

The Operation of Substance as a Unifying Principle
in the Dialectical Methods of Hegel and Marx

Ellen Travis

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THE OPERATION OF SUBSTANCE AS A UNIFYING
PRINCIPLE IN THE DIALECTICAL METHODS OF HEGEL AND MARX

BY

ELLEN TRAVIS

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis I argue that Hegel and Marx accomplish a reduction of heterogeneity to unity by means of the concept of substance. Substance is the methodological principle that creates the subjective being of an object. Substance unifies phenomenal diversity by identifying heterogeneous objects as the genetically related productions of a single source. I examine the relation of subject and object first in Hegel and, then, in Marx, and show how subject-object relations become more labyrinthine but remain methodologically governed by substance. This locates their work as part of a philosophical discourse in which the dominant direction of inquiry is toward the resolution of multiplicity in unity. The context for this analysis is the work of David Zilberman, a Russian sociologist and specialist in Hindu philosophies, who shows that the dialectical methods of Hegel and Marx are inadequate for understanding cultural difference. In approaching the problem of cultural diversity, the distinction between subject and object must be maintained, whereas in dialectical logic, it is dissolved.

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An interest in difference is current in many academic disciplines and political movements. Cultural, racial, and sexual differences are the three types of difference most often distinguished as socially significant. There is also general acknowledgement that a preoccupation with difference marks a departure from the modern preoccupation with unity. Yet, there is a danger, despite this acknowledgement that the logical tenacity of the thinking of unity is not adequately appreciated. The late David Zilberman, a Russian sociologist, philosopher and specialist in Hindu philosophies, was working on this problem and had formulated a method for intercultural understanding based on Hindu philosophies. He was also beginning to look for ways to make this method accessible to Western Europeans. According to him,

The plurality of cultural universes is readily admitted in the sciences of culture as a fact of elementary evidence... What remains problematic, however, is the general methodological possibility of representing the corresponding investigatory perspective as a unitary cultural fact sui generis, among those that constitute the scientific tradition (1988, p. 299).

This is to say, that even though pluralistic conceptions have become commonplace in scientific investigations, an appropriate methodology has not yet emerged. For those educated in Western European science and philosophy the difficulty of formulating the problem of diversity as a methodological one is compounded by the fact that diversity and difference have long been standard usage in Western culture despite their subordination to the concept of unity. Their placement now, in a prominent position, would not necessarily change their character as concepts developed in and secured within a philosophical system designed to produce unity. In Western European thinking, the

obvious plurality of phenomena in the world has always been incorporated within a monolithic or monotheistic notion of Truth. There was always only one Truth; just as there was only one God. The methods for producing knowledge corresponded to this conception of truth as singular or unitary not multiple. When, for example, cultural difference first began to engage the Western European mind, the result was a decomposition of Truth in relativity. Put another way, Truth splintered. It was not possible to say more than that each cultural universe was true in its own way; there were no methods available, no cognitive methods, with which to make an account of multiple truth. It was only possible to show heterogeneous objects incorporated as elements of a system, presented as parts of a whole, or as manifestations of a procreative source, to list some strategies. In the European intellectual tradition, the methods for constructing concepts as objects of thought always reduce diversity to unity, difference to identity.

Zilberman, distinguishes between cultural and meta-cultural levels of thinking. The cultural level, according to him, is inevitably monistic. By contrast, non-monistic thinking is only possible with a method that allows movement from one type of cultural thinking to another. My objective is not to explain the latter. Instead, I intend to investigate thinking at the cultural level, to investigate precisely David Zilberman's claim that thinking at this level is monistic, by looking at the Hegelian method, dialectical logic. Initially, I found that dialectical logic allowed for the theoretical emergence of difference, or heterogeneity, in a way that seemed non-monistic. Now, I would argue that Hegel's method reduces heterogeneity to unity by means of the concept of substance. I also think that Marx's method, although it differs from Hegel's in some ways, nevertheless reduces

difference to identity by means of the same concept. A detailed formulation of my research problem follows.

Cultural thinking is not aware of the signification nature of the object of cognition, so the thought-constructed object appears as a natural object. When thinking itself is cognized this way, the result is the same as for any other object of thought: it is constructed as a model that inevitably appears as natural and specific to the cultural type that produced it. The problem of inter-cultural understanding, i.e. the problem of different types of thinking, must be approached in another way. Zilberman proposes the method of divided construction as a way of approaching the object of cognition indirectly. Approached dividually, thought becomes a pseudo-object (i.e. non-natural, not a 'thing') to be understood as existing only in the social enterprise of its production.

Hegel's method of thinking was dividual, but not in a manner appropriate for cognizing thinking itself. This is to say, his method was appropriate for giving an account of one type of cultural thinking. He made philosophical thought both active (constructive) and objective; but he also made it one component of Idea, a theoretical model of actuality, or the realization of thinking activity. Since this work of constructing theoretical models belongs to thinking within a given type only, Hegel's theoretical model of thinking is still monistic; it is a cultural object specific to the tradition of thinking that produced it. It is for this reason that Zilberman says that Hegel "failed to produce workable and usable models of philosophical thinking which could be materialized in the social enterprise of science" (1988:13). For Zilberman, science is the enterprise of inter-cultural understanding. Understood dividually, thought is activity generated and divided

among social actors, existing only in their interrelations. Zilberman calls Hindu philosophers 'fictitious' subjects as a way of expressing the complete dependence of each one's thinking on the social location of its occurrence. Understood dividually, thought is constructive activity in a more radical sense than any Western philosopher has presented it. It has no empirical prototypes in the sense that it is not conditioned by or modelled on empirically existing objects. It means, also, that thinking neither originates in nor is carried out by a subject whose position is transcendental in relation to its object.

In what Zilberman calls the elementary cognitive situation, the thinking subject of experience has experiential knowledge of self as separate from the world, that is, the world confronts him as an other or as an expanse of otherness. This division was naturalized by Descartes in his predication of being upon thinking contained in the statement "I think, therefore I am." In making this statement causally, his existence is predicated on his thinking, not correspondent with it. Thus thinking and being are separated. Ontology and epistemology appear in this way as academic institutionalizations of this separation, with ontology specifying what the object is (its being) and epistemology specifying the mode of access to the object (how it is known, how it is thought). In this formulation, the activity of thinking consists in bridging the cognitive gulf separating subject and object. Thought is not constructive activity; the object is indifferent to the subject in that its being is completely independent of the subject's cognitive activity. But despite the object's indifference to cognition, it is nevertheless transparent to the observing subject.

In the first paragraph of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel rejects the view that cognition is the activity of bridging distance between the cognizing subject and the object. According to this latter view, before the object can be known in its truth or as what it is in itself "one must first come to an understanding about cognition, which is regarded either as the instrument to get hold of the Absolute, or as the medium through which one discovers it" (1977: § 73, p. 4). Although he does not cite Descartes specifically, this understanding of cognition corresponds to the Cartesian distinction between the object and cognition of it. Hegel wants to expose this view of cognition as one doomed to leave truth out of reach. Such a view leaves cognition, i.e. as an instrument or a medium, outside of the object, which is the truth cognition wishes to apprehend:

it presupposes that the Absolute stands on one side and cognition on the other, independent and separated from it, and yet is something real; or in other words, it presupposes that cognition which, since it is excluded from the Absolute is surely outside of the truth as well, is nevertheless true...
(1977: § 74, p. 47)

The premises of Hegel's argument here do not depart completely from Descartes'. Hegel retains the idea that the object has a truth, is something in itself, apart from the cognition of it by a single individual. Hegel distinguishes, however, between the cognition of an individual and cognition in general; for him, cognition in general is not simply a faculty extractable or abstractable from each individual. Because this is what it was for Descartes, it would have been untenable for him to claim a constructive power for cognition, because that would have led to arguments that objects did not exist apart from his specific (individual) cognition of them. Yet where cognition is not originating and

fully represented in a single individual, not a faculty merely replicated in each cognizing subject, the impossibility of cognizing truth is surmounted, while allowing the category of absolute truth to remain.

Hegel also retained the transcendentalty of thinking and in fact carried it further than Descartes by removing the distinction between subject and object. He effected the removal of this distinction by making thinking and experience reflective. In the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right, he says

It is the will whose potentialities have become fully explicit which is truly infinite, because its object is itself and so is not in its eyes an 'other' or a barrier... (1967: § 22, p. 30 emphasis added).

Although this statement refers specifically to the will, it characterizes the relation of subject and object in Hegel generally. The two are not opposites in the sense of enduring and irresolvable opposition (as they are for the Understanding, where Hegel would place Descartes); opposition of this sort is only at a stage of thinking where the true identity of the apparently opposed categories is not yet unrevealed or manifested (1967: remark to § 26). Non-identity would have the object as an other, which is a barrier. In other words, it *has* to be dark, or impenetrable, from the point of view of subjectivity. But for Hegel, the subjective side realizes an objective significance inherent in it. In the above quotation, the subjective side, represented in this instance as will, is only true to its own proper nature when it is its own object, or is objective. What this means is that it is wrong to characterize will, or any aspect of Spirit, as subjective without qualification, or even by adding as a kind of attribute the objective significance it gives to itself.

In Hegel's system, objectivity is that which achieves actual existence (actuality is objective); this is one of the four meanings of *objective* Hegel gives in the addition to § 26 in the Philosophy of Right, namely, that, "the 'objective' will is also that in which truth lies" (1967: p. 32). In this addition, the translator does not provide the German word translated as 'objective'. One of the German words for object, from which we might expect an adjective to be derived, is *Gegenstand*, which means literally, standing against, or opposite. This meaning agrees with the literal origin of the English word, which, according to the Concise Oxford dictionary, is to throw before, towards, against, or in the way of. Both German and English coincide with experience: the object stands opposite or in the way of the subject. It may be, however, that the noun *Gegenstand* has no adjectival form. None is given in the Langenscheidt New College German dictionary. If this is the case, *objektiv* must always be the adjective form corresponding to *Gegenstand*. Yet, § 107 in the section on Morality, suggests a distinct usage for *objektiv*:

the subjective will further determines what it recognizes as its own in its object (*Gegenstand*), so that this object becomes the will's own true concept, becomes objective (*objektiv*) as the expression of the will's own universality" (p. 76).

In this statement, the object (*Gegenstand*) is still something merely standing opposite or confronting the will, and it is the recognition of itself in this object that reveals [or perhaps bring into being/actualizes] its objective (*objektiv*) character. According to this interpretation, *objektiv* would refer to the situation in which the distance, i.e., experiential separateness of the object, is overcome. This conjecture, based only on the translator's selective provision of the German, does not establish whether there are different words,

in German, to express Hegel's distinction between the standpoints of experience and philosophical thinking. It seems that there are not, and that only one side of the object is inscribed in the word for it. In English, only one word serves, even if the experiential distance between subject and object is overcome and the object is known/thought/cognized from the point of view of its subjective significance.

In the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel formulates subjectivity as an activity. He presents it as the activity of differentiation, the principle of difference, by which Spirit develops itself. Methodologically, subjectivity is a mechanism for the proliferation of difference/diversity out of unity. Although subject and object are opposing positions when considered abstractly, their truth is as phases of an activity. Considered in this way, subject and object are both subsumed under the name for this activity. An object thus presented never stands as self-sufficient; its mode of appearance as this object here and now is only one side of it, its real being. It has another side as well, its ideal being, which is its subjective significance. The object always refers to the subjective activity that produced it and contains this reference within itself as, we might say, a memory or as a genetic inheritance. The mechanism by which this reference is made, by which the object shows its origins and, thus, to which the object owes its dual character, is Substance. Substance is the principle of connection whereby it is possible to see objects as genetically related to subjective activity. Moreover, this genetic connection between object and subject creates a connection between objects. As substantial, objects are to be viewed as the genetically related descendants of a single ancestor. Substance is the principle of connection whereby it is possible to view

apparently unconnected phenomena as finite determinations of Spirit. Substance is the principle that makes the differentiating activity of Spirit *self*-differentiating. This is to say that subjectivity produces a heterogeneous array of objects in the world that are to be seen as manifestations of a single substance. In this way substance is the methodological mechanism for the reduction of heterogeneity to unity.

Marx constructed the objects of his thought by the same method Hegel used, but moved away from the position Hegel took, that cognition is the subjective component of truth. What Marx wanted and took from Hegel, was a model for constructing theoretical objects that incorporated/encompassed the movement from subject to object. In the first Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx says that previous materialism did not give its objects a subjective significance:

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism - that of Feuerbach included - is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of *contemplation*, but not as *human sensuous activity*, practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the *active* side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism (Tucker, 1978: p. 143).

