Lovett. In this letter he stressed the necessity of
an American military connection with the countries of West-
ern Europe;

> [T]he treaties that are being proposed [with Ben-
> elux] cannot be fully effective nor be relied upon
> when a crisis arises unless there is some assur-
> ance of American support for the defence of West-
> ern Europe. The plain truth is that Western Europe
> cannot yet stand on its own feet without assurance
> of support. ... But he [Bevin] considers that, if
> the United States were able to enter with Great
> Britain into a general commitment to go to war
> with an aggressor, it is probable that the poten-
> tial victims might feel sufficiently reassured to
> refuse to embark on a fatal policy of appease-
> ment.[102]

This view was repeated and expanded upon in a February 6
communication when Inverchapel told Lovett that,

> without assurance of security, which can only be
> given with some degree of American participation,
> [emphasis added] the British Government are un-
> likely to be successful in making the Western Un-
> ion a going concern.[103]

Bevin's primary objective was clearly to "entangle"
American military might and political influence in Western
Europe on a formal basis. This objective had been first pur-
sued after World War One though it failed to be realised;
disasterous consequences followed that failure. The PHPS
had revived the idea as a policy aim and Bevin used the
Western Union concept as the strategem for its achievement.

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[102] FRUS, 1948, Volume Three, Western Europe., pp.14-15.

[103] ibid, p.19.

In the first three months of 1948 British foreign policy was
not so much evolving as it was being tailored to meet with a
favourable American reaction. Whereas previously in Bevin's
speech the concept of Western Union could alone save Western
Europe, by February of 1948 British policy was emphasising
the gross inadequacy of even the most successful of unilat-
eral European efforts. Its most explicit revelation is con-
tained within that same letter of February 6;

> In dealing with this new situation it hampers
> Mr.Bevin not to know how the mind of the United
> States Government is moving and what arrangements
> he could propose ... with the best prospect of
> finding that they would commend themselves to
> Mr.Marshall from the point of view of possible
> United States participation at a later stage.[104]

In his effort to achieve a concrete American commitment, Be-
vin was willing to attempt to make British policy conform to
the desires of the Truman Administration. He was to repeat
this offer on March 6 while the final negotiations leading
to the Brussels Pact were in progress.[105]

In conclusion, it would appear that the British Govern-
ment never envisaged the Treaty of Brussels, as first con-
ceptualised in Bevin's Western Union address, and later as a
distinct European defence organisation, as an end in itself.
Instead it was conceived and understood as a means to an

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[104] ibid, p.20.

[105] Throughout the final negotiations, the British Ambassa-
dor in Brussels kept the American representative in Bel-
gium informed as to the contents of the in camera ses-
sions. (See ibid, pp.39-40.) It is inconceivable that he
would have done so without official sanction.

end; the first step toward the realisation of a larger, twenty-five year old aim. From the beginning, Britain desired a concrete American commitment to the security of Western Europe. Since the near-defeat of World War One, the British knew that a stable, and hence peaceful, balance in Europe could only be preserved through the active involvement of the United States. The further decline after 1945 of the continental European Powers, relative to the emerging Superpowers, made American involvement imperative. Britain might demand the perquisites of the third Great Power, but the inter-war period had especially taught that country that prestige is not an adequate deterrent when confronted by an expansionist State: after 1945, London realised only the United States possessed a credible deterrent power to the USSR.

In recent years revisionist historiography has suggested that the United States was anxiously awaiting the opportunity of formally consolidating its hold on Western Europe; a position it felt it warranted by right of its wartime efforts, and national interests. Whether this was in fact what happened is not reflected in the documentation. For, during this period, the encouragement for long-term American involvement in Europe seems to have come from London. The accuracy of British policy guidelines in gauging what was essential to convince the United States to formally abandon its isolationist past was revealed on March 11 when Marshall informed Inverchapel that the United States was,

prepared to proceed at once in the joint discussions on the establishment of an Atlantic security system.[106]

The American invitation to Great Britain to begin what were to be secret military talks must have minimised the importance of the proposed alliance between the Western European states. This denigration of Western Union must have also been reinforced for the British by the fact that the American invitation arrived even before the completion of the negotiations that were to lead to the Brussels Pact. If the interpretation that Western Union was a means of involving the United States in Western European security is correct, then the principal British objective was achieved even prior to the existence of the Treaty of Brussels.

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[106] FRUS, 1948, Volume Three, Western Europe., p.48.

Chapter V

THE ROOTS OF FRENCH POLICY, 1944-1948

5.1   INTRODUCTION

For most of the decade preceding World War Two, France was regarded by the majority of contemporary military analysts as the most formidable of the European Great Powers. Its million-man army, the extensive fortifications of the Maginot Line, security alliances with Eastern Europe, and its enjoyment of a relative economic prosperity, seemed to support that view. At that time it also tended to suggest that the awful stagnation experienced during World War One was all that was likely to occur if war did indeed break out between France and Hitler's Reich. However, and like so much of the politics of the Interwar Period, appearances tended to belie reality. In six short weeks in the Summer of 1940, the German Wehrmacht completely destroyed the power and status of France in Europe. Four long years later when the Anglo-American forces liberated that country, France emerged terribly distorted from what had been truly a national nightmare. The France of 1944 was devastated economically, rent by an accentuated political polarisation, and both stunned, and shamed, at being the only pre-war Great Power on the Allied side to have been defeated by the Axis. The

last factor was only slightly mitigated by the heroic efforts of the wartime Resistance. All three characteristics, in different measure, were to influence the shape and scope of post-war French foreign policy between 1944 and 1948. In conducting an examination of how that country's policy related to the emerging post-war problem of Western security, two distinct elements are easily discernible; domestic politics, and foreign policy concerns. Each of the two was to impact on the attitude of the French Government toward the formulation of the Treaty of Brussels (1948).

5.2 THE DOMESTIC SCENE

The most important of the two major influences acting on post-war French politics was the turbulent domestic political situation. This was not an altogether unique occurrence as far as France was concerned. The pre-war political history of that country was a litany of unstable coalitions resulting in frequent changes of government leadership: in the period of the Third Republic (1870-1940) there were ninety-eight separate governments installed.

Innate political factionalism aside, the Second World War affected French domestic politics far more adversely than World War One ever did. In the period following the first war the memories of the great victories such as the two battles of the Marne, and of Verdun, were able to compensate for the horrendous suffering the French populace had en-

dured.   The heroic figures of Joffre, Gallieni, Petain, and
Foch, stood above the vagaries of politics and were hailed
by all regardless of political persuasion. And, more impor-
tantly, in 1919 France had not been beaten by its wartime
adversary. Whatever national political unity had existed in
1939 had dissipated by 1945. After the Liberation of France
the new instability arose because of the strains of the war,
demands for fundamental social change,   and the multiple
claims on the loyalty of the French people; the latter force
was generated by the previous two.

Perhaps the most evident political expression of this na-
tional disunity was found in the weakening of the Radical
Party.   In the 1930's the Radical Party had functioned as
the dominant political machine in French politics. By 1944,
however, the Radical leaders were blamed for having advocat-
ed policies which many felt had led to the Second World War
and, ultimately, were deemed to have been responsible for
the defeat of France in 1940. The party's position was also
compromised by the active involvement of several of its
leaders in the collaborationist government established by
Petain at Vichy.   Not having ever been an ideologically-
bound party, the Radicals had been capable in the pre-war
years of appealing to a public support that was extremely
broad-based. In post-Liberation politics they were, by com-
parison, largely unimportant.   Their weakening presaged the
polarisation of post-war French politics, and deprived that

polity of a much-needed cohesive element.[1]

At the end of World War Two there were in France "only two real powers; the Communist Party and General De Gaulle."[2] These two polar forces were to impact on French politics for the period 1944-1948 to an extent that many of the Governments' policies were simply reactions to their independent activities. By 1948 and the signing of the Treaty of Brussels these same two forces were perceived to be threatening the very continuity of democracy in France: the French Communist Party (PCF) because of its ideology, and General de Gaulle because of his popularity and autocratic personality.

This was not the perception in the period immediately following the Liberation and lasting until de Gaulle's unexpected resignation in January of 1946. During the nineteen months of his tenure as President of the Provisional Government, de Gaulle was able to enforce an uneasy, though efficacious, calm on French politics. During this period other major political forces emerged, to compete with de Gaulle and the PCF, such as a renascent Socialist Party, and a newly created Catholic-conservative movement (MRP).[3] However

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[1] Philip M.Williams, Crisis and Compromise, Politics in the Fourth Republic., London, Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1964., pp.17, 115-117.

[2] The Economist., August 18, 1945.

[3] This was the French acronym for le Mouvement Republicain Populaire. For an understanding of the philosophic roots of the MRP see Russell B. Capelle, The MRP and French For-

his status as the preeminent national hero allowed de Gaulle
to establish a stable government by co-opting the support of
both the right and the left wings of the French political
spectrum.

In this early period the only real challenge to de Gaulle
came from the PCF. The PCF's leadership role in the wartime
French Resistance had greatly increased its stature and,
consequently, its political legitimacy. The contribution of
the PCF to the war effort was undeniable; it has been esti-
mated that nearly 50% of the French armed forces, and at
least 30% of the Resistance were mobilised by the PCF.[4] Fur-
thermore, just as de Gaulle benefitted from his seemingly
close relationship with the major Western Allies,   the PCF
enjoyed considerable prestige as a result of its affiliation
with the Soviet Union: the immediate post-war world was
both appreciative and admiring of the inestimable Soviet
contribution to victory. Favourable French perceptions of
the USSR may also have been influenced by the fact that the
Soviet Union, like France, and unlike Great Britain, had
been occupied by Germany for several years.   Equally valua-
ble and politically important was the fact that the PCF,
which had been a minor party in the pre-war era,   did not
suffer the public's opprobrium of seeming to have contribut-

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eign Policy., New York, Praeger, 1963.

[4] Simon Serfaty, "An International Anomaly: The United
States and the Communist Parties in France and Italy,
1945-1947" in Studies in Comparative Communism., Vol.8,
Nos.1 and 2, Spring/Summer 1975. p.127.

ed to the French defeat.[5]

During the war the PCF and the Free French under de
Gaulle had enjoyed an extensive rivalry in organising and
directing the Resistance forces in France. Despite this dis-
trust, in March of 1944 two PCF members were included in the
London-based cabinet of the Free French. In no way sympa-
thetic to their cause, de Gaulle undertook this decision for
purely political reasons as he was to explain years later in
his memoirs;

> The part they [PCF] were playing in the Resis-
> tance, as well as my intention to see that their
> forces were incorporated into those of the nation
> at least for the duration of the war, led me to
> the decision to put two of them in the govern-
> ment.[6]

It had been a politically astute move on the part of de
Gaulle, for after the Liberation the Communist-led Resis-
tance often found itself in effective control of many re-
gions in southern France.

The acceptance of the two ministerial posts in de
Gaulle's cabinet seems to indicate, as early as March 1944,
that the PCF leadership had decided to work through the ex-
isting institutions of the French state to obtain power.
They apparently believed that their extensive Resistance
connections, cohesive organisation, and nation-wide reputa-

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[5] Edward Mortimer, The Rise of the French Communist Party.,
London, Faber and Faber, 1984., pp.307-312.

[6] Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, Unity, (1942-1944)., Lon-
don, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1959., pp.184-185.

tion, could be converted into popular electoral support once France was liberated. As Communist leader Maurice Thorez noted in 1945, the PCF was

> a government party. We must be conscious everywhere of the gravity of our responsibilities before the Party and before the nation.[7]

There also appears to have been an accurate forecasting, by the PCF, that de Gaulle's wartime stature would translate into real political power once France was liberated: in other words, it would be better to appear as a political ally rather than as a foe of a national leader, especially one with de Gaulle's unforgiving temperament. By the Summer of 1944 this decision was reinforced by a realistic understanding that neither of the two major Western Powers would permit the PCF to attain power while the war was still in progress.[8]

De Gaulle apparently suspected the PCF of simply biding its time, and waiting for the most propitious moment to seize violently the reins of government. It was a view which many conservatives and socialists alike shared. Surprisingly, the PCF did little to dispel that unfavourable and politically-expensive impression. When shortly after the Lib-

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[7] Simon Serfaty, "An International Anomaly: The United States and the Communist Parties in France and Italy, 1945-1947", p.128.

[8] Long after these events Thorez was quoted as saying, "With the Americans in France the revolution would have been annihilated". Quoted in ibid, p.131. See also Edward Mortimer, op cit., p.317, and Henri Michel, The Second World War - Volume Two., New York, Praeger, 1975., pp.836-837.

eration, the Provisional Government ordered the Resistance to give up their wartime armaments, the PCF refused. Later that same year the Communists disobeyed the government's order for the PCF-led Patriotic Militia to disband. Only at the end of 1944, when the PCF leader Maurice Thorez returned from his wartime sojourn in Moscow, were the Government's instructions followed.[9] The reason for the PCF's initial reluctance to obey the Provisional Government, despite their wartime cooperation with de Gaulle, may have been due only to stubborn pride on the part of a recognisably youthful leadership. This may accout for their compliance with the orders once Thorez was allowed to return to France from the Soviet Union where he had fled in 1940. However, the more likely explanation is that the PCF was not yet prepared to abandon all hope of an eventual uprising to establish a workers' state. They may have wished to retain the armed communist-led forces as a means of leverage on successive French governments.

The damage done by their adamant refusals to obey what the majority of the French believed to be the legitimate government of France was irreversible. For many moderate and patriotic left-wing leaders, the image of a well-armed PCF force meant that the pre-war saying of "no enemy on the left" was a fable. For conservatives, it simply reinforced an already prevalent opinion of the PCF. It also further

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[9] See Philip M.Williams, op cit., p.18, and Edward Mortimer, op cit., pp.315-318.

isolated the PCF from de Gaulle, and his growing distrust
was to be reflected throughout his dealings with them:

> Though Government orders set up a single Committee
> of Liberation in each department composed of rep-
> resentatives of every movement, party and trade
> union ... a swarm of committees appeared which
> claimed to set the pace, control the mayors, em-
> ployers, directors, and to hunt down the guilty
> and suspect. The Communists, skillful and united
> in their aims, using various labels, and utilising
> the sympathies and loyalties which many of them
> had won in various milieus during the conflict,
> were careful to provoke and sustain these splinter
> groups strengthened by arms.[10]

The post-war electoral strength of the PCF was first re-
vealed on October 21, 1945, when the French people over-
whelmingly supported the abolition of the Third Republic
and, at the same time, elected a new Constituent Assembly.
The result of the referendum owed much to de Gaulle's cam-
paign, supported by the MRP, which had advocated a new con-
stitutional arrangement in France. He urged that the country
needed to limit legislative authority, and return to a sys-
tem which allowed for a greater concentration of power in
the executive organ of government. Interestingly both the
PCF and the Socialists had opposed any constitutional chang-
es.[11] However support for de Gaulle's position did not
translate into majority electoral support for the conserva-
tive parties. Instead, the elections revealed that the larg-
est party in the Constituent Assembly was the PCF. Al-

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[10] Charles DeGaulle, _War Memoirs_, _Salvation_ (1944-1946).,
London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1960., p.15.

[11] _The Economist._, September 8, 1945.

though, numerically, the popular vote was almost evenly split between the PCF, MRP, and the Socialists, the Communists had achieved a plurality of 3%.[12] This meant that although they held the greatest number of seats in the Assembly, they did not possess a majority position. The reasonably successful maiden appearance of the MRP, and the relatively poor performance of a weakened Socialist Party, resulted in a tally of 4.75 million votes for each: by way of contrast, the PCF was able to garner 5.25 million votes.

The PCF was to experience continued electoral success throughout 1945. The municipal elections in April witnessed unprecedented gains for the Communists. And although it had been felt that the results were simply a protest vote against "the poor quality of life under de Gaulle for the previous nine months",[13] the October elections indicated otherwise. The latter results revealed a near-doubling of pre-war support for the PCF. Most of these ballots came at the expense of a badly splintered Socialist Party, and from the Socialists' former strongholds in industrial centres and among the country's secular trade unions. Indeed by the end of 1945 the PCF had wrested control of the largest trade union - the CGT - from the Socialists.[14]

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[12] The results were; PCF - 26.2%, MRP - 23.9%, and Socialists - 23.4%. See Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: American-European Relations Since 1945., London, MacMillan, 1981., p.55.

