ETHNIC RELATIONS AND CHINESE STATE POLICY

by

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ABSTRACT

A contribution to political anthropology and the study of ethnic relations, this thesis links traditional and contemporary Chinese attitudes and practices toward ethnic minority groups. Sinocentrism has been the basis for both traditional and modern policies. An active force in shaping the Chinese worldview and the dynamics of Chinese culture and personality, Sinocentrism is also prominent in Confucianism, the state religion of Imperial China. Confucianization has occurred in many non-Han Chinese cultures, contributing to the absorption of these peoples into the Chinese way of life.

Policies and practices of the ancient Chinese state toward minority groups exhibit both pacifist and militarist orientations. Generally speaking, pacifist orientations were exhibited toward strong tribal groups in the north whereas military conquests, forced Confucianization, and ultimate assimilation frequently occurred in the south. The tu-si system of indirect rule functioned together with Han colonization and Confucianization to incorporate these ethnic groups into Chinese society. Nevertheless, ethnic conflicts persisted.

Pluralist elements taken from Marxist and Soviet sources have recently entered Chinese ethnic policies. Formulated in the Republican era, these elements have found expression in the present government's recognition of minorities and in the establishment of autonomous minority regions. However, pluralist elements in policy have been contradicted and overwhelmed by a new Sinocentric

assimilationist thrust which has transformed existing Chinese minority groups through the training of minority cadres, collectivization, Han migration, and the transformation of minority ethnic lifeways by the imposition of a common socialist ideology and culture. Thus, contemporary Chinese ethnic policies are cultural pluralist in form but assimilationist in content and are reminiscent of those of the past.

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A Brief Summary of Theories on Ethnicity

Many scholars complain that conceptual confusion exists in ethnic studies and this is especially true of Chinese ethnic studies. As some of them note, the Chinese language has only one term, "minzu", to cover all the meanings conveyed by the terms "ethnic group," "ethnicity," "peoplehood," "nation," and "nationality" (Heberer 1989; Schwarz 1971). The English translation of "minzu" as "nationality" and "nation" is commonly used to describe all the different groups of people in China, but terms like "ethnicity", "ethnic group" and "ethnic identity" are more frequently encountered in the case of Western countries. Unfortunately, the abundance of English concepts concerning ethnicity has produced as much confusion, if not more, than has the poverty of the Chinese terminology. Therefore, scholars such as McKay and Frank (1978), and Connor (1978) complain about the lack of conceptual precision in ethnic studies, and they believe that conceptual clarification and precision would lead to better theoretical work.[1]

In order to avoid conceptual confusion, I prefer to use the term "ethnic group" to describe all the non-Han groups in China, the sub-units of a larger society. Therefore, I use the terms, "ethnic group" and "minority group" interchangeably to refer to the

fifty-five non-Han groups in China. All these groups differ from the Han Chinese in terms of traditional subsistence, social organization, language, and religion. At one time independent and sovereign, all of these groups now occupy a dominated position and are minorities today in both numerical and political senses.

Actually, any conceptual clarification depends to a great extent on the writers' theoretical orientation. Risking simplification, I would like to present a brief overview of some important theories about ethnicity for the purpose of providing a framework for examining Chinese ethnic issues. Generally speaking, I think that many ethnic theories fall into one of two paradigms -- assimilationism or ethnic persistence. By assimilationism I mean the perspective which sees the phenomenon of ethnicity as liable to disappearance as society "advances", or becomes industrialized and urbanized. The second paradigm presents the opposing view that ethnic identities and ethnic conflicts will always exist.

1. Assimilationism

Systematic study of ethnic issues began in the United States in the 1920s. The central paradigm at this time, as represented by Robert Park, was assimilationism, whose influence persisted well into the 1960s. The major focus of this paradigm was on ethnic change in industrial and urban circumstances. Park and his followers attempted to illustrate how ethnic and racial groups would be absorbed into the mainstream. The most important part of Park's theory is his idea of a race relation cycle. According to

this theory, immigrants took either the route of least resistance through contact, accommodation, and fusion or a more circuitous route from contact, via conflict, competition, and accommodation, to a final fusion (Park 1950). The only difference between the two routes rests on the fact that the latter would take a longer time, during which more resistance could be exerted on the part of immigrant groups. But both routes share one final destination--the loss of a distinctive ethnic identity. The underlying assumption of assimilationism, based on evolutionary and liberal ideas, was that all humans of whatever culture, language, or belief systems would be drawn into the "industrial fray by the promise of better things for the well-being of all" (Driedger 1989:36). In short, the assimilationists saw racial and ethnic forms of identification as incompatible with modern society. They claimed that racial and ethnic characteristics would disappear in due time (Thompson 1989:73). Embedded in the metaphor of the melting pot, the theory posits that many immigrants would no longer wish to continue the traditions of the restricted old world but would opt for the opportunities of the new. Each ethnic and racial group would be synthesized into a new group, a new nation, and a new culture.

Milton Gordon modified Park's assimilation theory and made it more sophisticated. According to Gordon (1951,1964), assimilation is not a single process but involves a number of subprocesses or stages. Cultural assimilation, or acculturation, refers, in Gordon's words, to "the absorption of the cultural behavior patterns of the 'host' society" -- the incoming group's acceptance

of the modes of dress, language, and other cultural characteristics
of mainstream society. Structural assimilation is manifested in
the degree to which immigrants enter the social institutions of
the society in the economy, in politics, and in education, and the
degree to which they are accepted into these institutions by the
majority group. Gordon believed structural assimilation would be
the foundation for a total assimilation. He contended that once
structural assimilation was far advanced, all other types of
assimilation would naturally follow. Apart from structural and
cultural assimilation, five other types of assimilation are listed:
marital (large-scale intermarriage with members of the host
society), identificational (development of sense of peoplehood
based exclusively on the host society), attitudinal (absence of
prejudice from the host society), behavior receptional (absence of
discrimination from the host society), and civic assimilation
(absence of value and power conflicts). Thus, Gordon saw seven
distinctive forms of assimilation all oriented toward the same
destination. Although Gordon's approach was a complex multilineal
and multidimensional one, it was in the spirit of Park's theory.

2. Ethnic persistence and conflict

The main idea of the assimilationist paradigm is that
ethnicity is incompatible with modern society, and that it should
disappear. But this assumption proved unable to explain the
persistence of ethnicity and the development of ethnic movements in
the 1960s and 1970s in the United States and elsewhere in the

world. Black Americans and some other ethnic groups had not been assimilated (as the assimilationist theories had predicted) to the American society which had become highly industrialized and urbanized. Rather, they tried hard or were forced to retain their ethnic identities. Therefore, increasing numbers of scholars have found that the phenomenon of ethnicity was becoming more important rather than less important in many parts of the world in the post-industrial and post-modern era. Hence came the discovery of the "new ethnicity" (Glazer and Moynihan 1975). By the mid-1970s a shift of focus in ethnic studies had occurred, and scholars turned from assimilationism to a new orientation. This new paradigm is characterized by a recognition of the persistence of ethnic phenomenon. Within this recent paradigm, I include various theories, both those romantically celebrating the phenomenon of ethnicity and those not doing so. Therefore, I follow scholars such as Glazer and Moynihan (1975), and Scott (1990) who see these theories as representing two different perspectives: the primordial and circumstantial. The common feature of these two perspectives lies in the fact that both recognize ethnic phenomenon and both focus on how an ethnic group is formed and maintained. Generally speaking, the primordial perspective stresses the cultural, psychological and biological factors which function in ethnic formation, organization, maintenance and persistence. The circumstantial perspective looks at social circumstances, both internal and external, under which an ethnic group exists.

The first perspective includes three approaches: the social-

biological, the psychological and the cultural, which sometimes appear mixed together. The first social scientists to focus on the concept of primordialism were Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz. Shils (1957) applied this concept to kinship ties, while Geertz extended it beyond kinship to larger-scale groups based on common territory, religion, language, and other customs. In other words, Geertz included not only the ties of blood, but also other cultural and historical factors into a primordial attachment which "stems from the 'givens'... of social existence" (1963:259). According to both of them, these primordial attachments constitute the foundation for ethnic sentiments and solidarity.

It is not difficult to find that biological elements, that is, kinship ties, are important in primordial-oriented works. To this I would add Isaacs' work on basic group identity, which sees the place of birth and body image as playing a role in permitting ethnicity to combine effectively with ethnic group interests (Isaacs 1975). In this respect, however, the socio-biological approach as formulated by van den Berghe goes farthest in that it attempts to push the explanation of ethnic or racial identity beneath social, economic, historical, and other forces to the biological or genetic level. For him, ethnic and race relations are extensions of the idiom of kinship; ethnic and race sentiments are extended and attenuated forms of kin selection (van den Berghe 1978:403). According to Reynolds, van den Berghe's evidence for primordialism is that:

> it is in fact based on real kinship, i.e., genetic kin
> selection, and that it is an extension of that old kinship

> sentiment which can be simply expressed as 'help your own kin, not outsiders'. The theory is left at this very nebulous level and no further evidence in its favour is offered (Reynolds 1980:312)

In short, van den Berghe seems to suggest that genes determine psychology, which in some way influences individual relationships, group structures, and group relationships in an ethnic context. However, van den Berghe does explicitly deny that the social relations between ethnic groups can be totally explained in biological terms.

One of the best examples of the psycho-cultural approach is De Vos' theory that the ethnic identity of a group of people consists of their subjective symbolic or emblematic use of any aspect of culture in order to differentiate themselves from other groups (1975:16). Feeling the need for a psychological or "emic" approach to the question of ethnic identity, he sees ethnicity as a subjective sense of belonging and finds that it is determined by what a person feels about himself rather than by how he is observed to behave. Furthermore, De Vos connects the individual feeling of continuity with the past to the historical continuity of the group. Thus:

> Ethnicity in its deepest psychological level is a sense of survival. If one's group survives, one is assured of survival, even if not in a personal sense (1975:17).

Here, the sense of belonging to a group is believed to be the most important part of the maintenance of that group.

In contrast, the major feature of the circumstantial perspective is to look at the members of an ethnic group in a

broader social context. One variation of this perspective is the rational choice theory proposed by Michael Banton. This theory takes into account the larger social context within which ethnic groups exist and compete with each other (Banton 1983). The main idea is that when groups interact, processes of change affect their boundaries in ways determined by the form and intensity of competition. When people compete as individuals this tends to dissolve the boundaries that define the groups, but when they compete as groups this reinforces these boundaries. In other words, Banton looks at how ethnic identities and boundaries are maintained or altered in terms of intergroup competition. However, this approach is a little too idealized, as some scholars observe (See and Wilson in Smelser 1988), because the conditions in which ethnic groups compete are always featured by inequality. In reality, ethnic competition does not take place on an equal footing, as some groups have more access to resources because of their dominant position.

