

AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH CANADA,
BRITAIN AND FRANCE IN
THE FORMATION OF NATO: 1945-1955

by

SHARON SEGAL

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History
University of Manitoba,
Winnipeg, Manitoba

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION

1

1. THE POST-WAR WORLD AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 1945-1947

I	THE POST-WAR SITUATION	18
II	THE UNITED STATES TAKES THE LEAD	24
i	Willing International Actor or Not?	24
ii	First American Signals	29
iii	The North American Partnership	34
iv	Maintaining the Atomic Monopoly	38
III	THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER	40
i	A New Enemy	40
ii	Fast Moving Events of 1947	50

2. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION COMES INTO BEING 1948-1950

I	THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY CONCEPT IS BORN	63
i	First Steps	63
ii	West European Union, Czechoslovakia and American Involvement	68

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

iii	The United States Commits Itself to an Atlantic Security System	74
iv	The Berlin Blockade Spurs on the Alliance	82
II	THE NEGOTIATIONS	84
i	Talks Begin	84
ii	The American Role in the Negotiations and the Signing of the Treaty	87
III	IMPLICATIONS AND AFTERMATH	91
i	Effects on National Sovereignty and Support for the Pact	91
ii	The Military Assistance Program and Preliminary Organization	96
3. THE YEARS OF CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION 1950-1955		
I	AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES AND WESTERN EUROPE	106
II	TURNING POINTS OF 1950	112
i	The London Conferences	112
ii	Korea and the Need to Maintain a Bold Front in Europe	116

<u>TABLE OF CONTENTS</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
iii An Historic North Atlantic Council Meeting	121
iv The Americans Protect their Interests, the French Propose a Compromise & NATO Establishes its Military Headquarters	127
III THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION TAKES SHAPE	133
i General Eisenhower Assumes Command & Greece and Turkey Enter the Fold	133
ii Military Alliance or Atlantic Community?	138
iii The European Defence Community	144
IV ALLIANCE DEFENCE SYSTEM FINALLY CONSOLIDATED	146
i A New American Administration & a Change in NATO Policy	146
ii The European Defence Community Collapses & West Germany Joins NATO	150
CONCLUSION	164
BIBLIOGRAPHY	182

INTRODUCTION

From this act taken here today will flow increasing good for all peoples. From this joining of many wills in one purpose will come new inspiration for the future. New strength and courage will accrue not only to the peoples of the Atlantic community but to all peoples of the world community who seek for themselves and for others equally, freedom and peace.

Dean Acheson,
U.S. Secretary of State.

In the solemnity of this moment I put my signature to this pact in the name of the people who join with other signatories for the preservation of the great freedoms, and in giving an assurance to mankind of our determination to assist all the peoples of the world to live in understanding and good neighbourliness.

Ernest Bevin,
British Foreign Secretary.

In signing this pact, France solemnly proclaims her absolute determination to maintain peace. It is not for herself alone that France wants peace, for she knows that peace has become the indivisible property of all, and that, by allowing it to be compromised by one of us, we would all lose it together.

Robert Schuman,
French Foreign Minister.

There can be no place in this group for power politics or imperialist ambitions on the part of any of its members....This Treaty is a forward move in man's progress from the waste-land of his post-war world, to better, safer ground.

Lester Pearson,
Canadian Secretary of State
for External Affairs. ¹

With these glowing words of peace, security and international brotherhood, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by twelve countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States) in Washington D.C. on April 4, 1949. Since that time there have

been well over 100 wars around the globe, the world stockpiles of both conventional and nuclear weapons have grown astronomically, Europe was divided for over forty years by the Cold War as the United States and the Soviet Union vied with each other for world supremacy and as NATO and Warsaw Pact troops and armaments confronted each other on the continent. Even now when the division of Europe has ended and the primary focus of international tension has shifted elsewhere, wars continue to be the chosen means for settling differences amongst nations, as recently manifested in the Persian Gulf. Clearly the era of peace and security heralded by the architects of the North Atlantic Treaty has proved to be elusive, and the power politics and imperialist ambitions Lester Pearson spoke of at the signing ceremony, far from vanishing from the face of the earth, have become more firmly entrenched than ever. Furthermore, despite official pronouncements of great unanimity of purpose and harmony of interests, the North Atlantic allies have frequently found themselves at odds with one another, to the extent that France withdrew permanently from the military structure of NATO in 1966, while Greece withdrew temporarily in 1974 (rejoining in 1980).

Much of the friction has been between the United States and its European partners, often over America's role and influence within the Alliance. According to the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, it is an alliance of equal partners,

but frequently NATO policy has appeared to coincide with American foreign policy interests. John Holmes, former Canadian diplomat and President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, pointed out in 1964 that "the real nature of the alliance relationship is obscured by the rhetoric of 'free and equal partnership'" and that although the United States would prefer "to act in concert with its allies" if it cannot "it may be expected to act anyway".² Various crises over the years seem to back up his view: the American bombing of Libya from U.S. bases in Britain in 1986, the interception of Italian aircraft by American navy planes after the Achille Lauro incident in 1985, the American invasion of Grenada in 1983 without prior consultation with the allies and, most recently, the American determination to intervene after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait with or without U.N. backing. The failure to consult necessarily raises questions about the extent to which America's partners have surrendered elements of their sovereignty through participation in the Western Alliance.

Given America's obvious and undisputed leadership role it is hardly surprising that much of the literature on NATO both originates in and focuses on the United States. Of course, there is no dearth of literature on NATO. Leaving aside the volumes of memoirs by political and diplomatic participants in events - whose views may be coloured by lapses of memory, political conviction or self-promotion -

the vast majority of the scholarly work has focused on analyses of current problems and has dealt primarily with present and future concerns. Even the work undertaken from a historical perspective has generally either dealt with specific strategic, military or political problems the Alliance has faced or has looked at it as part of the foreign policies of specific member countries, most often that of the United States.

Most of the works on NATO tend to be uncritical, accepting as given the basic premises and policies of the Alliance and extolling its virtues. (This is not entirely surprising as much of this work has been supported with NATO funds and comes from Institutes of Strategic Studies, Centres for NATO Studies and like institutions.) Such interpretations range from works like Robert Endicott Osgood's NATO: The Entangling Alliance (1962) - a classic study of NATO in the context of contemporary American foreign policy with an emphasis on military strategy and problems created by the nuclear age - to more recent studies, such as Creating the Entangling Alliance (1981) by Timothy P. Ireland and NATO After Thirty Years (1981) edited by L.S. Kaplan and R.W. Clawson. Both the latter works look at NATO from an American perspective. By contrast, European Security: Prospects for the 1980s (1979) edited by Derek Leebaert and The Permanent Alliance: The European-American Partnership 1945-1984 (1977) by Geoffrey Williams, provide a similar concern with

strategic over political issues, but with the emphasis on the European dynamic.

This is not to suggest that no attention has been paid to the problems and divisions within NATO. Henry Kissinger, for one, has written several books which consider both strategic and political problems that have surfaced within the Alliance. The Troubled Partnership (1965) and American Foreign Policy (1977) are two examples. In these Kissinger addresses what he sees as American insensitivity to the European historical experience, traditions and concerns as well as a tendency to encourage Europe to remain militarily dependent on the U.S. which have been two of the causes of much of the tension within the Alliance. Others have been the Europeans' reluctance to move faster towards some form of political union in Europe and their inclination to see themselves as lobbyists with Washington rather than as initiators of events. Kissinger concludes that these issues have to be taken into account in order to improve the American position and the efficiency of the Alliance as a whole; this will be achieved only if there is greater political cohesion and a move away from the twin failings of American unilateralism and European irresponsibility.

A similar view of NATO's European members is found in several works written from both the U.S. and European perspective. An American, Robert Endicott Osgood in Alliances

and American Foreign Policy (1968), writes frankly about America's use of alliances as a "major means of projecting American power", restraining its allies and maintaining international order.³ He chastises the European partners for both failing to take over their own defence and for being unwilling to federate. Indeed, European union has been an American aim since the earliest days of the Alliance, a goal the U.S. has always wanted and pursued within the NATO structure.

From the European perspective, Alfred Grosser in The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945 (1980) (which was published simultaneously in Germany and France) focuses on the Western European end of the equation. He analyzes the different European (primarily French and German) responses to the partnership with the United States which, for all its difficulties, has remained a cornerstone of West European reality for over forty years. In Grosser's view, even though the United States is undoubtedly the dominant partner in the relationship, its presence in Europe and within the Western Alliance is, overall, a positive thing, something the Europeans themselves requested and continue to want to maintain despite their occasional disagreements.

There has been little revisionist work published on NATO. William Appleman Williams, David Horowitz, H.W. Berger

and Gar Alperowitz have all written critical interpretations of NATO, but only in the context of more general works on American foreign policy and the Cold War. Such is also the case with Joyce and Gabriel Kolko's The Limits of Power: The World and U.S. Foreign Policy 1945-1954 (1972). In their section on the creation of NATO they maintain that its main target was not any real military threat from the Soviet Union, as its advocates claimed, but rather the threat of the rise of communism within Western Europe. According to them, the role assigned to the Alliance by Washington was to contain West Germany (so that it would pose no threat to American economic and political ambitions in Europe), to contain internal disorder within the member countries and (as a useful corollary) to sustain a psychological momentum against the Soviet Union.

In looking at the above studies on NATO two things stand out. The first is that all of them, whether they consider this to be a positive or a negative feature, take as given the leadership of the Atlantic Alliance by the United States. The second, and one that concerns us more here, is that, despite agreement on the American role, none specifically address the question of whether or not NATO itself functions as an instrument of U.S. hegemony and control and, if it does, what effect this has had on the other members.

This study will consider the way in which the pattern of American leadership was established and implemented from the very beginning of the Alliance concept and consider how this affected other member nations within the Alliance. It is not intended to be an exhaustive study of NATO policy or American policy or, for that matter, of British, French or Canadian policy. Rather, it is an attempt to present a broad ranging, interpretative study designed to reveal some of the internal dynamics of the organization, which were established from its very earliest days, and to ascertain the motives and objectives of some of the key players. Thus, the thesis focuses on two interrelated issues: the role of the United States within NATO, and the manner in which membership in an alliance led by a world superpower has affected the individual sovereignty of some of the member states.

These are complex questions. There are many threads which run through the history of the alliance relationship - the political, the military, the economic - all of which need to be untangled in order to try and answer the questions posed. One of the problems which arises, and must be solved in a study such as this, is the need to sort out myth from reality, word from deed, as the picture which emerges is full of seeming contradictions. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty seems straightforward, and the stated desire of the members to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their members, founded on the principles of

democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law"⁴ seems noble enough. But these are clearly aims which are open to wide-ranging interpretation. One must look at how they have been translated into practice and what type of organization and relationship has emerged as a result. The outcome will be to clarify the U.S. role and its impact on the sovereignty of member nations.

One of the most commonly held views about the North Atlantic Alliance is that the United States did not really want to become involved but was pushed into it by the other Western countries, most notably Britain and France. Several countries claim to have acted as the catalyst in bringing about the formation of the Western alliance after World War II. The British say it was their idea and cite Winston Churchill's famous speech at Fulton, Missouri in March 1946 calling for continuing "fraternal association", particularly in the military field, between the United Kingdom and Commonwealth and the United States. This was followed by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's initiative in launching the Brussels Pact together with what his biographer describes as "his greatest achievement", namely "securing American support for Europe's recovery through the Marshall Plan and for her security through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."⁵

The Canadians also lay claim to being the initiators of the North Atlantic Treaty concept and point to July 1947 when

External Affairs Minister Louis St. Laurent told the Canadian House of Commons that there was room within the United Nations for closer associations of states for collective security, an idea which he subsequently presented to the United Nations itself the following September.⁶ A Norwegian expert has even suggested that it was Norway which invented the concept of an Atlantic defence policy and, therefore, subsequently NATO. He claims that during the war the Norwegian government-in-exile in Britain recognized the importance of trans-Atlantic security interests and drew up proposals for post-war military cooperation and a future mutual security alliance between Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and possibly Canada and Greenland.⁷ The United States, for its part, has always downplayed any role it took in initiating the North Atlantic Alliance and has tacitly accepted the image of being the reluctant but self-sacrificing saviour of Western Europe after 1945. What is myth and what is reality here is another part of the tangled web that needs to be unravelled.

Another is the concept of partnership. The words of the Treaty and the statements of its supporters always stress the idea of an Atlantic partnership. But what kind of partnership can it be when all of the partners unquestioningly accepted the American proposal that the NATO military forces always be under the command of an American general (SACEUR - Supreme Allied Commander Europe)? Was this decision accepted simply

because the Americans had more expertise and money, or did the NATO Council members think an American would, inherently, always do a better job? Surely, if experience were the issue other member countries, like Britain and France, would have been more qualified. Unlike the Americans, they both had several hundred years experience of participation in alliances and planning military strategy and both had been leaders of the allied victory (in the West) together with the United States. Or perhaps it was because other members were still too war-weary in 1949 and needed to put all their energy into rebuilding their shattered countries. Yet this decision was never questioned even after West European recovery was an established fact. Surely there must be concern about the fact that the American general holding the position of SACEUR, under U.S. law, is ultimately responsible not to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the member countries represented on the NATO Military Committee, and hence to the governments of those countries, but to his own Commander-in-Chief, namely the President of the United States. Does this situation not automatically compromise the sovereignty of the other member states and call into question the notion of partnership?

The issue of sovereignty is also complex and can be approached on several levels. There have been a number of open and well-publicized conflicts between NATO members, several of which will be looked at in this study. These have

included French resistance to the European Defence Community project and to German participation in the Alliance; American opposition to Britain and France during the Suez crisis; conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and, of course, the French withdrawal from NATO's military wing in 1966. More recently there has been strong American resistance to European plans to revitalize the West European Defence Union structure, resistance which, in 1985, prompted Dr. David Owen, formerly British Foreign Secretary and subsequently leader of the British Social Democratic Party, to describe America's aim to be "to atomize and rule" within NATO.⁸ Yet despite these disagreements, which have at times been quite acrimonious, the governments of all the member states continue to support the Alliance and actively participate in it. Even France is still a member of the political wing of the organization. So on this level perhaps it could be said that the issue of sacrifice of sovereignty is really a non-issue.

On the other hand, if one looks at the level of public opinion the matter can be viewed quite differently. During the past decade, particularly after the 1979 NATO decision to deploy U.S. Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe and to test Cruise missiles over Canada, there has been an upswing in public opposition in Western Europe and Canada at the very least to some NATO policies and often to participation in NATO at all. The American bases and weapons in these

countries are often viewed as a threat to national sovereignty and have become the focus of much public protest. Clearly, on a subjective level at least, opinion is divided about whether or not NATO membership means a violation of national sovereignty. Public uneasiness about the issue does not appear to be reflected in government attitudes and actions, while opposition parties tend to vacillate on the issue. Both the New Democratic Party in Canada and the Labour Party in Britain have at times included withdrawal from NATO as part of their programmes and at other times not.

This study attempts to assess the above issues by looking at the extent to which member states were, in practice, not just in words, free both to influence NATO decisions and to exercise control over their own political, military and economic affairs in NATO's formative years, despite the increasing presence in their countries of large numbers of foreign troops, weapons and money. It also looks at what happened when there was conflict between American desires and the aims and those of other countries.

In addition to the United States, the study considers the positions of Britain, France and Canada in the formation and consolidation of the Alliance. Britain and France have been the two other leading members besides the Americans. As former colonial powers, each has its own distinctive international position and relationship with the U.S. and

each has tried in its own particular way to carve out a position for itself in the post-1945 world and in the Western Alliance. Canada, on the other hand, is very much one of the junior partners and one which has been perhaps the most staunch supporter of American positions. It too has a distinctive relationship with the United States because of its geographical proximity and the myriad of ties that link it to its southern neighbour.

Events are dealt with chronologically in order to gain an overview of the way in which the alliance relationship developed. Specific crises as well as questions of ongoing concern, such as the role of Germany, are considered in order to examine the demands made by the United States, the importance of these demands to American foreign policy at the time, the way in which they affected Britain, France and Canada and how these countries reacted to them. The crises and issues included must necessarily be limited by constraints of time and space, but they cover the major issues which confronted NATO in its first decade. The emphasis is primarily on political rather than military or economic relations, except where the latter are immediately relevant. The study relies as much as possible on official published records of NATO itself and of the governments concerned.

The study is divided into three sections which cover three distinctive phases in the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance. The first chapter covers the years 1945-1947. It considers the post-war situation and the very different positions in which the U.S., Canada, Britain and France each found themselves. It looks at the way in which the United States took the lead in the West and shows clearly that the Americans had no intention of remaining isolated from the international arena. The chapter also considers the rapid realignment of forces and allegiances internationally, the emergence of "a new enemy" and the fast-moving events of 1947 which set the stage both for the continuing American presence in Western Europe and the emergence of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Chapter two deals with the actual formation of the Alliance in the years between 1948 and 1950, years which Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary-General described as "years of cautious optimism and slow methodical progress".⁹ It looks at the first steps, the way in which external events helped speed up the process and the American behind the scenes involvement in events. The process of negotiations and actual drawing up of the North Atlantic Treaty are reviewed and the rationale for the creation of the Alliance is considered. Was it established, as its proponents argue, as a defence against Soviet expansionism and the danger of war or was it closer to the Kolkos' interpretation of containing West Germany and

controlling unrest in Western Europe? Or was it more complex than this? Lord Ismay himself is quoted as having summed up the reasons for the founding of NATO as to keep the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in.¹⁰

Chapter three looks at the years from 1950-1955. This was the period of consolidation, growth and military expansion in the wake of the Korean War. The emphasis in these years was very much on military matters. It was the time when the military structure of the organization was set up and the troops under its command increased. NATO adopted what was known as a "forward strategy" of defending Europe as far to the east as possible. During these years the failure of the European Defence Community and the concerted efforts of a new administration in Washington finally paved the way for the admission of Germany in 1955 and the consolidation of a strong, American controlled Western Alliance.

Despite the recent profound changes which have occurred in the international situation, the questions being considered here are not only matters of historical interest but remain issues of ongoing and current relevance. The bipolar division of the world may be ended and the Cold War may be over but NATO still exists and is in the process of reassessing its position and reorganizing its forces to adapt to the new global conditions. For example, in June 1991, the decision was made to move troops out of central Europe and

concentrate on the southern flank in Greece and Turkey, closer to areas of international tension. At a time when the world has just been exposed to the devastating firepower and military might of the United States in the Persian Gulf War, when the international situation remains volatile and when the desire for real peace and security is being voiced by more and more people around the world, a study such as this seems both timely and relevant.

¹ "Excerpts from Speeches Delivered at the Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C. on April 4, 1949", Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XV (April 15 1949), pp. 386-392.

² John Holmes, "The Relationship in Alliance and in World Affairs", in The United States and Canada, proceedings of the American Assembly Conference 1964 (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1964), p. 100.

³ Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 1 & 21.

⁴ Preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty printed in The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1984), p.264.

⁵ Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (London: Heinemann, 1983), p.116.

⁶ These incidents are referred to in both Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Paris: NATO Information Service, 1954), p.7, and Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949 (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1977), p.9.

⁷ Talk given by Professor Olav Riste, Director, Research Centre for Defence Studies, Oslo at the London School of Economics and Political Science, March 13, 1986.

⁸ British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio 4 interview with Dr. David Own, April, 1985; rebroadcast March 28, 1987.

⁹ Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, p. 31.

¹⁰ Quoted by Professor Gwyn Prins of Emmanuel College, Cambridge in British Broadcasting Corporation Radio 4 documentary "NATO: A Time For Change", May 1986 and by Dr. Peter Foot of Dartmouth Royal Naval College, England in a talk on "American Policy and the Formation of NATO" given at the London School of Economics and Political Science, October 24, 1985.

Chapter 1
THE POST-WAR WORLD AND
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER
1945 - 1947

I THE POST-WAR SITUATION

When war ended in 1945 the world was considerably changed from what it had been a decade earlier. The old centre of power in Europe was devastated. Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, although victors, were faced with grave problems. They had suffered great loss of life, both military and civilian (450,000 in Britain, 675,000 in France and a staggering 20 million in the Soviet Union, although the total was probably much higher)¹, as well as the destruction of their material resources and productive capacity. Houses, factories, mines and mills all needed to be rebuilt. Their war-weary populations faced a momentous task of reconstruction.

The war had cost Britain a quarter of its national wealth - that is almost seven and a half billion pounds (according to figures presented at the negotiations for an American loan). Its foreign debt had increased from 476 million pounds in August 1939 to 3,355 million in June 1945.

The heart of the once mighty British Empire was close to bankruptcy.² Britain was bracing itself for what was graphically described at the time as "perhaps the narrowest and darkest economic defile through which the British people have ever had to thread their way".³

A similar situation existed in France, which also had the additional problem of recovering from Nazi occupation and four years of rule by the puppet Vichy government. In 1946 prices in France rose by 80 percent followed by 100 percent a year later, wages declined and there were severe shortages of food, other basic necessities and all the materials needed for recovery.⁴

In spite of the economic chaos, the political situation in the United Kingdom remained relatively stable. The war-time coalition government was replaced at the 1945 general election by a majority Labour government led by Clement Atlee. The popularity and personal reputation of Winston Churchill were not sufficient to keep him and his party in power. The British people appeared to want a government which was pledged to social reform and state intervention rather than the old conservative values and policies that were equated with the depression years and pre-war appeasement.

In France, however, the political situation was more precarious. General de Gaulle, who had led the French

resistance abroad, marched at the head of the Free French Army into Paris on August 25, 1944. Two months later the allies officially recognized his administration as the de facto Government of France. He was elected provisional President in November 1945 but resigned within ten weeks. The government of the new Fourth Republic was plagued by internal divisions (there would be no less than 23 governments in the next twelve years) and the French Communist Party wielded widespread influence and support. In the elections for the first Constituent Assembly of the Fourth Republic 28.2 percent of the population voted Communist, 17.8 percent Socialist and 25.9 percent supported the moderate Mouvement Republicain Populaire (MRP) which had governed with de Gaulle.⁵

In addition to their internal problems, the European colonial powers were faced with nationalist movements in Asia and Africa and the loss of their colonies. After the defeat of Japan, France fought stubbornly to maintain its control of Indochina, a fight which it finally lost in 1954. Unrest on the Indian subcontinent forced the British to grant independence to India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon by 1948. The Dutch faced a similar fate in Indonesia.

The grim situation in Europe stood in sharp contrast to that across the Atlantic. The war, after all, had been fought on European soil and it was there that most of the damage had

been inflicted. Although the United States and Canada had participated in the war they had suffered no physical damage and virtually no civilian lives lost, and their economies emerged unscathed. In fact, the war had been very profitable for both North American countries and by 1945 they were enjoying an economic boom. The United States had become the wealthiest and most powerful country in the world. This power was based on both its economic and military strength. The U.S. had accumulated a huge surplus of capital through the sale of arms and strategic resources for both cash and credit and its Gross National Product had doubled in the course of the war. By 1944 it was producing 45 percent of the world's munition supplies and by the summer of 1945 it had a monopoly on the atomic bomb. At war's end it controlled 434 military bases around the world in contrast to the three it had operated in Guam, Hawaii and the Philippines before 1939.⁶ American troops were stationed in 56 countries on every continent while three-quarters of the world's invested capital and two-thirds of its industrial capacity were concentrated in the United States.⁷

Canada had also prospered, although on nothing like the scale of its continental partner. It had been producing strategic raw materials and foodstuffs, developing its industrial capacity and supplying munitions for the war effort. Its GNP rose from \$111 billion in 1939 to \$180.9 billion (in 1929 dollars) in 1945⁸ and by the end of the war

it was ranked third in the world in industrial production and fourth in the strength of its armed forces.⁹

During the war American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King concluded two agreements which laid the foundation for the post-war relationship between their two countries. In August 1940, on the initiative of Roosevelt, the two men met and worked out plans for joint defence of the North American continent. They signed the Ogdensburg Agreement, whose duration was left open-ended and which the Canadian cabinet was never even consulted about. It established the Permanent Joint Board of Defence to organize the integration of Canadian-U.S. defences, in essence subordinating the Canadian military to the more powerful American Joint Chiefs of Staff. The following year, on April 20, Roosevelt and King met again and issued the Hyde Park Declaration. This was the economic counterpart of Ogdensburg. Its avowed purpose was the coordination of the two economies for the purpose of efficient war production.

Many Canadians, both at the time and since, saw this formalization of Canada's military and economic links with its powerful southern neighbour as the start of a commitment to American, rather than British, domination. The official report of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs Annual Study Conference, held in Toronto in June 1944,

recognized this and stressed that, particularly since 1940, "Canadian policy cannot be widely at variance with that of the Republic" and that "Canada may not act without the tacit approval of the United States".¹⁰

Despite Prime Minister King's uneasiness about the American influence in Canada, after the war the military accord, which had been struck ostensibly to facilitate the fight against Nazi Germany, was renewed. In 1946 the military alliance initiated at Ogdensburg was expanded and made permanent. The Joint Military Cooperation Committee was established to replace the Permanent Joint Board of Defence and it was also agreed that joint air defence would be organized for the two countries. However, bowing to public pressure at home, the Canadian government shied away from accepting total free trade for the continent; this was considered by many in Canada as a step towards assimilation into the United States.