[13] The Economist., May 5, 1945.

[14] The Economist., October 27, 1945. See also Alfred Gros-

De Gaulle might have prevented the October electoral suc-
cess of the PCF had he not continued to refuse to become
personally involved in politics by leading a political par-
ty. Additionally, the issues proved far too divisive for an
alliance of the existing centrist parties with the result
that the strongly cohesive PCF emerged disproportionately
strong. The Socialists and the Communists may have agreed
on constitutional matters, but no political alliance was
possible between the two: their stormy pre-war relationship,
which continued after 1945, meant that the Socialists could
not act as a moderating influence on the PCF. At the same
time, any agreement between the Socialists and the MRP was
equally impossible as they disagreed on the constitutional
form the future Fourth Republic should assume. The MRP and
Socialist parties, who together might have arrested the
PCF's electoral gains, proved unable to organise themselves
into an effective counterpoise. As one writer has noted;

> [T]he attempts to transform the non-Commnunist Re-
> sistance into a political movement was thus still
> born, and instead three parties [MRP, Socialist,
> and unofficial Gaullists] succeeded in canalising
> the new enthusiasm.[15]

Despite the PCF's October successes, de Gaulle was at
first able to pursue policies which obtained the support of
all three major parties. This ability was directly attribu-
table to three factors. First, a considerable amount of

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ser, op cit., pp.68-69.

[15] Philip M.Williams, op cit., p.19.

progressive legislation had been proposed and enacted: much of this legislation dealt with economic and financial reforms and was supported by all three parties in the coalition. Second, despite his distrust of the PCF, de Gaulle continued to include two members in his cabinet: one held the Aviation Ministry, while the other remained without portfolio. Third, his personal popularity remained unrivalled. Overall, it was a

> style of government, in which a national hero of
> authoritarian temper carried out the revolutionary
> policies of an insurrectionary committee, subject
> to the criticism of a parliamentary assembly and
> was one which combined features cherished by the
> extreme Right, the extreme Left, and the moderate
> Centre.[16]

However, the October electoral success of the PCF understandably led to greater assertiveness for a leading role in the legislative process of the Provisional Government. On November 15 Thorez issued a public demand for one of either the foreign, defence, or interior, ministries in the post-election coalition then being assembled. Fearing that the PCF wanted "one of the state's essential powers and thereby have means of taking control in a moment of confusion", de Gaulle refused the demand.[17] Although it was to survive until May of 1947, "tripartisme" (the coalition of the MRP, PCF, and Socialists) was clearly a tenuous political alliance. Exasperated with the difficult maneuvering among the

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[16] Philip M.Williams, op cit., p.20.

[17] Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, Salvation (1944-1946)., p.269.

parties, de Gaulle suddenly resigned on January 19, 1946.[18]

The months that followed de Gaulle's resignation were to reveal the lack of public confidence in the stability of the system which was to become a constant feature of this period in post-war French politics. The end of his tenure as President brought a dramatic shift in policy emphasis by successive French governments. De Gaulle's ability to rise above partisan politics, by appealing to the entire French people, enabled him to subordinate domestic policy to foreign policy concerns; or, as in the case of certain of his economic reforms, to pursue one level of policy without adversely affecting the conduct of the other. Under de Gaulle's successors the central concern of government largely became one of seeking measures that would ensure, or at least not endanger, cabinet survival. The underlying tensions of the earlier coalitions, which had been held in check by de Gaulle, soon came to the surface. The period of 1946 to beyond the signing of the Brussels Treaty, witnessed a series of increasingly powerful assaults on the moderate, or centrist (MRP and Socialist) parties' hold on power.

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[18] Outwardly the resignation stemmed from the question of legislated restraints to his proposed defence budget. However the actual reason may have been an attempt by de Gaulle to forestall the PCF from sabotaging the coalition and thereby damage his reputation. See The Times, January 21, 1946. See also Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume Three, British Commonwealth, Europe., p.401. Hereafter this source is cited as FRUS.

The primary domestic problem in France was the reconstruction of the economic order in that country. It was characterised by the difficulties in industrial recovery, redistribution of the national income, and a spiralling inflation that was brought under control only in late 1948. These were issues that were faced by all of the governments in post-war Europe. However in France they were exacerbated by disputes over defence, colonial, and foreign policies as each political party attempted to see their own programme implemented to as great a degree as possible. As a result, even in governing coalitions, the parties spent as much time attacking each other as they did fending off those of the opposition.

The first general election after de Gaulle's resignation took place on June 2, 1946. Once again it revealed gains for the PCF and the MRP at the expense of the Socialists. This was repeated on November 10, when the first elections under the Fourth Republic occurred. Again the PCF was returned as the country's largest parliamentary party. As the PCF and the MRP gained in electoral strength, each demonstrated a disinclination to work with the other in coalition governments. The MRP was increasingly concerned that it appear as an anti-Communist party and thus retain the support of the conservative sector of the French electorate. At the same time, and based on their electoral successes, the PCF did not want to play a secondary role in French politics.

The Communist Party wanted to prevent any loss of electoral support by continued adherence to any conservative-dominated coalition.   On November 27 the Central Committee of the PCF decided that it should undertake to assume a more important role in directing the affairs of the country.[19] On this occassion the PCF was only prevented from forming the government by the refusal of the Socialist Party to support them in the National Assembly.

Beginning in January, 1947, both the MRP and the PCF reluctantly participated in the two Socialist-led governments of Leon Blum and Paul Ramadier respectively. The leadership of the Socialist Party was just as determined as the MRP to prevent the PCF from obtaining control of either the army or the police forces. In the end, although the Ministry of National Defence was allotted to a Communist minister, bureaucratic adjustments were made such that the armed forces were actually controlled elsewhere.[20] Nevertheless, throughout both the Blum and Ramadier governments efforts were undertaken to strengthen the moderate elements in French politics. The need to bolster the position of the coalition, both in the legislature and in the public confidence, served as an important impetus leading to the conclusion of the Anglo-French alliance (the Treaty of Dunkirk) in March of

[19] Keesing's Contemporary Archives., p.8327.

[20] Claude Delmas, "A Change of Heart; Concerns Behind the Discussions in France", in NATO's Anxious Birth., ed. Nicholas Sherwen, New York, St.Martin's Press, 1985., p.61.

1947.

Growing American hostility to the continued inclusion of Communists in the French cabinet soon also drew the attention of both Blum and Ramadier. The role of the PCF, which had previously been tolerated, was closely scrutinised by the American Government following the announcement of the Truman Doctrine. There was a grave fear in Washington that the strength of the PCF was such that upon Soviet command it could, as Dean Acheson wrote, "pull the plug on France": the United States perceived the PCF as Europe's most dangerous fifth column. Jefferson Caffery, the American Ambassador to France, wrote to Marshall;

> [T]he long hand of the Kremlin is increasingly exercising power, or at least influence, in all European countries, largely through its principal lever the French Communist Party, and its fortress the CGT.[21]

For the Truman Administration the inclusion of the PCF in the French Government took on an importance that went far beyond the borders of France itself.

The hostility of the American Government understandably concerned the French Government. There was a fear that continued PCF involvement could mean the loss of American aid which was considered vital for both economic recovery and political stability. As early as Premier Blum's visit to Washington in the Spring of 1947 this threat had been made quite explicit: Secretary of the Treasury Fred Vinson stated

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[21] FRUS, 1948, Volume Three, Western Europe., pp.690-692.

that the massive aid and trade credits Blum wanted would flow to France when "the Socialists join an anti-Communist coalition, and so oust the Communists now [sic] occupying important posts in the French cabinet."[22] The French Chief of Staff, General Billotte, warned Blum that the United States could not be expected to maintain sizeable armed forces in Germany if a Communist France sat astride its supply lines.[23] It was therefore becoming apparent that the PCF could not retain its membership in the government if the necessary American aid was to be secured. It was also obvious that neither the Soviet Union, nor Britain, could provide that financial aid: the United States was the only source available. Slightly less important was the realisation that only the United States could provide the military support which was a requisite if the French Empire was to be retained in areas such as Indo-China.

De Gaulle had based his policy on a similar appreciation of France's situation. In achieving the Franco-Soviet treaty in December of 1944, de Gaulle strengthened his politically convenient alliance with the PCF. At the same time he was hoping to obtain the much-needed American financial and military assistance to offset the Soviet connection.[24] As

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[22] Simon Serfaty, "An International Anomaly: The United States and the Communist Parties in France and Italy, 1945-1947", p.132.

[23] ibid, p.133.

[24] Walter Lipgens, A History of European Integration, Volume One, 1945-1947., p.217.

one analyst has noted;

> [T]he more a policy of rapprochement with the So-
> viet Union succeeded in forcing Washington into
> additional assistance for De Gaulle, the more De
> Gaulle would be capable of releasing himself from
> the support of the Communists at home.[25]

Unfortunately for de Gaulle's successors, both the domestic and the international arenas had hardened to an extent that playing the "Russian card" was no longer a practicable option. The growing tensions between the two Superpowers meant that French interests were more sharply defined than before. After the Moscow Conference (April 1947) France firmly aligned itself with the British and Americans, rather than continue to try to be a mediating Power between the East and the West. As a result of their Western alignment American aid, both financial and military, became more important; so too was the French appreciation of the American attitude toward the PCF.

Despite the concerns of both the American Government and the French moderates, the Blum and Ramadier coalitions proved to be nearly unworkable. The PCF found itself opposed to the other parties on most issues of both domestic and foreign policy. Indeed it has been suggested that the only reason the PCF stayed in the government coalition was in an attempt to influence French policy at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.[26] After the Moscow Conference

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[25] Simon Serfaty, "An International Anomaly: The United
States and the Communist Parties in France and Italy,
1945-1947", p.130.

there was no further political utility to be gained by the PCF remaining in the coalition.   The failure of the Moscow Conference, and the end of "tripartisme" did not alter the PCF's official plan of action. Thorez and the PCF leadership remained publicly committed to the pursuit of an electoral victory as their means to achieve power. Edward Mortimer has suggested that Thorez and some of the other PCF leaders still thought it possible that France could continue to operate without entering either of the Superpowers' emerging blocs.   As evidence, Mortimer cites one of Thorez's speeches declaring support for the Marshall Plan and the "aid of our American friends".[27]

On May 3, 1947, the PCF deputies in the National Assembly, including the three cabinet ministers, voted against a piece of government-sponsored legislation.   Two days later the PCF ministers were dismissed from the government by Ramadier.   The political import of their dismissal was considerable;

> The Communists had neither gained control of the
> key ministries nor penetrated the governmental ma
> chinery sufficiently to paralyse it. They were not
> strong enough either to win a free election or to
> create a revolutionary situation.   Their one great

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[26] That this was the strategy of the PCF is supported by evidence then available to American, and presumably French, authorities. According to these sources the PCF had been instructed in early January, 1947, to obtain as many cabinet positions as possible.   They were to follow this course in order to moderate the position of the French delegation at the Moscow Conference. See FRUS, 1948, Volume Three, Western Europe., pp.668-669.

[27] Edward Mortimer, op cit., p.358.

asset was their grip on the trade-unions; and France was now to be ruled against the opposition of the largest party and the industrial working class.[28]

Soon after the dismissal of the Communist ministers a series of labour strikes took place. They were of a serious enough nature that Ramadier was forced to invoke wartime legislation in order to deal with them. Although no evidence of a direct linkage was ever found, the government believed that the Communist-led CGT union was behind them.[29] The strikes were a foretaste of what the PCF was to offer France later that year.

The strategy of the PCF changed quite abruptly after the Paris Conference of June, and the establishment of the Cominform in September of 1947. Addressing the issue of Marshall Plan aid, Thorez clearly stated the new battlelines;

> We [PCF] did not emphasise with the necessary force that we were only expelled from the government on the express orders of the American reaction. As a result of this initial mistake we did not at first pitilessly unmask the behaviour of the Socialist leaders and of the various government parties, as being a real ignominy, a shameful betrayal of national interests.[30]

The PCF's new strategy emphasised, for the first time, a strong anti-American platform. It asserted that the Marshall Plan was only a means of American imperialism which all patriotic Frenchmen should resist.[31] The adherence of

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[28] Philip M.Williams, op cit., p.24.

[29] The Times, May 26, 1946.

[30] Edward Mortimer, op cit., p.358.

the PCF to the new, Moscow-dictated, belligerency meant that their involvement in coalition enterprises was no longer even remotely possible. These aggressive statements intensified the perceived threat from the extreme Left.

During the Fall of 1947 the threat from the PCF-led Left appeared to continue to intensify. The radical measures the PCF were then relying upon were CGT-organised strikes. Complying with the express wishes of the Moscow-based Cominform the PCF used these massive industrial walkouts in an attempt to prevent the Ramadier Government from participating in the American-sponsored Marshall Plan. At the first Paris Conference Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had threatened France that, "if you accept the Marshall Plan you will unleash a tempest."[32] By November that threat was being actualised. Labour unrest had been continuous since early May of 1947, but its scope became nation-wide soon after the creation of the Cominform in Moscow. The initial outburst occurred on November 12, in Marseilles, and soon escalated to a series of nation-wide strikes lasting until December 10 when over two million workers were protesting.[33] Although the Ramadier Government did not yield to the pressure tactics of the PCF, the demonstrations had shown the extent of Communist support

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[31] FRUS, 1947, Volume Three, British Commonwealth, Europe., p.795.

[32] Merry and Serge Bromberger, Jean Monnet and the United States of Europe., New York, Coward - McCann, 1968., p.62.

[33] Keesing's Contemporary Archives., p.8949.

in France.

The second factor which served to influence Ramadier in braving the removal of the PCF from his government was de Gaulle's re-entry into French politics. It was innaugurated by a strident anti-government speech at Strasbourg on April 14, 1946. He issued the invitation, as he had done in 1940, for Frenchmen of all classes to join him in a new political movement. Calling his party the Rally of the French People (RPF) he was highly critical of the government's policies, and of the entire political structure imposed by the Fourth Republic. Importantly, the RPF's platform was also staunchly anti-Communist. De Gaulle repeatedly attacked the inclusion of Communists in the cabinet, and constantly demanded their explusion.[34] American Ambassador Caffery wrote Marshall about de Gaulle saying,

> De Gaulle has not yet decided on his strategy, but his general aim is...to destroy the hold of the political parties on their followers so that large parts of their membership, including their parliamentary representatives, will transfer their allegiance to him. Counting on the disintegration of the political parties and his own considerable public prestige DeGaulle apparently believes that in the ruins of the present political system he can rally a substantial majority and construct a strong coalition grouping all anti-Communist forces.[35]

[34] Keesing's Contemporary Archives., p.8529.

[35] FRUS, 1947, Volume Three, The British Commonwealth, Europe., p.698.

The vast crowds he drew, the press coverage - both foreign and domestic - de Gaulle received, and the enthusiasm which greeted his return all pointed to the advent of a new political force.[36]

The Right in France had never been completely quiescent. While de Gaulle had been in power they had tended to support the MRP. Nevertheless the broad popular support that manifested itself in the early successes of the MRP was illusory. The great majority of that party's supporters were far more conservative and anti-clerical than the MRP's progressive and Catholic leadership. In the absence of a more traditional conservative party, the MRP served as a temporary home for anti-communists, Catholics, anti-clerics, some peasants and other conservative political groups. Many of these more traditional conservative forces soon switched their support to the RPF once it was created.

