

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

AN EXAMINATION OF THE RATIONAL-IRRATIONAL
COMPONENTS IN THE PLANNING PROCESS

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YOON CHEE

DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING

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The highest good is like water. Water well-benefits
the ten thousand things and does not strain. It rests in places
that people despise, and so it approaches the TAO.

- LAO TZU -

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The prime purpose of this study is to understand the rational and irrational nature of the planning process. In the course of social action, there appears to be a two-fold nature of rationality and irrationality, namely substantial and functional. Substantial rationality is defined as a state of an intelligent act of thought, whereas the absence of the corresponding kind of state is defined as substantial irrationality. The former tends to be objective, thus it is communicable to the public, while the latter tends to be subjective and incommunicable. Substantial rationality and irrationality seem to exist in themselves as well as to govern the functional system in the course of action.

Functionality, therefore, exists with respect to the purposiveness of substantiality. When a series of purposive actions is oriented towards a predetermined goal, every component in the action is given a role. If a component leads the action towards the goal efficiently, it is called functionally rational. However, when a component leads the action in a negative direction from the goal, it is called functionally irrational. Therefore, it may be said that rationality and irrationality of this kind coexist within the context of the purposive action as positiveness or negativeness.

In so far as an action can be future oriented, predicting the course of action becomes necessary in order to effectuate it reasonably. However, because human intellectual capacities and

available information for the presented task are limited, even if the action is calculated in advance, the course of action seems to require adjustment. Therefore, the planning process is involved with prediction and adjustment. In other words, there are two functional roles in the planning process, indicative and adjustive. The former is substantial in character, while the latter is functional. A goal, as an indicative function in a course of social action, is directional as well as being an evaluative criterion based on social standards. Thus, it is assumed that the goal has to be formulated on social ethics as the principal medium.

Intentionality of human action seems to result in expanding and changing human knowledge. Therefore, the concept of planning may have to be adjusted by the nature of the expanding and changing pattern of human knowledge. For this reason there may be two distinctive concepts of the nature of the planning system, that is, developmental and adaptive planning. The former is concerned with the expanding pattern of things, the latter with the changing pattern of things. Both of these are assumed to be interdependent.

The general concepts employed in this study are expressed in Chapter II. First of all, the nature of rationality and irrationality in the planning process is defined. Then some characteristics of values are examined with respect to the planning system and finally the nature of the planning process in terms of prediction and control is considered.

Chapter III is an account of the value systems and the different

models applied to the planning process. The discussion of the former is centred on means and ends, values and its hierarchical structure, as well as value issues in conflict. The latter is concerned with planning theories based on rationality concepts.

In Chapter IV, consideration is given to the role of substantiality in the planning process; subjectivity and objectivity as a conditional ground for rationality, and social ethics as an evaluative measurement of the planning system.

Chapter V stresses the role of functionality in the planning process. The main functions in the process are divided into two parts, indicative and adjustive, and the concept of functional planning is examined in terms of the developmental and adaptive nature of the planning reality.

CHAPTER II

GENERAL CONCEPTS

A. RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY DEFINED

It is necessary at the outset to take up inquiries about definition, since "rationality" and "irrationality" are broadly expressed in the planning process.¹ The words "rational" and "irrational" seem to be used in two senses, either "substantial" or "functional". "Substantial rationality and irrationality" are features of fundamental characteristics of things, while functional rationality and irrationality exist for the utilization of things. In this regard, individual action in the social process is characterized by this "substantial rationality and irrationality" whereas social process itself is relative to the "substantial rationality and irrationality" of the individuals in the society.

Substantial Rationality and Irrationality

"Substantial rationality" may be defined as a state of being reasonable, while "substantial irrationality" may be defined as a state of being unreasonable. According to Karl Mannheim, the nature of rationality and irrationality of this kind is described as follows:

¹Paul Diesing, Reason in Society, (Urbana, Illinois, University Of Illinois Press, 1962), p.2., Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, (New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1940) pp.51-53.

We understand as substantially rational, an act of thought which reveals intelligent insight into the inter-relations of events in a given situation. Thus the intelligent act of thought itself will be described as "substantially rational", whereas everything else which either is false or not an act of thought at all (as for example drives, impulses, wishes, and feelings, both conscious and unconscious) will be called substantially irrational.²

An action, therefore, is substantially rational when it takes into account the possibilities and limitations of any given situation and reorganizes it so as to produce, increase, or preserve some good. This assertion implies two perspectives: that is, first, the action must be an efficient response to the situation in which some possible good is produced; and second, the efficient response must be based on intelligent insight rather than on coincidence.³ Thus, with respect to substantial rationality, there appears to be two distinctive aspects in the action: purposiveness towards producing good, and an intelligent utilization of purposiveness. In other words, an action oriented towards producing some good can be considered as purposive, while the efficient response based on intelligent insight can be deemed as an utilization of the action. Purposiveness exists in itself, whereas utilization of the action is governed by purposiveness. This means that given some kind of

²Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, p.53.

³Paul Diesing, Reason in Society, (Urbana, Illinois, University of Illinois Press, 1962), p.3

value or goal in question and the real world as it exists, an action can be said being rational if it approaches towards the given value or goal in a proper manner.⁴

To further elucidate substantial rationality the example of human survival may be used. If a man is hungry, it is rational for him to arrange things in order to attain food. Under ordinary conditions, it would be irrational for him to refuse nourishment. From this example, the dual aspect of substantiality and functionality in the attaining food can be seen; man's survival as purposive, and to arrange things to attain food as functional in the action. However, there seems to be the question of how much food can rationally satisfy him. It may be relatively easy to find the answer to such a simple question. But when the situation becomes more complex, it becomes more difficult to distinguish the more rational from the less rational action. In order to test whether one action is more rational than another it must be understood that there are some stages involved in the above situation: first, man's survival as substantial goal; second, relief from hunger as an objective to attain parallel to the course of survival; third, the man's bearing of reality on that objective; and fourth, the consequences of the

⁴Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, (New York, Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1953), p.38.

alternative course of action evaluated in terms of the given goals and objective.

Functional Rationality and Irrationality

Rationality that is functionally oriented is defined as a series of actions organized in a way which leads to a previously defined goal. A functional position or role is given to every component in the series of actions. Thus, functional rationality is relative to the substantial state or purposiveness in the action. In order to approach towards the predetermined goal, such a functional system of series of actions will be optimal when it most efficiently co-ordinates the means. Everything which breaks through and disrupts this functional process, is called functionally irrational. In this manner, the term functional rationality would not characterize an act in itself but only in relation to its position in the entire complex system of which it is only a part.⁵ If we accept this view, irrationality of this kind would be inseparable from the rationality in the functional system. This two-fold nature of functionality exists either in a positive or negative way to the predetermined goal. Therefore, rationality can be conceived as involving full knowledge of the system in question. This concept of rationality is required to identify the optimal alternatives appearing with reference to all the

⁵ Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, pp.53-55.

goals at stake. An efficient course of action is governed by the alternative chosen as optimal.⁶ Thus, in the course of action, it becomes necessary to distinguish what the efficient and inefficient components are for the predetermined goal.

Generally, the more rational action is the more efficient action. In a pure sense, efficiency is the ratio between valued input and valued output. In other words, to be efficient entails taking the shorter path and the cheaper means of orientation towards the attainment of the desired goals. In this context, a system is functionally rational, when it is so structured as to maximize net goal satisfaction in a compatible and dependable fashion. Consistently satisfiable results must be based primarily on an internal structure which is able to continue efficient operation through variations of individualistic components and through changes of organizational conditions. A conflict between individualistic or substantial values and organizational or functional values becomes an important issue to be adjusted in the course of action. In this respect, characteristics of value are worthy of discussion.

⁶Paul Davidoff and Thomas A. Reiner, "A Choice Theory of Planning", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 28(2), May 1962, p.105.

B. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF VALUE

There would be no need to discuss values if we were only concerned with description and analysis. But since planning is concerned with a series of actions (in order to rationally formulate the action), the planning system requires value criteria as an indicative function⁷ for the course of action.

Although there are innumerable human values, there are a small number of prime values. These values (such as democracy, equality, freedom and security in society) have a two-fold nature in conjunction with the given function; that is to say an instrumental as well as intrinsic nature.⁸

Another characteristic of value to be discussed is its qualitative and quantitative aspects in relation to value judgements in the decision-making process for the rational course of action. Finally, the conflict between individual and social values in the social process needs to be examined. In this context, the aforementioned characteristics of value will be discussed in the following manner.

Fact and Value

There are some philosophical distinctions between facts and values. Every decision involves "factual" and "value" elements.

⁷The aspect of indicative function in the planning process is elaborated in terms of goals and objectives in the process. See page 53.

⁸Dahl and Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, p.25.

This distinction proves to be a very fundamental issue for the decision-making process. It leads first of all to an understanding of what is meant by a "correct" organizational decision. Secondly, it clarifies the role of policy questions within an organization.