By the beginning of 1946 the new shape of world affairs was already becoming clearly delineated. Britain, France and the other countries of Europe were struggling to heal their wounds and regenerate themselves. Their days at the centre of world power were over. Canada was thriving economically, was ready to participate in the international arena as an industrial power, as it had not done prior to 1939, and had stepped out of the old colonial orbit into that of its

continental neighbour. The United States was the real victor.

Lester Pearson summed up the new relationships:

The most important change ... was in the position of the United States, now the western super-power and thus inevitably the leader of the free world....Britain and France had become lesser great powers not too far above Canada in strength and resources.¹¹

And the "western super-power" was ready to start flexing its muscles and let everyone know who would set the course in post-war international relations.

II THE UNITED STATES TAKES THE LEAD

i Willing International Actor or Not?

It is often asserted that the United States was reluctant to commit itself to involvement in Europe after 1945.¹² This is a view which has become part of American mythology but which is contradicted by the actual events of the time. Indeed, American involvement internationally, and particularly in European affairs, goes back further than the late 1940s. Although the United States was not involved politically as an international power after World War One (it did not participate in the League of Nations) it had emerged as the strongest economic power in the world by 1918. At that

time too, just as happened again in 1945, post-war Europe was indebted to the United States. Even during the First World War it was to American banks that the United Kingdom had turned for loans to finance its war effort and that of its European allies.¹³

There is little indication that the United States, or at least the Administration if not Congress, had any serious intention of reversing its international commitments after World War Two. If anything, during the war years efforts were made to broaden involvements abroad in preparation for the peace. On the economic front President Roosevelt organized the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944. Here twenty-eight countries met and agreed to establish the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These were designed to provide cash reserves for and to advance loans to member countries in the hope of preventing a repeat of the economic collapse of the 1930s. Although both were ostensibly international organizations, because of its economic strength the United States was bound to be the dominant and controlling member.

It was not only economic preparations that were being made during the war. As early as 1942, President Roosevelt and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were considering plans for a postwar system of American bases to be stationed around the world. Beginning from Roosevelt's idea of an

international police force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted a series of studies and drew up proposals for their vision of the postwar international order and defence of American national security interests.¹⁴ Many members of the American administration, particularly in the military, believed that the United States would need a strong system of foreign bases. They were hesitant to openly advocate such a system, however, because of the opposition it was likely to arouse both in Congress and amongst the American people who were anxious to bring the boys home.¹⁵

As early as October 1945 U.S. Secretary of State J.F. Byrnes presented British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin with a list of bases the Americans wanted to operate worldwide, from Iceland to the Pacific Ocean, and began pressing for British support in trying to secure them.¹⁶ It took the United States less than a year after the end of the war to begin negotiations with Britain for the establishment of military bases in that country - bases which were presented to the public and to the British parliament alike as temporary, but many of which remain in place to this day.¹⁷

Clearly, the American administration had no serious intention of withdrawing into isolationism as it had purported to do after World War One. By 1945 its troops, weapons and bases were already deployed worldwide and it had an economic stranglehold over most of Western Europe. It was

too involved, too powerful and too influential to have any reason to retreat. As one historian described the situation in 1945, the United States "had a near monopoly on the strategic decisions which would determine the structure of international relations in the post-war period".¹⁸

Secretary of State Byrnes had spelled out the American attitude to one of his generals, H.H. Arnold, at Potsdam in July 1945: "What we must do now is not to make the world safe for democracy but make the world safe for the United States".¹⁹ And speaking six months later, in February 1946, to the Overseas Press Club in New York (in a speech approved in advance by President Harry Truman) Byrnes informed the world's media representatives that the United States intended to fulfill its responsibilities as a great world power. He elaborated: "In the interest of peace we cannot allow our military establishment to be reduced below the point required to maintain a position commensurate with our responsibilities" and for that reason, he explained, the United States did not intend to disarm and "would maintain some form of universal military training".²⁰

In sum, the United States appeared to have few qualms about taking its place as a key actor on the international stage. What it was concerned about, however, was committing itself to any situation which might tie its hands and restrict its freedom of action. Hence, the image of the

Americans being dragged kicking and screaming, into the North Atlantic Alliance. Even on this issue many people in the Administration, especially the Department of State, had quickly recognized that it might well be advantageous for America to participate as the dominant partner in some form of alliance of Western nations.

By the end of 1947, the State Department, which had been considering the way in which the Americans might play a role in Western Europe, was prepared to discuss the issue of some sort of new Western alliance system with the British. The idea was discussed at talks between U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall and Ernest Bevin in London in December 1947.²¹ The State Department attitude was reflected in a March 1948 Policy Planning Committee paper on the Brussels Treaty which recognized that the fledgling West European Union "may serve as the core of an eventual close working association of states in which we, as the most powerful nation in the Atlantic and Western cultural community may ultimately find it advisable to participate".²² By the time this paper was being prepared secret talks had already begun among the Americans, British and Canadians on the security and defence arrangements which would eventually lead to the North Atlantic Treaty.

At that time the much talked of American reluctance to commit itself to foreign entanglements was to be found in the

Republican Congress, which did not want to be deprived of its power to declare war. Much of the wrangling which took place over this issue in the immediate post-war years consisted of attempts by the State Department to convince Congress that foreign alliances were in the best interests of the United States.²³ As will be seen in the next chapter, by 1948, after much debate and maneuvering, the State Department had won the argument.

ii First American Signals

It did not take the Americans long to make their attitude and intentions known to their war-time allies. There were indications of the dominant role the United States intended to take as early as the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow in December 1945. In his diary entry for December 19, 1945 American diplomat George Kennan, who was present at the meeting, discussed the way in which Secretary of State Byrnes had "consistently shown himself negligent of British feelings and quite unconcerned for Anglo-American relations". Byrnes apparently conceived and planned the Foreign Ministers meeting and approached the Russians about it before informing the British of his intentions. He then arrived in Moscow with an American paper on atomic energy control which had not been seen by either the British or the Canadians (the two other countries involved in the war-time atomic bomb programme). "When Bevin had remonstrated against

the presentation to the Russians of any document on this subject which had not been cleared with British and Canadian governments, Byrnes had given him two days ... to submit this document to London and get the approval of the British cabinet". Without waiting for a reply from London, Byrnes then submitted the document to the Russians the very day after Bevin's protestations.²⁴ All of which must have left Bevin and his advisors with an uneasy feeling about their position in world affairs and their "special relationship" with their war-time partner.

At the same time the French were faring little better in their relations with both members of the Anglo-American alliance. France felt like, and was often treated as, the poor relation in her dealings with her allies. Throughout the war the Americans had refused to recognize General Charles de Gaulle's Free French forces and had early on established diplomatic relations with the Vichy Government. The Free French were not informed in advance of the Anglo-American invasion of the French North African colonies in November 1942 and were then outraged when the Vichy Deputy Premier Darlan was appointed High Commissioner of the North African territories.²⁵

There was certainly no love lost between President Roosevelt and General de Gaulle. In his memoirs de Gaulle recalls his first meeting with Roosevelt at Casablanca in

January 1943 where the French leader found himself being watched by American secret service men and officials he describes as "des ombres au fond d'une galerie supérieure". From that first meeting he concluded that: "Roosevelt entendait que la paix fût la paix américaine, qu'il lui appartienne à lui-même d'en dicter l'organisation, que les Etats balayés par l'épreuve fussent soumis à son jugement, qu'en particulier la France l'eut pour sauveur et pour arbitre."²⁶

The Americans for their part were not impressed by de Gaulle whom they regarded as an ultra-nationalist interested only in restoring France to her former glory as a great power. Even after the Allied landings in Normandy in 1944 Roosevelt remained reluctant to hand over control of liberated France to de Gaulle, arguing that he had not been elected by the French people. Once it became obvious, however, that the Free French forces did, in fact, enjoy broad popular support and that they were playing a key role in the liberation of their country, Roosevelt relented and granted them recognition.

Nevertheless, after the war both the Americans and the Russians remained loath to include the French in the post-war negotiations, particularly in the plans for the German occupation and peace settlement. Nor were they sympathetic to the French position on the question of control of the vital

coal and iron industry of the Ruhr. The French felt that control of the German coal-producing areas was both the key to French reconstruction and the guarantor against the resurrection of German power. They advocated international control by the Allies of the key industries in the Ruhr region. Both the United States and Great Britain, however, were more concerned with putting Germany on its feet again so that it would not continue as a drain on the resources of the occupying powers. These were to prove two of the key bones of contention which plagued Franco-American relations for the next decade.

The French did not participate in the major post-war conferences at Yalta (February 1945) or Potsdam (August 1945). However, thanks to the intervention of the British, against the objections of the Americans and the Russians, their right to representation was finally acknowledged and they were allocated an occupation zone in Germany. At that time the British felt that France was the only country in continental Europe which had the potential to act as a counterweight to either German or Russian power, although they never subscribed to de Gaulle's vision of a unified Europe acting as a third force in the international arena between the United States and the Soviet Union.²⁷

Within weeks of the end of the war, on August 21 1945, without warning or consultation, the Truman administration

abruptly terminated the Lend-Lease Agreement which had enabled the Allies to sustain the war effort. This aid itself had not been without its price: the Americans had only made it available to Britain on the condition that the U.K. sell off its overseas assets first to pay its bills and that British goods containing raw materials supplied through Lend-Lease not be exported.

The ending of Lend-Lease led to a financial crisis in London and forced the British Government to negotiate a loan from the United States. In the negotiations the Americans pressed for the abolition of the imperial tariff, imposed harsh terms of repayment and stipulated that if Britain could not find the dollars with which to pay for American imports it would have to reduce in equal proportion its imports from other sources. Not surprisingly this caused bitter recriminations and resentment in Britain. In the House of Commons debate on the motion for approval of the Anglo-American loan agreement on December 13, 1945, opposition leader Winston Churchill bitterly denounced the agreement by which, he said, the Americans were using the financial crisis and loan to try and control and manipulate the United Kingdom.²⁸ Commenting on the agreement, the influential journal The Economist observed bitterly:

Our present needs are the direct consequence of the fact that we fought longest and that we fought hardest. In moral terms we are creditors; and for

that we shall pay \$140 million a year for the rest of the twentieth century. It may not be unavoidable; but it is not right.²⁹

This was followed the next week with an editorial which reflected British feelings of resentment, frustration and injured pride:

It is aggravating to find that our reward for losing a quarter of our national wealth in the common cause is to pay tribute for half a century to those who have been enriched by the war ...Beggars cannot be choosers. But they can, by long tradition, put a curse on the ambitions of the rich.³⁰

iii The North American Partnership

Meanwhile, on the western shores of the Atlantic relations between the two North American allies were proceeding rather more smoothly. Canada was considered to be crucial both strategically and economically for the United States. The Americans treated "Canada in a military sense ... as if it were an integral part of the United States" and believed that "it is as important to our national security to protect Canada as it is to protect California".³¹ Accordingly diplomatic relations with Canada were given the highest priority in the post-war period.³²

This American concern for its northern neighbour obviously paid off and by 1947 the Americans could publicly

declare that between themselves and the Canadians "there is an identity of view and interest".³³ Canada was their most reliable and willing partner, close military ally and "best customer and foremost supplier". A secret State Department memorandum drawn up for President Truman in preparation for an official visit to Canada in the summer of 1947 summarized the state of American-Canadian relations:

The two governments are exchanging information, interchanging personnel, cooperating in the establishment of weather and Loran stations in the Far North, conducting joint experiments under Arctic conditions at Fort Churchill, and developing plans for the defense of the continent. U.S. troops are stationed at present at Fort Churchill (about 30), at the Army Airfield at Edmonton and in comparatively small numbers at the weather and Loran stations.

A cautionary note was added, however:

While joint military cooperation has the strong support of a majority of Canadians, there is an element in the country which declares that the arrangements threaten a violation of Canadian sovereignty.³⁴

The Canadian government did not reflect the view of that minority element and, for its part, was happy to maintain and expand the ties with the United States. A paper prepared in January 1945 in the Canadian Department of External Affairs on post-war relations with the U.S. stressed the importance of continuing joint defence of the North American continent

and declared that "the governing principle of Canadian policy should be to continue to foster and maintain good international relations, generally between all nations, particularly with the United States. Any policy which would create unfriendliness between the United States and Canada would, in the long run, be inimical to Canadian interests". The paper recognized that this might mean that Canada would be pressured "to maintain defences at a higher level than would seem necessary from the point of view of purely Canadian interests", but nevertheless concluded "that the defences of Canada should be closely coordinated with those of the United States in the post-war period".³⁵

This was indeed what occurred. Through a series of negotiations held in 1946, free and comprehensive exchange of military information between Canada and the United States was agreed to and later "the interchange of personnel, standardization of equipment, joint maneuvers and tests in the Arctic, mapping and surveying of the northern region and the construction of a chain of weather stations and Loran and radio transmitters" were arranged between the two countries.³⁶

Much of Canada's apparent eagerness to accept American military involvement in Canada after 1945 resulted from growing North American concern about the activities of the Soviet Union. This sentiment was fuelled by the Gouzenko

affair in the autumn of 1945. Igor Gouzenko was a cipher clerk at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa who exposed details of Soviet espionage activities in Canada. His revelations led to a host of arrests and detentions as well as some convictions of Canadians who had worked with the Russians. The most notable was the conviction of Fred Rose, the sole communist M.P. in the House of Commons in Ottawa. Although some critics assert that the Canadian Government made too much fuss about this entire incident ³⁷, it did serve to fuel the growing anti-Soviet mood in Canada and the United States. It was not, therefore, surprising that when the Americans requested that their service personnel in Canada be exempted from Canadian law, the Canadian Government complied. The result was the 1947 Visiting Forces Act which effectively defined American forces stationed in Northern Canada as residents of United States territory subject not to Canadian law but to American military courts.

This Act did not go entirely unopposed. A minority in the Canadian House of Commons, led by the CCF Party, condemned the continuing American presence and influence in their country and advocated that Canada should take the opportunity to declare its neutrality and the integrity of its territory. The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, responded by assuring the House of Commons that American troops in Canada were, in fact, under Canadian command and that the government had no

intention of allowing the Americans to establish actual bases in Canada. He then warned ominously that "no man can undertake to say that there may not unfortunately be some time when all Canadians will be glad to see posts established here."³⁸

By this time the anti-Soviet hysteria which was gathering strength south of the border was also taking root in Canada; the views of the minority went unheeded and the bill was passed with an overwhelming majority. Despite this the Americans still felt concern about the opposition the bill had aroused and worried that any protracted debate on the issue might cause "a less favourable atmosphere for consideration of future joint defense requests" and give the Canadian government "an excuse for cautious handling of such requests".³⁹ Future events would prove such fears to be unfounded as U.S.-Canadian ties became ever closer.

iv Maintaining the Atomic Monopoly

One issue which had caused some concern in Canada, however, was the question of control of atomic power and information, although it was the United Kingdom which was most affected by American actions on this front.

Although the war-time atomic bomb programme, the Manhattan Project, had involved nationals from many countries

(a large number of whom had fled their native European homelands for the United States) it became essentially an Anglo-American project with the additional participation of Canada. This arrangement had been formalized at the Quebec Conference in August 1943 when the Quebec Agreement (or, to give it its proper title, the Articles of Agreement Governing Collaboration Between the Authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the Matter of Tube Alloys) was signed by Churchill and Roosevelt, with Canada as a non-signatory participant. This formally admitted both Britain and Canada to the Manhattan Project and effectively stipulated that both the U.S. and U.K. had to give consent before the atom bomb could be used. What was implicit in the Agreement, at least in the view of the British, was that "any future American nuclear arsenal would be subject to a veto by Britain".⁴⁰

When the existence of the secret agreement became known in 1946-47, it caused an uproar in the U.S. Congress and attempts were made to nullify its terms. As early as 1945 the American administration initiated moves to change the Agreement but a meeting between President Truman, Prime Minister Clement Atlee and Canadian Prime Minister King in November that year failed to convince the British to give up their right of veto. However, the American Congress moved quickly and introduced the McMahon Bill. This completely overrode America's war-time commitments to both Britain and Canada and made the exchange of information and technical

collaboration on atomic energy with any other country illegal. The bill was passed and signed on August 1, 1946, thus keeping the atomic monopoly firmly in the hands of the United States.

The British were outraged by this action and by American opposition to Britain, or Canada for that matter, undertaking atomic research and production of their own. By early 1947, however, the British government was already secretly organizing its own atomic research programme. The McMahon Act, combined with the abrupt termination of Lend-Lease, the onerous terms of the loan agreement as well as conflicts over policies being pursued in Palestine, put Anglo-American relations on a very shaky footing throughout 1946 and 1947.

The development of events in 1947, however, were about to heal any cracks which had appeared in the war-time Western alliance and finally consolidate the new shape of the post-war international order and America's role as the new western super-power.

III THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER

i A New Enemy

The anti-Nazi alliance which came into being during World War Two was a somewhat strange and uneasy union. The

history of the relationship between the Western powers and the Soviet Union was one of mistrust and suspicion dating back to the time of the Russian Revolution of 1917. This was fuelled for the Soviet side by Western intervention in support of the White Russians during the Civil War, the failure of both the U.S. and the U.K. to grant diplomatic recognition to the new regime, Western unwillingness to respond to Soviet overtures to form an anti-fascist bloc in the 1930s and finally the British and French appeasement policy between 1936 and 1939 which was based on the hope that Germany would turn its guns east against Russia rather than against Western Europe. When this did not happen and Britain, France and the Soviet Union all found themselves under attack from Nazi Germany the alliance was formed; Western suspicions quickly gave way to solidarity and cooperation, particularly in Europe.

However, in the United States when Germany attacked the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 - before America itself had entered the war - sentiment remained ambivalent. In response to the German invasion of Russia Harry Truman, then a Democratic Party Senator, commented pragmatically: "If we see that Germany is winning the war we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and in that way let them kill as many as possible."⁴¹ Once America was involved such attitudes subsided and the "Big Three"

cooperated successfully in leading their people to defeat the Axis Powers.

The success of the war-time alliance led many to cherish hopes of maintaining the new found international unity in the post-war world. This was the spirit in which the Atlantic Charter, the post-war conferences, the Nuremburg decisions and the fledgling United Nations were born; and it was the spirit implicit in some of the early post-war declarations of political leaders. For example, on November 7, 1945, Winston Churchill told the British House of Commons: "Any idea of Britain pursuing an anti-Russian policy, or making elaborate combinations to the detriment of Russia, is utterly opposed to British thought and conscience".⁴² Two months earlier Prime Minister Atlee had told South African Prime Minister J.C. Smuts that "the growth of Anglo-Russia antagonism on the continent would be disastrous to Europe and would stultify all the ideals for which we have fought".⁴³ Indeed, throughout 1945 and much of 1946 British Foreign Secretary Bevin was preoccupied with reaching agreement with the Soviet Union in order to avoid the division of Europe⁴⁴ and he is reported to have remained firm but very patient in all his dealings with the Russians.⁴⁵

Some American liberals were also interested in advancing the cause of friendly east-west relations. U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Henry A. Wallace, in a letter to President Truman,

dated July 23, 1946, argued that "we should ascertain ... what Russia believes to be essential to her own security as a prerequisite to the writing of the peace and to cooperation in the construction of a world order" and "We should make an effort to counteract the irrational fear of Russia which is being systematically built up in the American people by certain individuals and publications".⁴⁶

Yet less than six months after Churchill made the above comments he was delivering his famous "iron curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri; and despite the official pronouncements, an undercurrent of suspicion and hostility could be sensed. President Truman's words at a Navy Day celebration in New York City on 27 October 1945, had not been entirely reassuring. He had declared: "the United States will not recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of a foreign power" but had then added, in a more conciliatory tone that "present differences among the allies are not hopeless or irreconcilable".⁴⁷

Officials in the British Foreign Office were also quick to shift the focus of their attention to a new adversary in the shape of their former ally. Reports from the British Embassy in Moscow, as well as other foreign missions, led to what some described as "a time of anxious questioning concerning Soviet behaviour and ultimate objectives".⁴⁸ In

April 1946 the "Russia Committee" was established within the Foreign Office, charged with the responsibility,

to review weekly the development of all aspects of Soviet policy and propaganda and Soviet activities throughout the world, more particularly with reference to the Soviet campaign against this country ... to consider what action is required as a result of the Committee's review with particular reference to the probable degree of support to be looked for from the United States of America and to a lesser degree from France and others.⁴⁹

The Committee early on decided that Britain could not counteract the perceived Soviet threat alone and should, therefore, develop the closest possible ties with the U.S. What became known as a "defensive-offensive" policy was drawn up based on a broadranging anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda campaign linked with "material and moral" support for "elements fighting a battle against communism", particularly moderate forces in France and the Social-Democrats in Germany.⁵⁰ Although these recommendations were not accepted immediately by Bevin and the British cabinet, the Committee's recommendations were ultimately adopted and became the basis of British policy toward the Soviet Union after 1947.

Of the three leading Western allies only France appears to have continued to regard Germany as more of a threat than the Soviet Union. In December 1944 de Gaulle had signed a

fact of friendship with the Russians. After the end of the war the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, endeavoured consistently, but unsuccessfully, to win Soviet support for French proposals on the peace settlement. The French were well aware that their Anglo-American allies were increasingly preoccupied with Soviet rather than German intentions. A French commentator writing in the influential American journal Foreign Affairs in October 1947 expressed concern that the British and Americans were basing their policies on expectation of conflict with Russia and as a result they would want "a fully reconstructed Germany". Consequently, he added, "the French government and French opinion are deeply disturbed. They are fearful of the premiums which the exponents of the policy of strengthening Germany are only too willing to bestow on the Germans in order to curry their favour".⁵¹

The overriding issue in Anglo-American thinking and concern about the Soviet Union was fear of the spread of communism, especially to the countries of Western Europe. Fears were often expressed that the demoralized and hungry people of a devastated Europe would fall easy prey to communist demagoguery. This way of thinking was summed up years later, in 1960, by President John F. Kennedy who stated that the aim of post-war American policy had been "to preserve the political and physical integrity of Western Europe from the danger of communist takeover". He stressed that Western

Europe was the key to peace and American security because if it fell under Soviet control the United States "would be dwarfed in comparative strength".⁵²

Despite the propaganda which was soon to come justifying a military build-up against the perceived Soviet threat, few, if any, American or British officials actually believed at the time that there was a real danger of Russia launching a new war or invading Western Europe. Countless politicians and officials can be quoted to this effect; even the American Joint Chiefs of Staff felt no sense of urgency about Soviet intentions as they believed by 1947 that over seven and a half million Soviet troops had been demobilized.⁵³ For all his criticisms of Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, this was also the view given by Winston Churchill in his Fulton speech on March 5, 1946. He said: "I repulse the idea that a new war is imminent.... I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war".⁵⁴ This was also the opinion of the Chargé d'Affaires at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. John Holmes informed his government that he was certain that the Soviet Union did not want a shooting war at that time.⁵⁵ Speaking as late as May 1949 John Foster Dulles, then a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty that "I do not know of any responsible high official, military or civilian, in this government or any other government, who

believes that the Soviet [sic] now plans conquest by open military aggression."⁵⁶

This was also the view of the State Department's "Soviet expert". In a memorandum sent to the Secretary of State on March 15, 1948, George Kennan stated: "I have always felt that the Russians neither wanted or expected a military contest with us".⁵⁷ Later that year at the third meeting for Exploratory Talks on Security between the U.S., U.K., France, Belgium, Holland and Canada (the preliminary talks leading to the North Atlantic Treaty) he "expressed disbelief that the Soviet leaders contemplated launching world conflict by armed force. They had not yet repaired the devastated areas of Russia ... It [the Soviet Union] believed it could win ideologically more easily than militarily".⁵⁸ In his memoirs Kennan reiterates this conviction which he maintained throughout the Cold War period. He states: "the Soviet leaders were, after all, not anxious to have a showdown with us at this point in history, of that I was sure ... It was important in my view that the Soviet threat be recognized for what it was - primarily a political one and not a threat of military attack".⁵⁹

Despite these views, relations between the war-time allies continued to worsen. Inability to reach agreement on the post-war treaties, particularly the peace treaty with Germany, and on international control of atomic energy,

disagreements over Soviet activities in Northern Iran and Western objections to the Soviet use of the veto in the United Nations Security Council, all contributed to the rapid deterioration in relations. There were some voices in the West which did speak up for restraint and prudence but they were generally drowned out by the growing tide of anti-Soviet and anti-communist rhetoric which was fast flooding over North America and Western Europe.

One example of such caution was provided by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace. His view of developments is worth noting here as it gives a rarely glimpsed interpretation of American actions from someone actually within the American administration at the time. Writing in a confidential letter to President Truman in July 1946 Wallace asked rhetorically:

How do American actions since V.J. Day appear to other nations? I mean by actions the concrete things like \$13,000,000,000 for the War and Navy Departments, the Bikini tests of the atomic bomb and continued production of bombs, the plan to arm Latin America with our weapons, production of B-29s and B-36s and the effort to secure air bases spread over half the globe from which the other half of the globe can be bombed. I cannot but feel that these actions must make it look to the rest of the world as if we are only paying lip service to peace at the conference table. These facts make it appear either

- 1) that we are preparing to win the war which we regard as inevitable or

- 2) that we are trying to build up a predominance of force to intimidate the rest of mankind.