I interpret this as saying that materialist thinking had not approached its objects as the sedimentation of activity and that Feuerbach looked for the origin of an object in another object, rather than in the activity of a subject. Materialist thinking had no way of thinking about the activity congealed in objects, and presented each object instead as standing before another object. By adapting Hegel's method, Marx gave materialism a methodological way of representing activity, an active side to its objects, and a subject

consistent with a materialist approach. This means that for Marx, as for Hegel, the True is to be grasped and expressed not only as Substance but equally as Subject.

Subjectivity, defined according to its etymological origin, is the activity of substitution. Zilberman gives the meaning of the word subject as "Sub-iectum, cf. Gk. *hypo-ballō* by which is meant: to substitute, replace..." (p. 21). This is consistent with what I said earlier of Hegel: that subjectivity is the activity of (self-) differentiation. Now I can express this another way by saying that subjectivity in Hegel is the activity in which Spirit (cognition in general) substitutes a genetically related series of finite determinations for the infinity of itself. In Marx, subjectivity is also the activity of (self-) differentiation, but cognition is not the subject; cognition is included in the subject, which is the human species (man in general). Subjectivity is thus human activity in general, including cognitive activity within it, substituting a series of finite determinations, material expressions of this activity, for the infinity of itself. In Marx, while (self-) differentiation is an appropriate characterization of subjectivity, thinking of subjective activity as substitution leads to a specifically Marxian formulation of the object. Marx and Hegel differ in their formulation of the object and the seemingly subtle shift in meaning from differentiation to substitution allows for the articulation of this difference.

In Hegel, as previously noted, the activity of differentiation is the process of Spirit's self-actualization. The destiny of subject and object is to be one. In Marx, this destiny is forecast for subject and object in communism, but in capitalism, it is an unrealized/unactualized future. In the present tense of subject-object relations, there is a division in which the object, in effect, usurps the active role of the subject. Objects

proceed to develop/proliferate in such a way that it is difficult to discover that their origins are in human activity. As a result, Shchedrovitzky states:

the only way to understand the nature of the thing is by clarifying the mechanism of its formation and structure: and this involves an analysis of it as levels of substitution built in successive levels (1966: p. 33).

This is still an analysis of the object from the point of view of the subject. Subjectivity builds the object as/in a series of substitution relations. But in capitalism, the situation of subjectivity is such that its connection to objectivity is severed. Objects are for this reason dark, or obscured to thinking, which nevertheless gives an account of them. Mamardashvili says that what Marx wanted to do was to "find the determinants and formative mechanisms of the objects of knowledge that are "representatives" (or "replacements") for something else" (1986: p. 104). The 'something else' at issue here is the totality of the objective forms of human activity. The substitutions, or replacements, are the cognitive representations of these objectivities, which are already themselves substitutions, since subjective activity is by definition the activity of substitution. What appears in consciousness is thus a twice replaced/twice transformed object. This process of development by replacement depends, to a certain point, on the concept of substance as Hegel developed it. An understanding of Hegel's Doctrine of Essence does much to illuminate, for example, the relation of commodities in exchange. Nevertheless, the shift in Marx's thinking that makes substitution a more appropriate term than differentiation for subjective activity effectively precludes the resolution of contradiction that Hegel achieved. For this reason there is a very definite limit to what we can understand in Marx through reading Hegel.

The Proposal:

As I have said, academic inquiry before this century sought unifying principles not only in explicit statements about the character or shape of truth, but also in the logic of inquiry, that is, in the method of constructing truth. Both Hegel and Marx used a method that produced heterogeneity but still reduced it to unity as, in Hegel's case, a logical unity of the thoughts of Spirit (or Cognition) and, in Marx's, as material expressions of the progressive development of Human Productive Activity, including cognition within it. I shall try to show that they accomplished the reduction of phenomenal diversity by means of the concept of substance, which is the methodological mechanism that creates the subjective being of an object, unifying phenomenally diverse objects by identifying them as the genetically related productions of a single source. My project thus entails an examination of the relation of subject and object, first in Hegel and, then, in Marx, showing how subject-object relations become more labyrinthine, but remain governed methodologically by the principle of substance.

It is my view that Hegel and Marx gave a more convincing, or verisimilar, methodological formulation of difference than others in the tradition of Western philosophy. Nonetheless, their work is part of a philosophical discourse in which the dominant direction of inquiry is toward resolution of multiplicity in unity. In much of this discourse, the manifold expanse of life, the world's phenomenal heterogeneity, does not appear as multiplicity, but as duality. What is an unnumbered diversity, by the time it is formulated as an object of philosophical thought, is already reduced to two: self and not-self. In Descartes, self was mind; not-self became the body. Hegel, in contrast,

embraced the multiplicity of existence and affirmed the heterogeneity of phenomena in the principle of subjectivity. He reduced this heterogeneity, however, not as Descartes had done, by creating a residual category of difference from self, but rather by subsuming diversity, incorporating it, as self. The mechanism of this reduction, to reiterate, is substance, a concept which puts into practice the premise that there is a fundamental, discoverable unity in all existence.

A study of subjectivity and substance in Hegel and Marx, should illuminate our knowledge of the cognitive methods for reducing difference to unity. I think that we automatically use such methods, in a crude way or in a sophisticated way, depending on the extent to which we have studied them. They are the only methods currently available to the Western mind, I think, and have actually been naturalized as the process of cognition. Producing difference, as knowledge, will require a change in the methods by which cognition operates. This means that cognition will not remain the object that it was when its object, its uniform result, was unity or oneness.

Zilberman provides an alternative to the Western model of cognition not, however, by constructing a different model, but by developing a method for inter-cultural understanding based on the method of divided construction. My discussion of Hegel's method as a type of divided construction limited to the intracultural level owes much to an initial encounter with Zilberman's work. According to Zilberman, cultural thinking is monistic; Hegel's idea of cognition is monistic; Marx's idea of human activity is monistic. I wished to investigate this for myself, preparatory to further investigating Zilberman's method for intercultural understanding.

In Chapter One, I introduce Hegel's method, first in Zilberman's terms, and then in Hegel's own terms. In Chapter Two, I follow Hegel's logic as it appears in the *Doctrine of Being*. This prepares the way for a discussion, in Chapter Three, of the *Doctrine of Essence*, wherein substance appears as a unifying principle. In Chapter Four, I show how the concept of substance operates in Marx's analysis of capital, specifically in his treatment of the commodity form. This involves a discussion of metamorphic form, which I present as the Marxian object. Finally, I conclude by addressing briefly the difference of the Marxian object from the Hegelian and the consequences of this difference for the problem of subject-object relations.

Chapter 1

Zilberman says that the method of scientific inquiry since Galileo resembles the method of divided construction. According to this view of science, Western Science is not empirical in the usual sense. Zilberman uses Galileo's discovery of the distinction between uniform and variable motion as an example that shows science to be almost the opposite of what we usually see it as. We are accustomed to thinking that we illuminate the empirical world by means of concepts or, in other words, that scientific discoveries refer to empirically existing objects. Looking at the practice of science from Zilberman's point of view, we see that Galileo's discovery refers not to a physical phenomenon, but to a mental phenomenon, a mental object, conceived by a special method of thinking that uses empirical phenomena as abstract components of a resulting imagined object. Whereas we normally think of concepts as tools and empirical objects as the real objects of science, we now see instead that the work of science is the construction of non-empirical objects which are cognized through experimentation with empirical bodies.

Shchedrovitzky describes Galileo's work on the concept of motion in greater detail than Zilberman, and so I will use his account. Shchedrovitzky explains that Galileo generalized Aristotle's definition of motion. Aristotle said that two bodies have equal velocities "if they pass equal distances in equal intervals of time" (1966: p. 30). Galileo said that two bodies also have equal velocities "if the intervals passed by the one and the other are proportional to the times consumed" (1966:30). But even though the second definition is just a generalization of the first and so, consistent with it, Galileo found that the same experimental situation could be described by two contradictory conclusions.

First, he found that the velocities of two bodies falling along a vertical plane and an inclined plane are not equal, because the body falling on the vertical plane traverses a larger distance than the other in the same amount of time. Second, the velocities of these same two bodies *are* equal, because "the ratios of the times of descent along the entire inclined plane and the entire vertical is equal to the ratio of the lengths of the corresponding paths." (1966:30). The problem is that there is something about motion that the definition and the generalization do not reveal: "The velocity of fall along [the vertical plane] would be found to be greater than the velocity along [the inclined plane] in one place, equal to the latter in another, and smaller in still another" (1966:30). The variability of motion was not captured by the old definitions, so Galileo had to construct a theoretical model, or concept, of motion that incorporated both uniform and variable motion, as Zilberman says, in "the 'ideal model' of a body having two imaginary components [i.e. horizontal and vertical] in movement" (1987:11). The resulting definition does not describe the movement of any empirically existing body, for no object moves horizontally and vertically at the same time, rather it describes a mental object, which in the progress of science, is subsequently taken, or mistaken, for a natural object.

According to Zilberman, Hegel's method of thinking is similar to Galileo's. He says, "Hegel's philosophical method is amazingly close to the genuine strategy of construction and discovery used in the sciences" (1988:13). What this means is that the components of Galileo's 'never-existent' body, i.e. the motion of bodies falling along vertical and inclined planes, correspond to the two components of Hegel's Idea, which are: Concept (Notion, or philosophical thinking) and determinate existence (experience).

In Hegel's system, philosophical thinking and determinate existence are in the same kind of relationship as were Galileo's two definitions of motion; they are mutually exclusive yet equally valid. Shchedrovitzky refers to this situation as an antinomy, which he defines as a paradoxical situation in which two "mutually exclusive conclusions can be reached by means of two equally valid procedures" (1966:29). Zilberman also uses the term antinomy, in what seems to be a more general sense, yet is still consistent with Shchedrovitzky's usage. Zilberman uses the term antinomy to refer to situations in which the idea of verification becomes problematic. Zilberman gives the following illustration to help him explain the situation of thinking within each of the six Hindu reflections, but it is also appropriate for illustrating the relationship of philosophical thinking and experience in Hegel's system:

According to Einstein, there are some points in space where gravity grows so intensely that it forces rays of light to form a circle - and thus, a 'light trap' develops. So, everyone who places himself at such a point would still be sure that he looks straight ahead - but there, in front of him, he will see the back of another person...who is himself. Of course, he cannot break the spell of illusion since it is his own vision. So, he cannot confirm his understanding by experience.

(1988:47).

Here the understanding of gravity and the experience of it are not opposed. They are like the two mutually exclusive but nevertheless equally valid conclusions that Shchedrovitzky refers to; they can neither confirm nor refute each other though they are different.

In Hegel's system, philosophical thinking and determinate existence correspond, or are adequate to each other, in the Idea. Though their explicit difference is overcome in this circumstance, they remain mutually exclusive, that is, their relationship is

nevertheless antinomial. It is easiest to illustrate the antinomicity of philosophical thinking and phenomenal existence by looking at a situation in which they are both mutually exclusive and strikingly different. A good example of this is contained in the first paragraph of Freedom of Self-Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, (1977: § 197, p. 119), where thinking emerges for the first time, or, as it can also be put, where consciousness first takes itself, its own intrinsic being, for its object.

Hegel says that the independent self-consciousness, characterized as the lord in the lord-bondsman relationship, "does not become an 'I' that in its simplicity is genuinely self-differentiating, or that in this absolute differentiation remains identical with itself" (1977: § 197, p. 119). From the point of view of logic (philosophical thinking) it is impossible to think of such a self-consciousness. According to logic, the 'I' is precisely that which *is* self-differentiating in its simplicity, following the same triadic movement of self-differentiation as Spirit does. The 'I' refers to a stage at which the fact that its own significance lies in the Idea is still unrealized. The 'I', as a personal self-consciousness, a particular subjectivity, posits itself as the principle of unity, or the ground of all existence. In Logic, Hegel says: "The 'I' is as it were the crucible and the fire which consumes the loose plurality of sense and reduces it to unity" (1975: remark to § 42, p. 69). This was Kant's view of the 'I', which Hegel agrees with, except that, "we must note that it is not the mere act of *our* personal self-consciousness which introduces an absolute unity into the variety of sense. Rather, this identity is itself the absolute" (as above). So, while at a certain stage, self-consciousness, as 'I', is unaware that the significance of all existence, including its own, lies beyond itself, the process of

its own movement is nevertheless the same as Spirit's. The statement that Hegel makes in reference to the lord at the beginning of paragraph 197 is thus comprehensible only insofar as it refers to an experiential plane that is in an antinomial relationship with the logical plane.