By the Fall of 1947 it was clear to all that de Gaulle was aiming at re-attaining the political leadership of France. Throughout September and October of 1947 he continued to accuse the Ramadier Government and its coalition partners, the MRP, of being "soft" on Communism and needlessly jeapardising the safety of France. He repeatedly as-

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[36] In October, 1947, de Gaulle delivered a speech at Vincennes. American Embassy personnel sent to observe the General noted that the crowd of an estimated half-million was composed of people from all classes and seemed to be very receptive to his appeals for support. See ibid., p.763.

serted that the Soviet Union was pursuing an expansionist policy the objectives of which went further west of the Elbe[37] As Le Monde, noted on October 5, "those who refuse to admit that the world is henceforth divided into two camps have only to read the manifesto of the new International." It was equally explicit in stating that the Soviet Union was employing the various Western states' communist parties, including the PCF, in the fight against the Western bloc. In effect, the period of conservative dormancy ended with de Gaulle's reemergence into French politics.

The first electoral test for the newly formed RPF occurred in the municipal elections of late October, 1947. The results were a devastating repudiation of the moderate positions. The RPF took 40% of the popular vote, while the PCF retained its 30%. However the MRP and Socialists together only managed to garner 25% of the total number of ballots cast. The election meant that the RPF was firmly in control of the thirteen largest cities in France, including the Paris Council.[38]

The results of the election showed to what extent de Gaulle was able to rally public support and polarise popular opinion over the issue of anti-Communism. His party's victory was aided by his national status, the worst labour un-

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[37] Keesing's Contemporary Archives., p.8849.

[38] The Annual Register., London, Longmans, 1948., p.257. See also The Times., October 21, 1947.

rest since the early 1930's, and a public reaction against a stream of seemingly ineffective post-war centrist coalitions. As one contemporary observer wrote;

> The striking success won at the polls by the various groups General De Gaulle had rallied under the banner of anti-communism, is less a tribute to him personally than the expression of the revulsion against the political conflicts and tensions that have marred France's otherwise notable recovery from the effects of war and occupation.[39]

De Gaulle, himself, interpreted the election results as a public expression of a lack of confidence in both the existing Ramadier Government and the constitutional structure of the Fourth Republic; of the latter de Gaulle termed it a "system of paralysis". He demanded that Ramadier resign and call elections to create a new constitution. The Times. wrote that de Gaulle was acting much like a true Bonapartist,[40] while the PCF labelled him a fascist.[41]

De Gaulle appeared to pose a threat to the continuity of French democracy despite the fact that he neither led strikes, nor fomented armed rebellion. Among more moderate elements it was feared that given the opportunity, which seemed to be fast-approaching, he would establish an popular-backed authoritarian regime as Louis Napoleon had done in 1849. Many charged de Gaulle with aspiring to play the

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[39] Vera Micheles Dean, "De Gaulle's Success Fails to Discourage French Socialists" in Foreign Policy Bulletin., Vol.27, No.3, October 31, 1947.

[40] The Times., October 28, 1947.

[41] See "France: The Crisis of the Fourth Republic" in The World Today., Vol.4, No.10, October 1948., p.416-417.

role of the "man on horseback" which, contrary to his own expressed intentions, was felt to threaten the democratic institutions of France. Just as important to the Ramadier coalition was its perception that the RPF was a reactionary organisation and therefore quite unpredictable. Its intransigence on the question of constitutional reforms, and adamant refusals to enter any government but their own, resulted in the centrist parties viewing the RPF as the Right-wing complement to the PCF's threat from the Left.

De Gaulle also seemed to pose a threat in a more latent manner. His self-proclaimed role as the leader of a national political party, which functioned as an umbrella organisation for all types of conservative and some centrist groups gave de Gaulle and the RPF a position comparable to that enjoyed by the pre-war Radicals. One could even argue that this threatened the electoral viability of the existing centrist parties, more so than French democracy itself. According to American observers, there was in France

> a growing conviction among the public and certain political leaders that whether or not one approves or believes in de Gaulle and his policies, to survive France must have a strong government. De Gaulle, they believe, is the only figure with sufficient prestige and authority to rally behind him, control, and dominate, the anti-Communist forces which at present are a definite majority but which are "incoherent and impotent".[42]

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[42] FRUS, 1947, Volume Three, The British Commonwealth and Europe., p.731.

Therefore, by the beginning of 1948, French moderates clearly perceived that the domestic political situation in their country was moving towards a degree of extreme polarisation. This had happened at the turn of the century when the Dreyfus Affair erupted: at that time civil war had only just been avoided. Therefore the advocacy of the Treaty of Brussels served the domestic political interests of the centrist coalition in two ways.

First, the Treaty of Brussels can be seen as an attempt to prevent either the outbreak of civil war, or the subversion of democracy, in France. By demonstrating that the centrist-led Government was determined to resist Communism, and to take seriously the perceived Communist threat to France, it was hoped that much of the anti-Communist support given de Gaulle and the RPF would be syphoned away. This was not an unrealistic expectation; de Gaulle's constant viturperations about the centrists' inactivity at home in the face of Soviet Union's use of fifth columns in Eastern Europe, suggest that an RPF-dominated government may very well have pursued a similar policy had they been in power.

The second domestic political interest served by the Treaty of Brussels was to continue to undermine the political strength and attractiveness of Communist policies in France. By advocating European economic cooperation it was believed that French recovery would be hastened. By joining in a Western security pact, France was guaranteeing itself

continued American economic assistance and a further weaken-
ing of the position occupied by the PCF in French politics.
Furthermore it is highly unlikely that the Truman Adminis-
tration's European Recovery Plan would ever have received
Congressional approval if the States of Western Europe had
not addressed themselves to the problem of security. One can
realistically surmise that the French Government was aware
of this American caveat.

Although neither the Government, nor the PCF realised it,
the latter's strength in France had peaked.[43] However the
threats from both the Right and the Left were still per-
ceived to be very real in March of 1948. From a purely do-
mestic vantage point, French support for the Brussels Pact
can be understood as a foreign policy aimed at out-maneuver-
ing de Gaulle, and undermining the Communists: in so doing,
the moderates believed that French democracy would be saved.

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[43] In a telegram dated January 14, 1948, U.S. Amabassador
Jefferson Caffery told Marshall that the periods of calm
after the November strikes was deceiving. He stated that
most centrist leaders in France regarded the following
months as the most important in determining the political
nature of the country. He noted that De Gaulle and the
PCF were simply biding their time. As to the continuing
existence of a communist threat in France, Caffery wrote
"that the Communists are still strong and dangerous (they
did not make an all out effort last November) and will
use every means to insure the failure of [French Premier]
Schuman's economic plan is a disturbing certainty". See
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Volume
Three, Western Europe., pp.595-596.

5.3   THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

The Liberation revived the fundamental question of national security for France in what was a qualitatively different Europe than that of 1939.   However, while the political environment had been considerably altered by the war, French security concerns had not.   For most of the period 1944 to 1948, as had been the case in the interwar years, the predominant interest was French security vis a vis Germany. Having had to endure three separate German invasions in seventy years, and having been able to avert military disaster only once, it was understandable that France should once again have perceived even the defeated Reich as the most serious threat to its security.

Despite the continuing "German problem", the attitude toward that country was far less bitter than it had been after World War One. At that time the terrific bloodletting of the war and the domination of the Chamber of Deputies by right-wing nationalists had led France to demand a punitive peace settlement. This was achieved in 1919 within The framework of the harsh Treaty of Versailles However, after World War Two the political atmosphere was quite different.   The financial expenses of the second conflict had been much greater for France than those of the first war, but the human costs had not been nearly as severe. This fact, in addition to the domination of the National Assembly by the parties of the centre or left of the political spectrum (MRP, Social-

ist, and PCF), meant that the security question was debated in a less-vengeful environment.[44]

The Socialist Party, in particular, supported the use of a collective security approach as the basis for post-war French foreign policy. It was generally believed among the Socialist leadership that only an "international community" setting would allow for the resolution of the German question to everyone's satisfaction. In December of 1943 the General Secretary of the Socialist Party, Daniel Mayer, wrote that a lasting peace would be achieved only by means of "an international community constituted first by the United States of Europe and joined, in the end, to a United States of the World."[45] It was a view that was repeated in November of 1944 in the Socialist Party's "manifesto" on foreign policy:

> [Lasting world peace would depend on] collective
> security in a world-wide organization based on
> justice. This organization must not be dominated
> by one or several great powers, but must take the
> form of a federation of free nations, each of
> which gives up part of its sovereignty to a su-
> perior body with its own leadership, its own budg-
> et and armed forces adequate to guarantee the se-
> curity of every individual and of the whole

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[44] Some French political leaders even suggested that France was itself not totally innocent of having created the conditions from which the war erupted in 1939. The Socialist leader, Leon Blum, noted that many of the problems France had experienced were of French creation. In a speech to the Constituent Assembly he stated that French foreign policy before World War Two "was neither continuous, nor homogenous, nor infallible". See The Economist., December 22, 1945.

[45] Quoted in Walter Lipgens, op cit., p.215.

community.[46]

In an effort to resolve the German problem the Provisional Government's Consultative Assembly also favoured a collective security approach rather than the more narrow traditional-nationalist emphasis. In November of 1944 a resolution was passed in the Assembly urging de Gaulle's Provisional Government to,

> prepare an international organisation which will
> lead the community of States towards a federation
> of free peoples, within which regional agreements
> will not run the risk of leading to the formation
> of antagonistic blocs.[47]

It was in this vein that the December, 1944, Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance was viewed. As the proposed bases of French foreign policy, European unity and Great Power cooperation were to be achieved and maintained through a series of incremental steps:

> We believe that the pact with Russia is the begin-
> ning of a whole series of mutual-assistance treat-
> ies into which France, Russia, and Britain will
> draw all of the nations of Europe that are united
> to us by long-standing ties, both moral and ma-
> terial.[48]

However, concerned as the three major parties were with domestic issues after 1945, it was only politic to assign European unity a relatively low priority: despite mouthings of support for the concept, among legislators and party hie-

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[46] ibid, p.216.

[47] Dorothy Pickles, French Politics, the First Years of the Fourth Republic., London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953., p.184.

[48] Quoted in Walter Lipgens, op cit., p.218.

rarchies, it was forced to remain "an aspiration rather than a policy."[49] The well-known opposition of both the Superpowers in the immediate post-war period, and de Gaulle's refusal to follow a "European" foreign policy, had dissipated much of the earlier enthusiasm of the Socialists and large segments of the MRP.

As the President of the Provisional Government, de Gaulle was also understandably interested in French security and a lasting solution to the German problem; a solution amenable to France's long-term interests in Europe. Unlike the Consultative Assembly, he was principally concerned with restoring France's pre-war status in Europe, rather than sublimating his efforts in the creation of a European polity. De Gaulle, on the other hand, believed it was of vital importance to France to recover its status, and the privileges therein, of a Great Power. He felt that only by being accepted as an equal partner with the Big Three would France be able to administer effectively to its national security interests and actively participate in the re-ordering of post-war Europe. Throughout the war he had repeatedly sought to have France accepted as an equal member of the major Allied Powers. His efforts met with continued rebuffs which forced him to pursue a different means of obtaining Great Power status for France. One alternate method was through the advocacy of a limited form of European unity.

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[49] Dorothy Pickles, op cit., p.185.

In a series of three public addresses de Gaulle explained the political utility of the concept for France.

The first speech was delivered in London's Albert Hall on November 11, 1942. It was there that de Gaulle first made public reference to European unification. After emphasising the war effort of the Free French forces, his speech stressed the need for a collective unity "of the free nations of Europe in economic and defence fields." Possibly indulging his audience with some wartime propaganda, he stated that militarism and aggression were inalienable attributes of the German national character. Logically, therefore, since the rest of Europe was inhabited by basically peaceful peoples, de Gaulle's proposed unification of all European defence forces would prevent a German State from unleashing another war.[50] The thrust of his speech was that European unity could provide the mechanism for securing France from the greatest perceived threat to its security – Germany.

De Gaulle's second speech was delivered in Algiers on July 14, 1943. Although he once again argued against complacency with regard to Germany, his words were more revealingly directed at asserting French ambitions in post-war Europe. Perhaps because he was speaking to a largely French audience, the speech was of a more nationalist tenor than

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[50] H.S. Chopra, De Gaulle and European Unity., New Delhi, Abhinov Publications, 1974., pp.9-10.

had been the case in the Albert Hall. De Gaulle stressed that France belonged "in the first rank of nations which are great, and which, for that reason, are under all the greater obligation to guarantee the liberty of others." He stated that French forces were still fighting, and that they were "doing so in the name of France, to attain the goals of France, in agreement with what France desires." He further noted that "any system established on other foundations than these would lead to jeopardy or impotence." The speech was a statement that despite the defeat in 1940 France was still a Great Power and that the Big Three would do well to recognise that "fact". This view was repeated in February of 1945 when de Gaulle warned the Big Three, then at Yalta, that no post-war system could possibly function without the agreement of France.[51]

The third speech was also delivered in Algiers on March 18, 1944. In it de Gaulle returned to the subjects he had raised in the Albert Hall address - European unification in defence and economics. However the emphasis of the speech was placed on the necessity of forming "an economic grouping in Western Europe of which the Channel, the Rhine and the Mediterranean would be the arteries."[52] It is interesting to note that there was considerable similarity between de Gaulle's conception of a united Europe and the later British

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[51] The Economist., February 3, 1945.

[52] H.S.Chopra, op cit., pp.10-11.

proposal for a Western European Security Group. The crucial difference between the two conceptions is that de Gaulle never accepted the validity of British membership in "his" Europe: as a member of the Big Three, British membership would have overshadowed the Great Power role envisaged for France as the leader of continental Europe.

By late March of 1944, de Gaulle was publicly asserting that the distinct interests of Europe were not represented when the leaders of the Big Three met at their periodic summits. In order to rectify this unsatisfactory situation, and thereby achieve some control over their own destiny, he stressed the need for European States to band together within a format that would not entail the measurable loss of any sovereignty. De Gaulle was advocating the creation of an independent political force that would operate between the Anglo-American and Soviet Powers. The two foci of this "third force" were to be the recognition of collective economic recovery, and the need for a satisfactory "European" solution to the German problem. As the largest, most potentially powerful continental State, France was perceived to constitute the natural leader for this grouping.

Unlike the supranational motives of the representatives in the French Assembly, de Gaulle's rationale for encouraging any measure of European unity was purely nationalistic. He had first expressed this view in the Algiers speech of 1943. De Gaulle's basic objective was for France to create

and lead a system of European States who were to work together within the parameters determined by the national interests of France: the goal was to create a distinct French sphere of influence.[53] As he wrote in his memoirs, his aim was

> to assure its [France's] security in Western Europe, by preventing a new Reich from again menacing it. To collaborate with the West and the East if necessary contracting on one side or the other the necessary alliances without ever accepting any kind of dependence. ... To lead the states that touch the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees to group themselves from the political, economic, strategic points of view. To make this organisation one of the three planetary powers and, if it is one day necessary, the arbiter between the Soviet and Anglo-Saxon camps.[54]

It is likely that even had de Gaulle remained in power beyond January of 1946 this policy would have proven unsuccessful. Although official French documentation for the

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[53] It may appear politically unrealistic for de Gaulle to have expected post-war Europe to accept, unquestioning, the leadership of France. However one of de Gaulle's biographers has noted that he seems to have perceived France as _primus inter pares_ in Europe. de Gaulle effectively fused the destiny of Western civilisation with that of his own country. The logical outlook of this extreme nationalist belief meant that any time France realised a national objective, the whole of Europe was perceived to benefit from its success. As de Gaulle, revealingly, once stated, "old world, ever new, which from century to century, received the deep imprint of France and which is waiting for her to again show the road." In return for this "spiritual leadership" which France was destined to bear, de Gaulle seems to have expected an equal accretion of real political power and influence to France. See Anthony Hartley, _Gaullism_, _Rise and Fall of a Political Movement_., New York, Outerbridge and Dienstfrey, 1971., pp.15-17.