How would it look to us if Russia had the atomic bomb and we did not, if Russia had 10,000 mile bombers and air bases within 1,000 miles of our coastlines, and we did not?⁶⁰

Needless to say such sober words went unheeded. The final breaking point came with the failure of the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow in April 1947. The priorities of each of the parties at the Conference were succinctly summed up by Bevin's biographer: "For the Russians, it was reparations from the western zones; for the French, coal and a prior claim for the needs of French over German industry; for the British and Americans the restoration of the German economy to the point where the German people could provide for themselves and no longer be subsidized."⁶¹ With such different objectives, it is not surprising that agreement proved impossible.

The failure to agree and make any advances on the crucial question of the German settlement finally convinced the French "to abandon their attempts at having an independent foreign policy and to throw in their lot with the Anglo-Saxons".⁶² The British government still hesitated, but when the November Foreign Ministers' Conference ended in the same stalemate Bevin and the British cabinet at last decided to accept the recommendations of the Russia Committee.

By the end of 1947 the outline of the new international order was clearly discernible. The Western powers firmly believed that they were facing a new and even more sinister enemy than Nazi Germany. The mood of the time is described by President Truman in his memoirs:

We had fought a long and costly war to crush the totalitarianism of Hitler, the insolence of Mussolini and the arrogance of the warlords of Japan. Yet the new menace facing us seemed every bit as grave as Nazi Germany and her allies had been.⁶³

ii Fast Moving Events of 1947

Events in 1947, particularly American initiatives, moved swiftly. The beginning of the year found Britain facing its severest winter in decades. This, combined with its economic frailty, brought industry to a virtual halt for close to three weeks - something which even the war had not achieved. The government decided that in this situation it could no longer afford to finance its activities in Greece and Turkey. The British had been providing military and economic assistance for the monarchist Greek government in its fight against communist-led resistance forces, as well as economic aid for Turkey. Confident in the knowledge that the U.S. would take over its role in the region, the British government informed the American State Department in mid-

February that it would have to withdraw its troops and end the military and economic aid by March 31st.

The Americans had established an economic mission in Athens in December 1946 and were ready and prepared to become involved. On March 12, 1947 President Truman went before Congress and requested \$400 million aid for the two countries as well as the authorization to send military and civilian personnel to the area. In his address he made the famous American commitment to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures"⁶⁴ which became known as the Truman Doctrine. The end of American isolationism had finally been clearly and publicly enunciated to the world, as had America's intention to contain the spread of communism. Truman was clear about what he had wanted the speech to accomplish: "I wanted no hedging in this speech. This was America's answer to the surge of expansion of communist tyranny. It had to be clear and free of hesitation or double talk".⁶⁵

Not everyone was happy with the declaration, even if they supported its intent. Ernest Bevin felt that it was badly timed, coming as it did just as the Foreign Ministers' Conference was about to begin in Moscow, and may well have contributed to the failure to reach agreement.⁶⁶ George Kennan agreed with the decision to aid Greece as a way of

strengthening the resolve of the anti-communist forces there. He was, however, wary of the inclusion of Turkey in the package as there was no direct communist threat in that country. "I suspected that what was intended primarily was military aid, and that what had really happened was that the Pentagon had exploited a favorable set of circumstances in order to infiltrate a military aid program for Turkey into what was supposed to be primarily a political and economic program for Greece".⁶⁷

This was just a small aid package for Greece and Turkey. It was to be followed quickly by a much broader plan utilizing America's economic strength rather than political rhetoric, a plan which firmly established the United States' position in Western Europe. The Americans were about to launch what Cambridge historian Gwyn Prins has called a great economic war against the Soviet Union.⁶⁸

By the early months of 1947 it had become increasingly obvious that the entire European economy was on the verge of collapse. Close to a decade of war preceded by the worst economic depression in living memory had taken its toll. Britain, France and Italy were close to bankruptcy and would need more than a few credits to solve their problems. They turned to the strongest economic power in the world for help. The American and British governments were also coming to realize that the German economy, for which they (as well as

France and Russia) were responsible, would need considerable assistance.

In this context the American State Department began to plan an aid programme for Europe. Although it was couched in purely humanitarian and altruistic terms, there is little doubt that the Americans considered such a plan vital for their own national interests. In a paper on "Principles for Extension of U.S. Aid to Foreign Nations" prepared by the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department in March 1947 it was stated that the policy of the United States was:

- a) To support economic stability and orderly political processes throughout the world and oppose the spread of chaos and extremism.
- b) To reduce or to prevent the growth or advancement of national or international power which constitutes a substantial threat to U.S. security and well-being and to oppose programs of coercion and infiltration, especially when effected by the use of armed minorities.
- c) To orient foreign nations toward the U.S., toward support of the U.N. and toward procedures in international relations which are consistent with the purpose of the U.N.

And the proposed aid package was part of these policy objectives. The paper went on to list the goals of the aid programme:

- 1) To take positive, forehanded and preventative action in the matter of U.S. interests through assistance to

foreign nations. By timely provision of moderate amounts of assistance to avoid the development of crises which will demand urgent, much larger expenditures.

- 2) To apply assistance, under a system of priorities where it will do the most good from the standpoint of promoting U.S. security and national interest. Specifically, to give highest priority to nations or areas which are vital to our national security and national interest.⁶⁹

On May 8, 1947 Under Secretary-of-State, Dean Acheson, advised an audience in Cleveland, Mississippi that the United States would probably soon have to begin supporting the economic reconstruction of Europe. He stressed the importance of getting Europe, and Asia, on their feet again in order to guarantee their economic and political stability and to prevent hungry people from threatening freedom and democracy.⁷⁰ A month later, on June 5, Secretary of State George Marshall spoke at Harvard University and unveiled the European Recovery Programme which became known as the Marshall Plan. The speech itself did not in fact contain any details of a "plan"; it was addressed simultaneously to an American and a foreign audience and was designed to act as a catalyst. Possibly to assuage domestic criticism, in his speech Marshall threw out an offer to the Europeans which made it clear that American aid would be available to them on the condition that they showed their willingness to help themselves and work together. Requests for economic

assistance would be considered only if they came from a group of countries, not from one individual nation.

This emphasis on union in Europe was to become a recurring theme of American policy-makers and would be the cause of much tension and friction in the Western Alliance. Many people in the American administration believed that union would be the cure for Europe's problems; a united Europe would be more efficient and better able to stand up in the front lines to communist pressure - or so the thinking went. They naively equated the situation in Europe with that in North America in the eighteenth century when federation had been the solution to America's problems; but in advocating this route they were ignoring the long histories and traditions of the European nation states.

Nevertheless, the Europeans responded. Ernest Bevin heard Marshall's speech on the radio and was quick to grasp its implications. Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador in Washington at the time, has since observed: "Bevin seized on Marshall's speech and never stopped running".⁷¹ He contacted French Foreign Minister Bidault and together they organized a conference of sixteen European countries in Paris in July to coordinate European economic cooperation and respond to the offer of American assistance. The Conference drew up a report requesting a total of \$22 billion in aid from the United States for the period 1948-51. This was the beginning of the

European Recovery Programme. Truman went before Congress on December 19, 1947 and requested funds for the Marshall Plan which he described as "essential to the maintenance of the civilization in which the American way of life is rooted".⁷²

In offering the aid the United States had made a conscious decision to by-pass the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) which had been established to coordinate the economic recovery of Europe. According to George Kennan this was done to avoid having to deal with the Soviet Union which was, of course, represented on the U.N. commission. The Americans had, in fact, offered Marshall aid to all of Europe - not just the West - in the full knowledge that it would be rejected by the Soviet Union and its allies. In this way, they hoped, it would appear that if anyone was responsible for dividing Europe it was the Russians.⁷³

During this period Canada had also been organizing economic aid for Europe, on much the same lines as the Americans. The Canadians, too, had recognized that the financial crisis in Europe was also a dollar crisis in the sense that the bankrupt nations of Europe had no dollar reserves with which to buy either Canadian or American goods. The Canadian Minister of Finance, J.L. Ilsey, had spelled this out to the Canadian House of Commons as early as December 1945. He explained Canada's interest in facilitating the economic recovery of Europe in order to revive and

develop its own export trade. Even by that early date Canadian credits had enabled the European allies "to place large orders with us not only for food and materials but for manufactures, railway equipment, ships and so on".⁷⁴ By 1947, however, Canada was also beginning to suffer from the inability of the Europeans to pay for goods in American dollars, which the Canadians needed to finance their own rapidly growing trade with the United States. So Canada, too, reacted positively to the Marshall Plan.

All in all the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), as well as achieving its stated aim of facilitating the economic recovery of Europe, was a great boon for the United States. It greatly strengthened and consolidated its already powerful position in the Western world. A memorandum of the State Department Policy Planning Staff on July 21, 1947, succinctly summed up its benefits. It considered the main object of the ERP to strengthen the European countries "a) so that they can buy from us and b) so that they will have enough self-confidence to withstand outside pressure".⁷⁵

In case any of the European recipients might be tempted to weaken in the face of that ominous "outside pressure", one of the stipulations of the programme was that no government with communist members in it would receive any funds.⁷⁶ It also appears that the threat, whether implicit or overt, to suspend ERP funds was used by the Americans, on more than one

occasion, to influence the political situation in Europe. A secret State Department memorandum of December 1948 sent to Averill Harriman, the U.S. representative of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) - the body administering the Marshall Plan in Europe - discussed amongst other things American policy in France. The Memorandum suggests that Harriman make it clear to the French that unless the non-communist politicians unite against the communists in an effort to form a stable, moderate French government "the American people and Congress will not understand the reason for continuing substantial aid to France".⁷⁷ The implied meaning seems clear. Officials in Washington had also considered that a timely reminder to Britain "about some kind of return on the European Recovery Programme or on the crippling Lend-Lease bills might not be amiss" if satisfactory arrangements could not be made for establishing American bases in the U.K.⁷⁸ The threat of suspension of Marshall Aid was also used later against the Dutch over the issue of recognition of the American-supported Indonesian government.⁷⁹

By the time the year 1947 drew to a close, the United States had firmly entrenched itself as the economic saviour of Western Europe. With this considerable economic power the Americans were often able to exert political pressure on the countries they were assisting. All that now remained was to organize and consolidate the military shape of the American

presence in Europe and of the Western alliance. This was to be the major task on the agenda for 1948.

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- ¹ R.L. Sivard, ed., World Military and Social Expenditure: 1985 (Washington D.C.: World Priorities Inc., 1985), p.11.
 - ² Allan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (London: Heinemann, 1983), pp. 49-50.
 - ³ The Economist, Vol. CXLIX, No. 5337, (December 8, 1945), p.818.
 - ⁴ H. Tint, France Since 1918 (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1970), pp.110-114.
 - ⁵ Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945 (London: MacMillan Press, 1980), pp.55-56.
 - ⁶ R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, eds., Ties That Bind: Canadian-American Relations in War-Time from the Great War to the Cold War (Toronto: Samuel Hakkert & Co., 1977), p.xvii.
 - ⁷ David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus (New York: Hill & Wang, 1971), p.74 and p.81.
 - ⁸ Table on "Population and Economic Development, US and Canada, 1870-1955" in J.L. Finlay and D.N. Sprague, The Structure of Canadian History (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1984), p.484.
 - ⁹ Ibid., p.385.
 - ¹⁰ W.L. Morton, ed., Prepare for Peace: Report of the 11th Annual Study Conference on Canada and the Commonwealth in the World (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1944), pp.7-9.
 - ¹¹ L.B. Pearson, Memoirs 1948-1957: The International Years (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1974), p.31.
 - ¹² The views of isolationists like Republican Senator Robert A. Taft and the hesitancy of Congress as a whole are given as examples to support this view. Timothy P. Ireland in Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981), claims that what the United States really wanted was a Monroe Doctrine type general agreement to defend the free world without any specific binding commitments. Dr. Peter Foot of the Dartmouth Royal Naval College, England, speaking on "American Policy and the Formation of NATO" at the London School of Economics and Political Science on October 24, 1985, also talked of the apparent American reluctance to involve itself in Europe after the war.
 - ¹³ Details on this and other activities of American financiers in Europe during the first third of the twentieth century were given in a paper by Dr. Kathleen Burk on "Finance, Foreign Policy and the Anglo-American Bank: the House of Morgan 1900-1931" at the Anglo-American Conference of Historians in London, England on July 3, 1987.
 - ¹⁴ The Joint Chiefs of Staff study JCS570/2 signed by Roosevelt in November 1943, which became known as "the base bible", is an example of one such study.
 - ¹⁵ Details of the various proposals and counter-proposals made between 1943 and 1946 can be found in Simon Duke, US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom: A Matter for Joint Decision? (London: Macmillan Press, 1987).
 - ¹⁶ Bullock, Bevin, p.125.

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- 17 Duke, US Defence Bases in the UK, pp.19-22.
- 18 Horowitz, Free World Colossus, p.18.
- 19 H.H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper Bros., 1949), p.589.
- 20 J.F. Byrnes, "America's Position on World Problems", speech to the Overseas Press Club, New York, February 28, 1946 in Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XII, No.11 (March 15, 1946).
- 21 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)1948, Vol.III, Western Europe, p.1.
- 22 Ibid., pp.61-64.
- 23 In his biography of Dean Acheson, Gaddis Smith writes that "the successful completion of the Atlantic Treaty depended as much on Acheson's negotiations with the U.S. Congress as on his diplomacy with foreign governments". Gaddis Smith, The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy: Vol. XVI, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1972), p.67.
- 24 George Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston and Toronto: Little Brown & Co., 1967), pp. 286-287.
- 25 F. Roy Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 8-9.
- 26 Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires de Guerre: Vol. 2, L'Unité: 1942-1944 (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1956), pp.79-81.
- 27 Bullock, Bevin, p.144.
- 28 Randolph S. Churchill, ed., The Sinews of Peace: Post-War Speeches of Winston S. Churchill (London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1948) pp.78-79.
- 29 The Economist, Vol. CXLIX, No. 5337 (December 8, 1945), pp. 820-821.
- 30 The Economist, Vol. CXLIX, No. 5338 (December 15, 1945), pp.849-850.
- 31 U.S. State Department report on "American Post-War National Security Objectives" quoted in Lawrence R. Aronsen, "American National Security and the Defence of the Northern Frontier, 1945-1951", Canadian Review of American Studies, Vol. XIV, No.3 (Fall 1983), pp.259-277.
- 32 FRUS 1946, Vol V, Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson to President Truman, October 1 1946, pp.55-56.
- 33 FRUS 1947, Vol. III, Department of State Press Release on "Military Cooperation and Political Relations of the United States and Canada", February 12 1947, p.104.
- 34 Ibid., Memorandum from the Secretary of State to President Truman, June 5 1947. pp. 110-111.
- 35 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Report of the Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems, Post-War Canadian Defence Relationship with the United States: General Considerations, January 23 1945. Reprinted in James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), Document 1.
- 36 Aronsen, "American National Security". Further details may also be found in Documents on Canadian External Relations Vol.12, 1946 (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs), pp. 1728-1743.
- 37 This argument is made, for example, by Donald Creighton in The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957 (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1976), pp. 109-112 and by Finlay and Sprague, Structure of Canadian History, pp. 388-389.

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- 38 FRUS 1947, Vol. III, quoted in a telegram from the American Ambassador in Ottawa to the US Secretary of State, June 6 1947, pp. 111-112.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 Duke, US Defence Bases in the UK, p.39.
- 41 New York Time, 24 July, 1941.
- 42 Churchill, Sinews of Peace, p.28.
- 43 Bullock, Bevin, p.117.
- 44 Ibid.
- 45 For more details see the book by Bevin's personal secretary at the time, Piers Dixon Double Diploma: the Life of Piers Dixon, Don and Diplomat (London: 1968) referred to in Roy Merrick, "The Russia Committee of the British Foreign Office and the Cold War, 1946-1947", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 20, No.3 (July 1985), pp.453-468.
- 46 Private letter from Henry Wallace to President Truman, July 23, 1946 in Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, eds., The Truman Administration: A Documentary History (New York and London: Harper & Row, 1966), pp.238-243.
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- 49 Ibid., p.455. "Terms of Reference of the Russia Committee", prepared by Christopher Warner and Sir Nigel Ronald, April 12 1946.
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- 54 Churchill, Sinews of Peace, pp.93-105
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- 60 Bernstein and Matusow, The Truman Administration, p.239.
- 61 Bullock, Bevin, p.378.
- 62 Herbert Tint, France Since 1918 (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1970), p.112.
- 63 Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope: 1946-1953 (Suffolk: Hadder and Stoughton, 1956), p.107.
- 64 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st sess., pp.1980-1981
- 65 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p.111.
- 66 Bullock, Bevin, p.379.
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- 69 FRUS 1947, Vol. III, p.208.
- 70 Dean Acheson, "The Conduct of Foreign Relations". Speech to the Delta Council, Cleveland, Mississippi, May 8 1947, Vital Speeches, Vol. XIII, No.16 (June 1947).
- 71 Talk by Lord Franks on "Anglo-American Relations, 1947-1952", given at the London School of Economics and Political Science, November 21, 1985.
- 72 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st sess., p.11749.
- 73 This point is made by George Kennan in his Memoirs, p.337. It is also made by several other historians. See, for example, Horowitz, Free World Colossus, p.77 and Grosser, The Western Alliance, p.65.
- 74 Canada. House of Commons Debates, December 3, 1945, pp..2344-2347. Reprinted in R.A. McKay, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1971), pp.63-65.
- 75 FRUS 1947, Vol. III, p.335.
- 76 This point was made by Henry Wallace at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty in April-May 1949. It seems also to have been made clear to French Premier Ramadier and Italian Premier de Gasperi during the summer of 1947; the communists were subsequently either pressured to resign or dismissed from both their governments. (See Grosser, The Western Alliance, pp.61-63.) Marshall apparently reiterated the point to the Italians in March 1948. (See Horowitz, Free World Colossus, p.83.)
- 77 FRUS 1948, Vol. III, p.307.
- 78 Duke, US Defence Bases in the UK, pp.24-25. Duke also goes into some detail about other pressures the Americans were considering if they could not get the bases they wanted in Britain.
- 79 Details can be found in Grosser, The Western Alliance, pp.91-92.

Chapter 2
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
COMES INTO BEING
1948-1950

I THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY CONCEPT IS BORN

i First Steps

By the start of 1948 the mood in Western Europe and North America was one of increasing concern about both Soviet intentions and the activities of internal communist elements, especially in France and Italy. The Western governments viewed these latter groups as part of a world-wide communist conspiracy, centrally directed from Moscow. The accuracy of this kind of oversimplified interpretation must be open to question, but its promotion and widespread acceptance were certainly instrumental in furthering the organization of the Western Alliance and the consolidation of the American military presence in Europe.

When U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin met in London in December 1947 (see Chapter 1), following the breakdown of the final Foreign Ministers' Conference, they had discussed the need for some form of association between their two countries, France,

Italy and possibly other West European nations, as well as the "Dominions". At that stage they did not anticipate that this would be a formal alliance, but rather "an understanding backed by power, money and resolute action." ¹

There then followed two or three months of informal contacts and secret discussions between the American State Department and some of the European leaders. During this time, while no formal commitments were made, the U.S. Administration was actively considering both the ways in which it might participate in Western European security arrangements - in order to strengthen the West against the perceived Soviet threat - and, at the same time, how it could win Congressional support for such a role. Meanwhile, several of the European governments, particularly the British, French and Belgians, were coming to feel that they needed American military, as well as economic, assistance in order to guarantee their security.² Ernest Bevin, French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault and Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak became the principal European advocates of an American role in the defence of Western Europe.

In these circumstances, it was the British who made the first public move. Foreign Secretary Bevin formulated a plan for some form of Western Union, initially comprising Britain, France and the Benelux countries of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. He hoped that this would create "a solid core

in Western Europe" to which "other states including Italy, other Mediterranean countries and Scandinavia" would subsequently adhere.³

Bevin presented his proposals to the British House of Commons on January 22, 1948. He envisaged a series of bilateral treaties being concluded by Britain with France and the Benelux countries, for protection primarily against a resurgent Germany. These treaties would be modelled on the March 1947 Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk which created an alliance committed to joint action against any aggressive threat from Germany.⁴

When he rose to speak at Westminster, Bevin already knew that his plans enjoyed the backing of the U.S. State Department. He had discussed the issue of security arrangements for Western Europe with Marshall at their talks in December. On January 19, three days before Bevin presented his proposals to the House of Commons, Marshall had discussed the matter with the British Ambassador in Washington and informed him that he [Marshall] "was already turning over in his mind the question of the participation of the United States in the defence of Europe."⁵ In response to the specific details of Bevin's plan, State Department officials let the British know that the Americans would prefer the proposed treaties to be modelled on the Treaty of Rio di Janeiro (Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance,

signed by the U.S. and countries of Latin America, September 2, 1947), which made provision for action against any aggressor, rather than on the Treaty of Dunkirk which was directed solely against Germany.⁶

The Americans seem to have been interested in the Europeans organizing against more than just a revived Germany.⁷ They were concerned with organizing Western Europe as a bulwark against the Soviet Union and in the formation of a grouping of nations which could function outside the confines of the United Nations (where the Soviet use of its veto power was causing problems for the West) as the Rio Pact had created in the Americas. Louis St. Laurent, as Chairman of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations, had already suggested to delegates, in September 1947, that, in order to thwart the Soviet veto, "nations ... may seek greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for a greater measure of national security".⁸ It was just this type of organization which the State Department was encouraging the Europeans to create.

Bevin knew full well, as did the Americans themselves, that the union he was proposing would have no substance without a commitment of support from the United States. His ambassador in Washington informed the U.S. Under-Secretary of State, on January 27, that "the treaties that are being

proposed cannot be fully effective nor be relied upon when a crisis arises unless there is assurance of American support for the defense of Western Europe", and he suggested that secret talks begin between their two countries on the matter.⁹

Such talks, however, posed problems for the State Department. Supportive as it was of the formation of a Western Union, it still had to get the Economic Recovery Plan appropriations approved by Congress, before it could go on to seek support for military aid to Europe.¹⁰ Furthermore, before any formal undertaking of an American role in Europe could be authorized, there remained the difficulty of overcoming traditional Congressional hesitation about any overseas commitments which might jeopardize America's ability to act independently. Thus, the response to the British request for talks was to explain the Administration's problem and suggest that it would be more effective if the Europeans were seen to be taking the initiative, as they had done for the ERP, by organizing themselves first. The State Department informed the British at the beginning of February:

When there is evidence of unity with a firm determination to affect an arrangement under which the various European countries are prepared to defend themselves, the United States will carefully consider the part it might play in support of such a Western European Union.¹¹

With evidence of such a move by the Europeans, the matter would be easier to present to the Congress and more likely to receive its support.

ii West European Union, Czechoslovakia and American Involvement

Bevin, and the other European leaders involved, understood the message. They immediately set to work negotiating not the series of bi-lateral agreements which Bevin had initially envisaged, but the formation of a single West European Union as the Americans had suggested. Lord Franks, the British Ambassador in Washington between 1948 and 1952, has recalled that all the participants realized that the Union was to be "the sprat to catch the mackerel", the bait to assist the State Department in its efforts to win bipartisan Congressional support for American participation in the defence of Western Europe.¹²

Accordingly, talks began between the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in Brussels. There was, of course, no official U.S. representation at the meetings. The Americans were, however, following developments very closely, were informed daily of progress by their Chargé in Brussels and were active behind the scenes throughout the negotiations.¹³ The Policy Planning Staff of the State Department was busy considering ways in which the United

States could support the proposed Union, short of actually joining it. They recommended that "we should ... give it assurance of our armed support" and try to bring a number of other countries into it, such as Sweden and Switzerland.¹⁴

At this point external events intervened to help speed up the Brussels Treaty negotiations and further America's interest in involving itself militarily in Europe. Between February 21 and 25 the communist leader of the Czechoslovak coalition government, Klement Gottwald, reorganized his cabinet, replaced many of the non-communists with communists and instituted "one-party rule". This was followed, on March 10, by the death of Jan Masaryk, the non-communist Czech Foreign Minister, who was killed by a fall from a window of the Foreign Ministry in Prague. Whether he fell, jumped or was pushed out of the window was never established, but, taken together, his death and the government changes were interpreted, in the West, as part of a Moscow-inspired coup d'état and an indication of hostile, expansionist Soviet intentions. Although this interpretation of events has been questioned by several historians¹⁵, there is little doubt that it had the effect of further consolidating support, both in North America and Western Europe, for American involvement in West European security.

