INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI®

THE ROOTS OF FOREST POLICY ISSUES: THE "CONSERVATION–PRESERVATION CONFLICT" AND ITS ROLE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA'S FOREST POLICY

BY

JACQUELINE V. A. MIKOLASH

Canada

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
****
COPYRIGHT PERMISSION PAGE

THE ROOTS OF FOREST POLICY ISSUES: THE
"CONSERVATION-PRESERVATION CONFLICT" AND ITS ROLE
IN BRITISH COLUMBIA'S FOREST POLICY

by

Jacqueline V.A. Mikolash

A Thesis/Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University

of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree

of

Master of Public Administration

Jacqueline V.A. Mikolash © 1999

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It has been my extreme good fortune to work at the University of Winnipeg Library and also attend courses at the University. The University of Winnipeg possesses some of the finest support staff and faculty anywhere. I would first like to thank all of my friends at the Library and throughout the University for their friendship over the years. A special thanks goes to Coreen Koz for her guidance and for first opening the door of the University to me.

I would also like to thank the many professors who taught me throughout the years. Special thanks however, go to the Geography Department, the Department of Environmental Studies and of course the Master of Public Administration Programme. The M.P.A. Programme is a Joint Masters Programme between the University of Manitoba and the University of Winnipeg and I am therefore also very grateful to the staff and faculty of the University of Manitoba for their assistance over the years. Special thanks go to Ms. Catharine Dunlop and Ms. Jacqueline Cote for handling my numerous requests and inquiries. Special thanks to the University of Manitoba Libraries as well.

In particular I would like to thank Dr. Robert Adie for first suggesting I enroll in the M.P.A. programme and also for his support during the many courses I took from him. I am also very pleased to have been able to be a student of Dr. Andrew Lockery and thank him for developing the Environmental Studies Programme and inspiring an interest in the environment not only or myself but for countless other students. Thank you as well to Professor Marek Debicki, the chair of my Thesis Defence. However, this thesis would not have been possible were it not for my advisor, Dr. Ken Gibbons. His energy, interest and knowledge of Public Administration is the backbone of the M.P.A. programme. Despite numerous commitments he continually has time to guide students.

Finally, I must thank my family. I cannot thank my Mom and Dad enough for everything they have done for me, or my Aunt Ollie for always being there, or Jordan for being unselfish and sharing his computer time. Last but not least, however, I am deeply thankful for my better half-my husband Tim. Without his support, encouragement and laughter this would have been an impossible task.

ABSTRACT

Conflict and controversy have surrounded natural resource management in Canada and the United States for a century. This thesis focuses on the "conservation-preservation conflict", a well known issue in resource management. A historical overview of British Columbia's forest policy is presented in an attempt to display the vital role that this conflict of values plays in the understanding of past and present forest policy decisions. An understanding of the role this conflict plays is necessary as the next century's forest policy issues will probably also involve debates between the conservation and preservation interests over an ever-shrinking field of resources.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAC – Annual allowable cut

TFL – Tree Farm Licence

PSYU – Public sustained yield units

CORE – Commission on Resources and the Environment

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The end of this century is a time of concern about what the next century will bring, as well as a time to reflect on what has happened in the past. A glance at Canadian history illustrates the importance of Canada's natural resources to its development, as Canadian economic development has been dominated by the export of natural resources such as furs, minerals, fish and timber products. Therefore, given the significance of natural resources to the Canadian economy, this is an appropriate time to analyze what has happened to Canada's natural resource policies in the last hundred years. Policy decisions made today are not isolated from events in the past. It is important to realize that concern regarding the depletion of natural resources and debates regarding their management are not new. At the beginning of this century many important decisions were made regarding the future of Canada's minerals, rivers, wildlife and forests.

Forest policy in British Columbia (B.C.) has been chosen to illustrate how natural resource policy has evolved over the last hundred years. This policy area and this province have been chosen because many of the forces which affect forest policy in B.C. affect other provinces and other resource management issues, such as wetland management, wildlife management, and wilderness preservation. British Columbia's forest policy has also recently received a great deal of attention and become a focus of concern, not only for British Columbia and the rest of Canada, but also around the world.

Forest policy is a product of history, geography, culture, philosophy, and politics. While it is hoped that this thesis is of interest to those in these disciplines, it may also be of interest to those who are concerned with how policy in general evolves. As well, this

thesis may be of interest to anyone who is concerned with the future of Canada's natural

resources, as public debate regarding their fate enters its second century.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Hartley V. Lewis (1976: 4) maintains that any discussion concerning forest policy

in British Columbia should emphasize forestry's extreme importance, as it is the

area of public policy which governs the heart of economic life in British Columbia.

Hoberg and Morawski (1997: 391) agree and have described the importance of forestry

in the economy. The forest industry in British Columbia represents the single largest

component of the provincial economy and 30% of provincial employment is dependent

on the forest. The forest harvesting industry figures larger in B.C.'s economy than in any

other province, or in any other country. Taylor (1994: 35) notes that about half the total

Canadian volume of timber and one-third of Canada's direct forest industry jobs comes

from British Columbia. In 1994, the forest industry in B.C. generated sixteen billion

dollars worth of sales and 4.5 billion dollars in tax revenues.[1]

However, Hoberg and Morawski (1997: 391) note that the forests of British

Columbia are important for other reasons. They are also sources of tourism and

recreation. The forests contribute to human and ecological health, they maintain regular

patterns of water flow that reduce soil erosion, and they provide habitat for wildlife.

The forests of British Columbia are part of the temperate coniferous forest

ecosystem, which runs the length of the western cordillera or the Rocky Mountains. The

---

[1] Marchak (1983:6-7) notes that although the market is variable, lumber is the principal export of B.C, accounting for two and a half times the dollar value of pulp. Further, lumber, pulp, logs and chips, not end-products comprise the largest component of all exports. Burda, Gale and McGonigle (1998:47) agree and note that pulp, newsprint and dimension lumber comprise 88% of B.C.'s froest product exports.

forests extend from Alaska to British Columbia, and through Oregon, Washington, and Northern California (the Pacific Northwest). The entire area is heavily forested and in Washington, Oregon and British Columbia, much of the present forest stand was mature ancient temperate rainforest or *old-growth* (Clawson and Hyde 1976: 201).[2]

The concentration of the forest industry in British Columbia has led to intense forestry conflicts regarding how the forests should be managed. The task of managing these forests involves a matrix of priorities that have been in conflict for over a hundred years. These conflicts exist throughout the area. The issues regarding the management of these forests are largely the same throughout the region and both the forests and the mountains were the inspirational backdrop for these conflicts. These issues revolve around how much and what kind of timber should be logged, how the timber should be logged, and how much should be protected and preserved. The main protagonists are also similar – the preservationists, the conservationists, and the forest industries (Emery 1991: 2)

The economy of this region originally grew from unrestrained exploitation of forest resources. However, in the late nineteenth century, concern regarding the exploitation of the California forests inspired a continental conservation movement. This movement was dedicated to the application of scientific management and public ownership of forests. It resulted in the establishment of a federal government agency, the United States Forest Service, which was responsible for the management of these forests. Drushka , Nixon and Travers (1993: 178) notes that this began a long road of official commitment to the ideals of conservation and forest practice. Bernard Fernow and

---

[2] However, a March 1997 mapping of all the British Columbia coastal temperate rainforest by the Sierra Club indicates that over one-half of the ancient temperate rainforest has been cut (May 1998: 193).

Gifford Pinchot were responsible for first promoting rationalized forest management in North America, on the utilitarian ethic of the greatest good for the greatest number in the long run, or the *wise use* of natural resources.

This pattern of public ownership is paralleled in B.C. The allocation of constitutional powers in Canada provides the provinces with jurisdiction over land and natural resources. Hoberg and Morawski (1997: 391) and Lewis (1976: 4) note that as a result, 95 percent of the forested land in British Columbia is publicly owned and protected by the provincial government, and public ownership of the forests is more pervasive in British Columbia than in any other region in the western world. Therefore, provincial government policy determines all the landlord decisions and public policy making originates with the provincial government.

This tradition of public ownership, and with it a tradition of conservation, began in British Columbia in 1909, when a provincial Royal Commission was established to provide the government with a workable consensus to stop exploitation of the forests by industry. The Commission, chaired by Minister of Lands F.J. Fulton, listened to concerns from various sectors. The commissioners met with Robert H. Campbell, the Dominion Director of Forestry in Ottawa; Bernard Fernow, ex-Chief Forester of the United States Forest Service and Dean of the University of Toronto School of Forestry; and Gifford Pinchot, Chief Forester of the United States Forest Service (Drushka, Nixon, and Travers, 1993: 178).

In spite of institutional difference between British Columbia and the rest of the Pacific Northwest, forest policy became dominated by the forestry practice known as conservation or wise use (Rayner, 1996: 84-85). Wise use conservation is a concept that

has set the public agenda for natural resource management for over a century. This philosophy continues to shape policies today and is responsible for the concept of sustained yield and multiple use of natural resources. However, the dominance of Gifford Pinchot's utilitarian model of conservation does not mean it has not been criticized or opposed. Wise use conservation occupies an intermediate position between exploitation and preservation and as a result, conservation has faced continued opposition by the preservationists, or those who believe in righteous management. That is, nature should be preserved and not used (Taylor 1994: 48).

The Sierra Club was the first group to institutionalize the preservationist's viewpoint. It was formed in 1892 by John Muir, leader of the romantic preservationists. Muir was originally a friend and ally of Pinchot's. He joined Pinchot's campaign to promote conservation, as both shared a concern for stopping the destruction of the forests. However, their different philosophies soon became apparent. Pinchot's loyalty lay with forestry and the use of nature for civilization, while Muir supported wilderness and the preservation of nature from human use. John Muir favored non-use conservation and advocated as little development of natural resources as possible. Gifford Pinchot promoted wise-use conservation and favored utilization of the nation's resources (Hoban and Brooks 1987: 2). Therefore, Muir split from the conservationists and spent the rest of his life fighting to set aside areas of forest to be protected from logging and remain as wilderness. Muir and his followers came to be known as preservationists.[3]

Reidel (1987:16) notes that the differences between Muir and Pinchot and their

---

[3] Doem and Conway (1994: 103) maintain that preservationism originated as a radical faction within conservationism but evolved on its own towards favouring non-growth solutions rather than sustainable-use and technology solutions supported by the conservationists.

followers, more than their brief stand on common ground, determined the future, as their

unresolved conflicts of philosophy and policy have been handed down from generation

to generation. As a result, the Sierra Club still opposes wise use conservation practices

today. Michael McGonigle, of the Sierra Club Legal Defence Fund, recently criticized

reforms to British Columbia's forest policy.

> Because the environmental movement accepted
> incremental reforms within the dominant paradigm
> of continued industrial forestry, rather than
> insisting on structural reforms of the whole
> model of production and regulation, the movement
> is now tangled within a model of forestry that is
> unecological, and disempowered as a force for
> piercing the curtain of green rhetoric (1997:16).

Howlett and Rayner (1995: 384) and Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson (1996: 130)

note that the Sierra Club has not been able to alter the dominant paradigm and cause

significant policy shifts. However, they have been responsible for many incremental

changes or incremental tactical adjustments. These changes include preservation of high

profile landscapes from logging, and restrictions on the maximum size of clearcuts.

Reidel (1987: 14) urged foresters to consider what lessons can be learned from

history and the philosophies that underlay today's policies, as he feels these are

fundamental issues that must be understood. Taylor (1994: 44) maintains that nowhere is

the need to examine our values more evident than in Canada's policies and practices

towards its own natural resources. The purpose of this thesis is to examine forest policy

in British Columbia as it has evolved from debates between Gifford Pinchot's philosophy

of conservation, and John Muir's philosophy of preservation. Hoban and Brooks (1987:

2) maintain that this debate, which raged in the ranks of the late nineteenth century

conservationists, still exists, and remnants of this debate can still be found in policy

issues today. This thesis argues that the competing philosophies of conservation and preservation are as much a part of forest policy issues in British Columbia today as they were a hundred years ago, and if we are to understand why and how forest issues are or are not dealt with, we should understand these philosophies and the role they play in debates regarding forest policy.

Swinnerton (1991: 2-3) maintains that conservation and preservation are two distinct types of resource protection. Conservation and preservation have different meanings and distinct aims (Table 1). Preservation is not a less compromising form of conservation, but rather it is the retention of the integrity, authenticity and intrinsic value of a resource in perpetuity. However, conservation is seen as the capability of a resource to provide a function while maintaining its capability to meet the needs of future generations (Alberta Recreation and Parks 1986: 8).

Although the literature frequently refers to conservation as a paradigm, this thesis refers to conservation and preservation as concepts, models, ideals, or worldviews of environmental management. Taylor (1994:78) maintains that Pinchot's model of wise use conservation is rooted in Enlightenment thought and is part of the dominant expansionist worldview. It stands in stark relief to the preservationist model which is rooted in the Counter–Enlightenment and Romantic tradition. The ideological rift between Gifford Pinchot and John Muir reflects the schism between the Counter-Enlightenment/Romantic and the more pragmatic Enlightenment traditions (Taylor 1994: 27).

Kimmins (1997: 248) explains that while conservation has dominated forest policy decisions, it has historically competed with the preservation ideal as each struggles to define the environmental paradigm that should govern forest use. Taylor (1994: 79)

Table 1. Distinguishing Characteristics of Resource Preservation, Conservation and Exploitation

Approaches to Resource Use and Management

Resource Protection	Resource Development

	Preservation	Conservation	Exploitation

DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS

	Preservation	Conservation	Exploitation
Frame of Values	Ethical	Social/Economic	Economic
Perspective to Resource	Biocentric/Anthropocentric	Anthropocentric	Anthropocentric
Constraints on Levels of Use	Conscience/Ecology	Conscience/ Ecology/ Science/ Technology	Science/ Technology/ Economics
Type of Use	Non-use/Vicarious/ Appreciative/ Non-consumptive	Appreciative/ Consumptive	Consumptive
Level of Use	Retention of Integrity and Authenticity	Sustained Yield	Depletion/ Exhaustion
Output/Outcome From Use	Human experience/ Satisfaction/ Intrinsic benefits/ Future options	Human experience/ Market product/ Intrinsic benefits/ Extrinsic benefits/ Future options	Market product/ Extrinsic benefits
Ability to Accommodate Other Uses	Difficult	Possible/Probable	Possible
Timing of Resource Use	In perpetuity	Long term	Short term

Source: Swinnerton (1991;4)

maintains that in current debates over sustainable development strategies, these two

positions are in stark relief. He feels this was the reason that the Clayoquot Sound Task

Force could not reach a consensus in negotiations. The parties maintained their

allegiance to traditional value perspectives.

Although Brown (1968: 59-60) has trivialized the force of preservation in

Canada, this thesis illustrates historical ties to the preservationist movement and the

Sierra Club, through the Alpine Club of Canada. Nelson (1989: 83) maintains that the

wilderness idea has been and is relatively strong in western Canada largely because of

the early twentieth century diffusion of United States ideas and the writings of the Sierra

Club. Sanford (1997: 53) notes that Arthur O. Wheeler, founder of the Alpine Club of

Canada, has been called the Canadian John Muir. However, he feels a greater debt is

owed to Elizabeth Parker, a journalist for the Winnipeg Free Press. She was instrumental

in lobbying to create a group that would preserve wilderness. Parker (1907: 5) stated

that it was necessary to have:

> a national trust for the defense of our mountain
> solitudes against the intrusion of steam and
> electricity and all the vandalisms of this utilitarian
> age: for the keeping free from the grind of
> commerce, the wooded passes and valleys and
> alplands of the wilderness.

METHODOLOGY

Cubbage, Laughlin, and Bullock (1993: 23-28) note that various approaches help

policy analysts to explain why and how existing policies have evolved, to develop models

to evaluate policies and to predict how policies might evolve. One approach used by

policy analysts involves evaluating a particular policy while another approach focuses on the institutions responsible for the development of policies The comparative approach involves comparing policies and institutions in different countries and the historical approach examines the historical development of a policy. Still other policy analysts use an approach which focuses on the policy making process. Pross (1990: 297-300) notes that policy communities, which have an interest in a particular policy field, play an integral role in the policy process.

All of these approaches have been used to evaluate forest policy in Canada. For instance, Rayner (1996) compared forest policy in British Columbia's Forest Service to forest policy in the United States Forest Service. He was interested in the process and institutional aspects of forest policy. A. Paul Pross (1967) used an institutional approach to study how the development of forestry as a profession influenced forest policy in Ontario.

A number of approaches are used in this thesis to analyze British Columbia's forest policy. The impact of the policy communities' influence on forest policy is illustrated. In this case, the interaction of the subgovernment, or the B.C. Forest Service, the B.C. government and the forest industry, with the attentive public, or the Sierra Club is discussed. The institutional approach has also been used to examine forestry policy disputes between the Sierra Club, an institutional pressure group, and two institutional pillars; the legislature and the bureaucracy. A comparative approach has also been employed as the impact of the different ideologies of these institutions on B.C.'s forest policy is explained.

However, Sabatier (1988: 131) notes that a historical appoach is necessary when

analyzing policy change and time frames of a decade or more are needed to obtain an accurate portrait of a policy. He notes that a focus on short-term decision making may eliminate consideration of the successes or failures of a policy. Hoberg (1996: 136) also warns that one should not attempt to analyze a policy over short periods of time as there is a tendency to focus on one significant or fashionable variable and overstate the new case. Therefore, a generation of scholars may set themselves up to be easily discredited or become a "straw monster" for the next generation when a new variable comes into fashion. For example, Hoberg (1996: 136) points out that in the 1980s institutionalists discredited the work of the pluralists in the 1960s.

Nevertheless, historical approaches include aspects of the approaches previously mentioned. Therefore, a historical approach has also been used to analyze forest policy in British Columbia, in order to place forest policy issues in their proper historical perspective and as a result, contribute to the work of other academics. For instance, this thesis may provide insight into Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson's (1996: 112) work, which debated how to determine if changes made to British Columbia's forest policy in the 1990s, such as CORE BC and the Forest Practices Code, were significant policy shifts or incremental tactical adjustments.

The primary sources for this thesis are journals, books, newspapers and government publications. In order to obtain opinions on conservation and preservation perspectives, a wide variety of sources have been researched. The bibliography includes publications by the Sierra Club and its members such as Michael McGonigle, Vicki Husband and Elizabeth May. Numerous academic works from a variety of disciplines:

such as political science, environmental studies and forestry have also been consulted. Internet web sites have been extensively researched. However, care has been taken to choose current and reputable sites such as those of the Friends of Clayoquot Sound, the Sierra Club and the government of British Columbia.

CHAPTER ORGANIZATION

The four chapters of this thesis cover a time span of over a hundred years and nearly a hundred years of forest policy. The chapters are essentially divided into four forest policy eras[4]. Chapter One or the first policy era (pre 1900s-early 1900s) examines the roots of forest policy in British Columbia. This chapter will trace forest use in North America, from exploitation to the beginnings of the conservation movement. It will establish the philosophical foundations and the origin of the conservation and preservation movements in the United States, and trace their influence to Canada and ultimately British Columbia. The role of the key players in this thesis such as: Gifford Pinchot, John Muir and Bernard Fernow will also be explained in this chapter.

In Chapter Two, the second era of forest policy (1909-1960), the beginning or genesis of forestry and public ownership of the forests in British Columbia is examined. The importance of two Royal Commissions, the 1909 Royal Commission on Forestry and the 1947 Royal Commission on Forestry, will be the focus of this chapter. Gifford Pinchot's and Bernard Fernow's role in establishing conservation as the philosophical foundation of British Columbia's first forest act will also be demonstrated. The Pearse Commission and its recommendations for sustained yield and tenure are discussed. The

---

[4] These policy eras closely coincide with the four eras of the conservation movement described by Maini and Carlisle (1974: 4-5).

potential for future problems with sustained yield and tenure is also explained. The chapter will conclude by establishing the roots of the Pacific Rim Park controversy.

The role of the environmental movement and the re-emergence of preservationist concerns are explained in Chapter Three, or the third era of forest policy (1960-1985). Two highlights of this chapter are the Pearse Commission and the establishment of the Sierra Club in British in 1969. Included in this chapter are two major preservationist – conservationist battles; Pacific Rim and South Moresby.

The preservation-conservation controversy over the logging of the old-growth forests of Clayoquot Sound, and attempts to solve this dilemma are the primary focus of Chapter Four, or the current era of forest policy (1985+). The role of sustainable development is also explained. The consequences of the Clayoquot Sound controversy are discussed and a number of forest policy innovations, such as CORE B.C., the Forest Practices Code and the Scientific Panel on Forestry are examined. Chapter Four closes with a discussion of future policy issues and points out the potential for continued opposition by the Sierra Club to British Columbia's conservation practices.

The Conclusion will assess whether or not the thesis is supported by the research. The implications of the findings of this thesis for future research will be discussed. As well, the role of this research in policy analysis and other areas will be examined.