The method of constructing a theoretical object, or model, as a unity of two mutually exclusive components, resembles the method of divided construction, but in this form it is appropriate only for constructing objects within a given cultural tradition. As practiced by Galileo and Hegel, it is a monistic method. Hegel resolves the antinomy by merging the two contradictory findings in a dividually constructed model which replaces the object. This model fills the place of object. Its replacement constitutes naturalization of the object of cognition and, though it is an inevitable process of thinking on the cultural level, it results in monism when the object of cognition is thinking. The method of divided construction must be used differently when applied to cognition itself, so that thinking is not constructed as a natural object, capable of explaining only other cultural objects of its own type. When divided construction is used to understand thinking, the distinction between object and subject must be reintroduced. Hegel dissolved this distinction in order to present a model of thinking in which the object had an objective truth, yet was transparent to the thinking subject. In Hegel's system, cognition in general, or Spirit, is the Subject, and Substance is the principle that unifies the multiplicity of its substitutions (or productions, i.e. Spirit as determinate/phenomenal existence or objects). In Hegel's words, "everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as

Substance, but equally as *Subject*" (1977: § 17, p. 10). The True is the Idea, which can also be expressed as the truth, or actuality, of Substance and Subject.

Hegel's statement concerning the True begins a prefatory description of the self-movement of Spirit, which is a triadic process. Here, it is the point of departure for an introduction to the special concepts Hegel developed to resolve the antinomy of logic and experience. In Hegel's terms, the self-development of Spirit is an infinite progression of cycles comprising three moments, or phases. Although it is not quite accurate to think that each cycle is a discrete unit of development, because the final moment of one cycle is really the first moment of the next, each cycle does accomplish a movement from subject to object. As I have said before, this happens in such a way that the distinction between subject and object dissolves, and the mechanism for this dissolution is substance. Briefly described, the self-development of Spirit occurs in the following way. The first phase, or moment, of each cycle is an immediacy, which is rest, peace, or unity with self. The second moment posits determinacy, and in doing so, negates the immediacy of the first moment. It is also possible to say that Spirit makes a substitution in the second phase; it substitutes a shape or specific form of itself in the sphere of the finite for the infinity of itself. The relationship between Spirit and determinate shapes in the world is the relationship of content and form. Form, which I use here as synonymous with shape, refers to the mode of thought's existence in the world. The forms, or shapes, of thought's existence are transitory, but not, by that fact inessential or external in relation to thought (their content). For example, an artist's choice of medium is not an inessential aspect of the work, and, yet, the medium by itself is not art without "the presence and power of

thought" (1975: § 133, p. 190). Likewise, content, this presence and power of thought, is not art except as unified with or expressed in the appropriate form:

The content of the Iliad, it may be said, is the Trojan war, and especially the wrath of Achilles. In that we have everything and yet very little after all; for the Iliad is made an Iliad by the poetic form, in which that content is moulded (1975: § 133, p. 190).

Adequate form is the complete interpenetration of content and form, so that the whole is the True, is actuality.

Another way to describe the second moment of the triadic process, is to say that reflection disrupts, or breaks the peace-with-self that characterized the first moment. Reflection is mediation, but a self-mediation owing to the simplicity of mind. Mind's simplicity is its substantiality. The third moment restores immediacy, but in this immediacy Spirit now has achieved self-knowledge. It knows itself explicitly to be what it was, implicitly, all along. Through mediation mind reveals itself to itself and so, in the third moment, mind is for-itself what it is in-itself. Spirit's self-knowledge is achieved through negation, i.e. negation of the first immediacy and of the determinacy which is its self-mediation. Negation, as Hegel uses the word, is a generic term for the movement of mediation.

When Hegel says that the True is to be understood not only as Substance but equally as Subject, he is alluding to Spinoza. According to Hegel, in Spinoza's philosophy the True (or God) is Substance, but *not* Subject. In Hegel's view, Spinoza's ideas were misunderstood, and his "conception of God as the one Substance shocked the age in which it was proclaimed" (1977: § 17, p. 10) because it seemed that Spinoza

made God finite, in unity with the finite world. Hegel says that, on the contrary, Spinoza denied the finite any participation in Truth (which is infinite). Spinoza saw the world as "an appearance lacking in true reality" (1975: § 50, p. 83), while truth was of a single, or simple, substance that did not participate or express itself in diversity or difference. Of Spinoza's philosophy, Hegel says, "It is true that God is necessity, or, ... that he is the absolute Thing: he is however no less the absolute Person. That he is the absolute Person however is a point which the philosophy of Spinoza never reached" (1975: § 151, p. 214). There is a correspondence between the terms in this statement and those in the proposition concerning the character of the True, such that Thing is equivalent to Substance and Person to Subject. This means that Spinoza recognized the elementality, or simplicity, of God but did not recognize the activity of self-differentiation as equally characteristic of God, or what is synonymous here, Truth.

Hegel says that Spinoza's philosophy is "marked by the absence of the principle of the Western world, the principle of individuality..." and that "he defrauded the principle of difference or finitude of its due" (1975: § 151, p. 214). Both of these statements refer again to the absence of self-differentiating activity in Spinoza's conception of the True. The principle of individuality encompasses the idea of development through limitation. In order to advance, or even, in the case of an individual, to mature, it is necessary to limit possibility in a definite existence, or finitude. This is the principle of difference, the shaping of the infinite in a finite form. Of the will, Hegel says, it is necessary to "abandon the inward brooding which allows it to retain everything as a possibility. But possibility is still less than actuality. The will which is sure of itself does not *eo ipso*

lose itself in determinate volition" (1967: addition to § 13, p. 230). Individuality is the self-identity that renders the differences of finite expression coherent (1975: § 163, p. 226). Subjectivity is the activity of differentiation: the mediation of self-developing Spirit, in which process Spirit expresses itself in finite forms and negates these. Substance is the principle of unity: the self-sameness that unites the diverse and finite forms of itself; it is the principle of connection.

Hegel brings Substance and Subject together in such a way that from a certain stage on, subjectivity appears to be an attribute of substance: "the living Substance is being which is in truth *Subject*" (1977: § 18, p. 10). The activity of subjectivity seems to be added to the simplicity of substance and henceforth Hegel speaks of the activity of substance: "This substance is, as Subject, pure, *simple negativity* (1977: § 18, p. 10) [see also Logic 1975: § 151, p. 213 "Substantiality is the absolute form - activity..."] Substance is simple because it consists of one element. This is its character even in the moment of mediation. The negation of its original, immediate, unity with itself, which is expressed as diversity, is "reflection in otherness within itself" (1977: § 18, p. 10). The simplicity of substance is its transcendent continuity relative to the momentary unity and diversity of its development. ("Only this self-restoring sameness, or this reflection in otherness within itself - not an original or immediate unity as such - is the True"). The transcendent continuity, the elementality, or the simplicity of substance means that Spirit is one with itself: "In itself, [the life of Spirit] is indeed one of untroubled equality..." (1977: § 19, p. 10). This defines in-itself as the (infinite) content of Spirit, which becomes Truth when expressed in external forms, i.e. when it is for-itself.

In paragraph 19, Hegel seems to be speaking to an audience that might think the inward, infinite, content of Spirit is alone sufficient for truth. But essence alone is the original unity with self. By itself it is an abstraction, which Hegel signifies with the word 'pure'. In dialectical logic, truth is a concrete whole, or a concretion. Concrete derives from the latin verb meaning to grow together; this is the current meaning of the term (concre'scence) concrescence. In Hegelian logic, truth is a whole the constituent parts of which are known but are not in the end known as separate facts, but as an organic unity. The concrete unity is formed of the finite shapes Spirit takes in its movement through phases of rest (peace with self/immediacy) and the activity of negating this rest (the activity of positing determinacy/mediation), unified in the simplicity of their substance.

Taken in abstraction, essence and substance are universal. Universal is the term that signifies generality in abstraction; the universal is, by virtue of being abstract, undeveloped, as yet lacking the elaboration of the mature form. ("The beginning, the principle, or the Absolute, as at first immediately enunciated, is only the universal" (1977: § 20, p. 11)). Generality in dialectical logic is not the attribute in common that it is in formal logic. It is rather a genetic cell. Hegel expresses this metaphorically in (at least) three different images, one of which appears in the second paragraph of the Preface to the Phenomenology. Hegel says,

the bud disappears in the bursting forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one

another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual *necessity* alone constitutes the life of the whole (1977: § 2, p. 2 emphasis added).

The general is this *necessary* development, a continuity in which each form is connected both to that which precedes and that which follows it. To say necessarily connected here is the same as to say genetically, and to say substantially related. Substance is the inward connection in outward diversity. Ilyenkov expresses the dialectical understanding of the general as

...the idea of development organically linked (both in essence and in origin) with the concept of substance, i.e. the principle of the genetic community of phenomena that are at first glance quite heterogeneous (insofar as no abstract, common attributes can be discovered among them) (1977: p. 347-48).

Hegel's metaphor and Ilyenkov's statement both give the diverse individual participation in a substantial unity owing to their birth from one another. Substance is developmental because it means that the diverse forms of finitude express the infinite as truth, not randomly or abstractly, but by the birth of each form out of its predecessor. When considering the finite form in this way, we "presuppose a capacity to give birth to something which is opposite to itself" (Ilyenkov, 1977: p. 347). This is mediation.

Mediation, from the point of view of form, is giving birth to what is different, unlike, or opposite to self; for example, the tree does not share/replicate the characteristics of the acorn. The successive shapes of substantial development need not appear, materially, to be related. From the point of view of content, mediation is "nothing

beyond self-moving self-sameness" (Hegel, 1977: § 21, p. 11). Mediation is movement; it is movement that both asserts and denies. It asserts a positive shape, a particular shape, in relation to the formlessness of the universal. On the other hand, the first moment, immediacy, can also be characterized as a desire to abstain from any particular inclination, where the Absolute is nothing more than a word, an undeveloped, unarticulated grandeur. Movement from this enunciation of the universal is as much a negation as it is an assertion. It negates the abstract generality of the first phase in/by showing a definite form (Hegel 1975: remark to § 80, also § 12). This showing of a definite form is differentiation, self-differentiation. It is movement, but it is self-movement. Because it differentiates within itself, and moves itself, not adding anything external and not being moved by anything external, mediation is self-moving self-sameness.

In the Logic, Hegel says,

to mediate is to take something as a beginning and to go onward to a second thing; so that the existence of this second thing depends on our having reached it from something else contradistinguished from it (1975: § 12, p. 17).

The context for this definition is a discussion of the relationship between consciousness of the sensuous world and philosophical thinking. The beginning he speaks of is sense-consciousness; the 'second thing' is the philosophical thinking to which it (sense-consciousness) develops. The movement to reason is a negation of the world as it appears to sense-consciousness or as it is experienced (i.e. as "a vast conglomerate" (1975: § 12, p. 16) or a "manifold self-differentiating expanse of Life" (1977: § 197, p.

121) and also, conversely, a positive expression of the order/logic that is implicit in the facts of experience.

Chapter 2

Hegel says that every logical entity comprises three sides (1975: § 79, p. 113). A logical entity, also called a truth, and a notion, is thus a triangle. This geometrical way of representing the organization of thinking owes a debt to Aristotle, who showed the genetic significance of the triangle in relation to other geometrical figures. While a triangle is not the simplest element of geometry, the simpler elements, i.e. points and lines, are not units, structures, or objects. A triangle shows the elements in a concrete unity and, moreover, the nature of this concrete unity is such that "*all* conceivable geometrical figures can be *generated* from it"¹ (Zilberman, 1988: p. 6). By presenting logical entities or thoughts as triangles, Hegel formulates thinking as "a process of generation which is bound to the given content of the original genetic unit" (Zilberman, 1988: p. 6). Thus, in one sense, thinking progresses as an elaboration of triangular figures. We shall find the mechanism of their articulation in the concept of substance. In other words, in the development of thinking, substance is the principle of genetic connection. As the shape of scientific or philosophical thoughts, the triangle represents what the third side achieves, that is, the unification of the other two sides. For example, Hegel's model of the Absolute Idea is a unity of two mutually exclusive components, logical and experiential thinking. If we think of logic and experience as two sides of a triangle, we can see that the third side unifies them and effectively forms them as a concrete figure. By this achievement the third side entitles itself to subsume under its

¹but what are circles?

own name what were before mere abstractions or, in fact, the terms of an unresolved antinomy and, thereby, the third side entitles itself to stand for, or represent, the whole.

In addition to describing the elements of truth as *sides*, Hegel refers to them as moments. This introduces a temporal metaphor for how thinking works. By calling the stages of the logical entity moments, Hegel produces an idea of fluidity, of transience, that works against the tendency to solidify each stage, or hold each aspect of the whole as an independent something. I think of this latter tendency as the characteristic operation of thinking as Understanding. As Understanding, thought presents the sides of a logical entity as abstractions, separate and self-sufficient (see 1975: § 80, p. 113). This is the first way we can think of the work of abstraction: as the drawing of a constituent element away from its proper location in the configuration of the whole. The element in question is then separated or divided both from the whole and from other elements that might also be drawn away. An object is also abstract, however, when it is a statement, a definition, or even a name, that stands, passes for (represents) the whole. In this sense, the idea of the whole is drawn away from the knowledge of its parts, or from the full development of its parts. It is in this sense that Logic is the "science of the pure Idea" (1975: § 19, p. 25). Hegel uses the word pure to denote abstraction. To say that logic is the science of the pure Idea is to say that logic is merely a statement or a definition of the Idea, not the full development of the Idea.