The Brussels negotiations "now took on a different tone". The military aspect of the Union became the primary

concern and Germany's significance as a potential threat faded into the background. Indeed, only one of the eight declarations of intent in the Preamble to the subsequent Brussels Treaty referred specifically to Germany.¹⁶

The Western nations responded to the "Czech coup" with declarations of outrage and determination to defend themselves against the "Soviet menace". President Truman spoke of "the shock throughout the civilized world" which events in Czechoslovakia had caused.¹⁷ General Lucius Clay, the American commander in Berlin, warned, in a secret message to Washington on March 5, that he felt war with the Soviet Union was imminent; he added that "I am unable to submit any official report in the absence of supporting data" but just stressed that he sensed a new tenseness and threat in the air.¹⁸ Although CIA reports quickly assured the President that war was unlikely in the immediate future, the American response (from an Administration already deeply preoccupied with communist successes in France and Italy) was to develop more concrete plans to thwart the further spread of communist influence in Europe and replace it with American influence.

On March 8, 1948, the Director of the Office of European Affairs in the State Department prepared a memorandum for the Secretary of State on "How this Government can effectively assist, apart from ERP, in stopping further expansion of Communist dictatorship in Europe". In this document, the

problem is presented as "less one of defense against overt foreign aggression than against internal fifth-column aggression supported by the threat of external force, on the Czech model". In this situation, it was argued, American military support was essential in order to reassure "potential victims" and prevent them from embarking on "a fatal policy of appeasement". The Anglo-French-Benelux negotiations, then taking place, were considered to be "a substantial start" but it was felt that "the willingness of this Government to participate in or support such an arrangement is essential to its success and will enormously increase European confidence that it is possible to prevent extension of the area of dictatorship and worthwhile to fight if necessary to prevent it". Accordingly, the memorandum recommended that the President begin consultations immediately with the National Security Council and the Congress to consider, amongst other things

- 1) The magnitude and nature of the military commitments this Government is in a position to assume with respect to Europe.
- 2) What steps we can take to deter further fifth-column aggression on the Czech model, including a possible public declaration that this Government considers that any further suppression of free countries in Europe would be a direct threat to its own security....
- 3) The possibility of U.S. participation in a North Atlantic-Mediterranean regional defense

arrangement...including initially Great Britain, France Benelux and Italy.

- 4) Advising Bevin and Bidault that if they really mean business the Secretary would be glad to consult with them and perhaps with Sforza [Italian Foreign Minister] and a Benelux representative....
- 5) The necessity of keeping a security program separate from, although parallel and related to, ERP.¹⁹

Reading between the lines of this document, the Americans seem to have been far more concerned with controlling so-called "fifth-column" activities within Western Europe and with preventing Western governments from coming to any agreement with the Soviet Union [note the reference to "appeasement"] than with developments in Eastern Europe itself. It appears they were quite willing to accept the "iron curtain" division of Europe so long as American influence and outlook remained paramount in the western half of the continent. To this end, by early March 1948, they were ready to consider participation in a "North Atlantic-Mediterranean regional defense arrangement" both in order to prevent the spread of Soviet influence and to bolster "such free European governments as demonstrate their determination to act in the common defense".²⁰

This is also the conclusion reached by historian Robert A. Garson. He argues that by 1947 the United States had accepted the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and "had

also come to recognize that this very domination could serve to assist in plans to consolidate America's position in Western Europe, the Far East and Latin America....The repression in Eastern Europe could be used to goad West European governments into closer co-operation with each other and with the United States". Therefore, "the United States...declined to challenge the Kremlin directly, while it tailored its ostensible outrage to America's allies at home and abroad....Washington's occasional outbursts over Russian policy were basically a ruse for justifying its own policies of consolidation."²¹

The Western response to events in Czechoslovakia provides a good illustration of just such a tactic. President Truman used the opportunity of the "Czech coup" to speed up the passage through Congress of the European Recovery Program, as well as to endorse the restoration of selective military service. The March 8 memorandum had recognized the Government's need to crystallize public opinion in support of universal military training and the strengthening of the armed forces.²² The events in Czechoslovakia proved very useful for doing just this. The President and his Administration were in the process of transforming what was essentially "a struggle for power and influence into a great moral crusade."²³ Commentators Walter Lippman and Noam Chomsky have since described this as the process of creating

"manufactured consent", a process which was such a feature of American life during the early Cold War years.²⁴

iii The United States Commits Itself to an Atlantic Security System

On March 11 the British Embassy in Washington sent an aide-memoire to the Department of State expressing British concern with the fact that the Soviet Union had approached the Norwegian Government about the possibility of concluding a bi-lateral treaty of friendship and cooperation, on the model of those it was concluding with the East European countries. The British viewed this as a grave threat, as an "impending move on Norway" by the Soviets. The aide-memoire stated that Mr. Bevin "considers that the most effective course would be to take very early steps, before Norway goes under, to conclude under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations a regional Atlantic Approaches Pact of Mutual Assistance". The British recommended that this should include the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Eire, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, France "and Spain when it has a democratic government." The message concluded:

Mr Bevin is convinced that his majority government in the United Kingdom and the United States Government should study without delay the establishment of such an Atlantic security system, so that if the threat to Norway should develop, we could at once inspire the necessary

confidence to consolidate the West against Soviet infiltration.²⁵

The American response was swift and unequivocal. The next day, March 12, the Secretary of State advised the British Ambassador:

Please inform Mr. Bevin that in accordance with your aide-memoire of March 11, 1948, we are prepared to proceed at once in joint discussions on the establishment of an Atlantic security system.²⁶

Five days later, on March 17, the Brussels Treaty was signed. It was immediately greeted with declarations of support by the governments of both the United States and Canada. Speaking to a joint session of Congress, on the day of the signing, President Truman welcomed the Treaty warmly as a step toward "the protection and preservation of European civilization". He then described his country's position and intentions quite clearly:

I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires. I am sure that the determination of the free nations to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them do so....I believe that we have reached a point at which the position of the United States should be made unmistakably clear.²⁷

On the same day Prime Minister Mackenzie King addressed the Canadian House of Commons in Ottawa, in similar vein. He described the pact as:

...a step towards peace which may well be followed by other similar steps until there is built up an association of all free states which are willing to accept responsibilities of mutual assistance to prevent aggression and preserve peace.

He went on to make the commitment that....

Canada will play her full part in every movement to give substance to the conception of an effective system of collective security by the development of regional pacts under the Charter of the United Nations.²⁸

In retrospect, it seems probable, from these staunch declarations, that plans were already afoot for the creation of a more comprehensive alliance, in which both North American countries would be involved.

Within a matter of days, a series of secret meetings began in Washington between the Americans, British and Canadians to consider questions of defence and security for the North Atlantic region. The secrecy was such that very few people in either the British or the Canadian governments, or the American Congress, even knew the talks were taking place.²⁹ At the first meeting, on March 22, the British

representative suggested that the French be invited to participate. This was opposed by the U. S. representatives who felt that "the French required consideration as a security risk before the decision might be made." As was to happen time and again with all the participants in the subsequent talks on the Atlantic Pact, the British and Canadians yielded to the American position, and France was not invited to participate in this first series of meetings.³⁰

At the next meeting, the following day, the Americans opposed the idea of either the U.S. or Canada actually joining the Brussels Union "since the United States hopes to see the eventual development of a United States of Western Europe" of which the West European Union could be the core.³¹ Canada supported this position and in subsequent meetings often reasserted that it, too, had no interest in joining the Brussels Pact.³² At the same meeting concern was expressed about the fact that the security system under consideration would be a purely Atlantic arrangement which would exclude, therefore, countries like Italy, Switzerland and, eventually, Germany.³³

On the day this second meeting was taking place, the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department submitted its report on the Brussels Treaty (cited in the previous chapter) which fully recognized the advantages for the United States

of close association with the W.E.U. The report suggested that the U.S. should encourage the immediate extension of the Western Union not only to Italy but also to Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland "with Portugal to follow speedily thereafter". This was the grouping of nations the State Department believed could form the core of an alliance which it could dominate because of its power, wealth and influence.³⁴

By the next meeting, on March 24, a draft position paper, "in the form of a unilateral US document", was ready for discussion by the group. Although the draft had been prepared by British and Canadian, as well as American, delegates, it was decided that it should be presented as a purely American paper. This was both for the purposes of presenting it to Congress and the American people and so that countries who were to be involved in the discussions at a later date would not know that the issue had already been considered by others, without their knowledge or participation.³⁵

The stated purpose of the draft paper was "to give effect to the President's March 17 declaration of support for the free nations of Europe, the recommendations of which will require full bi-partisan consultation with US political leaders to assure full bi-partisan support." This paper stated, for the first time, that the objective of the

participants was "a Security Pact for the North Atlantic Area" of which "the US would be a member....along with all nations bordering on the North Atlantic."³⁶

At the final meeting of this group, on April 1, the position paper was approved and ready for the State Department to present for discussion to the National Security Council and select Congressional leaders, notably the influential Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The paper spelled out the action the United States was to take to give effect to the President's March 17 declaration. The Americans were to take the initiative in approaching other countries "to take part in a conference with a view to the conclusion of a Collective Defense Arrangement for the North Atlantic Area". An additional interesting feature of this paper is that it states in one of the final clauses that "when circumstances permit" both Germany and Spain should be invited to adhere to the proposed treaty. However, it is emphasized that "this objective...should not be publicly disclosed" [emphasis in original].³⁷

At the same time the other Brussels Treaty countries still did not know about the discussions and plans being made on their behalf in Washington. They had been assured, in general terms, of American support, military and otherwise; but they were not yet informed about any definite plans or

commitments from the American Government.³⁸ This was because the next step was to clear the way internally, within the United States Government, by getting Congressional approval for the plans which had already been drawn up at the U.S.-U.K.-Canadian talks on security.

At the beginning of April, the U.S. Under-Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, began discussions with Senator Vandenberg about the possibility of getting the support of Congress for an Atlantic security pact. Vandenberg indicated his willingness to try and work out a way to win over the Congress.³⁹ The State Department's efforts were being encouraged by the Europeans, who were themselves in the process of trying to set up the military structure of the W.E.U. While they were sympathetic to the U.S. Administration's difficulties, they argued that "a favourable opportunity is not to be missed" to secure an alliance which could provide American military support for Europe.⁴⁰

By the middle of April Vandenberg had agreed to work with the State Department Policy Planning Staff preparing a resolution to be presented to Congress. He was reluctant to propose a formal alliance for ratification but felt that a moderate resolution, which did not detract from Congressional power to declare war, stood a good chance of being accepted.⁴¹ Other influential people, like Senator Tom Connally and John Foster Dulles (then a member of the U.S.

delegation to the United Nations), were brought in to assist in the preparation of the resolution which was drafted and redrafted in the course of the next couple of months. After much lobbying and discussion it was finally presented to the Senate, approved and signed on June 11, 1948. The two key clauses of Senate Resolution 239 (which became known as the Vandenberg Resolution) confirm American support for the

- Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles and provisions of the Charter.

- Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as effect its national security.⁴²

With the ratification of Resolution 239 the way was now clear to proceed with negotiations for an Atlantic alliance. According to Lovett, the significance of the Resolution was not only that it opened the door to American overseas commitments, but also that it provided a "yardstick for measuring conditions under which the United States Government might furnish assistance to regional security groups. The primary criterion is that the security of the United States, not that of any or all of the participating countries, must be affected."⁴³ In other words, the American decision to involve itself in Europe was motivated not by concern for the

countries of Western Europe but by self-interest. This view was reiterated the following year, just prior to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, in conversations between Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Senators Vandenberg and Connally. Acheson told the Senators that, in his view, the chief value of the Pact was not only to act as a deterrent to future aggressors but also to appease France about Germany, in order to settle the German question in the way the Americans wanted. In the same conversation Senator Connally "said he had understood that one of the chief values to the United States of this Pact was the assurance it would provide of the use of base facilities in Greenland and Iceland and that if we did not get those we would not be getting very much while we would be giving a great deal."⁴⁴

iv The Berlin Blockade Spurs on the Alliance

Again external events intervened and, this time, helped set the Western Alliance talks in motion. On this occasion they concerned Germany. Following the breakdown of the Foreign Ministers' Conference at the end of 1947, American, British and French representatives had met in London during February and March 1948 to begin discussions about establishing a separate West German government. In fact, this idea had been considered in both the United States and the United Kingdom even prior to the failure of the December 1947 meeting.⁴⁵ Only the French had serious reservations about

setting up a German government and rebuilding Germany. At the London meetings their concerns were summarily brushed aside and preliminary plans were made for creating a new West German state.⁴⁶ In addition, a separate currency was planned for the western half of the country. Despite Soviet objections, this currency reform was implemented in the western zones in June. The Soviet response was to blockade Berlin, cutting off all traffic from the West and essentially isolating West Berlin from the rest of the western sector.

On June 28, the Americans and British announced an airlift to supply the beleaguered city. For close to a year food, fuel, mail and men were flown in to West Berlin, while discussions continued apace in London about the new German government. In addition, as a show of force, the Americans moved long-range B-29 strategic bombers to air force bases in England. In fact, the Berlin blockade provided a convenient excuse for the United States to move its bombers back into the United Kingdom on a permanent basis.⁴⁷ Although their presence was not presented as permanent at the time, the Americans obviously intended them to be so. U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, noted in his diary, on July 15, 1948, the advantages of "sending B-29s to Britain":

It would accustom the British to the necessary habits and routines that go into the accommodation of an alien, even though allied, power. We have the opportunity now [emphasis in original] of

sending these planes, and once sent they would become somewhat of an accepted fixture, whereas a deterioration of the situation in Europe might lead to a condition of mind under which the British would be compelled to reverse their present attitude.⁴⁸

Through a series of negotiations the blockade was finally lifted in May 1949. By that time the North Atlantic Treaty had been signed and a West German government was well on the way to being established.

II · THE NEGOTIATIONS

i Talks Begin

The Berlin blockade had not only provided a pretext for moving the American air force back to Britain and for a British rearmament programme, which began in September 1948, but it also ensured that plans for the Atlantic alliance moved ahead swiftly. On July 6 the Washington Exploratory Talks (WET) on Security began between representatives of the United States, Canada and the five Brussels Treaty countries.

At one of the first meetings the Americans made it clear that, as far as they were concerned, one of the foremost objectives of the security arrangements under consideration was that "the respective countries should be strengthened to

resist internal as well as external threats."⁴⁹ The framework was clear. The aim was not merely the creation of a military force to confront "the forces of evil" (as the Soviet Union was referred to at that early meeting), or just to bolster European confidence (which was a foremost concern of the British Government⁵⁰), but, in addition, to control internal unrest in the countries of Western Europe.

As the talks progressed throughout the year, it became apparent that the Americans were aiming for more than just an alliance among themselves, Canada and the Brussels Treaty countries. They advocated the inclusion of Ireland, Iceland and Portugal - to create a direct link between Western Europe and North America - as well as Italy and Sweden which they considered to be essential to West European security.⁵¹

Canada, too, was in favour of a pact which covered the North Atlantic approaches⁵², although Lester Pearson, in his memoirs, claims Canada had reservations about the inclusion of Portugal which did not meet the criterion of being a "democratic" country. However, since Britain and the United States were pushing for Portuguese participation for strategic reasons - control of The Azores - Canada quickly dropped its objections.⁵³

There was also some hesitation, by the majority of the countries participating in the talks, about the inclusion of

Italy. Its membership would obviously broaden the proposed alliance to more than a purely North Atlantic organization.⁵⁴ The Americans had been lobbying for Italy to be linked, in some way, with the Western Alliance at least since the end of 1947. In a National Security Council Report of November 14, 1947, entitled "The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy", one of the recommendations was that the United States should "vigorously seek through diplomatic channels to bring about a more favorable attitude toward Italy on the part of the British and French Governments and to enlist their active support of our aims."⁵⁵

After several weeks of discussion about the participation of Italy, and other countries, the position of the United States prevailed. By the end of December it had been agreed to invite Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Ireland and Portugal to join the pact, while an invitation was extended to Italy early in 1949.⁵⁶ It was decided that the United States would approach all these countries and conduct the negotiations with each of them.⁵⁷ In the event, only Eire rejected the invitation, because of its conflicts with the United Kingdom Government over the status of Northern Ireland.

ii The American Role in the Negotiations and the Signing of the Treaty

The above events indicate the dominant, pivotal role which the United States played in the negotiation and formulation of the North Atlantic Treaty. All the WET meetings were held in Washington and chaired by the Americans. According to Escott Reid, who was one of the Canadian representatives at the talks, particularly after Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, began chairing the meetings, the Americans pushed through the draft treaty with little opportunity for discussion or amendment by the other WET delegates.⁵⁸

It was also the Americans who conducted the discussions with all the other countries who were invited to join the pact. After the conclusion of the Treaty, the key decisions about the actual organization and structure of the Alliance were drawn up first in the Pentagon and then presented to the other member countries for approval.⁵⁹

Lester Pearson, in his memoirs, expresses the concern he felt at the time that the talks were being held in Washington, rather than London or Paris where they might have been less subject to U.S. pressures.⁶⁰ He strongly favoured Canadian involvement in an alliance with other countries, in addition to the United States, where there would be what he

refers to as "security in numbers....We did not want to be alone with our friend and neighbour. As a debutante on the world stage we were worried, not about rape, but seduction".⁶¹ However, in their efforts to make the Treaty into more than just a military alliance, the Canadians quickly discovered that American influence was paramount.

By February 1949, the Canadian Government had decided to press for a strong article to be included in the Treaty which dealt with economic and social collaboration between the member countries and with the promotion of democracy. The Canadian Ambassador to Washington told the negotiators that "there was a need for something which reflected the ideological unity of the North Atlantic powers."⁶² It was felt that this was the only way in which the Alliance would endure. According to Lester Pearson (who was, by that time, Canadian Secretary for External Affairs) "an alliance founded on the fear of aggression and on the need to take defensive action against aggression will disappear when the fear is removed. If our alliance was to endure, it had to have political, social and economic foundations."⁶³

This argument was supported, initially, by the United States and several other countries - with the notable exception of Great Britain, which took issue with the clause from the outset. However, once Dean Acheson took over as Secretary of State, he actively opposed the proposal, as did

several leading American Senators.⁶⁴ Acheson informed a WET meeting, on February 8, 1949, that Senators Vandenberg and Connally thought this article "detracted from the main purpose of the Treaty and got involved in social and economic questions which might raise internal political problems".⁶⁵ Ironically, one of the reasons the Canadian Government had decided to introduce the issue in the first place had been to assuage public opinion in Canada and, thus, forestall its own "internal political problems". In his memoirs, Acheson says that he agreed with the Senators' opposition to Article 2, felt no benefit would accrue from it and, therefore, redrafted it to make it as weak as possible.⁶⁶ To him the Canadian insistence on the Article was simply a nuisance and an irrelevancy.⁶⁷ He succeeded in pushing through a much watered down Article 2 which, despite periodic Canadian attempts to give it life, has essentially remained a dead letter ever since.

By mid-March 1949 the final draft of the Treaty had been agreed on by the twelve participating countries. With much fanfare, the text was made public on March 18. On the same day Acheson made a speech to the American people in which he defended the Pact as a means of ensuring the security of the United States world-wide. He said: "In the compact world of today the security of the United States cannot be defined in terms of boundaries and frontiers. A serious threat to international peace and security anywhere in the world is of

direct concern to this country. Therefore, it is our policy to help free peoples to maintain their integrity and independence, not only in Western Europe or the Americas, but wherever the aid we are able to provide can be effective."⁶⁸

On April 4 the foreign ministers of the twelve original signatory states gathered in Washington for the signing ceremony. At the same time the American, British and French Foreign Ministers signed the Occupation Statute for West Germany. This set out the details for the creation of a West German Government. It defined the responsibilities that government would hold and those which would remain in the hands of the occupying powers.⁶⁹ Although they were still unable to agree on the details of Germany's revival, all of the Western allies basically knew that, sooner or later, West Germany would have to be brought into their Alliance. German soil and manpower were going to have to be an essential component of NATO's military strategy.⁷⁰ An editorial in Le Monde two days after the signing of the Treaty had clearly recognized this fact. It stated: "Whether one cares to admit it or not, the rearmament of Germany is embryonically contained in the Atlantic Alliance."⁷¹

By August, 1949, all the member governments had approved the North Atlantic Treaty. What have been referred to as "the twin children of the Cold War" - the Atlantic Pact and the Bonn Government - had come into being.⁷²

III IMPLICATIONS AND AFTERMATH

i Effects on National Sovereignty and Support for the Pact

In the course of the negotiations, all the participants appear to have recognized, and accepted, that they were surrendering elements of their national sovereignty in this process. The United States had been conscious of this all along. It had made sure, however, with the careful wording of the Vandenberg Resolution and of the Treaty itself, that Congressional power to declare war and American freedom of action were safeguarded. The Europeans had wanted the Treaty to guarantee automatic military intervention by the United States if any one of the members was attacked. But the American negotiators rejected such an obligation and came up, instead, with Article 5 which commits each state only to "such action as it deems necessary" in the event of an attack on any partner.

The Americans, however, do not seem to have been as solicitous when it came to safeguarding the independence of action of their partners. A State Department Policy Statement on France, of September 20, 1948, says that "Privately, the US has let the participating [Brussels Treaty] governments know that it hopes...the cautious initial steps toward, military, political and economic cooperation will be followed

by more radical departures from traditional concepts of national sovereignty".⁷³ In his account of the creation of the Treaty, Escott Reid says that American officials frequently emphasized the need to surrender aspects of national sovereignty in order to establish security for the West. He implies that this outlook was tacitly accepted by all the negotiators.⁷⁴

Indeed, the other members do seem to have been well aware of this facet of the Alliance they were entering into. Lord Franks, speaking later about Britain's attitude, said that the United Kingdom did not hesitate to sacrifice elements of its sovereignty by signing the North Atlantic Treaty, although it was not prepared to take such a radical step with Europe alone.⁷⁵ Lester Pearson, for his part, felt that "interdependence" was more important than notions of independence and sovereignty. He supported the extension of American power in the battle against international communism and believed that small nations, like Canada, should group themselves around big powers in order to guarantee their security.⁷⁶ This was what had occurred in the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance. He was clearly not alone in this conviction.

In his memoirs, Pearson quotes a memorandum he wrote for Prime Minister King on April 20, 1948, after a meeting he had held with Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak in Ottawa. They had

discussed the prospects of an alliance and Spaak had indicated to Pearson that "he would go very far in the subordination of European national interests to international action for security."⁷⁷ And France, for its part, as early as 1946, had enshrined in the Preamble to its new Constitution that: "France consents to the limitations of sovereignty necessary for the organization and defence of peace".⁷⁸

Thus, it seems that the governments of eleven of the twelve signatory states willingly signed away part of their traditional independence and freedom of action in order to guarantee their security in the new international conditions of the post-war world. That is not to say, however, that the Treaty went entirely unopposed within each of the member countries.

As mentioned above, it seems one of the main reasons that the Canadians introduced Article 2 was to temper domestic opposition to the Treaty. At the WET meeting of February 8, 1949, the Canadian Ambassador stressed that "it would cause great political difficulty in Canada if there were no article...of a non-military nature."⁷⁹ Pearson admits, in his memoirs, that the Canadian position on non-military cooperation "was admittedly political. We did not think that the Canadian people, especially in Quebec, would wholeheartedly take on far-reaching external commitments if they were exclusively military in character."⁸⁰ Indeed,

Canadian Government anxiety about popular response to the proposed alliance was such that, right at the beginning of the negotiations, it suspended free trade talks with the Americans pending the conclusion of the Treaty. It was considered that it would be ill-advised to confront the Canadian people with two such contentious issues all at once.⁸¹

In Britain, from as early as 1947, the left-wing of the Labour Party, led by Richard Crossman and Michael Foot, had been very vocal in opposing the Labour Government's foreign policy and what they regarded as Britain's "dangerous dependence on the United States of America".⁸² They were joined in their condemnations by various socialist and communist groups. The Crossman group did, however, give conditional support to Britain's 1948 rearmament programme, as long as it did not detract from economic recovery or spending on social measures.⁸³ In the event, however, the approval of the North Atlantic Treaty aroused relatively little opposition in Britain. In the House of Commons vote to approve the Treaty there were 112 abstentions, six votes against and a large majority in favour.⁸⁴

In France, where popular anti-American sentiment was widespread, there was a stormy debate in the National Assembly on the Treaty. It was opposed by both the right and the left, primarily because of the implications about

Germany's future position in Europe. The Communists argued that the United States clearly had future German rearmament in mind and the right continued to view Germany as more of a threat to France than the Soviet Union. But the Treaty was approved, nonetheless.⁸⁵ The discussion on the Treaty caused internal dissent in several other European countries (Italy and Denmark, to name two) and in Iceland it sparked communist-led riots.⁸⁶

Even within the United States Government itself, the Treaty had its critics. The Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, George Kennan, consistently opposed the Pact because of its military nature. In a paper presented to the Secretary of State, on November 23, 1948, he argued that the danger facing the West was a political, not a military, one. He felt that the proposed pact would divert attention from the ERP by emphasizing a danger which he did not believe existed but which "might be brought into existence by too much discussion of the military balance and by the ostentatious stimulation of a military rivalry."⁸⁷

At the Congressional Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty held in April and May 1949, some critics did speak out against it. Henry Wallace, speaking for the Progressive Party of America, and James P. Warburg both argued that the Alliance would create the very military threat which it claimed to be defending against.⁸⁸ There were also objections

from long-time isolationists, like Senator Robert A. Taft, who believed the Treaty would oblige the United States to arm the nations of Western Europe.⁸⁹ Despite these objections, only thirteen Senators voted against the Treaty which was ratified by Congress on July 21, 1949.⁹⁰

ii The Military Assistance Program and Preliminary Organization

The signing of the Treaty was followed quickly by requests for military aid from eight of the NATO member countries and by the ensuing American Military Assistance Program (MAP). Four days after Congress approved the Treaty, President Truman requested \$1.45 billion for military aid for NATO allies as well as Greece, Turkey and the Philippines. In September Congress granted \$1.3 billion.