Fact is a property of reality. It exists in itself. A fact can be considered as a statement of existence involving definitions and postulations, and a relationship. Factual propositions are statements about the observable world and the way in which it operates. "The street is crowded", for instance, is one characteristic of a factual statement. The street is described in relation to a degree of congestion. In this context fact can be defined as a descriptive statement of the reality of the relationship.⁹

Value is, however, conceptual. It is conceived by an observer's experience of facts.¹⁰ Values may be expressed as ethical statements or as statements of preference, of standards, or of goals. "A society ought to be based on democracy", is a form of ethical statement as well as a statement based on goals.¹¹ "I would

⁹Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, (New York, The Free Press, 1965), p.45; Davidoff and Reimer, "A Choice Theory of Planning", pp.106-107.

¹⁰Gunnar Myrdal, Value in Social Theory, Paul Streeten, ed., (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), p.xxvii.

¹¹Dahl and Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, p.41, according to their democratic theory, democracy as an instrumental value is a goal and polyarchy is a process.

rather live in a house than in an apartment", is a statement of preference.¹²

In decision-making, there needs to be value as well as factual propositions.¹³ If decisions are considered as descriptions of a future state of affairs, there may be two implications. First, the description can be true or false in an empirical sense; and second, decisions possess an imperative quality - one future state of affairs is selected in preference to another and actions in the process are directed toward the chosen alternative. In this respect, decisions have an ethical as well as a factual context. Indeed, Herbert Simon asserts that ethical terms are not completely reducible to factual terms and that, in fact, they both have an empirical meaning. He also argues that:

To determine whether a proposition is correct, it must be compared directly with experience - with the facts - or it must lead by logical reasoning to other propositions that can be derived from ethical ones by any process of reasoning, nor can ethical propositions be compared directly with the facts - since they assert "oughts" rather than facts. Hence, there is no way in which the correctness of ethical propositions can be empirically or rationally tested.¹⁴

Decisions cannot be absolutely objectively described as

¹²Davidoff and Reimer, "A Choice Theory of Planning".

¹³Ibid., p.107.

¹⁴Simon, Administrative Behavior, p.46.

correct or incorrect, since they are involved with a statement of valuation such as, some particular state of affairs "ought to be" or that it is "preferable" or "desirable". The statement, in this connection, performs a prescriptive function, and is neither true nor false, correct or incorrect.

There are other ways in which fact and value relationships may be considered. First, facts and the handling of data invariably reflect the observer's bias. In relation to this view, Gunnar Myrdal states that "the chaos of possible data for research does not organize itself into systematic knowledge by mere observation. Hypotheses are necessary."¹⁵ Since hypotheses are based on values of their makers, factual statements may show biased interpretation. Second, factual statements about values are meaningful in regard to some configuration of fact. Conversely, facts are relevant by reference to value statements about facts.¹⁶

Intrinsic Values Versus Instrumental Values

Intrinsic and instrumental values are two different aspects in the value system. Multiple goals within a system of values can be described in terms of their interrelationships. Considering an

¹⁵ Myrdal, Value in Social Theory, p.128.

¹⁶ Davidoff and Reiner, "A Choice Theory of Planning" p.107, see also Geoffrey Vickers, Value Systems and Social Process, (London, Tavistock Publications Ltd., 1968), p.191, this aspect is described in detail in Chapter IV.

individual goal, as a part of a system of ends, has important analytic outcomes. One goal may appear as superior to an alternative goal when both are measured against a supreme value. However, the alternative may appear as a better means of satisfying a system-wide set of ends. It then follows that goals can be compared in terms of their intrinsic and their instrumental values.¹⁷

In the democratic process, for instance, freedom, equality, and majority rule can be considered as the supreme values, since they are the foundation of all the other values in the process. In other words, all other values which are intrinsic are relative and conditional to the supreme values (freedom, equality and majority rule).¹⁸ In relation to this viewpoint, Dahl and Lindblom argue that:

A prime goal (value) when attained is a direct source of satisfaction in itself; an instrumental goal (value), as the name implies has value only because it facilitates the attainment of one or more prime goals (values).¹⁹

In the social process, according to H. L. Lasswell, intrinsic values include:

power, respect, affection, well-being, rectitude, wealth, enlightenment, skill, and many others. For instance,

¹⁷ Davidoff and Reiner, "A Choice Theory of Planning", p.107.

¹⁸ Diesing, Reason in Society, p.234.

¹⁹ Dahl and Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, p.26.

for the purpose of analysing the social process, participation in decision making is a value of power.²⁰

Access to goods and services is a value of wealth. Affection includes friendship and also sexual intimacy. Rectitude is a value of morality. This list of values, Lasswell asserts, is representative in character, not exhaustive. It is not a ranking of values in preferential order in any one society. Accordingly, it appears that the position of intrinsic values varies from group to group, from person to person, and from time to time in the history of any society.²¹

Since real life is complex, many values that seem to be instrumental are to some extent intrinsic values also; or vice versa. Walking to a store to buy a quart of milk, for example, is never solely instrumental to anyone who enjoys walking. On the other hand, someone who has to buy a quart of milk may intend his walk to be solely instrumental, but in spite of his original intention he may find himself enjoying the fresh air and exercise. Similarly, a problem arises in society over power, for although it is an instrumental value, it can be so easily converted to an intrinsic value that provides direct satisfaction; in other words, it is easily converted from an instrumental to an intrinsic value.²²

²⁰ H. L. Lasswell, Power and Personality, (New York, W. W. Horton and Company Inc., 1948)

²¹ Loc. cit.

²² Dahl and Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, p.28.

Evaluation

It is now necessary to discuss evaluation. It seems that an evaluation is a judgement about the attribution of value to objects, and amounts of value. There are two fundamental types of evaluative criteria: that is, first, qualitative criteria, by which the presence of value is established; and second, quantitative criteria, by which the amount or degree of value is determined. The former consists of definitions of value and the latter consists of quantitative standards correlated in an appropriate way with the distinguishing characteristics of the definitions. Quantitative standards are, in this context, dependent on the definitions to which they apply.²³

Individual Values Versus Social Values

In the social process, there seems to be a continuous conflict between two types of interests; individual values and social values. The fact of this persistency appears to be significant. If either side of the issue is ignored in the course of social action, the process would be unbalanced and incomplete.

Individual values tend to stress the fundamental values of the individualistic interests, such as the satisfaction of personal desires. These values advocate for every individual the maximum freedom of decision consistent with the minimum interference with the decisions of others. Following from this view, the function of government, for instance, would be considered as an institution of

²³ Stephen C. Pepper, The Sources of Value, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1958), pp.272-273. This aspect of value is elaborated on in terms of values and value systems, see Chapter III A.

sanctions, preferably with the agreement of all individuals concerned, with a view to restraining men from undue mutual interference in the carrying out of feasible individual preferences. This view would develop a decentralized form of authority.

On the other hand, social values tend to stress a power beyond individual preferences. This may be conceived as a divine power, as an inscrutable absolute imperative, as functional reason, or as some directive cosmic or social force. In some such form, this type of value attempts to justify criteria of value that over-rule individual value preferences. It pursues functional orientation as its ideal. Functional efficiency becomes essential in such a society which stresses these social values. In order to maximize the efficiency, the institutional structure has to be highly centralized.²⁴

A tension between the two types of value systems becomes a central issue to be adjusted in the social process. At the same time, there is need of an inquiry about how far we can afford reasonable adjustment over the conflicting problems in the course of action.

²⁴Ibid., pp.88-92

C. PLANNING AS A RATIONAL ADJUSTMENT OVER IRRATIONALITY

One of the conclusions that can be drawn from the previous observations is that the definition of planning may be formulated as rational adjustment over irrationality²⁵ in the course of action. Planning seeks to solve problems by an appeal to reason, that is, to clear thought and experience, rather than by an appeal to emotions and passions, in other words to arbitrariness. In this manner, an attitude of reasonableness ought to be the foundation upon which planning is built.²⁶

In order to guide effectively the course of action towards attainment of predetermined objectives, one may have to remove obstacles to reasonable desired action or to adjust the desired action, or to compromise on both. These processes often need to be predicted and controlled by rationality. Actions in the processes may have to be scheduled and controlled so that net goal achievement is not diminished by avoidable conflicts among the actions.²⁷ Therefore, it is necessary to examine the aspects of prediction and control in conjunction with the course of action.

²⁵ Rationality and irrationality is defined in A of this chapter.

²⁶ Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. II, (London, George Routledge and Sons Ltd., 1947), pp.224-226.

²⁷ It is assumed that there is enough spontaneous human energy active in the system and that conflict does not have to be used to activate human energies.

Prediction

From the previous discussion it can be said that goal values are inherent in purposive activities. Goal approachment implies directional action. Goal formulation for the course of action emphasizes the notion of future orientation and entails the necessity of predicting the future state of events.