Among various ideas on the unequal relationships between ethnic groups the world-system theory is one of the most comprehensive. According to this theory (Frank 1966; Stavenhagen 1975; Wallerstein 1974, 1979), cultural divisions of labour are inextricably connected to the historic growth and concentration of capitalism in the European core states and its expansion through the exploitation of labour and the extraction of resources from colonized areas. Competition and trade barriers produced thereafter helped congeal national boundaries and acted to obscure

the shared class situations of workers and peasants. Colonization of peripheral areas facilitated a process of uneven global development in which the superexploitation of colonial regions and labour provided core states with the resources to solve internal problems of labour control and capital growth. Higher wages and higher-status jobs are preserved for members of the metropolitan labour force, who constitute an international labour aristocracy. Judicial and political structures such as citizenship rights reinforced these privileges. Since these divisions also reflected racial and ethnic differences, an ideology of racism developed to rationalize and promote this international system of stratification, legitimating the exploitation of natural resources in the peripheral regions. A continuous supply of cheap labour to the regions of the core was thereby provided, thus creating cultural divisions of labour which resembled those in the periphery.

As a general social theory, the world system theory was applied to ethnic studies by Wallerstein. Generally speaking, this theory interprets ethnic social organization as a particular form of social stratification, and its analysis of inequality is basic to an understanding of contemporary ethnic processes. However, it fails to make distinctions among peripheral regions to explain differential patterns of development, and it also ignores the ethnic problems outside the orbit of Western expansion; that is, in the ethnically plural Communist states (See and Wilson 1988:232; Thompson 1989:121).

Another approach to ethnic problems is neo-Marxist. One of the central representatives of this approach is Oliver C. Cox. According to his theory (1959), some ethnic groups such as Blacks are exploited primarily because of their class position as proletarians, which is itself a product of capitalism. Racism and the racial division of labour benefit the capitalist class and harm the entire proletariat, white and black, by dividing white workers from black workers to the extent that their common interests as workers are obscured by racist ideologies. In short, Cox saw and tried to explain the relation between capitalism and race relations in terms of the "mode of production", as well as in terms of class conflict between capitalists and the working class.

3. Assessment of the above theories

It is not the purpose of this thesis to provide a detailed assessment of the different paradigms, perspectives, and approaches mentioned above. However, I would like to briefly state my views on these theories. First of all, I think that neither a primordial nor a circumstantial perspective is able to explain the complexity and diversity of ethnic phenomenon. As Scott notes (1990:149), the circumstantialists accuse primordialists of an inability to explain the persistence of ethnic identity over time and to address the issue of why such an identity can change or fluctuate in its intensity. The primordialists counter that while the circumstantialists can explain why ethnicity fluctuates over time, they are less able to account for the fact that, despite its

temporal fluctuations, ethnicity often persists, sometimes over centuries. However, these different or even opposing paradigms and perspectives are not mutually exclusive. When properly combined, they can compliment each other so as to constitute a better explanation of ethnic phenomenon. Ethnic identities, ethnic groups, and ethnicity are both primordial and circumstantial. The biological, psychological and cultural givens are the specific products of previous specific historical, social, and political forces at specific times; they are givens only relative to present circumstances. But the present political, social, and economic forces will no doubt exert an impact on these "givens", so that the latter will change to a greater or lesser degree in the future. This seems to be true of Chinese ethnic issues, because neither of the two perspectives alone can adequately explain what has happened and what is still happening to China's ethnic minorities. In addition, as I will show in the following chapters, both assimilation and the persistence of ethnic identity can be seen in Chinese ethnic relations, past and present, and I can predict that they will still coexist in the future. The over-stressing of one orientation at the expense of the other will inevitably distort the whole picture, at least in the case of China.

Actually, both assimilation and ethnic conflict are not static and changeless; rather, they are dynamic and dialectical. As some scholars (Lieberson 1961; Schermerhorn 1978) points out, neither assimilation nor conflict alone is an inevitable outcome of ethnic interaction. Integration, or assimilation, is usually compounded

with conflict and likewise conflict displays integrative features. The following chapters will illustrate this point: assimilation and conflict have existed side by side, both in history and at present, and they have often been linked to each other at various points in Chinese history.

An Overview of Chinese Ethnic Relations

1. Marxism and Sinocentrism

One of the major themes of this study is that the present Chinese government's policy towards minority group consists of two parts: an age-old Sinocentrism and a Chinese version of Marxism which has been greatly influenced by Soviet theories and practices. A detailed discussion of Sinocentrism will appear in Chapter Two. The most obvious feature of this ideology rests on a sense of superiority felt by the Chinese toward non-Han peoples and the claim that the best fate for barbarians, a term reserved for all the non-Han peoples whose customs and cultures have differed from the Chinese, is to be assimilated into Han-Chinese society. Another point worth mentioning in this regard is that the Chinese have paid more attention to cultural rather than to racial or phenotypical differences. Therefore, a non-Chinese person in traditional China could be regarded as a Chinese if he or she lived according to the Chinese way of life, which was often defined in Confucian terms. However, it is interesting to note that

Sinocentrism shares something in common with Marxist ideas on ethnicity in the Chinese context. Present Chinese ideas and practices which are believed and claimed to be based on Marxist materialism have not weakened but rather strengthened the traditional Chinese ideology of Sinocentrism, although by using a different rhetoric.

Marx's ideas on ethnicity are unsystematic and often ambiguous (Dreyer 1976; Hsieh 1986; Kwong 1980). For Marx, what is called national consciousness is merely a manifestation of a bourgeois state of society. Nationalism is used as a tool of the bourgeoisie, masking class differences and encouraging tensions with the proletariat of other countries. The ambiguous part of Marx's ideas lies in his assumption in the Communist Manifesto that the supremacy of the proletariat will cause national differences and antagonisms between peoples to vanish "still faster" than they had under capitalism. According to Dreyer (1976:44), this assumption can be interpreted as calling for either complete assimilation or only the abolition of sharp hostilities. Also important is Marx's declaration of a "right to self-determination". However, he did not give a precise definition of this concept. This has engendered two kinds of interpretations: the right to total independence, or the right to some degree of autonomy within the large state polity. It is worthwhile to point out that Marx's belief in the primacy of economic factors led him to underestimate the power of historic, linguistic, and cultural factors. He posited the supremacy of international class consciousness over the

power of ethnic ties (Dreyer 1976:44). Although he declared the right of self-determination, Marx still believed that eventually economic self-interest and the proletariat's growing realization of its basic unity would bring all ethnic groups together.

Lenin made it explicit that the right of self-determination means political independence and political separation of minority ethnic groups from the oppressor nation (Lenin 1964:146). What is more, he pointed out that this principle was also applicable to socialist countries, apparently denying that all ethnic problems would be ended by the proletarian revolution (Lenin 1964:325). However, Lenin, like Marx, believed that minorities' perception of economic self-interest would lead them to decide against independence.[2] Therefore, it is not hard to see, as Connor (1969) observes, that the right of self-determination is more a gesture, a slogan, than a principle in practice. The fate of the minority peoples, as predicted by Lenin, is to be fused into a common proletarian culture. But before the fusion happens, as Lenin stated, the minority groups should be granted a variety of rights, including:

> The general situation of equal rights--the division of the country into autonomous and self-governing territorial units according--among other things--to nationality (the local population determines the boundaries, the general parliament confirms them)-- the limits of the administration of the autonomous districts and regions as well as the self governing local units; the illegalization of any departure from equality of nations in the divisions of autonomous districts, zemstvos, etc.; general school councils democratically elected,etc.; freedom and equality of languages--the choice of languages by the municipal institutions, etc. The protection of minorities: the right to a proportional share of the expenditures for school

> buildings for students of "alien" nationalities, for
> "alien" teachers, for "alien" departments in museums and
> libraries, theaters and the like; the right of each
> citizen to seek redress (before a court) for any
> departure from the corresponding equality of rights, for
> any "trampling upon" the rights of national minorities;
> a census of population every five years in the multi-
> national districts, a ten year census in the country as
> a whole, etc.... (Lenin 1914 cited in Wolfe 1948:585).

This paragraph actually anticipated very much in the subsequent Soviet and Chinese policies toward minority groups, especially in terms of the cultural pluralist elements in these policies. However, the actual nature of Marxist and Leninist ideology regarding ethnicity is assimilationist. It is no wonder that Stalin considered the claim of the right to self-determination to be counter-revolutionary, and that he emphasized the role of economic development and downplayed that of preservation of minority cultures.[3] The assimilationist thrust in Marxism-Leninism eventually led to disastrous consequences concerning minority groups such as Jews, Tartars, and Siberian peoples when assimilation or fusion became a more common watchword in Soviet policies toward minorities.

To sum up this line of thinking, we find that class consciousness and economic interests are always given priority and ethnic ties downplayed as being subservient to the former. This inevitably leads to the conclusion that assimilation into a common proletarian culture, or communism, is stressed. Comparing this with Park's version of assimilationism, we find that both kinds of ideas claim that the more advanced ethnic groups, whether in the capitalist countries in Park's case or in the socialist, will

attract the "backward" ethnic minority groups to give up their own cultures and identities to be ready for assimilation or fusion. An important difference also exists. Park's timetable for assimilation is more immediate while Marxist ideas in the Soviet version allow a longer time for the disappearance of ethnicity to occur. Moreover, pluralist elements in Soviet Marxist ideas, which are manifest in the promise of equal rights for different groups and respect for minority groups, have led to inconsistencies in both theory and practice over time. However, these inconsistencies are less pronounced when we look at the problem in this way: assimilation is inevitable in the long run and ethnicity is temporary. This underlying assumption of Marxism is common in socialist countries, and it is based on the belief in social evolution from "primitive" stages of social organization through slavery, feudalism and capitalism, to communism.(cf. Engels 1942; Morgan 1963).

For this reason, I think that Marxist and Soviet ideas are not incongruent with the Sinocentric worldview. It is especially meaningful to note that the Chinese communists abandoned ideas such as the right to self-determination and the federal structure of the state even before they took power in 1949. Instead, slogans such as "the national question, in the final analysis, is the question of class" and, "the fusion of minority peoples into a common communist society" (Liu 1964) have been enthusiastically embraced in policies and practices concerning minority problems. For this reason, I regard contemporary Chinese ideas and policies on

ethnicity as assimilationist in nature, but cultural pluralist in form.

2. An overview of Chinese ethnic relations

With Sinocentrism as the basis for policies and practices toward non-Chinese groups, ancient and imperial China sought to absorb various ethnic groups into Chinese culture and society. As I will show in Chapters Two and Three, this assimilationist thrust has been realized in Chinese military expansion, colonization, direct or indirect administration, and Confucianization in non-Chinese territories. All these procedures finally turned many non-Han peoples into Chinese minorities and some into full Chinese citizens. These processes were continuous and more effective in south China, where environmental factors favored the Chinese intensive mode of production and where various tribes were too weak to present effective resistance. On the other hand, Chinese expansion beyond the Great Wall and Chinese control over the tribal peoples of the northeastern, northern, and northwestern parts of today's China were a recent achievement, as incorporation and control has often been interrupted by barbarian invasions. However, the conquering of part or all of China by these groups also led to the Sinicization in varying degrees of the conquerors. As a result, some non-Chinese groups such as the Manchus and Zhuang have been almost completely assimilated. They have abandoned their traditional ways of life, to live in the Chinese way as defined by Confucianism and to behave like typical Chinese (See appendix 1).