The American Government had no doubt about the value and purpose of this aid. In April, Secretary of State Acheson had already outlined the importance of MAP in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He had argued that

The furnishing of military assistance to the Atlantic Pact countries is designed to assist us in attaining the fundamental goal of our foreign policy: the preservation of international peace and the preservation of the security of the United States.⁹¹

He was somewhat more candid in a memorandum he sent to the President on May 12, 1949.

It is important that Congress act on the Military Assistance Program at this session. Failure to so act would compromise seriously our leadership among free nations, result in the possible loss of the initiative which those nations have secured, and prejudice our entire foreign policy interests.⁹²

In discussing the importance of America's military contribution to the Alliance, a memorandum from George Kennan at the Policy Planning Staff puts the American position in clear perspective.

Our whole position in argument [over respective roles in strategic planning] must rest largely on the predominance of our contribution and on what we are being asked to do for the others. If we have nothing to give we can hardly expect others to accede to our views.⁹³

And accede to its views in NATO planning and organization was precisely what the United States wanted and expected from its new allies, as future events would show.

As yet, the Alliance existed in name only. Throughout 1949 preparations were made for the creation of the actual working structure of the organization. It was to be run by a Council comprised initially of the Foreign Ministers, and subsequently permanent representatives, of each of the member

states. The first Council meeting was held in September 1949. At that time the Defence Committee was established, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of all the member nations (Iceland, having no armed forces, was to be represented by a civilian). Significantly, the Defence Committee was based permanently in Washington, as was the Standing Group. This was essentially the Defence Committee's executive body which consisted of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States, United Kingdom and France and was organized to function continuously in Washington.⁹⁴ This core military steering group was proposed by the Americans, who actively discouraged the desire of both Italy and the Netherlands to join it.⁹⁵ Canada, for its part, was quite happy for Washington to be the base of the military organizations. Its main concern was that the Atlantic Pact should not disrupt its own arrangements with the United States in the Military Cooperation Committee (the successor to the war-time Joint Board of Defence).⁹⁶

At the September North Atlantic Council meeting a working party recommended that five regional groups be established "to prepare detailed plans for possible war". These were 1) the North Atlantic Ocean group; 2) the U.S.-Canada group; 3) the Northern Europe group; 4) the Western Europe group; and 5) the Western Mediterranean group. These were all formally established at the meeting. The United States was represented officially in only the first two

groups. However, at secret talks held in Washington, between the British, French and Americans at the time of the meeting, the British requested that the Americans participate in the three European-based groups as well. Acheson assured Bevin that the U.S. intended to play an active role, without officially being members, on the condition that this did not in any way limit "the ultra-secret global planning arrangements" then existing between their two countries.⁹⁷

Thus, by the end of 1949 the North Atlantic Alliance was well on its way. The Americans were beginning the process of arming Western Europe and were in a position to dictate ensuing developments. Two events toward the end of the year set the stage for the consolidation and expansion of the Western Alliance under American auspices. In August, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb. In response, President Truman ordered a comprehensive review, to be carried out by the Departments of State and Defense, of American foreign policy objectives in peace and war. These two events were to have a significant effect on the future course of the North Atlantic Alliance and would play a key role in the final stage of consolidating the Organization.

¹ Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Vol. III, record of talks between Marshall and Bevin in London, December 17 1947, summarized in a telegram from the US Chargé in London to Marshall, December 22 1947, p.1.

² See for example of kind of talks taking place, FRUS 1948, Vol. III, record of talks between French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, French

Minister of the Armed Forces Paul Henri Teitgen, First Secretary of the US Embassy in Paris and US military attachés in France, Paris, January 29 1948, pp.617-619.

³ FRUS 1948, Vol. III, British Ambassador in Washington to the Secretary of State, January 13, 1948, pp.3-4.

⁴ Ibid., British Ambassador in Washington to the Under-Secretary of State, January 27, 1948, pp.14-15 and Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Paris: NATO Information Service, 1954), p.7.

⁵ FRUS 1948, Vol.III, British Ambassador to Under-Secretary of State, January 27, 1948, pp.14-15.

⁶ Ibid., memorandum from George Kennan, Director of State Department Policy Planning Staff, to Secretary of State, January 20, 1948, pp.7-8; Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, p.8; and Allan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (London: Heinemann, 1983), p.517.

⁷ There were indications, by as early as the end of 1947, that the Americans envisaged the establishment of a new West German government, which could serve as a strong front-line of defence against Eastern Europe. See, for example: George Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston and Toronto: Little Brown & Co., 1967), p.401 and Robert A. Garson, "American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Power: Eastern Europe 1946-1950", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 21, No.3 (July 1986), p.353. This position was also supported by some in the British Government. Josef Foschepoth argues in "British Interest in the Division of Germany after the Second World War" (JCH, Vol.21, No.3, p.392) that the British favoured "the de facto division of Germany into one part under eastern and one under western control...and the founding of a separate West German state...in order to integrate it into the western sphere of influence".

⁸ Speech by Louis St. Laurent, Chairman of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations, to the UN General Assembly, September 18, 1947, in R.A. McKay, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1971), pp.95-97.

⁹ FRUS 1948, Vol. III, pp.14-15.

¹⁰ This point has been made by, amongst others, Escott Reid - one of the Canadian negotiators at the North Atlantic Treaty talks - in his detailed account of the negotiations, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), p.41.

¹¹ FRUS 1948, Vol. III, Under-Secretary of State to the British Ambassador, Washington, February 2, 1948, pp.17-18

¹² Talk by Lord Franks on "Anglo-American Relations, 1947-1952", delivered at the London School of Economics and Political Science, November 21, 1985.

¹³ An example of such behind-the-scenes influence was when, prompted by its concern about communist activity in Italy, the State Department informally raised the question with the Brussels negotiators of the possibility of including Italy in the proposed union in the near future. (See FRUS 1948, Vol. III, Marshall to the U.S. Embassy in Brussels, March 3, 1948, p.35.) This was part of ongoing American attempts to strengthen the position of the Italian Government against the Communists, prior to the pending Italian elections and was the rationale behind a Report of the National Security Council of March 8, 1948, which recommended that the United States should "press for the immediate

inclusion of Italy in negotiations for Western Union". (FRUS 1948, Vol. III, pp.775-779.

14 Kennan, Memoirs, p.404. Kennan quotes the Report but does not give a precise date for it, just saying it was presented in "early March".

15 See, for example, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp.392-398. Cambridge historian Gwyn Prins, speaking in a B.B.C. Radio 4 documentary "NATO" in May 1986, described the background events. He argued that by February 1948 Czechoslovakia was faced with a severe food shortage because of crop failures. Non-communist Czech ministers had gone to the United States requesting food aid, but the U.S. had refused to provide any such assistance unless it could have military concessions in Czechoslovakia in return. Viewing this as blackmail, the Czechs refused and the communist ministers then arranged for the Soviet Union to provide aid. According to Prins, the West could easily have maintained friendly relations with a neutral Czechoslovakia, but it was "thrown into the hands of the Soviets" because of narrow U.S. suspicions and misconceptions.

16 Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945 (London: Macmillan Press, 1980), p.85.

17 Bullock, Bevin, p.410.

18 Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, eds., The Truman Administration: A Documentary History (New York and London: Harper & Row, 1966), p.269.

19 FRUS 1948, Vol. III, pp.40-42.

20 Ibid.

21 Robert A. Garson, "American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Power: Eastern Europe 1946-1950", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.21, No.3 (July 1986), pp.347-366.

22 FRUS 1948, Vol. III, p.41.

23 Donald Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), p.141.

24 Lippman and Chomsky were speaking in an American film entitled "Are We Winning Mommy?". This could not be shown in the United States but was broadcast on British Channel 4 television on August 10, 1987. The film highlights the importance of the part played by propaganda to justify and build support for American actions during the Cold War. It chronicles the drastic change in American public opinion from the end of the war - when the Soviet Union was regarded as a friend and ally, when J.V. Stalin was known affectionately as "Uncle Joe" and when Russian war relief campaigns were commonplace - to the era of McCarthyism, "the red menace" and the world-wide crusade against communism. Noam Chomsky argues in the film that, given popular sentiment in 1945, it was necessary for the Government to convince the American people that the war was not over but rather that there was now a new and more dangerous adversary. Accordingly, the State Department launched a wide-scale public relations campaign, which was described by former State Department official Arthur Macy Cox as a campaign of "political manipulation". The extent of its success can be measured by the fact that in 1945 the general consensus amongst the American people was that there would never be another war; by 1948, 73% believed another war was inevitable and many were ready to support the loyalty checks on Federal Government employees launched by President Truman in 1947 and the subsequent anti-communist legislation and activities. The late 1940s

were a time of anti-communist frenzy in the media - particularly in films and on television - of the founding of the CIA and its "Crusade for Freedom" (which featured personalities like Bob Hope, Bing Crosby and future President, Ronald Reagan), and of Radio Free Europe. (The above information is all from "Are We Winning Mommy?") For more details on the State Department's "Propaganda War" see sections in FRUS on the "International Information Program" for selected years from 1949 onwards.

25 FRUS 1948, Vol. III, British Embassy, Washington to the Department of State, March 11, 1948, pp.46-47. It is indicative of the mood of the time that such a proposal by the Soviet Union for a bi-lateral treaty was regarded as an aggressive threat, while similar bi-lateral treaties being concluded by Western governments, particularly the United States, were considered to be purely defensive and a means of ensuring peace.

26 Ibid., Secretary of State to British Ambassador, March 12, 1948.

27 Excerpts from President Truman's address to Congress, March 17, 1948. Item No. 17 in Documents relating to the North Atlantic Treaty, prepared by the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, 81st Congress, 1st Session, Document 48. Presented by Mr. Tom Connally, April 12, 1949. Also in FRUS 1948, Vol. III, pp.54-55.

28 R.A. McKay, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954, p.182.

29 For details of the British situation see the paraphrase of a telegram from Bevin to the State Department in April, 1948 in FRUS 1948, Vol. III, pp.79-80. In Time of Fear and Hope, p.11, Escott Reid states that only seven cabinet ministers and officials in Canada knew the talks were taking place.

30 FRUS 1948, Vol. III, Minutes of the First Meeting of the US-UK-Canada Security Conversations, Washington, March 22, 1948, pp.59-61.

31 Ibid., Minutes of the Second US-UK-Canada Meeting, March 23, 1948, p.64.

32 See, for example, Ibid., Memorandum of Conversation between the Under-Secretary of State and representatives of the Benelux countries and Canada, August 20, 1948, p.216.

33 Ibid., Minutes Second US-UK-Canada Meeting, March 23, 1948, p.64.

34 Ibid., "Report of the Policy Planning Staff Concerning Western Union and Related Problems", March 23, 1948, pp.61-64.

35 Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p.46.

36 FRUS 1948, Vol. III, Minutes 3rd US-UK-Canada Meeting, March 24, 1948, pp.66-67.

37 Ibid., Minutes 6th US-UK-Canada Meeting with enclosure entitled "Final Draft", April 1, 1948, pp.71-75.

38 See for example of talks with other Brussels Treaty countries, report of talk between State Department representatives and the Belgian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in Washington on April 5, 1948 in Ibid., pp.76-78.

39 Ibid., Memorandum of conversation between the Acting Secretary of State and Senator Vandenburg, April 11, 1948, p.82.

40 Ibid., Telegram from Bevin and Bidault to Lovett, April 17, 1948, p.91.

41 Bernstein and Matusow, eds., Truman Administration, Documentary History, p.274.

42 Ibid., Senate Resolution 239, pp.274-275.

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- 43 FRUS 1948, Vol. III, record of conversation between Lovett and the Turkish Ambassador in Washington, July 21, 1948, p.196.
- 44 FRUS 1949, Vol. IV, record of conversation between Acheson, Vandenburg and Connally, Washington, February 14, 1949, pp.109-110.
- 45 Josef Foschepoth, "British Interest in the Division of Germany after the Second World War" Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 21, No.3 (July 1986) pp.391-411. Foschepoth argues that British plans for the Foreign Ministers' Conference were geared not to success but only how to make the breakdown appear to be solely the responsibility of the Soviet delegation; the British were interested in keeping Germany divided in order "to safeguard...the Western sphere of influence" and ensure that neither East nor West gained control of a unified Germany. This was also the position the US State Department was taking by 1948. See, for example, Gaddis Smith, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Vol. XVI: Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1972), which quotes Acheson as telling Senators Connally and Vandenburg that "there could be no adequate strength without the revival of West Germany" (p.70). See also FRUS 1948, Vol. III, letter from the Acting Secretary of State to the U.S. Special Representative in Europe, December 3, 1948, which states: "We must not permit Germany to be drawn into the Soviet orbit or be reconstructed as an instrument of Soviet policy....Our current policy must be to bring Western Germany into close association with the free democratic states of Western Europe", p.308.
- 46 F. Roy Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe: 1945-1963 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p.16.
- 47 See Simon Duke, US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom: A Matter for Joint Decision? (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), pp.29-36 and Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain (London: Michael Joseph, 1984) p.27 for more details on the return of the U.S. airforce to Britain. Campbell, in fact, argues that U.S. forces never completely left after 1945 but the Berlin Blockade provided a useful pretext for them to be brought back openly, as a prelude to a much larger influx of American forces into Britain after 1950.
- 48 Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries: the Inner History of the Cold War, (London: Cassell & Co., 1952), p.457.
- 49 FRUS 1948, Vol. III, minutes WET Meeting, July 6, 1948, p.154.
- 50 Bullock, Bevin, p.687.
- 51 FRUS 1948, Vol. III, minutes 9th WET Meeting, August 9, 1948, p.211.
- 52 Ibid., talks between Lovett and the Ambassadors of Canada, France, Belgium, Holland and the UK, Washington, August 20, 1948, p.216.
- 53 Ibid., pp.211-243, Pearson, Memoirs, p.55 and Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p.199.
- 54 See for example, FRUS 1948, Vol.III, p.330, FRUS 1949, Vol.IV, p.30. and Pearson, Memoirs, p.55.
- 55 FRUS 1948, Vol. III, p.725.
- 56 Ibid., p.343.
- 57 Ibid.
- 58 Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p.49.
- 59 See, for example, FRUS 1949, Vol. IV, pp.255-256.
- 60 Pearson, Memoirs, p.54.
- 61 Ibid., p.33.

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- 62 FRUS 1949, Vol. IV, minutes WET Meeting, Washington, February 8, 1949, p.86.
- 63 Pearson, Memoirs, p.44.
- 64 Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p.52 & p.170.
- 65 FRUS 1949, Vol. IV, minutes WET Meeting, February 8, 1949, p.86.
- 66 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969), p.277.
- 67 R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, Ties That Bind: Canadian-American Relations in Wartime, From the Great War to the Cold War (Toronto: Samuel Stevens Hakkert and Co., 1977), pp.125-130.
- 68 FRUS 1949, Vol. IV, p.244.
- 69 For details of the division of responsibilities between the West German Government and the Occupying Powers see Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, p.30. Willis argues that the Germans found the restrictions on them excessive and began campaigning immediately for their reduction.
- 70 FRUS 1949, Vol. IV, paper on Germany by the State Department Division of Central European Affairs, February 24, 1949, pp.94-96 and B.B.C. Radio 4 documentary "NATO", May 1986.
- 71 Le Monde, April 6, 1949, cited in Grosser, The Western Alliance, p.89.
- 72 Grosser, The Western Alliance, p.82.
- 73 FRUS 1948, Vol. III, pp.652-653.
- 74 Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, pp.26-28.
- 75 Talk by Lord Franks, November 21, 1985.
- 76 Cuff and Granatstein, Ties That Bind, pp.117-121.
- 77 Pearson, Memoirs, p.47.
- 78 Quoted in Chatham House Study Group Report, "Britain in Western Europe: West European Union and the Atlantic Alliance" (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956), p.14.
- 79 FRUS 1949, Vol. IV, minutes WET Meeting, February 8, 1949, p.86.
- 80 Pearson, Memoirs, p.55.
- 81 FRUS 1948, Vol. IX, telegram from the Canadian Ambassador in Washington to the Director of European Affairs in the State Department, April 1, 1948, pp.410-411.
- 82 Bullock, Bevin, p.395.
- 83 FRUS 1948, Vol. III, report of the Office of Intelligence Research on "Britain's Rearmament Program: Political and Economic Implications", November 17, 1948, pp.1121-1124.
- 84 Bullock, Bevin, p.688.
- 85 Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, p.56.
- 86 For details of the European reaction see Grosser, The Western Alliance, pp.87-90. The events in Iceland are reported in FRUS 1949, Vol. IV, National Security Council Report on "The US and North Atlantic Security Interests in Iceland", July 29, 1949, pp.313-315.
- 87 Kennan, Memoirs, pp.407-410.
- 88 U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty, 81st Cong., 1st sess., April-May 1949, Part 2 and T.G. Paterson, ed., Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), pp.65-66.

89 Excerpts from Taft's speech to the Senate against the North Atlantic Treaty are reprinted in Bernstein and Matusow, eds., Truman Administration Documentary History, pp.281-283.

90 Ibid., p.280.

91 FRUS 1949, Vol. IV, p.297.

92 Ibid., Acheson to Truman, May 12, 1949, p.298.

93 Ibid., Kennan to the Acting Secretary of State, June 1, 1949, p.301.

94 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1984), pp.25-26.

95 FRUS 1949, Vol. IV, p.325.

96 Ibid., report of conversation between the State Department Assistant Secretary for European Affairs and the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, August 3, 1949, pp.316-317.

97 Ibid., pp.325-328 and Bullock, Bevin, p.719. The sentence about ultra-secret arrangements does not appear in the American record of this conversation but it does in the British (in FO 800/483/NA/49/15) according to Bullock. It probably refers to the unofficial January 1949 Modus Vivendi Agreement between the two countries. For details see Duke, US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom, pp.41-44.

Chapter 3
THE YEARS OF CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION
1950-1955

I AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES AND WESTERN
EUROPE

Following the short period of what Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary-General, has called "cautious optimism and slow methodical progress"¹, the years between 1950 and 1955 were a time of intense activity. They saw the creation, organization and rapid growth of the military structure of the Alliance, and its extension to include three new member countries - none of which were actually North Atlantic nations. Although the activities and issues NATO concerned itself with in the early 1950s were wide-ranging and complex, it had, essentially, two main preoccupations. These were the formation, build-up and arming of the military wing of the Organization and the search for a way to bring West Germany into the fold. On both of these fronts it was the United States which took the initiative and moulded Alliance policy. As mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb in late August 1949 prompted President Truman and his administration to initiate a comprehensive review of American foreign and defence policy.

The result was a lengthy, secret report known as NSC 68 which was completed by the National Security Council in April. Full of Cold War rhetoric, this document could be characterized as the ideological rationalization and justification for America's global anti-communist, and specifically anti-Soviet, crusade as well as for its dominant role in that campaign - a campaign which, according to the report, imposed upon the United States "in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership".²

NSC 68 considered both "the Fundamental Purpose of the United States" and "the Fundamental Design of the Kremlin". It analyzed what it called "the Underlying Conflict in the Realm of Ideas and Values" between the two superpowers as a result of which

Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic values, naturally will take such action, including the use of military force, as may be required to protect those values.

For this "a strong military posture [was] deemed to be essential". This was, indeed, the bottom line in the American position - the urgent necessity for a military build-up by the West, under the leadership of the United States. The rationale for America's pivotal role was fairly clearly spelled out:

Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish.

And what role was envisaged for the rest of the Western world in this grand design? "The full capabilities of the rest of the free world are a potential increment to our own capabilities" but that "free world" could only be united and given a sense of purpose by the U.S. "In the absence of affirmative decision on our part, the rest of the free world is almost certain to become demoralized. Our friends may become more than a liability to us; they can eventually become a positive increment to Soviet power". The conclusion, therefore, was that it was incumbent upon the United States to "organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world" for "a much more rapid and concerted build-up of actual strength". It was recognized that this would be a costly undertaking, involving "significant domestic financial and economic adjustments".³

Accordingly, this policy reappraisal - which has subsequently been characterized by one commentator as "a call for global war" ⁴ - anticipated an expansion of the annual U.S. defence budget from \$13.5 billion to at least \$40 billion.⁵ In the event, the actual funds allocated for military spending increased from \$13 billion in fiscal year 1950, to \$22.5 billion in 1951 and \$43.9 billion in 1952.⁶ Commenting on the decision to take the path of military

expansion, historian David Horowitz has argued that the American leadership persisted in opposing negotiations and diplomacy as a means of settling outstanding problems in Europe and opted instead for "a programme of military rearmament on a scale never before witnessed in peacetime".⁷

This was the backdrop against which American actions in the ensuing years took place. That is not to say that NSC 68 marked a sudden change of direction in American foreign policy. As seen in earlier chapters, from at least 1947 and the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, the United States had been inclined towards confrontation rather than negotiation in its relations with the Soviet Union and the rest of Eastern Europe. The report was, rather, the refining and concrete formulation of ideas and plans which the U.S. Administration had been considering for some time.

In the same month that Truman ordered the policy reappraisal (January 1950), George Kennan's Policy Planning Staff drew up an outline of American foreign policy interests world-wide for Secretary of State Dean Acheson to use in his discussions on the international situation with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This summary highlighted the importance of the Military Aid Program (MAP) and American plans for "integrated defense" by the North Atlantic Alliance, as well as the achievement of a stable West German government which could be fully integrated into Western

Europe. The summary also indicated America's intention of intervening anywhere in the world it considered necessary in order to stop " Russian communist expansion".⁸

The reference in the summary to "integrated defense" refers to the plans drawn up by the U.S. Departments of State and Defense for defending the entire North Atlantic area. These were approved by President Truman on January 27, the same day the United States signed bi-lateral military assistance agreements with the eight European NATO countries and allocated \$900,000,000 in military aid funds. The plans were then presented to the Alliance partners for approval, approval which was given with what the American records describe as "no major substantive changes".⁹

Despite the apparent easy agreement with U.S. plans by the other members, the State Department was beginning to be concerned with what was to be a recurring American criticism of its NATO allies, namely a perceived lack of zeal for the cause. In February 1950, the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in London sent a telegram to the Secretary of State expressing concern about what he described as "flagging enthusiasm" even in "some genuinely friendly non-communist circles". He feared that "this could lead to resurgence of the neutrality complex in Western Europe" and "weaken the will to build Western solidarity and strength". He hastened to add that this "wavering" was not yet evident in government circles, but

could be found in some sections of the general public. He was concerned lest it "remove the stimulus to governments to take specific measures in furtherance of North Atlantic Treaty objectives". One solution he proposed was to step up the public information program aimed at Western Europe in order to "bring about...renewed appreciation of wisdom and benefit of NAT and generate...resurgence European zeal for creating the necessary solidarity and improving the military posture of the Atlantic community".¹⁰

A similar pragmatic and somewhat manipulative approach towards Western Europe was manifested in a memorandum from the Director of the Coordinating Committee of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) to his deputy in London. He summarized America's attitude to its European partners in this way:

It is in the enlightened self-interest of the United States to support...the free countries of Western Europe with their total population of 300 million people, a high percentage of skilled artisans and potential soldiers, an industrial production at least two times as great as the USSR and satellites, and with political and moral traditions like our own. This support must increasingly aim at uniting the strength of Europe and must be applied with an increasing degree of U.S. leadership.¹¹

II. TURNING POINTS OF 1950

i The London Conferences

The preceding telegram was sent at the time when preparations were underway for the London Conferences. These were three separate sets of meetings which took place in London, in May and June 1950, and were intended to lay the groundwork for the future shape of the Western Alliance. They consisted of bi-partite U.S.-U.K. talks, tri-partite U.S.-U.K.-France talks and a full twelve power North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting. In the minds of the British and French governments the primary purpose of the discussions was to make the North Atlantic Treaty into a living reality by sorting out its organizational problems and creating the institutions necessary for further Western cooperation.¹²

As far as Britain was concerned, it considered the bi-partite talks by far the most important of the three sets of meetings. It hoped that these would define the Anglo-American special relationship and place it at the the centre of the Atlantic Pact. "From the British point of view...the ends which the new Anglo-American partnership should serve were to strengthen Great Britain's position as a world power and to emphasize the importance of the Atlantic framework for Western consolidation".¹³ The British were even hesitant to include France in this inner circle, although Canada was

regarded as acceptable and reliable. A brief prepared for the British delegation at the Conferences on the "general attitude to be adopted towards the French as regards our talks with the Americans on major policy issues" stressed that

It must be recognized...that the real direction of the Atlantic Pact effort must be in Anglo-American-Canadian cooperation and, if possible, in some 'inner group' whose duty it might be to examine both economic and strategical necessities.