There seems to be two types of goal forecasting in decision-making; namely categorical and conditional. The former tends to be an absolute and dated assertion about the occurrence of a particular sort of events. The latter to be hypothetical and explanatory.²⁸ Repetitive events enhance opportunities for categorical prediction. Since social problems are complex and unreplicative by nature, difficulties arise when we attempt to calculate the future of events consciously. The fact that history rarely repeats itself represents that it is so tenuous to predict. In this manner, Michael Scriven views history as an explainable rather than a predictable subject.²⁹ This may be a reason why social action as a complex phenomena must often take place at a lower level of rational projection than business and industrial actions.

²⁸ Stephen Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding, (London, Harper Torchbooks), p.31.

²⁹ Michael Scriven, "Explanation and Prediction in Evolutionary Theory", Science, August 1959, p.77.

If we accept the view that the rational activities are based on the foundation of intelligent thought, rational prediction ought to be judged by reference to its predictive success with respect to the given conditions. Therefore, "man's limited mental capacity, lack of emotional integration, inhibited foresight, and need for uncalculated action" must be taken into account when factual estimation for the course of future events is considered.³⁰ In this context, prediction of a series of actions in society must be based on conditional and hypothetical grounds rather than categorical grounds.

Incomplete information and present value standards, when the prediction is pursued, provide uncertainty in the estimation of future events. Information is collected in terms of the criteria of the present but the projected event is concerned with the values of the future. In this context, Scriven stresses the view that:

Hypothetical probability prediction does not have any value for actual prediction except insofar as the conditions mentioned in the hypothesis are predictable or experimentally producible... the irregularity producing factors lie outside their range of observation and are not predictable by reference to any factors within this range.³¹

In other words, predictions depend upon unknown future events, and in consequence the range of phenomena compatible with

³⁰ Dahl and Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, p.61.

³¹ Scriven, "Explanation and Prediction in Evolution Theory", p.478.

it will be wide and the possibility of falsifying it will be correspondingly large. Waste and error, therefore, are the inherent costs of attempts to make rational prediction. Many important decisions are necessarily a calculated risk,³² and thus entail the possibility of waste and error. In short, as Charles L. Leven views it, a good deal of misunderstanding can be avoided if the users of analytical systems can learn to regard them not as question answering devices but as means of achieving increased understanding of the processes relevant to policy decisions.³³

Control

Control is another major component in a rational course of action. The estimated course of action should be directed towards attainment of desired objectives, since to predict the course of action is often uncertain in reality. In other words, the course of action should be adjusted by means of control.

Many forms of control may be exercised within social systems. Large units of indirect control such as a corporation, a trade union, or the stock market usually consist of many small units of direct control. For example, the corporation president controls the

³² Dahl and Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, pp.85-86.

³³ Leven, "Establishing Goals for Regional Economic Development", 30(2), 1964, Journal of the American Institute of Planners, p.101.

responses of the plant foreman. But since the span of control, in the sense that the president can make his direction effectively, is relatively limited, the foreman is, therefore, directly controlled through an intermediate chain of other individuals.³⁴

Controlled behavior may be thought of as lying at one end of a continuum of which the other end is the absence of immediate and direct control. An individual's responses are autonomous or uncontrolled to the extent that no other people can bring about these responses in a definite way.³⁵

Yet, the location and character of controls can be examined in terms of centralization and decentralization. From the functional point of view, the decision making system may be centralized by utilizing general rules to limit the power of subordinates. On the other hand, a decentralized decision making system may forestall the evils of centralized powers by removing from subordinate hands the actual decision making function. Both systems, however, seem to coexist in the planning process. Rexford G. Tugwell stresses the view that;

Diversity within unity suggests a general determination

³⁴Dahl and Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, pp.93-94, and Simon, Administrative Behavior, pp.26-28; according to Simon, the span of control can be either broadened or limited in the planning process.

³⁵Ibid., Dahl and Lindblom, pp.96-97.

of policy with local exclusion ... it is quite possible to conceive local freedom within a planned development, of central co-ordination together with decentralized control of operations.³⁶

He further emphasizes that policy formulation must remain centralized while current management of operations is decentralized. The differences between the characteristics of one planning system and another, however, lies in the combination of determinants in relation to controls.³⁷

Since the instruments of planning are relevant to the existence of the planning process, both centralization and decentralization as instruments of planning should be applied with an understanding of the given situation. The larger the number of actions involved in the planning process, the stronger the necessity will be to co-ordinate these activities. In this manner, there may be a stronger necessity for co-ordination in larger organizations than in smaller, just as there is such a necessity in a multiple complex as compared to a simple complex. By exercising authority or other forms of influence, it is possible to centralize the function of deciding so that a general plan of operations will govern the activities of all members of the organization. Therefore, the problem may be how the planning process

³⁶ Rexford G. Tugwell, The Place of Planning in Society, (San Juan, Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico Planning Board, 1954), p.40.

³⁷ Loc. cit.

can be adjusted in terms of minimizing centralized power and maximizing decentralized individual interests without interrupting its functional process.

CHAPTER III

VALUES AND THE PLANNING PROCESS

The central theme of this chapter is to examine the role of values and value systems in the planning process. In order to formulate meaningful plans, as goal values, the planner must have a rational insight into the nature of prime values in the society where he is planning.

Since planning leads to action and action requires commitments,¹ the plan, as the course of action, ought to be determined in terms of a rational understanding of values and value systems involved in the planning process.

A. VALUES AND VALUE SYSTEMS

Means and Ends

The conceptual nature of values in the planning process can be discussed within a framework of means and ends. Means and ends are dependent on how responsibilities and concerns are provided for and how wide or narrow a view of the situation one takes at a specific time. The distinction between values representing means and those representing ends can be compared with a distinction between preferable modes of conduct and preferable

¹Gibson Winter, *Social Ethics*, (New York, Harper and Row Publishers Inc., 1968), p.17. This aspect of action and commitment relationship is discussed in terms of acceptance and commitment relationship in social action. This relationship is also discussed in Chapter V, see pages 61 and 62.

end-states of existence.² For instance, the attainment or maintenance of health may be considered as an end value in a society, while the prevention of cancer may be regarded as a value of means. However, from the governmental viewpoint, the prevention of cancer may be an end, whereas restriction of tobacco advertisement may be interpreted as a means of cancer prevention. Therefore, it can be said that mean and end values are contained in a chain of actions. If values are considered as ends then they are considered to possess an intrinsic nature. Conversely, when they are deemed as means, values are interpreted to possess an instrumental nature.³ In the example above, values in the social system have a two-fold nature, instrumental and intrinsic. Although the rank list of values can vary with an individual's preference, health, wealth, leisure, and honor can be considered as highly ranked values in a society.⁴

Values and Hierarchical Structure

Many writers have observed that values are organized into

²Milton Rokeach, "The Theory of Organization and Change within Value-Attitude Systems", Journal of Social Issues, 24(1), 1968, p.17.

³This characteristic of values is explained in Chapter II, see page 12.

⁴Robert C. Young, "Goals and Goal-Setting", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 32(2), March 1966, p.79, see also Dahl and Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, pp.25-54.

hierarchical structures and substructures. Operationally speaking, the concept of a value hierarchy suggests a ranking of values along a continuum of importance. The two separate value systems, instrumental and intrinsic, may be posited each with a rank-ordered structure of its own, each functionally and cognitively connected with the other, and also connected with many similar attitudes towards specific objects and situations.⁵

Charles H. Granger points out that values exist within a framework of objectives, as "aims or ends of actions" with the highest aspirations at the peak of the pyramid. Continuing further, it can be shown that most objectives split into a number of parts often with interrelationships that form a complicated hierarchical pattern. It is only within this hierarchical context, according to Granger, that a particular objective can be examined. In other words, a prime value in the planning process must be evaluated in the light of the particular circumstances being faced, such as the internal and external constraints and the values of individuals who direct the destiny of the organization.⁶

Values in Conflict

In Chapter II, it was pointed out that the individual values and social values often create conflict situation in the social action.

⁵Rokeach, "The Theory of Organization", p.10.

⁶Charles H. Granger, "Hierarchy of Objectives", Harvard Business Review, 42(3), May-June, 1964, pp.63-74.

In this chapter it seems now important to discuss the value conflict problem with respect to organizational process. This problem is frequently shown when a person is confronted with a situation in which he has to give up a portion of one value in order to attain some of another value. As a result this situation may activate two or more values in conflict with one another.⁷

According to Meyerson and Banfield, prime values as ends in the planning process contain active and contextual elements.

They describe that:

The active elements are those which occupy the foreground of the image so to speak; they are the features of the desired situation which have been singled out and made focus of interest and activity. Contextual elements lie in the background; they are value conditions which ought to be realized or ought not to be violated in the attainment of the active elements. The explicit formulation of an end is usually elliptical; the active elements are set forth but the contextual elements are described incompletely or not at all.⁸

Simon also sheds light on the effects of variable value nature in his treatment of sets of values as multiple constraints. Continuing further, a plan, as a course of action, must satisfy a complete set of requirements or constraints, although one of these requirements is occasionally singled out and regarded as the goal of the action.