In § 79 Hegel says:

In point of form Logical doctrine has three sides: (a) the Abstract side, or that of understanding; (b) the Dialectical, or that of negative reason; (c) the Speculative, or that of positive reason." (p. 113)

In paragraph 83, he gives what I think are two ways of expressing the structure of logical doctrine, and if they are not two more ways of expressing the same configuration as given in § 79, they are at least parallel configurations since the point of § 79 is that every logical process has this form. And so, the two paragraphs (§ 79, § 83) should come together in the following way. The doctrine of being is the theory of thought in its immediacy, which is the notion implicit and in germ, and this is the abstract side of logical thought, what can also be called the phase of understanding.

The doctrine of essence is about the theory of thought in its reflection and mediation, which is the being-for-self and show of the notion. This is also what Hegel calls dialectical or negative reason. From the Preface to the Phenomenology, we know that negativity is movement (see 1977: § 32, p. 19). Whereas rigidity characterizes the phase of abstract immediacy, the phase of reflection is a movement that disrupts and negates what previously appeared (seemed) fixed. But supersession of the first phase is not a subsequent establishment of the second. It is not to be characterized as the superimposition of an externally originating opposite on the statement or definition asserted in the first phase. The second issues from the first, in the same way that "life, as life, involves the germ of death, and that the finite, being radically self-contradictory, involves its own self-suppression" (1975: remark to § 81, p. 117).

In this example, the negative, which is deterioration, shows itself as an inherent or indwelling aspect of the object under consideration. The idea of life as development is not nullified when this negative appears, because we know that both are true. And so it happens that reason "maintains two opposite propositions about the same object, and

in such a way that each of them has to be maintained with equal necessity" (1975: § 48, p. 76). This is Hegel's definition of antinomy. He says that in Kant's view, antinomies are a defect of reason. According to Kant, the object itself must not comprise contradictory elements and its appearance to reason in this way shows the incapacity of reason to know truth. For Hegel, contradiction is involved in the truth of the thing known. I think of this as a step beyond Kant: first we see contradiction and locate the contradiction in reason. Then we see that reason and truth coincide; as a consequence we also see that the opposed determinations are in the thing as well as in the knowledge of the thing. Here, thinking may search for cause. For empirical science, as it is usually understood, the opportunity to posit a causal relation signals the end of inquiry. I am not saying, however, that a causal relation is the end point for empirical science as it is usually *carried out*, because Zilberman argues that Hegel's method is in fact very close to the method used in the sciences: hence, his comparison of Hegel with Galileo. It might be that empirical science (mis)understands itself as searching for causal relationships. But no matter what the impulse is to close matters with causal statements, here it is an invitation to error. For Hegel, causality is a relationship that emerges in the phase of dialectical reason. This phase of reflection is superseded in the doctrine of the notion and Idea. The latter is the theory of thought in its return into itself and its developed abiding by itself, or the notion in and for itself. This is speculative, or positive, reason. I cannot say more at this point than that positive reason resolves contradiction into unity.

The doctrine of Being begins: "Being is the notion implicit only: its special forms have the predicate 'is'..." (1975: § 84, p. 123). 'Is' defines the present; this sphere encompasses only what is here and now, lacking the knowledge of development and of connection. Because the doctrine of being has already been introduced as the abstract side of logical thinking, it concerns the here and now of thought objects in the form of predicates. Predicate, at times, seems merely to mean 'verb', as in § 84; having the predicate 'is' means that the objects under consideration are confined to the logical present. In § 85, predicate refers to the syntactical unit that defines the subject of a proposition:

even the Absolute...in comparison with its predicate...is as yet only an inchoate pretended thought--the indeterminate subject of predicates yet to come (1975: p. 123-24).

The thought-form is the predicate. What is accomplished in the sphere of Being is the movement from pure Being, i.e. the indeterminacy of the merely 'is', to Being as a logical entity, which is determinate being, or predication in the form of a syntactical unit. The moments of Being, i.e. the thought-forms in which Being becomes determinate, are: Quality, Quantity, and Measure.

Pure being is the abstract and empty verb: the Absolute is, or the Absolute is being. Being as yet has no shape. Pure Being is the absence of determinacy and in this it is the same as Nothing. Hegel says that pure Being "is an absence of attributes, and so is Nought" (1975: remark to § 87, p. 128). Far from being a joke, the identity of Being and Nothing is not even a paradox in the circumstance of making a beginning, or, in other words, in Becoming. A thing in its beginning, or in the phase of its becoming,

is at the same time as it is not. This is the movement in which two empty abstractions, Being and Nothing, lose their abstract character, i.e. cease to be what they were, in unity. In unity, they vanish, and dealing no longer with two abstractions, we have instead their notion. Hegel says that Becoming is "the first concrete thought-term" (1975: remark to § 88, p. 132).

Common-sense makes an easy transition from Becoming to Being Determinate: determinate being is that which *has* become. It seems necessary only to arrest the movement of becoming to get a something, or, as Hegel says, a somewhat. Hegel describes the situation differently and I am not sure whether there is significance in the difference. He says,

Becoming is as it were a fire, which dies out in itself, when it consumes its material. The result of this process however is not an empty Nothing, but Being identical with the negation...the primary import of which evidently is that it *has become* (1975: remark to § 89, p. 134).

What has become exists as a something having both content and form. Logically, its aspects are quality, quantity, and measure. I think it may be accurate to say that these are the mechanisms of predication; what I mean to say is that in determinate being, the predicate achieves the form of a syntactical unit. What was mere beginning, *has begun* in expressing a specific character that defines it exhaustively. This is Quality. Quality is the character that makes the thing what it is, distinguishing it from everything it is not. In positively asserting itself, Quality thus entails a negative. What it negates is Otherness in relation to it. Conversely, it is Being-for-another in relation to this otherness. Considered alone, Quality is Being-by-self.

This is the point at which Hegel introduces the concept of Reality. He says, "Quality, as determinateness which *is*, is Reality" (1975: § 91, p. 135). Reality encompasses the sphere of what is determinately existent--this is what is expressed in the quote above. Hegel gives some examples in the remark to § 91: "the body may be called the reality of the soul, and the law the reality of freedom, and the world altogether the reality of the divine idea" (1975: p. 135). The body, the law, the world, are all real and, we also know, their significance lies outside themselves, precisely in those things to which Hegel refers them: the soul, freedom, the divine idea, respectively. Reality is that which exists as the materialization of something else. The outward appearance of this something else is its reality.

In the preceding paragraph (§ 90), Hegel has said, "Quality is...completely a category of the finite" (1975: p. 134). The explanation he gives in the remark requires, I think, some knowledge of the philosophy of Nature but I suspect that he is saying the finitude of Quality has to do with its exhaustiveness. The quality of a thing is at once its outward determinacy and an exhaustive account of it. If so, must its significance lie elsewhere in another form? I ask this in an attempt to find a point of connection between this statement on the finitude of Quality and the statement on finitude Hegel makes in the remark to § 10 in the Philosophy of Right:

Finitude consists...in this, that what something is *in* itself or in accordance with its concept is one phenomenon or exists in one way, while what it is *for* itself is a different phenomenon or exists in another way; so, for example, *in* itself the abstract reciprocal externality characteristic of nature is space, but *for* itself it is time (1975: p. 25).

The correspondence of what something is in itself and what it is for itself seems to require self-consciousness, because the correspondence is precisely the self-knowledge that is a return to self, connecting the outward appearance with the essential character. This is much different from the situation of things in the world of nature. In nature, there is an absence of self-consciousness and so the significance of the thing is not known by the thing itself, but by a thinking consciousness external to it. This must be what the exhaustiveness of Quality implies. Where there is an absence of self-consciousness, there is only Being-for-another. This is what Hegel is talking about when he says, "Since...otherness, though a determination of Quality itself, is in the first instance distinct from it, Quality is Being-for-another" (1975: § 91, p. 135). Determinate being distinguishes itself in taking a definite shape and in so doing creates otherness as the residual of itself. Otherness is in this way implicit in determinate being but, in the phase of Being-for-another, being does not recognize otherness as its own production. This is its finite character: otherness is both distinct from it and external to it. The transition to Being-for-self marks the point at which being recognizes itself in otherness.

The first category, Being-for-another (Quality), is a something, a positive. It is not merely a positive though, since in being something it is also not something. This is what Hegel means when he says that something implies an other, and to say that something implies an other is synonymous with saying that "a something is implicitly the other of itself" (1975: remark to § 92, p. 136). Otherness is a negative; this negative is the second category, which issues from the first. Nonetheless it is, Hegel says, a some other, a somewhat in its own right, and an initial, though false, idea of infinity comes in

the idea of an endless alternation of 'one' and an 'other'. The third term releases thinking from this endless repetition in expressing the unity of one and its other. We have already seen that the first and second terms are not entities external to one another brought together in an additive way. Because the second issues from the first, their genuine relation is a self-relation. The significance of this self-relation (self-recognition in the other) is really to deny the truth of the other. This is what the category of Ideality expresses: that the second term has its truth in the first. True infinity is this self-relation, or a resolution of division into oneness. When we have this relation of two entities, such that the second issues from the first, the first is endowed with a capacity to produce, to bring forth out of itself. The unity of the two is really a return to the source rather than a return in the sense of simply reverting to a thing that exists side by side with the other.

The third term is really the whole, and in relation to Being and Otherness, Being-for-self is the third term. In Being-for-self, the specific determinacy that was Being and the residual that appeared as Other are both, as Hegel says, absorbed and annulled. Hegel uses the word *aufheben* to express the fate of the first moment of a triad in relation to the second, and of both the first and second moments in relation to the third. *Aufheben* is translated as the verb, *to sublate*. He describes the german usage of the word as encompassing two opposite meanings:

We mean by it (1) to clear away, or annul: thus, we say, a law or a regulation is set aside; (2) to keep, or preserve: in which sense we use it when we say: something is well put by. This double usage of language, which gives to the same word a positive and negative meaning, is not an accident, and gives no ground for reproaching language as a cause of confusion. We should rather recognize in it the

speculative spirit of our language rising above the mere
'either-or' of understanding (1975: § 96, p. 142).

What Hegel calls the speculative spirit of language, an apparent contradiction that can be resolved into unity, is the pattern of his own logic. In the relationship between experience and philosophical thinking, experience is both annulled and preserved in philosophical thinking. In Being-for-self, Being and Otherness cease to be abstractions in an external relation and instead appear as what they are in truth: moments of the development of One, or self. Otherness was a negative, the negation of the positive determinacy of Being. Being-for-self negates the negation that was Otherness. It is a negativity that shows the truth of the apparent other to be self. Where previously were two abstractions externally related, is now One self-subsistent unity/unit.

The One is a self-relation, or self-reference, of specific determinacy and the negation, which amounts to a rejection of, the determinacy initially posited. The return into self negates the specific determinacy of its being as an exhaustive expression of itself. In Hegel's terms, this relation of the moments of Being-for-self is also a self-repulsion: "the One manifests an utter incompatibility with itself, a self-repulsion: and what it makes itself explicitly be, is the Many" (1975: remark to § 97, p. 142). The word Repulsion expresses a heretofore unmet valence of negativity. In determinate Being, or Being-for-another, negativity appeared as the relation of opposition. Otherness negated Being as its opposite, which was "a reference connecting somewhat with an other" (p. 142). In Being-for-self, negativity appears as the "unity of the same and the other" in which otherness is negated as otherness and recognized as self. Here, I think, negativity is the relation of ideality where we see the capacity of the source to manifest

itself in a multitude of mutually exclusive productions. This is the way in which the One proliferates and makes itself into the Many.

What Hegel says next is that repulsion "is by one stroke converted into its opposite - Attraction" (p. 142), when we see that "as a negative attitude of many Ones to one another, it is just as essentially a connective reference of them to each other" (1975: § 98, p. 143). I have spoken of negativity as an encompassing term for two types of relationships/connections, and it may be that Attraction simply expresses the relational import of negativity in a way more consistent with common usage. For the passage from the One to the Many is not a splitting of the One into Many, such that a connection is broken, it is a proliferation, in which a connection is maintained. Hegel speaks of self-repulsion as the method by which the Many distinguish themselves, and yet such a term might also, and erroneously, suggest a random dispersal of the Many. The passage from the One to the Many is the transition from Quality to Quantity: the transition is not a dispersal but a further development of Being, another phase of Being. The word attraction recalls this to mind. This movement may be equally characterized as the movement in which what was One appears now as Many or as the movement in which "a thing remains what it is, though its quantity is altered, and the thing becomes greater or less" (1975: remark to § 98, p. 145).