CHAPTER ONE

ERA 1 (PRE 1900s-EARLY 1900s): THE ROOTS OF BRITISH COLUMBIA'S

FOREST POLICY

When Europeans first settled in North America, they were greeted by an apparent

"superabundance" of natural resources. Resources were described in terms such as

endless forests, limitless prairie, countless buffalo, billions of passenger pigeons and

rivers teeming with salmon (Clepper 1971: 10). The myth that prevailed was that

resources were inexhaustable. This wealth of natural resources was responsible for the

astonishing growth of Canada and the United States. The forests were of prime

importance, as they provided materials for this growth. However, the forests were also

seen as impediments to settlement, as it was believed that nature stood in the way of

civilization and progress (Allin 1982: 50-51).

Taylor (1994: 22-25) maintains that this presumption or myth of resource

abundance predicated many of the values underlying Western industrial society such as

the belief in liberal democracy, freedom, individualism, and laissez-faire capitalism.

Capitalism encouraged an expansionist worldview in which nature was seen essentially

as a storehouse of resources. Consequently, seventeenth and eighteenth century political

and economic theorists, such as John Locke (1632-1704) and Adam Smith (1723-1790),

looked forward to an era of material wealth and an end to the authoritarian political

institutions that had hitherto characterized an era of resource scarcity. Peine (1998: 46)

also notes that Locke's theory rationalized the European seizure of American lands, and

an expansionist land use policy, as Locke believed that land was a gift of God to

humanity. Nature in itself was worthless and only acquired value through human labor.

This land use ethic is also a philosophy of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment placed faith in science and technology's ability to harness and dominate nature (Taylor 1994: 47). This philosophy is grounded in Francis Bacon's advocacy to control nature for human needs and the Newtonian view of the universe as a great machine. Further, it was quantities rather than qualities which mattered. Nature lost its intrinsic worth because values, instincts and emotions could not clearly be measured in the light of reason. Facts were separated from values and values were of secondary importance.

La Force (1979: 41) notes that the Age of Reason's attack on Christianity and traditional authority and its de-mystification of the universe encouraged a secular point of view. However, although society was increasingly caught up in a materialistic worldview and rationalism, there was disenchantment with this way of life. New "faiths" such as nationalism, individualism and romanticism were created to replace tarnished ones.

Romanticism, a stream of dissident counter-enlightenment thought, emerged during this time to challenge the intellectual orthodoxy of the time (Taylor 1994: 47). The romantics were rebelling against the neoclassicism of the Enlightenment and encouraged the primitive and natural to balance with overly civilized and intellectualized ideals (La Force 1979: 41). Romantics stressed the importance of the nonrational rather than the rational and the emotional, and the instinctual rather than reason and science (Taylor 1994: 47). At the heart of romanticism was a new concept of nature.

THE TRANSCENDENTALISTS AND ROMANTICISM

By the 1850s an academic interest arose regarding the value of wilderness. The literature of American transcendentalists Ralph Waldo Emerson and David Thoreau

followed this wilderness theme by asserting that individuals should realize their communion with nature (Taylor 1994: 47). In the eastern United States industrial growth and devastation were well ahead of the western United States and Canada and Thoreau and Emerson espoused the mystical virtues of the vanishing wilderness. The transcendentalists believed that the natural world transcended its physical dimensions and reflected spiritual truth and moral law (Burton 1972: 135). They stressed that mountains, plains and forests were places of solace and spiritual revival. By doing so they laid a philosophical framework for the movement to preserve the remaining forests of North America (Marty 1984: 64).

Burton (1972: 135-136) maintains that Thoreau was the dean of the transcendentalists. As early as 1851, he pleaded for recreational, spiritual and amenity values which were lost in the expansionist era of the nineteenth century. Thoreau's *Walden* (1962) followed nature as a vehicle to criticize many of the society's values such as civil authority, Lockean values of ownership and property, and society's conformity and bondage to false needs.

John Muir, like the transcendentalists, refused to place dollar values on wilderness. Muir became a leader in the change of public attitudes towards wilderness and helped spread this new cult of nature throughout the Anglo-Saxon world. Miller (1994: 53) describes Muir as America's foremost apostle of nature. Muir believed that wilderness was precious by its very existence and in it, over-civilized people could find spiritual solace. His inspiration to preserve wilderness was the mountains of California (La Force 1979: 41).

JOHN MUIR AND THE MOUNTAINS

Miller (1994: 51) notes that John Muir has many accomplishments which marked

him for immortality. He is famous for his many books and articles on nature as well as

for his battles for National Parks. However, Muir was also the best mountaineer in the

United States in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Muir found in mountaineering

and the Sierra Nevada Mountains of California, the wildness, spirituality and oneness

with nature he was searching for. It was his love of climbing which led him to zealously

campaign for preservation of nature.

Muir attended the University of Wisconsin and was especially influenced by his

friendship with Jeanne Carr, the wife of one of his professors. Miller (1994: 53) notes

that she introduced him to the lyrical spokesmen for nature like Wordsworth and Robert

Burns, as well as the transcendentalists, Thoreau and Emerson. Muir was raised by his

strict Calvinist father. However, he rejected his father's God and embraced a more

benevolent deity, "Nature". Eventually, his newly embraced religion had a significant

effect on how he practiced his sport of mountaineering.

Climbing became a part of his religion. He set physical standards for the sport

and developed mountaineering ethics which are still practiced today. Muir believed that

the mountains should be climbed, not to conquer the peaks but, to become one with

nature. It was not what one climbed, it was how one climbed, which mattered and he

believed that climbing should be done with as little equipment as possible (Miller 1994:

58).

Cohen (1988: 4-5) notes that when Muir began to think about what men would

do with the mountains, he was in the Sierra Nevada Mountains. Muir developed ideas

about nature which were rooted in a non-anthroprocentric experience of the mountains. He developed a spiritual and intellectual value of nature and he pondered the human role in the mountain's destiny rather than the mountain's role in human destiny. He gained this philosophy during the 1860s and 1870s, which he spent almost entirely in the mountains.

Muir came to California in 1868 and devoted the next twenty-two years to enjoying the Sierra Nevada Mountains. In 1889, he was commissioned by the United States' leading monthly magazine, *Century*, to write a series of articles. His articles contained numerous photos and descriptions of the Yosemite Valley in the Sierra Nevada Mountains. The articles publicized his opinion, to nearly one million readers, that the area should become a national park, in the model of Yellowstone National Park. He emphasized that the area should be preserved, to prevent destruction to the area's wildness. The editor of the magazine, Robert Underwood Johnson, editorialized that the area should be preserved to prevent exploitation. Johnson also lobbied the House of Representatives Committee on Public Lands for the creation of Yosemite Park. The Yosemite Act was passed by Congress on September 30, 1890. Muir, however, still fearing that the park would fall to utilitarian uses, set up an organization, the Sierra Club, that would defend and promote the transcendental value of Yosemite (Allin 1982: 32-33).

The Sierra Club was the westcoast version of the Appalachian Mountain Club which was founded in 1876 (Hoban and Brooks 1987: 2). In 1889, the University of California was deliberating the formation of an Alpine Club and invited Muir to meet with a group of professors from Stanford and University of California. The Sierra Club was subsequently formed in 1892. The prime object of the club was service: taking

members to the mountains in the form of High Trips and publishing information in the form of the Sierra Club Bulletin (Cohen 1988: 9). The Sierra Club Bulletin became the most highly respected mountaineering journal in America and the High Trips were used to render the mountains of California more acccessible. Muir maintained these High Trips were necessary for political and philosophical reasons and these High Trips became standard features of many other western clubs (Cohen 1988: 62)

Muir's favorite trip in the Sierra's was to Yosemite Valley. Miller (1994: 52) notes that nowhere was Muir's relationship with the environment more obvious than in his special cathedral, Yosemite Valley. As Muir looked down from the mountains to Yosemite's wooded valleys, he lamented the destruction that was being done to the forests below. Cohen (1988: 34-35) maintains that of all the objects in nature, trees appealed to Muir most strongly and were the living beings he most wished to preserve. It was this concern for the forests of Yosemite, which initially led him to develop a friendship with Gifford Pinchot, Chief Forester of the United States Department of Agriculture (Cohen 1988: 64).

PINCHOT AND FORESTRY

By the early 1870's, concern regarding destruction of nature was no longer merely academic. In the past, if supplies of lumber were in short supply, a new region was opened up. However, near the end of the nineteenth century, the natural environment in the United States had been altered dramatically and civilization had spread across the continent. The census of 1890 indicated that there was no longer an American frontier (Clepper 1971: 8).

However, Cohen (1988: 65) notes that what was to become known as conservation was a fluid and incompletely formed idea before 1891. Some people wanted all nature preserved and maintained that all logging should be stopped, as it was destroying the beauty of nature. Somewhere between the two extremes, the preservationists who wanted to lock away resources and prevent their use, and industry which wanted unfettered use of natural resources, was conservation.

The earliest attempts in North American conservation were directed toward forest conservation. The concern regarding forest depletion arose due to waste caused by cutting and fire (Clepper 1971: 8). The foresters or resource professionals offered a more pragmatic solution to waste and mismanagement. However, forestry as a profession did not begin until 1891. In that year, Gifford Pinchot returned to the United States, after studying forestry techniques in France and Germany. Upon his return he initiated a number of management, fire control and selective logging processes. He was eventually appointed Chief Forester of the United States Department of Agriculture in 1898.

Pinchot knew as much about public opinion as he did about forests and each step he made in the department and throughout his career, was calculated to capture public support. Pinchot understood that the forests were an emotive issue. Timber destruction and scarcity were now the concern of sportsmen (women), preservationists, rainmakers, as well as the average person concerned about rising timber prices. Williams (1989: 416) also notes that many in the country had become concerned with the rapacious laissez-faire economy and Pinchot sensed that it was exemplified by the "cut and get out" exploitation of the forests.

Pinchot wanted to stop the destruction of forests and introduce the forestry

practices he had learned. He devised a compromise approach that would not stop the axe in mid-air, but would regulate it (Udall 1970: 115).

Pinchot offered a management program for the United States Forest Service based on rational management. It was based on efficiency and the application of science and planning to the environment. Pinchot's management program was based on the wise use of the forest, or the planned development of the forest reserves. Pinchot had an anthroprocentric view of nature. He believed it should be used for the benefit of humans. He developed a long term plan for the forests which over time could produce a sustained yield and a continuous supply of lumber (Williams 1989: 419). This idea appealed to "lumbermen" who now found themselves partners with, rather than opponents to, government forestry.

Scientific management came into vogue and became a central theme of corporations at the beginning of the twentieth century. Corporations provided a model for managing and coordinating workers. The techniques of scientific management were designed to control individual action in the workplace and create a well-oiled machine. The scientific practices of forestry which attempted to produce a rationalized forest were thus part of a similar rationalization occurring in the social realm (Jonasse 1995: 35).

PINCHOT AND MUIR TEMPORARILY UNITE

John Muir met Gifford Pinchot during a symposium on forestry held by *Century* in 1885. Both Muir and Pinchot had a love of forests in common. This love initially caused a bond of friendship and the two worked well together in an effort to protect the

nation's forests. They initially united their efforts to fight against the robber barons and industry to stop the wasteful destruction of the California forests. It was only a common enemy in unregulated development that held the conservation movement together. Events between 1890 and 1897 marked the rise and fall of a unified conservation movement (Allin 1982: 36).

Cohen (1984: 287) notes that many of the distinctions which are taken for granted today, such as the difference between a national park and a forest reserve, were not distinguisable in the early 1890's. Muir believed that Pinchot's proposed forests reserves would be indistinguishable from national parks. Therefore, Muir accepted wise use of the forests as a compromise. The vast outcry against any reserves by the forest industry also persuaded Muir to compromise with forestry. Destruction of western forests was so rampant that Muir believed that any step would be an improvement. Muir also realized that both preservation and wise use interests required forest reserves (Allin 1982: 37).

In 1897, the Forest Reserve Management Act gave the United States President the right to set aside forest reserves. This marked the end of a unified conservation movement as a problem eventually arose when it became clear that Muir considered these not merely reserves, but preserves, and he realized that national parks and forest reserves were managed for very different purposes. Muir and Pinchot's friendship dissolved in 1897, when they disagreed regarding whether to allow sheep to graze in the forest reserves. Muir was incensed that Pinchot would allow this destruction and Muir broke off any support for Pinchot's forestry efforts. Muir decided to devote himself to the creation of parks and never again spoke to Pinchot (Allin 1982: 37). Pinchot proceeded to spread his view of wise use to the entire North American continent.

Pinchot believed that exploitation of the forests was a continental problem. He

persuaded President Theodore Roosevelt to call an international conservation conference.

In 1908, Roosevelt, a firm believer in Pinchot's philosophy, called the White House

Conference on Conservation. Delegates were invited from Canada and Mexico. Among

the delegates were Prime Minister of Canada ,Wilfred Laurier and his Minister of the

Interior Clifford Sifton. However, John Muir was not invited.

The Conference consecrated a new catchword, conservation, which Gifford

Pinchot used for his plan for resource development and all plans which followed. Those

who followed John Muir were from then on known as preservationists. The schism

between Pinchot and Muir, the leaders of conservation and preservation respectively,

formalized the schism in the conservation movement.

PINCHOT'S INFLUENCE REACHES CANADA

Canada was not immune to events south of the border, nor was it immune to

waste and destruction of its forests. As a result, the Canadian government hosted the

American Forestry Congress, in 1882, at Montreal. Canadian and American

representatives were present at this inaugural meeting of the American Forestry

Association. The major issues discussed were the effects of forests on climate,

deforestation, forest fire destruction and the need for forest reserves. The Congress

maintained that   Dominion Forest Reserves were necessary to protect the present forests

(Gillis and Roach 1986: 41).

Gillis and Roach (1986: 49) maintain that after the Congress forest conservation

began its move from being the interest of a few individuals into the fury of politics in

Canada. Two years after the Congress, the first Forestry Commissioner in Canada, Joseph H. Morgan, was appointed in the Department of the Interior. As Commissioner, Morgan was instructed to consider ways to preserve and protect the forests of the Dominion. Morgan maintained that the Canadian government should adopt a forest reserve system similar to that in the United States (Gillis and Roach 1986: 44-45). Consequently, in 1884, the Dominion Lands Act was amended to provide for forest reserves on the crests and the slopes of the Rocky Mountains. However, during the late 1880s the conservation movement lay dormant in Canada due to an economic depression. Lumber exploitation and forests fires continued to deplete the forests of eastern Canada. Gillis and Roach (1986: 46-47) maintain that although the creation forests reserves was the first step toward a creation of a forestry system, which led to the flowering of forestry in Canada, it was another decade and a change of government before anything was done to administer the reserves.

Gillis and Roach(1986: 52) maintain that three specific acts of the Liberal government contributed to defining what conservation and forestry meant in practical terms: the creation of the Forestry Branch in Canada's Department of the Interior; the passing of the Dominion Forest Reserve Act of 1906; and the founding of Canada's Commission of Conservation in 1909. Wilfred Laurier's Minister of the Department of the Interior, Clifford Sifton was crucial to these events. Sifton was an interested observer in American trends and appreciated the mounting popularity of scientific forestry and the economic arguments of Gifford Pinchot. Both Pinchot and Sifton believed conservation should work against the wastefulness and environmental excesses of a developing society. However, they were not opposed to development. Ideally conservation would

mean "wise scientific management". Nature could be used and saved (Taylor 1994: 27).

Sifton founded a Forestry Branch in his department and Elihu Stewart was appointed the

first Superintendent of Forestry in 1899.

Stewart wanted to be given responsibility for all of the forest reserves. Gillis and

Roach (1986: 54-56) maintain that Stewart was influenced by Pinchot's philosophy and

methods and was shamelessly trying to copy his bureaucratic success. When Stewart first

met Pinchot, Pinchot was starting to unite American federal forest management. Stewart

wrote to Pinchot and asked him for advice and information about forestry. Pinchot invited

Stewart to Washington in 1899 and advised Stewart on two points which he felt were

crucial in the development of Canadian policy. First, Pinchot maintained that

administration of forests should not be divided between government organizations and,

secondly, Pinchot maintained that the government held forestland in British Columbia

was all important.

Stewart's career stifled when Clifford Sifton, a dynamic supporter of conservation

measures, resigned and was replaced by Frank Oliver. Oliver advocated decentralized

control and was not a supporter of federal forestry initiatives. His only conservation

concern was in the control of wildfires. However, the Canadian Forestry Association still

supported Stewart in his efforts to increase his Forestry Branch's power. The Association

led forestry to the forefront of Canadian issues and a Canadian Forestry Convention was

held in Ottawa in 1906.

The Convention received a great deal of attention and support. Prime Minister

Laurier spoke of the need for conservation of Canada's forests. The leader of the

opposition, Robert Borden, took the opportunity to protest that the Laurier government

had not done enough to support conservation. He advocated increased government control of forests and cited Bernard Fernow, ex- Chief Forester in the United States and a teacher of forestry in Toronto, as saying Canada's forests were in danger of depletion.

However, Gifford Pinchot's keynote speech highlighted the Convention. His speech highlighted five points which were repeated by most of the speakers. He called for an organized national forest policy which would evaluate land before settlement, manage reserves by trained government employees, improve fire fighting efforts, require railway companies cooperation in fighting fires during railway construction, and encourage tree planting on the prairies. (Gillis and Roach 1986: 61)

After the Convention, Oliver introduced the Dominion Forest Reserves Act of 1906. However, the Laurier administration was not about to create an all powerful Forestry Branch (Gillis and Roach 1986: 63). The Forestry Branch was denied regulatroy control of existing leases within the reserves. The land would only return to the Crown when the land was cut-over. When the Forest Reserves Act was finally passed it exempted timber leaseholders from Forestry Branch control as Ottawa "lumbermen" had lobbied against an all powerful forestry organization that would control their business.

However, the Laurier Liberals still supported conservation. Two years after the Canadian Forestry Convention Pinchot, personally delivered an invitation to Laurier to attend the National Conservation Conference in Washington D.C. on February 18, 1909. Laurier replied that his country was concerned with conservation and he sent delegates to represent Canada to the Conference. The Conference agreed on a list of principles regarding natural resource use. The Conference also agreed that each country should establish a Commission of Conservation (Foster 1978: 38).

Three months after the Washington Conference, Parliament established the

Comission of Conservation. The Commission was non-partisan and was composed of

representatives of both levels of government. Federal and provincial governments were

granted the statutory right to membership. The members of each provincial government

charged with natural resource administration were declared ex-officio members as

resources (except in the prairie provinces) came under provincial jurisdication as defined

by the British North America Act. Therefore, any attempt at natural resource

conservation would ultimately depend on provincial agreement, support and cooperation

(Foster 1978: 39). Although the Commission was responsible for conserving all natural

resources, forestry was of primary importance and such things as wildlife conservation

were not considered. The Commission had a definite agenda for forestry in Canada and

advised members of the Royal Commission on Timber and Forestry in 1909 on forestry

problems in British Columbia (Gillis and Roach 1986: 143). Forestry Superintendent

Robert H. Campbell also advised the British Columbia Royal Commission. However, in

1911 Campbell's Forestry Branch split into the Forestry Branch and the Parks Branch.

THE FOREST RESERVES AND NATIONAL PARKS ACT

The Forest Reserves Act was amended to become the Forest Reserves and

National Parks Act of 1911. The Forestry Branch had been in charge of the Canda's

parks until 1911. A separate Parks Branch was created in 1911 after the Dominion Forest

Reserves and Parks Act was passed in May 1911. Under this legislation, forest reserves

were to be administered by the Forestry Branch and park administration was the

responsibility of the Parks Branch. Oliver maintained that the two Branches were

included in the same bill so that forest reserves could easily become parks. However, the

opposite was also true. Until 1930, logging could take place in parks under Forestry

Branch supervision if the demand warranted it (Gillis and Roach 1986: 64-65).

Gillis and Roach (1986: 66) maintain that this division between forest reserves

and parks, indicates that the diversification of the conservation ethic had become

apparent in Canada as well as in the United States. Cohen (1984: 287) agrees and notes

that forest reserves and parks were indistinguishable at first in the United States.

However, as the differences between Muir and Pinchot escalated, the different purposes

for national parks and forest reserves also became apparent.

Foster (1979: 80) and Nelson (1984: 4) maintain that Pinchot and Muir had a

profound effect on Howard Douglas, Canada's Dominion Parks Commissioner. Douglas

became the second superintendent of Rocky Mountain National Park and director of the

world's first national park branch. He operated the park with an eye on his department's

budget and he was aware of other philosophies of the day, as he often quoted John Muir

in his departmental reports (Foster 1978: 80). Foster (1978: 36) notes that there was as

yet no Canadian John Muir to argue for preservation or plead for the necessity to preserve

the forests and create national park. However, Marty (1984: 76) maintains that Douglas

was first exposed to Muir's philosophy in Rocky Mountain Park when he met John

Muir's disciples, the mountaineers of the Alpine Club of Canada.