⁷ David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, (The Free Press, New York, 1963), pp.31-33.

⁸ Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest, (New York, The Free Press, 1964), p.317.

Conflict problem appears to be between the individual as an actor and the organizational requirements as constraints. In other words, following Simon's viewpoint:

When we come to organizational decisions, we observe that many, if not most of the constraints that define a satisfactory course of action are associated with an organizational role and hence only indirectly with the personal motives of the individual who assumes that role. In this situation it is convenient to use the phrase organization goal to refer to constraints, imposed by the organizational role which has only this indirect relation to the motives of the decision maker.⁹

In this case, it seems difficult to adjust multiplicity of values caused by different motives of individuals as well as by many ways of expressing these interests. This sort of value conflicts is often mutually antagonistic. Therefore, without assigning a relative value to interests, a list of prime values becomes meaningless in the evaluation of the organizational alternative courses of actions.¹⁰

Another source of conflict appears when prime goals are not held between long and short term values in the planning process. In this case goal values are relatively antagonistic

⁹Herbert Simon, "On the Concept of Organizational Goal", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 9, June 1964, p.3, p.7 and p.21. According to Simon, "Goals mean value premises that can serve as inputs to decisions. Motives mean the causes that lead individuals to select some goals".

¹⁰Braybrooke and Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision*, pp. 24-25. See also Young, "Goals and Goal-Setting", p.81.

towards each other.¹¹ How can environmentalists reconcile their long range imperative (cleaning up the environment) with poverty's immediate urgencies (the provision of employment and cheap power through steam generating plants) could be a good example of this kind of value conflict. While the poor are interested in cheap power for their own use and to provide jobs, the resultant air pollution can be a significant case for environmentalists to consider. If cleaning up the environment raises the price of power, there will be no goal to be achieved for either interest. In this manner, it may be a rational procedure to minimize the confrontation with competing interests.¹²

B. THE PLANNING PROCESS

Since planning can be defined as a rational adjustment over irrationality,¹³ the planning process may be considered as an appropriate series of rational adjustments. The process, then, involves certain steps of a technical as well as behavioral nature. F. Stuart Chapin Jr., writes that the technical nature of the field relates to the steps of planning in some defined work program,

¹¹ Leven, "Establishing Goals for Regional Economic Development", p.103.

¹² Henry C. Wallich, "Environment Versus Poverty", Newsweek, 72(23), June 7, 1971, p.87.

¹³ See Chapter II, page 17.

whereas the behavioral nature deals with a sequence of action.¹⁴

According to Young, the planning process can be described as "a process for determining goals and designing means by which goals may be achieved".¹⁵ This definition also implies that the process involves the technical and behavioral usage of rational adjustment. The question appears to be how far one can afford to apply rationality in the planning process. Hence, it is worthwhile to discuss some models of existing decision-making theories.

Perfect Rationality Model

This concept originated from Simon¹⁶ and attempts to approximate an abstract model of "perfect rationality".¹⁷ This model is called "rational-deductive ideal"¹⁸ or "pure rational model"¹⁹ by the theorists. Meyerson and Banfield describe the stages in the decision-making process as follows:

1. The decision-maker considers all of the alternatives (courses of action) open to him; that is,

¹⁴F. Stuart Chapin Jr., "Foundation of Urban Planning", Urban Life and Form, Werner Z. Hirsch, ed., (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963), pp.222-223.

¹⁵Young, "Goals and Goal-Setting", p.78.

¹⁶Simon, Administrative Behavior, p.67.

¹⁷John Friedmann, "A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning Behavior", Administrative Science Quarterly, 12(2), September 1967, p.225.

¹⁸Braybrooke and Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, p.9.

¹⁹Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Re-examined, (San Francisco, Chandler Publishing Co., 1968), p.132.

- he considers what courses of action are possible within the conditions of the situation and in the light of the ends he seeks to attain;
2. He identifies and evaluates all of the consequences which would follow from the adaption of each alternative; that is, he predicts how the total situation would be changed by each course of action he might adopt;
 3. He selects that alternative, the probable consequences of which, would be preferable in terms of his most valued ends.²⁰

Although a number of theorists²¹ adopted this model in accordance with a respectable intellectual tradition, Meyerson and Banfield judged that "no decision can be perfectly rational since no one ever knows all of the alternatives open to him at any moment or all the consequences which would follow from any action".²² Since rationality in real life tends to be relative,²³ this model seems to contradict its original fruitful hypothesis, that is, absolute rationality. Because of its logical rigidity, this model precludes any capability of substantial modification.²⁴ Furthermore, the

²⁰Meyerson and Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest, p.314.

²¹Davidoff and Reimer, "A Choice Theory of Planning".

²²Meyerson and Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest, pp.314-315.

²³Simon, Administrative Behavior, pp.75-77, also see Models of Man, Social and Rational, (New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), p.198, he proposes the concept of "bounded rationality".

²⁴Friedmann, "A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning Behavior", pp.225-226.

difficulties involved in the unpredictable nature of things²⁵ and the problems of values²⁶ make this model unsatisfactory in practice. With a few exceptions, the perfect rationality model is in fact impossible. The exceptions are problems that are susceptible to quantification "such as some concerning inventory or replacement policies, allocation policies, communication network designs, product mixes and search patterns".²⁷

Incrementalism Model

Lindblom has proposed a model of incrementalism that advocates "muddling through",²⁸ as a counter-model to the perfect rationality theory. The emphasis of this model is on the acceptance of limited human intellectual capabilities and of limited sources of information. According to this theory, the course of social action may be regarded as one:

That takes existing reality as one alternative and compares the probable gains and losses of closely related alternatives by making relatively small adjustments about whose consequences approximately as much is known as about the consequences of existing reality or both.²⁹

²⁵ See Chapter II, page 18.

²⁶ Braybrooke and Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, Chapter II. The problems of values are also pointed out in Chapter III A on page 9 of this study.

²⁷ Dror, Public Policymaking Re-examined, p.133.

²⁸ Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through", Public Administration Review, 18 and 19, 1958-1959, pp.79-88.

²⁹ Dahl and Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare, p.82. This idea is originally adapted from Karl Popper's "Piecemeal Engineering" concept. See The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol.I, pp.157-168, and also The Poverty of Historicism, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1960), pp.64-70.

Braybrooke and Lindblom also describe the decision-making process of policymakers adhering to the incremental model as follows:

1. Less importance is given to clarifying any principle values; the planner rather focuses his attention on marginal or incremental values;
2. Means and ends are simultaneously chosen since a means-ends relationship is possible only to the extent that values are agreed upon, are reconcilable, and are stable at the margin;
3. Agreement on policy becomes the only practicable test of policy correctness;
4. Policy is not made once and for all; it is made once and re-made endlessly;
5. The planner does not attempt to attain long range goals in a single operation; he rather attempts to facilitate small changes under the given conditions;
6. The planning process is not oriented towards maximum attainment of goals, but towards adjustment of irrationalities.³⁰

The shortcoming of this model seems to be in its conservative attitude towards social changes. In other words, the limited innovation of marginal changes can hamper necessary major changes which attempt to improve social action. Its basic assumptions, namely respect for the past and skepticism about human ability to predict the future, nevertheless meet the needs of a stable society. In this context, Dahl and Lindblom

³⁰ Braybrooke and Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, pp.37-109; Lindblom "The Science of Muddling Through"; and Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol.I, p.158.

assert that:

Calculated risks are often necessary because scientific methods have not yet produced tested knowledge about probable consequences of large incremental changes, small changes will clearly not achieve desired goals, and existing reality is highly undesirable ... to continue existing policy is a greater risk than to discard them in favour of an alternative calculated risk.³¹

However, where some directed social changes are required, as in countries undergoing accelerated progress in science and technology or those facing emergencies, such situations may preclude the implementation of this model.³²

In short, the main advantage of this model is its recognition of the limitations of human knowledge and because of this, planners are aided in avoiding arrogance in their decision-making. Also the model draws attention to dangers of radically new policies. Hence, this model is valid for large area of social action where stability and predictability are essential.³³

Bounded Rationality Model

The principal concept of this model is the acceptance of the reality that human capacity in knowledge, foresight, skill and time is limited. In this sense, this model is basically the same as the incrementalism model in terms of attitude towards the world of

³¹ Dahl and Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, pp.85-86.

³² Dror, Public Policymaking Re-examined, p.145.