Modern Chinese policies and practices toward minorities differ in some respects from those of the past. The most obvious difference lies in the fact that some elements of cultural pluralism have been introduced from Soviet sources. As I will illustrate in Chapter Four, these cultural pluralist elements in present-day Chinese policies toward minorities appear in the pronouncement that minority customs, languages, and history should be respected and encouraged to develop. Its concrete manifestation is expressed in practices such as the official recognition of minority groups and the special treatment of minority groups by the government, both of which are evidenced in the establishment of minority autonomous regions. However, cultural pluralism turns out to be secondary in the People's Republic of China's policies and practices toward minority peoples, since the overwhelming thrust of the government's effort is assimilationist in nature. Therefore, as Chapter Five illustrates, we can find some parallels between past and present policies. The military expansion of imperial times has been replaced by Communist military "liberation" of minority areas such as Xinjiang and Tibet. Besides, I will also show that government sponsored colonization is evidenced in the work of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (PCC), a quasi-military organization composed mostly of demobilized Han soldiers, and that this has taken the place of military colonization in non-Chinese areas under imperial regimes. More important are the so-called democratic (land) and socialist reforms which have contributed so much to the creation of a uniform social

structure (socialist society) and culture (socialist culture). These have in many ways surpassed traditional practices of Confucianization and the imposition of the Chinese administrative system upon minority peoples.

The thesis demonstrates that we can not isolate present Chinese policies and practices toward minorities from the Chinese tradition, which has been a living force effectively shaping the former rather than a dead or passive background as many scholars in Chinese ethnic studies treat it. This fact leads us to the conclusion that present-day Chinese policies and practices should be seen as the continuation of a tradition which is deeply rooted in the Sinocentric worldview. Therefore, I view traditional Chinese attitudes toward non-Chinese peoples as explicitly assimilationist and present minority policies and practices as assimilationist in nature but pluralist in form.

Chapter Two

"Chineseness" and the Sinocentric World View

This chapter focuses on the Sinocentric world view, Confucianism, and the Chinese characteristic personality, which represent what I term, "Chineseness". In other words, these aspects of Chinese culture distinguish the Han Chinese from other ethnic groups. In addition, the process of Confucianization has proved to be one of the most important procedures for turning "barbarian" groups into Chinese or Chinese minorities. I will discuss this important process of "becoming Chinese" in the final section of this chapter.

Introduction: Sinocentric World View

Generally speaking, the typical traditional Chinese perspective about the world order was Sinocentric. Chinese political philosophy considered the ultimate objective of government to be the setting in order of the whole known world, rather than merely ruling a specific state. The emperor was the Son of Heaven and entitled to rule supreme over all mankind with the Mandate of Heaven (Hsu 1971:81). Hence, "under the wide heaven, there is no land that is not the Emperor's, and within the sea-boundaries of the land there is none who is not a subject of the Emperor". In a similar vein, the emperor's ministers regarded world statesmanship as their highest objective. All these ideas

are consistent with Confucianism, which has been considered to be
the ideal of the Chinese for thousands of years.   Lien-sheng
Yang (in Fairbank 1968:20) finds a Sinocentric hierarchy in the
Chinese world order:

> "In theory, it should have been hierarchical in at least
> three ways, China being internal, large, and high and the
> barbarians being external, small, and low."

China, which means "the Middle Kingdom" in Chinese, was claimed to
be the center of the world. The ancient Chinese astronomically
determined the exact center of the world and found it at a place
near Luo-yang, an old capital of China in Honan province (Eberhard
1982:99). Specifically, the focal point of civilization was in the
capital of the country, in the emperor's palace which was also the
center of power. It seems that the concept of a border did not
exist in ancient China. According to Eberhard (1982) and Lattimore
(1951), even the Great Wall was not a border in our sense but
served in the same way as do city walls. The emperor claimed to be
the ruler over all under heaven, and his domain naturally included
the barbarian tribes.

There was a fundamental distinction established between the
Chinese and the barbarian. As Hsu observes (1971:81), the test of
barbarity was not so much race as it was cultural achievement. A
barbarian was one who did not accept Chinese civilization and did
not know the refinements of ceremony, music, and culture.
Therefore, barbarians were considered to be inferior, and animal-
like because of their ignorance of the beauty of the Chinese way of
life and their lack of sufficient intellect to appreciate reason

and ethnics (in the Chinese way). One of the striking examples in this regard is the idiographic Chinese characters used to designate the barbarians.[1]

The Chinese often compared barbarians to animals. Guan Zhong, a distinguished statesman in the Spring and Autumn period, is quoted in Tso Zhuan as saying that "the Di and Jung are wolves, to whom no indulgence should be given" (cited in Yang 1968:25). Pan Gu, the author of the History of Han, described the Xiong-nu in the following terms:

> The Sage-King [of China] treated them as animals, not entering into oaths with them or fighting or chastising them. Their land cannot be used for the cultivation of food, and their people cannot be treated as subjects" (cited in Hsu 1971:81-

82).

Su Shi, one of the most important poets of the Song dynasty, made a statement which has since become famous: "The barbarians cannot be governed in the same way as China is governed. That is to say, to seek good government among animals will inevitably lead to great confusion" (cited in Hsu 1971:82). Therefore, it becomes "understandable" that the Qing officials described Western barbarians as having the disposition of "dogs and sheep". Many other biased descriptions of non-Chinese cultures may be found. The text which follows shows Chinese efforts to use religion as a way to "civilize" (actually to eliminate) another ethnic group:

> The Hu [a general name for northern tribes] have no humanity; they are stubborn, cruel, and have no manners. They are not different from birds and wild animals. They also do not believe in emptiness and non-activity. Therefore Lao-tze crossed the frontier pass and taught them pictures in order to convert them...The Hu are cruel and uncivilized, and in order to prevent them from producing worthless descendants, [Lao-

tze] asked the men not to marry women and the women to remain unmarried. When the whole country accepts these rules, the Hu will by necessity be ruined. (cited in Eberhard 1982:101).

The second example appears in a Chinese official history (The Old History of Tang) and displays a negative Chinese attitude toward the Tu-jue, an ancient people:

> The barbarians, though they have a human face, have an animal heart. Therefore, they are not as we are. When they are strong, they attack us and steal; when they are weak, they humbly submit themselves [to our rule]. They know neither gratitude nor [moral] duty: this is just their nature (cited in Eberhard 1982:101).

These descriptions of non-Chinese people as immoral, animal-like, and irrational in their behavior are representative of typical Chinese attitudes. Yang (1968:27) points out that most Chinese believed that barbarians were greedy and warlike, therefore closer to animals in character. This attitude also demonstrates that the Chinese often did not try to understand, much less attempt to respect, the cultures of the non-Chinese. Modern, educated Chinese have little knowledge of these peoples. Even Fei Xiao-tong, the dean of the Chinese anthropologists and sociologists, talks again and again about the backward and feudal nature of Chinese minority peoples (Fei 1981).

Many Chinese attitudes toward non-Chinese peoples have their roots in Confucianism, which is often regarded as the state religion of China. As Hiasayuki Miyakawa (1960:220) notes, the Sinocentric cultural doctrine involves pride in the superiority of Chinese cultural institutions, the wish to extend them to the barbarians if possible, and a stress upon universal ethnics. These

elements have long been present in Confucianism. Confucianists considered barbarians not to be equal to the Chinese because the customary rites and ideas of righteousness prevailed in China but not among barbarians, even when they had established chieftains (Miyakawa 1960:23). When asked why he was to live among the 'rude' barbarians, Confucius said that: "If a superior man dwelt among them, what rudeness would there be?" In other words, wherever a superior man (a civilized Chinese) resides, he can instruct those about him to conduct themselves in accordance with "the rites and righteousness" (Miyakawa 1960:24). Confucius himself thought that in teaching there should be no distinction of race (Miyakawa 1960:26). The importance of this idea can be seen as giving an impetus to Confucianists to assimilate different peoples and cultures into Chinese civilization through their acceptance of the universal truth of Confucianism. Finally, it should be pointed out that Confucianism, especially in Mencius' version,[2] affirmed the Confucian's responsibility to change the barbarian way of life. But at the same time, Mencius seemed to approve the punitive action of the Chinese (Confucian) kings against barbarians who were considered to be father-and king-deniers. Many of these above-mentioned ideas have been used to justify Chinese denigratory attitudes toward non-Chinese peoples. More importantly, they were also used to justify the military, cultural, and economic expansion of China into the territories of non-Han peoples.

Confucianism--the Basis of "Chineseness"

Sinocentrism is an important part of Chinese culture, or what may be called, "Chineseness". However, it seems to be common for many scholars interested in China to salute Confucianism as the basis of "Chineseness". Confucianism itself is in fact deeply and solidly rooted in the earlier life style of the Chinese people who had lived before the birth of Confucius. In other words, Confucianism constitutes the continuity of an earlier Chinese civilization which had already developed its own qualities and ideologies distinguishing the Chinese people and their culture from other peoples and cultures. This development from an earlier civilization to Confucianism has long perpetuated the characteristic traits of the Chinese people and has formed a unique Chinese personality (see Keightley 1990:15-54 for discussion of early Chinese civilization).

What is Confucianism? Is it a school of thought, a worldview, a social ethic, a political ideology, a scholarly tradition, a religion, or a way of life? Many scholars have argued these questions. As a matter of fact, the word "Confucianism" is a generic Western term that has no counterpart in Chinese (Tu 1989:112). The word "Confucian" derives from "Confucius", the Latinization of Kong Fu-zi, or Master Kong. As Tu notes (1990), the term "Confucianism" was coined in Europe in the Eighteenth century to designate the Chinese term, ru-chia, which actually means a school of thought or a tradition of learning with Confucius as the founder. However, the term ru-chia also refers generically to all kinds of scholars.

1. Confucianism as a school of thought

Actually, Confucianism began as a school of thought, and changed later into a state religion. This has made it possible for the school of thought, much modified in later times, to become the only legitimate and official way of thinking, talking, and behaving among the Chinese people for thousands of years. As a school of thought, Confucianism was first begun by Kong Fu-zi, or Confucius (551-479 B.C.) and its later development was based on Kong Fu-zi's ideas and acts. One of the most important ideas of Confucius is that education is a ceaseless process of self-realization. Although he noted that learning is for the sake of the self and that the end of learning is self-realization, he found public service to be a natural consequence of true education. This emphasis on education and learning comes from Confucius' optimistic assumption that human beings can be self-perfected by means of learning, an expression of "moral optimism" (see Weber 1951).

As a teacher of humanity, Confucius' ambition was: " To bring comfort to the old, to have trust in friends, and to cherish the young" (Tu 1990:116). His aim was to restore trust in government and to transform society into a moral community by cultivating a sense of human caring in politics and society. The foundation necessary to achieve this aim is to create a scholarly community, the fellowship of Jun-zi (noble men). As a moral vanguard of society, Confucius tried to reformulate, and revitalize those institutions which were believed to have maintained social solidarity and enabled people to live in harmony and prosperity.

One central institution was the family. He also argued that the self-cultivation of each person is the root of social order, and that social order is the basis for political stability and universal peace (Tu 1990:116). Confucius believed that rulers are supposed to govern by moral leadership and exemplary teaching rather than by force. Therefore, the government is responsible not only to provide food and security but also to educate people. Law and punishment are the minimum requirements for order, and social harmony can only be attained by virtue achieved through ritual performance.