[54] Charles de Gaulle, _War Memoirs_, _Salvation_, _1944-1946_., p.175.

period has yet to be released for academic study, many of the same questions about the viability of a "third force", raised by the British Foreign Office, were also being discussed in the Consultative Assembly and the French dailies. An editorial in Le Monde questioned the political viability of de Gaulle's European bloc given the probable hostile reactions of the two Superpowers.[55] In her study of French politics during this period, Dorothy Pickles has also revealed an extensive debate in the French press as to the possibility and practicability of a French-led independent European Power.[56] The many post-war political and economic debilities of France seem to have been quite obvious to interested observers. As Britain had also learned with regard to its own "third force" potential, France and the other States of Europe were too weak to support de Gaulle's diplomatic grouping. Furthermore, the emphasis on a nationalist foreign policy met considerable resistance among Socialists and some members of the MRP in the Consultative Assembly. Walter Lipgens has noted that, prior to January of 1946, at no time was the Assembly so in favour of de Gaulle's foreign policy aims that there was not significant reactions against it.[57] De Gaulle, himself, admitted that the November 1944 foreign policy debate in the Assembly revealed how isolated he was in the Assembly when France's role in Europe was be-

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[55] Le Monde., July 31, 1945.

[56] Dorothy Pickles, op cit., p.75-83.

[57] Walter Lipgens, op cit., p.226.

ing discussed;

> I was obliged to discover that my idea of France's
> standing and rights was hardly shared by many peo-
> ple who swayed public opinion.[58]

If the principle of de Gaulle's foreign policy had been
to see France restored to nominal Great Power status, that
goal was largely realised by January of 1946. The second
half of the four year period, 1946-1948, was dominated by a
search for a lasting solution to the German problem in Eu-
rope. Under de Gaulle, French policy had opposed the cre-
ation of a new Reich and, instead, had stated a preference
for the division of the former German territory into several
small sovereign States.[59] The Socialist-MRP coalition of the
Fourth Republic moderated, to an extent, de Gaulle's posi-
tion. However the conservative MRP did not allow a whole-
sale abandonment of the Gaullist positions on questions of
national security: although largely in favour of a "Europe-
an" approach to the German question, some members of the MRP
felt that the threat that country posed to French security
required that many Gaullist ideas be retained. Subsequently
the Quai d'Orsay sought a solution which would satisfy basic
French concerns about security vis a vis Germany, while not
appearing to be as intentionally punitive as de Gaulle's
policy.[60] In April of 1946 French Foreign Minister Georges

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[58] Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, Salvation, 1944-1946.,
p.60.

[59] The Economist., October 20, 1945.

[60] Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, "France and its German Neighb-

Bidault (MRP)   listed France's three specific security re-

quirements.[61]

The first requirement was for definite guarantees against

a resurgence of an aggressive Germany.   Many in France held

the conviction that Nazi-Germany's rise could not have oc-

curred but for the extensive political and economic assis-

tance it received from the United States and Great Britain.

The Locarno Pact of 1925 had proven inadequate in addressing

this problem due largely to British reluctance to support

France.   It was a strongly-held belief that a reconstructed

post-war system must prevent that outcome from happening

again.

Bidault's system of guarantees consisted of three basic

objectives. First,   there was a desire to create a buffer-

zone between any German State and France.   Opposed by the

Socialists,   as well as the Americans and British,   de

Gaulle's original demand for an independent Rhineland was

discarded in November of 1946.[62] Instead France returned to

its post-World War One policy of advocating a prolonged mil-

itary occupation of the territory.   Second, France demanded

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our, 1944-1984" in _Aussenpolitik._, Vol.35, No.2, 1984.
pp.149-151.

[61] The _Times_, April 8, 1946.

[62] A.W. DePorte, _De Gaulle's Foreign Policy_, _1944-1946._,
Cambridge, Ma., Harvard University Press, 1968., p.160.
See also Herbert Tint, _French Foreign Policy Since the
Second-World War._, London,   Weidenfeld and Nicholson,
1972., pp.28-39.

the internationalisation of the Ruhr thereby depriving Germany of a substantial independent war potential. Having been stripped of the Silesian coal and iron fields, the Ruhr was the last industrial and resource centre in Germany capable of producing the massive amounts of armaments necessary for an aggressive foreign policy.

In advocating the occupation of the Rhineland and a new status for the Ruhr France was attempting to protect its territoral integrity. In explaining French interests Bidault remarked that "Germany must be deprived of both her war potential and of her invasion base".[63] That legislative support for these demands existed in France had been revealed, despite general Socialist opposition, during the January, 1946, debate on European security in the Constituent Assembly. It seemed to many that the demands were the very minimum of what could be called for in a peace settlement. Edouard Herriot, the leader of the Radical Party and former inter-war premier, made just this point;

> Let our allies realise that without such a solution it is useless to speak to us of peace and security.[64]

The third guarantee which Bidault had listed was the demand for the independence of the Saarland and its economic union with France. Throughout most of this period French

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[63] Alexander Werth, _France, 1940-1955._, London, Robert Hale, 1956., p.294.

[64] _The Times_, January 16, 1946.

coal mines remained inoperative or inefficient and it was believed that the large coal deposits of the Saar would aid considerably in France's economic recovery. This demand was to become increasingly important as both the economic and domestic political situation in France worsened throughout 1946 and 1947.

The second of the security requirements was the need for reliable military alliances. French policy, under Bidault, envisaged a system of specific anti-German alliances which would prevent Germany from playing-off one Power against the other as had happened after World War One. The first step in the construction of this security system had already been accomplished in December of 1944 with the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. Although the Franco-Soviet alliance had been concluded while the war was still in progress, it had been designed for a post-war environment. The explicit purpose of the treaty was to prevent a repeat of the inter-war inertia "by opposing any initiative liable to enable Germany to attempt aggression once again."[65]

Equally important for the construction of the alliance system was the necessity of a reliable Anglo-French military pact. As early as September of 1945 de Gaulle had suggested that between the two countries there was an absolute compat-

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[65] Alexander Werth, op cit., p.232.

ibility of interests as far as Germany was concerned.[66] However differences over the Levant, as well as the Yalta and Potsdam accords, rendered such an understanding impracticable at that time. The resignation of de Gaulle in January of 1946 and the accession of Felix Gouin suggested that these differences might more easily be overcome; Gouin's Socialist Party was the strongest supporter of an Anglo-French military accord in all three post-war legislative assemblies of France between 1944-1948. Earlier on June 13, 1945, the Socialists had sponsored a resolution in the Assembly calling for de Gaulle to continue his efforts in search of Anglo-French alliance.[67] In his first speech to the Constituent Assembly as Premier, Gouin stated his desire for an alliance with Great Britain.[68] He envisaged it as the second stage in the creation of a revived Triple Entente. These views were repeated in March, 1946, in a speech he delivered in Strasbourg.[69] Although the British Government responded favourably on both occasions, efforts at reaching an accord foundered on the French precondition of Anglo-French agreement on Germany. Likewise, efforts by Gouin to convince his coalition cabinet to lift the preconditions failed repeatedly owing to the opposition of the MRP and especially Bi-

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[66] The Times, September 10, 1945.

[67] The Economist, June 23, 1945.

[68] The Times, January 30, 1946.

[69] The Times, April 2, 1946.

dault.[70]

Gouin and his successors in the newly constituted Fourth Republic were, nonetheless, under considerable pressure to achieve an Anglo-French understanding. Among many French legislators it was believed that cooperation with their sometime rival Great Britain was essential for peace to be maintained in Europe; an Anglo-French alliance was the "other half" of the security system involving France, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. Additional public pressure came from General de Gaulle: at Bar-le-Duc, de Gaulle urged Anglo-French reconciliation and the conclusion of a "fundamental agreement".[71] Despite these pressures in addition to those within his own party, it was only in an effort to strengthen the position of the centrist-led coalition that Premier Leon Blum was able to overcome the MRP's objections and offer an alliance without preconditions. The result was the _Treaty_ of _Dunkirk_ signed in March of 1947.

The political importance attached to the _Treaty_ of _Dunkirk_ was paradoxically demonstrated by the criticism it faced in France. Although it was unanimously supported in the Assembly, there was profound disappointment expressed over the limited scope of the alliance. Many deputies noted that, as Germany was then occupied territory, the greatest problem confronting French security policy was not actual

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[70] The _Economist_, April 13, 1946.

[71] The _Times_, July 29, 1946,

German aggression.   Instead,   most   critics of   the treaty charged that   the threat of   aggression sometime in   the future, from an unspecified source, was of greater concern and unease.[72] Additionally, the debate over the treaty's ratification revealed that   France desired more than   just a military pact: although a military   alliance was the publicly-stated objective, a political compact was the desired aim.

The third   requirement that   Bidault listed   as essential for France was collective security.   The emphasis placed on this factor is not surprising   given the support the concept of the League of Nations received from France during the inter-war period.   As in the inter-war period France perceived a collective security system,   based on effective Four Power cooperation, as its best protection against German revisionism.   Because of this view   France was an original signatory to the United Nations Charter,   and an active participant in its early sessions.   Collective security was also the lynchpin   upon which   the other   two   security requirements   were based;   there was little hope   that France would be entirely secure from   future German   aggression if   the Great   Powers were not agreed   amongst themselves as to how   to respond if such an eventuality occurred.

The international   environment changed rapidly   after Bidault's   promulgation   of   France's   security   requirements. Tensions among the Four Powers that had existed from the be-

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[72] The Economist, March 8, 1947.

ginning of the occupation escalated over the degree to which the German economy was to be allowed to recover, as well as the complementary problem of war reparations. The French Government was also alarmed at the apparent willingness of the British and Americans to allow a rapid German economic growth which it was felt could pose a threat to French security without any security guarantees being imposed. In addition, France grew increasingly concerned when its requests for additional deliveries of coal from the Saar were refused by the Western Powers. To France, itself in dire economic straits, it appeared as though Great Britain and the United States favoured "a revival of German industry at the expense of French industry."[73]

In the past when voicing its concerns at post-war conferences, France had repeatedly found support from the Soviet Union. Indeed there was an expectation that the Soviet Government would continue to support French positions at the Moscow Conference: French agreement to a Soviet role in the management of the Ruhr economy and acceptance of Soviet-imposed border revisions in Eastern Europe led Bidault to this assumption. Additionally, the PCF which had in the past acted as a "barometer" for Soviet opinion was wholeheartedly in accord with the principal thrust of French foreign policy prior to Moscow. However, at Moscow the Soviet Union's support for French aims in Germany abruptly ended. The reasons

[73] Alexander Werth, op cit., p.305. See Herbert Tint, op cit., pp.12-25.

for this change in Soviet foreign policy appear to be rooted in several factors. First, the looming demise of "tripartisme" as the foundation of government coalitions probably served as an effective influence leading to the change in Soviet policy: without a guaranteed role for the PCF in future governments their was little to gain in French domestic politics by continuing to support French foreign policy objectives that were not entirely in accord with those of the Soviet Union. A second, equally plausible, reason might be that, as the post-war European economic situation approached its nadir, the Soviet Government simply decided that it was a propitious time to increase the Communist parties' pressure on Western governments. Importantly, the opinion that Soviet opposition to French requests for additional Saar coal was not based on concern for the recovery of Germany received widespread credence in France. It was believed that through their opposition to French demands, the Soviet Union was hoping to exacerbate the weak economic condition of France, and thereby strengthen the appeal of the PCF; this view seemed to be confirmed by the negative Soviet performance at the first Paris Conference in June, held to discuss Marshall Aid. The last likely reason for the change in Soviet policy is linked to the perceived intentions of the Soviet Union toward occupied-Germany. To many in the West, Bidault included, the emphasis of Soviet policy on a centrally-administered German State suggested that the Soviet Union was attempting to design a political apparatus which

it could easily takeover. As a result, Soviet opposition to France's request for increased allotments of Saar coal can be understood as an effort to undermine the newly-formed Bizonia (the economic linkage of the British and American occupation zones) and an attempt to prevent France from entering into a similar arrangement with the other two Western Powers by forcing it to pursue an independent Saar policy dictated by worsening domestic economic conditions.[74]

Therefore, by the end of the Moscow Conference it was clear that France could no longer continue to play the role of a mediating Power between the East and the West.[75] After Moscow, Bidault gave public expression to his dissatisfaction;

> Its all over. Its finished. Any agreement with Russia is impossible. There is no longer any alliance or any unity among the Greats; no longer any possiblility of an entente with the Communists. A new era has begun...[76]

The threatening Soviet attitude at the first Paris conference, Soviet sponsorship of the Cominform and their belligerent intransigence at the London Conference only served to confirm the results of the Moscow meetings. The idea of a

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[74] See FRUS, 1947, Volume 2, Council of Foreign Ministers, Germany and Austria., pp.139-142, and 207. See also F. Roy Willis, The French in Germany, 1945-1949., Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1962., pp.33-34., and Jacques Freymond, The Saar Conflict, 1945-1955., London, Stevens and Sons, 1960., pp.3-38, 300-303.

[75] Guy de Carmoy, The Foreign Policies of France, (1944-1968)., Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967., p.23. Also See Herbert Tint, op cit., pp.119-121.

[76] Quoted in Walter Lipgens, op cit., p.497.

united Europe acting as an independent Gaullist-like "third force", which had guided French foreign policy in one form or another since the Liberation, was effectively abandoned by May of 1947 and officially so after the two Paris Conferences of June and July. In September of 1947 Premier Ramadier publicly asserted the new position of the French Government;

> [I]t is not easy to establish such a new and unique constitution as that of a united Europe, but I am certain that this is what we must do.[77]

The acceptance of European unity as a formal policy aim forced France to re-assess that conutry's position in Europe. The basic understanding of what principles European civilisation stood for had been voiced during the war by the non-Communist Resistance groups, and after the Liberation by the Socialists and the more dedicated Christian-democratic elements in the MRP. Under de Gaulle's leadership, based as it was on the pursuit of power and status, the French Government was largely unaffected by these concerns. However, the Moscow and Paris Conferences, Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, and the decision to align France with the Western bloc, resulted in a renewed emphasis on the aspects of the "European" civilisation; importantly, after May 1947, the United States was strongly in favour of a united European approach. Bidault summed up France's position in a speech delivered in the National Assembly in February of 1948:

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[77] Quoted in Walter Lipgens, op cit., p.500.

> Since the Moscow Conference differences have been
> accentuated. In this difficult situation result-
> ing from this clash of ideologies and of civilisa-
> tions...France finds herself at a crossroad. If
> this situation should be aggravated she will risk
> being carried into a new ordeal that duty commands
> be spared her. The government has done all so that
> it can not be reproached for having let pass the
> slightest possibility of an agreement. It has only
> posed a single condition; respect for people and
> their fundamental freedoms. The events have not
> responded to these efforts. It is not the time to
> be persuaded by illusion or happy complacency. It
> is necessary to work, keep brave, and to hope. Our
> field of action is Europe. Though a world power,
> France is first a European country...The idea of
> Europe is not new for France...Europe is a terri-
> tory stretching to the Urals. It is also a spirit,
> an alternative civilisation, Christian and human-
> ist.[78]

It was this sense of urgency and of community which accounts

for the role of necessity which Ramadier stressed in his

statement of September 1947. It was also the sense of being

distinctly "European" that widened the gulf between the East

and the West.

Aligning itself with the West and formally in favour of

European unity meant that French security objectives had to

be adapted. Although France continued to see an aggressive

Germany as the primary threat to its national security, it

was evident that a wary caution had to be exercised towards

the Soviet Union.[79] As Raymond Aron wrote,

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[78] "Speech by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M.
Bidault, in the National Assembly", 13 February 1948, as
printed in Documents on International Affairs,
1947-1948., London, Royal Institute of International Af-
fairs, 1952., p.221.

[79] It is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain whether
or not the French Government continued to believe in the
existence of a German threat. During the negotiations

> the truth is that the French, who, after all, have just about as much sense as other peoples, are not blind to the fact that the growth of Soviet power has radically changed the situation. ... The danger is that Germany may seek an alliance on one side or the other with a view to fresh adventure.[80]

The rapid alteration of foreign policy presented France with an acute dilemma. After the Moscow and Paris Conferences, Bidault realised that France had to be protected from Soviet expansionism, as well as secure from a revived German State. However the new foreign policy direction first practised at the second Paris Conference meant that Germany had to be integrated into Western Europe. More importantly, acceptance of the Marshall Plan meant that the economic potential of Germany was recognised to be essential for European recovery; in other words, the much-feared German industrial strength had to be revived. This dilemma was also one which the French Government recognised it, alone, was incapable of resolving; the experience of 1940, and the acceptance of Marshall aid underscored the Ramadier Government's realisation of this fact.