³³ Ibid., p.146-147.

things. Simon defines bounded rationality as:

The capability of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world - or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality.³⁴

Therefore, it may be a rational attitude to replace "optimizing" goals with "satisficing" goals, and to find a course of action that is "good enough".³⁵

In order to organize the complex nature of problems, if the system of variables is closed, rational decision may be feasible to the extent that it is limited to the set of factors upon which the decision is based. In nature, the limited set of factors corresponds to a closed system, to the extent that significant indirect effects are absent.³⁶

The difference between this model and the incrementalism model seems to be in the attention that is paid to selecting alternatives. Because it is difficult to predict possible alternatives, it may be relatively rational to choose merely the first satisfactory alternative.³⁷ Furthermore, it is hard to achieve even a satisfactory alternative since the search for alternatives usually stops

³⁴ Simon, Models of Man, p.198.

³⁵ Ibid., p.204.

³⁶ Simon, Administrative Behavior, p.83.

³⁷ Simon, Models of Man, pp.252-253.

early and thus the satisfaction standard is lowered. Therefore, satisfactory alternative choosing becomes an achievement and should be aimed for rather than optimal alternatives.

The advantage of this model lies in its realistic tone; it seems true that decision makers do not try to improve their policies beyond what they consider satisfactory. The shortcoming of the model lies in its acceptance of the satisfactory quality as given neglects what variables are shaping this satisfactory quality and how much they could be guided.

CHAPTER IV

THE ROLE OF SUBSTANTIAL RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY IN THE PLANNING PROCESS

In the last chapter, some aspects of rationality and irrationality in the planning system, as well as some characteristics of value systems were discussed. It now becomes essential to explain what is the role of rationality and irrationality in the planning system with respect to both substantiality and functionality. This chapter is concerned with the role of substantial rationality and irrationality in relation to objectivity and subjectivity as well as concerned with social ethics as the evaluative media while the following chapter deals with the role of functional rationality and irrationality in the planning process.

A. OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY

Objectivity seems to be a necessary condition in the public world since without it there could be no scientific community, no communication and no collaboration towards determined goals. Objectivity can be a property of being intelligent. In this regard, there seems to be two kinds of objectivity; the objectivity of reality and the objectivity of idea. The former belongs to a reality in its world while the latter belongs to commonly shared world of reality. Subjectivity then, may be defined as an absence of objectivity, an unshared or incommunicable private experience or observation. In short objectivity can be valid for the general public; while

subjectivity can be valid for the private, individual, and incommunicable act.¹

Since the reality of the world can only be perceived by an observer in terms of his own conceptualized idea, objectivity is bounded in order to establish communicable common ground. In other words, the objectivity of reality is only observed in the context of the observers' subjective image of reality, therefore, there needs to be an inter-subjectively justifiable or verifiable public ground in the course of action. In relation to this Popper states as follows:

Scientific theories are never fully (or objectively) justifiable or verifiable, but that they are nevertheless testable ... therefore, the objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested.²

In the rational conduct of human affairs, there must be two essential conditions; intelligence and objectivity. An intelligent being can not be rational without being objective, and vice-versa. Referring to Quenton Gibson:

Objectivity in itself will not ensure that a person holds rational beliefs. He may be objective and still not take account of the evidence at his disposal, since for this intelligence is required. But failure in objectivity ... is something which will prevent him holding rational beliefs, however intelligent he may be.³

¹Patric A. Heelan, S. J., Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p.6.

²Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (New York, Harper and Row Publishers, 1968), p.44.

³Quenton Gibson, The Logic of Social Enquiry, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966) p.77.

The objectivity of our actions may, to a large extent, be a function of what we believe them to be. In discussing objectivity, we may have to take into account the fact that there are some factors influencing one's motives, customs and social situation, which may affect one's beliefs. At times our motives may lead us to adapt beliefs without consulting the factual evidence, or they may lead us to make a prediction on the fact. In the former situation we speak of prejudice, in the latter situation, of bias. In reality, however, prejudice and bias exist only when they are not detected. Also, at any time there are many thought habits which are not easy to discern, simply because they are accepted by the general public. The beliefs which they imply are presupposed in the sorts of questions we ask and in the answers we expect to receive. Furthermore, beliefs are often presupposed in the very structure of the language which we learn. Finally, limits on the availability of facts also influence beliefs. In this case, if no interests are involved, a common form of intellectual error appears in that improper weight is placed on the fact which is near at hand.

A. Ryan views that, in human action, it is only feasible to achieve objectivity, when we do not hide the facts for the sake of values and beliefs which we happen to hold and when we do not confuse the goals of the theorists with the true world. The influence of values on the way we organize our factual evidence suggests that we should not expect one objective view, but several objective

views.⁴

Objectivity entails the selection of a definite number of related facts, the labelling of them and the consequent elimination of unnecessary facts. Since this set of facts will be based on the researcher's subjective interpretation of that objectivity of reality, the resultant idea or concept is always an abstracted form of the objectivity of reality. The varying degrees between the subjectivity of the observer and that of what is observed may damage the objectivity of reality. In practice, although decision-makers must operate the planning system in terms of objectivity, the quality of their decision must depend partly upon how they select the facts from which they arrive at their subjective image.

The communicability of knowledge and information is an important aspect of social conduct since objectivity in itself would not ensure that social action contains objective intercourse. Referring to A. J. Ayer, the communicability of knowledge may be explained in terms of the problem of language:

The question whether an object is public or private is fundamentally a question of language; it depends upon the conventions which we follow in making judgements of identity. Thus physical objects are public (communicable) because it makes sense to say of different people that they are perceiving the same physical object; mental images are private because it does not make sense to say of different people that they are having the same mental image; they can be imagining the same thing, but it is impossible

⁴Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Science, (New York, Pantheon Book, a division of Random House Inc., 1970), pp.232-238.

that their respective mental images should be literally the same. (Since) these conventions could be altered ... it would simply be a matter of formulating for different people to share the same experience ... (Therefore), the existence of the public object will be established by the fact that other people are also having, or at least disposed to have, the appropriate experiences.⁵

Kenneth E. Boulding, like Ayer, stresses the view that public knowledge is part of our mutual image of the world, since the image is commonly held by the people who are also part of our image of the world. Therefore, public knowledge is intersubjective. Taking this point of view, public knowledge is an identical image of the world, as opposed to a private incommunicable image. Hence, the public value systems that are based on the public knowledge are approximately the same.⁶

If we consider the growth of knowledge as the growth of an organic structure, a complicated problem appears if there is a difference in the magnitude of the organic structure of knowers.⁷ In other words, one who has lesser knowledge or experience may find difficulty in communicating with a person who has more. As Reinhold Niebuhr states, the solution to this problem may be in the fact that:

Their (people) rational faculty prompts them to a sense

⁵ A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, (Middlesex, England, Penguin Books Ltd., 1969), pp.200-203.

⁶ Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image, (Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1963), pp.14-16.

⁷ Ibid., p.16.

of justice which educational discipline may refine and purge of egoistic elements until they are able to view a social situation, in which their own interests are involved, with a fair measure of objectivity.⁸

The communication of knowledge and information as a function of rational adjustment over irrationality becomes important when an organizational system assumes a complex form which requires co-ordination. In other words, communication is an essential component of the co-operative process where common values are held as objectively shared interests. Lindblom states that since common values dictate some general policies, mutual adjustment becomes necessary to the extent that these values cannot be formulated in such a way as to adequately test policies. Continuing further Lindblom writes that:

Typically some values are widely shared and at the same time are specified in sufficient concrete and unambiguous forms as to permit co-operative discussion. Co-operative discussion then narrows the range of alternative policies over which the mechanisms of ... mutual adjustment may thereafter achieve a selection and co-ordination.⁹

Simon also regards communication as an important function of organizational behavior. He states that "in the integration of the group, communication fills the gap left by the absence of any

⁸ Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), p.xi.

⁹ Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy, (New York, The Free Press, 1965), p.132.

organic connection among the individuals".¹⁰ In practice, following Simon's viewpoint, the process of co-ordination for complex situations involves three stages:

One, the development of a plan of behavior of all the members of the group (not a set of individual plans for each member); two, the communication of the relevant portions of the plan to each member; and three, a willingness on the part of the individual members to permit their behavior to be guided by the plan.¹¹

This means that the plan of the organization must be communicable to people in the system and the individuals must integrate their own behavior into the co-ordinated pattern.

In summary, objectivity may be considered as the broad field of public activity which is presupposed by doing and questioning. There may be a number of worlds in which there can be intersubjectivity. It is the common place in which many people meet. People meet by orienting themselves mutually to one another in a common world or in the common ground of their worlds. The overlapping of worlds is an indispensable condition of communication between people. The range over which they can communicate, and the extent to which they can be in contact, is determined by how much of a common world they share. A world is, then, essentially a meeting place of a group.

¹⁰ Simon, Administrative Behavior, p.108; the aspect of communication with respect to co-ordination in co-operative system is elaborated in Chapter V, see page 54.

¹¹ Ibid., pp.107-108.