Filial piety constitutes one of the basic Confucian values necessary to ensure the integrity of ritual performance. It is believed to be the first step toward moral excellence. In a great sense, filial piety registers a movement beyond self-centeredness, and it aims to establish meaningful relationships among family members. Thus, filial piety was seen by Confucius as an essential way of learning to be human and humanity through self-cultivation is the cardinal Confucian virtue. Now we can better understand why family ethics are seen to be not merely a private, personal concern but make possible the realization of the public good.

The formation of Confucian tradition as a school of thought among "a hundred schools" at that time was not completed until two third-generation Confucian scholars further developed Confucius' ideas. For Mencius (371-289 B.C.), considered to be the second greatest Confucian in China, Confucians serve the vital interests of the state as scholars. They do so not by becoming bureaucratic

functionaries, but by assuming the responsibility of teaching the ruling elite the art of "humane government" (Jan-zheng). Mencius explicitly stated that a true or noble man could not be corrupted by wealth, subdued by power, or affected by poverty. One of Mencius' outstanding ideas was that the people are more important than the state, and that the state is more important than the king. A king who fails to act properly is unfit, and therefore he should be criticized, rehabilitated, or even deposed (Tu 1990:119). This idea was actually based on Mencius' conviction that human beings are perfectible through self-effort and that human nature is good, which reinforces the Confucian tradition of moral optimism. Specifically according to Mencius, each human being is endowed with four feelings: commiseration, shame, modesty, and a sense of right and wrong, which serve as the bases for cultivating the four cardinal virtues: humanity, rightness, ritual, and wisdom.

The other great Confucian at this time was Xun Zi (298-238 B.C.). Xun Zi followed the Confucian tradition by emphasizing the centrality of self-cultivation. He was convinced of the perfectibility of all human beings through self-cultivation. But this emphasis must be understood in the context of his view that humans are prone to make excessive demands to satisfy their desires. Therefore, he resorted to human rationality as the means to harness our desires and passions. He stressed the significance of authority provided by the ancient sages and worthies in transforming human nature with the help of the classical tradition, the ancestral religious rituals, the conventional norms, the

teachers, the governmental rules and regulations, and the political officers. In many respects, Xun Zi paved the way for an authoritarian trend in Confucian tradition, as well as for the later official acceptance of Confucianism as a state cult.

The Confucian school of thought was developed in the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D.). The most important feature of the school in this period was that new elements of Taoism, yin-yang cosmology, Mohism, Legalism and other schools or trends of thought were added to the Confucian tradition. One concrete manifestation of this intellectual syncretism was the idea of the correspondence between man and nature, which was appreciated in an organismic vision that all modalities of being were interconnected in a complex network of relationships. Human actions were seen to be tinged with cosmic consequences and Confucian ethics were combined with a naturalistic cosmology. Therefore, the emperor as the Son of Heaven could be theologically judged by the theory of mutual responsiveness between Heaven and humankind, providing Confucian scholars with a higher law to assess the conduct of a ruler (Tu 1990:126).

Another important development of the Confucian school occurred in the Song dynasty (960-1279 A.D.), a period considered to be one of a "Confucian revival". Zhu Xi was the most important of all Confucians at that time, and was the great synthesizer of Neo-Confucianism. As a holistic philosophy of life, Neo-Confucianism reanimated classical Confucian insights and successfully applied them to the concerns of time. Song Confucian themes included

mutuality between Heaven and man, spiritual kinship between all people, harmony between man and nature, and the learning of the importance of and the investigation of things. Particularly, Zhu Xi developed a pattern of interpreting and transmitting the Confucian way that for centuries defined Confucian goals, not only for Chinese believers but also for many in Korea and Japan. He defined the process of the "investigation of things" as a rigorous discipline of the mind which probes the underlying principle in things so that their vital energy can be transformed and humanity enlightened. He proposed a twofold method of study: to cultivate a sense of reverence and to pursue extensive knowledge, thus combining morality and wisdom. This combination was thought to be achieved through book reading, quiet sitting, ritual practice, physical exercise, calligraphy, arithmetic, and empirical observation (Tu 1990:131). Zhu Xi virtually reconstituted the Confucian tradition, giving it new meaning, new structure, and new texture, and transforming Confucianism into a distinct form of East Asian spirituality. Finally, it should be noted that the Song Confucians borrowed freely from Taoism and Buddhism, which were growing quite popular in China at that time. This inclusive character has proved to be of a great help in keeping Confucianism dominant in China for another several centuries.

The previous discussion actually simplifies the complex processes in the development of Confucianism, but it does serve to show that Confucianism, as a school of thought, has been neither static nor stagnant. It has embraced many other Chinese and non-

Chinese sources, which have contributed together to create the philosophical, ethical, and political views of Confucianism. In its most abstract sense, Confucianism is a worldview based on ideals of knowledge, not unlike other kinds of worldviews (i.e. Taoism). However, Confucianism is different from other schools of thought in that it has occupied a dominant place in both the intellectual and the daily life of China and been sponsored and promoted by various Chinese governments as a state religion.

2. Confucianism as a state religion

Confucianism was not the most powerful and dominant ideology until the Han dynasty. The gradual Confucianization of politics and society in China must have begun soon after the founding of the Han dynasty (B.C. 206-A.D. 220). By the reign of Emperor Wu (141-87 B.C.), Confucian perspectives had been deeply entrenched in the central bureaucracy through many ideas, institutions, and practices.[3] Confucian ideas also penetrated into the legal system; ritual became increasingly important in governing behavior, defining social relationships, and in adjudicating civil disputes (Shryock 1966; Tu 1989). In 136 B.C. Emperor Wu set up at Court five Erudites of the Five Classics, and in 124 B.C. he assigned fifty official students to study with them, thus producing a de facto imperial university. This was followed by the development of a system of schools, whose graduates were appointed to official positions after they had been examined by the state.

The first sign of Confucianism as a state religion came in

A.D. 58 when all government schools were required to make sacrifices to Confucius. Later Han emperors erected or repaired the temple to Confucius in Qufu, his homeland, and ennobled the descendants of the sage. By the end of the Han period as many as thirty thousand students had attended the imperial university. All public schools throughout the land had offered regular sacrifices to Confucius, and many temples had been built in his honor. He virtually became the patron saint of education and scholars. Despite growing Taoist and Buddhist influences between the Han and the Tang dynasties, Confucian ethics became inseparable from the moral fabric of Chinese society, and Confucius continued to be universally honored as the greatest sage in China.

From the Han period onward, Confucianism always enjoyed the status of the central state religion. One example was the compilation of the famous Tang legal code which implemented Confucian rituals in legal affairs. Ever since the Sui dynasty (586-618 A.D.) an examination system based on literary competency made the mastery of the Confucian classics a prerequisite for political success. Elite culture was defined in Confucian terms. In the Tang dynasty temples to Confucius were erected in all cities of the empire. These temples served as national halls of fame, where not only the sage himself but also his disciples and other great Confucians of later ages received honor and sacrifice. Generally speaking, in the dynasties after the Tang few changes occurred with regard to the Confucianization of Chinese society; rather, its dominant place was reconfirmed. Even during the Mongol

rule of the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368), Confucianization of the Yuan bureaucracy was successful to the extent that the Yuan court was actually the first to officially adopt the Four Books (Confucian classics compiled by Zhu Xi) as the basis of the civil service examination. In addition, the Mongol conquerors patronized the worshipping of Confucius so well that sacrifices reached their greatest height (Shryock 1966:231). Under the Manchu reign, which was also foreign in origin, an enormous amount of material valuable for the study of Confucianism was assembled and compiled. The Complete Library of the Four Treasures, with more than thirty-six thousand volumes, fulfilled the Manchu goal of giving a comprehensive account of all the important works of the four branches of learning in Confucian culture. Manchu emperors tried to present themselves as exemplars of Confucian kingship, and they worked hard to transform Confucian teachings into a political ideology. Thus, in many respects, the Manchu reign marked the apex of Confucianization in Chinese history.

We have traced the development of Confucianism as a school of thought as well as the emergence and confirmation of it as an officially recognized ideology and state cult. Confucianism, instead of Taoism and Buddhism, has been more often seen to be at the core of "Chineseness". The development of Confucianism as a school of thought, particularly at the time of the Song period, embraced elements of Taoism and Buddhism, thus enabling it to meet the challenge posed by Taoism and Buddhism. Besides, governmental sponsorship of Confucianism starting from Han times greatly

facilitated the process of Confucianization in Chinese political and cultural life. For these reasons, Confucian principles may have persisted in modern Chinese life in the Chinese characteristic personality, even though the modern age of China has witnessed a, "gradual erosion of Chinese intellectuals' faith in the viability of Confucian culture" (Tu 1990:136). Many Chinese and Western scholars (Hsu 1948; Smith 1991; Shryock 1966; Tu 1990; Yang 1986) still see a tremendous influence of Confucianism in the behavior, attitudes, and value orientations of the Chinese people today.

Chinese Characteristic Personality

I use the broad term, "characteristic personality", to signify all the ideas expressed by the terms "national character," "basic personality structure," and "modal personality".[4] All these ideas represent an important orientation in sociocultural anthropology; that is, the school of culture and personality, or psychological anthropology. This approach posits that there is a pattern of behavior that is common to, or characteristic of, most members in a society. This pattern, which is believed to result from the early experiences of the individuals in the society, is shared by the bulk of the society's members, and, therefore, is helpful in understanding the people, their culture, and their interaction. In short, psychological anthropology tries to link a culture to the individuals within it, seeing the latter as the product of the

culture. A detailed discussion and evaluation of this approach is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, suffice it to say that this approach may be helpful in understanding the question: what are the Chinese people like?

In this regard, Francis L.K. Hsu's work (1969) is instructive. Hsu adopts the notion of cultural postulates as developed by Hoebel (1954) in his discussion of legal institutions in non-literate societies and extends it to literate societies. The postulates refer to basic propositions shared by members of a society. These "broadly generalized propositions" or postulates are held by members of a society and refer to "the nature of things and as to what is qualitatively desirable and undesirable" (Hoebel 1954:13-4).

Hsu suggests fourteen postulates underlying the Chinese world-view, each with some corollaries. Of all these, filial piety is regarded by Hsu as the most important. According to Hsu:

> an individual's most important duty and responsibility are toward his parents, which take precedence over any other interest, including self-interest. The essential expression of this is filial piety. Filial piety is the individual's way of repaying parents for giving him life
>
> and raising him (1969:65).

In Chinese society, public demonstration of devotion toward parents (or grief toward their passing or misfortune) is highly meritorious and commonly approved of, though public signs of intimacy between the sexes are considered to be indecent under any circumstance. The highest of all filial duties is that an individual must marry and have male heirs. For this reason, a man is justified in

marrying a concubine or adopting a patrilateral cousin's son (father's brother's son) if his wife cannot provide heirs. Filial piety toward parents is also expressed in material support of and in living together with parents. It includes respect for and obedience to parents, proper mourning and burial of them, care of their souls through worship in the household shrine and clan temple, and glorification of the ancestors by a person's achievements. An individual is believed to owe everything (including his very life) and all he achieves to his parents specifically and to ancestors on the father's side in general. So it is required that while parents are living an individual must not go far away except with the parents' approval, and not knowingly endanger his body or life, because to do so means harm to his parents. However, an individual should not fear danger if it is necessary for the welfare of his parents.