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leading to the Treaty of Brussels Bidault made known his desire for an "explicit mention of Germany in some way publicly for domestic political reasons. The French public would expect that, not only expect it but would attack him, if he left it out." See FRUS, 1948, Volume Three, Western Europe, p.35.

[80] Quoted in J.B.Duroselle, "German-Franco Relations since 1945", in Review of Politics, Vol.14, No.4, October 1952. pp.508.

The solution which France adopted was the pursuit of specific American and British security guarantees; collective security was to be replaced by regional security. In June of 1947, Bidault and Bevin had discussed the idea of a Western defence pact:[81] France wished to capitalise on the Anglo-Saxon bloc's inter-relations which de Gaulle had and would deride. From then until December of 1947, Bidault repeatedly urged Bevin to raise the issue with the Americans. Bevin was eventually to do this resulting in Marshall's ambiguous reply that Western Europe might turn to the United States "for assistance in filling the gap between what was necessary for their defence and what they were able to do for themselves."[82]

Although Bidault apparently wanted to work "hand-in-hand" with Bevin, the issue of security was far too important to let lapse. Accordingly, in early November of 1947, General Pierre Billotte was sent to China to meet and discuss the situation in Europe with Marshall. Marshall is reported to have stated that the inability of the West Europeans to organise themselves would likely force the United States to abandon Europe. Billotte suggested instead a Big Three directorate in the West composed of the United States, France, and Great Britain: there is no record of Marshall's response

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[81] See Lawrence Kaplan, The United States and NATO., Lexington, University Press of Kentuucky, 1984., p.50.

[82] See Grethe Vaerno, "The Alliance and European Integration" in NATO Review. Vol.26, No.2, April 1978. p.24. See also FRUS, 1948, Volume Three, Western Europe, p.1.

to this proposal but, given his later answer to a similar inquiry from Bevin, one suspects Billotte's idea was received favourably. In reporting his discussions with Marshall to French Premier Robert Schumann, Billotte was instructed to open secret negotiations with the United States which began shortly afterwards.[83]

Importantly, French public opinion was also favourably disposed to the idea of reaching a security agreement with the United States. Whereas after the war there had existed a marked anti-American feeling in France,[84] by 1948 it had largely dissipated. In a February, 1948, public opinion poll over 70% of the sample felt that it was the United States which was helping France the most.[85] Although it is unlikely that the public's changed attitude acted as a factor in French foreign policy, it can be assumed that these same polls did not dissuade the government from continuing on their newly-adopted course.

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[83] As a matter of course, the French Government officially notified Bevin of the substance of the conversations. According to one unconfirmed French source, it was only after this notification that Bevin delivered his "Western Union" speech. See Serge and Merry Bromberger, op cit., pp.65-66.

[84] Simon Serfaty, "An International Anomaly: The United States and the Communist Parties of France and Italy, 1945-1947", p.126.

[85] The other results were 7% for the USSR, and 2% for Great Britain. See Alfred Grosser, op cit., p.73.

The French Government's interpretations of Soviet activities in Europe were equally important influences in the early months of 1948, prior to the signing of the Treaty of Brussels. By January, in response to persistent Soviet pressure on Norway, France began to urge publicly that the Norwegian Government resist Moscow's demands for military bases. However the most striking event during this period was the Soviet-engineered coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia. The Communist takeover in Prague fearfully recalled a time a decade earlier when the foreign occupation of Czechoslovakia presaged the outbreak of European, and later, world war. The attitude this particular Soviet action generated in official French circles is perhaps best reflected in the telegram of March 4 which Ambassador de Jean, in Prague, sent to Paris: its text is suppposed to have read that "[t]he Red Army may head for Brest any day."[86] This perception that the Soviet Union was following an expansionist policy seemed to be confirmed by the Soviet "invitation" to Finland to conclude a treaty of mutual assistance.

The form the Treaty of Brussels assumed was not that of the security pact which France had originally sought: nor was it the united European federation both the Socialists and MRP had advocated. The abandonment of Billotte's proposal for a three Power directorate meant that a possible Atlantic alliance with the United States became, instead, an

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[86] Merry and Serge Bromberger, op cit., p.67.

unsatisfactory West European defence arrangement between distinct sovereign States. As was well known in Paris, similar arrangements in 1914 and 1939 had failed to deter Germany. In both world wars victory was gained only after the entry of the United States. For France, the Treaty of Brussels was viewed as a job half-complete. It is interesting to note that, in the midst of the negotiations leading to the treaty, Bidault was continuing to urge Washington to become involved. On the day the Brussels Conference opened Bidault wrote Marshall that,

> the time has come to tighten collaboration in the
> political field, and as soon as possible in the
> military field, between the New World and the Old,
> joined as they are by their commitment to the only
> worthwhile civilisation.[87]

From a perspective dictated by French security policy the Treaty of Brussels could only ever have been understood as a "stepping-stone" to eventual American involvement in a Western European security system.

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[87] Claude Delmas, "A Change of Heart; Concerns Behind the Discussions in France", p.62.

Chapter VI

BELGIAN AND DUTCH POLICY LEADING TO THE BRUSSELS
TREATY

6.1   INTRODUCTION

Although dwarfed in size, economic strength, and military
power, the three Lowland countries - Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and Luxemburg - were important components of the
Treaty of Brussels.   Their accession to the treaty trans-
formed what might have remained a bilateral Anglo-French al-
liance, that is the Treaty of Dunkirk, into a West European
political pact. Moreover, it can be argued that as a result
of this transformation, the United States was more willing
to commit itself to the maintenance of the status quo post
bellum in Europe.   Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is
to examine the bases of Belgian and Dutch policy during the
period 1944-1948, in an effort to reveal those countries'
positions on the issue of West European security.   Conseq-
uently, this chapter is divided into three sections: an
analysis of Belgian foreign policy;   an analysis of Dutch
foreign policy; and an examination of the joint Benelux re-
sponse to the original Anglo-French proposals which led to
the Brussels Conference (March 4-17, 1948) and ultimately to
the signing of the Treaty of Brussels.

6.2 BELGIUM

Belgium, as the "cock-pit of Europe", has over the centuries unwillingly played host to many major international conflicts. A minor actor in world affairs, one writer facetiously, if not inaccurately, stated that the most conspicious feature of that country's foreign policy was its absence.[1] From its creation in 1831 Belgium had been a neutral State; first by means of an international agreement among the Great Powers in 1839, and after 1936 by a unilateral declaration of the Belgian Government. That Belgium should have entered into an international agreement, like the Treaty of Brussels, was the result of a major post-war foreign policy reorientation. This reorientation was rooted in three factors.

The most important of the three reasons was undoubtedly the abandonment of the traditional policy of neutrality. Although Belgium's internationally-guaranteed neutrality was first violated in 1914 because of the Second Reich's Schlieffen Plan, it had been restored as a unilaterally declared policy in 1936. The overwhelming German invasion of 1940 and subsequent four-year occupation signalled a violent end to the political legitimacy, as well as the apparent efficacy, of that approach to a national security policy. Prior to the 1940 invasion, and despite convincing evidence

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[1] "Belgium and her Problems", in The World Today., Vol.2, October 1946, p.479.

to the contrary, King Leopold III and his ministers had earnestly believed that their country's neutrality would be respected by all of the combatant Powers. The events of 1940 were to prove that belief to have been disastrously unrealistic. As a direct result, neutrality was rejected even while the Government remained in exile prior to Belgium's liberation in 1944. The period from 1944 to the signing of the Brussels Pact in 1948 witnessed the completion of this "about-face" in Belgian foreign policy.

The second major factor was the judgement that, in discarding neutrality, Belgium's security rested in furthering international cooperation. The Belgian Government-in-exile realistically understood that their country did not have, nor would it likely ever have, the required military wherewithal to defend itself. In response to this long-term inadequacy, there was a logical demand for a collective security system of which Belgium could be a member. Such a system was seen to be wholly consistent with that country's traditional policies: it would not be directed at any single country, and yet would still preserve Belgian territorial integrity.[2] This view was expressed as early as 1942 by Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Forein Minister;

> We must reconcile the rebirth of nationalism with
> an internationalism which will be essential...If
> we try to cling to old formulae we shall achieve
> nothing worthwhile. The experience of the League

[2] Keesing's Contemporary Archives., p.7637. See also Paul-Henri Spaak, The Continuing Battle, Memoirs of a European, 1936-1966., Boston, Little-Brown and Co., 1971.

of Nations demonstrates this point. Its rule of
unanimity, its deference to national sovereignty,
was one of the principal reasons for its failure.
Tomorrow there will be international, regional,
European, or world organizations, it does not mat-
ter which. But they are doomed to failure from
the outset if their participants do not accept
that the body must be superior to its individual
members.[3]

By late 1945 the structural weaknesses of the United Na-

tions Organisation, and the collective security system it

was originally intended to uphold, led to the prescient con-

clusion that it, alone, was unable to fulfil that role. Un-

der the direction of Spaak, Belgium replaced the abandoned

neutrality by a desire for, and a goal of, some form of co-

operative Western European defence organisation. This

change represented the new belief that only through linkages

with the States of Western Europe could Belgian security be

assured. However, Spaak's repeated overtures to both Brit-

ain and France were categorically rejected: both of Western

Europe's Great Powers were still intent upon the framework

of the Big Four.[4]

International cooperation was believed to be the best way in

which to guarantee Belgium's security, and it was for this reason

that early support for the concept of the United Nations had been

displayed. Both Premier Paul van Zeeland and Spaak had believed

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[3] Quoted in Walter Lipgens, A History of European Integra-
tion, Volume One, 1945-1947., Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1982., pp.259-260.

[4] ibid, p.260. See also Sir Llewelyn Woodward, British For-
eign Policy During the Second World War., London, HMSO,
1962., pp.467-468.

that an internationally constructive, and nationally beneficial, role could be played by a world-wide collective security organisation, providing that it was not totally dominated by the Great Powers; Great Power dominance was Belgium's main complaint about the unsuccessful League of Nations. Both men understood that, unlike Belgium, the Great Powers had global interests and capabilities, and therefore would naturally have a greater influence than smaller States in the various organs of the United Nations. However, their policy was guided by the aspiration that secondary, if influential positions for smaller States - such as Belgium - would alter their pre-war incapacity to shape world affairs: in abandoning neutrality they no longer wanted to be spectators to the foreign administration of their security. It was therefore a great disappointment to the Belgian Government that the Yalta Agreements of March 1945 accorded a right of veto to the five permanent members on the proposed Security Council. The quite evident rifts in the wartime alliance of the Big Three could only lead interested observers, among whom were Belgian officials, to question openly the ability of the proposed Security Council to take responsive actions to maintain international peace and security in the post-war era. Regardless of these concerns, the Belgian Government ultimately accepted the UN Charter; at that time it was held that "some form of an international organisation was better than none."[5] It was noted that the United Nations system, with the option of a Great Power veto over col-

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[5] Jonathon E. Helmreich, Belgium and Europe, A Study in Small Power Diplomacy., The Hague, Mouton, 1976., pp.380-381.

lective security measures was, nonetheless, a stronger organisation than the League of Nations which had not counted all of the Great Powers among its members.[6]

During his address to the Belgian House of Representatives, in which he urged ratification of the United Nations Charter, Spaak had decried the emerging division of Europe. He emphasised that a Europe composed of two hostile blocs would only benefit Germany. Nevertheless, the political and strategic reality of the day demanded otherwise, with the result that Belgian security clearly could not be assured within the existing format of the United Nations. Consistent with his earlier wartime efforts in Britain, Spaak's attention was focussed on the idea of regional defence arrangements as were permitted under Articles 51-54 of the United Nations Charter. In his speech Spaak foreshadowed that for Belgium "regional understandings were both reasonable and desirable."[7] Spaak's advocacy of some degree of regional unity in Europe was entirely consistent with the expressed platforms of two of the largest Belgian political parties; the Socialists, of which Spaak was a member, and the Catholic-dominated Christian-Socialist Party.

As a distinct element of Belgian foreign policy, international cooperation on a regional basis was first evident in the economic union of that country with the Netherlands and Luxemburg. Known as the Benelux Pact, it had first been proposed in 1942; although

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[6] Keesing's Contemporary Archives., p.7637.

[7] ibid.

currency exchange rates were set in October of 1943, and the overall draft treaty was initialled in September of 1944, the pact was only officially ratified in October, 1947. It had originally been envisaged as an agreement to create a common tariff for the three Lowland countries, but the actual purpose of the Benelux Pact, when it emerged in 1944, was to facilitate their complete economic union.[8]

To a large extent, the Benelux agreement was seen as an exemplar of how the post-war world could be ordered. In part due to the cumulative shock of both world wars, many prominent people believed that as the principal political actor the nation-state had failed them, ethically and politically. It was a belief which Van Zeeland, but more especially, Spaak shared.[9] In attempting to find a solution to Europe's common post-war needs greater European unity was proposed. It was this conceptualisation which partly underlay Belgium's participation in the Benelux Pact. The perceived need to restructure post-war Europe, both politically and economically, was at the root of the Socialist Party's response to the Marshall Plan:

> Europe at this moment is at the crossroads. The US aid proposal presents the continent with a decisive choice. Either it will choose the road of co-operation and ignore the claims of national particularism, or it will try once again, in defiance of experience and reason, to reconcile state sovereignties with the Continental solidarity that is imperatively needed.[10]

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[8] Jonathon E. Helmreich, op cit., pp.381-382.

[9] Michael Charlton, The Price of Victory., London, British Broadcasting Corporation, 1983., p.33.

[10] Quoted in Walter Lipgens, op cit., p.504.

This view was echoed by the Benelux Foreign Ministers who envisaged the Marshall Plan's demands for extensive European economic cooperation as an effort "to create economic relationships [emphasis added] in Europe adapted to present day needs."[11]

Belgium's advocacy of international cooperation in the post-war era was not due solely to altruism: it was firmly grounded in a realisation that the country's basic political objectives of physical security and economic vitality were wholly dependent on a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Europe. Clearly Belgium's territorial integrity was not assured if an armed conflict among the Great Powers erupted in Europe. The geo-strategic location of the country meant that armies heading in either direction, East or West, would likely invade and utilise Belgian territory. And although Belgium had escaped the war-wrought devastation of other countries, there was a strong belief that extensive economic problems lay in the future. Like Great Britain, Belgium was basically an exporting nation and therefore concerned to preserve and protect, if not expand, existing markets; for Belgium these markets largely lay in Europe. Belgium, like its Benelux partners, felt that actions such as the Marshall Plan, would ultimately fail if efforts were not directed to the creation of a European solution.[12] To a large extent it was believed that this solution could be found in a Benelux-type arrangement.[13]

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[11] Keesing's Contemporary Archives., p.8659.

[12] "Belgium's Prosperity: some problems of the future", in The World Today., Vol.4, No.6, June 1948., pp.240-247.

[13] Pierre-Henri Laurent, "Beneluxer Economic Diplomacy and

From a political standpoint, the Belgian emphasis on creating
entities embodying principles other than the existence of the
State itself was completely understandable. As Robert Rothstein
has noted, it is good "political sense" for a smaller Power to
try to lessen the impact of the Great Powers through the adoption
of a system of law and standards.[14] In this vein, Spaak envisaged
the Benelux Pact, alongside other regional organisations, as
strengthening an already weakened United Nations system; a United
Nations which theoretically would embody those laws and stan-
dards. As he stated in the Belgian House of Representatives,

> I believe that this agreement between Belgium, Luxem-
> burg and the Netherlands, is good for our country and
> an example to the world.