B. SOCIAL ETHICS AS THE EVALUATIVE MEDIA IN THE PLANNING PROCESS

Evaluative concern for decision-making in the planning process can be examined in terms of social ethics since social and cultural patterns are characterized by ethics. The social habits, rules, and principles, which we apply to valuations, institutions, and systems of orientations, are mostly hidden in culture. We tend to take social ethics for granted because social rules and principles are difficult to take into account. Social ethics may be considered what Schutz calls moral "recipes" for daily existence. In this manner, our social existence is shaped by the sequences of actions and relationships of expectations.¹² The former is concerned with the future states of events, the latter with approaching social goals. According to Schutz, since one tends to arrange the "recipes" with respect to his actions, rather than in terms of scientific systems, the knowledge of ethical "recipes" is assumed in one's social world.¹³ In other words, social order is arrived at through the acceptance of certain rules or norms of social behavior and the acknowledgement of the values or beliefs underlying them. From this viewpoint, the social value system is constituted by the moral

¹²The aspect of relationships between expectations and actions was discussed in a framework of human values and beliefs which determines the social existence. See page 11.

¹³Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers II; Studies in Social Theory, Arvid Brodersen, ed., (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), pp.72-74 and 92-93.

weight of means such as good, ought, should, must and right.¹⁴ In short, the role of ethics in society is to postulate the evaluative criteria called "goodness" which is potentially related to all the other variables of the universe through a "goodness" function, which is employed to judge whether one state of event is "better" or "worse", than another.

However, over the wide range in an open variable system, the variables of the world tend to be neutral in regards to goodness.¹⁵ It has to be noted that social order in the organization of human communities becomes difficult and uncertain as a social evaluative medium, when the society is faced with radical and rapid changes. Thus, in periods of rapid social change, social ethics need to be reorganized. The formulation of ethical imperatives in society is not universal in this sense. Once again Winter writes that:

Certain ethical norms may have a long continuing authority (individual liberty in American experience), but the meaning changes with the developing character of man;s social existence, especially in terms of rapid social change ... Hence, social ethics is historically relative ... (In short), social ethics is, thus, the continuing and daily business of man and in his social existence; it seeks universals but works with the relativities of an historically conditioned situation.¹⁶

¹⁴Gibson Winter, "Introduction: Religion, Ethics, and Society", Social Ethics, G. Winter, ed., (New York, Harper and Row Publishers, 1968), p.7.

¹⁵Kenneth E. Boulding, The Organizational Revolution, (New York, Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1959), p.XV.

¹⁶Winter, "Introduction: Religion, Ethics, and Society", p.8.

According to Boulding, however, the goodness function can be broken down into two links. He states as follows:

The first is a statement of relationship, that is, of possibility or impossibility ... the second is an approval of results, according to some criterion of goodness ... The first link is what properly belongs to science, the second to ethics.¹⁷

In this context, science deals with the study of factual happenings, whereas ethics deals with the judgement of values in relation to the factual situations. For instance, "if we do not eat food, we will die in so many days", or "if we do not control industrial smoke in our environment, the atmosphere will be contaminated by waste." These are factual statements as a result of scientific studies. However, that "death and air pollution are bad" is an ethical or evaluated statement in accordance with the survival factors.

Social Ethics and Social Science

The ethical reference may be by no means exclusively social. However, since the ethical standards in the general character of human affairs have a social relevance, it may not be possible to conceive human conduct without the social reference. Therefore, ethical standards need to be the regulator of mutual rights and obligations, and of the criteria governing social interaction. Hence, social science is of great direct importance to

¹⁷ Boulding, The Organizational Revolution, p.xvi.

social ethics.¹⁸ In this respect, the evaluation of social inquiry is conclusive and determinable in the social ethics, while social science is concerned with the problems of social conditioning. Furthermore, in the course of factual inquiry, the evaluative concern is the leading consideration in the social ethics.¹⁹

In its practical involvement in society, social ethics is directed at problems of practice and organization from theoretical, systematic and generalized perspectives. It must be based on a commitment to clarity of ideas, to examining the rational consistency of evaluative norms and to organizing disciplines within society.²⁰ This does not mean, however, that the recommendations for social policy identifies the social ethics. As Boulding states:

The ethics is involved in the kind of ethical evaluation which are pre-requisite for policy counsel or hypothetical propositions of social science before any policy recommendations can be made.²¹

In other words, what the social ethics is concerned with is criteria for judgements, suitable to be applied to the problems of practice and organization. With respect to the social ethics, the various potentialities in the field of the problems can be measured by means of the goodness function.

¹⁸Talcott Parsons, The Social System, (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1959), p.14.

¹⁹Winter, "Introduction: Religion, Ethics and Society", p.10.

²⁰Ibid., p.9.

²¹Boulding, The Organizational Revolution, p.7.

Although dealing with the problem of defining evaluative criteria, social ethics is also dependent upon knowledge of the factual situation. Again, Winter states that:

The ethicist has the problem of clarifying and grounding the imperatives which are relevant to particular issues; he also has to delineate characteristics that mark the embodiment of submersion of these imperatives in particular social arrangements ... The social ethicist, (therefore), has to develop criteria to designate the presence of a value and investigate the actual states of affairs where studies are not available.²²

He explains further that the descriptive task of social ethics is indispensable when the specification of conditions have to be met by the policy maker for the realization of imperatives. Therefore, the policy maker may have to be directed by the social ethicist who must, before arriving at appropriate policies, uncover the purpose in exploring ethical issues and clarifying them as he begins to comprehend the situation. However, when an alienation arises between social science and social ethics, ethicists are dependent upon scientific research. In understanding the problems of ethical order the descriptive generalizations of science are required by ethicists. On the contrary, through a collaborative approach, many of the implicit evaluations and ethical concerns of the social scientists can be clarified and enriched.

²²Winter, "Introduction: Religion, Ethics and Society", p.11.

Social Ethics and Social Policy

From the above it may be seen that emphasis on the various elements of moral considerations must be provided in the policy making process since the moral image in society has a function of elucidating the alternatives on the moral problems in the course of developing public policy. Thus, the ultimate concern of societal policy planning must be based upon the ethical image of society. In this context, the policy maker can cultivate the practical integrity of the society by challenging its inequities and bringing moral considerations to bear on its societal policies.

Different views on social ethics may organize different ways of social ethical considerations. One way of organizing the elements of social ethics can be expressed in terms of the ethical absolutism. An ethical absolute value orients the moral order as the expression of man's nature and fulfilment; in religious terms, or in terms of a principle of love seeing man as ultimate concern for being. However, in this study we shall not involve ourselves in these natures of ethical viewpoints but rather, our attention will be focused on the view of ethical relativism. Max Weber calls this view as "an ethics of responsibility in which one has to give on account of the foreseeable results of one's action". He continues that:

... a man who believes in an ethic of responsibility takes account of precisely the average deficiencies of people; ... he does not even have the right to presuppose their goodness and perfection. He does not feel in a position to burden others with the results of his own actions so far as he was able to foresee them; he will say these

results are ascribed to my action.²³

This approach stresses the survival of the society - its conditions of existence. For the survival of society, policy is good when the ethics lead to the societal existence and development in relation to the social problems; ethical norms are relatively regulative, reflecting the stages of development of the society in terms of the problems.²⁴ The ultimate interest of the pollution control in society, for example, can be interpreted by this ethical viewpoint.

A somewhat similar concept of the survival of the society is developed by Reinhold Niebuhr. He emphasizes that a human being is "bound to seek the realization of his true nature". According to him:

... the will-to-live ... transmutes into the will-to-power or into desire for 'power and glory'. Man, being more than a natural creature, is not interested merely in physical survival but in prestige of social approval. Having the intelligence to anticipate the perils in which he stands in nature and history, he invariably seeks to gain security against these perils by enhancing his power, individually and collectively.²⁵

Therefore, according to Niebuhr, the ultimate purpose of the task of analysing and of tracing human conducts is to "find political methods which will offer the most promise of achieving

²³Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation", From Max Weber's Essays in Sociology, Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., (New York, Oxford University Press, 1967), pp.120-121.

²⁴Winter, "Introduction; Religion, Ethics and Society", p.15-16.

²⁵Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Children of Sight and the Children of Darkness", Social Ethics, G. Winter, ed., (New York, Harper and Row, Publishers, 1968), p.153.

an ethical social goal for society". The following inquiries may be the imperatives of judgement for the political methods:

1. Do they do justice to the moral resources and possibilities in human nature and provide for the exploitation of every latent moral capacity in man?
2. Do they take account of the limitations of human nature, particularly those which manifest themselves in man's collective behavior?²⁶

Since public policy predicts a social preference into the future with an intrinsic view that it may be one of the better course of events, these ethical views of human fulfilment become extrinsic in establishing societal goals. Social policy, then, must be based on the ethical order of society.

In summary, social science, social ethics and social policy are interwoven in the rational course of human affairs. When the three move from reflections to recommendations for societal goals, social ethics can be expressed as the principal medium, or the bridge, between social science and social policy. Thus, a rational way of shaping man's future can be adjusted on the public ground of social ethics.