It was realized, of course, that such activity could not be organized openly and that "there should be some facade" of including France and possibly Italy; but, the brief stressed, the existence of any such unofficial group "should be kept entirely from the Latins"¹⁴

The French, for their part, had no intention of being excluded from the inner circle of Western powers. In mid-April the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, told the United States that he felt "grave disquiet" about the bilateral Anglo-American talks, fearing they may have an unfavourable effect on France.¹⁵ Consequently, and primarily as a result of American initiative, the tri-partite talks were organized. The Americans were keen to encourage and support France as a way of promoting European unity and, ultimately, involving West Germany with the Western bloc.

Recognizing this, Schuman chose to consult the State Department before announcing his plan for pooling the French and German coal and steel industries in a supranational organization which other nations could also join. This Coal and Steel Community was precisely the type of move toward federation in Europe which the Americans favoured (and the British rejected).

While the two former European imperial powers worried about how to maintain their power and status in the new Alliance and vied with each other for American favour, the United States was making its own plans for NATO and formulating its objectives. The State Department considered the main importance of the London meetings not the issue of organization but as an opportunity to discuss important political questions and elaborate new policy directions, particularly with regard to Germany. In a conversation with the British Ambassador in Washington, at the end of April, Acheson emphasized that time was of the essence for the Alliance to adopt definite plans to "deal with Russia". He proposed the four main topics that should be considered in London: defence, Germany, Asia and maximization of international trade. He emphasized that Europe should be prepared to divert manpower and materials for the defence effort and that means would have to be found to tie Germany in with the West in all ways, short of forming a German army.¹⁶ Most NATO members realized, by this time, that West

Germany would eventually have to participate in the Alliance, but many tended to feel that the time was not yet ripe for such a move, particularly for German military involvement in Western defence.¹⁷

Although the question of actually rearming Germany was not being seriously considered by the State Department in April, it did regard as urgent the need to involve the West Germans with the West in the political and economic fields and to utilize German resources and manpower for the defence effort.¹⁸ The U.S. Department of Defense, however, had long been convinced that "Europe could not be defended without the willing and active participation of West Germany".¹⁹ It may well have been considering the question later posed by commentator Alfred Grosser: "Could the American general staff afford to do without the human potential of a country whose population voted 95 percent anti-communist and rely on France, whose voters gave the Communist Party 25 percent of their vote?"²⁰

The London meetings put the issues of German participation and Western rearmament on the agenda for the first time, although no binding decisions were made. At a bi-partite meeting on May 10, Acheson told the British he thought "it would be a great mistake to decide now that Germany should never enter the Atlantic Pact although for the

time being it might be politically impossible to say that she should"²¹

Essentially, the only achievement of the London Conferences was to air the issues, but little more. The U.S. Department of State and the British Foreign Office were both reportedly dissatisfied with the outcome - the British because their "Atlanticist" hopes had been dashed and they "failed to establish a secure and exclusive basis of Anglo-American cooperation within the Western Alliance" and the Americans because they had not made much headway on the issues they considered most important.²² Nor were the meetings particularly satisfactory for the smaller members. Lester Pearson reported to his government in Ottawa after the London North Atlantic Council meeting that "there was, as usual, a general reluctance...to express any misgivings felt as to proposals put forward by the U.S. representative"²³

ii Korea and the Need to Maintain a Bold Front in Europe

After the meetings the Americans turned their attention back to their main preoccupation - the military build-up of the Alliance. On June 1, President Truman requested military aid funds for 1951 from Congress. He asked for about \$1 billion for the North Atlantic area, \$120 million for Greece and Turkey, \$27.5 million for Iran, Korea and the Philippines

and \$7.5 million for China. He also asked for flexibility in moving funds around and relaxation on the restrictions regarding which countries could receive military aid. His requests were approved by the Senate in a unanimous vote on June 30 and by the House of Representatives (with a vote of 362-1) on July 19.²⁴

By July, the U.S. was beginning to pressure the allies to increase their military efforts. It was recognized that the levels of rearmament the Americans had in mind would require economic sacrifices all round and slow the pace of European recovery. In a memorandum dispatched to American diplomatic offices in all the North Atlantic Treaty countries, just prior to the first meeting of the North Atlantic Council Deputies in late July²⁵, Acheson stressed that all members would have to increase their military budgets by raising taxes and transferring funds from non-military to military spending. He instructed that this "should of course be conveyed in such a manner as to avoid any impression that we are attempting to dictate to our friends the action they shld take."²⁶

Once more events far outside the North Atlantic area were to play a significant part in helping the Americans achieve their objectives. On June 25 a force of North Korean soldiers crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea. How open and clear cut an act of aggression this was has since been

questioned by some historians and remains a matter of debate to this day.²⁷ Nevertheless, the Americans, who had been instrumental in establishing the government in South Korea, viewed it as a blatant, hostile, communist act of aggression inspired, if not directly organized, by Moscow. They were quickly able to mobilize support from their NATO and other Western allies, as well as from the United Nations, for immediate military retaliation and within 48 hours American ground and air forces had been were deployed in the region.

A report by the National Security Council on July 1 suggested how lucky it was for the U.S. that the attack had occurred where and when it did.

Our current involvement in the Korean crisis is unique in that it has occurred in the only theater in which the U.S. is capable of conducting immediate general offensive operations with its armed forces. In all other areas...the armed forces of the U.S. are either not appropriately positioned or are of such inadequacy as to be incapable of effective action in the event of further crises.²⁸

The report went on to warn that the Soviet Union was likely to test American resolve in other areas. It therefore urged that the Europeans be encouraged to "show utmost vigilance and firmness in the face of any and all Soviet encroachments....We, together with other NATO powers...must keep up a bold front in Europe."²⁹

The war in Korea dragged on for three more years but long before it ended NATO had established that "bold front" by setting up its military command structure; in addition American and Canadian troops had returned to Western Europe, which had itself undergone rapid militarization and rearmament. Immediately after the outbreak of war in Korea the U.S. Departments of State and Defense began to work out how Europe was to be defended as far to the East as possible.³⁰ Dean Acheson said later that it was as a result of events in Korea that he became convinced of the need to rearm Germany. "If there was to be any defense at all it had to be based on a forward strategy. Germany's role must not be secondary but primary - not only through military formations but through emotional and political involvement".³¹

The issue under consideration in the State Department by the end of July, Acheson wrote in a memorandum, was "not whether Germany should be brought into the general defensive plan, but rather how this could be done without disrupting anything else that we were doing and without putting Germany into a position to act as the balance of power in Europe."³² In order to avoid such an eventuality, the President and his Administration opposed the idea of allowing Germany to actually have its own army and general staff and favoured, instead, the creation of either a North Atlantic or a European army. This was to be composed of national contingents, one of which would be German.³³

One of the key people entrusted with the task of winning European support for these American plans was U.S. NAC Deputy, Charles Spofford.³⁴ He reported, at the beginning of August, that he was not happy with the response he was getting from the Europeans, a response which indicated that there was "less feeling of urgency in Europe than in the U.S." He suggested that "this calls for bringing to bear systematic pressure and persuasion over the coming weeks" and suggested attaching conditions to the provision of supplementary MDAP funds.³⁵ This proposal was vetoed by Acheson, who said it was "too dangerous".³⁶ He preferred, perhaps, more subtle ways of influencing events.

The Americans continued to consider plans for a European army, the specifics of which were to be kept secret from the allies for the time being.³⁷ The U.S. Ambassador in London suggested that such a force should be commanded by an American and that several American and British divisions be dispatched to Continental Europe.³⁸ Similar ideas were reiterated both in a telegram to Acheson from British Opposition Leader, Winston Churchill, on August 14 and in a State Department paper on the "Establishment of a European Defense Force", dated August 16. This paper recognized that German participation in such a force would imply "eventual German membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization". It recommended that the force itself should be under U.S.

leadership and have an American as its sole commander. This would have the effect of indicating full American commitment to the plan and would also be "in the security interests of the United States".³⁹

iii An Historic North Atlantic Council Meeting

The State Department plans had still to be presented to, and approved by, the other NATO countries. Gaining that approval was the task facing the American administration as it prepared for the September North Atlantic Council meeting, which was to be held in New York.

Early in September President Truman requested, and was granted, an additional appropriation of \$3,504,000,000 from Congress for military aid to the North Atlantic area, "in response to the threat to world peace caused by the assault in Korea".⁴⁰ The timing and significance of this move could hardly have been lost on America's allies. Shortly after the outbreak of the war in the Far East, Acheson had told Canadian External Affairs Minister, Lester Pearson, that events in Korea "made it politically possible for the United States to secure Congressional and public support for a quick and great increase in defence expenditures" as well as "for further assistance *to those of its allies who are willing to make a similar increased effort*" [emphasis added]. Pearson recorded this conversation in his diary and added the note:

"Korea was now the touchstone of our determination to meet the challenge elsewhere, whatever form it takes".⁴¹

On September 8, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense, Dean Acheson and Louis Johnson, informed the President of the views of their respective departments on the question of "the strengthening of the defense of Europe and the nature of the contribution by Germany to this defense". They were both agreed that "United States forces should be committed to the defense of Europe at the earliest feasible date". They advised the President:

The creation of a European Defense force within the NAT framework seems to us to be the best means of obtaining the maximum contribution from the European nations and to provide as well a framework in which a German contribution of a significant nature could be realized.

They then presented details of their plans for the organization of such a force and recommended that "an American national be appointed now as Chief of Staff and eventually as a Supreme Commander...but only upon the request of the European nations and upon their assurance that they will provide sufficient forces".⁴²

The following week, just prior to the Council meeting, Acheson met in secret in New York with Bevin and Schuman. He

told them about the American plans for a European army and the possible ways in which Germany might be included.⁴³ Officials of the three countries had, in fact, held preliminary talks in Washington at the beginning of the month. At that time they had drafted a paper on "Policy Toward the Soviet Union in Light of Recent Developments" which had recommended that "western military, political and economic measures of defense should be rapidly intensified" under central direction. However, no specific mention had been made of the concept of a Western defence force, let alone Germany's inclusion in it.⁴⁴

When the three Foreign Ministers met on September 14 the French rejected, outright, the idea of creating separate German divisions and were reluctant to consider any German involvement at all in the defence of Western Europe.⁴⁵ Schuman had earlier objected to the matter even being placed on the agenda of the forthcoming NAC meeting, because of the inevitable "divergence of views" between the three powers.⁴⁶ The British, on the other hand, supported Acheson but felt that the Americans were pressing the issue too hard and too fast.⁴⁷ Bevin had himself sent a private personal message to Acheson on September 4 presenting the British Government's views on the issue of "German association with the defence of the West". In this he pointed out that the British Chiefs of Staff believed there was "no visible way of providing the forces needed to defend the territories of the North Atlantic

Treaty powers without German assistance". However, the British were not prepared, at that time, to accept the recreation of a German army; they favoured the raising of a small German volunteer force, as had already been requested by the West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer.⁴⁸

The North Atlantic Council meeting, chaired by Acheson, opened on September 15. The Americans quickly informed the other delegates that the U.S. Government was prepared "to participate in the immediate establishment of an integrated force in Europe".⁴⁹ Acheson went on to say - much to the surprise of the majority of participants in the meeting ⁵⁰ - that this force "should involve the participation of German units and the use of German productive resources for its supply". Lord Ismay pointed out: "The U.S. proposal entailed a reversal of the Allied policy of disarmament and demilitarization of Germany"⁵¹ and as such took time to win acceptance. The meeting discussed the issue of "defending the NATO area against an aggression similar to that in Korea" and agreed that "a forward strategy must be adopted" so that "any aggression could be resisted as far to the east as possible".⁵²

The majority of the members supported the American proposals, although there were criticisms of the manner in which they had been introduced. Some of the junior partners (Canada, the Netherlands and Norway in particular) were

concerned about the fact that the issue had been discussed in advance by the U.S., U.K. and France, without their knowledge. The American record of the meeting noted that the smaller countries had essentially "no quarrel with the decision...but objected to the way this and other vital matters affecting Europe were dealt with by the Big Three without regard to the Council."⁵³

In his memoirs, Pearson recalls that, precisely for this reason, events around the time of the Korean war "underlined the necessity for political consultation and cooperation with the smaller members." He also describes the response he received from Acheson when he objected to the lack of consultation with the smaller powers. Acheson reportedly told him bluntly:

If you think, after the agonies of consultation we have gone through to get agreement on this matter [in the U.S.], that we are going to start all over again with our NATO allies, especially with you moralistic, interfering Canadians, then you're crazy.⁵⁴

Despite such perfunctory treatment, the Canadian delegation supported the American proposals and stated that they "favoured the principle of using Germany in European defense...[and] accepted the principle of German manpower being appropriately used in defense of the West."⁵⁵

Bevin, as head of the British delegation, also accepted Acheson's plans. However, a joint report of the U.K. Royal Institute of International Affairs and the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, prepared in 1953, noted that "there was widespread irritation in Great Britain at the manner in which the American Government had pressed its demands" and the way in which Bevin had yielded to American pressure in New York.⁵⁶

The French, however, continued to oppose German participation in the defence force and a great deal of time at the Council meeting was spent in trying to find ways to get around their resistance.⁵⁷

France took the position that she would consider German participation only in the context of an international European army owing allegiance to the European community. German units no larger than battalions were to be blended into this army with same size units of other nationalities.

The entire force would be responsible to a European Defence Minister under some kind of European Parliamentary assembly. However, the Americans and most of the other members "advocated the formation of German divisions which would be integrated into the NATO force".⁵⁸

After much, at times acrimonious, debate a compromise was finally reached when the French size limit on the proposed German units was accepted and the Americans agreed to increase U.S. funds available for the French military programme (to help with French commitments in Indochina).⁵⁹ The Americans also agreed to send more troops to Europe (a move they had been planning, in any case). None of these difficulties and differences were evident in the carefully-worded communiqué issued after the meeting. It simply declared that:

The Council agreed upon the establishment at the earliest possible date of an integrated force under centralized command...to ensure the defence of Western Europe....The Council was in agreement that Germany should be enabled to contribute to the build-up of the defence of Western Europe.

iv The Americans Protect their Interests, the French Propose a Compromise, and NATO Establishes its Military Headquarters.

NATO had accepted the American plans, but the U.S. Administration also took steps to ensure that the arrangements would enhance its own military position. A "Policy Record Guide Statement" issued by the State Department on September 22, emphasized that it was U.S. policy to acquire the military rights in foreign territories

that were "urgently required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff". There had been successful negotiations with several North Atlantic Treaty countries for the use of "military facilities we desire in their territory". The Secretary of Defense had asked "the JCS to take the necessary action to insure that NAT regional defense plans adequately reflect US requirements for military rights."⁶⁰

The controversial Ambassadors' Agreement had been concluded with the U.K. in April. This informal arrangement, finalized only in an exchange of letters between the U.S. Ambassador in London and a British parliamentary Under-Secretary and never formally signed as an official agreement, made provision for the development of four joint U.S.-U.K. bases in the British Midlands, to be used by the U.S. Air Force. No time limit was attached to their stay.⁶¹ In July, the Americans moved the non-nuclear components of their atomic stockpile to Britain; they needed only the nuclear cores to be shipped from the U.S. in the event of war.⁶²

In May arrangements were concluded with Canada on the integration of military production between the two countries, essentially extending "into the peacetime period the principles of the Hyde Park Declaration of 1941".⁶³ By September the State Department was able to inform the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that general plans had been agreed between the U.S. and Canada on

combining industrial resources "in order to meet the demands of the present tense international situation".⁶⁴ However, the Americans were still dissatisfied with Canada's plans to increase its defence effort. The U.S. Ambassador in Ottawa reported that some members of the Canadian cabinet remained hesitant, although there was an "increasing awareness in official Canad. circles that Canada's effort has fallen short as compared with UK and other countries".⁶⁵ An article in the influential American journal Foreign Affairs was particularly critical of the Canadian contribution.

Canada remains the only member of the North Atlantic Union which has not some form of military draft....As long as the Canadian Government will spend upon defense only a much smaller proportion of the national income than do both the United States and Britain, and balks at the enforcement of conscription, Canada can expect continuous criticism, both at home and abroad, for the inadequacy of her contribution.⁶⁶

Such problems were minor, however, compared with the difficulties the Americans were having convincing the French to implement the decisions of the September NAC meeting. The issue of increased militarization posed no problem - in fact the French wanted more military aid from the Americans and more U.S. troops stationed in Europe.⁶⁷ It was the question of Germany which remained the stumbling block. The French were facing mounting pressure, not only from the United States but also from their other NATO allies all of whom were

keen to begin organizing an integrated defence force. Eventually, the French Premier, René Pleven, proposed, on October 24, the creation of a supranational European army with national units of limited size. Pleven's proposal was designed both to please the United States and other NATO members, and to convince the French public to accept German participation in West European defence on a limited basis, by "painting it in the popular colours of 'Europe'".⁶⁸

Acheson was initially unhappy with the fact that the French proposals accorded West Germany second-class status; but Pleven and Jean Monnet - influential economic advisor to the French Government - met with him and succeeded in winning him over and gaining his support. From then on the Americans became the most ardent advocates of the Pleven Plan⁶⁹ and negotiations began between the six European countries already involved in organizing the Coal and Steel Community (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) for the creation of the European Defence Community (EDC).

While the French were busy working out a way of reconciling themselves to Germany's involvement in Western defence, the Americans had taken it upon themselves to draw up plans for the NATO defence structure and Germany's role in it. A paper prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense, in October, laid out what essentially became the military structure of the Alliance. It specified the need for a

Supreme Allied Commander and Headquarters in Europe.⁷⁰ In addition, even before the final details regarding German participation had been agreed by the other members, the State Department drew up recommendations for the revision of the Prohibited Industries List, in order to facilitate German military production. Plans were also made for the specific form the German military units would take, "based on assumption we wld. eventually obtain NATO agreement on a plan similar to our own."⁷¹

In all this planning, it was understood that the Supreme Allied Commander of the forces in Europe (SACEUR) would be an American. In his memoirs Truman admits: "in our planning of the program, I had always had General Eisenhower in mind as the logical man for this unique job". He discussed the issue with the General, secretly informed the NATO defence ministers that he had arranged everything and then went through the formality of obtaining approval at a North Atlantic Council meeting.⁷²

That meeting was held in December 1950 in Brussels, under the Chairmanship of Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul van Zeeland. The formalities of establishing the integrated defence force, appointing the Supreme Commander - a position which was always to be held by an American - and setting up the Allied Headquarters in Paris were all agreed and U.S.

General Dwight Eisenhower was duly appointed. In addition, Acheson informed the Council:

I am authorized by the President to say that before this day is out he will place under the Supreme Commander the United States forces in Europe. We hope that this action will be matched as soon as possible by other governments belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty.⁷³

Lester Pearson, who represented Canada at the meeting, later said that "General Eisenhower was appointed in theory by all the member governments but, in effect, by Washington."⁷⁴ Nevertheless, Canada, like all the other members, supported the decisions and declared its conviction "that the defenses of Europe must be strengthened and that Europe was in essence the heart of the strength of the West".⁷⁵

NATO had taken an enormous step forward. An organization was to be brought into being which would have the authority and the power to ensure that, from Norway to the Mediterranean, national forces allocated to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (henceforward to be known as SHAPE) were properly assembled and trained into an effective integrated force. There was, in fact, to be the unprecedented arrangement of a unified command in time of peace.⁷⁶

III. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION TAKES SHAPE

i General Eisenhower Takes Command & Greece and Turkey Enter the Fold

Following his appointment, General Eisenhower was briefed by Acheson and President Truman. The briefings set out very clearly the attitude of the U.S. administration towards NATO and to the other member states, as well as the American view of its own role in the Alliance. As such it is worth quoting here in some detail as an indication of U.S. attitudes and intentions at the time. After some discussion about the international situation and the Soviet threat after 1945, Acheson explained to Eisenhower

The United States took leadership in formulating the North Atlantic Treaty. This Treaty is not simply a military treaty, but is a vehicle for closer political, economic and security cooperation in the North Atlantic community. *It is a most fundamental part of our foreign policy,* and with the Inter-American Treaty, it is the foundation of our security system. The North Atlantic Treaty is of the upmost importance because while it is technically limited to the North Atlantic area, the Treaty countries actually exercise some control over a vast bulk of the strength of the free world.

Acheson then went on to discuss the situation as it stood at the beginning of 1951:

The time has now come...when plans must be translated into action. While all the other countries sincerely believe in the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty, they have not shown the same sense of urgency as has the United States since Korea. The principal task of the United States is to give the necessary leadership, assistance and direction...to galvanize the European countries into action so that they will press forward and...make the necessary effort and sacrifice....Our tactics in bringing the other countries along with us must not consist simply in constant pressure and warning that others must do more. We must...set the example by our actions and establish firmly in the minds of the Europeans our determination.

He then explained to the General that although the other member states fully recognized and accepted the necessity of U.S. leadership in the Alliance, there was some concern amongst them about "the inconstancy of United States' purposes in Europe". However, he advised that if the United States was seen to be pressing ahead determinedly, it would remain in a good position "to exercise pressure on the Europeans to do what is necessary."

In advising Eisenhower on how to deal with the various member countries, Acheson warned him about "the differences between Northern and Southern European Treaty countries". The Americans considered the former to be "law-abiding", with "sound governmental structures". Despite some initial reluctance "to make an all-out effort", the Secretary was confident that they were "now prepared to face up to

reality". The Southern Europeans, on the other hand, "by very reason of their latin nature" suffered from "emotional, political and social instability" and had a dangerous tendency towards neutrality. Nevertheless, Acheson concluded, "if proper leadership is exercised by the United States, it should be possible to get them to take the steps which are necessary."

The briefing concluded with expressions of confidence in Eisenhower's ability to carry out the "difficult and formidable" task of galvanizing Western Europe into action, with the active support of the United States Government.⁷⁷ Thus armed with his instructions and words of advice, General Eisenhower took a group of senior American officers to Paris as the planning group for SHAPE. They were subsequently joined by officers representing all the Alliance states.

The new SACEUR and his staff toured the European NATO capitals from January 7-26. Upon completion of the tour Eisenhower returned, not to his headquarters in Paris, but to Washington to report to the President and Congress.⁷⁸ Truman was then able to confirm that "General Eisenhower was fully in accord with my policy in Europe".⁷⁹ Apparently the other NATO countries were unperturbed by the fact that their new commander seemed to owe his first allegiance not to their

newly-established defence organization, but to his own Commander-in-Chief - the American President.

Eisenhower met with Truman and Acheson at the White House on January 31, 1951. He told them that, in his view, the real danger in Western Europe was the danger of "neutralism". He believed it was the communists who were fostering such sentiments by promoting the notion of Europe as "a third force".⁸⁰ (The fact that General de Gaulle - who could hardly have been considered a communist, even by Cold War standards - also espoused the idea of a third force, appears not to have entered into the General's interpretation of events.) Eisenhower saw the two key issues on the agenda for NATO in 1951 as creating a command structure for the Atlantic and European arenas and the expansion of the Alliance to the fringes of the Middle East by bringing in Greece and Turkey.⁸¹

The second proposal had been under consideration in Washington for some time but its achievement, while not posing such difficulties as the inclusion of West Germany, was to take some careful planning and maneuvering by the State Department. Many of the other Alliance partners, including initially Britain and France, felt that extending membership to Greece and Turkey was stretching the North Atlantic concept a little too far; several of them tried to find alternative ways of associating the two countries with

NATO. The smaller countries were also concerned that, once again, they had not been consulted about the issue in advance although all of them were doubtful that they could get "U.S. agreement on anything short of full membership".⁸²

The Canadians, in particular, were quite vocal, at first, in their opposition to the proposal. Lester Pearson recorded in his memoirs that

in private discussions I had opposed bringing in these two Eastern Mediterranean countries since I believed that these made nonsense of the North Atlantic character of our association, diminished our credibility as the foundation for an Atlantic community, and gave greater validity to the criticism that we were purely and simply a military alliance. ⁸³

The Americans, however, were determined to press ahead. They were well aware that the kind of concerns expressed by Pearson were shared by other members. As a result they recognized the need "to present NATO purposes, policies and actions positively" in order to counteract any disadvantageous effects "of perceived American pressure on the entry of Greece and Turkey into the Alliance".⁸⁴ The State Department correctly concluded that the key step was to convince Britain and France to support the move and then get them to assist in winning over the other members, so that the pressure appeared to come not only from the United States.⁸⁵

This tactic apparently worked. The British tried to link the question to their pet project of a Middle East Command, but backed down quickly under U.S. pressure.⁸⁶ The Canadian Government decided to support the proposal once it was clear that both Britain and France would do so.⁸⁷

The North Atlantic Council Meeting was held in Ottawa from September 15-20. The United States easily accomplished what it considered "the primary purpose" of the meeting - namely, getting unanimous approval for the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO. Norway and the Netherlands reportedly only voted in favour in order not to block the will of the majority.⁸⁸

Pearson, who only a short while earlier had been voicing his objections, informed the Canadian House of Commons that his Government would ratify the protocol on admission as soon as the U.S., U.K. and France had done so. He added: "To my mind there is no question about the desirability of bringing Greece and Turkey into closer association with North Atlantic defence plans."⁸⁹

ii Military Alliance or Atlantic Community

The dissatisfactions and concerns felt both by the United States and the other partners about the negotiations for the inclusion of Greece and Turkey reflected underlying

differences within the Alliance which were becoming apparent by 1951. The majority of members were worried by the obvious American focus on the military build-up. This was of concern both because of the cost and effort it required and the attendant lack of interest in developing the North Atlantic community concept.