As far as the unity of Quality and Quantity goes, i.e. Measure, the third phase of the doctrine of Being, I can give the example that Hegel gives. The quality of water is that it is liquid, whether it is hot or cold, that is, irrespective of its temperature, except when two certain points are reached and then a quantitative movement cannot be made

without also bringing with it a qualitative change, in that the water turns either to ice or to steam. Hegel says that this example shows the antinomy of Measure, i.e. that it is equally true that 1) quality and quantity are indifferent to one another and 2) quality and quantity are intertwined to such an extent that we cannot be sure of the quality unless the quantity is also known. Hegel states this antinomy as follows:

On the one hand, the quantitative features of existence may be altered, without affecting its quality. On the other hand, this increase and diminution, immaterial though it be, has its limit, by exceeding which the quality suffers change (§ 108, p. 158).

He calls this "the revulsion from what is at first merely quantitative into qualitative alteration" (1975: § 109, p. 160). When he spoke earlier of the self-repulsion of the One which creates the Many, I also had in mind the word revulsion and in both what I am thinking of is a return. I am thinking of both words as expressing the unification of the first and second terms of a triad. In the first case, the (self-) repulsion of the One is the negation of the determinacy that initially appears as other, but comes to be recognized as self. This is the return to/into self which is Being-for-self, and the proliferation of Being-for-self (i.e. the proliferation of One into Many). In the second case, revulsion is the negation of quantity, or a return to quality which is a unity instead of indifferent independence.

Chapter 3

The abstraction of the sphere of Being consists, metaphorically speaking, in its restriction to the present. In the sphere of Essence, thought moves beyond the abstraction of Being, and this development toward the concrete is accordingly a movement beyond the present, into the past. In the Science of Logic, Hegel says,

Not until knowing *inwardizes*, *recollects* [*erinnert*] itself out of immediate being, does it through mediation find essence. The German language has preserved essence in the past participle [*gewesen*] of the verb *to be*; for essence is past - but timelessly past - being" (1969: p. 389).

This is to say, essence includes the past, and, moreover, puts the past and present in a relationship, by a movement that is simultaneously a turning back and a turning inward.

In the Logic, Hegel expresses the inward movement of essence as the sublation of Being.

He says,

...firstly, Essence, as simple self-relation, is Being, and secondly as regards its one-sided characteristic of immediacy, Being is deposed to a mere negative, to a seeming or reflected light 91075: § 112, p. 162).

As I have said earlier in the paper, sublation is both a preservation and a negation. In Essence, then, Being is both preserved and negated, in this way: that in Essence, as in Being, we are dealing with simple self-relation, i.e. the simplicity of Being is preserved, and, at the same time, the immediate, or abstract, character of Being is negated. Negation is the generic term for the movement suggested in recollection and reflection. Negation effects a relationship; in Essence, we are looking for relations that extend beyond the logical present. These are, simply put, relations of causality. We are moving beyond a consideration of what is, to a recollection of the timeless past, and this means thinking

about what is presupposed in the present, what conditions it, what causes it. Put another way, now we see things not just as they are, temporally abstract, but in light of something else, a formative influence.

As a timeless present, Being is a presumption of what yet remains to be known logically. The movement to Essence demands a retreat from presumption, to the truth (or true knowledge) of what appears as a self-sufficient and immediate totality (see 1969, p. 389 re: truth of Being). If Being is not a self-sufficient totality, we will expect that it contains a reference to something else. What kind of something else will it be, if I was correct when I said at the end of my discussion of Being, that Being-for-self is the negation of otherness as otherness in the recognition of it (otherness) as self? The something else is a reflection. Hegel expresses this by saying that "Essence...is Being...reflecting light into itself" (1975: § 112, p. 162). This metaphor of reflection expresses both the simplicity, or elementality, of Being and Essence, as well as showing that Essence makes, or posits, a certain kind of reference to itself. The self-reference of Essence, which can also be called its simple negativity, reveals determinacy as derivative. Hegel says,

This word 'reflection' is originally applied, when a ray of light in a straight line impinging upon the surface of a mirror is thrown back from it. In this phenomenon we have two things - first an immediate fact which is, and secondly the deputed, derivated, or transmitted phase of the same
(1975: remark to § 112, p. 163).

Reflection gives back an image that is not unaffected by the process, is not a replica of the initial, or immediate fact, but is a *deputed phase* of it. Deputed, derivated, and transmitted are three of seven words that Hegel uses to describe the mediated image,

which, as I said above, is determinacy/determinateness. He also uses, as might be obvious, reflected, as well as connected, given, and posited (1969: p. 391). All these words suggest a movement from one thing to another; connected and given do so in the most general (non-specific) way, expressing no more than an association. Posited carries a connotation of propriety; it means that something is put in its proper place, in its proper relation to other objects. Transmitted refers to something handed down, derivated to something received or traced from a source. To depute is to make a substitution. The relationship of reflection is now specified further: determinateness is placed in its proper position as something sent forth, drawn out from a source as a substitute for this source.

This movement to the cognition of what is within Being, or presupposed in Being, provides a particularly clear example of the antinomicity of philosophical thinking (cognition proper, logical thinking) and experience. From the point of view of experience, determinacy antecedent to form and matter is never encountered. In logic, by contrast, the first part of the doctrine of Essence is an approach to the materialization of determinacy, prior to which it is impossible to speak of a Thing, or Fact. Logically, a Thing/Fact is sublated Being or, to phrase an approximation, Being contextualized and materialized. In logic, what seems to be the elementary unit of our experience, i.e. a thing/fact, comes after, not before, its context is determined. Essence begins with pure relationality, or, as Hegel says, pure mediation: "Reflection is *pure mediation*...Pure mediation is only *pure relation* without any related terms" (1969: p. 445). This abstract relationality is as incomprehensible from the point of view of experience as pure Being was. Pure Being was no more than the abstract verb 'to be' without predication. Pure

reflection, where Essence, as a moment of the Logic, begins, is no more than an abstract statement of the most rudimentary idea of causality. The turning inward that marks the transition to Essence suspends determinateness, withholds itself from the material. Determinacy, which is a distinction made within self and which is otherness to that extent, comes into view, first of all, "as postulated and hypothesized" (1975: § 112, p. 162). In Being, we finished with a self-revulsion that negated all specific determinacy; we ended with a retreat into self that incorporated all specific determinacy. Now, in Essence, we begin with this negation of specific determinacy, with Being withdrawn into itself.

Identity is the first of the categories, or pure principles, of Reflection, which is in turn the first phase of Essence. The form of Identity preserves the self-relatedness of Being, its pure simplicity. It is abstract identity (self-relation) in the same way that logic is the abstract Idea. Logic is a statement of the Idea, lacking the concrete development of the Idea. Identity is Essence, but only as an abstract definition of Essence, lacking the knowledge of the development of essence, which holds difference within it. This abstraction is not synonymous with the formal logical maxim of identity, according to which "Everything is identical with itself, $A=A$: and negatively, A cannot at the same time be A and not A " (1975: § 115, p. 167). This law situates difference outside of and absolutely opposed to identity. It does not allow for the self-differentiation implicit in the propositional form, which, in setting up a subject "always promises a distinction between subject and predicate" (1975: § 115, p. 167). For Hegel, identity, even as pure/abstract self-relation, contains difference within it, which difference is on the point

of emergence. This is "...Being as Ideality..." (1975: remark to § 115, p. 167). Ideality, in Essence, is thus the self-relatedness of Mind, holding Being within it, holding the realization of itself within itself, on the verge, so to speak, of realizing itself in existence.

In the doctrine of Being we met with being as reality, where Hegel said that the significance of the real lies outside itself. He said that the significance, or the truth, of the body is in the soul, the truth of law is in freedom. The soul and freedom are thoughts, configurations of Mind. The ideal in this way refers to thoughts, to cognition, and, as the truth of reality, thought is accordingly to be seen as the source, the origin, of reality. Hegel says:

Ideality must be the ideality of something. But this something is not a mere indefinite this or that, but existence characterized as a reality which, if retained in isolation, has no truth (quoted by Knox, 1976: note 43 to § 184 orig fr. § 96 Enc.).

Truth is the concrete, which is a unity of the real and the ideal; truth is the full development of the whole. In this sense, we might want to say that ideality no less than reality is untrue so far as it is isolated or considered as independent, but this seems to contradict Hegel's assertion that essence, as the ideality of being is the truth of being. The solution to this problem lies in the fact that reality and ideality are not actually separate things somehow combined or added even though the statement that truth is the unity of the real and ideal can appear to mean this when it is interpreted according to formal, or analytical, logic. The case is rather that cognition overcomes the abstraction of immediate being and in this way, truth, or the concrete whole, is the unity of the real and the ideal.

Difference emerges from Identity in the following way: identity, as self-relatedness, is self-repulsion and this is the hypothetical postulation or positing of a multiplicity of determinacies. The relation to Other - being, i.e. this postulated multiplicity, appears as Distinction, Relativity, and Mediation. Distinction begins as immediate difference, to which Hegel gives the name Diversity. Immediacy, if we use it in the same sense in which we used it to characterize the sphere of Being, connotes a restriction to the present tense where the knowledge of development/connection is absent; here, immediacy refers not to an absence of connectedness or relation, but to the circumstance in which relation is externally imposed. In diversity, different things are merely a heterogeneous aggregate "...indifferent to the difference between them..." (1975: § 117, p. 169). Hegel presents Comparison as an external agent that establishes a relation among diverse objects by articulating their difference or similarity. It soon becomes clear that in statements of specific difference, unity (or similarity) is implied, or is implicit. Likewise, statements that articulate similarity imply, or presuppose, difference.

Hegel chooses only bad examples to illustrate this relation of distinction. That is, he illustrates only what distinction is not, as in discovering the difference between a pen and a camel and the similarity of a beech to an oak. But even in bad examples, where in the first case, no point of similarity is evident, and in the second, where the difference is negligible, we still see that in comparison, a relation between two things may be premised on any of several points: a beech and an oak are both trees, both deciduous trees, and, as to their difference, they grow to different heights, have differently shaped leaves, grow in different soils. This variety of points on which to compare suggests that

there is nothing in an oak that especially demands its comparison to a beech. We can compare them on any of several points and when we do, we imply difference on speaking of similarities, and vice-versa. I think this is what Hegel means when he says that likeness and unlikeness reflect each other; each shines a light on the other, making the other visible as well as itself. Likeness and unlikeness become, by reason of this implicit reference to each other, the terms of reflexive difference, or difference implicit. Hegel says, likeness and unlikeness are "a pair of characteristics which are in completely reciprocal relation. The one of them cannot be thought without the other" (1975: § 118, p. 171). As a further specification of this reciprocity, Hegel presents the categories of Positive and Negative.

Positive and Negative are opposed. They do not merely reflect each other but are determined in exclusive relation to each other. In this exclusivity we see the first emergence of Necessity. This means that "the different is not confronted by *any* other but by *its* other" (1975: remark to § 119, p. 173). The positive and the negative are, in the exclusivity of their relation, elements of a whole and outside of this unity they would cease to be what they are. Hegel says, "the one of the two is, only insofar as it excludes the other from it, and thus relates itself thereto" (1975: remark to § 119, p. 174). Formal logic retains the excluded other, the residual category, as an abstract Negative. According to this way of thinking, the opposite of up would only be not - up. For Hegel, in contrast, the opposite term has a character of its own though it derives its character as opposite in its relation to its other. Down is the opposite of up and up is the opposite of down. Each is the residual category of the other; that is, it is not only the negative that

is the opposite of the positive, the positive is also the opposite of the negative. This is the basis for Hegel's statement that "both are potentially the same" (1975: § 120, p. 175). The relativity of positive and negative becomes their interchangeability, and as interchangeable, they collapse in upon each other. In this collapse is the formation of Ground. Positive and Negative form a ground, by falling to the ground.