ALPINE CLUB OF CANADA

Bella (1987: 39) notes that the parks were a main area of concern regarding

resource exploitation. William Pearce, a bureaucrat and employee of the Canadian

Pacific Railway (CPR), wanted to maximize the park's profitability. He came into

constant conflict with Arthur Wheeler, a surveyor with the Department of the Interior.

Wheeler is famous for his survey of the Selkirk range of the Rocky Mountains. As a

surveyor , Wheeler was impressed by wilderness and came to love outdoor life and

mountaineering. He also tried to photograph the mountain passes but was frustrated by

the smoke from the forest fires and he reported that many of the forests had been stripped

by fire. Wheeler eventually became the founder of Canada's first environmental

organization, the Alpine Club of Canada.

Canada's mountain ranges were popular with alpinists. They came from England

and Switzerland, however, most of them were from the United States. Canada did not as

yet have an alpine club of its own and Wheeler proposed that a Canadian branch of the

American Alpine Club was possible. He joined Professor C.Fay of the Appalachian

Alpine Club to propose a North American Alpine Club (Johnston 1985: 6). The

Appalachian Alpine Club had helped organize the Sierra Club in 1892.

However, Wheeler's proposition was opposed by Elizabeth Parker of Winnipeg.

She felt that it would be unpatriotic to join an American organization. Parker frequently

wrote on the editorial page of the Winnipeg (Manitoba) Free Press, using the pen name

The Bookman. Parker used her position as a journalist with the Winnipeg Free Press to

lobby for a strictly Canadian Alpine Club. She wrote in articles and editorials all across

Canada, promoting the need for an alpine club (Bella 1987: 41-42).

Altmeyer (1976: 31) maintains that, in the spirit of the Gospel of Nature, Parker

urged people to become mountain climbers, as alpining was a potent force against the

materialism of the age. She wrote of the need to return to the wilderness of the mountains

in order to escape materialism. Parker (1906: 147) also mentions that the mountain solitiudes provide the best physical vision on earth.

The Alpine Club of Canada became an organization of hikers climbers and campers. While it promoted the highest ideals of mountain climbing, it was also Canada's first guardian of the vast wilderness taken for granted by Canadians in what they thought was the limitless mountain west (Sanford 1997: 53). The first meeting of the club took place in Winnipeg in March 1906. A constitution was drawn up and included two noteworthy proposals. One was the preservation of the natural beauties of mountain solitudes and also the interchange of ideas with other alpine organizations (Johnston 1985: 6). Indeed, the Sierra Club Bulletin and books by John Muir were listed in their library holdings as early as 1909 (Parker 1909: 150). Wheeler's (1909: 65) address to the Canadian Club in Toronto also discussed the purpose of the Alpine Club of Canada. The club wanted to bring people to the wilderness for physical and spiritual uplifting. The focus of the membership was not the wealthy, but those who were not endowed with much wealth or leisure time.

One of the guests at the club's 1912 field camp was J.B. Harkin, Commissioner of Dominion Parks. Luxton (1975: 82) notes that Harkin had a great influence on park policy. Harkin shared the philosophy of John Muir that sunshine and outdoors rejuvenated the soul and preservation of the environment was his primary concern. Harkin also frequently paid tribute to Muir for his work in preserving nature and often quoted Muir in his departmental reports (Foster 1978: 80-81). He attempted to balance the wilderness idea while promoting the growth of the Canadian National Park. His views regarding the need for national parks were expressed in the *Canadian Alpine Journal*

(1918: 101).

Wheeler, Harkin and others enjoying the mountain solitudes, interpreted conservation to mean a justification for preserving wilderness. As a result, Wheeler and other Alpine Club supporters opposed development in parks. They, like Muir, wanted more and larger parks which would be dedicated to preservation. Marty (1984: 99) notes that Harkin spent the next two decades trying to amend the National Park Act to exclude all industrial exploitation from his parks.

WISE USE PREVAILS

By the early 1900s conflicts arose between foresters and promoters of national parks in Canada and the United States (Nelson 1989: 86). Bella (1987: 45) notes that the battles were fought against the backdrop of the American conservation movement, an idea which had overflowed into Canada from the United States. The conservation movement changed forest management, and scientific management encouraged the creation of forest reserves in land unsuitable for agriculture. The largest was Rocky Mountains Forest Reserve which surrounded Rocky Mountains Park. It extended into British Columbia and Alberta to the United States border. [5] Arguments eventually ensued over what should become of these forest reserves. In areas such as these, the battle lines became increasingly clear, between those who supported conservation and development and those who believed in preservation and no development. These conservation and preservation philosophies had spilled into Canada and the stage was set for them to play a major role in forest issues later in the twentieth century.

---

[5] Luxton (1975:81-82) notes that the 1911 Dominion Forest and Reserves Act separated Yoho and Glacier parks from Rocky Mountains Park, which later became Banff Park.

However, since the early years of this century, the wise use school has prevailed as the dominant voice of conservation in North America. Although the Conservation Commission disbanded in 1921, the principles of the movement remained entrenched in the practices of many resource professionals. Gifford Pinchot's utilitarian ideas dominated the conservation movement for the rest of the century (Devall and Sessions 1984: 293).

BRITISH COLUMBIA, EXPLOITATION'S LAST STAND

By the early 1900s, separate forest branches were established in the principal wood-producing provinces and by the federal government. Swift (1983: 54) maintains that although the conservation movement had gained support in eastern Canada, it was already too late. The depletion of eastern forest reserves was already extensive and the lumber industry and forest action had shifted westward to British Columbia. In the United States, the lumber industry's ethic of "cut the best and leave the rest" had come into conflict with the powerful American conservation movement. Teddy Roosevelt had placed much of western forest land in reserves and the U.S. lumber industry sought timber leases elsewhere. British Columbia was one of the last timber frontiers in North America. The lumbering industry gravitated towards the nearest source of available forest resource, British Columbia. Once the forest industry became established in British Columbia, its size and power enabled it to dominate provincial politics.

The arrival of forestry was comparatively late in terms of the general chronology of events. As a result of this, the province's first forester did not have to fight the battles that were fought at the federal level and the Forest Branch could also take advantage of

the experience of others. Forestry came to British Columbia after the rest of the country,

and B.C.'s experience was a logical extension of similar events in the rest of Canada and

the United States (Gillis and Roach 1986: 129). From 1912 to after World War II, a

period which covered two world wars and a global economic depression, British

Columbia's timber industries established a government-corporate axis which came to

dominate Canadian forestry (Drushka, Nixon and Travers 1993: 178). The following

chapter shall describe the beginnings of forest policy in British Columbia, an era which

Gillis and Roach (1986: 129) have called "Pinchotism in British Columbia."

CHAPTER TWO

ERA 2 (1909-1960): THE GENESIS OF FOREST POLICY IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

A.C. Flumerfelt (1914: 492), a member of B.C.'s first Royal Commission on

Forestry, noted that until the twentieth century, British Columbia had been spared the

alienation of her forests. Gray (1982: 25) maintains that as a result, the province was one

of the last timber frontiers in North America, near the end of the nineteenth century.

However, two main factors encouraged the exploitation of the province's timber supply.

First, the United States timber reserves had been severely depleted. Therefore,

American "timbermen" and speculators, who were looking for new reserves, were

attracted to British Columbia's forests (Lewis 1976: 6). Second, two transportation

developments removed British Columbia from its relative isolation and connected it to

the rest of the world's timber markets. The Canadian transcontinental railway was

completed in 1885. As a result, British Columbia became connected to the rest of the

country's markets, especially those in the prairies, which needed lumber for settlement.

The construction of the Panama Canal in 1914 also connected B.C. to eastern seaboard

and foreign markets.

Therefore, the lumber industry and sawmills of British Columbia emerged from

their relative insignificance and timber resources were exploited on a scale comparable

to that which the rest of the continent had been subjected to earlier. This explosive

growth has been described by Swift (1983: 57-58). He notes that around the turn of the

century, the total cut from provincial land jumped 1000 per cent in eighteen years. By

1889, 43.9 million board feet had been cut. However by 1907, 566 million board feet of

timber had been extracted from B.C. forests.

Although the British North America Act rests ownership of the forests with the provincial government, initially, the timber was disposed of without government intervention. The four primary ways of disposal were: the outright sale of lumber along with the land; by leasing timber land; by issuing a license to cut timber; and by selling timber separate from selling the land. However, near the turn of the century the British Columbia government began developing a forest policy, and the government realized the economic value of the forests. The forests were viewed as a new source of revenue for the provincial government. (Drushka Nixon and Travers 1993: 177 and Swift 1983: 58).

Therefore, in 1896, the B.C. government attempted to establish the first legislation concerning the province's forests. A holding charge of ten cents an acre was assessed and owners of sawmills were then allowed to obtain exclusive cutting rights to any area of forest they desired. After this, timberlands of the crown were permanently withdrawn from sale. Only the crop of timber on them could be used by means of timber leases. The British Columbia government granted timber licences but the land remained with the crown. (Drushka, Nixon and Travers 1993: 178).

Flumerfelt (1914: 493) notes that this new legislation established retaining public ownership of the land, while selling the timber as the basic principle of enlightened forest policy and was the beginning of modern forest policy in British Columbia. In 1905, Richard McBride's new Conservative government continued this tradition. McBride needed to build up the provincial treasury and decided to take advantage of the increased demand for lumber. In order to capture large amounts of timber revenue quickly, the government adopted the policy of allocating millions of acres at low rental charges for future cutting.

Swift (1983: 58) notes that the government abandoned the old system of granting

five year leases and instituted a new system of timber licences. Each new licence was for

a period of twenty-one years. McBride also abolished restrictions on how many licences a

single person could hold. As a result, by 1907, more than fifteen thousand cutting

licences were in private hands

A major forest policy question arose regarding the stability of tenure of these

licences, as industry demanded perpetual tenure with fixed royalty charges on the

licences. Swift (1983: 58-59) notes that industry used the rhetoric of the new

conservation movement to justify their demands. Industry used the argument that unless

licences were renewable, licence holders would cut as much high-grade timber as

possible in as little time as possible.

The Crown wished to avoid a "cut and get out" situation. However, the Crown

wanted a perpetual supply of revenue from the timber licences, as much as industry

wanted perpetual tenure. Therefore, in 1909, McBride promised perpetual tenure, but

only on the terms recommended by a Royal Commission Inquiry into Forestry (Gray

1982: 25-27). Schwindt (1979: 3) notes that this began a twentieth century tradition of

having a Royal Commission precede changes to forest policy in British Columbia.

THE 1909 ROYAL COMMISSION

In 1909, the government of British Columbia appointed a Royal Commission to

assess its forest policy and study timber and forestry problems. This inquiry laid the basis

for policy for the next thirty-five years and also set the stage for the 1912 Forest Act. The

most important issue at this time was the renewability of licences (Swift 1983: 59).

However, another issue revolved around the need for the forests to yield a supply of lumber in perpetuity.

A.C. Flumerfelt, president of Hastings Shingle Manufacturing Company (the world's largest at that time) was on the Commission. Martin Grainger, a future Chief Forester of British Columbia was secretary to the Commission and William Roderick Ross, a member of McBride's cabinet was also on the Commission. The Commission, which came to be known as the Fulton Comission, was chaired by Frederick Fulton. Fulton was Minister of Lands and Works and the Commission was actually conducting an inquiry into the operations of Fulton's department (Swift 1983: 52).

The Commissioners held hearings in logging communities and listened to arguments made by various sectors. However, the hearings did not provide the Commissioners with a solution to their problems with the province's forest industry. Gillis and Roach (1986: 144-45) note that Ross was determined to solve these problems and recommended that they use the ideas of the conservation movement as a guide.

Therefore, the commissioners attended the United States National Congress on Conservation and Natural Resources held in Seattle in 1909. They also travelled to Ottawa and met with Robert H. Campbell, the Dominion Director of Forestry. They travelled to Toronto to meet with Bernard Fernow, founder and Dean of University of Toronto's School of Forestry and they visited Gifford Pinchot, Chief Forester of the United States Forest Service. This enabled the Commission to listen to American thoughts on forest conservation, and listen to the forestry agenda of the Canadian Forestry Association and the Commission of Conservation .

Drushka, Nixon and Travers (1993: 178) note that this was the beginning of the

long, slow road of official commitment to the ideals of conservation in British Columbia.

They further note that foresters such as Bernard Fernow and Gifford Pinchot were the

most articulate proponents who rationalized forest management. Both men were

extremely influential in the development of forest policy in British Columbia, as well as

in Canada and the United States. Pinchot's views have been mentioned and his role will

be elaborated later. However, some mention of Fernow's background and important role

in the conservation movement is pertinent.

BERNARD FERNOW

Drushka (1985: 26) notes that until 1876, there was not one professionally trained

forester in North America. Botanists, agriculturists and "lumbermen" were concerned

with timber supply, but not with forest management. Bernard Fernow was among the first

to advocate scientific management of North America's forests. He was trained as a

forester in Germany, according to the European theory of forestry, which viewed the

forest as a renewable natural resource. Forestry was a scientific and technical field based

on the doctrine that foresters could be trained to manage the forests so that the forests

would supply timber in perpetuity (Swift 1983: 52).

Fernow's ideas were not readily accepted in the eastern United States. However,

his ideas were accepted in the western United States as the federal government still

controlled enormous areas of forest in the form of National Forests. Fernow's rational

approach to forestry also gained acceptance with the Society of American Foresters. The

Society was devoted to scientific methods of forestry and saw themselves as a kind of

priesthood. By 1902, this small group had enormous influence on the development of

forest policy in the western United States, and in Canada, especially in British Columbia. (Drushka 1985: 30).

Government policies in Canada leaned toward public ownership of forests. Therefore, the members of the Royal Commission sought the advice of Bernard Fernow. His idea, that the state was best suited to manage forests, appealed to the government of British Columbia as it tried to deal with a lumber industry centred in the United States (Drushka 1985: 32).

THE FULTON COMMISSION AND THE 1912 FOREST ACT

The 1912 Forest Act was based on the Commission's Report. Swift (1983: 59) points out that the Act laid the basis for policy in Canada's most important forest province for the next thirty-five years. On the basis of a crude inventory, the Commission advised against long term allocations. Therefore, demand for timber was met with short term licenced timber sales (Schwindt 1979 :3). The Forest Act provided for government regulation of rentals and royalties on this licenced timber. However, there was no regulation of logging on timberland already under licence.

The Forest Act also provided for a bureaucracy of some of the best forestry talent in North America. William Roderick Ross, Minister of Lands, was in charge of the Forest Branch. Ross corresponded with Professor Fernow and Gifford Pinchot to solicit advice and gain knowledge. He acted on Pinchot's advice and hired a consultant, Overton Price, to organize the branch. (Gillis and Roach:1986: 145). Price was a trusted assistant and confident of Gifford Pinchot in the United States Forest Service (Gray

1982: 28). Flumerfelt (1914: 502) noted that Gifford Pinchot proposed that he would give the work of forest conservation in the province his personal supervision. Flumerfelt (1914: 502) also noted that:

> there was a general chorus of approval
> throughout British Columbia , when the
> government announced that Gifford
> Pinchot had taken the greatest interest
> in the quest for good men, and that the
> services of Overton W. Price, vice-president
> of the National Conservation Association,
> the man who under Pinchot, had achieved
> the splendid organization of the Forest Service
> had been secured as consultant forester.

Price recruited trained American foresters to headquarter positions and appointed Harvey R. MacMillan, a recent Master of Forestry graduate from Yale and Assistant Director of the Dominion Forestry Branch, to the position of Chief Forester. Martin Grainger, secretary to the Fulton Commission, retained his position as Chief of Records. Grainger spent a large part of the summer of 1911 searching through provincial statutes and identified all that related to forestry. This allowed MacMillan to concentrate on his job as Chief Forester. His first task was to assemble a field staff. He hired seventeen foresters from the Dominion Forestry branch and the United States Forest Service. By 1912, MacMillan felt that his department was set up to accomplish the task of conservation, that is, to use the forest for the greatest good for the greatest number. The Branch can therefore be considered a product of the early conservation movement and, due to Overton Price, a direct offshoot of the ideals Gifford Pinchot expressed for North American Forestry (Gillis and Roach 1986: 148-149).

On paper the Forest Act adequately addressed the future of timber supply, and by 1915 the British Columbia government controlled 96% of the province's forest land

(Drushka, Nixon and Travers 1993: 178). However, a number of unforseen problems developed. To begin with, the Forest Act provided little regulatory role for the Forest Branch for pre-1912 tenures. A major flaw in the Act was that it did not cancel all pre-1912 leases. Therefore, royalty taxes could not be increased on these nineteenth century leases. Increase in rates could only be applied to logs cut from newer leases. As a result, the Forest Act was amended in 1913 and again in 1914 (Gray 1982: 30-31). These amendments to the 1912 Forest Act determined that royalties should be calculated every five years depending on the average selling price of the lumber.

The political and economic significance of the forest industry eventually circumscribed the autonomy of the government. Lumber companies used the shibboleths of development, investment and prosperity for all to overcome bureaucratic resistance. As a result, the province often conceded to the perceived needs of the forest companies as industry encouraged opposition to the structures created by the conservationists. For instance, the forest industry maintained that free enterprise would benefit the people, not taxes and regulations created by the government. (Gray 1982: 49).

The Forest Branch also went through personnel changes. Richard McBride resigned in 1916 and MacMillan resigned shortly afterward as Chief Forester. MacMillan founded his own company, which eventually became the corporate empire MacMillan Bloedel. (Gillis and Roach 1986: 151). As well, when World War I broke out, the Forest Branch lost most of its personnel to enlistment and conservation was put on hold (Gray 1982: 31). Mills were also shut down on short notice and unemployment skyrocketed.

The government also required money to support the Branch's high levels of expenditure between 1909 and 1912. However, the funds given to the Forest Branch by

the government were never sufficient for to allow the development of an efficient

regeneration program. A forest inventory was desperately needed for future planning but

all efforts of the branch went into forest fire protection.[6] The disastrous forest fire years

of 1918-1922 depleted the forest fire suppression fund. Therefore, the government

recommended that government and industry contributions to the fund be set at a three to

two ratio. Industry, in turn, complained that it was paying proportionately more for land

that it was only renting than the government was paying for land that it owned. The

Forest Act was amended so that the ratio of government to industry contributions to the

fund were three to two. However, in reality this ratio was not enforced and by 1927, the

ratio used approached five to three (Gillis and Roach 1986: 154).

Swift (1983: 76) notes that although the Depression did not spare the forest

industries, the ruthless extraction of lumber continued. However, Government

expenditures on forestry were even further curtailed and forestry staff were further

reduced. Most people were concerned with surviving and there was little time to think of

resource management. For a province that was so dependent on the forest industry, the

situation was desperate.

Thus, the government and industry ignored conservation and future values as

they concentrated on present values. However, Gillis and Roach (1989: 152) maintain

that one step taken toward forest conservation was the reintroduction of forest reserves or

provincial forests. They were the forerunner of the sustained yield limits or working

circles which were introduced after the Depression and World War II by the Sloan

Commission.

---

[6] Fire was considered by those interested in forests to be the main "enemy" besides exploitation (Morgan 1978)

43

THE 1947 SLOAN COMMISSION

Drushka, Nixon and Travers (1993: 7) note that the 1918 Federal Commission on Conservation rationalized the state ownership of forest land in Canada. The argument presented was that public ownership of the forest lands, for reason of public interest, would ensure that the forests would be well cared for. They feel that this became an enduring myth that was only once ever substantially challenged. This occurred in British Columbia and resulted in an inquiry known as the Sloan Commission.

Although conservation was used by those in charge of administration of the forest, it could not be said that the forests in British Columbia were being managed to ensure future supplies of wood (Swift 1983: 61). Gillis and Roach (1989: 152) note that by the late 1920's, it was evident that the introduction of public forest management would be a long process. Questions regarding the proper role of the state in forest policy arose shortly after the Great Depression. Swift (1983: 60) maintains that as a result, twenty-five years after British Columbia brought in its first Forest Act, the new Chief Forester, Ernest C. Manning began a campaign against wasteful logging practices and underspending.

Manning felt that the recommendations of the 1909 Royal Commission on forest resources had been disregarded. Royalties had not been put to proper use, as little of the money had been spent on forest protection, research and enhancement. Further, little control had been exercised over logging. However, Manning's prescriptions were quite moderate considering his criticisms. Swift (1983: 79) explains that as the history of forest policy became apparent, Manning became pessimistic about the probability of wholesale policy change.

Manning was en route to present his views on forest management when he was killed in a plane crash. However, his speech was published after his death. It warned that remedies to forest depletion that cost finance ministers money, for a generation not yet at the polls, would never be accepted. Manning's death was a further blow to conservation and debates ensued regarding public versus private ownership (Swift 1983: 79).