Hsu believes that the extended family is also desirable in Chinese society because it represents the ideal of filial piety. Within this multi-generational family, an individual should subordinate his obligations and feelings toward his wife and children in the interest of fraternal harmony--the basis for the stability and maintenance of the family. Fathers are expected to provide for their sons, including their wives, and to see that their daughters marry well. In theory, all sons are equal, though the eldest has to take the place of the father if the latter dies, and the eldest may be given a slightly larger share of inheritance in compensation for extra ritual duties. Marriages of children are

arranged by their parents. A wife who pleases her husband but not her husband's parents should be divorced. Furthermore, ancestor worship is an essential part of filial piety. On the one hand, ancestral spirits are dependent on their descendants for offerings and care; but on the other, the individual's own achievements are due to the accomplishments of departed ancestors, and ancestral spirits will look after the welfare of their descendants.

Filial piety also requires that parents are always right with reference to their children, and that a crime against parents is much more heinous than one against children. By extension, a crime against any elder relative is more severely punished than a crime against a younger one. Filial piety is so socially approved in Chinese society that an individual's conduct toward his parents is considered to be an invariable guide to his worth in general and for predicting his behavior toward others.[5]

In traditional Chinese society, the clan is also a very important social unit, as Hsu notes. This unit is composed of all males who are descendants of one common ancestor and the spouses of these males. They have duties and obligations toward each other in descending degrees of intensity and extent relative to the actual parent-child relationship. Within the clan, the patrilineage of nine generations (Ego plus four ascending and four descending generations) is the primary social and legal unit, consisting of the dead, the living, and the yet unborn. The individual's duty toward the lineage take precedence over that toward the clan; duties toward the clan rank over those toward matrilineal

relatives, and those toward matrilineal relatives over those toward nonkin. An individual's duty and responsibility toward parents are extended in decreasing order of intensity and relevance to ascending generations of patrilineal ancestors. Finally, kinship ties are an individual's most important possession in life, better than wealth, and preferable to all other ties.

Within this patrilineal kinship structure, guided by the principle of filial piety, there is a hierarchy in terms of gender and age. Women are inferior to men; formal education is restricted only to men. It is believed that quarrels among women are unavoidable, and men are advised to keep them under control, so that fraternal harmony won't be broken. In addition, age in traditional China means wisdom and deserves respect. In this light, younger brothers should obey and respect older ones, and by extension, all younger men should obey and respect all older men. The kinship hierarchy can be extended to the larger society--the state. It is believed that there are bound to be superior and inferior human beings, that some people can naturally exercise authority over others, and that rulers are superior to their subjects. The former are entrusted with the making of laws and the meting out of punishments. It is also believed that rulers and the people must be separated by a wide social and economic gulf, and that class distinctions (in wealth, power, education, appearance, and connections) are necessary and natural. Therefore, it is advised that a person not oppose a man superior by virtue of wealth, power, intellect, or connections until one has carefully

weighed his chances of winning, because futile protests are embarrassing and ridiculous.

In addition, Hsu observes that the Chinese prefer nonaggression and peaceable ways to aggression and strife. Gentlemen are said to use words but not force because they believe that what one can accomplish by words one can not do by force. If a quarrel can be settled amiably with give and take on both sides this is infinitely better than a showdown, which always leads to bad blood and sows the seeds of future trouble. This may have something to do with another Chinese belief that a kind of link exists between merit, or good deeds, and reward and between demerit and punishment. Rewards and punishments may come to the person in question or to that person's descendants. Finally, the Chinese believe that their way of life is superior, and that the non-Chinese should follow it. If non-Chinese peoples want to learn it, they are welcome to do so. But those who will never learn the Chinese ways should not be bothered with. This attitude is but another manifestation of Sinocentrism and is especially relevant to the present thesis.

Hsu's postulates describe some of the most important characteristics of Chinese people or their modal personality as he has come to understand it. His thesis has been supported by some recent work on the Chinese characteristic personality which finds that the Chinese, in comparison with Westerners, tend to be more emotionally reserved, introverted, fond of tranquillity, overtly considerate, socially cautious, group-oriented, and willing to

accept power and authority, including submission to nature (Chu 1985; Smith 1991:39-41). However, the very idea of cultural postulates still has its problems. For one thing, it neglects the difference between high and low culture, or great and small traditions; a dichotomy which many scholars have called to our attention in discussing Chinese society (Johnson 1983; Stacey 1986; Stover 1974). In fact, a gentry-scholar and a peasant may not share as much in common as these postulates would seem to indicate. Hsu himself notes that in reality peasants do not have joint and multi-generational families (1969). Therefore, other investigators might have drawn up a different list of postulates in describing Chinese society and Chinese people if they had studied China's peasantry more thoroughly. This is, as Barnouw notes, another problem with the concept of cultural postulates (Barnouw 1985:73). Nevertheless, it is clear that the Chinese characteristic personality, if such exists, is not incongruent with the basic tenets of Confucianism, as, for example, in its stress placed on filial piety. Moreover, this characteristic personality of the Chinese was one to which the Chinese expected barbarians to aspire, and it could be achieved, among other ways, by the Confucianization of these non-Chinese peoples.

Confucianization

In discussing Confucianism, I have illustrated that the Confucianization of China's politics and society has helped make

Chinese society what it is. In this section, I will show that Confucianization has also occurred in many non-Han cultures, contributing to the absorption of these formerly independent peoples into the Chinese way of life. Generally speaking, two patterns can be distinguished: Confucianization occurred among some powerful northern tribes as a result of their own choice; but for the southern tribes, this was imposed on them by their Chinese masters.

It was Confucianization which allowed the Chinese to establish their control over the northern tribal groups. For a long time in history these groups checked Chinese military expansion into their territories and expanded into China proper, conquering parts or the whole of China. Therefore, Confucianization together with other influences of Chinese culture ultimately worked more effectively than military expansion in acculturating and assimilating these peoples into Chinese culture and society. In Han times the sons of Xiong-nu leaders often had to come to China as hostages and lived there for a long time. These non-Chinese young men were educated in a Chinese way by learning Confucian rules and rites. According to Eberhard (1982:118), the moment they had a Confucian education they tried to give up their own names and adopted Chinese names. This facilitated the Sinicization and the eventual assimilation of the Southern Xiong-nu, who became indistinguishable from the Han Chinese in later times. Similar processes occurred in many barbarian dynasties, such as the Toba Northern Wei, the Khitan, Jurchens, Mongols, and Manchus. The most well known example is

that of the Manchus who had become fully Confucianized and Sinicized by the end of their dynasty in 1911.[6]

Confucianization in the north occurred "naturally"; that is, the non-Chinese became Confucianized on their own, though with the help of their Chinese subordinates. However, Confucianization in the south has been imposed by the Chinese state. Therefore, the Confucianization of northern tribal peoples seemed to be less complete (except in the Manchu case) than that of southern tribes. In other words, Confucianization appeared to be more effective in the South than in the north. Consequent to military expansion, Confucianism became an effective factor in the integration of southern native peoples.

The first period of Confucianization in the south happened between the Han and the Song dynasties (206 BC - 960 AD), during which time local Chinese officials and administrators established Confucian schools to "cultivate" the natives. The best students from the schools were often promoted to high administrative positions. In Sichuan, for example, Wen Weng during the reign of Wen-di (179-157 BC) first enrolled boys from the families of subordinate officials and later eighteen men of talent were sent to Changan, the Han capital, for advanced studies. It was eventually claimed that Sichuan learning could be compared to that of Confucius' home in Shandong (Miyakawa 1960:33). Another Chinese official during the later Han period was reported to have ordered officials of inferior positions (most of whom were native) to study at a school he founded. He also examined and promoted some of these

men. It should be added that these native officials mastered Confucian learning and took a lead in adhering to a Confucian way of life.

The promotion of a Confucian way of life constituted a large part of the administrative work of Chinese officials. They made great efforts to replace the traditional customs and ways of life of the natives with those of the Chinese. Practices of shamanism, for instance, were severely attacked. At the same time ritual marriage laws were enforced and "proper" relationships between father and son and husband and wife taught. During the period of Three Kingdoms, Tao Chi was credited with transforming minority marriage and family systems. He was said to have taught barbarians the ways of marriage and to have instructed them in the obligations of fathers and sons. It was claimed that these local men and women, "beguiled each other, coupled hastily, and produced children whose fathers could not be ascertained" (Miyakawa 1960:31). Han Chinese success in Confucianizing barbarians can be shown in the case of the Lin-Chun Man. In Sichuan they became so Sinicized that they were registered as Chinese commoners belonging to commanderies and prefectures by the end of Han period. At the same time, the western branch of the group was assimilated into Chinese culture and even shared the provincial loyalties of the local Chinese (Miyakawa 1960:35).

From the Song period on, the full influence of Confucianism came to be established in the South. Zhu Xi exerted a great moral influence in the South and is said to have been responsible for the

practice of sexual separation. His ideas regulated a woman's behavior--hiding her face with a patterned cloth and wearing wooden-block shoes, and they transformed the previously "frivolous" southern women into those who observed decorum faithfully and felt ashamed to see male guests. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the southern peoples, many of whom were of non-Chinese origin, were more "Chinese" than even the northern Chinese after the Song period.

Patterns of Confucianization found in northern and southern China differed, but each was active in incorporating many non-Chinese people into the Chinese way of life. Some became full Chinese, and others became ethnic minorities living inside the Chinese nation-state. The process of Confucianization was greatly facilitated by and closely linked to Chinese military expansion, colonization, and administration. Expansion, colonization, and administration alone could be temporary, but supported by Confucianization, both as an ideology and as a way of life, they could become permanent successes. Confucianism has been a powerful element in the process of Sinicization and the assimilation of the non-Chinese in China. The very manifestation of a sinocentric world view is at once a system of philosophical precepts, moral rules, and a state religion deeply rooted in Chinese culture and personality.

Summary

This discussion of "Chineseness" illustrated differences between the Han Chinese and various minority ethnic groups. "Chineseness" refers to the characteristics of Chinese culture, and of its carriers, the Chinese people. The fundamental expression of these characteristics is to be found in Confucianism. As a unique way of life and ideology, Confucianism influences the patterns of behavior and value orientations of the Chinese people. The strong emphasis on filial piety and its extension as manifested in conformity to authority, both at home and in the larger society, and its acceptance of a hierarchical order of society act to differentiate the Chinese way of life from those of some non-Chinese peoples. An emphasis on education, and the importance attached to good government have also made the Han Chinese different from many non-Han peoples. All these factors have led the Han Chinese to feel proud of their own way of life and superior to other groups.

The Sinocentric world view of the Chinese has determined the fact that the Chinese have always expected other peoples to assimilate into the Chinese way of life. This has been the basis of the relationships between the Han and non-Han peoples in history. The Confucianizing process which has occurred among many non-Han groups, as illustrated above, is an important instance of the Sinocentric world view in action. Still, Confucianization is not the only factor involved in the absorption of the non-Han peoples into Chinese society. Expansion, colonization, and direct or indirect administration of the Han in non-Han areas have all

contributed to the final incorporation and assimilation of these peoples, and Chapter Three will deal with these issues.