The graphic representation of Ground as the inward collapse of positive and negative is one way of expressing that "the essential difference, as a difference, is only the difference of it from itself, and thus contains the identical as well as itself" (1975: § 120, p. 175). Difference posits a reference. To what does it refer? It cannot refer to something the same: that would not be difference. Difference refers to difference, and in doing this it refers to itself. This is essential difference as the unity of identity and difference: "self-relating difference...is likewise virtually enunciated as the self-identical" (1975: § 120, p. 175). Essence, at this point, is thus the logical expression of the situation expressed metaphorically in reflection. Hegel's illustration (§ 112) involved a ray of light and its reflection in a mirror. I tend to think of a face reflected in a mirror because I find that it gives a more forcible impression of the distinction between the object and its image. The reflected image is not the face itself; it is a separate object, different from the face itself. Yet, in giving an image of the face, it is related to it, as a version of the original. This is as much as is given in the category of Ground. Hegel says:

The ground and what is grounded are one and the same content: the difference between the two is the mere

difference of form which separates simple self-relation, on
the one hand, from mediation or derivativeness on the other

(1975: remark to § 121, p. 176).

To the category of Ground corresponds the law of sufficient ground, which does no more than this: "it asserts that things should essentially be viewed as mediated" (1975: remark to § 121, p. 176). Ground establishes essence as a relation, but the category of ground is limited to a reference that shows the direction of cause, without addressing the cause itself. As I have said before, Hegel's standpoint is not relations of cause and effect; in the Notion, cause and effect are superseded. Just as identity and difference are categories superseded in their unification, so it will be with cause and effect, but first they have to appear. Ground is a prototype of cause, in that it gives an idea of consequence, while it is, however, still "void of a content objectively and intrinsically determined, and is therefore not self-acting and productive" (1975: remark to § 121, p. 177). For the present, essence as reflection, as a relation of consequence, provides a context for Being that entitles it to the name Existence.

Existence is an indefinite multitude of existents: grounds and consequents exist and are determined as ground or as consequence depending on the specific direction in which their interconnection is traced. Existents, thus located in "a world of reciprocal dependence and of infinite interconnection" (1975: § 123, p. 179), are Things. The reflection-on-another, which is the interconnection, the relatedness, of existents, is likewise their reflection-on-self. The existent emerges from the ground, and in this way, its interconnectedness is as much its own self as it is a relation to otherness. The Thing is constituted as related-to-otherness; it does not exist by itself, and so its relatedness is

its own character. It holds within it, then, the differences by which/through which it is constituted, and, as the unity of these differences, is not coterminous with any single one of them. The differences, which are none of them directly merged with the thing as its exhaustive character, are Properties. The thing *has* properties. Since, in common usage, properties are often called qualities, Hegel recalls that quality is a category of Being which defines a somewhat completely. A somewhat is its quality, whereas a Thing is "not confined to this or that definite property" (1975: § 125, p. 182).

From the point of view of their independence, properties are Matters. As distinguishable and, in this sense, detachable, from the Thing, they are qualities proper: that is, abstractions. Strictly speaking, matters are the constituent elements of inorganic nature only, because only in inorganic nature can the constituent elements of a whole exist abstractly and independently, in accordance with the logical definition here provided. In organic nature, the elements, while distinguishable, are not capable of independent existence. An organic whole is thus, not merely the sum of its parts, but is greater than this sum. A thing, in this sense, not coterminous, nor reducible, to any of its constituent elements, nevertheless still falls short of organic unity, because

it subsists not on its own part, but consists of the matters,
and is only superficial association between them, an
external combination of them (1975: § 127, p. 184).

I infer from this that the category of Thing is not adequate when applied to organic life. A living thing is, by this interpretation, a loose expression, or as Hegel said of the common expression that a thing has qualities, "the phraseology is a misplaced one" (1975: § 125, p. 182). A thing is, from this point of view, the sum of its parts. As matter, these

parts are "the immediate unity of existence with itself" (§ 128, p. 184) which is the same as the self-identity of the thing, its reflection-on-self. This is an explicit contradiction of what was said earlier, when the attributes of the thing (from which matters were deduced) were distinguished from the thing-as-reflection-into-self. Compare:

the thing is reflection-into-self: for it is an identity which is also distinct from the difference, i.e., from its attributes (§ 125, p. 182).

and,

the thing has on the part of the matters its reflection-into-self (the reverse of § 125); it subsists not on its own part, but consists of the matters... (§ 127, p.184).

The import of this explicitly acknowledged contradiction seems to be that the Thing is a contradiction (1975: § 130, p. 185) and this contradiction is what makes Appearance or the Phenomenal inherently unstable (1975: see remark to § 131, p. 187: "Appearance is still divided against itself and without intrinsic stability".) Matter is the category in which this contradiction comes to the fore; it makes manifest the Thing's contradictory nature, because it is, as the immediate unity of existence with itself, the pure formlessness of abstract reflection-on-self as well as holding reflection-on-another within itself as Form. But it also seems that this disruption of the Thing into Matter and Form (1975: § 129, p. 185) as I have expressed it above is too rigid a distinction between them. There is no such thing as a matterless form, nor is there formless matter. The distinction between Matter and Form is, Hegel seems to say, a distinction retained only by reflective understanding which tries to decide whether the thing is a unity having external properties or whether it is no more than these external ties.

Appearance is this contradiction delineated above, at which the mind is not to rest but rather to acknowledge as instability. The appearance of contradiction distinguishes the sphere of Essence from Being; the contradiction that now shines forth was implicit in Being. Hegel says:

Appearance is higher than mere Being - a richer category because it holds in combination the two elements of reflection-into-self and reflection-into-another: whereas Being (or immediacy) is still mere relationlessness, and apparently rests upon itself alone.

(1975: remark to § 131, p. 187)

We have then, appearance as an advance, as viewed in comparison to Being. When we say, on the other hand, that something is *only* an appearance, we refer to the inadequacy of the category: that it does not resolve its contradiction. This is the view of Appearance from the point of view of the Notion. From this point of view, appearance is to be seen as "grounded not in itself, but on something else" (1975: remark to § 131, p. 187). How does the contradictoriness of appearance imply that it is grounded on something else? Here we are at the phenomenal, where experience begins, which is for us, instead, produced as a result, as the truth of Being. This truth shows Being to be just what appearance is now said to be: grounded not in itself, but on something else. From this, the question as to how appearance, as a sphere of contradiction, implies a ground outside itself is answered. Although its contradiction is explicit, it holds resolution implicit

within it, as its ground, and it will itself emerge as the 'something else' referred to².

Hegel says,

"The Apparent or Phenomenal exists in such a way, that its subsistence is *ipso facto* thrown into abeyance or suspended and is only one stage in the form itself" (1975: § 132, p. 188)

Form, as we saw it last, manifested the Thing's reflection-on-something-else, the import of which is that it carried within it the differences of the Thing, or, put another way, the difference of the Thing from itself. Now the further implications of this are developed. The form, in manifesting the difference of the thing from itself, seems to be a prototype of the general: it is at once the totality of forms as well as appearing as a specific instance of itself. Hegel does not say that the phenomenon is form, or is a form, rather he says that the phenomenon's subsistence is one stage in the form itself and that it has its essence "only in another aspect of the form" (1975: § 132, p. 188). I take this to mean that the phenomenon appears as form, and that phenomena, as forms, are related, or refer to each other as the differences of themselves from themselves:

the self-relation of the phenomenon is completely specified, it has the **Form** in itself: and because it is in this identity, has it as essential subsistence. So it comes about that the form is **Content** (1975: § 133, p. 189).

Self-related, or self-reflected form is content. By such a statement as this, which I think is true to Hegel's meaning, content can nevertheless come to be identified with essence.

²I think, perhaps, that because reflective thinking (understanding) holds the phenomenal and the cognitive as separate, there might be some temptation here to forecast a cognitive imposition of resolution on the contradiction of phenomenal existence. But the contradiction is itself no less cognitive than the resolution (See 1976: note 44 to § 185, p. 354 and 1975: remark to § 24, p. 43).

And if essence is as in formal logic, taken for an attribute of the phenomenon, an opposition of form and content develops. The formal opposition of these categories presupposes a formless content and contentless form, neither of which exists in the Hegelian conception of form and content.

As Hegel presents form and content, they are opposed only insofar as content is the self-relatedness of form *as opposed* to external, or indifferent form. External form is form "not reflected into self" (1975: § 133, p. 189); this is form that is "equivalent to the negative of the phenomenon" (1975: § 133, p. 189). Form and content is thus the new configuration of reflection-into-self and reflection-into-otherness. Now we can say that the way in which the Phenomenal is "divided against itself" (1975: remark to § 131, p. 187) is the "doubling of form" (1975: § 133, p. 189) in which self-relatedness is form as content and relation-to-otherness is indifferent or external form. This division, as the appearance of essence, is relativity, or correlation. Hegel says, "the phenomenon is relativity or correlation" (1975: § 134, p. 191) and this encapsulates, almost poetically, the contradiction that confronts us. The phenomenon, which is a thing, a unity, is also a relation, that is, more than one thing, or at least two things. Hegel defines relativity this way:

one and the same thing, viz. the content or the developed form, is seen as the externality and antithesis of independent existences, and as their reduction to a relation of identity, in which identification alone the two things distinguished are what they are (1975: § 134, p. 191).

What corresponds to this apparent contradiction, that unity is division and/or that division is unity, is first of all the relation of Whole and Parts. The content (developed form) is

the whole that contains the parts as its difference from itself. The whole is a unity, yet its existence as a unity of parts contradicts what unity is supposed to imply. The parts, on the other hand, are diverse and independent, but they are parts only as related to one another, that is, when they are taken together as the whole; their independence contradicts their existence as parts. As Hegel says of this relation,

the notion and the reality of the relation are not in harmony. The notion of the whole is to contain parts: but if the whole is taken and made what its notion implies, i.e., if it is divided, it at once ceases to be a whole (1975: remark to § 135, p. 191).

Cognition is still, when it understands its object according to this relation, at a stage inappropriate for the study of organic life. At this stage, cognition is the work properly called analysis, which takes a living or concrete body and dissects it. Hegel gives anatomy as an example of an appropriate application of analytical thinking: anatomy shows the human body as composed of parts that combine to form a whole, but this operation can only be performed on a body that has ceased to live. Analysis cannot give an account of the movement and development of organic life.

An advance beyond the mechanical relation of whole and parts is made in cognizing the relation of content and form as a relation of Force and its Expression. What was presented, in analysis, as the whole, comes to be seen as an activity, a force that puts itself forward with diverse results. Whereas realizing the whole brings about its decomposition into parts, force continues to be what it is in its exertion. The force is not lost as soon as we cognize it from the point of view of its expression. Cognition of the phenomenon according to the categories of force and expression is the cognition of

what was lacking, what was unthought, in the thinking that formed the phenomenon as a relation of whole and parts: force is movement. Does this mean that movement is now our object? Am I misguidedly fixated on this transition? As movement, though still finite because not self-originating, the category of force seems to foretell the difference of Hegel's substance from Spinoza's. Force is the first thought of a self-differentiated whole, which Hegel expresses thus:

The very act of out-putting accordingly sets in abeyance the diversity of the two sides which is found in this correlation, and expressly states the identity which virtually constitutes their content.

(1975: § 137, p. 196).

Hegel says that the truth of force and expression is the relation of Inward and Outward; in other words, force gives a unity of reflection-on-self and reflection-into-something-else such that reflections-into-something-else appear as the forth-coming (out-putting) of reflection-into-self.

Hegel speaks of the categories of Inward and Outward as the Understanding treats them. As always, the understanding can deal only with abstract oppositions. Held apart, the Inward appears to be essence and the Outward, the unessential. Essence, according to this way of thinking, is pure reflection-into-self, or pure self-identity. The Outward is a purely external, or indifferent form, without connection, it would seem, to the so-called essence. This treatment of Inward and Outward is a wresting apart of what has already been logically related. Essence has not been developed in isolation from reality, from form, from diversity or multiplicity; these are not synonymous terms but are made so only by a formal thinking that grasps the distinction of Inward and Outward and holds

them in isolation. What Outward signifies, for Hegel, is an external cognitive vantage point of the kind that we saw earlier in Being-for-another as distinguished from Being-for-self. Hegel gives as an illustration of the distinction between Outward and Inward the situation of a child, who is for his parents and teachers something other than what he is for himself. For himself, or from his own vantage point, he is not yet reasonable. His own reason is not yet actual while he remains a child, and reason, in the form of religion and science, appears to him as "an outward authority" (1975: remark to § 140, p. 198). His education and maturation are the coming to be, the actualization, of "his own and inward nature" (1975: remark to § 140, p. 198), which is to be reasonable, and it is also the actualization of what his parents knew of him all along. It is in this sense that:

Actuality is the unity, become immediate, of essence with existence, or of inward with outward" (1975: § 142, p. 200).

This defines actuality in the terms with which we are most recently familiar; inward and outward are the categories from which the logical advance to actuality is made. But inward and outward are categories of the sphere of Appearance, and it is the contradictions of this sphere that actuality solves/resolves.