F.D. Mulholland, chief forester of the Canadian Western Lumber Company, argued for an even division between public and private ownership. Mulholland was one of the most respected foresters in Canada and had recently worked with the B.C. Forest Service, directly under C.D. Orchard, Manning's replacement as Chief Forester. The Forest Service, under the guidance of F.D.Mulholland, prepared a report on the state of British Columbia's forests in 1937. It was based on an inventory begun in 1927 by Mulholland and outlined serious grounds for concern about the conditions of B.C. forests. If change did not come quickly, there would not be a large enough base of timber on which to rebuild the denuded forest. However, Mulholland left the Forest Service when it became clear that a proposal by Orhcard to continue state ownership would prevail (Drushka, Nixon and Travers 1993: 7).

Orchard was aware of the severity of the situation and developed a solution. May (1998: 187) notes that Orchard was a proponent of sustained-yield management in the tradition of Pinchot and Fernow. In 1942, he sent a memo to Minister of Lands, Wells Gray, which persuaded the coalition government to adopt sustained yield policies. However Premier Hart responded cautiously, arguing that a Royal Commission on the province's forest resources was first needed.

In late 1943, Mr. Justice Gordon Sloan of the B.C. Court of Appeal was appointed

to head the inquiry. Professor Drummond of the University of British Columbia also

made recommendations to Sloan. Drummond proposed that a permanent independent

forest commission should be responsible for implementing the new sustained yield

policy. The commission's jurisdiction should extend over all aspects of forestry. The

commission should not be composed of experts, but rather three to five reliable and

responsible "men", free to make decisions without political or other influences (Wilson

1987-1988: 12-13).

Sloan criticized previous governments for wasting forest revenue on

governmental activities not connected to forestry, which was the primary source of the

province's wealth. He felt that the practices of the past had been completely unacceptable

and if allowed to continue would have grave consequences for the province. Sloan

maintained that the future of the industry itself was in jeopardy, as well as the economy

of the province. He felt that sustained yield management was needed to guarantee timber

in perpetuity.[7]

Wilson (1987-1988: 11) notes that Sloan decided to endorse the main features of

Orchard's conservationist case. Orchard's original idea was that a few hundred of the

companies which were logging in the province would obtain Forest Management

Licences (later called Tree Farm Licences or TFLs) and become transformed into land-

based forest managers. These companies could then harvest a perpetual supply of wood.

Orchard had also suggested that private operators should be induced to practice sustained

yield by offering long-term rights to nearby crown timber. Public working circles would

also be established and operated according to sustained yield principles. Timber in the

---

[7] Miller (1994: 127) notes that Sloan defined "sustained yield" as a perpetual supply of commercially usable quality from regional areas in yearly or periodic quantities of equal or lesser volume.

Public Working Circles, later called Public Sustained Yield Units (PSYUS), was to be harvested according to a schedule or an Annual Allowable Cut (AAC) administered by the Forest Service (Drushka 1985: 76). Binkley (1997: 43) notes that under the Forest Act, the level of annual allowable cut, the AAC is set by the chief forester on the basis of broad biophysical and socio-economic criteria. Therefore, as it is not calculated by any one formula, it is not possible to predict what future AACs might be.

The Forest Act was amended in 1947 to facilitate the management of sustained yield. The principle of granting rights on timber only was retained until 1947, when Orchard's recommendations were enshrined in law. The Forest Service believed that the Forest Act amendments would carry on the long established principle of ownership and responsibility of the forests and Forest Management Licences would give industry long-term tenure and relief from high carrying charges. It was hoped that this would make industry interested in the production of forest crops.

Wilson (1987-1988: 22) notes that sustained yield provided a powerful positive image. From 1950 to the late 1960's there was an atmosphere of complacency, as sustained yield became a security blanket for British Columbia's forestry. It seemed to be a guarantee that the province's forests would supply a perpetual flow of timber and few questioned this policy.

Lewis (1976: 6) summed up the policy activity of this era. Catch-phrases like multiple use, sustained yield and maximum benefits were used frequently. However, they were not clarified and were often ambiguous. Clear comprehensive statements on forest policy were not available. The three Royal Commissions of 1910, 1945 and 1956 investigated forest resources, but they specified the issues to be inquired into rather than

the objectives toward which they were to direct their recommendations. However, the 1956 Sloan Commission reiterated the findings of the 1947 Commission. Sloan maintained that the province was making a successful transition to sustained yield management (Wilson 1987-1988: 19).

Rayner (1996: 87) maintains that this policy was successful on its own terms as old tenures were rapidly converted into Forest Management Licences . The Forest Act was revised in 1947 to provide for the TFLs. Therefore, the Minister of Lands and Forests could enter into an agreement with any person for the management of Crown lands, for the purpose of continuously growing crops of forest products. Forty-one TFLs were issued. Most of these TFLs were very large. The first one granted was 2.4 million acres (Drushka 1993: 6). The first TFL was issued in 1948 and the last in 1966 (Ainscough 1976: 39).

Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson (1996: 118) note that the twin policy pillars of the Sloan Commission were the tenure system, based on the Tree Farm Licence, and a sustained yield policy, which was later augmented by the Integrated Resource Management. The sustained yield pillar and the tenure pillar augmented each other and any force which corroded public confidence in sustained yield affected the tenure pillar. Drushka, Nixon and Travers (1993: 180) note that sustained yield and tenure were actually a compromise stance, which forever changed forest policy in British Columbia. Drushka (1985: 63) agrees and notes that sustained yield and tenure became the most volatile issues in forest resource politics. Both concepts, along with the corporate concentration which they encouraged, were eventually the source of criticism and attack, as they required the logging of old-growth forests.

PROBLEMS OF SUSTAINED YIELD – OLD-GROWTH

The forest policy makers of Sloan's era were faced with many difficulties and high levels of uncertainty. The TFLs were worth a lot of money and cost very little. Orchard did not realize that granting licences would result in an capital gain for the TFL's recipients. However, during this period the Forest Service had adhered to Fernows's belief that government and large corporations were more efficient at managing forests than small operators.

Orchard was not able to predict that the Second World War would produce vast amounts of capital, which would be used by industry to become even more powerful. Wilson (1987-1988: 14) maintains that as well as this, forest policy makers were ill prepared for the post–war boom which put immense pressure on the forests to produce vast quantities of lumber. Sloan's report also did not come to grips with how much reforestation was needed or question whether the state and industry could produce the amount of reforestation that might be needed. Sloan's recommendations had been designed to bring provincially owned timber under regulated management that would maximize the productivity of the forests. The great hope of sustained yield was that it would stabilize regional economies based on forest industries while maintaining forest cover for watershed protection, prevention of soil erosion, providing recreational activities and wildlife habitat.

Drushka (1985: 43) maintains that Sloan's first objective was to create forests in an even distribution of age classes that would yield a constant volume of timber in perpetuity. The implications of this were not immediately apparent but they were enormous. The government was committing the province to a decades long course of

action to create Fernow's hazy conception of a normal forest. This became the core of some of the most controversial issues in B. C. forestry. Sahajananthian, Haley and Nelson (1998: S75) note that for the next three decades forest policy required that old -growth forest be liquidated and replaced with managed timber in one rotation, about 80-120 years, depending on the geographic location.

Therefore, the forest industry was able to achieve high harvesting levels due to the definition of sustained timber yield as the cut that liquidates old-growth. Ainscough (1976: 39) notes that one of Sloan's primary objectives was to recover the capital tied up in old-growth forest and convert it to a growing forest as rapidly as sustained yield principles would permit. This lead to the appearance of clearcutting and the destruction of old-growth forests. Clawson and Hyde (1976: 202) recognized that for British Columbia and for the Pacific Northwest, the problems of managing the old-growth stands would be difficult and of importance.

However, changes in forest management practices were slow to follow. Swift (1983: 62) maintains that even though conservation and sustained yield were not being practised, conservation ideology provided the underpinnings for the administrative treatment of forests for most of the twentieth century. Demand for change of the sustained yield practices, which liquidated old-growth forests, did not occur until the late 1980s when the demand for non-use timber values of forests accelerated [8].

International concern for forests in general precipitated interest in the sustainable development of forests in the late 1980's. Forest practices which required the logging of

---

[8] Haener and Luckert (1998: S2-7) note that, in addition to timber outputs, forests symbolize the health of the planet, are sources of biodiversity, provide environmental services such as carbon sequestration and air and water filtration, and are sources of tourism and recreation.

the old-growth forests in Clayoquot Sound in British Columbia received international attention. These events will be elaborated in Chapter Four. However, the pressure for preservation of old growth forests was initiated by the growth of the environmental movement, which accelerated in the sixties.

THE DAWN OF THE MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL ERA (1960-1985)

During this period, from approximately 1909 – 1960, the power of the government forest bureaucracy was established. Wilson (1987-1988:50) notes that the system vested control in the minister, the Forest Service and the companies holding long-term tenure rights. This allowed these decision makers to operate relatively free of public scrutiny. It played a major role in defining the salience of the conservation problem and in structuring perceptions regarding solutions. Most importantly, it became a storehouse of information for anyone who wanted to critique the situation.

This system was questioned in the 1970's when proposals to democratize the policy were made by a wide variety of groups. Wilson (1987-1988: 4) maintains that a new set of factors brought about the 1970's renewal of concern regarding timber perpetuation. Drushka (1985: 52) notes that beginning in the 1960's a new criticism of sustained yield policy began to appear in British Columbia. The complaints grew in volume and eventually the future of the policy was in jeopardy. These criticisms reflect what is known as the ecological perspective. This perspective criticizes the way sustained yield treats the diversity of the forest as an unimportant entity. The issue of forest conservation once again was described as problematic and the dominant view was that government investment in forest land had been too low.

Therefore, the enduring myth that the best managed lands in the province were those under provincial forest administration first came to be challenged in the seventies. For instance, there were disclosures of deliberate mismanagement and doctored waste assessment reports in South Moresby in the Queen Charlotte Islands, TFL #1. Rayonier Canada (B.C.) had been granted this tree farm license in 1958. The next chapter will describe the 13 year debate which ensued over its logging plans. This debate eventually involved the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club of Western Canada, the Friends of the Ecological Reserves, the Western Canada Wilderness Committee and the Valhalla Society (Sewell, Dearden and Dumrell 1989:156).

PRESERVATION AND PACIFIC RIM

Another of the most prominent issues of the next period, from 1960-1985 period involves the establishment of a national park in the Pacific Rim area of Vancouver Island. This too will be elaborated in the next chapter. However, demand for preservation of this area from logging was initiated in the 1909-1960 era. The area included two Tree Farm Licences which had been awarded in 1955: MacMillan and Bloedel's TFL 20 and British Columbia Forest Products's TFL 22 (Nelson and Cordes 1972: 66).

The idea of establishing a national park in the Pacific Rim area began in 1930 when the B.C. government set aside a reserve in the Nitinat area. This was one of several reserves established in the province at the request of the federal government pending their inspection as possible national park sites. Nelson and Cordes (1972: 6) note that the idea of a park was apparently forgotten during the Depression and World War II. The idea resurfaced briefly in 1947. C.D. Orchard pressed for a decision regarding the timber in

the Kennedy Lake Reserve. The timber could be logged if a park was not developed by the federal government. The federal government indicated that it was interested but said the provincial government was responsible to initiate the action. The federal government based their response on a strict interpretation of the British North America Act, which gave the provincial government control of land and resources. Therefore, to establish a national park, it was necessary for the province to assume all aspects of land acquisition. The provincial government could then turn the land over to the federal government free of all encumbrances.

In 1947, a survey of forest resources had been done by the B.C. Forest Service and was submitted to Orchard. As a result, Orchard said that the west-coast reserve areas would not be satisfactory national park sites because much of the timber was under lease and logging was not permitted in national parks. Bella (1987: 56) notes that section four of the National Park Act of 1930 specifies that the parks were to remain unimpaired for future generations and mining, hydroelectric development and commercial forestry were not allowed. This clause was included in the National Parks Act because of intense pressure from Arthur Wheeler and the Canadian National Parks Association to stop any development in National Parks.

Johnston (1985: 10) notes that the Canadian National Parks Association was formed in 1923 on Harkin's approval and encouragement. It was considered one of the Alpine Club of Canada's finest achievements. The Alpine Club was a lifetime member of the Association and the Association was dependent on the Club for financial and volunteer assistance. Although the formation of the Canadian National Parks Association was on of the Canadian Alpine Club's finest actions, the Club's preservation efforts

became diffused. Wheeler was on the Association's executive and the Canadian National Parks Association was considered a mouthpiece for Wheeler (Bella 1987: 51). However, the National Parks Act of 1930 was created to satisfy supporters of Wheeler and the Canadian National Parks Assocation (Bella 1987: 56).

Many of the founding members such as Wheeler and Parker died during this period. Further, both Canada and the United States were caught in the grip of a Depression and then a world war. Unemployment, war, peace, and federalism became prominent issues. Park creation was not a priority and the Kennedy and Nitinat reserves were canceled. Therefore, the chance to develop a national park was lost until the 1960s. Nelson and Cordes (1972: 3) note that a national park could have been established much more easily in the 1930's and 1940's before lumbering became well established in the area, as institutional arrangements under the TFLs gave the lumber companies a strong hold over public land. However, in the 1960s the Sierra Club joined the National and Provincial Parks Association in their struggle to preserve the area from logging interests.

THE SIERRA CLUB

As previously mentioned, Pinchot's utilitarian, conservationist view dominated the era between 1909 and 1960. Wars and a major depression did make preservation of wilderness less important. However, the Sierra Club continued to grow and refine its techniques for preserving wilderness. Graber (1976: 94) notes that after the Second World War, the Sierra Club evolved from a regional, California based, hiking and preservation organization with 4,000 members and an annual budget of $100,000, to a

national organization with 100,000 members and an annual budget of $2 million. This also reflected the Club's expanding political horizons.

In the sixties two developments took place. One was that the Sierra Club used lawsuits to force compliance with environmental legislation. The other was the Sierra Club moved to Canada and began to use these tactics here. They became involved in a major battle with logging interests over Pacific Rim National Park. They joined the National and Provincial Parks Association in its struggle to include the Nitinat Triangle as part of the park. The inclusion was opposed by the B.C. Forest Service due to logging interests. Thus, by the sixties, a new era was about to begin. Intense conflict resumed and, as Hoban and Brooks (1987: 3) note, the debate between those who believed in conservation and those who believed in preservation, which had been smoldering from 1895 to 1970, was reignited.

CHAPTER THREE

ERA 3 (1960-1985) : THE MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL ERA

Wilson (1987-1988: 23) notes that the resurgence of concern about the timber

supply in British Columbia was partially rooted in a weakening of the economic and

technological developments that had fueled the optimistic mood of the 1950-1970 period.

There were also clear signs that the timber supply was being rapidly depleted. However,

the resurgence of conservationist and preservationist concerns was also the result of two

political developments, the arrival of the NDP government in 1972 and the growth of the

environmental movement from the 1960's onward. Both these developments are pertinent

to this thesis and shall be elaborated on in this chapter.

THE MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT

The modern environmental movement began in the United States in the 1960's

and was marked by an ecological message of interdependency. A number of

environmental disasters in the United States lead to this realization that life and the

environment were interdependent. Air pollution, in the form of smog, became a concern

when 600 people died in New York in the early 1960s. On January 28, 1969 the Santa

Barbara "blowout" endangered bird and marine life, and polluted the shores of San

Miguel Island. This disaster occurred because oil companies drilled on the continental

shelf of California despite scientific warnings that the wells were close to fault lines and

eruptions could occur from the unstable ocean floor. Gas and oil spurted from a hole

which erupted in the ocean floor and by mid-May, 3.5 million gallons of oil had

surfaced. Then, in 1971, scientific reports indicated that industrial waste, including lead

and mercury, was being dumped into the Mississippi River. These reports indicated that this waste was destroying the river's aquatic life and was also threatening aquatic life in the Gulf of Mexico, as well as human life in Louisianna (Longgood 1972: 220-225).

One important result of these disasters was that waste and mismanagement by industry was not only viewed in a quantitative form. There was now a qualitative element, and the quality of the environment was perceived to be deteriorating or polluted. Thus, environmental issues became issues which affected the general public, as the natural environment showed signs of being degraded by the byproducts of industry (Burton 1972: 138).

Greater value was once again placed on wilderness and wilderness related activities. Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson (1996: 120) note that this can be traced to a complex array of factors. Society was more affluent, and had greater mobility and more leisure time. This enabled people to travel and as a result, people increased their exposure to nature. As well, an ever expanding system of back country roads were used by the public for hiking and off-road trails. Many of these roads were a by-product of the forest-industry expansion, and a consequence of these excursions was that more people were exposed to logged-over areas.

Wilson (1987-1988: 29) maintains that societal developments were critical to the debate, which was renewed in the sixties, regarding solutions to timber perpetuation worries. He explains that participation in the environmental movement was linked to participation in other societal reform movements of the 1960's. The liberation movements such as the civil rights movement, the women's movement and the anti-Vietnam War movement, struggled to change attitudes and institutions. The

environmental movement and the liberation movements attracted many of the same

activists, as participants campaigned to eliminate injustice, against humans and the earth

(Scheffer 1991: 16).

The pressure for reform often came from hinterland communities which had been

influenced by newcomers with these "sixties" values. Indeed, one of the major

environmental struggles of the seventies in British Columbia was the struggle over South

Moresby (to be discussed later in this chapter). It was initiated by Thom Henley (Huck).

Henley found shelter on South Moresby Island in the Queen Charlottes after he resisted

the Vietnam draft (May 1990: 8-9). Thus, in the 1960s many different types of concern

and reactions were united under the banner of environmentalism. Sandbach (1980: 21)

notes that the term environmentalism was interpreted to mean a social movement, a set of

ideas based on ecology, or just a greater interest in environmental affairs.

Hoban and Brooks (1987: 3) maintain that these circumstances led to the first

Earth Day on April 22,1970. This celebration helped spread the environmental movement

and renewed concern, regarding the human impact on the environment, from the United

States into Canada. A related consequence was the rapid establishment of new groups and

expansion of established groups into Canada, such as the Sierra Club of Western Canada

in 1969. These groups were concerned with an array of environmental issues and

Mitchell (1980: 347) notes that groups such as the Sierra Club, which were part of the

original conservation movement, added environmental issues such as air and water

pollution to their traditional concerns of wilderness and wildlife preservation. However,

Mitchell (1980: 347) also points out that wilderness preservation was still considered to

be the classic concern of the environmental movement.

As a result, preservation groups became devoted to preserving wilderness areas in British Colmbia. For instance, the Nitinat Triangle, the Valhalla, South Moresby and the Purcell became wilderness areas of particular importance (Nelson 1989: 89 and Wilson 1987-1988: 24). Only the struggle to preserve Nitinat and South Moresby from logging interests will be discussed later in this chapter as they both invloved the Sierra Club of Western Canada. However, they are also the epitome of the conservation-preservation struggle.

Although the preservationist groups did much to publicize bad logging practices and poor reforestation performance, there was still resistance to preservation proposals. Of particular concern to these groups was the increasing recognition that wasteful logging practices put increased pressure on the remaining old-growth timber stocks. Public concern about forest management was used to press for change in sustained yield practices and much of the criticism was directed against the gap between the myth and the practice of sustained yield.

The strategy used by the environmental movement during this era was to question the key promises of sustained yield. The environmental movement also used doubts about sustained yield to question the fundamental beliefs behind sustained yield, such as conservation. This in turn allowed the environmental movement to pressure for an alternative ecological vision, for how the forests should be managed (Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson 1996: 120). In 1972, the campaign by the environmental movement against sustained yield was assisted by the election of the New Democratic Party (NDP), a critic of forest practices, at that time.

WILLIAMS AND THE NDP

Wilson (1987-1988: 21) notes that Bob Williams, an NDP candidate, was elected in 1966. Williams found the NDP caucus lacking in knowledge of forest policy, so he became self-educated and produced a barrage of critiques against Social Credit forest policy. However, his criticisms were from a landlord's perspective. That is, Williams' first concern was finding ways to extract increased revenues from industry and make them pay "fair rent" for the publicly owned resources that they were using.

When the NDP came to power in 1972, Williams became Minister of Lands, Forests and Water Resources. The NDP was suspicious about the advice it received from the existing Forest Service. Therefore, one of Williams' first actions as Minister was to establish the Environment and Land Use Committee Secretariat (ELUCS). The ELUCS was an elite interdisciplinary bureau, which produced studies and documented negative consequences of past forest management policies. The bureau was skeptical about the sustainability of the current harvest level and felt that assumptions were overly optimistic about forest inventories and harvest levels premised on these assumptions. The reports also documented the earliest references to the inevitability of timber falldown. Falldown was believed to be a threat to future timber supplies. It was argued that this phenomena would occur because the harvest of second growth stands would not contain as much volume per acre as the natural stands which had been growing for centuries (Wilson 1987-1988 : 24). Hammond (1992:129-130) explains that monoculturing forestland with tree plantations, will never produce as much or as high a quality timber provided by the old natural stands which have been cut down. For instance, lumber from second-growth Douglas-fir has problems with warping and the highest quality, longest lasting paper

comes from the pulp from old -growth trees.