Chapter Three

The Han and Non-Han Peoples in History

China: A Multiethnic Society

The phenomenon of polyethnicity has emerged along with the emergence of the state (Isaacs 1975; McNeill 1986; Patterson 1977; Smith 1981, 1987). McNeill makes it clear that polyethnicity has been normal in civilized societies, whereas the ideal of one ethnically unified state has been exceptional in theory and rarely approached in practice (1986:4). McNeill also notes that China has been subject to recurrent conquest from the steppes and that Chinese settlers, as they penetrated southward from the initial core region of the Yellow River Valley, engulfed a great number of other peoples who did not at once merge into the Chinese social/cultural system as undifferentiated subjects of the emperor (1986:19). From the time of the Han dynasty (202 BC to 220 AD) the emperors sent their well-trained, professional armies to extend royal political jurisdiction into central Asia and other borderlands where a diversity of peoples such as Turks, Tibetans, Mongols, Manchus, and Koreans became subjects of the Chinese rulers.

Traditional China was composed of Han Chinese and peoples of different languages, cultures, and ways of life. Political and ethnic boundaries never coincided exactly. Chinese conquest of borderlands alternated with conquest of part or all of China by

peoples coming from those same borderlands (Mcneill 1986:19). This trend has helped create the multiethnic character of China.

The formation of a "we-group," the Han-Chinese, and a "they-group," the other ethnic groups, took a long time. According to Li Chi (1928), the "we-group" traced its ancestry to the Yellow Emperor, a legendary founder of Chinese civilization, while the "you-group" included the barbarians in the northern, northeastern, northwestern, and southern parts of China. The Chinese population was concentrated mainly in the northeastern and central eastern regions at about the beginning of the Christian Era. Since that time, there has been a steady decrease in percentage of population in both the northeastern and central eastern regions of China (corresponding to present-day Hobei, Shanxi, Shandong, Honan, Hubei, Anhui and Jiangsu provinces) and a parallel increase south of the Yangtze River. By studying city building activities, surnames, and migration, Li Chi finds that the Han Chinese came into contact with other peoples before the common era, as the former expanded out from the core region of central China in almost every direction.

The movement of the Han Chinese before 206 B.C. was limited to the area north of the Yangtze River; the southeastward movement was the dominant current up to the end of 1280, and was especially strong in the periods between 265 A.D.- 618 A.D. and between 906-1280. A southwestward movement began around 206 B.C. and became dominant only between 1280-1644 (Li 1928:165). The Chinese "we-group" included a few foreign elements in the north of China, such

as the Xiongnu-Turk and the Tungus. By 1644 the Chinese population north of the Yangtze was a mixture of at least three elements, while south of the Yangtze the population was a mixture of the "descendants of the Yellow Emperor" and various indigenous peoples (Li 1928:167).

China's Policies and Strategies

Sinocentrism, which was discussed in the preceding chapter, has been the basis of Chinese policies and practices vis-a-vis non-Chinese groups. Broadly speaking, these policies and practices can be described in terms of either a pacifist or a military orientation. Although considered inferior and therefore looked down upon by the Chinese, barbarians were not foreigners in as much as they were not outside the domain of the universal Chinese empire. Actually, barbarians were considered to be merely uncivilized peoples awaiting assimilation into the Chinese orbit through a cultural transformation. For this very reason, it was the duty of the emperor, as the sole mediator between Heaven and Man, to effect that transformation and confer the "boon" of civilization upon those who had the misfortune to be born barbarians. Winning the hearts of barbarians and then assimilating them through virtuous rule has been one of the more important themes in Chinese history.

The "Canon of Shun" in the Book of Yu, one of the earliest books in Chinese history, instructs:

>Be kind to the distant, and cultivate the ability of the near. Give honor to the virtuous and your confidence to the good, while you discountenance the artful so shall the barbarous tribes lead on one another to make their submission (cited in Hsu 1971:82).[1]

The message is very clear: the wise emperor (of China) was one who won the admiration of barbarians by his irresistible virtue, and in return the barbarians were expected to be so moved as to come to submit and to assimilate into Chinese civilization. The characteristic of this "laissez-faire" (Hsu 1971:83), or loose-rein (Yang 1968:24), policy toward other peoples was a belief that Chinese emperors or kings should be virtuous and benevolent for the sake of the spontaneous admiration from barbarians which would produce voluntary assimilation on the part of the latter.

Pacifism was not the only Chinese strategy concerning the non-Chinese. Policies of war were also pursued in many cases. The Book of Odes, the earliest book of poems in China, contains many words on militarism. An example is also to be found in Tso Zhuan, where the marquis of Chin is quoted as saying that since the Jung and Ti (both barbarians) know nothing of affection or friendship and are full of greed, the best plan is to attack them (cited in Yang 1968:25). Confucius seemed to have approved of warfare when he said: "Let good men teach the people seven years, and they may then likewise be employed in war" (cited from Analects in Yang 1968:26). I think it unnecessary to provide more examples of Chinese militarism in words, as I will soon discuss Chinese expansion and conquest which represent militarism in action. But I should point out that some writers are wrong when they assert

that non-interventionist policies were predominant in Chinese history. In fact, both kinds of policies existed side by side in the expansion of the Chinese empire.

These two kinds of policies were manifested in different forms but for the same purpose; that is, the integration of barbarians into Chinese civilization. Generally speaking, they were pursued at different times and toward different kinds of peoples. When China was strong, militarism was more likely to be the dominant policy in dealing with the non-Chinese peoples; whereas, when she was weak, pacifism was a more likely choice. In addition, military conquests occurred more in the south, where the land was suitable for the Chinese pursuit of agriculture, and where the tribal societies were weaker. On the other hand, pacifism was more often used toward the peoples in the north and northwest where land was not good for agriculture and where non-Chinese groups were stronger. Whatever policy was used, however, the process of absorbing the neighboring peoples into the increasing large colonial empire of China continued until this century.

1. China's expansion

I have discussed the process of Confucianization in the preceding chapter. Here, I would like to repeat that this process has been one of the most important factors in turning barbarians into Chinese. Confucianization was often facilitated by other procedures, such as expansion, colonization, and administration. I will discuss military expansion and colonization first, because

I think that they represent the major thread of Chinese history.

Justified by the Sinocentric world view, Chinese military conquests and expansion were pushed forward in all directions (See Maps 1,2,3,4,5,6,and 7 in Appendix Three). Today's China was developed from a core area in portions of modern Honan, Shensi and Shandong provinces. According to Granet (1930:77), ancient China before the end of the West Zhou,or Chou (771 B.C.) was limited to the regions around present-day Honan and the neighboring parts of Shenxi, Shanxi, and Shandong provinces along the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River. The southern boundary of the territory was Qinling mountain range, and its extension to the east was bordered by the hills of Funiu and Muling in Shandong. It embraced to the north the terraces which bordered the left bank of the middle reaches of the Yellow River, and it ended in the east at the confines of the alluvial zone, marked by the present lower valley of the Yellow River and a line prolonging it to the south. Surrounding this ancient territory were peoples who were called barbarians--to the south, the Man; to the east, the Yi; to the west, the Jong; and to the north, the Di.

In the sixth century B.C. the alliance of the states from which imperial China was to grow had covered the whole of the region bounded in the north by the line later to be traced by the Great Wall, in the south by the Yangtze River, in the east by the ocean and in the west by the foothills of Shensi basin (Wiethoff 1975:39). However, by the end of the Warring (or contending) States period (221 B.C.), some frontier states such as Qin and Chu

had already expanded into today's Kansu, Sichuan, Jiangxi, Hunan, Zhejiang and Fujian provinces, covering many parts of southeast China and some parts of southwest China and northwest China. In the northern region, for example, Chinese expansion was ultimately to be more important than the barbarian invasions.[2]

Under Qin-Shi-Huang-Di, the first emperor of a united imperial China, China incorporated the Ordos desert in the North into the Chinese territories, which marked the start of strategic advances by later Chinese imperial governments into non-agrarian areas. The Chinese armies also forced their way across the watersheds in the south of modern Jiangxi and Hunan to the sea in the vicinity of the city of Canton, thus establishing for the first time a Chinese bridgehead on the South China Sea. In the Han period China strengthened its position in south China by conquering the Yue people in present-day Guangdong and Guangxi provinces. In the northwest and north the Han armies pushed far into Central Asia, reaching the western side of the Pamirs. They also subdued an area now partly in southern Manchuria and partly in North Korea. In addition, a large scale strategic resettlement was undertaken for the sole purpose of filling in and securing a newly conquered area in the northwest. Between the Han and Tang dynasties China at her weakest moment had to retreat to the south of the Yangtze River because of the aggression and invasion of the nomadic peoples who established several dynasties in North China. However, this period saw the Chinese settlement of the south, and Hainan Island, the southern end of modern China, came permanently under Chinese rule.

In the Tang period (618-907) Chinese forces "recovered" all the territories previously occupied by Han armies, reaching southern Manchuria in the east, Mongolia in the north, the Tarim basin in the west, and Annam (present-day North Vietnam) in the south. More importantly, Tibet was drawn into the sphere of Chinese influence for the first time. In addition, the Tang set up special military protectorates around the territory under direct Chinese rule for the security of the regions remote from the center of power and only semi-colonized.

Chinese territorial expansion almost ended with the decline of the Tang dynasty; subsequently only a few Ming emperors made some temporary conquests. However, the Mongol and Manchu regimes continued the pattern of expansion after they had conquered China proper. In the Manchu regimes (1648-1911), for example, the Sinicized Manchu rulers brought Outer Mongolia and the Tarim basin back under the direct rule of Beijing for the first time in nearly a thousand years. Later, the Qing armies reached as far as Lake Balkhash, before an administrative province was set up in Central Asia which was called Xinjiang (new frontier). In addition, Manchu forces also temporarily advanced as far as Lhasa, the center of Tibet, and the eastern part of Tibet was annexed to present-day Sichuan province. Finally, the entire area of Tibet became nominally part of the Qing. Taiwan fell to the Qing empire in 1683. Thus China reached its largest geographical size under the Manchu Qing dynasty.

Chinese expansion to the south has always been different from

that to the north. The southward expansions have been continuous, long standing, and effective; almost all of the southern regions had become Chinese provinces by the fall of the last imperial dynasty in 1911. However, the northward expansions (including those to the northeast, northwest and west) were interrupted now and then, and generally less effective, as permanent control was not achieved until after the present government (PRC) came to power in 1949. The reason for this difference, according to Lattimore (1951), lies in the fact that the steppe, desert, and plateau areas in the northern, northwestern, western and northeastern parts of China were not suitable for intensive agriculture and its corresponding social and cultural forms; environmental factors tended to favor pastoralism. On the other hand, climate, fertile land, and other environmental factors of the southern regions allowed Chinese society to take root. Besides, as Eberhard (1982) notes, the much stronger tribal organizations in the northern and western regions also worked to check Han Chinese expansion, while the weak tribal societies in the southern regions could not successfully resist aggression and conquest.