The third factor which directly influenced immediate post-war
Belgian foreign policy was the changing domestic political situ-
ation. As was the case in France, Belgium possessed an active and
even more extreme Communist Party which adhered to positions dic-
tated by the needs of Soviet foreign policy. In addition to their
reasonably successful electoral performances, the Communist Party
was able to obstruct government policies by either withdrawing
much-needed coalition support or by relying on the orchestration
of public opposition and strikes through the Communist-led trade
union movement,[15]

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the Creation of Little Europe, 1945-1950", in _Journal_ _of_
European Integration., Vol.10, No.1, 1986., pp.27-28.

[14] Robert Rothstein, _Alliances_ _and_ _Small_ _Powers_., New York,
Columbia University Press, 1968., pp.1-64.

[15] In 1947 Van Acker, the Belgian Labour Minister, stated
that the strikes were led by the communists, and "allied

Alongside the threat posed by the Communists and their opposition to the concept of European unity was the the nationally-divisive question of the monarchy which also served to fragment further the already politically-divided Belgian peoples. The future of the monarchy, and of the role of King Leopold III, acted as the principal stumbling-block to the formation of a broad-based government coalition which could officially support European unity through its foreign policy. The political necessity of retaining a Communist presence in the governing Belgian coalition, although in minor economic posts, effectively prevented any Belgian diplomatic initiative aimed at countering the growing Soviet threat to democratic Europe.[16]

In March of 1947, however, the pro-monarchy Christian-Socialists decided to postpone addressing the contentious question of the future of the monarchy. As a result, a "grand coalition" of Christian-Socialists and Socialists was formed; the new coalition had sufficient parliamentary support to exclude the Communists from the government. The presence of two Europe-oriented Belgian political parties in the government meant that European unity was no longer limited to being a topic for discussion; it became, instead, a basic policy objective.[17]

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to similar movements in neighbouring countries". See Keesing's Contemporary Archives., p.9132.

[16] Jonathon E. Helmreich, op cit., p.386.

[17] Walter Lipgens, op cit., pp.262-263.

The creation of the "grand coalition" coincided with the breakdown of Four Power cooperation: it had begun to collapse after the Moscow and first Paris Conferences of March-April and June respectively. As it became increasingly apparent that Europe was becoming divided, the coalition hoped that an invitation to accede to a Western Pact might drain some of the electoral support enjoyed by their pro-Soviet Communist Party. Furthermore, it was believed that such a grouping of States would assist Belgium in the realisation of its objectives for unity in Europe.

These three factors, in varying degrees, manifested themselves in a series of unsuccessful and unreciprocated overtures made to Great Britain urging that Power to take the lead in establishing a regional defence organisation in Western Europe. In 1942, and again in 1944, Spaak proposed to Anthony Eden that Western Europe required the security cooperation of all of its regional actors.[18] On both occasions, Eden, supported by the British Cabinet declined to take such an initiative. The Churchill Government was not averse to discussing areas of Anglo-Belgian political and economic interest; however Spaak's demand that attention be focussed on military cooperation forced the British to demur, citing the possibility of hostile, and injurious, American and Soviet reactions to such efforts. Likewise, the Belgian efforts in 1945 to convince Britain to extend the Anglo-Belgian military guarantees to France, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg, failed.[19]

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[18] See Sir Llewellyn Woodward, op cit., pp.467-469.

[19] Paul-Henri Spaak, op cit., pp.85-86.

It was only natural that Belgium should have turned to Great Britain as the Power to assume the leadership role in organising post-war Western Europe. The most obvious, and important, reason was that Britain was the only undefeated European Power and possessed far more influence with the Superpowers than did any other European State. However, the Belgian initiatives were also guided by other concerns. Great Britain had long been the most trusted of the international guarantors of Belgian neutrality; of the five Great Power guarantors of the 1839 Treaty of London, Britain had been the least likely to want to see Belgium's neutral status compromised. This respect for Belgian sovereignty had held true in the post-war era as well. By comparison, Belgian relations with the most proximate Power - France - were not conducted on the same cordial level. Indeed, while Franco-Belgian relations were characterised as "normal", the Belgian Government, in 1945 and 1946, did publicly accuse the French Government of attempting to stir up the pro-French separatist element among the Walloon population.[20] Additionally, Britain's steadfastness during the Second World War had earned it much respect from the numerous governments-in-exile, most of whom resided in London, and the Belgian officials were not immune to the popular support of British prestige. There was, accordingly, a "strong sense of solidarity" with Britain which had deepened as the war had progressed toward victory, and which was to last well into the post-war period.[21] As Spaak told Eden in 1944, the British "had not

[20] "Belgium and her Problems", p.479.

[21] Michael Charlton, op cit., p.34.

yet realised how much all the countries of Western Europe looked
to them."[22] This sentiment was repeated early in 1945 when, writ-
ing to a Conservative Member of Parliament, he further noted that
"after the war Europe will be glad to unite under Britain's vic-
torious leadership."[23]

After 1945, however, Belgium was again relegated to the unsa-
tisfactory role of spectator in the events concerning the securi-
ty of Western Europe. In 1947 Spaak privately requested that the
Treaty of Dunkirk be extended to include the Low Countries, but
as before the British chose to reject the offer. Discreet dis-
cussions between Belgium and the United States on the topic of a
Western European defence pact, occurred intermittently, but with-
out any tangible progress. Not possessing the status, nor the
opportunity, to take the diplomatic initiatives necessary, Spaak
and Belgium were forced to wait impatiently until Bevin announced
the new direction British policy was to take in his Western Union
speech of January of 1948.

6.3   THE NETHERLANDS

Like Belgium, the Netherlands did not expect the German on-
slaught when it broke upon them in early May of 1940. Hav-
ing declared their permanent neutrality in 1815, and having
avoided becoming involved in the First World War, there ex-
isted a solemn belief in the efficacy and rectitude of that

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[22] ibid, p.34-35.

[23] ibid, p.35.

policy among the Dutch people and their successive governments. This view was most succinctly expressed at the signing of the Treaty of Brussels by Baron van Boetzelar, the Dutch representative:

> The Netherlands regarded neutrality as the guiding principle of its international policy, believing that it helped to promote a proper balance among the Great European powers which, it was convinced, was a decisive factor for peace in Europe.[24]

Domestic support for maintaining the policy of neutrality was consistent throughout the pre-war period despite mounting evidence that, in time of war, that status would not long be respected. When American president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, inquired as to whether the Netherlands felt threatened by Hitler's pre-war policies, the Dutch Government indicated that it did not.[25]

During the inter-war years, when neutrality was necessarily dubbed "independence", because of Dutch membership in the League of Nations, there was a creeping apprehension in government circles about that overall policy in what appeared to be a changing world.[26] However there was, as though in response to this emerging concern, an equally determined effort to avoid taking partisan positions in areas

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[24] Paul van Campen, "Abandoning Neutrality; How and Why the Netherlands Joined the Atlantic Alliance", in NATO's Anxious Birth., ed. Nicholas Sherwen, New York, St.Martin's Press, 1985., p.124.

[25] J.J.Schokking, "The Netherlands in a Changing World" in International Affairs., Vol.23, No.3, July 1947. p.343.

[26] ibid, p.346.

of international dispute for fear of compromising their "independence". Because of different historical circumstances, the neutrality of the Netherlands expressed itself in a manner different from that of its Belgian counterpart. As a trading nation relations with other States were largely concerned with mercantile interests and seldom, if ever, involved questions of "high politics". Throughout the interwar period the Netherlands refused to participate in international security negotiations, make binding political pledges, sign the Locarno Pact, or discuss military affairs with neighbouring States. And although the Dutch maintained relatively sizeable armed forces, they were of little consequence to the overall European balance of power, as it was used exclusively to maintain their geographically-diffuse colonial empire. Comfortable in, if deluded by, their self-imposed isolation in the midst of Europe, the Dutch never believed that the Netherlands would become embroiled in the conflict that surrounded them;

> Love of country, pride in the happy circumstances
> resulting from the painstaking efforts of so many
> generations, made it almost sacriligious to con-
> template the possibility of such a disaster.[27]

The loss of confidence in neutrality which accompanied the German attack meant that the policy had to be abandoned in the post-war environment. It was precisely for this reason that the Dutch Government-in-exile agreed to the Benelux Pact's economic arrangements for the post-liberation period.

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[27] ibid, p.343.

The drain on the Dutch Treasury as a result of the revolt in the Dutch East Indies, alongside the then immediate concern for reconstruction, led the Dutch to conclude the Benelux Pact. A common tariff wall encircling the Lowlands, and eventually leading to complete economic union, meant that a trading bloc of nearly twenty million in Europe, not including the colonies, was created from which to draw economic strength.[28] With nearly one half of the national wealth destroyed by the German occupation, it is not at all surprising that the first concrete measures were taken in the economic field. As one contemporary writer noted;

> A considerable part of her agricultural land was flooded, her productive capacity was paralysed, her manpower was disorganised with the removal of labour to Germany, housing conditions were very bad, and the population was under-nourished.[29]

In security affairs Dutch policy underwent essentially a two-step development. It was recognised that neutrality required either a general peace or a stable and global balance of power. It was obvious in 1945 that neither element was present nor likely would be in the near future. Dutch neutrality throughout the Nineteenth Century had also rested on the protection which, since the Seventeenth Century, Britain had afforded the independence of the territories opposite the Thames estuary. However, it was understood by the Dutch

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[28] Including the colonies, both Dutch and Belgian, the Benelux group was the third largest trading bloc after the British Imperial Preference System, and the Franc Zone.

[29] "A Note on the Dutch Economic Situation", in The World Today., Vol.4, No.3, March 1948., p.117.

Government that the relative decline in British power, <u>vis a</u>
<u>vis</u> the Soviet Union, prevented Britain from continuing to
play that role in Europe. The only State capable of effec-
tively balancing the Soviet Union was recognised to be the
United States, and active American participation in resolv-
ing the post-war problems of Europe was uncertain at this
time. Therefore, in the early post-war period the principal
threats to Dutch security emanated from a precedented fear
of Germany's revival, and the concern about Soviet political
aspirations in Europe; the latter factor grew in importance
throughout 1947 and the breakdown of Big Four Co-operation.

In light of these systemic changes, the Netherlands first
sought security in the nascent United Nations Organisation.
The necessity of subordinating the country to an interna-
tional organisation in order to achieve peace and security
had first been accepted by the Dutch Resistance during the
war. In April of 1944 the two largest resistance groups is-
sued a joint manifesto which stated;

> The Netherlands must aim at the closest possible
> combination with the other Western European states
> and also co-operate loyally with the other nations
> of the world, especially in organising a new
> League of Nations. In so doing the Netherlands
> must be ready to accept a limitation of their sov-
> ereignty, as every nation should be asked to do
> after this war in the interests of an organization
> standing for international justice.[30]

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[30] Quoted in Walter Lipgens, <u>op cit</u>., p.264.

Although the Dutch Government was never in favour of as broad an approach as that suggested by the Resistance, it did accept the principle of a "new League of Nations" for the post-war world. However, the Dutch Government disliked the structure of the United Nations for exactly the same reasons as did their Belgian neighbours: that is, the presence of the "veto" in the Security Council, and the resulting Great Power domination. Additionally, they were unhappy that the Charter made no mention of international morality and justice; after basing their own policy of neutrality on such concepts for over a century, their unease was understandable. It was a strongly-held, and quite logical, belief that long-term international peace, based on a system of collective security, depended on a recognised international morality. In both areas Dutch diplomacy was, to their disappointment, unable to secure their inclusion in the Charter[31]

In a 1946 public statement in the Dutch parliament, the government categorically rejected neutrality as its policy. Substituting the United Nations' objective of collective security, they noted that post-war problems which they were then experiencing might make regional defence organisations both useful and necessary.[32] If this statement was meant as a message to the other West European governments, including

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[31] ibid.

[32] Paul van Campen, "Abandoning Neutrality; How and Why the Netherlands Joined the Atlantic Alliance", p.20.

the British, it made little impact. Indeed the press reports made little mention of Dutch support for regional defence, and instead concentrated on the statement's equally firm rejection of European federation.[33] However the United Nations failed to live up to Dutch expectations. It became increasingly apparent that the Security Council was politically impotent because of growing Anglo-Soviet hostility, and was therefore unable to perform its mandated role. The hostile, anti-Western attitude of the Soviet Union as expressed in its reaction to the Marshall Plan, as well as its intransigence at the 1947 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, revealed to the Dutch that the feared division of Europe was nearly complete. These unexpected changes to the international system naturally impacted on Dutch security policy and, importantly, on their attitude toward the "German problem".

Like most of Western Europe, the Netherlands' German policy was faced with a profound dilemma. On one hand, the Netherlands needed to be made secure from a future invasion from their Eastern neighbour, and there was a strong desire to see strict, and broad-ranging limitations placed on Germany when its sovereignty was restored by the Great Powers. As a result, as late as January of 1947 Dutch policy emphasised the Gaullist strategy of splintering Germany into sev-

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[33] See The Times., December 2, 1946, and The Manchester Guardian., December 4, 1946.

eral sovereign States.[34] On the other hand, there was a re-
alistic recognition that German economic recovery was inexo-
rably bound-up with that of Western Europe generally, and
the Netherlands specifically. Trade with Germany had ac-
counted for over one-fifth of all Dutch trade in the pre-war
period. It was clearly understood the Netherlands was
largely dependent on its economic relationship with Germa-
ny.[35] It was realised, therefore, that it was necessary to
re-create German economic strength so to allow Western Eu-
rope to benefit from its historical, and mutually extensive,
trading inter-relationships. This dilemma was largely
solved by the actions of the Soviet Union: the German fear
receded as the Dutch Government became increasingly con-
vinced that the Soviet Union was aiming to destabilise demo-
cratic institutions in Western Europe by exacerbating eco-
nomic disparities, and by posing the ever-present threat of
several hundred Red Army divisions in Eastern Europe.[36]

Despite general support for the idea of European unity
and for a complementary Dutch foreign policy, two political
factors intervened to prevent the Netherlands from pursuing
that option. The first factor was the rise of traditional
conservative, and hence nationalist, political forces among
the Dutch. The liberation of the country, the abandonment of

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[34] Walter Lipgens, op cit., p.266.

[35] "A Note on the Dutch Economic Situation", p.119.

[36] Frank E. Hugget, The Modern Netherlands., New York, Prae-
ger, 1971., p.194.

neutrality, post-war economic austerity, and the escalating
conflict in the Dutch East Indies (later Indonesia) all con-
tributed to a revival of conservatism.[37] This popular out-
look was reflected from mid-1945 on by the composition of
successive governments; they were coalitions of the Catholic
People's Party and the right-wing Labour Party. As a result
internationalist-oriented foreign policy options were disre-
garded in favour of more nationalist policies such as a
"Gaullist" German policy, the continuing of the war in In-
donesia, and a refusal to ratify the Benelux Pact until Oc-
tober of 1947; the latter only occurred because of intensi-
fied American pressure expressed by means of the much-needed
Marshall Plan's economic aid.[38]

The second factor operating throughout this period was a
concern that Europe not be formally divided into two oppos-
ing camps made more rigid by exclusive security and economic
arrangements. As early as 1943, E.N. van Kleffens, the For-
eign Minister of the Dutch Government-in-exile, had private-
ly expressed the belief that the post-war world would indeed
witness the division of Europe between the Soviet Union and
a Western bloc. Furthermore, he suggested that his country
would be forced to take an active participatory role in Eu-
ropean affairs should that occur. Because of this percep-
tion of what might occur, and the adverse consequences for

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[37] Walter Lipgens, op cit., p.266.