Although the bureau was not engaged directly in forest policy, the studies it produced were used by the environmental groups to become educated in matters dealing with forestry. Therefore, this was also an era of rapid learning about forest policies for the public and arguments ensued over such issues as flawed inventories, falldown and corporate concentration. (Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson 1996: 120-121).

Drushka (1985: 81) notes that by the 1970's independent loggers were almost extinct and complaints from numerous interests grew regarding tenure and concentration of the industry. For example, a few months after Williams was in office, Crown Zellerbach announced that it was closing sawmills. The government responded by buying out the company. Small operators were outraged that the government response to concentration in the industry was to set up crown corporations. As a result, Williams became determined to make some changes to the tenure system. However, he did not wish to become absorbed in the myriad of leases and licences that had been granted in the last century, so he assigned a Royal Commission.

CORPORATE CONCENTRATION AND THE PEARSE COMMISSION

A fourth Royal Commission on Forestry, in British Columbia was called as a result of criticism of the concentration of corporate power, concerns of increased demands for non-timber resources, fully allocated timber supply and environmental impacts. The Commission's recommendations were expected to allow the full contribution of forest resources to the economic and social welfare of British Columbia in terms of commercial and environmental benefits. The Commisssion was established by

Premier Dave Barrett and the New Democratic Party. Williams appointed Peter Pearse, a University of British Columbia forest economist, to head the inquiry. It was a one-person inquiry and the Royal Commission became known as the Pearse Commisision (Drushka 1985: 217).

Miller (1994 b: 129) notes that Pearse was charged with studying the extent of forest commitments, forest management provisions and the tenure system. Drushka (1985: 83) notes that although Pearse received submissions from a wide range of views, the inquiry was dominated by the tenure issue and who should have access to publicly owned forest resources. Once again, forest companies demanded more secure tenure agreements, while independent loggers wanted less industry concentration.

Drushka (1985:56) notes that Pearse saw forest policy as the result of changing influence among conservationist and industrial promoters, and he believed that economic tools could be used to solve conflicts between timber producers and other forest users. He believed that since 1947, forest policy in British Columbia had been determined by those interested in the resource itself such as the professional foresters. However, those who "owned" the forest, the public, and those who used the forest, industry, had been ignored. Pearse believed that sustained yield policy relied too heavily on technologists to solve conflicts regarding the future supply of timber. He maintained that economic tools should be used to resolve conflicts between timber producers and other forest users. For instance, he believed that non-timber values such as recreation were increasing and these values should be systematically assessed.

Drushka, Nixon and Travers (1993: 11) note that Pearse also expressed concern about the degree of concentration of timber rights in the province. Pearse felt that

concentration of the control of timber harvesting rights was a matter of urgent public concern. Pearse's solution to this concentration was to dissolve industry's stranglehold through competitive bidding for timber sales and rights and to make tenure less permanent.

His report highlighted the degree of corporate concentration, power and control that a few companies had over the industry. However, while Pearse was preparing his report, concentration continued to increase. For instance, the 20 largest companies increased their control of harvesting rights. The share of cutting rights held by the ten biggest companies increased from 37 percent in 1954, to 59 percent in 1975. By 1975, the fifteen largest forest companies directly controlled over half the timber in the PSYUs and nearly all the TFL timber. Further, almost none of these companies were in business prior to 1948 (May 1998: 190). By the time the Royal Commission had completed its report the Social Credit Party was in power and two years later the new Minister of Forests, Tom Waterland, introduced legislation to change the Forest Act.

THE FOREST ACT OF 1978

After 1975, the Forest Branch of Lands Forests and Water Resources became the Ministry of Forests. The new ministry chose to ignite concern about the future timber supply and painted a gloomy picture. It stated that falldown soon would be felt in every area of the province. Therefore, annual allowable cuts would have to be reduced after the first rotation (Drushka 1985: 50). Miller (1994b: 129) notes that a flurry of activity followed as government and industry tried to find ways to offset the falldown. Numerous programs such as the Forest Resource Development Agreement were initiated to establish

reforestation, but pressures on timber supply continued.

In 1978, the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia approved Bill 14, which was simply called the Forest Act. The legislation repealed the Forest Act of 1912 and set the terms for granting harvesting rights to crown timber. However, the new Forest Act did not call for a redirection of forest policy.

The Forest Act of 1978 closely paralleled the recommendations of the Royal Commission. However, it deviated from the Commissioner's recommendation to leave areas open to competitive bidding. Instead, the Forest Act established additional security to established rights. Existing Tree Farm Licences remained intact, but the legislation reduced the terms on all existing TFLs to eight years. Pearse however, recommended that these existing licences should expire.(Schwindt 1979: 18).

Pearse had recommended reducing the new TFL terms to fifteen years. However, Waterland chose to institute twenty-five year renewable terms. Old Timber Sale Licences and Timber Sale Harvesting Licences were converted into Forest licences, which provided a specific volume of timber that could be harvested over a fifteen-year term. A number of Pearse's other recommendations were also defeated by industry opposition (May 1998: 190-191).

Pearse pointed out that any change in tenure had to honour existing timber rights. However, he failed to recommend that measures should be instituted to stop the "Exodus factor." This is one of the consequences of corporate concentration. Many of the original recipients of TFLs had withdrawn from the province. That is, once companies harvested mature timber from their TFLs, they take their profits and leave the province. Successor licensees were the ones which had to bear the costs of damage to the land. Another

problem was that if the province wanted to cancel these licences - for instance if a national park was to be declared in an already licenced area - it was the province which was obligated to pay millions in compensation to the licencee. Pearse also did not question how well industry managed the public lands they held tenure on (Drushka 1985: 86).

Worries about forest preservation were not a prominent reason for the Royal Commission and changes to the Forest Act did not cease the conflict between the forest industry and other interests. It did however, officially commit B.C. to a policy of multiple use of its crown forests. The inquiry also inspired numerous groups to express views regarding the future of the forest. This participation contributed to the growing technical expertise of the environmental movement, which by this time was embroiled in a struggle struggle to preserve the Nitinat area from being logged.

NITINAT TRIANGLE - THE CONSERVATION-PRESERVATION BATTLE RESUMES

The following is a summary of the Nitinat controversy which began in 1964, as described in detail by Nelson and Cordes (1972: 3-20). They explain that, in 1964, the Tofino Chamber of Commerce announced that the federal government indicated willingness to establish a park on west Vancouver Island if the provincial government would turn over the land. British Columbia's Recreation and Conservation Minister, Ken Kiernan, agreed that a park proposal was desirable if the area was free of timber and mining leases. However, it was first necessary for Kiernan to present the idea to his Cabinet before he submitted the proposal to Ottawa.

Little was decided until the eve of a provincial election, a year and a half later. Kiernan communicated with Arthur Laing, the federal Minister of Resources, and invited him to take over Wickaninnish Provincial Park, as a nucleus for a national park. Laing promised a speedy reply but two years of federal-provincial exchanges resulted in rejection of the area because it was too small. By March 1968, the size of the area devoted to Wickaninnish Park was increased and Ottawa seemed willing to participate in the acquisition of private land for the national park. However, by June the discussions stalled again because B.C. was not willing to pay half of the cost of land acquisition.

The Trudeau government came to power in 1968 and Kiernan explained to the new Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, Jean Chretien, that his government could not afford to pay additional land acquisition costs as his government was committed to using the funds for its provincial park acquisitions. Chretien replied that he first wanted a survey of the proposed park area and then he would discuss cost-sharing.

The first recognition that some type of agreement was reached occurred when the B.C. throne speech of January 1969 contained sections which asked the legislature to consider legislation to facilitate a national park on the west coast of Vancouver Island. The park proposal contained three phases. The first was the Long Beach area, 1700 acres of federal land, Wickaninnish Park and 12,000 acres under forest management licences held by British Columbia Forest Products (BCFP) and MacMillan Bloedel. Phase II consisted of the Effingham Islands and Phase III included the Lifesaving Trail which extended the length of the coastline from Port Renfrew to Barkley Sound.

In September 1969, legislation set down ground rules for the establishment of a national park. However, on December 1, 1969 B.C.'s Minister of Recreation, H.G.

Williams announced that the Lifesaving trail would not be included in the park. Preservation groups now became involved as this omission by the provincial government seemed to signal a major concession to lumbering interests. The trail was needed by industry for access to the ocean from logging sites.

Pressure from two interest groups, the Victoria Fish and Game Club and the Amalgamated Conservation Society, resulted in formal approval of transfer of lands in Phase I and II. However, the lands in Phase III were subject to adjustment. By 1970, the B.C. government, the B.C. Forest Service, MacMillan-Bloedel and B.C. Forest Products, and the federal government met to discuss enlargement of Phase III to include the Nitinat Triangle. This proposal was opposed by the B.C. Forest Service, MacMillan Bloedel and B.C. Forest Products due to the loss of timber interests in this area. The President of the Council of Forest Industries issued a press release condemning the inclusion of the Nitinat area due to the resultant loss of jobs. He claimed to be in possession of a map which showed the tentative boundaries as agreed to by both governments and as proposed by the Sierra Club.

The Sierra Club of Western Canada, which was formed in 1969, had entered the controversy. They presented the arguments of interested groups such as the National and Provincial Parks Association (Nelson and Cordes 1972: 20). In 1972, the Sierra Club produced a book entitled *The West Coast Trail and Nitinat Lakes*. Included in the book was the map of the proposed national park boundaries (see next page). The book also contained sections devoted to explaining the problems associated with the park's creation.

The Sierra Club proposed that 14,000 acres be withdrawn from TFL 27 in order

to include the Nitinat Forest in the National Park. The proposals were endorsed by the Sierra Club and every major conservation group in British Columbia and detailed submissions and appeals were made to the provincial government and its Environment and Land Use Committee. The response from the provincial government was an offer to adjust the boundaries to include 8,00 acres on the Nitinat lakes. In return for this the government asked for 8,000 acres of land presently included in the Long Beach section of the National Park..

The Sierra Club rejected the proposal as it felt this would set a precedent and rejected the offer. They believed that it was not a good idea to use land exchanges involving parkland. The Club noted that provincial and federal agencies must be made aware of the general dissatisfaction with the multiple use philosophy pushed by the Forest Service and the forest industry. However, this was not resolved until a dispute over logging in South Moresby occurred.

SOUTH MORESBY

In 1974 Rayonier Canada (B.C.) Ltd. submitted a five-year logging plan to the provincial government to harvest timber on Burnaby Island, in the South Moresby chain of the Queen Charlotte Islands. However, the Haida natives of South Moresby and other concerned citizens opposed the initiative. They formed the Islands Protection Society and, led by Thom Henley, prepared a South Moresby Wilderness Proposal.

They presented the proposal to the provincial government and began a thirteen year debate, which eventually involved national and international groups. By the early 1980s the debate involved a number of environmental groups. These included the

Sierra Club Boundary Proposal

Source: Sierra Club of British Columbia (1972:76-77)

Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society (formerly the National and Provincial Parks Association of Canada) and the Sierra Club of Western Canada. The cause also gained international attention when American groups such as the Sierra Club and the American based National Parks and Conservation Society gave their support (Sewell, Dearden and Dumbrell 1989: 158).

May (1990: 141-142) notes that 1986 was a crucial year for the South Moresby battle. The United Nations (U.N.) set up the World Commission on Environment and Development to address global environmental issues. The members from the U.N. committee expressed concern that if Canada could not save South Moresby, there was little hope for the rest of the world. Therefore, the commission, chaired by Norway's Prime Minister Gro Harlem Bruntland, visited Vancouver and held a series of public hearings. However, the native communities were not represented.

Canada's representative on the commission was Maurice Strong, a long time supporter of South Moresby. He arranged for a separate hearing with the Haida natives of South Moresby. Sewell, Dearden and Dumbrell (1989: 160) point out that the Haida had joined the environmental lobby; however, the Haida cause focused on land claims, whereas the environmental focus was on preservation of the area through creation of a national park.

South Moresby receded from headlines but, on May 20, 1986 the provincial cabinet accepted the recommendations of the Wilderness Advisory Committee (W.A.C.) "in principle" and a vague commitment was made to discuss the creation of a national park at South Moresby. The W.A.C. had been appointed by the provincial government and was chaired by Derrick Sewell. O'Riordan (1989: 115) notes that Sewell had always

been a conservationist for natural resource management in the classical sense of the term. However, in his final years Sewell chose to turn his talents to wilderness preservation and therefore chaired the W.A.C. This committee actively supported preserving South Moresby as wilderness.

At the first bargaining session between federal and provincial bureaucrats, which began in late June, provincial officials maintained that the creation of a national park in the Charlottes could not begin until two issues were resolved. First, the British Columbia government needed to approve of its negotiating position. Second, the B.C. government demanded that Ottawa pay its seventeen year, $24 million dollar debt for the Nitinat Triangle area of Pacific Rim National Park. Tom MacMillan, federal Minister of the Environment instructed Ottawa to find money within the basic Parks budget, even if it meant maintenance of existing parks would suffer (May 1990: 157-159).

British Columbia agreed to negotiate a National Park on the boundaries proposed by the Wilderness Advisory Committee. However, MacMillan noted that the federal government wanted the national park to include marine areas. At this time a provincial election gave Bill Vander Zalm a political mandate. He had dodged the South Moresby issue, except to say that logging was necessary as the trees were diseased. (May 1990: 159).

On February 18, 1987 the federal government handed over its outstanding debt for Pacific Rim. However, the federal government demanded that the Lyell Island area be included in the South Moresby deal (May 1990: 172-173). The W.A.C. boundaries were a major area of contention. Windy Bay on Lyell Island was not included in the W.A.C. proposal. The area was the largest remaining unlogged watershed in South Moresby and

supported trees which were more than one thousand years old. It had to be included for if too much of the area was clear cut, justification for the area as a national park would be lost.

MacMillan demanded a moratorium on logging the areas wanted for a national park. By this time, South Moresby held symbolic importance and was one of the major Canadian environmental concerns. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney personally spoke with Vander Zalm and on March 9, 1987 the throne speech at the opening of B.C. Legislature maintained that it would attempt to expedite federal-provincial negotiations for the establishment of a national park at South Moresby. In September of 1987, the Federal Government and the province of British Columbia signed an agreement to create South Moresby national Park Reserve and Federal Environment Minister Tom MacMillan was given the Sierra Club's highest award for his role in preserving South Moresby (Sewell, Dearden and Dumbrell 1989: 148).

Hawkes (1996: 92) notes that this agreement culminated fifteen years of bitter conflict. In the end, Western Forest Products negotiated tens of millions of dollars in compensation for a lease which they had only paid tens of thousands for. However, David Suzuki made a comment in the *Globe and Mail* which noted how significant the South Moresby conflict was. Suzuki (1987: 4) maintains that the South Moresby conflict was instrumental in ushering in a new worldview based on the concept of sustainable development and biodiversity and he states that:

> In the end what South Moresby revealed
> was a profound clash between worldviews.
> The dominant one sees all of nature as a potential
> resource. But there is growing support for a

> different outlook that recognizes that we are
> biological beings, who, in spite of science and
> technology remain embedded in and dependent
> on nature. So we have to fight to keep nature intact
> and try to bring ourselves into a balance with the
> environment. South Moresby could be a watershed
> that marks a shift towards this emerging worldview.

THE END OF AN ERA

May (1998: 192) maintains that Commissioner Pearse's report had drawn

attention to the fact that the AAC exceeded sustainable limits and logging rates would

have to be reduced once the high-volume old-growth timber was gone. However, despite

changes to the Forest Act and some gains by the environmental movement in this era, the

politics of the early 1980's revealed continued support of industry's practices (May 1998:

191; and Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson 1996: 111). May (1998:191) maintains that

during this period of "sympathetic administration", forest officials were instructed to

ignore logging infractions. This policy was an interim approach to the economic

difficulties faced by the forest industry during these years.

Miller (1994b: 130) explains that the major recession in the early 1980's, a

significant public service downsizing, and the increase of public participation combined

to limit the capability of the Forest Service to keep planning programs on schedule and

ensure that AACs were kept current. For instance, one-third of the forest staff was laid

off and ranger districts were combined and made larger.

As well, Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson (1996: 111) note that conflict between

industry and other forest users continued. There were public suspicions about the close

tie between the Ministry of Forests and industry. The Minister of Forests, Tom

Waterland, was forced to resign in 1986 due to his interest in Western Forest Products

(the same company which was involved in the South Moresby dispute) as Waterland had

issued this company TFLs and made decisions in favor of this company. May (1998: 191)

points out that Waterland had personally invested $20,000 with the company.

McGonigle (1989: 525) notes that by the early 1980s the environmental

movement lost its impetus and was often treated as just another interest. Further, industry

blamed the economic woes of the early 1980s on the environmentalists (Marchak 1995:

87). However, in the late 1980's the environmental theme made a resurgence in public

affairs and resulted in an air of urgency which had not been seen since the 1960s. This

time it recognized that the scale and interaction of threats to the environment were

global.

The B.C. government continued to allow clear-cutting and public concern

eventually focused on the global environmental impacts of this practice. Other resource

users, such as fishermen, trappers and tourism operators were also concerned that poor

logging practices were affecting their interests. Loggers too, were concerned that

increased mechanization resulted in job losses. Therefore, Miller (1994b:130) notes that

the concept of sustained yield with an emphasis on maximizing production was found

inadequate and was questioned. There were demands for the economic principles of

conservation to be replaced by ecological ones such as diversity.

A new and important set of themes emerged as a result of the introduction of the

concept of biodiversity and sustainable development at the 1986 United Nations World

Commission on Environment and Development. Concern for biodiversity was further

developed by conservation biologists and landscape ecologists with the United States

Forest Service and came as a result of experiences in the old-growth forests of the U.S. Pacific Northwest. As a result, concern focused on the preservation of old-growth ecosystems in North America, as it was believed that these ecosystems were being depleted because of sustained yield practices (Rayner 1996: 91).

Therefore, by the late 1980s, the positive symbolism associated with sustained yield was severely eroded and it was acknowledged that sustained yield practices would not guarantee a perpetual supply of timber. Greater rates of investment were required and there was also a need to pay greater attention to other values (Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson 1996: 111). As a result, the entire premise of high-yield forestry on public lands became questioned.

This supplemented the long-standing argument that stressed the value of wilderness areas and reinforced the need to preserve them. It was argued that as well as depleting areas of wilderness values, conversion of old-growth forests led to a loss in biodiversity. Haener and Luckert (1998: S83) also note that in the late eighties concern mounted over tropical deforestation, and it was not long before the environmental impact of forest management in North America was also scrutinized. Parallel developments south of the border in the Pacific Northwest meant that these arguments could not be ignored in British Columbia. As a result, Miller (1994b: 130) notes that the microscope of public and media attention was turned on the forests of British Columbia.

Although changes to forest management had been slow to evolve, demands for non-timber values, old-growth depletion and pressing national and international concern for forest environments, accelerated in the late 1980s. Therefore, by the early 1990s, the international environmental movement condemned forest practices in Canada, especially

British Columbia, and campaigns were organized to boycott Canadian forest products in

Europe and the United States (Sahajananthan, Haley and Nelson 1998: 74).

Burda, Gale and McGonigle (1998: 46) note that during the next era the "war in

the woods" resumed and a series of valley by valley battles ensued. They involved

environmentalists, the forest industry and the provincial government. However, this

period also witnessed the growth of the strength, power and size of the wilderness

preservation movement, from a handful of groups to a broad based social movement.[9]

Therefore, as protection of wilderness areas from the impact of industrial forestry once

again became a sensitive issue in British Columbia, attention focused on logging the old-

growth forests of Clayoquot Sound. This time however, the Nuu-Chah-Nulth represented

the local aboriginal interests; the Sierra Club, led by Elizabeth May, sparked national

interest and Greenpeace International catapulted the conservation-preservation dichotomy

into the global spotlight.

---

[9] Doern and Conway (1994: 118) note that the 1989 Decima survey listed the environment as the most prominent issue for Canadians, ahead of the deficit, unemployment and free trade. Blake, Guppy and Urmetzer (1996-1997:41) also note that the environment was one of the hottest topics in B.C. in the early 1990s.

CHAPTER FOUR

ERA 4 (1985-): THE PRESENT

Hoberg (1996: 142) notes that as a result of the late 1980's burst of public interest

in the environment, B.C. forests once again became an intense political issue.

Consequently, the Social Credit government was criticized about the environmental

image of the forestry sector. However, attempts to change forest policy did not occur

until the NDP government campaigned with a pro-environment platform in 1991. When

the NDP came to power, the most important environmental issue in the province was

developing a "greener" forest policy.

Hoberg and Morawski (1997: 392) maintain that while the surge of environmental

concern in the 1960s had an impact on B.C.'s forest policy, this new wave of

environmental concern had more profound effects. Specifically, the controversy

surrounding the logging of the old growth forests on Clayoquot Sound proved to be what

Hoberg and Morawski (1997: 398) call a test or "crucible of change". Robson (1994: 29)

notes that the logging of Clayoquot Sound became not only a regional issue but also a

national issue and a symbol for how attitudes towards natural resources management

must change.

Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson (1996: 123) note that four events were emblematic

of a shift in concern. In 1989, provincial Forests Minister Dave Parker was forced to

withdraw a plan to increase the amount of land in Tree Farm Licences, after province-

wide hearings on this proposal generated protests. Later that year, the Ministry of Forests

sponsored the Old-Growth Strategy (a survey). Then, in 1990, the Assistant Deputy

Minister of Forests was publicly criticized by the Deputy Minister for his comments that

the Ministry's prime mandate was to maintain timber harvests. Finally in 1992, the new NDP government established CORE, the Commission on Resources and Environment. CORE was a decision making process. CORE's mandate was to settle land – use disputes and its pivotal role in the Clayoquot Sound controversy will be explained in the next section.

CORE BC: PRESERVATION AND CONSERVATION REUNITE? – OR "LOG AND TALK?"

In 1991, a new provincial government was elected and the reins of power were given to Mike Harcourt and the NDP. Van Kooten and Wang (1998: S63) note that the newly elected government embarked on a number of initiatives to restructure the province's forest practices. The Harcourt government began with a Protected Area Strategy (PAS). That is, the government promised to double the number of parks and devote 12 percent of B.C.'s land base to parks or ecological reserves. The new government also promised to legislate a stronger forest practices act.

As well, early in 1992, a new institution - the Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE) was established. Premier Harcourt launched CORE under the direction of former ombudsman of British Columbia (1987-1991), Stephen Owen (Drushka, Nixon and Travers 1993: 37). CORE's mandate was to design a land use strategy for British Columbia to implement the PAS targets. The Commission was also charged with finding a consensus on land-use issues and was supposed to facilitate a negotiation process in local areas and regions of intense conflict (MacIsaac and Champagne 1994: 10).

Hoberg and Morawski (1997: 393) note that CORE was a bold experiment in governance as CORE was a conflict resolution process explicitly designed to resolve forest land use conflicts through a shared decision-making approach (Drushka, Nixon and Travers 1993: 37). At the time it was believed that shared decision-making and a consensus based process was the solution to B.C.'s land-use conflicts. Therefore, the previous bargaining style, which was characterized as closed and highly discretionary, now included multiple actors representing numerous interests, or stakeholder groups (Hoberg and Morawski 1997: 393). Many members of the stakeholder groups were members of the attentive public and were now at the forefront of the public policy process.

Marchak (1995: 114) notes that CORE included representatives from many stakeholder groups. The stakeholders were from every major forest region in British Columbia and ranged from loggers to environmental groups. Negotiations were to take place in round table regional meetings and their recommendations were then supposed to be submitted by Commissioner Owen to government.

Drushka, Nixon and Traves (1993:58) note that in November 1992, CORE began the process of regional negotiations on Vancouver Island. The objective of the Commission was to reach a consensus on recommendations for a land-use strategy and present it to Commissioner Stephen Owen. The recommendations were to accommodate the interests of all groups involved in the forest debate in British Columbia. Recreation, Direct Forest Employment, Tourism, Local Government , General Employment, First Nations, Conservation, Forest Sector (Majors or industry), Youth, Provincial government, Forest Sector (Independent) Social and Economic Sustainability, Mining , Agriculture,

and Fisheries were among the included groups.

Despite the wide variety of interests on the Commission, the groups worked together cooperatively. The Commission first created a mutually agreed upon process and procedures manual. Next they drafted a Vision Statement to the year 2020 for Vancouver Island that briefly outlined the importance of environmental rights, values and responsibilities to future generations. The sectors believed that it was unanimously agreed upon. However, a difficulty arose with one of the groups; the Forest Sector - Majors, which perceived a vested interest in the traditional back door approach to reaching an agreement with the provincial government (Drushka, Nixon and Travers 1993: 58).

The Forest Sector-Majors was the only sector with a legal entitlement to forest land use and had actually taken a wait and see attitude. At the March 25, 1993 meeting in Campbell, Forest Sectors- Majors presented their own Vision Statement as a test of the commitments of the other sectors. This was a revised version of the 2020 Vision Statement. It eliminated many points which had been agreed upon and stressed new ones. Drushka, Nixon and Travers (1993:59) maintain that this was a decisive turning point in the attempt to join conservation, preservation and other interests as partners in forest land-use decision-making. The other sectors refused to back down and the Forest Sectors- Majors agreed to accept the Vision Statement which accommodated the interest of all sectors.

However, in the end these plans were only regarded as proposals to Cabinet and were subsequently modified to address political concerns. Drushka, Nixon and Travers (1993: 62) maintain that the Cabinet decision to disregard the CORE recommendations

was widely perceived to express a diminished resolve on the part of the Harcourt government to support the shared decision-making negotiations underway on Vancouver Island. The general feeling was that the government process was created to keep groups talking while logging proceeded and land used decisions were made behind closed doors.

MacIsaac and Champagne (1994: 10) note that the legitimacy of the CORE process was jeopardized because it excluded the Clayoquot Sound area of Vancouver Island from the CORE process. The government refused to reform its tenure system, and decided to log Clayoquot Sound. In April of 1993, the provincial Cabinet announced its own provincial boundaries for the forest to be protected and those to be under special management. As well, integrated resource use was allowed in a controversial part of Vancouver Island; the old-growth forests of Clayoquot Sound (British Columbia Forest Service 1993: 5-10). The decision proved to be a critical turning point in the land-use conflict which had started in the Sound in 1984.

CLAYOQUOT SOUND: CRUCIBLE OF CHANGE

Clayoquot Sound is a 262,000 hectare land-area composed of pristine watersheds and old-growth forests on Vancouver Island. It is also one of the few intact examples of a coastal temperate rain forest left on Vancouver Island. A portion of the Sound had previously been set aside to create Pacific Rim National Park. Ninety-three per cent of Clayoquot Sound is forested and represents both natural and commercial significance in an age of industrial forestry, aboriginal self-determination and increased environmental consciousness. Clayoquot Sound is also a crucible of the conflicts and dilemmas that policy-makers in B.C. and Canada face (Hoberg and Morawski 1997: 399).

Darling (1991: 4-6) argues that the harbinger for land use conflict in Clayoquot

Sound was the highway, known as Pacific Rim highway, from Port Alberni to the West

coast of Vancouver Island. The highway connects the logging communities of Port

Alberni and Ucluelet to the wilderness community of Tofino. The highway was

originally built to provide the forest industry with easy access to timber . However, with

the creation of Pacific Rim Park came a new perspective and a new use for the highway.

It provided access to the last remaining wilderness on the west coast of Vancouver Island.

Many residents of Tofino initially came there at the time the park was being

created in the sixties. Robson (1994: 29) notes that, as a result, Tofino became the place

where the thin strands of the 60's peace movement and uncharacteristically Canadian

civil disobedience met the energy of a new environmental wave, as environmental

consciousness swept the globe in the 1980s. Tofino residents discovered that the key to

the survival of the area was the careful stewardship of Clayoquot Sound's forest

resources and as a result, the value of Clayoquot Sound took on a new meaning. It was no

longer viewed only as a resource for logging, it was also a wilderness area that should be

preserved.

Therefore, those who supported the preservation ethic in Tofino began to

challenge those with the exploitation mindset in Port Alberni and Ucluelet and when the

forest companies tried to expand their activities in Clayoquot Sound and employ loggers

in Ucluelet to feed the mills in Port Alberni, the battle over trees and jobs was joined.

Robson (1994: 29) maintains that Clayoquot Sound was the place where, eventually,

those with the ethic to destroy the forests met those who wanted to protect it.

THE WAR IN THE WOODS RESUMES

In 1980, Macmillan Bloedel served notice that it would commence logging in Meares Island during the winter of 1982. However, a local environmental organization, the Friends of Clayoquot Sound was formed to protect Meares' old-growth. The Ministry of Forests responded by developing a integrated resource planning initiative which did not include environmental and native interests. The Ombudsman ruled that the Ministry could not exclude the native and environmental interests. Therefore, the planning team included representatives from the local native bands, the friends of Clayoquot Sound, the International Woodworkers of America and the Pacific Rim National Park. However, after two years of debate the Ministry accepted a plan that Macmillan Bloedel had submitted. Macmillan Bloedel had developed its own option which would include cutting the slopes facing Tofino.

Darling (1991: 6) notes that in August, 1984, Macmillan Bloedel created TFL 44 by amalgamating Tree Farm Licence 21, which covered most of Clayoquot Sound, with Tree Farm Licence 22. These licences included the Alberni Valley, the Alberni Canal and Barkley Sound. This decision further entrenched the industry as a major employer in Port Albeni and Ucluelet. B.C. Logging Products also elected to concentrate its logging activity in the same area.

May (1998: 197) and Darling (1991: 7) note that the Clayoquot controversy began at the end of 1984, when the Nuu-Chah-Nulth and local residents of Meares Island within Clayoquot Sound launched a blockade against MacMillan Bloedel. The Nuu-Chah-Nulth and other aboriginal interests played a vital role in the Clayoquot Sound controversy. However, their interests, although important, focused on land claims rather

than solely environmental issues and their role will only be briefly described here.[10]

The Nuu-Chah-Nulth successfully obtained an injunction to protect Meares Island's forests pending their land claim and Meares Island was declared a "Tribal Park" by the Nuu-Chah-Nulth in 1985. However, at the same time, the Haida were struggling to preserve Lyell Island in the South Moresby dispute. This overshadowed the Nuu-Chah-Nulth efforts and there was little acknowledgment of the debate until the late 1980's.

Darling (1991: 8) notes that the controversy flared again when Fletcher Challenge attempted to create a road to Shelter Inlet. The Friends of Clayoquot Sound saw this as a path of progress through the wilderness. The Shelter Inlet and Moyhena watersheds, which are protected in Strathcona Park, comprise the largest contiguous old-growth rainforest left on the island and were considered critical to maintaining the integrity of Clayoquot Sound. However, Fletcher Challenge needed access to timber to survive.

The Friends of Clayoquot submitted a telegram to the Minister of Forests and Fletcher Challenge and asked for a moratorium on logging and road construction until they reviewed a plan which they felt was a compromise. The plan did not call for a halt to logging, rather it called for "sustainable development of the region".

In response to this Fletcher Challenge applied for the transfer of a major tree farm licence (No. 46) on Vancouver Island from Fletcher Challenge Canada to Interfor (part of the Sauder Group). Fletcher wished to be rid of the tenure area which included all of its

---

[10] Although both groups at first protested logging in Clayoquot, Nuu-Chah-Nulth pursued their interest with the provincial ombusman and began negotiations on an Interim Measures Agreement. It was accepted in 1994 and was a resource management partnership between government and First Nations and allowed logging by the First Nations. In 1996, Greenpeace protested against the Nuu-cha-nulth as the First nations approved logging which Greenpeace was protesting (Hoberg and Morawski 1997: 393-401).

Crown forests within Clayoquot Sound. Part of the reason for this was Fletcher wanted

to reduce its exposure to environmental criticism as much of the remaining coastal

temperate old-growth rain forest is concentrated within Clayoquot Sound.

However, under the Forest Act, public forest tenure cannot technically be bought

and sold in British Columbia. The Minister of Forests had to approve transfer of timber

rights before any mills could transfer hands. The residents of Clayoquot Sound also

wanted their interests respected when the licence area was transferred. Therefore, the

provincial government was trying to solve the forest land dispute which centered around

preservation of the wilderness areas on Clayoquot, namely the old-growth forests, while

ensuring a continuation of the forest industry (Darling 1991: 8-10).

Rayner (1996: 91) notes that the public resistance to the practices of sustained

yield had begun to focus on the clearcutting of old-growth stands. The Minister of Forests

was unable to contain this issue to closed door bargaining. Public meetings were held to

ease public fears but the meetings brought out the high level of distrust that the public

had for the close links between the government and the major licensees. Public

perception was that the forests were not even being managed sustainably for commodity

purposes. As well, at the meetings a new management technique was discussed. This

new technique was known as sustainable development.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

A new viewpoint for addressing global environmental problems known as

sustainable development was found in a report of the United Nations World Commission

on Environment and Development. The commission looked into the deterioration of the

global environment. The report of the Commission, known as the Bruntland Report, was a blueprint for reform. The ripples from this Report spread out and eventually reached western Canada. During the Bruntland Commission's tour of Canada, it met with the Canadian Council of Resource and Environment Ministers. In October of 1986, a National Task Force on Environment and Economy was established to recommend the path Canada should take to achieve sustainable development. As a result, a National Task Force on Environment and Economy reported to the Canadian Council of Resource and Environment Ministers that new practices were needed to ensure environmental and economic sustainability (Natural Resources Canada 1991:1-2).

Although under Canadian constitutional arrangements the provincial governments are custodians of the forests, in the 1980s the federal government actively tried to improve the condition of the country's forests. Natural Resources Canada (1997: 2-4) notes that although forest management is a matter of provincial jurisdiction, all levels of government cooperate closely in national and international forestry matters. Further, both Federal, and provincial revenues were affected by the decline of the forest industry. Therefore, in 1986, the federal government entered into a partnership with the British Columbia government to restock NSR (not sufficiently restocked) land and provide funds for research. The federal, provincial and territorial governments also agreed on a framework for cooperation in forestry. The stated philosophical objective was the advancement of sustainable development (Marchak 1995: 104-105). This spirit of cooperation is inherent in Canada's national forest strategy for sustainability as Canadian governments were asked to revise their forest policies to better reflect the principles of sustainable development.

CLAYOQUOT SOUND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (TASK FORCE) STEERING COMMITTEE

The impetus for creating the Clayoquot process transpired because the community of Tofino prepared a report on the need to consider the use of forest resources within Clayoquot Sound according to sustainable development principles. This view was based on the work of the Bruntland Commission's report, *Our Common Future*, and both the federal and provincial governments endorsed this approach (Drushka, Nixon and Travers 1993: 30).

Darling (1991: 14) notes that on August 4, 1989, Environment Minister Bruce Strachan and Regional Development Minister Elwood Veitch appointed a Task Force to resolve resource use conflicts in Clayoquot Sound. The Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development (Task Force) Steering Committee was composed of representatives from each regional community as well as interests from labour and small business.

The term consensus was interpreted to mean that everyone around the table had to agree before an issue could be raised. Because of this interpretation the community of Tofino was unable to address the long-term sustainability of the forest sector because the industry representatives would not allow it. At the Steering Committee meetings Macmillan Bloedel and Fletcher Challenge, supported by labour (the International Woodworkers Association), demanded that the attention be put on the retention of jobs.

Taylor (1994: 78-79) notes that nowhere was it more evident than in the acrimonious debates between the environmentalists and forest industry representatives on the Clayoquot Sound Task Force, that the two positions stand in stark relief. The

representatives upheld traditional value perspectives and failed to reach a consensus.

Thus, what the multi-stakeholder panel accomplished was to reinforce the differences

between these two perspectives rather than to amalgamate them or reach a compromise.

One year into the process the government made a decision to proceed with

logging in selected intact old-growth areas within Clayoquot Sound. As a result, the

environmental sector representatives resigned. Taylor (1994: 79) notes that the

environmentalists felt that the process was hampered from the beginning by the "log and

talk" agenda of the province. However, there were also complaints that the overall

administrative process was unfair (Drushka, Nixon and Travers 1993: 31 and Mc Namee

1994: 34).

McNamee (1994: 34-35) notes that on October 28, 1992 the committee

disbanded, failing to agree on the issue of protected areas. After three years of debate the

Planning Team had compiled a draft report with one total preservation and two partial

preservation recommendations for the area. However, MacMillan Bloedel had also

withdrawn from the team and submitted its own options to the Ministry. Even though the

Task Force disbanded, forestry proponents still promoted what they called the "majority

option", which called for one-third of the area to be protected and the rest to be open to

logging.

The government's April 1993 decision, the *Land Use Plan for Clayoquot Sound*,

was based on this option despite the fact that it was not endorsed by environmental or

First Nations interests. In June 1993, the Province ignored the Planing teams options and

chose Macmillan Bloedel's plan to cut most of the slope facing Tofino. Therefore, the

final land-use decision was made the old fashioned way, by Cabinet. Further, McNamee

(1994: 35) felt that, by misrepresenting the majority option, the Harcourt government and industry planted the seeds for future conflict

McNamee (1994: 34) notes that under the "Clayoquot Compromise" as the decision has been called, the province planned to protect one-third of the area. However, half of this area was already part of Pacific Rim National Park and Strathcona Provincial Park, so it really only added an additional 18 percent. The government claimed that it would apply special management practices to another 15 percent designated as scenic corridors. However, McNamee (1994: 34) claims that the Sierra Club of Western Canada protested that 30 percent of those corridors were already logged.

Forest Minister Dan Miller made his decision for transfer according to law and there was no legal requirement to consult with the Clayoquot Sound Susutainable Development Steering Committee. He had abided by the Forest Act and transferred the licence with a number of conditions. However, it was perceived that he had ignored the opinion of the people of Clayoquot Sound. His major mistake was to make consultations regarding the transfer behind closed doors. He tried to pass off his failure to consult with native communities, environmentalist and small business as unimportant (Drushka, Nixon and Travers 1993: 29).

As a result, the Tofino residents feared that continuation of current clear cutting logging methods at current rates would liquidiate its old-growth forests. Practices were also considered to be unsustainable and would eventually wipe out future logging jobs and revenue. Hoberg and Morawski (1997: 399) note that environmentalists were outraged and launched an immediate media and civil disobedience campaign aimed at discrediting the government and its decision process.

CONSERVATIONISTS VERSUS PRESERVATIONISTS - ENTER THE SIERRA CLUB.

Robson (1994: 29) notes that in the years spanning the first blockade in 1984, in Clayoquot, the Friends of Clayoquot Sound spent a decade in talks with government and forestry officials as part of CORE and The Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Task Force. However, when the government announced its version of a compromise between logging and forest preservation, Clayoquot defenders were stunned. They felt that what was being saved in the Sound was marginal forest or alpine terrain.

McNamee (1994: 35) notes that the environmental community was playing its final card in the Clayoquot Sound deal: the new federal government. On October 21, 1993 Liberal opposition leader Jean Chretien pledged to negotiate with the B.C. government to protect Clayoquot Sound as part of Pacific Rim National Park. Therefore, the Sierra Club and the Western Wilderness Committee presented parliament with 105,000 signatures which demanded that Chretien follow through with his commitment to preserve the forest. However, after his election Chretien maintained that he did not follow through on his campaign promise because forestry is under provincial jurisdiction (Weikle 1994: 1).

As a result, in November of 1993 Clayoquot Sound became the destination of 130 environmental pilgrims on the Clayoquot Express. Elizabeth May, executive director of theSierra Club of Western Canada, and the Sierra Club of Canada staff organized the Clayoquot Express. It was a cross Canada journey to Clayoquot Sound that began in St. John's, Newfoundland and covered 7000 miles by Via Rail, ferry, and bus to Tofino (Robson 1994: 29).

In all, ten thousand protesters gathered at the Black Hole, a portion of Calyoquot which had been clearcut. The organizers used the code from the Quakers which shunned violence. From this headquarters nicknamed the Peace Camp, Greenpeace and Friends of Clayoquot Sound helped organize mass demonstrations and blockades of logging roads. Greenpeace organized a peaceful blockade of Kennedy Bridge and 272 people were arrested. By the time the demonstrations ended more than 900 protesters were arrested and charged with criminal contempt for peacefully blockading the logging road into the Sound (Nelson 1994: 18). Meanwhile, environmentalists, led by Greenpeace, launched a brilliant campaign which tapped the environmental concerns of international consumers and European markets threatened a boycott of any B.C. forest products which contained old-growth fibres.

As a result, May (1998: 197-199) notes that the protest reverberated around the world and gave the British Columbia government a black eye. Nelson (1994: 18) notes that the arrests made Canada look like an "environmental outlaw". Therefore, top forestry officials from various NATO countries urged Canada's Ambassador to the U.N., Arthur Campeau, to take a second look at the Clayoquot decision.

The Harcourt government was now faced with a legacy of "sympathetic administration" and over-cutting. Therefore, Premier Mike Harcourt and his government created a number of new regulations and laws to protect more forest and reform logging practices in order to diffuse the severe criticism it was receiving for allowing further clearcutting in Clayoquot. First, the government's signed the March 1994 Interim Measures Agreement (IMA) with the Nuu-chah-nulth (Hoberg and Morawski 1997: 402). This is primarily a resource partnership between the Nuu-chah-nulth and will not be dealt

with. However, two other significant developments that occurred in wake of the explosive Clayoquot Sound controversy will be discussed. They are the adoption of a new Forest Practices Code and the creation of the Scientific Panel for Sustainble Forest Practices in Clayoquot Sound. (Hoberg and Morawski 1997: 400).