Earlier I said, and quoted Hegel as saying, that Appearance is divided against itself and that Appearance is unstable. In light of these statements, actuality may be defined as a sphere of stable unity, provided stability is not construed as stasis. Hegel describes the movement of the actual in the following way:

The actual is exempted from transition, and its externality is its energizing. In that energizing it is reflected into

itself: its existence is only the manifestation of itself, not of another.

(1975: § 142, p. 201)

That the actual is exempted from transition cannot mean that it deviates from the form of all logical truth. At the beginning of the *Logic*, Hegel said that every logical entity is to be understood as a passage of three moments in logical time. In each logical entity, thinking makes a transition from a phase of immediacy to a mediate phase and, finally, to a resolution of the contradictions or oppositions exposed in the phase of thought's dividedness. It must be transition of another kind/in another sense from which actuality is exempt, and I can only think that it must be the transition that thought had to make from the knowledge of its self-unity/self-identity (its relation to itself) to its knowledge of heterogeneous otherness. That is to say, throughout the doctrine of Being and the doctrine of Essence thinking always had to make a transition, in the sense of crossing over, from self to other and its resolutions of contradiction/opposition never accomplished the transition that finally incorporates otherness as self. In actuality, otherness is superseded; the actual "is reflected into itself: its existence is only the manifestation of itself, not of an other" (1975: § 142, p. 201). In the phase of its immediacy, actuality is possibility. We know that the first moment of logical entities asserts the whole, and so actuality begins with the assertion that everything is possible. This inwardness of the actual, that anything is possible, corresponds to an immediate outward face or externality that is pure contingency. If anything or everything is possible, the reality that is, is by that fact not necessary, but merely accidental. Such a reality is, but guided only by the thought of what is possible, might just as well not have been. In the case of a child, it

may seem that anything is possible for him while he is still an infant. And whatever he is, as an infant and in the process of his attaining to reason, may appear as no more than the accident of circumstance. Understood in this way, the child is a creature of circumstance, conditioned from without. The movement he must make is toward self-conditioning, and this movement is, first of all, expressed in the thought of real possibility, in which the principle of necessity is discernible. In questions of necessity, we are looking for antecedents that are still contained in, not lost or external to, the situation with which we are concerned. Necessity implies a self-relation; it implies that what stands before us is derived from itself.

Necessity, as Hegel uses the term, refers to teleological action in which "we have in the end of action a content which is already foreknown" (1975: remark to § 147, p. 209). If necessity seems blind, if it seems to give a result that surprises, this can only be attributed to a fault of individual cognition. Necessity is a logical principle and, according to Hegel, the process of cognition in general. In this process, in the working out of necessity, we begin with "scattered circumstances" (1975: remark to § 147, p. 209), which assert themselves initially as positive but which collapse in upon each other. Out of this collapse, which is a negation, something else proceeds: a "new actuality", "quite another thing" (1975: § 147, p. 209). If this new actuality, which shows itself as a unity, where before we saw only a scattered multiplicity, comes upon the mind unexpectedly, we are to deduce only that we did not comprehend the design that was all along in the process of actualizing itself. In the Hegelian view of cognition, the world and cognition are one and the same content. He says, "The intellectual principle underlying the idea of

divine providence will hereafter be shown to be the notion" (1975: § 147, p. 209). In other words, the notion is the cognition of design, but insofar as this might still suggest a separation of cognition and design it may be better to say that cognition is design. This means that the world does not develop in alienation from cognition: the logical movement of cognition is in correspondence with the world, and this correspondence is actuality. Necessity overcomes contingency in resolving the relation of inner and outer into a single motion (1975: § 147, p. 208). It shows the actual to be an "immediate self-translation of inner into outer, and of outer into inner" (1975: § 147, p. 208). This self-translation is the relation of Substance and Accident such that Substance is the self-relating principle that unifies contingency. I think another way to say this might be that necessity reveals itself in the accidental, or contingent, as substance. By this means substance gives a relation of causality in which it is both cause and effect. Substance is the means by which cognition bends the infinite series of causes and effects and "transforms the infinite progression into a self-contained relationship." (1975: § 154, p. 217).

This is the point towards which we have been working: where Substance emerges as the unifying principle among diverse phenomena. From this point, Hegel continues and develops the Doctrine of the Notion, in which the standpoint of Substance is superseded. Hegel's remarks on Spinoza have already given some suggestion as to how this might be accomplished. Spinoza made too little of diversity; he denied it any participation in Truth, by making Truth only substantial and not subjective. In Hegel, we have seen how substance is reformulated as a genetic principle of connection discernible

in heterogeneous finitude. But the principle of Subjectivity still remains largely unexplored. My intention here has been to investigate the concept of Substance, and I turn now, not to the Doctrine of the Notion, but instead, to Marx. In Marx, we will see how the concept of substance operates in Marx's analysis of commodity exchange.

Chapter 4

In Marx, my inquiry begins from the sixth Thesis on Feuerbach, in which Marx says, "the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality it is the ensemble of the social relations" (Tucker, 1978: p. 145). This statement has a Hegelian origin and I wish to show something of this origin. By expressing my intention in this way I mean to preclude the possibility of interpreting my statements about Marx as an attempt to transform Marx into a Hegelian, or into Hegel himself. In speaking of origins, I mean to suggest the irreducibility of Marxian dialectics to Hegelian dialectics at the same time that I point to a similarity between them. It is true, I think, when Ilyenkov says of the sixth Thesis that "Here one clearly sees not only the sociological principle of Marx's thinking, but also its logical principle" (Ilyenkov, 1977: p. 358). By this he means that Marx produces a sociological vision when he formulates the human essence as the total or whole of human relations rather than as an attribute of individuals. Marx constructs the human essence dividually, as the product of social relations and so his sociological insight is made possible, or is created, by the method of his thinking. This misses something important, however, since Hegel also worked according to this method and was, as Marx says, "the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner" (Tucker, 1978: p. 302), but his work is not by this fact sociological. What is the difference between them then, that leads in Hegel's case to philosophy and in Marx's to sociology? A preliminary answer to this question, I think, is in the elements each one chose as the dividual components of his thinking. Marx

discusses this in his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. In the Critique, he says of Hegel:

the idea is made the subject and the actual relation of family and civil society to the state is conceived as its *internal imaginary* activity (Tucker, 1978: p. 16).

This is Marx's description of Hegel's theoretical model of Actuality, or Idea. He identifies the components of this model as cognition (idea) and empirical existence, which are related, as I would say, antinomially, or as Marx says, in such a way that empirical existence is the internal imaginary activity of cognition. Marx wanted to show that the individual elements productive of history are not, as Hegel would have it, mind and empirical phenomena, but humans themselves. He says:

The fact is that the state issues from the multitude in their existence as members of families and as members of civil society. Speculative philosophy expresses this fact as the idea's deed, not as the idea of the multitude, but as the deed of a subjective idea different from the fact itself (Tucker, 1978: p. 17).

Marx's materialism, when he writes this, consists in his proposing that empirical existence does not have a significance different from itself. He says that really existing human beings are the active subjects through which the family, civil society, and the state come into existence. At this point, as well, his vision of socialized humanity is still democracy. He was still preoccupied with the 'activity as such' to which he refers in the first Thesis on Feuerbach (Tucker, 1978: p. 143). Ironically, by the time he wrote the Theses on Feuerbach, he had already given the economic sphere of human existence a position of dominance relative to other spheres, and so was actually no longer concerned with activity as such, but with economic activity specifically. When he wrote the Critique, he was

attempting still to formulate a model of human activity, or social being, in which all spheres of human life, the political, economic, familial, and intellectual, were in organic unity with each other. It seems that he could not, for some reason, pursue this formulation of activity and began to focus his thinking on economic activity.

Much later, he summarized the results of this shift as follows:

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of the development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general (Tucker, 1978: p. 4).

I wonder if this shift was made necessary by a limitation in method, which he shared with Hegel, such that he had to naturalize activity as an object, a theoretical object and that this required the specification of activity as some definite kind of activity. Once this is done, other kinds of activity have a significance different from themselves, similar to the way that empirical existence has a significance different from itself in Hegel. However close Marx may have been initially to an idea of human activity similar to Zilberman's, where human actors are themselves the dividual elements of activity, he produced in the end a model of actuality that naturalizes activity as a theoretical object. The summary of his opinions reveals a model of actuality in which activity, I think, becomes a theoretical model of human activity in which the human species is the naturalized subject in an antinomial relation to its objects which are, collectively, its productions. The

objects include not only the material products of subjective activity, but also immaterial, or idealized, objects such as the forms of intellectual, political, and familial life.

This relation of subject and object is, in Marx as in Hegel, a dissolution of the *prima facie* experiential opposition between them. In both Hegel and Marx, the subject, as one element of the dividually constructed model of actuality is itself two-fold: it is both differentiating, as subjective, and relating, as substantial. In this thesis, I have focused on the self-relating power attributed to Cognition in Hegel's work, specifically in the (small) *Logic*. Now I would like to turn to the self-relating power of human productive activity in Marx. My objective in looking at Marx is a very limited one. I wish only to show how a knowledge of Hegel's objective logic, which includes the doctrines of Being and Essence, influences a reading of Marx's chapter on the Fetishism of Commodities in Capital.

Marx begins Capital with an analysis of commodities. He says that "wealth appears as an immense collection of commodities" (Marx, 1954: p. 43), specifically in "the form of society we are about to consider" (Marx, 1954: p. 44), the capitalist social formation. The commodity is the basic unit of wealth in the capitalist social formation. For Marx, wealth is always the result of productive activity and commodities are the form of wealth specific to capitalist relations of production. He begins Capital this way for a reason that presupposes the reader's knowledge of subject-object relations in dialectical thinking. He says that the character of the product must be the same as the character of the activity: "the product is after all but the summary of the activity of production" (Tucker, 1978: p. 73). If knowledge of the product gives also knowledge of the activity

and the relations within which it occurs, we have a statement about the object that says it still holds its antecedents or the processes of its formation within it.

The first thing to know about a commodity is that it is a use-value. A use-value is a specific article of utility, a coat, a table, a loaf of bread. It is a product of labour that, by its physical qualities, is capable of satisfying a human need or want. The product's useful, physical qualities are objective and intrinsic to it, and the product's usefulness is realized in consumption; use-value is realized through consumption. Products of human labour always possess use-value: use-values "constitute the material content of all wealth, whatever its social form may be" (Marx, 1977: p. 126). Because of this, analysis of use-values does not give knowledge of the social relations of the capitalist form.

Commodities, however, possess another property, in addition to use-value, and this property is value. Value is an objective quality of the commodity but, unlike use-value, has nothing to do with the physical characteristics of the commodity. Marx explains that commodities are exchanged in definite quantities. Commodities that are exchanged must be different use-values, but in exchange, these qualitatively different articles are equated quantitatively: x tea is exchanged for y linen or z sugar. The exchange is always made between definite quantities of different articles. From this Marx says it is clear that "the valid exchange-values of a particular commodity express something equal and...exchange-value cannot be anything other than the mode of expression, the form of appearance, of a content distinguishable from it" (Marx, 127). That is, both commodities in an exchange relation are reducible to a common element represented in both. Since this common

element can have nothing to do with the physical properties that give commodities their qualitatively different use-values, valid exchange-values must be based on the fact that all commodities are products of labour, labour abstracted from the particular skills and operations that give the commodity its useful qualities. Abstract labour, congealed in the product, is the common element, the "value-forming substance" that finds its expression in exchange-value. The magnitude of value is determined, then, by the quantity of abstract, homogeneous labour embodied in the commodity. Labour is measured in time and therefore we can say that the value of a commodity is determined by the labour time required to produce it. Not forgetting that the labour is abstract, homogeneous labour, where each individual's labour is one unit, identical with every other unit in the homogeneous mass of the total labour of society, we realize that the labour-time determining value is "the labour-time which is necessary on average, or in other words is socially necessary. Socially necessary labour-time is the labour-time required to produce any use-value under the conditions of production normal for a given society and with the average degree of skill and intensity of labour prevalent in that society" (Marx, 1977: p. 129). From this we can see that value is a property of the commodity that is social in origin, or that value is a social property of commodities. It is objective and, congealed in the commodity, appears as a natural property of it. Whereas use-value, which pertains to the natural, physical qualities of the object, is realized in consumption, value, a social quality, is realized in exchange.

Both use-value and value go together to make up a commodity; the commodity has a dual character. Since the product is the summary of the activity, the labour that

produces commodities also has a dual character. Insofar as it produces use-values, it is concrete labour, that is, in the particular capitalist form, particular labour. The labour that produces value is abstract. This means that the determinants of value are implicit in use-value and that, therefore, abstract labour, i.e. simple, homogeneous labour without regard for its specific character, is implicit in concrete labour. It is only in the capitalist social formation that productive activity is divided, abstracting one aspect of productive activity. Under other circumstances the social character of productive activity would be contained within, be in organic unity with, the production of useful articles, not achieving a significance separate from the article's specific utility.