[38] ibid, pp.504-506.

the Netherlands' security situation which would likely result, both Van Kleffens and his successer, Baron van Oosterhout, consistently urged that Dutch foreign policy not support political relationships which could serve to exacerbate the emerging East-West problem.[39]

Nevertheless, by mid to late 1947, the constraints of the first factor were largely overcome by a realisation that the division of Europe was taking place regardless of Dutch policy. Influenced by the twin failures of the Moscow and first Paris Conferences, and compelled by economic necessity to participate fully in the second Paris Conference, Dutch policy began to change its principal thrust. By November of 1947 a Dutch security policy based exclusively on the United Nations was no longer accepted as a reasonable replacement for neutrality; neither seemed able to guarantee the security of the Netherlands from a growing Soviet-Communist threat. At that time the Foreign Minister Baron van Oosterhout had stated,

> that should, contrary to our hopes, the division
> of Germany into Western and Eastern parts assume a
> more or less definite character, the Government
> would feel compelled to reconsider its whole poli-
> cy in Europe.[40]

As was noted earlier with regard to British policy, it was to be the London Conference in December 1947 that ultimately decided the need for a shift in Dutch policy. It was in

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[39] ibid, p.265.

[40] Paul van Campen, "Abandoning Neutrality; How and Why the Netherlands Joined the Atlantic Alliance", p.122.

this atmosphere, resigned to the fact of the Soviet-dictated division of Europe, that the Dutch Government received the welcome Bevin initiative of January 1948.

6.4   BENELUX POLICY IN JANUARY 1948

The three Benelux countries reacted immediately to Bevin's Western Union speech. On January 23, the Belgian Government issued a press communique which acknowledged the importance of the speech delivered only the day before. The communique also stated that Belgium had no intention of unilaterally responding to Bevin's overture; by this Spaak meant that, in accordance with the wishes of both the Netherlands and Luxemburg, the Benelux Pact would respond with a single voice. In order to arrive at a common Benelux policy with which to respond to the Anglo-French proposals, the three foreign ministers met in Luxemburg from January 29 to 31.

The text of the final communique of the Luxemburg Summit stressed that that the Bevin plan was regarded, by the Benelux members, as an "important contribution to the achievement of the Union of Western Europe."[41] However, the communique also noted that the ambiguity of Bevin's speech, and of recent Anglo-French policy in general, made it essential that a concerted effort be made to define

> the rough outline of a common attitude based on
> Western European solidarity and awareness of the
> role which the Benelux could play in the movement

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[41] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p.9117.

for unity.[42]

In other words, the Benelux countries were issuing a diplomatic "demand" that Britain, and France to a lesser extent, explain the twin concepts of Western Union and "spiritual federation" in greater and more specific detail. Having waited nearly eight years after their defeat by Nazi Germany for a change in British policy in the direction Bevin appeared to be moving, the Benelux countries were impatient for progress to be made. Although Bevin's speech had made mention of only proposed talks on the feasibility of such a plan being implemented, the Benelux communique went much further.

The leaders of the Benelux countries did not, at that time, know the specifics of Bevin's idea, and apparently relied entirely on the Western Union speech of January 22. They therefore responded to the few particulars that that speech had contained. Their collective response was a largely negative one. At Luxemburg the three foreign ministers decided to reject the proposals as they had been framed by the speech and, instead, put forward four of their own conditions. These conditions, it was announced, were considered to be necessary for Benelux accession to any form of Western Union. They were:

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[42] Paul-Henri Spaak, op cit., p.145. See also Nicolas Hommel, "Opting for Commitment; Luxemburg consolidates its independence within Nato", in ed. Sherwen, op cit., p.137.

1. the rejection of the Treaty of Dunkirk bilateral for-
   mula as the basis for agreements of Western Union;

2. the demand that military assistance, in the event of
   aggression, be immediate;

3. the demand that economic cooperation among the signa-
   tories be included in any treaty of Western Union,
   and;

4. the need for a system of "regular and periodic con-
   sultations."[43]

The four conditions issued at the conclusion of the Lux-
emburg Summit were largely ignored by Bevin and Bidault in
the memoranda submitted to the three Benelux countries on
February 19. Spaak has written that the two draft treaties
were apparently proposed after exclusive Anglo-French con-
sultations, as they were very much alike. Furthermore, it
was noted that the two drafts were almost identical to the
1947 Treaty of Dunkirk which was a strictly bilateral and
anti-German military alliance. Two arguments were raised by
the British and French Governments to support the limited
nature of the proposed treaties: an anti-German alliance
would not alienate, and might even facilitate agreement
with, the Soviet Union; and a bilateral Dunkirk-style treaty
was preferable for fear that the Americans might use a mul-
tilateral alliance "as a pretext for assuming that the se-

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[43] See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Volume
Three, Western Europe., pp.26-29. Hereafter cited as
FRUS.

curity of Europe was assured and, consequently, for with-drawing their troops."[44] Despite these valid concerns, the Benelux countries were unanimous in rejecting the two draft treaties submitted by Britain and France. This rejection was based on four factors.

First, although support among the Benelux partners is re-ported to have varied, there was general agreement that any form of linkage in Western Europe had to comprise more than a traditional military compact. At Luxemburg it was recog-nised that while military security was extremely important, and necessary, the threat posed by the presence of the Red Army in Eastern Europe was likely transitory. A political alliance defined by a culturally-similar membership practic-ing within the Western democratic tradition would, it was felt, offer the strongest form of bulwark against the west-ward expansion of Soviet power and influence; subsequent military arrangements could then only serve to buttress Western Europe. Furthermore, the Treaty of Dunkirk did not address the very evident economic interdependence of the five Powers which all had admitted at the second Paris Con-ference in July of 1947. From a purely political vantage it is understandable that the Benelux countries preferred the format of a political alliance for on-going discussions and consulatations. Within a political alliance, where member-ship was decided by adhesion to common principles, the Low-

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[44] Paul-Henri Spaak, op cit., p.146-147.

land countries would carry as great a weight; whereas in a military alliance they would likely always be the weakest and least-influential members.

Additionally, however, the concept of a political alliance was popularly supported by the growing post-war integrationist movement, which counted Paul-Henri Spaak among its members. Within that movement's terms of reference there was a desire to emphasise, and to explore, the basic commonalities of Western Europe. These commonalities were neither limited by, nor to, the existence of a threat from the Communist East as they would have done within the constraints of a military pact. Instead the understanding of the Benelux countries, as to the parameters of the proposed Western Union, included long-held cultural traditions, historic economic relationships, and the basic intersubjectivity of political discourse. The threat Western Europe faced was recognised as not being solely military, but represented a direct and powerful challenge to the prevailing value system upon which all of Europe's democracies rested. Accordingly, the Benelux countries felt that a series of bilateral treaties – as per the Dunkirk formula – would neither provide an effective vehicle for Western Europe to address their collective problems, nor confront a recognisably interdependent destiny.

The second factor had its basis in the "collective security" orientation of the Benelux countries. Despite their

deep-rooted reservations about the ulitimate efficacy of the
United Nations as a collective security organisation, there
was a clear preference for any regional security arrangement
to be based on the principles contained within the <u>Charter</u>
<u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>United</u> <u>Nations</u>. As a result of their deliberations
at Luxemburg, there was some question as to the legal com-
patibility of Bevin's global system of bilateral alliances
within the collective security system of the United Nations;
this was especially the case with regard to Article 52 of
the <u>Charter</u> which allows only for regional security arrange-
ments that serve to buttress the overall collective security
system. A collective security system was believed to be
neither viable nor legal if the Dunkirk formula was adopted.
For the three countries, the answer which Spaak had first
publicly proposed in 1947 during the Benelux Pact's ratifi-
cation, lay in a regional orientation to any proposed West
European security agency.

The formula they suggested already had been conveniently
provided by the United States. On January 10, 1948, as part
of the sporadic American-Belgian discussions concerning West
European security, the United States had responded to
Spaak's most recent request for direct involvement. Al-
though the American response was not promising, it did at-
tempt to encourage Spaak's own efforts at persuading his Eu-
ropean counterparts of their collective need to organise

themselves.[45] Furthermore, the United States State Department forwarded a copy of the recently concluded multilateral Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) which had been signed in September of 1947. The American note to Spaak, which was labelled "Secret", stated that neither the British nor the French had yet been advised as to the contents of the treaty.[46]

The provision of a copy of a yet-to-be-released treaty to the Belgian foreign minister was an important political gesture. In response to a query concerning the organisation of West European defences, it was without question an attempt to suggest a solution to the concerns which Spaak had raised. At that time it was the only example of a regional defence pact within the parameters allowed by the UN Charter. Therefore it is not coincidental that, in rejecting the Dunkirk formula, and without one of their own to substitute, the Benelux countries stated their preference for a pact structured instead along the lines of the recent Rio Treaty.

The third reason was that the Benelux countries were not as concerned about a possible German threat as they were about the intentions of the Soviet Union which they then had to confront. Each of the three countries was experiencing

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[45] See Pierre-Henri Laurent, "Beneluxer Economic Diplomacy and the Creation of Little Europe, 1945-1950", pp.25-29.

[46] FRUS, 1948, Volume Three, Western Europe., p.3.

domestic political problems which could be traced back, it was believed, to the machinations of the indigenous Communist parties catering as they were to the strategic objectives of the Soviet Union. The Benelux countries rejected the anti-German context of the Anglo-French proposals as being unrealistic given the political environment within which they were then operating. As they stated in their Luxemburg communique, the international political basis of the Dunkirk formula "no longer fully corresponds to the realities to which the British Foreign Secretary has alluded."[47]

The fourth possible reason for rejecting the Dunkirk formula is somewhat more hypothetical. It was apparent to the Benelux, as it was to the United States, Great Britain, and France, that no possible grouping of West European States would be able at that time to act as an effective counterbalance to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Consequently, it was understood that only the United States could fulfil that necessary function. This view had also formed the basis for both British and French foreign policy as was reiterated in the draft-treaty memoranda of February 19. Therefore, for the Benelux countries the essential purpose of any European form of Western Union could only but be temporary; its final purpose had to be to achieve immediate American involvement in Western Europe.

[47] Nicholas Hommel, "Opting for Commitment; Luxemburg consolidates its independence within Nato", p.138.

Although information on the particulars of the Luxemburg summit are scarce, it is quite likely that the three governments were well informed as to Marshall's important dinner conversation with Bevin in December of 1947.[48] At that time he remarked,

> to the effect that if the Europeans united for their defence in the way they were supposed to be doing under the Recovery Plan [ERP], they might turn to the United States for assistance in filling the gap between what was necessary for their defence and what they were able to do for themselves.[49]

If they did indeed know of this remark and attached as much importance to it as Ernest Bevin apparently had, it is equally likely that the Benelux foreign ministers believed that the Americans would be more impressed with a multilateral framework. This perception would most certainly have been reinforced by Spaak's own correspondence with Marshall which had led to Washington proposing the Rio Treaty formula: importantly the United States was the leading member of

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[48] This supposition is based on a number of historical facts. Anglo-Belgian relations were reasonably close during this period, especially in the OEEC, and with regard to their own extensive bilateral military contacts. As Spaak was a well-respected statesman on both sides of the Atlantic, it is more than possible that he was informed of Marshall's statement following the London Conference in 1947. It is equally possible, given his dialogue with the United States, that if he did not learn of the Secretary of State's comments from the British, he could have learned about them from the Americans. Furthermore, as Laurent has noted, "Belgium was the central U.S. ally in advocating American goals for Europe." See Pierre-Henri Laurent, "Beneluxer Economic Diplomacy and the Creation of Little Europe, 1945-1950".

[49] Grethe Vaerno, "The Alliance and European Integration" in NATO Review. Vol.26, No.2, April 1978., p.24.

that regional security system. Understood in this light, any arrangement based on the Rio formula can then be seen as a politico-security counterpart to the Marshall Plan. From such a starting point, the Benelux, Britain, and France, could more effectively husband their resources and then approach the United States for the military assistance they knew their countries would need.

Chapter VII

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis, as was originally stated in the Preface, was to examine the Treaty of Brussels (1948) with a view to determining whether, or not, that Pact meets the criteria to be considered a model of a security regime. The two types of research – theoretical and empirical – undertaken to realise this purpose, can only lead to one conclusion; the Treaty of Brussels does not represent a model of a security regime. It is not often the case that unfavourable and unexpected findings comprise the conclusion of academic research in the social sciences. Most often, or so it seems, "dead-ends" or research failures occur in the natural or applied sciences: this is due to the forced adhesion of the variables being examined by those fields to Nature's laws. In the social sciences natural laws do not exist in a manner which allows analysts to predict, or to explain, with any certainty the actions of Man in his numerous social environments. Therefore, the role of social science theories is more limited; they are considered useful if they explain a section of history in such a way as to allow for the extraction of valuable information which will lead one to a better understanding of that reality. The research conclusions of this work have failed to support the author's orig-

inal hypothesis but, from an academic vantage, this alone cannot constitute failure.

Epistemologically, this thesis involved the testing of the recently-devised theory of the international regime by applying it to a strictly delineated segment of modern history. This effort was undertaken with three general research objectives implicit in the original hypothesis. The first objective was the overall evaluation of the theory being employed: the testing of the regime concept is the only means by which theoretical conceptualisations can be evaluated as to their academic merit. The second objective was to verify the existence of the particular historical data upon which the theoretical assertions of the regime concept are founded; in other words, to examine the utility of the theory by searching for the requisite historical information to justify its employment. The third, and last, objective was to comprehend the general theoretical base of the regime concept: to understand the purpose behind the theoretical conceptualisation so as to know the parameters of the investigation. From this epistemological perspective, all of these objectives were realised in this thesis and in that sense the research was not altogether a failed enterprise.

The segment of history within which the author's hypothesis was tested was the period leading to the Treaty of Brussels (1948) and the national security policies of the signatory States therein. By itself, the text of the treaty, as

discussed in Chapter Three, exhibits all of the basic attributes to be considered a model of a security regime. However, subsequent analysis of the signatories' national security policies and of their perspectives regarding security lead to the alternate, and more sound, conclusion. Security regimes can be understood as an international institutional arrangement among a self-conscious grouping of States and which are based on a common desire for security along clearly defined principles and norms. In effect, a security regime is a mutual-security organisation based on an exclusive system-wide awareness of, and adherence to, certain societal norms. By stating that the Brussels Pact is not a model of a security regime this thesis concludes that the political institution created by the Treaty of Brussels does not meet the criteria as put forth in this definition.

The emphasis placed by regime analysis on normative State interaction requires that the political concept of security be redefined. Among most writers on international security affairs there tends to be a concentration of effort in examining structural factors such as economic wealth or the augmentation of military power. It is argued that States are more secure, or enjoy greater security, from threat if they possess systemic capabilities in greater abundance; it is, however, recognised that there exists a security dilemma which serves to hinder the "mad rush" for a greater accumulation of those capabilities. Nevertheless, this thesis has

argued that it is the type of threat a State confronts which dictates the security policy advocated and pursued. The two types of perceived threat - internal or external or a combination of both - require different and distinct responses by a State. The concept of security is admittedly an ambiguous political notion. However, if it is defined as the protection of already-acquired values, as is done in Chapter Two, a security policy becomes any government policy undertaken for that objective; the State, alone, defines the threat it perceives. This necessary redefinition of security opens wide the parameters of what constitutes security and threats thereto. External threats, or those directed at a particular State's economic and military capabilities, are still considered as important considerations. At the same time, internal threats, or those directed at a State's constitutional, cultural, or societal structure are also deemed to be relevant factors for investigation.

The basis of the concept of the security regime is a recognition among a group of States of a basic interdependence in the achievement of individual security. In other words, a group of States self-consciously perceive a common threat to their already-acquired values, and each member of the group realises it is individually incapable of rendering that threat harmless. Flowing from the definition of security adopted in Chapter Two it stands to reason that security regimes may arise in response to both external and internal types of threat: the Lockean model of the state of nature

explicitly providing for the intersubjectivity of social values necessary for a collectively-perceived internal type of threat. Moreover, security regimes must be capable of redressing both levels of threat - systemic and specific-adversarial - which are endemic in any system composed of sovereign States so as to permit the creation of an environment where restraint can be expected. A brief review of this thesis' historical research reveals that, while many of the requisite factors listed in Chapter Two underlay the five signatories' policies, the Treaty of Brussels cannot be considered an accurate model of a security regime.