CLAYOQUOT SOUND SCIENTIFIC PANEL: HOW TO LOG NOT WHETHER TO LOG

May (1998: 198) notes that the most high profile effort to assess the impacts of clearcutting and to make recommendations for ecologically appropriate logging was the Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel. Stephen Owen, CORE commissioner, recommended that the government appoint the Scientific Panel in 1993. The Panel was convened by Mike Harcourt and the NDP government in 1993 in response to the public outcry against the government's announcement of clear-cut logging of 70 percent of the Sound's old-growth trees. McGonigle (1996: 13) notes that the Panel suggested an inversion in public policy by situating economic institutions within the limits of ecosystems instead of taking economic interests and levels as a starting point with environmental consequences to be dealt with as they occur. The Panel also suggested replacing the AAC harvest determination with a method in which cuts are determined through an analysis of the geographical distribution of harvesting. May (1998: 198-199) notes that the Panel maintained that before logging plans could be approved, a full inventory of the biological characteristics of the forest to be logged was required.

In 1995, the Panel released several volumes of recommendations and the Harcourt government accepted all of them. A moratorium on future logging in pristine watersheds

was issued by the government until extensive inventories could be conducted. May (1998: 198) notes the Minister stated that by accepting these recommendations, it signified the end of clear-cutting in Clayoquot Sound.

However, May (1998: 199) maintains that the most significant feature of the Panel's report was the approach that it recommended for exploiting a natural resource. This approach could ultimately apply to not just forest, and not just to temperate rainforest, ecosystems. The approach could be applied to other ecosystems such as fisheries and agriculture as well as Boreal forests. The "precautionary principle" was used by the Panel for its planning prescriptions.

May (1998: 199) notes that the Panel recommended that logging decisions should first be made on what part of the forest should remain rather than for industry to decide what it wanted to log. Therfore, it was important to decide what should remain to protect other values, such as environmental and cultural ones. This is fundamentally different from nearly every province's approach to logging. Non-timber values are generally considered to be a constraint on logging. Therefore, the crux of the Panel's argument was that foresters could regrow a tree but they could not regrow a forest. The Panel recommended that in the future the forest management should be based on maintaining the ecosystem, not meeting the needs of the mills.

The government eventually adopted all the measures from the Scientific Panel. However, the Panel was only given the mandate to discuss how logging could be made ecologically sound, not whether logging should take place. As well, Elizabeth May, Executive Director of the Sierra Club of Canada (1998: 199) maintains that even though the Scientific Panel is a blueprint for ecological practices, its implementation is

marred by loopholes "a logging truck could drive through".

AFTERMATH OF THE SCIENTIFIC PANEL

The Friends of Clayoquot Sound wrote a report analyzing the implementation of

the recommendations set forward by the Scientific Panel. They note that on July 6, 1995

the BC. government adopted all of the recommendations of the Scientific Panel for

Sustainable Forest Practices in Clayoquot Sound. It was believed to be a monumental

decision, which would turn forestry on its head and appeared to satisfy preservation and

conservation concerns. For the first time in British Columbia ecosystem, integrity was to

be put above the flow of timber (Friends of Clayoquot Sound 1998: 1).

However, one of the steps in the planning process, community participation was

skipped. As well, the scientific studies for inventory are under the funding restraints of

Forest Renewal B.C. and as a result are only snapshot inventories. Therefore, three years

later all sectors appeared to be struggling with this challenge. The government is in the

midst of an expensive and cumbersome planning process for Clayoquot Sound and

logging companies are questioning whether logging is still viable under the stringent

standards. Environmentalists too are questioning the Panel's decisions. For instance, in

1998, the Sierra Club asked why Clayoquot Sound is being studied in isolation of the rest

of Vancouver Island, as logging in one region could affect the ecological viability of the

whole region (Friends of Clayoquot Sound 1998: 1).

The conclusion of the report by the Friends of Clayoquot Sound is that the

implementation process to date falls short of the letter and the spirit of the Scientific

Panel recommendations. Instead of being turned on its head, forestry was buttressed by

government and industry because the process laid out for substantive change had been subverted. The result is that clearcuts are merely being called by another name (Friends of Clayoquot Sound 1998: 6).

McNamee (1994: 34) maintains that from the moment that the NDP took office they consistently failed to deal with Clayoquot Sound as a political issue that needed solving and the province failed to build the political consensus that would allow such a compromise to function. However, the government also introduced a new Forest Practices Code. Hoberg and Morawski (1997: 407) maintain that the Panel's recommendations were considerably more radical than those found in the Code. They note that whereas the Scientific Panel represented an entirely new forestry philosophy and new harvesting principles, the Code strengthened the rules governing conventional forest practices. The next sections will discuss the difficulties that the Code has encountered.

FOREST PRACTICES CODE

The Forest Practices Code was proposed in June 1995 and was to be fully implemented by June 1997. At the time, Natural Resources Canada (1997: 5) called it one of the most stringent pieces of forest legislation in existence and Shahjananthan, Haley and Nelson (1998: S74) also maintain that it is the most significant piece of legislation to be introduced in British Columbia, since the Forest Act of 1948. The Forest Act of 1948 committed the provincial government to sustained yield management while the Forest Practices Code provided a legal and comprehensive legal framework for sustainable management of B.C's Crown forest lands. The Province was also declared a steward of

the land and was to balance spiritual, ecological, economic, and cultural needs as well as conserve biodiversity.

The Code was supposed to dramatically change the way B.C. forests were managed. The Forest Practices Code includes eighteen regulations governing all aspects of sustainable management of the province's Crown forests and provides stiff penalties for non-compliance. The Code is reinforced by new institutional structures such as the Forest Practices Board, which monitors compliance and listens to public complaints (Gunton 1998: 9).

Burda, Gale and McGonigle (1998: 45) note that despite tangible outcomes in this era, such as over two hundred new protected areas and the Forest Practices Code, forestry conflict has not faded far from view. May (1998: 201) notes that the Sierra Club Legal Defence Fund has called these initiatives a tranquilizer for public concern. McGonigle (1997: 18) feels that the environmental objective has run up against two contrary objectives - the enduring survival of a corporate base-industrial forest industry and the continuing pre-emininent role of the forest ministry. He feels that the result has been the classic repackaging of a stale product, what McGonigle calls "old wine in new bottles". The following section shall review the complaints which the Code faces at the present time.

THE PRESENT (Plus ca change)

McGonigle (1997: 18-19) feels that the new Forest Practices Code, one of the largest pieces of Canadian legislation ever written, has proved to be a 1800 page paper tiger. It is unsuccessful as it is massively bureaucratic to the forester, and impossibly

expensive and unnecessary. Environmentalists also find that the Code's size, complexity, technicalities and cumbersome administrative procedures make it difficult to enforce the code, even with a special appeals process. As well, identifying a new area for special management often has the effect of warning industry to speed up logging in the area while the old regulatory regime still applies.

There are also problems with the biodiversity. McGonigle (1997: 19) notes that two years after the Code was implemented, there were still no landscape units designated to protect biodiversity. In other words, while the overall legislation seeks to protect biodiversity, it does so within the sustained yield management "paradigm". That is, the official policy of liquidation of old-growth forests and conversion to managed even aged plantations of "normal forests" still holds. Therefore, when new provincial parks are designated the level of AAC is often not reduced but, at the Cabinet's insistence, is kept high to reflect the Crown's socio-economic objectives. This is a consequence of the Code's biodiversity guide which explicitly allows biodiversity requirements to be relaxed where there will be significant impact on the AAC.

Binkley (1997: 51) also maintains that there may be serious environmental problems associated with the approaches to logging it specifies. The Code reduces the average size of clearcuts and requires that logged areas be replanted before logging adjacent areas. However, the net effect may be to scatter the harvest across the landscape. This will fragment the forest and have unpredictable consequences for biological biodiversity. Burda, Gale and McGonigle (1998: 46) also maintain that this policy of protecting islands of wilderness in a sea of industrial activity does little to ensure protection of biodiversity.

May (1998: 201- 202) notes that industry has launched a massive public relations campaign in Europe and the United States. Industry has quoted the Code's sustainabilty rhetoric and maintains its commitment to logging which would not interfere with the spiritual values of the forest. However, at the same time, industry opposes the Code, arguing that it is too costly and that the wood supply will be jeopardized. Therefore, as industry has faced profit losses the Code has become its scapegoat. Further, for all the anticipation about the Code's effectiveness, not a single charge has been laid even though the Sierra Club Legal Defence Fund has found abundant evidence of Code violations (May 1998: 203).

Binkley (1994: 94-95) also notes that while the Forest Practices Code reduces cutblock sizes and imposes adjacency restrictions, there are also environmental effects that are not necessarily positive. For instance, the roads into an area that is active may end up being longer. Therefore there may be more environmental damage as the roads also cause damage by fragmenting the forest ecosystem into isolated islands. Binkley (1994: 95) also questions what the impact of the Code's harvest restrictions will be globally. He maintains that the harvest will likely shift to others areas of the world. In other words, reductions to harvest levels in British Columbia do not necessarily reduce the global environmental impacts. They merely shift them to another part of the world.

Kimmins (1994: 14) also notes that the Forest Practices Code addresses forest practices for a forest which is being harvested, but does not specify what the forest is expected to look like in the future. He feels that without such a vision it is unlikely that the Code will achieve the results that the public expects. Sahajananthan, Haley and Nelson (1998: S74) maintain that it is hard to take objection to the general objectives of

the Code. However, the way in which these objectives are interpreted and implemented may threaten the vitality of British Columbia's forests products industry, as well as the environmental and cultural values. They maintain that nothing short of fundamental changes to the way public forests are allotted and administered will be able to sustain the forests.

Finally, neither the Forest Practices Code nor the recommendations of the Scientific Panel have resolved the controversy over logging Clayoquot Sound. The Friends of Clayoquot Sound recently reported that forestry has not been turned on its head either by the Code or the Panel as logging is still taking place with little regard to ecological principles. The Friends of Clayoquot Sound maintain that the changes in logging practices are cosmetic and afford no protection to Clayoquot Sound (Friends of Clayoquot Sound 1998: 1).

Therefore, despite numerous initiatives which have been instituted through nearly a century of forest policy, past grievances remain unresolved and new preservation issues constantly occur. McGonigle (1996: 11) of the Sierra Club, summarized the recurring crisis in B.C.'s forests. First, the forest industry was created by liquidating the natural forests and replacing them with managed forests. This has proved problematic as the AAC has increased beyond any possible calculations. Next, the forest industries were given long term exclusive rights to timber in order to encourage the companies to invest in the forests. This however, has had the effect of locking public policy in a straight jacket. Third, the entire industry was built on large volume at a low price and finally, environmental values were never really part of the original forest policy. If and when environmental values have been discussed, they have only been addressed when pressure

from the preservationist cause requires it.

WHAT NEXT?

The Clayoquot Sound controversy has not been put to rest and protests continue. As well, logging of the Great Bear Rainforest, on the central coast of British Columbia, is reigniting protests from groups such as the Sierra Club. Twigg (1998: 11-12) notes that the president of the Sierra Club approached Peter McAllister of the Sierra Club of Western Canada and asked him to write a book documenting the need to preserve the Great Bear Rainforest. McAllister hoped that the book would spark debate, but was afraid of another "war in the woods".

Meanwhile, the Sierra Club expressed concern regarding the British Columbia government's land-use decision to compensate MacMillan Bloedel for past parks creation on Vancouver Island. The government negotiated a land use decision that excluded 3.5 percent of Vancouver Island, or 120,000 hectares, from government regulation. Of this, 90,000 hectares are within Macmillan Bloedel's tree farm licences on Vancouver Island. As a result, the Sierra Club (1999: 1) expressed fear that this might be a trend towards privatization.

The role of privatization in B.C. forest policy has not been discussed so far, as it has not been an issue for most of this century. However, Mathew Ingram (1999: B2) notes that B.C. deputy premier Dan Miller sparked this fear by stating that he thought it might be wise to sell off some of its crown land. Ingram (1999: B2) likened this about face in philosophy to "Brigitte Bardot admitting in public that maybe killing all those harp seals isn't such a bad idea after all".

However, Ingram (1999: B4) notes that Premier Glen Clark immediately took the wind out of Miller's comments by stating that privatization is not being considered. Clark maintains that the trees belong to the people of British Columbia and the province needs to control the industry. Premier Clark stated that privatization would be like selling off the province's birthright and therefore maintains that privatization "is certainly not government policy and never will be" (Ingram (1999: B2).

CONCLUSION

B.C. FOREST POLICY - EVOLUTION NOT REVOLUTION

It has been a luxury to be able to research over a hundred years of documents relating to forest policy, and in an effort to contribute to this research, British Columbia's forest policy has been studied from its roots to present day. There are also advantages to selecting a policy which could be examined over such an extensive span, as it has revealed a number of critical points. First, the research established that the forests were the first natural resource to be protected on this continent. Second, for purposes of comparison, forest use was also studied before there was any government policy governing the forest's use. Third, it is apparent from this research that concern for the environment and the depletion of natural resources is not new and this is not the first generation to debate the fate of Canada's natural resources.

As a new century of natural resource management approaches, there is concern that natural resources will be here for the next generation. However, it is sobering to note that, at the beginning of this century, Prime Minister Laurier warned that we must maintain our natural resources for the generations to come (Armson 1982: 59). As a result, for Prime Minister Laurier, we are the generations to come and as each generation passes the playing field of resources shrinks and the demands increase. Therefore, this should establish the importance of understanding this struggle, not necessarily for ending the debate, but for distinguishing between the rhetoric and the reality of a policy decision, and for understanding the implications of assuming too quickly that the debate has been resolved.

Deforestation and its consequences are now a global concern. Therefore, B.C.'s

forest policy decisions have global impacts and have become the concern of preservation groups around the world. As well, forest industries operate on a global scale and much of the world's forests are now in the hands of a few multinational forest companies. For instance, the recent takeover of Macmillan Bloedel by Weyerhauser has placed much of British Columbia's forests in the hands of an international company. Weyehauser operates across the United States and Canada, and as far away as Uruguay and New Zealand. As a result, a mill run in New Zealand may now be operated by the same company as a mill in Clayoquot Sound, British Columbia.

Therefore, the politics and practices of British Columbia's forest policy have been used as an example which may be compared to how forest policies in New Zealand, or other parts of Canada and the United States have evolved through interaction with the forest industry and environmental groups. However, any study of forest policy (or any policy) must first understand the basic philosophies which affect policy decisions in order to properly analyze issues. It is therefore necessary to realize, as this comprehensive overview reveals, that conservation is the underlying philosophy of forest policy of crown owned forests, not only in British Columbia, but in Canada and the United States.

Chapters One and Two have traced this conservation philosophy to the beginning of this century and to its creator Gifford Pinchot. These chapters also linked this philosophy to other societal developments such as the enlightenment, scientific management and the capitalist mode of production, in an attempt to demonstrate that this philosophy is both firmly imbedded in, and highly compatible with western industrial society. As a result, conservation became deeply embedded in British Columbia's first Forest Act.

Chapter Three illustrated that the practice of sustained yield, which was incorporated into the Forest Act in 1947, further embedded conservation. In this chapter a number of concessions to the preservationist cause were described, such as the creation of Pacific Rim Park and Gwaii Hannas Park. However, changes to the Forest Act, as recommended by the Pearse Commission, did not call for a redirection of policy and further entrenched sustained yield and the tenure system. During the early 1980's conservation once again demonstrated its stranglehold of forest policy, and by the 1990s changes such as CORE BC and the Forest Practices Code, appear to have been made within the limits of sustained yield and thus within the conservation philosophy.

Marchak (1998: 73) maintains that, like the sorcerer's apprentice, this machinery cannot be stopped and consequently, changes to forest policy have been only occasional nods in the direction of ecological limits. Therefore, further to Marchak's comment and to answer Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson's (1996: 112) argument regarding policy change, a logical conclusion would be that there has been an evolution of forest policy in British Columbia, not a revolution! At times in the last hundred years it may have appeared that there was a dramatic revolution or radical change in the way British Columbia's forests were going to be managed, but this was not the case.

Chapter Two illustrated that during the sixties the environmental movement gathered strength. The Sierra Club was established in British Columbia and formally established preservation concerns. This resulted in campaigns to preserve Pacific Rim and South Moresby. In the last hundred years, conservationist and preservationist concerns have occasionally called a brief truce and worked together, for example, on the Commission on Environment and Resources in the early 1990s. During the Depression,

post World War II and in the early 1980s preservationists briefly retreated.

Preservationists have also rallied and made gains in the late 1960s and again in the early

1990s. There were also periods of complacency, such as after World War II when it was

believed that the forests were being managed efficiently. Finally, in the 1990s there were

suggestions that forest policy had been turned on it head by the new Forest Practices

Code. Yet, within a few years the debate ensued about whether forestry remained

essentially in the same mold that it was created in. Therefore, despite a multitude of

Royal Commissions, revisions, and controversial issues, government policy towards the

forests still holds that they are to be wisely used and issues regarding the forests are

addressed within this conceptual framework (see Appendix 1).

Therefore, preservation values were never really part of the policy equation. What

this century has witnessed however, is a struggle first to decide what and how much can

and should be preserved, and second, to include these values into forest policy. Too often,

as McGonigle (1997: 16) states, changes have been accepted by those seeking

preservation of the forests, only to find that the changes are cloaked in a curtain of

preservation rhetoric and are conservationist in reality.

However, this research has established that preservation also has deep roots and

is not merely a passing fad. To believe so trivializes the preservation movement.

Therefore, one must not confuse a waning of, or sense of complacency in, preservationist

concerns with their acceptance of B.C's forest policy. It is necessary to realize that

although there may not appear to be an issue of the intensity of a Pacific Rim, South

Moresby or Clayoquot Sound, this does not mean that preservationists have conceded or

or been defeated. It also should not be interpreted that because a battle has been won

that the war is over. In fact the "war in the woods", as it is now often referred to, is far from over.

A growing population, high levels of consumption, high levels of pollution and economic pressures puts ever increasing pressure on the world's forests. Today, forests are valued both economically and ecologically, yet there is really only one forest to serve these values. As the playing field of resources shrinks it is increasingly difficult for these values to avoid each other. Forest policy decisions involve choices. For more than a hundred years the British Columbia government has chosen to view the forests as a source of revenue and a means of economic growth and employment. This decision spans Social Credit, Liberal and New Democratic governments. As a result, the forest industry has become deeply embedded in the technical, administrative, and economic structures of the B.C. state. This continued dependence will make changes in forest policy very difficult and as a result, issues such as falldown, corporate concentration, and preservation will continue to be a concern.

Therefore, to return to the original thesis statement, this historical policy analysis of British Columbia forest policy supports the argument that the conservation-preservation conflict still plays a vital role in forest policy issues. Indeed, the embers of the nineteenth century conservation-preservation debate are smoldering waiting for another Clayoquot Sound, South Moresby, or Pacific Rim to re-ignite them. Therefore, although it is impossible to predict future events, it may very well be that the fate of the last stand of forest in Clayoquot Sound, or other troubled spots, will be debated by those who believe it should be preserved and those who believe it can be wisely used.

APPENDIX

THE LAST TREE IN B.C.

All this fuss over one tree. The ex-IWA types say we should log it. The Sierra Club says we should save it. It's the same old jobs-and-logs argument we've been hearing in this province for 100 years.

Sure, it's worth millions of dollars in Japan. But maybe it's also worth millions of dollars here. Who knows how many tourists come to Vancouver Island each year just to see the last tree in B.C.

That's what they call it. But the few old ex-loggers around say it's just more preservationist propaganda. There are lots of trees in orchards and back yards, and even a few left over from the tree-planting days in the last part of the 20th century.

But what we haven't got any more of—except for this one—is wild native trees. What they used to call old growth.

So what difference can one tree make? It's pretty old and decadent anyway, say the ex-loggers. It'll just fall over if we don't cut it down. Right now it's worth $10 million dollars in Japan. In the future, it will just be an old log rotting on the ground.

One tree represents a heritage, say the environmentalists. Two hundred years ago there were thousands of big old growth trees in this province. Surely the least we can do is save the last one for our grandchildren. Yes, it will die one day. But maybe by some miracle, it will reproduce itself and we'll have an old growth forest on Vancouver Island again.

All this fuss about old growth, say the ex-loggers. What about jobs? What about the 10 minutes of work time for the faller? And the two hours of helicoptering to haul it to the ship in Vancouver harbor? And the $200 in stumpage for the government? You just can't lock up a tree in some kind of old growth museum so backpacking tourists can go look at it.

So, in typical Canadian fashion, we held a Royal Commission on the Fate of the Last Tree in B.C. It was chaired by an old logging company vice president, pensioned off 30 years ago when MacMillan Bloedel closed its last mill in the province. And they appointed a few government people, a few university people, a few more ex-industry people. They even found an acceptable environmentalist.

And people from all around the province appeared before the Royal Commission via satellite hook-up. And they were split 50/50 between saving the last old tree and logging it.

So the Royal Commission said we should study the tree a little longer. Get some scientific reports. Comb the bare hills and back roads of the province to see if it really is the last tree. Find out if any birds or animals depend on the old tree for their survival. See if we could make a deal with Washington or Oregon to import a few of *their* natural trees.