Hegel calls civil society the stage of division. There the phrase refers to the division in which everything particular belongs to civil society, or the economic sphere. It is the stage in which the principle of particularity develops itself, and the general is separate, exerting a regulating force upon the sphere of particularity. With a meaning appropriate to Marx's system, the phrase can also be applied to Marx's analysis of the bourgeois form. It is a stage of division: the general and the particular are divided. The general is abstracted, with value encompassing the general or universal character in human productive activity, in that it derives from the totality of social relations. It is abstract generality, abstract equality. Use-value becomes the abstract particular and the production of use-values, the abstract sphere of particularity. The general also exerts here a regulative or normative force upon the particular, as it did in Hegel's system (although there, the process and the meaning attached to universality and particularity were

different). This normative force, which the abstract general exerts, expresses itself in the exchange relation.

In the simple or accidental exchange-relation a single commodity is exchanged for another. The two commodities, A and B, are different use-values; their particular characters are different. Their relation is regulated or controlled by the general, the social substance, labour, sedimented in them. Both commodities participate in this social substance as one aspect of their dual character, along with their particularity (use-value). Since we have described the capitalist formation as the stage of division and noted the division of general and particular in the products of labour in this formation, we know that the general and particular are not in organic unity with each other within the commodity form. Both are contained in the commodity, but in opposition to one another. This opposition becomes manifest in the exchange relation. This is what is meant by saying that the commodity realizes itself in exchange. In the exchange relation, Commodity A assumes the relative form of value. This means, paraphrasing Marx, Commodity A expresses its value in Commodity B. Commodity B serves as the material, i.e., the material, physical body, in which A expresses its substantial character. The material body of B is use-value, the specific, particular article of utility, as, for example, a coat. The substantiality of A is its value, the crystallization in it of social labour (the non-sensuous, social property of the commodity).

In the exchange-relation, each commodity expresses only one side of its dual character; Commodity A its value and Commodity B its use-value. The two aspects, or moments, contained in each commodity when they lay outside the exchange-relation, now,

within the exchange-relation appear in two bodies. Within a given relation a commodity cannot be both value and use-value. Where, for example, x Commodity A = y Commodity B (x Commodity A is worth y Commodity B), A appears as value only and B as use-value only: "the same commodity cannot...simultaneously appear in both forms in the same expression of value" (Marx, 140). Thus the abstraction of general and particular which characterizes the commodity form is expressed, made manifest, in the exchange relation.

The relative form of value is the active side of the exchange-relation and the equivalent form is passive. Commodity A expressed its value in B, and B is only the material, the passive body, in which A realizes its value. The exchange relation is, in other words, where the social quality of the commodity 'comes to life', and that is what makes the relation between commodities a social relation. The commodity realizes its fetishistic character in exchange. A fetish is an inanimate object endowed with life and this is precisely what the commodity is. It is an object, a thing, which, by virtue of the social substance sedimented in it, is transformed into a subject in the exchange-relation.

Marx says, as soon as the product of labour (a table in the following example),

emerges as a commodity, it changes into a thing which transcends sensuousness. It not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own free will" (Marx, 163-164).

The metaphor is ironic, for while it is absurd to imagine a table twisting about in the air, the commodity does, after all, act in the exchange-relation.

The social property of the commodity, invisible and non-sensuous, yet objective, reveals itself, in coming to life, by relating itself to another thing outside itself. In the simple exchange-relation this other thing is another single commodity. The two commodities are in an ideal relation of substantiality. The relative form, Commodity A, realizes or materializes its substantiality in the equivalent form, B, and the equivalent form is the ideal being of the relative form. The ideal being of B is distinct from its real being; its sensuous, bodily form is use-value and gives no indication of its ideal dimension. The other commodity becomes a symbol for the first. The symbol is a sensuous body: "But this body, while remaining itself, proves at the same time to be the being of another body and as such its 'ideal being', its meaning, which is quite distinct from its bodily form immediately perceived by the ears or eyes" (Ilyenkov, 1977: 266). The physical body of B, use-value, is the abstract particular, whereas its ideal being is value, the abstract general. Ilyenkov says: "The ideal is consequently the subjective being of the object, or its 'otherness' i.e. the being of one object in and through another, as Hegel expressed this situation" (Ilyenkov, 1977: 265). The ideal dimension of B, the passive object of A's activity, is the subjective being of A. The peculiar situation here is that the subject is a commodity, a thing, but we have already noted its fetishistic character. Here we only see more clearly how it acts, that is, it ideally posits the other commodity as itself.

Another way to say that commodity A ideally posits B as itself is to say that A makes B a substitute for itself. This is the same as saying that A makes B an image of itself or, conversely, that B is the reflected image of A. This brings us to an explicitly

Hegelian phrasing of the situation: the relation of two commodities in exchange is reflective. We know already the import of reflection as Hegel develops it in the *Doctrine of Essence*. It is both a visual and a temporal metaphor for substantial relations as relations of causality. Cause appears visually as the original of a reflected image or as an original in relation to its substitute. As a temporal figure, reflection recalls the past as a formative influence on a present state of affairs. In both the visual and the temporal we are to see the relation between two objects as a relation of one to a version or image of itself. This is the relation of two commodities in exchange. In exchange, commodity A expresses only value, commodity B only use-value. A relates itself to B as an image of itself, as an image, therefore, of value. Because reflection shows the past in the present, it is the value-forming character of productive activity, its social character, that is revealed in the act of exchange. At this point the commodity relation, which shows value (commodity A) as the truth of use-value (commodity B), reveals its past. In other words, when the two-sided character of the commodity is realized in exchange, we are able to excavate its origins. Realized in exchange, the commodity relation becomes our figurative present relative to the process of its formation.

We are now in a position to understand how the product of labour reflects the activity of production. The dual character of the commodity should reflect a divided activity. We will expect to find that productive activity has, on one hand, a social, value-forming character and, on the other, a private character that creates use-values. Since we also know that commodity A, as value, relates itself to B as an expression of itself, we will characterize value-forming labour as self-relating, unifying, or reductive activity.

Marx calls this simple, abstract, or homogeneous labour. Value-forming labour is labour in the abstract, reduced from its particular character to its character as simple human labour. Marx describes this reduction:

skilled labour counts only as simple labour intensified, or rather, as multiplied simple labour, a given quantity of skilled being considered equal to a greater quantity of simple labour (Tucker, 1978: 310-311).

This is the same reduction we saw in the exchange relation, where commodity A, as value, reduced B, as use-value, to itself. In this situation, the substantiality of human activity, its self-relatedness, is abstracted from its subjective, or self-differentiating, character. This abstraction/dividedness lies dormant, and so, concealed, until it is realized/expressed in the act of exchange, which is however already one remove from the activity itself. We see the dividedness of the activity only in the dividedness of its image or substitute. As Marx describes it, this account for the fetishistic character of commodities. The commodities replicate between them the circumstances of their production. Moreover, they replace these circumstances, establishing themselves as self-sufficient reality. Value then appears as a natural attribute of the commodity. Here is where Marx makes a decisive departure from Hegel. In Hegel, I don't think we find that the object takes up a life of its own, naturalizes its attributes, and asserts its self-sufficiency. In Hegel, it seems, cognitive activity not only produces its objects (for examples, logical categories or the state) but also exposes the process of their formation; these seem to be one and the same activity. In contrast, the Marxian object is obscure with respect to its origins.

Conclusion

As I said at the beginning of this paper, my primary aim has been to show how the concept of substance operates in Hegelian logic as a mechanism of reduction. Substance reduces the "manifold expanse of life" to unity by revealing the apparent heterogeneity of phenomena as a self-relating, self-differentiating whole. The power of self-relation and of reduction are the same. Substance shows a relation between diverse phenomena by showing one to be a reflection, an image (or a version) of the other; in other words, substance shows a relation by reducing one phenomenon to another. This method of connecting by reducing is how Hegel resolves the problem of antinomy. When confronted with contradictory yet equally valid propositions, Hegel is able to maintain both by showing that one is the reflected image of the other. Whether we speak of phenomena or of propositions, Hegel resolves mutually exclusive difference into a unity of substantial, or reflective, connections. Marx follows this method of formulating the connections among heterogeneous phenomena according to the principle of substance. But whereas Hegel used the reflective metaphor to show that the object is a product and how it is derived, Marx uses it to show this as well as that the product conceals its origins. This is almost accurate. It fails however to acknowledge Hegel's distinction between the apparent and the actual, which was his way of expressing the product's obscurity. But Hegel is always working towards closing the distance between the activity and its product. He works to resolve antinomy/contradiction as quickly and as cleanly as possible. Marx is more willing than Hegel to dwell on the antinomial relation of the product and its original. In figurative terms, we could say that Hegel and Marx each

studied two faces. Hegel looked for the features that indicated a family resemblance and called one the offspring of the other. Marx accepted this and yet became preoccupied with features that seemed unique to each, concluding finally, that one was a transformation or metamorphosis of the other. In the idea of metamorphosis, he does not abandon the ideas of connection and of development, but he calls attention to a drastic alteration in form.

This attention to characteristics that obscure the connection between forms in a metamorphic development raises new problems for thinking. Mamardashvili says that Marx reveals "a new objective continent that was not there for previous thought and which subsequent thought cannot afford to ignore" (101). This new objective continent is an object that still contains the mechanisms of its formation within it as a sedimented substratum, but it also presents itself as independent. It conceals this substratum, as it were, beneath a surface terrain of independence. This new configuration of the object destabilizes the relation of object and subject that Hegel developed. This new object exposes the antinomial relation of subject and object. I think this is the problem to which Marx left European thought heir. Moreover, I think that in the approach to this problem lies the European point of entry to Zilberman's work.

I introduced this paper with references to Zilberman's work in order to express at the outset my expectation that neither Hegel nor Marx formulate a method appropriate for inter-cultural understanding. I took as a point of departure, Zilberman's claim that both are monistic thinkers. I can now conclude that for Hegel and Marx monistic reduction is achieved in part by dissolving the opposition of subject and object and that the concept

of substance is instrumental in this dissolution. It is also clear now why substitution seemed an apter term for subjective activity in Marx than the term differentiation, which was appropriate for Hegel. Substitution expresses the independent character that Marx's object has. The Marxian object's independence is its most important characteristic from our point of view because of its consequences for the relation of subject and object. I have tried to show how far Marx's treatment of this relation depends on Hegel's concept of substance. Now I would like to discuss briefly how Marx's attention to the object's independence undermines the correspondence of subject and object that Hegel established and exposes the antinomicity of subject and object. Marx says,

The characters that stamp products as commodities, and whose establishment is a necessary preliminary to the circulation of commodities, have already acquired the stability of natural, self-understood forms of social life, before man seeks to decipher, not their historical character, for in his eyes they are immutable, but their meaning (Tucker, 1978: 324).

This states the problem of the Marxian object: it presents itself as an exhaustive, and specifically, as a timeless reality. The question of its past, of the process of its formation, never arises. If we want to know how it happens that the formative activity congealed in the object is invisible, we must consider again the metaphor of reflection. This time we will consider the reflection of light in the eye that produces a visual image. Marx says, "the light from an object is perceived by us not as the subjective excitation of our optic nerve, but as the objective form of something outside the eye" (Tucker, 1978: 321). The activity that produces the visual image is not itself visible, not discernible, anywhere in the product-object. How does this compare with Hegel's version of the reflective

metaphor? On one hand, Marx still shows a reflective relation between two phenomena: an objective image in the present is to be understood as the reflected form of an activity in the past. Labour is the activity that is formative yet invisible in the objective image. On the other hand, this new way of stating the metaphor does not seem compatible with the version in which past and present could appear as a face and its reflected image in a mirror. In the latter we present the formative original as an object juxtaposed to another object; in the former, the formative original which is a formative activity is presented as such in the figure itself. This seems to improve the metaphor: by representing the activity of production as activity. It shows, moreover, what Marx has wanted to emphasize: an obvious distinction between the activity and its objective form. But now that the object is no longer transparent, the unity of subject and object seems open to question. Previously, their unity was unequivocally established. The self-differentiating activity that Hegel presented introduced an idea of multiplicity, but it was governed by a unifying principle. In Marx, self-differentiating activity is less clearly identifiable as self-unifying. Possible confusion about the object's origins and its prepossessing air of independence make for a complicated, uneasy reduction. The antinomial relation of activity and product now resists resolution. Subject and object begin to seem distinct, as they were in the situation that Zilberman calls the elementary cognitive situation (1988: 21) and as the Hindu philosopher Samkara says they are (Zilberman, 1988: ??). The antinomial relation of subject and object refuses to subside in unity and we must look for a new way to approach it.

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