2. Peaceful policies

Chinese expansion to the north was interrupted by barbarian invasions which repeatedly forced the Chinese state south of the Yangtze River. During these periods there was no question of China's northward expansion. In the Yuan and Qing dynasties it was the Mongols and the Manchus who enlarged Chinese territory and

established long standing control in the northern, northwestern and northeastern areas. Of necessity, military force was not the only Chinese strategy to deal with the nomadic, hunting, and oases-dwelling non-Chinese peoples; peaceful strategies were resorted to again and again by various Chinese governments. Confucianization was one of the most important peaceful strategies. A representative form of this strategy was known as ho-qin (peace and friendship); that is, the creation of marriage ties. This policy began as early as the first emperor of the Han Dynasty, when he found his regime was not strong enough to fight the Xiong-nu.[3] In the Tang period, according to Eberhard (1982:106), twenty-one Chinese princesses were given to foreign rulers but only three were true daughters of the emperor. Marriages of this kind often took place between China and such strong neighbors as the Uygurs, the Tibetans, and the Mongolians. These marriage ties served to develop a kind of good will between China and its neighbors, but this seldom lasted long. In fact, the foundation of this policy was to buy peace with gifts of silver or silk, and sometimes even territory. In the Han period, for example, Chinese governments were forced to offer annual payments to the Xiongnu, Wuhan, and Xianbei. This policy was implemented by the Song governments, which have become a symbol of shame for many Chinese because of their large payments to the Khitan and Jurchen regimes.

This policy also had its effects; that is, in corrupting the barbarians. Beginning with the Xiongnu, many nomadic peoples became increasingly dependant on the luxuries provided by the

Chinese. In addition, the gifts of the Chinese sometimes induced some barbarians to surrender, and enabled the Chinese empire to expand. One example is that of a group of Qiang people, who, attracted by Chinese luxury goods or the promise of such goods, offered to surrender to China under the following conditions:

1) they would surrender to China as a tribe of about 10,000 people.
) they would present all their fertile lands to the Chinese.
3) they would themselves take residence in the strategic points along the border to guard the frontier for China (Yu 1967:71).

Also included in peaceful strategies were ambassadorial missions, which created opportunities for the Chinese to show their neighbors the advantages of Chinese civilization. As well, tribute missions and private trade also worked effectively in the process of carrying Chinese culture over borders and in attracting non-Chinese peoples. All in all, these peaceful strategies contributed to the acculturation of non-Han peoples. Some tribes abandoned part or the whole of their traditional way of life and adopted Chinese culture (see Lattimore 1951 and Tao 1976 for detailed discussion of the Sinicization of the Xiongnu and Jurchens). Thus, they laid a foundation for the later assimilation or incorporation of these people into the Chinese state.

3. Chinese colonization

Chinese expansion to the south was steady and effective. By "steady" I mean that the Chinese have never stopped expanding into the southern parts of China. Even when north China was ruled by

the barbarians (between the Han and Tang dynasties, and during the South Song period), Han Chinese dynasties in the south continued their expansion into modern Sichuan, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou provinces. By "effective" I mean that the Chinese were successful in consolidating their rule over the southern and southwestern tribal peoples and in incorporating them into Chinese administration.

One of the most important reasons for this was Chinese migration to the south, which was a result of both population pressure and the barbarian invasions in North China. The presence of a large Chinese population paved the way for increasing influence of Chinese civilization on the tribal peoples and a more complete administration over them. According to Wiens (1967), there have been four great Chinese movements to the south. The first occurred during the reign of the Western Jin Emperor Hui (91-307 A.D.). Starting from 98, approximately two million people took part in this first large-scale movement. The second great migration took place during the end of the Western Chin (316 A.D.) in which 60-70 percent of the Chinese population in North China fled southward. This movement was significant in that it led to the development of the south with the result that the tax revenue of the entire Tang (618-907 A.D.) depended almost wholly on the Yangtze valley plain. However, the first two movements were restricted to the Yangtze basin and Sichuan. The third migratory movement occurred during the end of the Northern Song period in 117 A.D. when the capital of the Song in north China fell to the hands

of the Jurchens. Thereafter, the old southward movement was intensified. According to Wiens, the result of the Song defeat was the occupation by the Han Chinese of the regions of Guangdong, Fujian and Guangxi (Wiens 1967:180). During this time the West River basin in Guangdong was developed. The fourth Chinese migration resulted from the Japanese invasion of China from 1931 to 1945.

4. Chinese administration--Tu-si system

There were a number of steps in the process by which the Chinese expanded and absorbed various tribal peoples into Chinese society. The first step was expansion or military conquest, which led to contacts with the non-Chinese peoples. The second step saw an influx of Chinese merchants and settlers. Tensions and conflicts between the Chinese and the natives occurred, with the result that the Chinese government stepped in and "pacified" the area before building fortresses and walled towns to protect Chinese citizens. The third and final step was the establishment of direct, overt control over these peoples. Here, the Tu-si system (native administration system, with tu meaning native and si meaning official) came into being.

The seeds of this system were planted in the early dynasties' policies which were often essentially laissez-faire in character. It became a firmly established system of indirect rule with a definite hierarchy of ranks only during the Ming dynasty (Wiens 1967:14). There were three types of feudal offices in this system

and almost all were hereditary in character: 1) civil tribal administrative officials such as Fu (district), Chou (prefecture), and Xian (county), and assistant xian magistrates; 2) military officials such as Xiun-wei-si, An-fu-si, Chao-tao-si, Chang-kuan-si, and Chih-hui-si, all concerned with command of troops; and finally 3) deputies, such as sub-district magistrates, jail wardens, courier or post-masters, and registrars. This system originated in areas which were geographically isolated (e.g., being high mountain ranges or rugged terrain) or inhospitable (e.g., those with hot, humid, and malarial climates). These areas were difficult for a central administration to oversee. Historically, this system resulted as much from these factors as from the desire to rule barbarians through barbarians. As well, there was the consideration that the Tu-si established divided forces counter-balancing each other and preventing large-scale rebellions (Wiens 1967:15-6).[4]

The Ming dynasty regulations governing the Tu-si were strict at the beginning, and there was a fairly close supervision over tu-si relations. Therefore, it was required that notification of succession to local rule be made by the hereditary tu-si to the Ming Court. The heirs were registered with the Court, which kept the genealogical records of the tu-si, so that struggles among potential claimants to succession could be reduced or prevented. Normally, the Court would issue a document certifying the heir's genealogy to the neighboring clans within and near his domain when he was ready for succession. During the Ming dynasty, tu-si

employed Han-Chinese civil service officials as their aides, and their chief secretaries or registrars were largely such officials. These civil service aides were authorized to adjudicate and administer affairs of the Han-Chinese within the domain of the tu-si concerned. In this manner, there was established a dual political administration as a kind of transition to full Han-Chinese civil administration.

Indirect rule was often replaced by direct Chinese administration in situations in which the tu-si refused to obey orders from their Han-Chinese superiors. This occurred when an area became settled with such large numbers of Han-Chinese that the tu-si tried to expel or kill them out of fear of their growing power. This also occurred when the tribesmen concerned had become so thoroughly Sinicized that they readily accepted Han-Chinese social and political institutions and laws.

After the abolition of the feudal hereditary tu-si office or the rule by tribal chieftains over their own kingdoms, the final step was the political integration of former alien territory into the Han-Chinese empire. The process was described in Chinese as "kai tu Kuei liu" (change the tribe-chiefs and return to civil magistrates). Thereafter, the tribal peoples were considered, at least in theory, to be Han-Chinese citizens and equal to the Han under the law. At this point, the continued expression of a tribal way of life and of tribal independence was to be suppressed, and tribal laws and mores were no longer held valid. Instead, Han-Chinese political institutions and legal codes took effect. In

this regard, the Ming governments achieved their greatest success in Guizhou, which was established as a province under the central government administration. However, in other regions, especially in Guangxi, the Ming efforts to replace indirect rule by direct administration were forcefully resisted by the natives and therefore failed .

The Tu-si system in the early Qing period was fully developed in that more regulations and tighter supervision were applied to the tu-si. First of all, the hierarchy of ranks, as well as the processes of succession to rank, were made more elaborate. Taxation and military duties along the frontier and in the suppression of tribal rebellions were more consistently imposed on the tribal chiefs. More importantly, the commanders in charge of imperial garrisons were directed to watch and control the tu-si. From the mid-Qing period on continuous efforts were made by the Qing government to eliminate tu-si power. In this regard, this dynasty was much more successful than the previous Ming dynasty. The abolition of the tu-si occurred in some areas of Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, Guangxi, Yunnan and Guizhou. As a result, all the tu-si had been eliminated in Hunan and Hubei by the end of the Qing period, and the tribal departments and districts in Guangxi and Guizhou had become very similar to Han-Chinese departments and districts in administrative practices. However, the system changed little in frontier areas such as in Yunnan, Xikang (part of modern Sichuan province), and it persisted in some remote tribal strongholds such as in the Da-liang Mountain area in Sichuan until

the government of the People's Republic of China finally put an end to it in the 1950s.

The Tu-si system was typical of the imperial Chinese administration over non-Han peoples. Similar administrative measures were also taken in non-Han areas in other parts of China. Preceded by military conquests, this administrative system functioned together with Han colonization and Confucianization to ultimately incorporate these ethnic groups into Chinese society. As this was accomplished, many of these groups became minority peoples.

5. Chinese policies toward "submitted" barbarians

The Chinese policies toward minority peoples started no later than the Han dynasty. In the Han period a central distinction was established between inner and outer barbarians. Outer barbarians lived outside China proper and were independent of the Chinese sphere of administration. Inner barbarians settled inside China proper and lived under Chinese administration and government. Inner barbarians (also called surrendered or submitted barbarians at the time) were what we would today call minority peoples. These minority groups were either forced to settle by the Chinese government or came of their own free will to settle within China. Sometimes they were placed along the Chinese border areas to guard against barbarian invasions. These peoples included the Xiongnu, Qiang, Wuhuan, and Koreans. Inner and Outer barbarians were treated differently by the Han government. The outer or the most

rebellious barbarians were treated in a loose rein fashion; they were allowed to pursue their own way of life and to have their own leaders. But for some inner barbarians who were submissive or greatly Sinicized, the Jun-Xian (district and county) administration was imposed on them (Yu 1967:76). This happened to 80,000 Koreans in 18 B.C., and to the Ai-lao people in modern Yunnan in A.D. 69. In the first case, a province was created, and in the second, a county created (Yu 1967:77).

Inner barbarians were generally exploited and oppressed by the Chinese local officials. They were subject to taxation, which steadily increased especially in the later period of the Han dynasty. In terms of labor services, they were often forced to work as slaves by the Chinese at a time when Chinese subjects were released from some labor and military services. Under the policy of "using barbarians to attack barbarians", surrendered barbarians were also used to fight either against their own tribesmen who remained hostile to the Chinese empire or for the Chinese warlords against each other. Apart from lack of provision, these non-Chinese subjects also suffered from the fact that they were forced to put their wives and children in the custody of Chinese officials as hostages (Yu 1967:84). Toward the end of the Later Han (25-221 A.D.) and during the period of the Three Kingdoms (221-265 A.D.), Chinese control over inner barbarians tended to be tightened.

All these practices concerning minority peoples in the Han empire were adopted or expanded in the later Chinese dynasties. For example, the Chinese did not recognize native shamanism as a

religion and always tried to restrict it. They claimed that the religious practices of the natives wasted too much money, and that their sacrifices of oxen were economically harmful. In this way, the native systems of religion were destroyed.