Charles Spofford reported to Acheson, in August, that the British were concerned by NATO's preoccupation with military affairs. At the same time, he felt the French viewed the Alliance as merely "a short-term enterprise" in comparison with the longer range "European framework" they favoured.⁹⁰

An article by Kingsley Martin in the British periodical The New Statesman, in the autumn of 1951, expressed a British criticism of the Alliance - albeit from the left-wing of the Labour Party. Martin stressed that the United States looked at matters from a different perspective than the British and other Europeans. The Americans were expecting the allies

to arm to the utmost, to accept their bombers on our aerodromes and to follow closely the twists and turns of State Department policy. What bothers us is that Americans seem unaware that our point of view in the matter may be different from theirs.

He expressed concern about the American view of the world which bore, in his opinion, "but the haziest resemblance to

the complicated facts". Martin went on to report that in certain circles in Britain (even amongst some Conservatives) there was less fear of Soviet aggression than of the American refusal to take opportunities of peace-making.⁹¹

Similar concerns were felt by Canada, as well as several of the European members. In July 1951 Lester Pearson visited most of the NATO capitals in Europe. At the end of his tour he concluded that "apart from Winston Churchill, all the Western European leaders I consulted were torn between relief at the security the North Atlantic Alliance, under U.S. leadership, was giving to Western Europe...and anxiety over some aspects of U.S. policy which might commit them, as members of the Alliance, to courses and consequences they did not desire."⁹² On his return to North America, Pearson told a State Department official that during his trip "he had frequently been asked if the U.S. had decided that its objective was not to prevent a war, but rather to win one".⁹³

Later in the year Pearson wrote an article in which he considered Canada's own unique, and somewhat impotent, position within NATO and the implications of developments in both Europe and the United States for Canada. He stressed that no country had "a greater stake in the success or failure" of the Alliance than Canada. Canadian policy-makers were continually haunted by the spectre

that the United States may feel it necessary to pursue policies inside our coalition which the other members cannot wholeheartedly follow; or that inadequate cooperation from the other members may discourage American effort and leadership to the point where Washington may decide to go it alone! Any Canadian government is bound to do what it can to exorcise these dangers. This is the first principle of Canadian diplomacy. It is founded on the inescapable fact that no country in the world has less chance of isolating itself from the effect of American policies and decisions than Canada. If Washington 'went it alone' where would Ottawa go?⁹⁴

The U.S. State Department was aware of the concerns felt by its Alliance partners and acknowledged the need to demonstrate an American interest in more than just military matters. A Department memorandum, of August 9, focused on this problem and recommended that the United States Government indicate "evidence of our interest in non-military objectives of the Atlantic Treaty" in order to satisfy the Allies. To appease the critics and prevent the issue surfacing at the forthcoming NAC meeting (at which both the admission of Greece and Turkey and American plans for further military expenditure were to be considered), the memorandum proposed that ways be found to demonstrate U.S. interest in "the North Atlantic concept". This could be achieved through public declarations, in talks between Spofford and his fellow NAC deputies as well as with other officials of NATO governments. In addition, the U.S. could look at ways of "expanding foreign policy coordination among the NATO

nations" and at the possibility of initiating some form of programme based on Article 2 of the Treaty.⁹⁵

That such declarations and proposals were little more than a facade is suggested by the fact that in the very same week the above memorandum was dispatched, a State Department statement on "Principles Governing United States Relation with NATO" emphasized quite different goals. It considered the "central objective" to be securing "promptly the forces, adequately trained and equipped, necessary to the defense of the Atlantic community". In order to accomplish this goal the United States would exert bi-lateral pressure on other members "to assist a) in obtaining agreement to multilateral plans sought by the U.S. and b) in obtaining the implementation of such plans." It was pointed out that the achievement of these aims was being greatly assisted by the fact that the two key international officials of the Alliance (SACEUR and the NATO Defence Production Board coordinator) were both Americans who were "working in close coordination with the American Administration".⁹⁶

Despite such influence, the Americans were still concerned. They suspected that at the forthcoming NAC meeting "all of our Yankee ingenuity is going to be directed toward the job of convincing the Europeans that the military requirement for defending Western Europe is larger and costs more than the sum total of all national efforts [made so far]

by the NATO countries". Their tactics for the Ottawa meeting were planned accordingly.⁹⁷

During this same period the United States signed bilateral agreements with France for the establishment of an air base at Chateauroux (March 28) and for the installation of seven bases in Morocco (July 12); with Denmark for the defence of Greenland (April 27); with Iceland for the joint defence of that country (May 9) and with Portugal for the use of airfields in the Azores (September 6). In addition, mutual security pacts were signed between the U.S. and the Philippines and between the U.S., Australia and New Zealand in 1951.⁹⁸

Nor was Canada excluded from similar agreements. In May the Americans had agreed with the Canadian Government to continue leasing part of the R.C.A.F. base at Goose Bay, Labrador. They were giving serious consideration to stationing American atomic weapons at this site.⁹⁹ Plans were also underway to begin construction of a string of radar defence stations across the Canadian north, with the U.S. assuming two-thirds of the cost.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, negotiations were continuing with Britain for several more U.S. Air Force bases to be built in that country, in addition to the ten already in operation there.¹⁰¹

So despite any protestations or pretensions to the contrary, there seems little doubt that the primary interest of the United States at that time was to consolidate its own military position in the West, with the assistance, however hesitant or ambivalent, of its NATO allies.

iii The European Defence Community

Meanwhile, talks continued throughout 1951, in Paris, aimed at establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) envisaged in the Plevin Plan. Despite the fact that this was to be a European endeavour, the Americans had no intention of being left out of the discussions.

Even before the discussions began in February, Acheson informed the French Foreign Minister, Schuman, that "we would accept an invitation to send an observer to the Paris Conference". In addition, he made it clear that the United States would only accept any arrangement agreed in Paris "if it is entirely sound and practical both from the military and political points of view" and "if it does not delay an effective German contribution to the common defense". He hastened to add that, of course, the decision had to be the Europeans' own and the United States had no intention of exerting any pressure on them.¹⁰²

The American Administration believed that the French had only proposed the idea of the EDC in the first place in order to minimize the threat of German rearmament, once it was clear that this was inevitable.¹⁰³ Accordingly, despite Acheson's commitment to the contrary, the Americans were fully prepared to keep up pressure to reach agreement, while trying not to arouse antagonism in Europe. To achieve this, they had to attempt to harmonize German and French objections while convincing the hesitant British and Dutch to accept an increase in "continental European integration" in defence matters.¹⁰⁴

This was no easy task and by early 1952 the negotiations had reached an impasse. The Germans were pressing for better terms while the French were backing off, ambivalent over whether to treat "Germany as a potential ally or enemy". According to Acheson, the deadlock could only be resolved by the United States. "Our Government...brought pressure on the French and British to get on with the German program;...General Eisenhower...hammered away at European governments through Chiefs of Staff and Defense Ministers;...John McCloy [U.S. High Commissioner in Germany]...put all his great energy into pressure on the Chancellor and High Commissioners;...and I harried the Foreign Ministers, sometimes to the point of revolt".¹⁰⁵

Such determined efforts paid off and a treaty to establish the European Defence Community was finally signed in Paris on May 27, 1952. This was not the end of the matter, however. The terms of the Treaty could not come into force until it had been ratified by all six participating Governments.

IV ALLIANCE DEFENCE SYSTEM FINALLY CONSOLIDATED

i A New American Administration & a Change in NATO Policy

Meanwhile, there was an election in the United States in which former NATO Supreme Commander Eisenhower was elected President. He appointed John Foster Dulles his Secretary of State. Under their administration, which took office in January 1953, American, and consequently NATO, policy took a new turn.

Dulles was a Cold War hardliner who had frequently spoken out strongly against "the Soviet menace" and who reportedly believed that people had to be "scared into doing their bit" for the cause.¹⁰⁶ In 1950 he wrote a book called War or Peace in which, according to a popular English magazine of the day, he "denied belief in preventive war as a durable means to peace" and "demanded a militarily powerful free world constantly gnawing at Soviet despotism by every

method short of aggressive war".¹⁰⁷ He rejected the previous administration's policy of "containment" of communism and advocated instead "liberation" of lands subject to Soviet tyranny. Eisenhower accepted Dulles' theses and enunciated these views during the election campaign. The future President told a gathering of the American Legion, on May 25, 1952, that it was the mission of the United States to free the millions of people subject to communist slavery and added "the American conscience can never know peace until these people are restored again to being masters of their own fate".¹⁰⁸

The new American approach was soon reflected in the Eisenhower Administration's defence policy and subsequently in NATO policy. The Americans were still dissatisfied with the European rearmament effort. They felt that the Alliance was being weakened as a result of Europe's increased "sense of independence from U.S. guidance and direction" caused by the success of European economic recovery.¹⁰⁹ Accordingly, they began to reassess the West's reliance on conventional weapons and forces, the majority of which were based in Europe and might, potentially, prove unreliable.

This changed outlook toward Western defence policy was first aired at the NAC meeting in Paris in December 1952, at which the planned rearmament levels for Europe were reduced. One commentator summed up the meeting in this way

After feverishly seeking air divisions, air squadrons and destroyer flotillas for three years, NATO turned...to perfecting the weapons it had on hand and expanding the logistical base on which troops, planes and ships must operate. 110

The new Secretary of State had more in mind than this, however. At the April 1953 Council Meeting he "put forward a new concept", based on a slower, steadier development of conventional defensive strength, "reinforced by the availability of new weapons of vastly increased destructive power and by the striking of an air force based on internationally agreed positions."¹¹¹ In other words, the front line of NATO defences were to be air rather than land-based, relying first and foremost on nuclear weapons, the possession and control of which were entirely in the hands of the United States.

In reporting to the National Security Council about the meeting Dulles said that Alliance planning had now been put on a more realistic footing. "We now propose to look on NATO as the defense of Europe by Europe with U.S. assistance". In providing that assistance the Americans would now "concentrate on quality rather than quantity".¹¹² Precisely what was meant by "quality rather than quantity" was made clear at the next NAC meeting, held at the end of the year. At that time particular attention was paid to the provision

of the most modern weapons for the Alliance. The Final Communiqué recorded

The Council noted with satisfaction the intention of the President of the United States of America to ask Congress for authority to provide information on nuclear weapons to NATO commanders for purposes of NATO military planning.¹¹³

This plan was part and parcel of what became known as the policy of "massive retaliation" which was first expounded by Dulles in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954. Nuclear weapons were now to be considered as having become "conventional" and essential for the defence of the NATO area. In his speech Dulles said that Washington had decided "to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly, by means and at places of our choosing". He undertook to consult the Allies before using nuclear weapons, if time allowed,¹¹⁴ although the Americans have since always resisted binding commitments on the issue of consultation.¹¹⁵

Dulles' speech left some of the other Alliance members feeling somewhat concerned. Lester Pearson responded to it when he addressed the National Press Club in Washington, on March 15, 1954. While welcoming the close relationship Canada enjoyed with the United States and the protection that relationship, and membership in a common alliance, offered,

he admitted he was a little uneasy about the speech. He was particularly troubled by the use of the words "instantly", "means", and "our". He emphasized that he was not criticizing the new defence concept but felt that it made the need for close diplomatic cooperation and consultation between the Allies more important than ever.¹¹⁶ In other words, the other NATO governments wanted to know, in advance, just what the American Government was planning to do in their name.

ii The European Defence Community Collapses & West Germany Finally Joins NATO

By the time the policy of massive retaliation was being debated, the European Defence Community was close to collapse. Since the Treaty had been signed, back in May 1952, the French, and to a lesser extent the Italians, had shown a marked reluctance to see the project actually come to fruition. The Germans were also procrastinating, primarily because of differences with France over control of the rich coal-producing area of the Saar River basin. .

Between June 1952 and December 1953, the Americans made persistent efforts to encourage ratification of the Treaty.¹¹⁷ An example of the rather heavy-handed tactics they employed was the amendment by Congress of the Mutual Security Act. This allowed the American Government to withhold a portion of military aid funds to those countries which had

not ratified the EDC Treaty. The amendment was renewed in June 1954.¹¹⁸

The State Department was also preparing for the eventuality that the entire scheme might be defeated and considering what course to take in that event. By September 1952 the options being considered in Washington included outright West German membership in NATO; German rearmament independent of the Alliance; some form of German non-military contribution to Western defence; or "a retreat to a peripheral defense of Europe based on an arc from Norway, through the British Isles to Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey".¹¹⁹

French Foreign Minister Schuman was also trying to gain support for the Treaty and endeavouring to overcome his countrymen's hesitations by pointing out the consequences of rejection. He argued that defeat of the EDC would result in either a greatly weakened Western Alliance, without German participation, or the creation of a German army within NATO. Neither of these would be acceptable to France; the EDC was the best possible alternative the French could hope for.¹²⁰ Such blandishments appear to have had little effect, however. It seemed that the more the Americans pressed for ratification the more French hostility grew. Between 1952 and 1954, successive French governments were paralyzed by the EDC quarrel.¹²¹ The Americans, for their part, were becoming

increasingly frustrated with the French. This frustration was manifested at the December 1953 NAC meeting where Dulles delivered a speech which included veiled threats of potential U.S. policy changes if the Treaty failed to be ratified. He angrily warned the Alliance Foreign Ministers

If...the European Defence Community should not become effective, if France and Germany should remain apart...there would be grave doubt whether continental Europe could be made a place of safety. That would compel an agonizing reappraisal of United States policy.¹²²

These American tactics were not well received in Europe and were considered as little short of extortion in some countries, particularly France. Although the U.S. Administration gradually recognized the negative effects of its approach and decided that better progress could be made with "the relaxation of direct and overt U.S. pressure",¹²³ it was too late to change the mood in France. On August 30, 1954, the EDC Treaty was rejected by the French National Assembly in a vote of 319 to 264.¹²⁴ The European Defence Community was defeated before it ever came into being.

Not surprisingly, the Americans were angered by this turn of events. The State Department blamed both the French communists - who they believed just wanted to hand Western Europe over to the Soviet Union - and the ultra-nationalists of the Right - who had given in to ultra-nationalism despite

the dangers that would face an independent, isolated France - for the defeat of the EDC. On the day the Treaty was rejected, Dulles sent the text of a U.S. statement to the American Ambassador in France. It described the defeat as a "grave event" and warned

The French rejection of EDC, without provision of any alternative means of dealing with the basic ills of Europe, compels the US to reappraise its foreign policies and adjust them to the resultant situation.¹²⁵

The U.S. Administration was now determined to move ahead - if need be without French support - and help Germany "to restore full sovereignty...and enable it, by reasonable rearmament...to contribute to international peace and security"¹²⁶. The State Department began, immediately, to prepare alternative plans. It recognized that the EDC project had failed partly because many Europeans saw it as "a U.S. project to force premature federation along military lines, involving a high risk of ultimate German predominance in a European union"¹²⁷[emphasis in original]. Although there was to be no consideration of postponing German rearmament, it was felt that new tactics should be adopted. "The US should avoid the attitude it has displayed for years, that this is of primary urgency to strengthen NATO" and appear to be almost indifferent. Neither France nor Britain (which was still reluctant to assume commitments in union with

continental Europe) were to be pressured. Rather, tactful, diplomatic resources would be employed, with the United States staying out of the limelight.¹²⁸

Dulles encouraged British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, to act as mediator. Eden visited all the European NATO capitals in September to discuss the question of German entry into the Alliance. He found that the defeat of EDC and the vacuum it seemed to leave in European defence was, in fact, leading many Alliance partners to look more favourably on such a possibility.¹²⁹ Most of the European leaders were upset by French actions. Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany announced, early in September, that he was ready to negotiate with the U.S. and U.K. alone.¹³⁰ Dulles himself visited London and Bonn from September 16-17. The fact that he excluded Paris from his itinerary was interpreted as a clear indication that he wanted Germany rearmed and its sovereignty restored as soon as possible.¹³¹

By the end of September, what had seemed an impossibility four years earlier had been achieved. A Nine-Power Conference was convened in London (with the Brussels Treaty countries, Germany, Italy, the U.S. and Canada). It met between September 28 and October 3, at the end of which time West Germany and Italy had been invited to adhere to the Brussels Pact and participate in the newly-formed West European Union (WEU); the occupation regime in West Germany

was to be ended as soon as possible and the three occupying powers agreed to recognize the West German Government as the legitimate government of Germany; and the NATO countries present undertook to recommend that West Germany, through its participation in the WEU, be invited to join the Alliance at the next NAC meeting.¹³²

In five short days the major problems which had been plaguing the Alliance for four years were resolved. France remained a stumbling block, even at the Conference, resisting, to the end, West German participation. But the efforts of Lester Pearson - representing the one country not immediately involved - as honest broker or as some might say U.S. mouthpiece, together with the implicit likelihood that if the Conference failed the U.S. and Germany would conclude a separate arrangement, eventually forced France to capitulate and the final agreement was hammered out.¹³³

The Conference reconvened in Paris on October 6, at which time agreement was reached between France and Germany on the control of the Saar region. A full NAC meeting was held from October 20-23. It drew up the protocol for the accession of West Germany to NATO. The Protocol was signed by all Council members on October 23, 1954.

None of the decisions could come into effect without being approved by the governments involved. Between October

and December the Americans made efforts to encourage ratification. On December 23, the French National Assembly voted against some of the provisions of the Paris Agreements. President Eisenhower's reaction according to the diary entry recorded by his press secretary was: "Those damn French! What do they think they're trying to do? This could really upset the applecart in Europe". He then told Dulles: "We must let them [the French] know that we don't like this one bit but we must also tell them, in effect, that we are sure they will vote right". Eisenhower's not so subtle message got through and vote right they did, with the ratification vote just squeaking through the National Assembly on December 30.¹³⁴

Within the next couple of months German membership was ratified by all the member governments. In May 1955, ten years after Germany's defeat by the Allied Powers, the Federal Republic of Germany formally acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty. The Americans had achieved their objectives and NATO had been consolidated as the prime organ of Western defence.

So a mere ten years after the end of the Second World War the global picture had been entirely transformed. The new bi-polar division of the world was complete. In May 1955, under the leadership of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact was concluded between the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania.

Facing this new Eastern alliance was the Western bloc headed by the United States, now firmly established across the western reaches of Europe and the North Atlantic. By 1955, under the firm guiding hand of the State Department, the United States had accomplished its long-held goal of integrating Germany into the Western Alliance and of consolidating a strong military organization under U.S. leadership, with a nuclear capability which was to remain firmly in the control of Washington.

The finishing touches of this process were implemented through the course of 1955. In March, President Eisenhower made a commitment to maintain American forces in Europe for as long as necessary. In May, the Federal Republic of Germany was formally welcomed into NATO and in December Alliance forces were equipped with American supplied and controlled nuclear weapons.¹³⁵ There was to be no turning back. The Americans had succeeded in carefully moulding a grouping of states in the West solidly behind U.S. aims and objectives. Britain and even more so France had reluctantly conceded their number one position in the international arena to the United States. Canada had eagerly shifted its allegiance from an old to a new colonial power. How the Alliance, and more particularly the United States as its leading force, would maintain the fragile unity of fifteen distinct nations was the challenge facing NATO as the first post-war decade drew to a close. The internal contradictions manifested in the

Alliance's formative years had been grappled with and at least temporarily resolved. But they had only been swept under the carpet and would remain to plague the Western Alliance into the late twentieth century.

¹ Lord Ismay, NATO: the First Five Years 1949-1954 (Paris: NATO Information Service, 1954), p. 31.

² Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1950, Vol. I, NSC 68, p.241.

³ Ibid., pp. 234-292.

⁴ Noam Chomsky referred to NSC 68 in this way in the film Are We Winning Mommy? America and the Cold War which was shown on British Channel 4 television on August 10, 1987.

⁵ Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel to President Truman 1946-1950, "NATO - A Landmark of the Truman Presidency", NATO Review, No.2, (1984), pp. 25-30.

⁶ David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus (New York: Hill & Wang, 1971), p.260.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ FRUS 1950, Vol. I, memorandum from George Kennan to Dean Acheson, January 6, 1950, pp. 127-138.

⁹ FRUS 1950, Vol. III, p.1 and p.12 and Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, p.164.

¹⁰ FRUS 1950, Vol. III, p.22.

¹¹ Ibid., p.36.

¹² Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series II, Vol. II (London: HMSO, 1987), pp. vi-xv.

¹³ Ibid., p. vi and p. xi.

¹⁴ Ibid., "Brief for U.K. delegation", April 27, 1950, pp. 151-154.

¹⁵ Ibid., postscript to a letter from British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin to U.K. Ambassador Franks in Washington, April 19, 1950, p.64.

¹⁶ Ibid., letter from Ambassador Franks to the Foreign Office in London, April 28, 1950, pp. 186-187.

¹⁷ In April the American Ambassador in Paris reported to the Secretary of State that French Premier Georges Bidault had said that "further thought must be given as to how Germany can be associated with the North Atlantic effort". (FRUS 1950, Vol. III, p.60.) The British also accepted that ultimately the aim of Western policy would have to be to bind West Germany to the West; their preference was to do this slowly by first admitting the Germans to the Council of Europe. On the question of re-establishing the German armed forces most of the Europeans were firm. In the debate in the British House of Commons on March 28 Bevin said: "We have set our face - the United States, France and ourselves - against the rearming of Germany and that, I am afraid, we must adhere to". In the same debate, however, opposition leader Winston Churchill had spoken of the need for Germany to participate in the defence of Europe. In France, Schuman told the French National Assembly on February

24 that although German participation in some organizations was favoured, "it is quite impossible even to discuss the question of a restoration of Germany's military forces". (Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series II, Vol. II, pp. 95-108 and pp. 138-140.) The Belgians, however, were reported to have indicated by March "that Western Germany should be rearmed and that no further time should be wasted in dallying with the situation". (FRUS 1950, Vol. III, telegram from the Secretary of State to certain diplomatic offices, March 13, 1950. p.30.)

18 FRUS 1950, Vol. III, telegram from the Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy, Paris, April 21 1950, p.59; memorandum by John Foster Dulles, Consultant in the State Department, April 21 1950. p.60.

19 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969), p.435.

20 Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945 (London: Macmillan Press, 1980), p.122.

21 Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series II, Vol. I. (London: HMSO, 1986), Extract from the record of the Third Bi-Partite Ministerial Meeting, May 10, 1950, p.11.

22 Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series II, Vol. II, pp. xvii-xix.

23 L.B. Pearson, Memoirs 1948-1957: The International Years (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1974), p.67.

24 FRUS 1950, Vol. I, editorial note pp. 321-322.

25 One concrete outcome of the London North Atlantic Council meeting in May was the decision to set up a civilian body "to coördinate the work of the Alliance's civilian and military bodies and to act as a forum for regular political exchanges between member governments". It was composed of Deputies to the Foreign Ministers of the member governments and met in continuous session in London. (NATO: Facts and Figures, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1984, pp. 26-27.) The Deputies held their first session on July 25 at which time the U.S. Deputy Charles Spofford was elected Permanent Chairman. (Ismay, NATO: the First Five Years, p.164.)

26 FRUS 1950, Vol. III, telegram Secretary of State to Diplomatic Offices (NAT countries), July 22, 1950, pp. 138-140.

27 See for example Kolko, The Limits of Power, pp.578-617 and T.E. Vadney, The World Since 1945 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), pp. 134-144. This latter book describes the background to the war as rooted in events prior to 1950 such as American opposition to the indigenous People's Committees established at the end of the war, the enforced division of the country and popular opposition to the continuing U.S. presence in the South. Vadney points out that "a debate developed as to whether the United States itself had invited the attack". Interestingly, as late as June 18, just a week before the invasion, John Foster Dulles was in Seoul and assured the Korean National Assembly of America's continuing support "so long as you continue to play worthily your part in the great design of human freedom". (Cited in Vadney, p.144.)