²⁶Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p.xxiv.

CHAPTER V

THE ROLE OF FUNCTIONAL RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY IN THE PLANNING PROCESS

The role of functionality in the planning system is only relative to purposive activities characterized by substantial reality.¹ Since the planning process can be considered as a series of goal oriented actions, the process requires an efficient functional adjustment in order to effectuate the course of action. Therefore, functional rationality and irrationality exist within the context of the purposive process. Without purposiveness, the role of functional rationality and irrationality become absurd. When a function in the planning process is aimed in a positive direction towards a determined goal, it is considered functionally rational. Whereas, when a function is moving in a negative direction, it is called functionally irrational.

In this light, two issues require examination; one, functional components in the planning process; and two, concepts in the planning system concerned with given situation. The former is divided into two parts, indicative and adjustive functions, while the latter is concerned with the developmental and adaptive natures of the planning system.²

¹ See page 4 for definition of substantiality and functionality in relation to rationality and irrationality.

² It is taken for granted that knowledge is expanding and changing. Therefore, developmental planning deals with the expanding nature of knowledge, while the adaptive planning deals with changing nature of knowledge. See page 63 for elaborated analysis.

A. INDICATIVE FUNCTION IN THE PLANNING PROCESS

Goals and Objectives

The indicative function in the planning process can be expressed as the role of goals in the process. This type of function has a dual nature, substantial and functional. The former is contained in the reality of the goal itself, the latter is concerned with the evaluative media for the procedural states of the given situation. In other words, the substantial nature of the indicative function is concerned with the existence of the end state of the planning system. The functional nature deals with the realization of the end state. The role of goals in the process can be described as the vital force determining not only proposed actions but also directing the entire course of inquiry and study.³

The examination of goals in the planning system falls into two categories, that is, the qualitative aspect and the quantitative aspect. Referring to Young, these aspects can be seen in terms of a goal and objective framework. He asserts that:

... a goal is an ideal and should be expressed in abstract form; it is a value to be sought after, not an object to be achieved. An objective ... is capable of both attainment and measurement; its inherent purpose is implicit rather than explicit ... In general, goals are universal and lasting while objects change under varying circumstances.⁴

³Young, "Goals and Goal-Setting", p.79.

⁴Ibid., p.78.

From this viewpoint, the qualitative aspect of goals and the quantitative aspect of objectives can be examined in regard to long-term potential as well as immediate potential. Cyert and March state that:

The goals of business firms are a series of more or less independent constraints imposed on the organization through a process of bargaining among potential coalition members and elaborated over time in response to short run potential. In the long run, studies of the goals of a business firm must reflect the adaptation of goals to change in the coalition structure.⁵

B. ADJUSTIVE FUNCTION IN THE PLANNING PROCESS

Co-ordination in the Co-operative Process

When individuals, groups or agents share a common goal, and each participant has competent knowledge and information as to what the others are doing, co-operative action is required in order to make adequate decisions. For example, when a group of people participate in building a house, each would have his own ideas. If they do not communicate with each other, the resultant house would not satisfy anyone in the group. In this case, they would probably meet with a better result if they adopted and followed co-operative ideas. In this matter, the co-operative action is concerned with the integration of the participants into an operational system. In order to proceed with the operation properly, the system may require co-ordination. In connection with this aspect of functionality in the

⁵ Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, Behavioral Theory of Firm, (New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p.43.

co-operative process, Simon writes as follows:

A major purpose of the planning and organizing that precedes any activity is not merely to put each participant in the job he can best fill, but to permit each to perform accurate expectations as to what the others are going to do ... it would clarify ... to use the term co-operation for activity in which the participants share a common goal, and co-ordination for the process of informing each as to the planned behaviors of the others. Hence, co-operation will usually be ineffective ... in the absence of co-ordination.⁶

Therefore, it can be said that co-ordination is required for adjustment by all the participants of the shared decisions.

Neil W. Chamberlain distinguishes co-ordinating activities into two different aspects, physical and non-physical. According to him, co-ordination can be exercised in relation to the technical aspects of an operation as well as to the humanistic aspects. The former involves the manipulation of physical things with respect to the efficiency of the organizational parts. The latter, which is superimposed on the former, deals with adjustment over the people on whom the functionality of the organization depends.⁷ In organizational practice, physical components may not necessarily need to be motivated to co-operate while human agents usually need to be motivated. In other words, as Parsons says, "decisions of policy and decisions of allocation of responsibility ...

⁶ Simon, Administrative Behavior, pp.71-72.

⁷ Neil W. Chamberlain, Private and Public Planning, (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965), p.6.

leave open the question of motivation to proper performance".⁸

The duality of physical and non-physical components in the planning system seems to support the notion of the co-existence of substantiality and functionality in the co-ordinative process. Again, Simon explains this nature of co-ordination in terms of a procedural and substantive concept. He states that:

By procedural co-ordination is meant the specification of the organization itself ... substantive co-ordination is concerned with the content of the organization's activities.⁹

The procedural co-ordination, then, tends to tolerate the authoritative nature of the functional structure in the organizational system, since this aspect of co-ordination deals with the generalized description of the behaviors and the relationship of the components in the system. There appears to be an integrative issue, for according to Parsons, while the system is required to achieve the many complex contributions to an organization goal, the special types of actions cannot be presumed to be motivated by the mere nature of the participants independently of the organizational situation.¹⁰

Jan Tinbergen stresses the necessity of co-ordination in relation to policy influenced by circumstances of emergency. When

⁸Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1960), p.34.

⁹Simon, Administrative Behavior, p.140.

¹⁰Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, p.34.

strong tension appears between goals and reality, the situation has to be guided by co-ordinative measures. Therefore, countries confronted with a war, extreme poverty, or deep depression, require more co-ordinative adjustment than one having more normal situations.¹¹

However, the necessity of co-ordination is one thing, and a result of the necessity is another. In fact, a difficult question arises over the responsibility between the concentric and centrifugal pull of the co-ordination system. The former may result in lack of reality, the latter, confusion. This question seems to be dependent upon the situation faced by the organization.¹²

Communication and Co-ordination

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it can be noted that communication is an essential functional component in co-ordinative action. Cyert and March emphasize the importance of communicated information in the co-operative process on the following basis:

To examine the effect of differing goals ... prepared by individual members of organizations, and to consider the net organizational effect of an information system operating under partial conflict of interest.¹³

¹¹Jan Tinbergen, Central Planning, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964), p.70.

¹²Albert Waterston, Development Planning: Lessons of Experience, (Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 267-271. This aspect is also elaborated in terms of "centralization and decentralization", see page 60.

¹³Cyert and March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, p.67.

Therefore, from this viewpoint, information is not only sought through search behavior by the organization, but also processed.

Referring to March and Simon, the greater the efficiency of communication in the co-operative process, the more interdependent it becomes. Increasing the efficiency of communication involves both qualitative and quantitative aspects of inquiries. The qualitative aspect is concerned with the classification of schemes which are significant to the program-evoking aspect of communication. The quantitative aspect with co-ordination by feedback as well as standardization of the co-ordinative media.¹⁴ The aspect of "goals and objectives" in the planning process, for example, can be explained in terms of this dual aspect of communication inquiries.¹⁵

This duality, also, can be examined in the context of the language system in our culture. It is relatively simple to describe and to communicate concrete objects that are tangible or standardized. For example, in public planning, the Master Plan, as a physical end, employs technically standardized devices for the sake of comprehensiveness.¹⁶ On the other hand, it is extremely difficult to

¹⁴James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations, (New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), p.162.

¹⁵See "Goals and Objectives" in this chapter on page 53.

¹⁶According to Simon, although in public planning a Master Plan is required to be comprehensive enough for the sake of communication to the general public, "public planning should focus its attention on the crucial 'standardization problems'". See his article, "Research for Choice", Environment and Policy, W. R. Ewald, ed., (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1968), p.370.

communicate intangible and non-standardized objects. Also the subjective world of different knowledge structures¹⁷ among people results in the same situation. "Uncertainty absorption"¹⁸ takes place when these difficulties are presented in communication. Herbert J. Gans has observed the problem of communication difficulties in his studies of the residents in Boston's West End. He has recommended for the communication problem between the residents and the redevelopment agency that first, in order to prevent the development of rumors due to an information vacuum, the amount of information given to the residents be maximized; and second, the agents should be trained to understand the nature of the project which they are involved with so that they have more insight into what the presented issues mean to the residents and thus, can develop a more tolerant attitude towards their reactions.¹⁹

Another phase of communication in the co-ordination process is the necessity of definite channels where information can flow by means of a formal plan or by the gradual development of a formal program. In other words, as Simon views:

Information and stimuli move from sources to points of decisions; instructions move from points of decision

¹⁷ This aspect is discussed in Chapter IV A, see page 37.