Chapter Four discussed the evolution of British security policy during the period 1944-1948. This time period essentially involved a redefinition of Britain's role in the new political environment of the post-war world; a redefinition made more necessary by that country's decline relative to the power positions occupied by the two Superpowers. Chapter Four was written around three general propositions that can be made regarding British policy leading to the Treaty of Brussels in 1948. The first proposition is that both the Churchill and Attlee Governments realised that the post-war distribution of systemic capabilities was such that Britain's status as an effective international actor could be maintained only by means of a direct linkage with the countries of the European continent. Despite this realistic appraisal of Britain's position, both governments were prevented from constructing a Western European Security Group

for fear of antagonising both the Soviet Union and the United States; the importance of this factor is demonstrated in numerous officials' statements as well as in the text of the Treaty of Dunkirk signed in March of 1947. Sincerely, and logically, supportive of post-war Great Power cooperation, British policy reflected that country's appreciation of the fact that it, alone and opposed by both Superpowers, did not possess the wherewithal to undertake to create any semblance of a united and British-led Western European grouping of States.

The second assertion that can be made about British security policy is that it was extremely responsive to the collapse of Great Power cooperation. Although the Churchill Government had been quite suspicious of Soviet motives in Europe, the Attlee Government was remarkably open-minded and confident about its ability to "do business" with the Soviet Union. This optimistic attitude was due to the Labour Party's opinion that "Left understood Left", a sincere desire for international cooperation in the post-war world, and the belief that the greatest threat to peace was the possibility of a revanchist German State taking advantage of Great Power rivalries. During the period 1945-1948 this tidy perception of a limited threat, easily prevented, changed; a residual fear of Germany was supplemented and eventually overwhelmed by a clearly perceived threat emanating from the Soviet Union. As Chapter Four demonstrates, British policy became

increasingly concerned as a result of the disruptive actions initiated by indigenous, pro-Moscow, West European Communist parties and especially by the intransigent and hostile attitude assumed by Soviet representatives at the various Conferences of Foreign Ministers: if Britain was not directly affected by the former of the two concerns, it was certainly the target of much of the abuse and Soviet propaganda delivered during those conferences. After the failed Moscow and first Paris Conferences, the perception of the Soviet Union as a distinct threat to British security, and that of the West in general, was accepted as a new element in the post-war international system. Events such as the futile London Conference and the Communist coup in Prague, which took place shortly before the Brussels Conference, only served to underscore the fact that Great Power cooperation was no longer a feasible option upon which British policy could be based.

The last general understanding of British security policy during the period under review was an ever-present aim of formally involving the United States in the maintenance of the status quo post bellum in Europe; this objective was to be realised finally by the American accession to the North Atlantic Treaty in January of 1949. As a result of this goal, British policy throughout the early post-war era was a deliberate effort to administer to its own security interests in such a manner that it would not entail the alienation or the hostility of the United States. Indeed, the

principal aim of British policy was to pursue a security policy that would necessarily "entangle" the United States in European affairs: such an entanglement would then serve to offset the fears of the recognisably necessary German revival, and balance the otherwise preponderant Soviet position in Europe.

All three aspects of British security policy came together in Bevin's proposal for Western Union which he first made public in his speech of 22 January 1948. First, by advocating the creation of his ambiguous Western Union, Bevin was acknowledging that Britain could not stand apart from Western Europe; the long-term nature of the ideological division of the continent dictated otherwise. Second, the speech publicly recognised the Soviet threat which was perceived to be directed at undermining the recovery of Western Europe, and accepted that the acquisition of the means of combating that threat was the salient concern then confronting "democratic" Europe. Lastly, Bevin's Western Union was proposed as a political device to draw the United States into a long-term, formal security arrangement with Western Europe: the States of Western Europe would work together and using the experience of the Marshall Plan as a precedent, hope that the United States would contribute sufficient resources to counter the Soviet threat. Chapter Four concludes by asserting that, for Great Britain, the Treaty of Brussels was an important policy objective but, given the post-war con-

straints operating on that country, the treaty's importance was of an interim nature and entirely symbolic.

Chapter Five addressed the question of French policy during the immediate post-war period, and the reasons behind France's accession to the Treaty of Brussels in 1948. This chapter divided the principal determinants explaining French policy into two broad categories; domestic considerations and concern for external security. The domestic political situation which France's leaders had to confront was one whereby threats to the continuity of French democracy were clearly perceived to exist. These threats came from the PCF on the left, which was politically aligned with the Soviet Union, and from de Gaulle's RPF which emerged in April of 1946 and represented the reactionary Right. To the leaders of the centrist (Socialist-MRP) coalitions, the continuous electoral successes enjoyed by the PCF and its ability to mobilise popular support through its control of the largest trade union, meant that the possibility of a Communist take-over - peaceful or otherwise - was ever-present. The attempt by the centrist parties to control the PCF through "tripartisme" became increasingly untenable because of intra-coalition rivalries, the growing confidence and ministerial demands of the Communist Party, as well as Washington's linkage of economic aid to the removal of Communist ministers from the French cabinet. The decision of the Ramadier in May of 1947 to expel the Communists from his cabinet led

to nation-wide strikes and an economic crisis which further questioned the continuity of democratic institutions in France. It was largely because of the PCF's strength and the governments' reluctance to address the issue head-on which led de Gaulle to end his retirement, form the populist RPF, and begin lashing-out at the centrist coalitions' policies, while emphasising the Communist threat. As it happened, however, the Socialist-MRP coalition perceived de Gaulle to be as great a threat as that posed by the PCF; de Gaulle's popularity and early electoral successes suggested the possibility of a Bonapartist revival in France which the centrists understandably opposed. Faced with what appeared to be an assault, from both the Right and the Left, directed against the very existence of French democracy the Ramadier Government followed a policy throughout 1947 that led to the Treaty of Brussels. In signing the treaty, the government hoped to realise their goal of economic recovery and thereby undermine the popularity of the PCF's political programme, and at the same time weaken the appeal of de Gaulle's reactionary anti-Communist position.

In the complementary category of foreign affairs, France's policy evolved in response to its own national needs and the temperament of the international system. Midway through the four year period, French foreign policy underwent a shift in emphasis dictated largely by France's changing international position. From 1944 until de

Gaulle's resignation in January of 1946, French policy had been concerned primarily with the recovery of that country's pre-war status as a Great Power. After that rank had been recovered, approximately by the beginning of 1946, France turned its attention to the achievement of a "satisfactory" solution to the German question; satisfactory being defined largely by French national interests. In its pursuit of this policy objective France attempted to play the role of a mediating Power between the Anglo-Saxon bloc and the Soviet Union. However, by the time of the Moscow and first Paris Conferences of 1947, it had become apparent that the Soviet Union was not at all interested in any form of constructive engagement along the East-West axis of Europe. Indeed, many French leaders believed that Soviet policy objectives were predicated on the economic breakdown of the West; this perception seemed to be confirmed by the massive PCF-inspired strikes called for by Moscow in response to France's acceptance of the American Marshall Aid. Chapter Five demonstrates that, throughout 1947 and into the early months of 1948, French perceptions of the Soviet Union were undergoing a substantial transformation. By March of 1948, this transition had progressed to such an extent that the Soviet Union had effectively replaced Germany as the principal threat to French security. It was, therefore, in this hostile environment that France acceded to the Treaty of Brussels however, while a united European front was regarded as useful, French policy logically demanded the active involvement of the United States.

The last historical chapter, Chapter Seven, focused attention on the emerging security policies of the two Lowland countries of Belgium and the Netherlands. Although relatively unimportant in the international Balance of Power, their accession to the Treaty of Brussels demonstrates three points which serve to highlight the regime-aspects of the treaty. First, both countries abandoned their traditional postures of neutrality due to the realisation that the maintenance of their security required their active involvement; when the efficacy of the United Nations' collective security system became questionable, a regional-based approach was accepted as the logical alternative. Second, both States recognised the political utility of an international order founded on common principles; such an order would more readily permit active and constructive participation by lesser Powers. Third, perhaps more than Great Britain or France, both States seemed to appreciate more willingly that postwar Europe could only reemerge if its countries worked together politically and economically. Chapter Seven also demonstrates that domestic political factors, such as the composition of the two countries' governmental coalitions were important influences in the development of their security policies. However, the crucial need for economic recovery, the division of Europe, and the underlying Soviet threat served to unite the Benelux countries during the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Brussels.

Chapters Four through Seven comprise a substantial portion of this thesis. The research into the bases of the signatories' security policies is a necessary and vital feature of any attempt to apply a social science theory to a given segment of History. While the detailed analysis of the text of the Treaty of Brussels, which was undertaken in Chapter Three, suggested that the treaty itself represented a model of a security regime, the necessary historical support for that position cannot be found in the five Powers' policies. Based on the conventional appreciation of the concept, as detailed in Chapter Two, it must be concluded that the Treaty of Brussels is not an accurate model of a security regime for two principal reasons.

The first reason is that the signatory States to the Treaty of Brussels were not an all-inclusive self-conscious grouping. If the Brussels Pact could be considered as a security regime it must be understood as protecting the signatories from both types of threat - external and internal. The Soviet Union and its policies were perceived to be threatening not only the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the five Powers, but also their basic social and ethical doctrines. The historical research undertaken clearly reveals the presence of perceptions of both types of threat underlying the national security policies of the signatories; these perceptions were reflected in the clauses of the treaty itself as outlined in Chapter Three. However,

while the five States saw themselves as a bastion of European civilisation confronted by a threat from a non-European Power and its ideology, they never conceived of themselves as an island.

Although Benelux, and to a lesser extent France, were in favour of some form of federal union in Europe, their separateness from other bearers of European civilisation was only geographical. The type of threat perceived, that is anti-democratic and anti-Western, meant that a natural affinity was generated with other similar "European" States elsewhere; Italy, South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and especially the United States. The "diplomatic fence" necessary for a systemic conceptualisation of a security regime was not constructed around only those five signatories. The perceived threat was to a way of life which, as noted in Ernest Bevin's Western Union speech, had "extended its influence throughout the world".[1] The principles and norms of the <u>Treaty of Brussels</u> as discussed in Chapter Three were no different from those pursued throughout the Western World in the immediate post-war period. If there was a "diplomatic fence" the five signatories were only one section of the field it encircled.

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[1] "Speech by Mr.Bevin in the House of Commons, 22 January 1948," printed in <u>Documents on International Affairs, 1947-1948</u>., London, Oxford University Press, 1952., p.212.

The second reason why the _Treaty_ _of_ _Brussels_ does not represent a model of a security regime is perhaps the most obvious; confronted by the perceived Soviet threat, the five Powers knew themselves to be incapable of guaranteeing their own security. Everyone of the five Powers recognised that even by pooling their resources they did not possess the economic or military wherewithal to defend the values - sovereignty, territorial integrity and cultural identity - they all wanted to protect. It was for that reason that each of the five Powers perceived the _Treaty_ _of_ _Brussels_ as a means of formally involving the United States in the post-war European security system. The willing acceptance of American economic aid by means of the Marshall Plan was Western Europe's admission that it lacked the necessary finances to undertake post-war reconstruction without substantial assistance. The pursuit of an American military commitment to the security of Western Europe, through the later _North_ _Atlantic_ _Treaty_ (1949) and NATO, demonstrated the perception of an inability for successful collective self-defence. While the _Treaty_ _of_ _Brussels_ could, and did, reinforce the "no-war" community in Western Europe, it was recognised to be wholly incapable of redressing the general systemic, or even a specific adversarial, threat if either contained the most powerful putative adversary of Western Europe - the Soviet Union.

The question that remains for the conclusion is an evaluation of the utility of international regime theory for the undertaking of analyses in International Relations. By and large, it can be readily asserted that the concept of the regime is indeed valuable and may lead to a greater comprehension of History and, of course, the present interactions of States. Hedley Bull's society of States, refined as it has been by Friederich Kratochwil's concept of the "public interest" complements, and supports regime theory: all three ideas serve in turn to buttress the Lockean model of the state of nature.

Man is a social animal, and because of this he is also necessarily involved in normative actions; societies cannot exist without such involvement. Utilising the Hobbesian approach to the state of nature as a theoretical model of the international system means that the idea of an international society, however geographically defined, is ignored or at least de-emphasised. The regime concept re-admits the ever-present normative elements which comprise a substantial portion of Man's political behaviour; ideological and religious conflicts, violent or otherwise, bear witness to the veracity of this statement. Therefore, in conclusion, the utility of international regime theory lies in its re-introduction of Man's fundamental humanity into analyses based primarily on political realism.

Appendix A

THE TREATY OF BRUSSELS (MARCH 17, 1948)

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Belgium, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas,[1]

Resolved

To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations;

To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage;

To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united;

To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery;

To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression;

To take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression;

To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other States inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination;

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[1] Treaty of Brussels: Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence between the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands. Brussels, 17 March 1948. Text taken from Documents on International Affairs, 1947-48., London, Oxford University Press, 1952., pp.225-229.

Desiring for these purposes to conclude a treaty for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defence;

Have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

[Names Follow]

who, having exhibited their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I

Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to promote the economic recovery of Europe, the High Contracting Parties will so organize and co-ordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, the co-ordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges.

The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Consultative Council referred to in Article VII as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic organizations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organizations.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common, both by direct consultation and in specialized agencies, to promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their peoples and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries.

The High Contracting Parties will consult with the object of achieving the earliest possible application of recommendations of immediate practical interest, relating to social matters, adopted with their approval in the specialized agencies.

They will endeavour to conclude as soon as posssible conventions with each other in the sphere of social security.

Article III

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civi-

lization and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means.

Article IV

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

Article V

All measures taken as a result of the preceding Article shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The present Treaty doers not prejudice in any way the obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nationss. It shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it deems neceesary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article VI

The High Contracting Parties declare, each as far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any other of the High Contracting Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

None of the High Contracting Parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the High Contracting Parties.

Article VII

For the purpose of consulting together on all the questions dealt with in the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will create a Consultative Council, which shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continually. The Council shall meet at such times as it shall deem fit.

At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties, the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit the High Contracting Parties to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise; with regard to the attitude to be adopted and the steps to be taken in case of a renewal by Germany of an aggressive policy; or with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability.

Article VIII

In pursuance of their determination to settle disputes only by peaceful means, the High Contracting Parties will apply to disputes between themselves the following provisions:

The High Contracting Parties will, while the present Treaty remains in force, settle all disputes falling within the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice by referring them to the Court, subject only, in the case of each of them, to any reservation already made by that Party when accepting this clause for compulsory jurisdiction to the extent that that Party may maintain the reservation.

In addition, the High Contracting Parties will submit to conciliation all disputes outside of the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

In the case of a mixed dispute involving both questions for which conciliation is appropriate and other questions for which judicial settlement is appropriate, any Party to the dispute shall have the right to insist that the judicial settlement of the legal questions shall precede conciliation.

The preceding provisions of this Article in no way affect the application of relevant provisions or agreements prescribing some other method of pacific settlement.

Article IX

The High Contracting Parties may, by agreement, invite any other State to accede to the present Treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the State so invited.

Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing instruments of accession with the Belgian Government.

The Belgian Government will inform each of the High Contracting Parties of the deposit of each instrument of accession.

Article X

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government.

It shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall thereafter remain in force for fifty years.

After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto provided that he shall have previously given one year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government.

The Belgian Government shall inform the Governments of the other High Contracting Parties of the deposit of each instrument of ratification and of each notice of denunciation.

In witness thereof, the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Brussels, this seventeenth day of March 1948, in English and French, each text being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted to each of the other signatories.

For Belgium:	(L.S.)	P.H. Spaak.
	(L.S.)	Gaston Eyskens.
For France:	(L.S.)	G. Bidault.
	(L.S.)	J. De Hautecloque.
For Luxemburg:	(L.S.)	Joseph Bech.
	(L.S.)	Robert Als.

For the Netherlands: (L.S.) W. Van Boetzelaer.
                        (L.S.) Van Harinxma Thoe Slooten.

For the United Kigdom of Great Britain and N. Ireland
                        (L.S.) Ernest Bevin.
                        (L.S.) George Rendel.

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