The reports came back that there were no wild animals living anywhere near the old tree. Washington and Oregon only had a few hundred trees left, so they wouldn't consider selling us one. And as far as anyone could tell, it was the last original wild tree left in B.C.

So the Royal Commission recommended that to be fair to both sides of the argument, we split the difference. Cut off the top half of the old tree and sell it to Japan. Put a fence around the bottom half and declare it a national historic site.

That way everyone would win. The old loggers would have their tree to cut down and sell. And the environmentalists would have theirs to appreciate and show off to the tourists.

The loggers said they would settle for that. But the environmentalists insisted they had to have the whole tree—nothing less. After all, they argued, everything else had already been logged or burned or killed off by acid rain or the disappearance of the ozone layer.

It was hard to believe they wouldn't save the last original wild tree. If they cut off the top, it would just die anyway, they argued.

But the government went along the Royal Commission's report and ruled that the tree should be cut in half. If old trees were a heritage to be remembered from times past, well, so was logging old trees and selling them to foreign countries.

So the tree was measured from tip to stump and the fallers came and climbed half-way up and cut the top off. It crashed to the ground. One of the loggers yelled to the environmentalists who were demonstrating nearby, "That's your half!"

The protesters waved their placards and booed and hissed and shouted. And the logger turned to the policeman standing by the barricade and said, "Goddamn treehuggers—never satisfied!"

Source: Hammond (1992: 175-176)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ainscough, G.L. (1976), "The British Columbia Forest Land Tenure System," In William McKillop and Walter J. Mead eds. *Timber Policy Issues in British Columbia* (Vancouver : University of British Columbia) 33-55.

Alberta Recreation and Parks (1986), *Policy Statement for the Alberta Ministry of Recreation and Parks* (Edmonton: Alberta Recreation and Parks).

Allin, Craig (1982), *The Politics of Wilderness Preservation* (Westport: Greenwood Press).

Altmeyer, George (1976), "Three Ideas of Nature in Canada, 1893-1914," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 11(3): 21-36.

Armson, K.A. (1982), "Introducing Options in the Forest" *Policy Options* 3(3): 58-60.

Bella, Leslie (1987), *Parks for Profit* (Montreal: Harvest House Ltd).

Binkley, Clark S. (1994), "Perspective on Western Canada's Timber Supply," In *Timber Supply in Canada: Challenges and Choices- Conference Proceedings* (Ottawa: Natural Resources Canada) 92-95.

Binkley, Clark S. (1997), " A Crossroad in the Forest: The Path To Sustainable Forest Sector in BC," *BC Studies* 113: 39-61.

Binkley, Clark (1998), "Forestry in a postmodern world or just what was John Muir doing running a sawmill in Yosemite Valley," *Policy Sciences* 31: 133-144.

Blake, Donald E., Neil Guppy and Peter Urmetzer (1996-1997), "Being Green in BC: Public Attitudes Towards Environmental Issues," *BC Studies* 112: 41-61.

British Columbia Forest Service. "*Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision Background Report.*" April 1993, 11 pages. Available: //www.for.gov.bc.ca/het/Clayoquot/clay.html. 30 June 1999.

Brown, Robert Craig (1968), "The Doctrine of Usefulness: Natural Resources and National Park Policy in Canada, 1887-1914," In J.B. Nelson and R.C. Scace eds. *The Canadian National Parks: Today and Tomorrow* (Calgary: University of Calgary) 46-62.

Burda, Cheri, Fred Gale and Michael Mc Gonigle (1998), "Eco-Forestry Versus the Status Quo: Or Why Innovative Forestry Is Neither Contemplated Nor Permitted Within The State Structure of British Columbia," *B.C. Studies* 119: 45-72.

Burton, Thomas L. (1972), *Natural Resource Policy in Canada* (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart).

Clawson, Marion and William F. Hyde (1976) , "Managing the Forests of the Coastal Pacific Northwest for Maximum Social Returns," In William McKillop and Walter J. Mead eds. *Timber Policy Issues In British Columbia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press) 171-206.

"Clayoquot Still Threatened." *Taiga News* 26 January 1999: 2 pars. Available: htttp://www..sll.fi/TRN/Taiga News/News26/clayoquotJan99.html. 21 June 1999.

Clepper, Henry E. (1971), *Professional Forestry in the United States* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press).

Cohen, Michael P. (1984), *The Pathless Way: John Muir and American Wilderness* (University of Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press).

Cohen, Michael P. (1988), *The History of the Sierra Club: 1892-1970* (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books).

Connaghan, C.J. (1991),"Sustainability – Partnership or Marriage of Convenience?" In Kim Sanderson ed. *Sustainable use of Canada's Forests: Are we on the Right Path?* (Edmonton: Canadian Society of Environmental Biologists) 1-6.

Cubbage, Frederick W., Jay O'Laughlin and Bullock Charles S. eds. (1993), *Forest Resource Policy* (New York: John Wiley and Sons).

Darling, Craig R. (1991), *In Search of Consensus: An Evaluation of the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force Process* (Victoria: Uvic Institute for Dispute Resolution).

Devall, Bill and George Sessions (1984)," The Development of Natural Resources and the Integrity of Nature," *Environmental Ethics* Winter: 293-308.

Doern, G. Bruce and Thomas Conway (1994), *The Greening of Canada: Federal Institutions and Decisions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).

Dowdle, Barney (1976), "Comments and Viewpoints," In William McKillop and Walter J. Mead eds. *Timber Policy Issues in British Columbia* (Vanncouver: University of British Columbia) 226-229.

Drushka, Ken (1985), *Stumped: The Forest Industry in Transition* (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre)

Drushka, Ken, Bob Nixon and Ray Travers (1993), *Touch Wood: B.C. Forests at the Crossroads* (Madeira Park, B.C.: Harbour Publishing).

Emery, Claude (1991), *The Case Against Share Groups in British Columbia.* (Ottawa: Parliament Research Branch).

Ewart, Arthur W. (1994), "John Muir and Vertical Sauntering," In Sally M. Miller ed. *John Muir: Life and Work* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press) 42-61.

Flumerfelt, A. C. (1914), "Forest Resources," In Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty general eds. *Canada and Its Provinces* 12:487-524.

Foster, Janet (1978), *Working for Wildlife: The Beginning of Preservation in Canada.* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).

Friends of Clayoquot Sound. *"Scientific Panel Report"* September 22, 1998: 7 pages. Available: http://www.island.net/-focs/Sci_Pan_Report.html. 30 June 1999.

Garner, Joe (1991), *Never Under the Table: A Story of British Columbia's Forests and Government Mismanagement* (Naniamo: Cinnabar Press).

Gillis, and Thomas R. Roach (1986), *Lost Initiatives: Canada's Forest Industries, Forest Policy and Forest Conservation* (New York: Greenwood Press).

Graber, Linda (1976), *Wilderness As Sacred Space* (Washington D.C.: Association of American Geographers).

Gray, Stephen (1982), "Forest Policy and Administration, 1912-1928," *BC Studies*: 24-49.

Gunton, Tom (1998), "Forestry Land Use in British Columbia: The Dynamics of Change," *Environments* 25(2/3): 8-13.

Haener, M.K. and Luckert M.K. (1998), "Forest Certification: Economic Issues and Welfare Implications," *Canadian Public Policy* 24 (Special Supplement): S83-S94.

Hammond, Herb (1992), *Seeing the Forest Among the Trees: The Case Fore Wholisitc Forest Use* (Vancouver: Polestar Books).

Harkin, J.B. (1918), "Our Need For National Parks," *Canadian Alpine Journal*:101.

Hawkes, Suzanne (1996), "Gwaii Haanas Agreement: From Conflict to Cooperation" *Environments* 23 (2): 87-100.

Hoban, Thomas More and Richard Oliver Brooks (1987), *Green Justice: The Environment and the Courts* (Boulder: Westview Press).

Hoberg, George (1996), "Putting Ideas in Their Place: A Response to "Learning and Change in the British Columbia Forest Policy Sector," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 29(1): 135-144.

Hoberg, George and Edward Morawski (1997), "Policy change through sector intersection: forest and aboriginal policy in Clayoquot Sound," *Canadian Public Administration* 40 (3): 387-414.

Howay, F.W., W.N. Sage and H.F. Angus (1942), *British Columbia and The United States* (Toronto:The Ryerson Press).

Howlett, Michael and Jeremy Rayner (1995), "Do ideas matter? Policy network configurations and resistance to policy change in the Canadian forest sector," *Canadian Public Administration* 38 (3): 383-410.

Husband, Vicky (1991), "B.C's Vanishing Rainforests," In Kim Sanderson ed. *Sustainable Use of Canada's Forests: Are we on the Right Path?* (Edmonton: Canadian Society of Environmental Biologists) 83-88.

Ingram, Mathew (1999), "B.C. forest policy shift defies belief," *Globe and Mail* April April 19 B2.

Ingram, Mathew (1999), "B.C. should rethink forest policy," *Globe and Mail* April 20 B4.

Jonasse, Rick (1995), "The Foresters Eye: Technology, Techniques and Perceptions In Early American Forestry," *Alternatives* 21(3): 32-37.

Johnston, Margaret E. (1985), "A Club with Vision: The Alpine Club of Canada and Conservation 1906-1930," *Park News* 21(3): 6-9.

Kimmins, Hamish (1994), "Sustainable Development in Canadian Forestry in the Face of Changing Paradigms," in *Timber Supply in Canada: Challenges and Choices Conference Proceedings* (Ottawa: Natural Resources Canada) 3-18.

Kimmins, Hamish (1997), *Balancing Act: Environmental Issues in Forestry* (Vancouver: UBC Press).

Kumi, Janna W. (1991), " The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: What's Wrong with British Columbia Forestry Today" In Kim Sanderson ed. *Sustainable Use of Canada's Forests: Are we on the Right Path* (Edmonton: Canadian Society of Environmental Biologists) 59-64.

LaForce, Gina L (1979), "The Alpine Club of Canada, 1906 to 1929: Modernization, Canadian Nationalism, and Anglo-Saxon Mountaineering," *Canadian Alpine Journal* 62: 39-46.

Lambert, Richard S. and Paul Pross (1967), *Renewing Nature's Wealth* (Ontario: OntarioDepartment of Lands and Forests).

Lertzman, Ken, Jeremy Rayner and Jeremy Wilson (1996), "Learning and Change in the British Columbia Forest Policy Sector: A Consideration of Sabatiers' Advocacy Coalition framework," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 29(1): 111-133.

Lertzman, Ken, Jeremy Rayner and Jeremy Wilson (1996), "On the Place of Ideas: A Reply to George Hoberg, " *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 29(1):145-148.

Lewis, Hartley V. (1976), " Objectives of Public Forest Policy in British Columbia: Some Economic Observations," In William McKillop and Walter J. Mead eds. *Timber Policy Issues in British Columbia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia) 3-22.

Longgood, William (1972), *The Darkening Land* (New York: Simon and Schuster).

Lothian, W.F. (1977), *A History of Canada's National Parks Volume II* (Ottawa: Parks Canada).

Lower, A.R.M. (1938), *The North American Assault on the Canadian Forest* (Toronto: The Ryerson Press).

Luckert, M.K. and F.J. Salkie (1998), "Forestry in Canada: Transitions and Emerging Policy Issues," *Canadian Public Policy* 24 (Special Supplement): S1-S10.

Luxton, Eleanor G. (1975), *Banff Canada's First National Park: A History and a Memory of Rocky Mountains Park* (Banff: Summerthought).

McGuire, John R. (1976), "Timber Policy Issues in the United States," In William McKillop and Walter J. Mead eds. *Timber Policy Issues in British Columbia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia) 23-32.

McGonigle, R. Michael (1989), "The Case of the British Columbia Island Trust." *Canadian Public Administration* 32 (4): 524-544.

McGonigle, R. Michael (1996), "Tenure Reform in BC Forests: A Communitarian Strategy For Sustainability," *Policy Options* November 11-15.

McGonigle, R. Michael (1997), "Behind the Green Curtain," *Alternatives Journal* 23 (4): 16-21.

Mc Killop, William and Walter J. Mead (1976), *Timber Policy Issues in British Columbia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia).

MacIsaac, Ron and Anne Champagne (1994), *Clayoquot Mass Trials: Defending the Rainforest* (Gabriola, B.C.: New Society Publishers).

McNamee, Kevin (1994), " Clayoquot Sound: Compromise or Catastrophe, " *Nature Canada* Spring : 34-35.

Maini, J.S. and A. Carlisle (1974), *Conservation in Canada: A Conspectus* (Ottawa: Department of Environment Canada Forestry Service).

Marchak, Patricia (1983), *Green Gold: The Forest Industry in British Columbia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press).

Marchak, Patricia (1995), *Logging the Globe* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press).

Marchak, Patricia (1998), "Commentary," *BC Studies* 119: 73-78.

Marty, Sid (1984), *A Grand and Fabulous Notion: The First Century of Canada's Parks* (Toronto: NC Press Ltd).

May, Elizabeth (1990), *Paradise Won: The Struggle to Save South Moresby* (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart).

May, Elizabeth (1998), *At The Cutting Edge* (Toronto: Key Porter Books).

Methven, Ian R. (1991), " Sustainable Use of Forests: The New Holy Grail?" In Kim Sanderson ed. *Sustainable Use of Canada's Forests: Are We on the Right Path?* (Edmonton: Canadian Society of Environmental Biologists) 39-46.

Miller, Ian (1994a), "Summaries of Provincial Status Reports on Timber Supply: Western Canada, British Columbia" In *Timber Supply In Canada: Challenges and Choices: Conference Proceedings* (Ottawa: Natural Resources Canada) 89-91.

Miller, Ian (1994b), "British Columbia Status Report" In *Timber Supply In Canada: Challenges and Choices: Conference Proceedings* (Ottawa: Natural Resources Canada) Appendix A: 126-135.

Miller, Sally M. (1994), *John Muir: Life and Work* (Albuquerque:University of New Mexico Press).

Mitchell, Robert Cameron (1980), "How Soft,Deep or Left? Present Constituencies In The Environmental Movement For Certain Worldviews," *Natural Resources Journal* 20: 345-358.

Morgan, George T. Jr. (1978), "Conflagration as Catalyst: Western lumbermen and American Forest Policy," *Pacific Historical Review* 47: 167-188.

Natural Resources Canada (1997), *The Sustainable Management of Forests* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada).

Nelson, J. Gordon (1970), *Canadian Parks In Perspective* (Montreal: Harvest House).

Nelson, J. Gordon (1984), *An External Perspective on Parks Canada Strategies, 1986-2001* (Waterloo, Ontario: University of Waterloo).

Nelson, J. Gordon (1989), "Wilderness in Canda: Past, Present and Future," *Natural Resources Journal* 29: 83-102.

Nelson, J. Gordon and L.D. Cordes (1972), *Pacific Rim: An Ecological Approach to a New Canadian National Park* (London: University of Western Ontario).

Nelson, J. Gordon and R.C.Scace eds. (1968), *The Canadian National Parks: Today and Tomorrow* (Calgary: University of Calgary).

Nelson, Joyce (1994), "Pulp and Propoganda" *Canadian Forum* July/August: 14-19.

O'Riordan, Jon (1989), "Derrick Sewell and the Wilderness Advisory Committee in British Columbia," *Natural Resource Journal* 29: 115-127.

Pal, Leslie A. (1987), *Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction* (Toronto: Methuen).

Parker, Elizabeth (1906), "The Mountain Ideal," *Rod and Gun* 7: 146-148.

Parker, Elizabeth (1907), "The Alpine Club of Canada," *Canadian Alpine Journal* 1 (1): 3-7.

Parker, Elizabeth (1909), "Library Holdings," *Canadian Alpine Journal* 3: 150

Peine, John D. (1998), *Ecosystem Management For Sustainability* (Washington, D.C.: Lewis Publishers).

Peterson, Philip V. (1982), "An Interview with Sierra Club Executive Director J. Michael McClosky," *Journal of Forestry* 80 (5): 276-279.

Pross, A Paul (1967), "The development of professions in the public service: the foresters in Ontario," *Canadian Public Administration* 10 (3): 376-404.

Pross, A. Paul (1990), " Pressure Groups: Talking Chameleons," In Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams ed. *Canadian Politics in the 1990s* (Scarborough: Nelson Canada) 285-312.

Rayner, Jeremy (1996), "Implementing Sustainability in West Coast Forests: CORE and FEMAT as Experiments in Process," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 31 (1): 82-101.

Reidel, Carl A. (1987), "Roots, Ruts, Revolution," *American Forests* 93 (5,6): 14-16, 73-74.

Robinson, Bart (1983), "Valhalla Victory," *Equinox* 12: 111-125.

Robson, Barbara (1994), "Pilgrims Progress," *Nature Canada* Spring: 28-33 & 36-37.

Sabatier, Paul A. (1988), "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein," *Policy Sciences* 21: 129-168.

Sahajananthan, Sivaguru, David Haley and John Nelson (1998), "Planning for Sustainable Forests in British Columbia through Land Use Zoning," *Canadian Public Policy* 24 (Special Supplement): S73-S81.

Sandbach, Francis (1980), *Environment Ideology and Policy* (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell).

Sanderson, Kim ed. (1991), *Sustainable Use of Canada's Forests: Are We On the Right Path?* (Edmonton: Canadian Society of Environmental Biologists).

Sandford, R.W. (1997), "The Serious Sport of Climbing: Reflections on the Birth of the Alpine Club of Canada on the Occasion of its 90th Anniversary," *Canadian Alpine Journal* 80: 52-53.

Scheffer, Victor B. (1991), *The Shaping of Environmentalism in America* (Seattle: University of Washington Press).

Schrepfer, Susan R. (1988), "Establishing Administrative *Standing*: The Sierra Club and the Forest Service, 1897-1956," *Pacific Historical Review*: 55-81.

Schwindt, R. (1979), "The Pearse Commission and the Industrial Organization of the British Columbia Forest Industry," *B.C. Studies* 41: 3-35.

Sewell, W.R. (posthumously), Philip Dearden and John Drumell (1989), "Wilderness Decisionmaking and the Role of Environmental Interest Groups: A Comparison of the Franklin Dam, Tasmania and South Moresby, British Columbia Cases," *Natural Resources Journal* 29:147-169.

Shortt, Adam and Arthur G. Doughty general eds. (1914), *Canada and Its Provinces.* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press).

Sierra Club of British Columbia (1972), *West Coast Trail and Nitinat Lakes: A Trail*

Guide (Vancouver: J.J.Douglas Ltd).

Sierra Club of British Columbia. "Government Giving Away Our Home And Native Land." Sierra Club News Media Release 17 March 1999, 2 pages. Available: http://www.sierraclub.org/canada/bc/News/Media_Releases/NativeLand. html. 21 June 1999.

Suzuki, David (1987), "South Moresby," *Globe and Mail* July 11 at 4, col.3.

Swift, James (1983), *Cut and Run: The Assault on Canada's Forests* (Toronto: Between the Lines).

Swinnerton, Dr. Guy S. (1991) *People Parks and Preservation* (Edmonton: Environment Council of Alberta).

Taylor, Duncan M. (1998), *Off Course: Restoring the Balance Between Canadian Society and the Environment* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre).

Theberge, John B. (1990), "Wilderness Philosophies: Are We Pre-Programmed?" In Nelson, J.G., J.A. Carruthers and A.R. Woodley eds. *Wilderness Management Occasional Paper 14* (Waterloo, Ontario: Heritage Resources Centre).

Thoreau, Henry David (1962), *Walden* (New York: Macmillan).

Timber Supply in Canada: Challenges and Choices-Conference Proceedings 1994. (Ottawa: Natural Resources Canada).

Twigg,Allen ed. (1998) "Married With Grizzlies," *BC Bookworld* 12(2): 11-12.

Udall, Stewart L (1970), *The Quiet Crisis* (Discus Books).

Van Kooten, G. Cornelis and Sen Wang (1998), "Estimating Economic Costs of Nature Protection: British Columbia's Forest Regulations," *Canadian Public Policy:* 24 (Special Supplement): S63-S72.

Weikle, Brandie, "Chretien Pressured to Keep Clayoquot Promises" CUP 17 January 1994, 1 page. Availabe:http://www.mun.ca/muse/Archive/vol44/9402. 21June 1999.

Wheeler, Arthur O. (1909), "Canada's Mountan Heritage" in *Addresses of the Canadian Club of Toronto* (Toronto: Warwick Bro's & Rutter Ltd.).

Williams, Mabel B. (1936), *Guardians of the Wild* (Toronto: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd).

Williams, Michael (1989), *Americans and Their Forests: A Historical Geography* (New

York: Cambridge University Press)

Wilson, Jeremy (1987-88), "Forest Conservation in British Columbia, 1935-1985: Reflections on a Barren Political Debate," *B.C. Studies* 76: 3-32.

World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), *Our Common Future* (New York: Oxford University Press).