28 FRUS 1950, Vol. I, NSC Draft Report on "The Position and Action With Respect to Possible Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation", July 1, 1950, p.332

29 Ibid.

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- 30 Gaddis Smith, The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, Vol. XVI: Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1972), pp. 240-241.
- 31 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p.437.
- 32 FRUS 1950, Vol. III, memorandum by Acheson on his meeting with the President, July 31, 1950, pp. 167-168.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 FRUS 1950, Vol. III, p.64.
- 35 FRUS 1950, Vol. III, Spofford to the Secretary of State, August 4, 1950, pp. 184-185.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson, p.241.
- 38 FRUS 1950, Vol. III, U.S. Ambassador, London, to the Secretary of State, August 8, 1950, p.190.
- 39 Ibid., pp. 214-219.
- 40 FRUS 1950, Vol. I, p.352.
- 41 Pearson, Memoirs, pp. 150-151.
- 42 FRUS 1950, Vol. III, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to the President, September 8, 1950, pp. 273-278.
- 43 Ibid., pp. 295-301.
- 44 Ibid., pp. 1170-1172.
- 45 Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson, pp. 241-242.
- 46 FRUS 1950, Vol. III, U.S. Ambassador, Paris, to Secretary of State, September 5, 1950, p.267.
- 47 Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson, pp. 241-242.
- 48 FRUS 1950, Vol. III, pp. 264-266.
- 49 Lord Ismay, NATO: the First Five Years, p.32.
- 50 Pearson, Memoirs. Pearson notes that Acheson introduced the matter of German involvement "without any preliminary warning". p. 85.
- 51 Lord Ismay, NATO: the First Five Years, p.32.
- 52 NATO: Facts and Figures, p.28.
- 53 FRUS 1950, Vol. III, p.303 and p.1231.
- 54 Pearson, Memoirs, pp. 67-68.
- 55 FRUS 1950, Vol. III, p.310.
- 56 Royal Institute of International Affairs & Council on Foreign Relations, Britain and the U.S.: Problems in Cooperation (London: RIIA, 1953), p.149.
- 57 FRUS 1950, Vol. III, p.310.
- 58 FRUS 1951, Vol. III, State Department paper on "Integrated Forces and European Defense", January 26, 1951, pp. 755-759.
- 59 Grosser, The Western Alliance, p.122 and Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope: 1946-1953 (Suffolk: Hodder and Stoughton, 1956), p.272.
- 60 FRUS 1950, Vol. I, p.398.
- 61 For more details on the Ambassadors' Agreement and the subsequent growth in the American military presence in Britain see Simon Duke, US Defence Basis in the United Kingdom: A Matter for Joint Decision? (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), pp.50-61, and Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain (London: Michael Joseph, 1984).

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- 62 Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier, p.32.
- 63 Statement by Canadian Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton, to the Canadian House of Commons, May 19, 1950 in R.A. Mackay (ed.), Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1971), p.241.
- 64 FRUS 1950, Vol. II, p.585.
- 65 FRUS 1950, Vol. III, p.151.
- 66 John A. Stevenson, "Canada - Free and Dependent", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 3, (April 1951), pp. 456-467.
- 67 FRUS 1950, Vol. III, State Department Aide-Memoire on "The Need of the French Government for Immediate Assistance in its Military Effort, both with respect to its North Atlantic Treaty responsibilities and its military efforts in Indochina", December 18, 1950, pp. 1446-1451; and message from Charles Spofford to the Secretary of State, July 28, 1950, indicating that the French wanted additional American and British forces to be moved to Continental Europe, especially Germany, p. 148.
- 68 Grosser, The Western Alliance, p.123.
- 69 Ibid. and Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson, p.243.
- 70 FRUS 1950, Vol. III, p.372.
- 71 Ibid., Acheson to the U.S. High Commissioner in Germany, October 18 & 19, 1950. p.295 and pp. 389-391.
- 72 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 272-273.
- 73 Lord Ismay, NATO: the First Five Years, p. 35.
- 74 Pearson, Memoirs, p. 63.
- 75 FRUS 1950, Vol. III, p. 600.
- 76 Lord Ismay, NATO: the First Five Years, p. 37.
- 77 FRUS 1951, Vol. III, State Department Memorandum outlining the Secretary of State's presentation of North Atlantic Treaty problems to General Eisenhower, January 4, 1951, pp. 396-400.
- 78 Lord Ismay, NATO: the First Five Years, p. 38 and Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 273.
- 79 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 274.
- 80 FRUS 1951, Vol. III, p. 451.
- 81 Ibid., p. 456.
- 82 Pearson, Memoirs, p. 72 and FRUS 1950, Vol. III, p. 1231.
- 83 Pearson, Memoirs, p. 85.
- 84 FRUS 1951, Vol. III, pp. 244-245.
- 85 Ibid., State Department Working Paper on "Greece, Turkey and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", August 28, 1951. pp. 568-572.
- 86 Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson, p. 262.
- 87 FRUS 1951, Vol. III, p. 601 & p. 651.
- 88 Ibid., Secretary of State to the President, September 19, 1951. pp. 678-679.
- 89 Statement by L.B. Pearson to the Canadian House of Commons, October 22, 1951, in R.A. Mackay, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy: Documents, pp. 206-208.
- 90 FRUS 1951, Vol. III, Charles Spofford to the Secretary of State, August 24, 1951, p. 258.

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- 92 Pearson, Memoirs, p. 75.
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- 94 Lester B. Pearson, "The Development of Canadian Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1 (October 1951), pp. 17-30.
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- 96 Ibid., pp. 236-237.
- 97 Ibid., "US Position at Ottawa", September 6, 1951, pp. 646-650.
- 98 Lord Ismay, NATO: the First Five Years, pp. 39-40.
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- 100 FRUS 1951 Vol. II, p. 885 and R. Mackay, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy: Documents, pp. 242-244
- 101 Duke, U.S. Defence Bases in the United Kingdom, pp. 86-96.
- 102 FRUS 1951, Vol. III, paper prepared in the State Department on "Integrated Forces and European Army" in which Acheson's letter to Schuman is quoted, January 26, 1951, pp. 755-759.
- 103 FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. V, Part 1, p. 597.
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- 105 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 608.
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- 107 Everybody's Weekly, London, England, January 17, 1953. pp. 8-9.
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- 109 FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. II, Part 1 & 2, NSC Policy Statement on National Security Policy, undated (summer 1953), p.586.
- 110 Drew Middleton, "NATO Changes Direction", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 3 (April 1953), pp. 427-440.
- 111 John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace", Foreign Affairs, Vol.xxxii, No. 3 (April 1954), pp. 353-364.
- 112 FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. V, Part 1, Secretary of State's Report to the National Security Council, April 29, 1953, p.398.
- 113 NATO Final Communiqués 1949-1972, North Atlantic Council Meeting, 14-16 December, 1953, Paris (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1974).
- 114 FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. V, Part 1, p. 511-512 and FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. II, Part 1 & 2, p.609.
- 115 See Duke, U.S. Defence Bases in the United Kingdom, and Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier, for more details on the issue of consultation, particularly as it has affected the United Kingdom.

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- 116 Speech by Lester Pearson to the National Press Club, Washington, March 15, 1954. Extracts cited in R.A. Mackay, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy: Documents, pp.253-256.
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- 118 Ibid., p. 851.
- 119 Ibid., p.694.
- 120 Robert Schuman, "France and Europe", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 3 (April 1953), pp. 349-360.
- 121 Grosser, The Western Alliance, pp. 123-125.
- 122 FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. V, Part 1, p. 448 and John Foster Dulles, "Unity Must be Achieved Soon: It May Never Again be Possible for Integration to Occur in Freedom." Speech to the North Atlantic Council Meeting, Paris, December 14, 1953; Reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 20, No. 6 (January 1954), pp. 165-167.
- 123 FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. II, p. 407.
- 124 Grosser, The Western Alliance, p. 126.
- 125 FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1115-1116.
- 126 Ibid., p. 1116 and FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. V, Part 1, p. 1001.
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- 128 Ibid.
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- 131 F. Roy Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe: 1945-1963 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p.186.
- 132 FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1345-1355. Selected documents of the Conference, including its Final Act and the revised Brussels Treaty, can be found in Lord Ismay, NATO: the First Five Years, pp. 235-266 and in Appendix II to the Chatham House Study, Britain in Western Europe: WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956), pp. 94-108.
- 133 Pearson, Memoirs, pp. 88-90.
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- 135 NATO: Facts and Figures, (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1984), pp.333-334.

CONCLUSION

The preceding chapters have explored the process by which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being under the firm guiding hand of the United States. Despite the American mythology to the contrary, this Alliance of ostensibly sovereign states was moulded and shaped by the Americans to serve U.S. foreign policy aims and interests in the post-war world. Such was to be the continuing story of the Western Alliance, not simply in its formative years but for many years to come - and even in radically different international circumstances.

Over the years NATO has continued to manifest and grapple with many of the same issues it faced in its infancy - the rivalries between the three big powers, American dissatisfaction with the level of commitment and contribution from other members as well as frustration with their attempts to make NATO into more than simply a military organization, European resistance to American dictate and lack of consultation in addition to concerns about loss of national sovereignty, to name a few. Nevertheless, the United States has continued successfully to steer the Alliance in the direction it chooses, often in glaring violation of the fine-sounding words of consultation and equal partnership that are reiterated in official communiqués. A cursory look at some of the developments after 1955 will indicate how the patterns

set and difficulties experienced in NATO's first years have continued and become firmly entrenched.

One of the recurring concerns which has been voiced frequently, particularly by smaller members including Canada, often much to the frustration of the United States, has been the desire to maintain NATO as something more than just a military alliance. Over the years this issue has consumed much time and effort with little significant result other than perhaps to appease the complainants.

As was discussed at the end of the previous chapter, in response to the conflicts that surfaced as a result of American pressure to ratify the EDC agreement in the mid-fifties, the United States decided to adopt new tactics of tact and diplomacy to achieve its objectives. Despite the fact that this tactic eventually bore fruit with the admission of Germany to NATO, the Americans remained uneasy and irritated by the continuing concerns of many members about the predominantly military nature of the Alliance. American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed the other members were using the issue of the need for greater political unity as an excuse not to put adequate money into their military budgets and as a means of getting more economic aid from the the United States through NATO. At the same time they refused to submit their own national policies for review by the Organization.¹ Consequently, in order to

manipulate these dissatisfactions into a direction that could serve American objectives, Dulles turned his attention to getting the Alliance to try and sort out its internal problems by encouraging member states to subordinate national to collective interests. To this end, in 1956 he proposed the formation of a Committee of Three - Lester Pearson of Canada, Gaetano Martino of Italy and Halvard Lange of Norway - to make recommendations for improving and extending co-operation among members in the non-military field. In the introduction to the report of the Three Wise Men, as they became known, it was noted that

NATO has not been destroyed, or even weakened, by the threats and attacks of its enemies. It has faltered at times through the lethargy or complacency of its members, through dissension or division between them; by putting narrow national considerations above the collective interest....to combat these tendencies NATO must be used by its members for much more than it has been used, for sincere and genuine consultation on questions of common concern.²

The Report concluded that

the deterrent role of NATO based on solidarity and strength can be discharged only if the political and economic relations between its members are cooperative and close. An Alliance in which the members ignore each others interests, or engage in political or economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of each other, cannot be effective either for deterrence or defence....The fundamental historical fact underlying

development is that the nation state, by itself and relying exclusively on national policy and national power, is inadequate for progress or even survival in the nuclear age.

In this context, consultation in an alliance

means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions have become fixed.³

Precisely what was meant by this, at least as far as the Americans and British were concerned, was spelled out clearly by U.S. President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan at the conclusion of their talks in Washington in October 1957. The communiqué issued after their meeting stated

the concept of national self-sufficiency is now out of date. The countries of the free world are now interdependent, and only in genuine partnership, by combining their resources and sharing tasks in many fields can progress and safety be found.⁴

At the same time, Dulles advised the German Foreign Minister that it would not always be possible to consult about everything if there was a need to act quickly. He said

While we are anxious to see the NAC develop into a useful consultative body, we do not wish to have our capacity for action destroyed.

The German Foreign Minister understood clearly what Dulles was saying and responded that "the U.S. plays the

essential role in NATO and...no-one wants to restrict U.S. action".⁵ In other words, despite the fine phrases, the United States intended to continue acting as it saw fit and expected the unquestioning support and concurrence of the other members of the Alliance. This was the pattern which had emerged from the time of NATO's founding and which continues to this day.

The Report of the Committee of Three was just the beginning of many efforts to deal with internal differences and conflicting interests within the Alliance, as well as of continuing American determination to maintain its capacity for independent action. Many of these contradictions surfaced in glaring form in the decade between 1956 and 1967. This was a period which saw NATO put to some of its most difficult tests as the Organization endeavoured to harmonize the interests of fifteen discrete countries (and in particular 3 big powers) while also maintaining American control and dominance.

In the middle of 1956 the interests and actions of the three big powers in NATO came into sharp conflict in the Suez Crisis. While the specific details of the crisis are not of importance here, what was significant about Suez was the confirmation of American power in the Middle East, in place of the old colonial regimes of Britain and France, within the Western Alliance and in the international arena.

Following the rise to power of Egyptian nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954, both Britain and France, as well as Israel, felt threatened by the potential implications of the rise of Arab nationalism. The Americans, on the other hand, were more concerned to win over Egypt and other Arab states to prevent them from turning to the Soviet Union for support. Following a series of incidents involving all three big powers, Nasser nationalized the British and French owned Suez Canal in July 1956. In an effort to force Nasser to back down and to protect their interests in the region, Britain and France conspired with Israel to initiate a war against Egypt. This was done without the knowledge of the United States.

The Americans were not prepared to support war in the Middle East at that time and mobilized United Nations opposition to Britain and France. Canada quickly joined in U.S. condemnation of Britain, France and Israel and Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent gently chastized the British for acting unilaterally, without consulting either the United States or the United Nations. In a telegram sent to British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden on November 1, 1956, St. Laurent expressed Canada's deep concern at "the deplorable divergence of viewpoint and policy between the United Kingdom and the United States in regard to the decisions that have been taken and the procedure followed". He emphasized the

distress felt by all those, including Canada, "who believe that Anglo-American co-operation and friendship is the very foundation of our hopes for progress toward a peaceful and secure world."⁶ The ensuing combination of diplomatic and economic pressure, spearheaded by Secretary of State Dulles and President Eisenhower, forced the Anglo-French operations to a halt on November 7.

Speaking at the United Nations debate on the crisis Dulles declared his deep regret that "the US finds itself unable to agree with three nations with whom it has deep friendship, admiration and respect, and two of whom constitute our oldest, most trusted and reliable allies."⁷ He reiterated this theme at the Conference of American West European Chiefs of Mission in Paris the following May. He explained that during the Suez Crisis the United States had been acting out of principle, of commitment both to the U.N. Charter and to the 1st Article of the North Atlantic Treaty on renouncing the use of force except in self-defence. Dulles self-righteously declared

a nation like the US with a world-wide responsibility has got to put its principles ahead of any one or more nations.⁸

What the Suez Crisis really illustrated was not the American commitment to principles (the United States has, after all, chosen to resort to force on several occasions

when it served American interests to do so), but rather the end of the dominant influence of the old colonial powers in the region, the impossibility of British and French efforts to play great power politics against the will of the Americans and the undisputed leadership of the United States both in the Middle East and in the Western Alliance. At a conference of their Northern Europe Chiefs of Mission in September 1957 the Americans acknowledged this new reality

The Suez Affair caused the United States to review its relationship with the UK and with France and as a consequence tripartite consultation was quietly abandoned and replaced by bilateral consultation within the NATO framework.⁹

This, of course, was not the end of British and French efforts to assert their influence but it had been made very clear who called the shots both within the Western Alliance and internationally.

A crucial area in which American leadership and authority were exercised in the Alliance was through U.S. control of the NATO nuclear capability. In the military arena, on the initiative of the United States, the 1950s and 1960s saw a move away from reliance on conventional weapons to the development of NATO's nuclear capabilities. This process resulted in greater conflicts than ever as the European members became increasingly hostile to American control of the NATO nuclear force. In an attempt to diffuse

these concerns President John F. Kennedy, in the early 1960s, made efforts to try and build cohesion based on positive rather than negative goals. For example, in a message to the North Atlantic Council pledging continued American support for the Organization, Kennedy emphasized the importance of not only military strength and commitment but also economic and political development. He painted a picture of a unified Alliance playing an expanded, almost missionary role in the world.

Although the technical task here is economic, our ultimate purpose transcends material considerations. The challenge is to create a new partnership between the old nations in the north and the new nations in the south. In the end we must build that partnership not merely on common interest in economic growth, but on a common commitment to the principles of political freedom.¹⁰

It was conflict over the issue of American control of NATO's nuclear force which led to one of the Alliance's greatest internal conflicts, reflecting the near impossibility of reconciling the interests of competing world powers. The crisis was the complete withdrawal of France from NATO's military organization in 1966.

As previous chapters have shown, France had long resented American control of the Western Alliance and cherished aspirations of regaining its international prestige and stature. French President General de Gaulle had been a

proponent of Europe acting as a "third force" between the two superpowers since the early post-war years. De Gaulle became President of the Fifth Republic in 1958 and proceeded to pursue the independent foreign policy which he had always advocated. When he failed, in 1959, to win Anglo-American agreement for some sort of three-power control of the Alliance's use of atomic weapons, he withdrew the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO's command and began to plan for an independent French nuclear force. The final straw for de Gaulle was the failure of President Kennedy to consult the Alliance during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was yet another clear indication "that the Atlantic Alliance was not really a partnership of equals but an instrument for arrogating all authority to Washington."¹¹

The Franco-American rift became more and more pronounced until in 1966 de Gaulle withdrew all French forces from the NATO command and ordered all NATO installations out of France. France continued, however, to be a member of the Alliance. In informing U.S. President Lyndon Johnson of the French decision, de Gaulle declared

France intends to recover, in her territory, the full exercise of her sovereignty, now impaired by the permanent presence of Allied military elements or by habitual use being made of its air space, to terminate her participation in the 'integrated' commands, and no longer to place forces at the disposal of NATO.¹²

The Americans, needless to say, were not pleased by this move. In his reply to de Gaulle, President Johnson made the oft-repeated American threat to recalcitrant members, especially France.

I would be less than frank if I did not inform you that your action raises grave questions regarding the whole relationship between the responsibilities and benefits of the Alliance.¹³

The French, nevertheless, went ahead and the one member of the Alliance for whom American control and the necessity to surrender sovereignty had been too much of a sacrifice and affront to national pride chose to pursue its own independent course in international affairs. In reality, however, in the intervening years France, while regularly speaking out on its own behalf, has continued to throw its support behind the United States internationally as subsequent events in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf have demonstrated.

Following the withdrawal of France, in some ways things appeared to go more smoothly within the Alliance. European sensitivity and popular opposition to American dominance and suspicions that Europe's interests might have been sacrificed for the achievement of superpower detente persisted and surfaced periodically. Britain, by and large, adjusted to its world position as a lesser power while still managing to retain its special relationship with the United States and in

the Alliance, only occasionally having its knuckles rapped by the U.S., as in the 1982 Falklands War.

Despite some tensions during the years of the Diefenbaker government, Canada has continued to play its part in the Western Alliance as loyal American supporter and sometimes mouthpiece on the international stage. The view of Canada presented by the U.S. Ambassador to Ottawa as long ago as 1957 sums up that role and still holds true today. The Ambassador told delegates to the American Northern Europe Chiefs of Mission Conference in London,

In post-war diplomacy Canada occupied a unique position as a member of the Commonwealth and a neighbour without a colonial past or geographical pretensions whose influence has been exercised mostly in support of U.S. objectives. Her territory and resources are essential to our military defense.

Despite potential difficulties with the Diefenbaker government, the Americans remained confident in Canada's continuing support. The Ambassador continued, Canada

...will continue as a sound and reliable ally. Support for NATO is truly non-partisan. In general they tend to see the world through our eyes and they appreciate the geographical realities of their defense situation. They believe in free enterprise and we need have no fear that they will abandon us.¹⁴

The same statement could easily have been made by an American ambassador speaking today or at any time in the more than forty year history of NATO.

The picture of internal relations within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization presented in the preceding chapters has essentially continued throughout the zig zags of history since the 1940s. The Alliance has remained primarily a military organization supporting the aims and objectives of the United States on the world scale.

In many ways the world of 1991 is fundamentally different from the world of 1949. In the last two years the bi-polar division of the world has ceased to exist and the Cold War has come to an end. The Soviet Union is no longer the enemy, the Warsaw Pact has been disbanded and German reunification is a reality. Lord Ismays's three reasons, quoted earlier, for the founding of NATO - namely to keep the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in - no longer apply. The Russians are no longer a threat, the Germans are united behind the aims of the Western Alliance and the United States has become the sole, supreme world power. German unity, so long sought in words if not in deeds by the Americans, is now being hailed as a victory for the crusade against communism in words reminiscent of Truman's 1947 call for the containment of communism. Although countries of Eastern Europe, notably Yugoslavia, are

undergoing crisis and disintegration, the long-cherished American goal of Western European union - which caused much friction and resentment in the early years of the Alliance - is now nearing reality with the impending political as well as economic union of Europe in 1992.

Despite these changed international conditions the familiar internal relationships within the Alliance remain evident. The Cold War may be over but as recently as February 1991 the United States was testing its cruise missiles over Northern Canada. A Canadian armed forces spokesman in Alberta, essentially speaking on behalf of the U.S., drawing no distinction between "we" and the Americans and failing to indicate precisely who we are defending and against whom, commented

Although politically the Cold War is off,
in order to maintain our capability to
defend ourselves we have to test.¹⁵

In 1988 Canada renewed its agreement with the United States to allow cruise missile testing over Canadian soil for another five years.

The recent Persian Gulf war demonstrated once more the extent to which the internal relationships forged since the very first years of the Alliance still remain in place, although now applied to activities far outside the North

Atlantic area. Once U.S. President George Bush decided to take a stand against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and mobilized United Nations support for the American stand, it did not take long for the members of the Alliance, as well as others, to line up and commit themselves to the American position. This happened despite the fact that U.S. initiatives were apparently taken without consultation with America's closest allies. An article in the Guardian newspaper on August 8, 1990, headlined "Britain is caught by surprise", noted

Despite Whitehall claims that the decision to send US troops was taken in close consultation with Britain, the Government last night appeared to have been caught unawares by the move.

Despite the lack of notification, British politicians, like those in so many other countries, wholeheartedly endorsed the American action. However, the British Shadow Foreign Secretary, Gerald Kaufman, did comment somewhat pathetically

I would wish any UK government to be consulted by the US. The UK government under Mrs Thatcher doesn't rank as much in international affairs as it used to or ought to do.¹⁶

Other familiar patterns were repeated too. Support for the U.S.-led war caused divisions within the French

government, resulting in the resignation of one Minister. In the final analysis, however, the French backed the U.S./U.N. initiative and sent troops to the front. Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney supported the American position from the outset, although some Canadian opposition politicians voiced reservations. The fact that these were motivated primarily to win political mileage rather than on principle was revealed by the opposition's subsequent position. The debate on the situation in the Persian Gulf was actually taking place in the House of Commons in Ottawa when the U.S. air force launched its first attack, thus taking both the Iraqis and Canadian politicians by surprise. All the words of reservation being voiced at the very time by opposition politicians stopped instantly, the debate was ended and the entire House of Commons declared unequivocal support for the war. So much for consultation, independence in foreign policy and protection of sovereignty!

Where does NATO go from here? With the Warsaw Pact disbanded, the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe espousing the model of Western style free market economy and democracy, Germany reunited and the United States as the supreme world power currently floating on the euphoria of victory in the Persian Gulf, the question facing the Alliance must be to determine its place and role in this new international climate. Undoubtedly, the United States still needs NATO to support its aims and self-appointed role as

world policeman, judge, jury and moral guardian. Equally likely, however, is continuing dissension in the ranks when those American aims run counter to the interests of other members.

At the present time, with the United States riding a wave of success internationally and nations still continuing to use war as a means of settling differences, it seems likely that NATO will continue to have a part to play and will flourish holding on to the American coat-tails. Where this path will take the North Atlantic Alliance and when and where the next crisis will break out can only be a matter of conjecture and, indeed, apprehension, in today's unstable international climate. The only real lesson to be learned in history is that nothing stands still and the dynamics discussed in the preceding chapters will continue to develop and change as the objectives of both the United States and the other member nations evolve in response to changing international conditions.

¹ Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1955-1957, Volume IV, report on discussion at North Atlantic Council Meeting, October 20, 1955, pp.23-26.

² NATO Letter, Vol. 5, Special Supplement, "Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO", January 1957.

³ Ibid.

⁴ NATO Handbook (NATO Information Service, Paris, 1959), p.66.

⁵ FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. IV, memorandum of conversation with Foreign Minister of Germany at Dulles' Washington home, November 23, 1957, pp.190-193.

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- ⁶ Arthur E. Blanchette, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy 1955-1965: Selected Speeches and Documents (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1977), pp.13-14.
- ⁷ Quoted in Roscoe Drummond and Easton Coblenz, John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power (New York: Doubleday and Co.Inc., 1960), p.175.
- ⁸ FRUS 1955-1957, Vol.IV, minutes of West European Chiefs of Mission Conference, Paris, May 6, 1957, pp.575-576.
- ⁹ Ibid., Summary of Proceedings, Northern Europe Chiefs of Mission Conference, London, September 19-21, 1957, p.610.
- ¹⁰ Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., ed., The Dynamics of World Power: A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy 1945-1973, Vol.1, Western Europe (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, in association with McGraw Hill Book Co., 1973), pp.685-686.
- ¹¹ T.E. Vadney, The World Since 1945 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), p.296.
- ¹² Schlesinger, Dynamics of World Power, President de Gaulle to President Johnson, March 7, 1966, p.834.
- ¹³ Ibid., Johnson to de Gaulle, March 7, 1966, p.835.
- ¹⁴ FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. IV, Summary of Proceedings Northern Europe Chiefs of Mission Conference, September 19-21, 1957, pp.617-619.
- ¹⁵ Winnipeg Free Press, February 1, 1991.
- ¹⁶ The Guardian, August 8, 1990.

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