¹⁸ March and Simon, Organizations, pp.164-166.

¹⁹ Herbert J. Gans, "The Human Implication of Current Redevelopment and Relocation Planning", The Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 25(1), 1959, p.24.

to points of action; information of results move from points of action to points of decision and control.²⁰

Thus, this aspect of the communication system tends to establish a hierarchical structure in the co-ordinating process. This means that the structure of the communication system tends to be centralized in order to maximize the efficiency of co-ordination. Therefore, it is necessary to elaborate upon adjustment in terms of centralization and decentralization.

Centralization and Decentralization

An analysis of the functional advantages and disadvantages of centralizing or decentralizing the co-ordination process is now useful. Since the need for co-ordination arises, from the necessity to effectuate and channelize the knowledge and information in the planning system, an authoritative core is required to enforce responsibility on to individuals to secure expertise in making decisions, as well as to stimulate the co-ordination of activities. Therefore, the employment of authority as a means for co-ordination of group activities reflects the essential substantive role to which this means can be applied.²¹ In other words, authority becomes the power necessary to make decisions which guide the action of individuals in the planning system. In this sense there appears to be a relationship between superior and subordinate. When a plan of

²⁰ March and Simon, Organizations, p.167.

²¹ Simon, Administrative Behavior, p.133.

action for subordinates is adopted by the superior, it is communicated in the process to the subordinates; the final stage is then an acceptance of this plan by the subordinates. The authoritative function comes into play after this acceptance.²² However, the limitation of the authoritative power is within the confines of the subordinate's willingness to accept the superior's decisions. This means that the commitment of the subordinate for the determined action can be expected only within the context of the accepted decision.²³ Therefore, acceptance by the subordinate must be a sufficient stimulus in itself to actualize the decision in question. Then a reasonable superior-subordinate relationship will be set up in the course of action. As Popper argues,

we must not overlook the fact that it is easy to centralize power but impossible to centralize all knowledge which is distributed over many individual minds.²⁴

Chamberlain also notes that there appears to be a tendency towards centralized authority, when superiors in the system seek to defend the system's integrity. Then, gradually it causes inefficiency in the system. He explains as follows:

With the passage of time, the tightness of the premises (from which the subsystem derives its direction) is likely to result in an unacceptable inefficiency. Since in closing off discretion it closes off the capacity to deal

²²Ibid., p.124.

²³Parsons, The Social System, p.55.

²⁴Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, pp.89-90.

with the unexpected ... in order to preserve the efficiency of the subsystem, top management must act, but this time to enlarge subsystem discretion - decentralization becomes the order of the day.²⁵

March and Simon argue that the question of centralization and decentralization is related to cognitive matter. Since we have to accept the limited human capability of handling information, and the fact that human motivation is relatively dependent upon his subjective interest, decentralizing the power handling information may be a better way than centralizing it.²⁶ According to their theory, the principle of bounded rationality²⁷ is considered as an important force influencing decentralization as the only means of reconciling planning with democracy.²⁸ Referring to the experience of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), three distinct characteristics of decentralized administration can be ascertained:

1. It is one in which the greatest number of decisions is made on the spot.
2. It must develop as far as possible the active participation of the people themselves.
3. It must co-ordinate the work of all other agencies concerned, and the co-ordination must be in the field.²⁹

²⁵ Chamberlain, Private and Public Planning, p.45.

²⁶ March and Simon, Organizations, pp.203-209.

²⁷ See Bounded Rationality Model in Chapter III B, page 34.

²⁸ Julian Huxley, TVA: Adventure in Planning, (London, The Architectural Press, 1941), p.133.

²⁹ Loc. cit.

In this context, Philip Selznick also credits the TVA's efforts as follows:

... the TVA's emphasis on participation is explained as a catchword, satisfying the agency's needs to transform an unorganized citizenry into a reliable instrument for the achievement of administrative goals.³⁰

C. THE ROLE OF THE PLANNING SYSTEM

As mentioned, human knowledge and the human capability for handling that knowledge is limited; also, the intentionality of human knowing attempts continuously to expand the structure of knowledge and consequently the structure tends to be modified continuously.³¹ In this respect, value determinants, which were considered universal in the previous state, would be changed by the newly expanded knowledge structure. The planning system has to adjust to the ever expanding and changing formation of human intellectual resources. Therefore, it is necessary to adjust the planning system in accordance with the developmental as well as adaptive natures of the knowledge system. In this connection Melvin M. Webber notes that:

... the rate of discovery and invention has been explosive during these past two decades; and yet

³⁰ Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1953), p.200.

³¹ According to Heelan, the intention of the orientation of human knowing - "noetic intention" - is an attitude of inquiry ... accompanied by an active search for what is already foreshadowed in some way by the questioning ... while noetic intentions are invariant elements in the structuring of the world, the world ... is an organically growing system which evolves and develops according to the special intentionality laws which rule it. See his book Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity, pp.3-4.

we in the developed world seem to have accepted even that fact as a stable condition and take rapid change as a normal, no-change condition. Perhaps this is further indication of our large adaptive capacities.³²

From this viewpoint, when social theory advances, the human capability to predict social change will be improved. In effect, the emergence of a new way of thinking about the future is dependent upon the consequences of knowledge expansion. Therefore, as Webber emphasizes:

This new concept of the future represents a remarkable change that is potentially as important as any of the developments that are now building up.³³

Hence, the planning system must be adjusted in this context.

The role of the planning system takes on a two-fold aspect; one is concerned with the expanding nature of social events, while the other is concerned with the changing nature of the events.

Friedmann views this aspect of the planning system as a function of the system maintaining actions in society. According to him:

System maintaining actions may be either adaptive or developmental ... Adaptive actions strive to maintain the equilibrium of a societal system in the face of changing external conditions or unforeseen internal changes. Developmental actions are concerned with changes that will propel a society toward new forms of self-realization.³⁴

³²Melvin M. Webber, "Planning in an Environment of Change", Part 1, Town Planning Review, 39(3), 1968, p.179.

³³Ibid., p.180.

³⁴John Friedmann, "Notes on Societal Action", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 35(5), 1969, p.313; See also his article, "A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning Behavior", Administrative Science Quarterly, 12(2), 1967, pp.225-252.

This assertion coincides with that of Chamberlain, for he expresses that this concept can be seen in accordance with short run as well as long run performance in social action. In the immediate organizational process, components can be integrated into a co-ordination system and are thus interdependent of one another. Hence, it is an ongoing performance with incremental change being made at various stages to better achieve the organization's objectives. However, when expectations are not met, the planning process invokes the application of controls to accomplish the aim. In the long run, on the contrary, a different initiative may be required for incremental change on its own may not be enough. There must be adaptive planning which modifies the organization's ongoing activity into new categories of activities.³⁵ This view is also echoed in Friedmann's statement that:

Under developmental planning, there is a high degree of autonomy with respect to the setting of ends and the choice of means; under adaptive planning, most decisions are heavily contingent on the actions of others external to the planning system.³⁶

In this relation, the planning system takes two different characteristics; that is, allocative and innovative. Allocative planning is concerned with "the formation and adaption of criteria for

³⁵Chamberlain, Private and Public Planning, pp.174-175.

³⁶Friedmann, "A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning Behavior", pp.229-230.

distributions of resources among competing uses". While innovative planning is concerned with "the mobilization and organization of resources for a specific and new use".³⁹

³⁹Friedmann, "Notes on Societal Action", p.313.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In order to understand the nature of the planning process this study has attempted to examine rationality and irrationality in the light of substantiality and functionality. Substantiality exists in itself as well as governs functional rationality and irrationality, whereas functionality is only relative to the purposiveness of the substantiality. Thus, objectivity becomes an essential condition when one defines what is rational and irrational. Rationality and irrationality in their substantial nature, stand on either subjective or objective grounds; while in their functional nature, they appear as positiveness or negativeness. Hence, the planning process has been defined as a rational adjustment by means of prediction and control over irrationality.

Values are important as an indicative function in the planning process. In social planning, in order to reasonably conduct the ongoing activities towards the intended goal, the value measurement in the performance has to be based on the social goodness as the evaluative media, thusly social ethics. Finally, the study has attempted to illustrate the role of functionality in terms of the indicative and adjustive functions as well as in terms of the planning system in social action.

In summary, this study has furnished some characteristics of the planning process. But why carry out such an examination in the first place? What may be gained from this study?

First, in order to rationalize planning efforts, decision-makers have to understand the nature of the world and have to realize their limitations of knowledge and capabilities of handling knowledge. Hence, there is no perfect sense of rationality, but rather a limited one. By accepting this limitation, decision-makers may become reasonable. Second, with the acceptance of limited rationality, policy makers have to search "continuously" for common "goodness" and endeavour to reduce common "badness". Third, the planning system has to be organized in such a manner that immediate problems are solved by means of developmental planning while at the same time long term happenings are organized in the planning system with respect to social adaptation.

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