The destruction of religious systems was paralleled by the suppression of indigenous legal systems. The Chinese replaced traditional legal systems with the court system, a fact which reminds us of colonial rule in Africa and elsewhere. The custom of blood revenge, one of the most important aspects of native justice, was abolished in 1666. The Chinese also confiscated the tribes' weapons and prohibited weapon-making in order to deprive the natives of the means of resisting Chinese rule. More recently, the tribes were forbidden to make political agreements with foreign countries or with the Chinese central government (Eberhard 1982:14).

One of the most important disruptions to traditional cultures was the forced change of courtship and marriage customs. Before the Chinese came, the native young men and women enjoyed a kind of freedom in their love affairs and marriage. Usually, they gathered on festive occasions. While singing and dancing, they chose their partners according to their own liking. However, the Chinese considered this practice to be degrading, and they introduced, and in some cases enforced, the practice of matchmaking, completely excluding the concerned men and women in their own affairs. This forced marriage in the Chinese way sometimes led to suicide, as it did among the Chinese. The Chinese also disapproved of native

practices such as matrilocality and matrilinear inheritance, and they tried to bring Confucian paternal elements into native life. Similar changes also took place in burial customs. Some minorities practiced cremation of the dead until the Chinese came and forbade this practice. Ancestor worship was advocated by Confucianism, and therefore the Han forced the non-Han to adopt the costly burial of the dead. All these factors may have led, as Eberhard implies (1982:143), to alcoholism and prostitution among some of the economically, politically, and culturally marginal native people.

As minority people, inner barbarians were often the target of discrimination and persecution. As Eberhard (1982:139) notes, while under Chinese administration and after having become Chinese citizens, the natives did not enjoy all the rights of true citizens. The minority peoples were always described as "mean", "coarse", or "wild animals" by the Chinese. In some cases, their status was much the same as that of the "caste" people at the bottom of the society. This situation lasted until the end of the eighteenth century.[5]

Discrimination manifested itself in many ways. Shen Ts'ong-wen, one of the foremost Chinese writers of the twentieth century, describes an event which happened in 1911 in his home town in western Hunan province where many minority people were concentrated. According to Shen's description (Kinkley 1978:38-9), some local people (most of whom were Han) planned an abortive rebellion. After the failure, merciless killings of the Miao followed, as the local authorities declared that there had been a

Miao rebellion rather than acknowledging the existence of an anti-dynastic conspiracy. Troops were sent to the Miao settlements for mass executions, with a quota of 100 Miao's lives daily. This near genocide lasted for a month.

Dialectics of Assimilation and Conflict

Assimilation of tribes in south China was imposed by the Chinese rulers, and was relatively complete. Conflicts also persisted. In contrast to the nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples in the northern, northeastern, and northwestern parts of China, the tribal peoples in south and southwest China long ago lost their independence. In other words, these peoples have been absorbed into Chinese society and culture. This is especially true of those residing in the valley areas. Here, the native peoples have been overcome by both Chinese military force and Chinese culture. This has led to the comparatively greater Sinicization we see among ethnic groups such as the Zhuang, Bai, and other smaller groups. However, this process of assimilation has always been accompanied by conflict between the invading Han Chinese and the native non-Han peoples.

Li Chi (1928:48-49), for example, finds that two common relationships have existed between the Han "we-group" and the minority "you-group". Assimilation was obvious, especially in the southeastern regions of China, as these areas have been marked by few dramatic ethnic conflicts. Li also suggests that a large part

of Han-style settlement might have been the result of the assimilation of the barbarian tribes who were influenced by the spread of Han culture, rather than by actual Chinese migration. Moseley (1973) finds that assimilation was not complete, though it did occur among some non-Chinese wet-rice cultivators living on the valley or plain areas. Conflict was more common between the Chinese and the mountain or upland ethnic groups. According to him (1973:18), indigenous peoples such as the Yi and Zhuang were impressed by the superior Chinese culture including agricultural techniques and literary, bureaucratic, military and commercial qualities. They adopted Chinese language and dress. As a result, a large number of them have become Chinese. Some individuals of both Yi and Zhuang ancestry have risen to high official positions. However, assimilation was far from complete in that many minority villages continued to co-exist with Han Chinese villages. Moreover, the upland ethnic groups have found comparatively little in Chinese culture of practical use to them. Assimilation and intermarriage occurred rarely. Historically, the Chinese went to war more frequently against the uplanders than against the lowlanders.

Conflicts between the Chinese and the native peoples of the south have been common in history, as noted by many scholars (Li 1928; Moseley 1973; Wiens 1967). According to Moseley, the Yi's fierce resistance to Chinese control earned them the title, "the independent Lolo of Ta-liang-shan"; in Yunnan, the Wa also fought tenaciously to guard their independence (1973:1). Table 3.1 shows

some of these conflicts, usually termed revolts and uprisings in Chinese sources. These conflicts are given by province.

Table 3.1 Ethnic conflicts in south China (B.C. 722-A.D. 1644)

Province	B.C. 722-207	B.C. 206-A.D.264	A.D. 265-617	A.D. 618-959
Sichuan	0	2	1	0
Hunan	5	2	18	10
Guangdong	0	4	3	5
Huangxi	0	0	0	14
Yunnan	1	3	3	53
Guizhou	0	0	0	0

Province	A.D. 960-1279	A.D. 1280-1367	A.D. 1368-1644
Sichuan	46	0	3
Hunan	112	6	16
Guangdong	23	17	52
Guangxi	51	5	218
Yunnan	0	7	2
Guizhou	0	0	91

(source: Li 1928:50)

Table 3.1 shows that ethnic conflict between the Han Chinese and the southern tribes had long existed in Hunan, Sichuan, Guangdong, and Yunnan. These were accelerated after 618 A.D., whenever greater numbers of Han Chinese immigrants settled in South China.

According to Wiens (1967), uprisings of the non-Chinese tribal peoples were not restricted to any particular tribe or group of tribes, although in later periods a larger proportion involved the mountain tribes such as the Yao, Miao, the Lolo and the Fan. The Yiao rose in arms in Guangdong and Hunan in the Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasties. During the Qing period, the Miao of Guizhou made their last important stand against the Han Chinese. All these uprisings were large-scale, as they cost the lives of tens of thousands of government soldiers to put down. Finally, it is important to note that almost all of these uprisings resulted from the fact that the indigenous peoples had been driven out from their fertile homelands and oppressed by the Han Chinese.

Open conflict was not the only form of native resistance to the Han. An avoidance policy seems to have been the most often used strategy. Many native peoples retreated further and further from the center of state power. In the face of Chinese expansion and colonization, indigenous minorities moved into countries such as Vietnam, Burma, and Thailand. It should also be mentioned that by retreating into deep mountains some minority peoples have led a hard life.

Another response to growing Chinese expansion and oppression was the creation of myths of origin and similar legends by these native peoples as a psychological compensation for what they had lost. For example, a myth of the Miao was that their ancestor was the Dragon King, as identified with the Chinese dragon -- the symbol of the emperor. In this way, the Miao believed that they

were as good as the Chinese. This message is also conveyed in
stories that the ancient Miao and the Chinese were brothers of one
family. Stories were also told that the Miao or Mongols or other
non-Chinese peoples were superior to the Chinese in courage,
strength, wisdom, honesty, and wealth (Eberhard 198:14-19).

The most extreme response involved "reverse discrimination"
against the Chinese by the natives. In most cases of this kind the
Han Chinese became slaves of minority peoples and were ill-treated
by them. According to some reports (Dessaint 1980:27-32; Eberhard
198:13), Chinese were bought and sold as slaves in Yi society.
These hereditary Chinese slaves were said to be customarily beaten,
made to dress in Lolo costume, locked up at night, given poor food
to eat, and not allowed to speak Chinese.

Summary

Eberhard (1982) summarizes the formation and origins of
Chinese minorities. According to his view, the first period of
minority formation ended around 50 B.C. During this period there
were groups living more or less independently within the core of
China proper. These groups became transformed first into
minorities and then into Chinese. The second period from 50 B.C.
to around 1000 A.D. saw the Chinese state expand to reach about the
size of the eighteen provinces of "China proper". It excluded the
areas still inhabited by strong tribes such as Manchuria, Mongolia,
Xinjiang, and Tibet. During this time, some of these tribes began

to organize themselves into tribal federations which were to conquer and rule for many centuries over parts of north China. This period also witnessed the disappearance of most of the tribal names of the first period, such as the Xiongnu, Xianbei, Wuhuan, Dian, Yue and so on, and the emergence of new tribal names like the Tujue, Tibetan, Uygur, Khitan, Jurchen, and Nanshao. The third period covers the time from about A.D. 1000 to the nineteenth century. Tribal names of this period can now easily be linked with still-existing tribes. These three periods saw not only the origins of presently existing minority groups, but also the formation of the Chinese state which was made up of various groups of people. In other words, two major processes have occurred in history: independent peoples were turned into submitted minority peoples; minority peoples became, finally, Chinese.

This chapter has discussed the historical processes by which various formerly independent ethnic groups were drawn into the orbit of the Chinese society and became minority peoples. Before the Chinese turned some of these peoples into Chinese minorities, they had been independent of Chinese rule, although influenced to different degrees by Chinese civilization. In many cases, especially with regard to some northern peoples, China has not been always superior, and it has again and again been conquered by the "barbarians" north of the Great Wall.

Incorporation and assimilation of non-Chinese peoples into the Chinese state and society has been achieved by Chinese expansion, colonization, Confucianization, and the imposition of Chinese

direct administration. Ethnic conflicts have occurred ever since the formation of the Chinese state. Some non-Chinese groups such as the Manchus and Zhuang are fully Sinicized, while others such as the Tibetans and Uygurs retain very strong ethnic sentiments and identities. Thus, we witness a dialectic of assimilation and conflict.

Two factors are important in the process of assimilation: extended, direct contact with Chinese society and similarities with regard to some cultural factors such as subsistence mode. The Manchus, for example, were more similar to the Chinese than the Mongols, as agriculture had been important in their life before they conquered the whole of China. This was also true of the Zhuang who had been rice cultivators before Chinese expansion. Two hundred and fifty years of rule of the Manchus over China and hundreds of years of life of the Zhuang under direct Chinese rule have made each group fully Sinicized. On the other hand, the very different modes of production along with less direct contact, have encouraged some ethnic groups to retain their identities. Compared with the Manchus, the Mongols, whose economic foundation relies on pastoralism, have been less assimilated. Still, their direct contact (a little less than a hundred years' rule over China) enabled them to accept the Chinese way of life more easily than Tibetans and Uygurs. This also explains why the mountain tribes of pastoralists and slash-burn agriculturalists in south China have had many more conflicts with the Chinese than have had the peoples living on the plains. The Tibetans and Uygurs may be the best

example of resistance to Chinese assimilation. The fact that these two groups had never completely ruled or been ruled by China until after 1949, and that their strong religious beliefs constituted an effective resistance against Confucianization, contributed to the pronounced retention of the ethnic identity of each today.

This chapter discussed both pacifist and military orientations of the Chinese with regard to non-Chinese groups in imperial China. Generally speaking, pacifist strategies were adopted to deal with the tribes beyond the Great Wall in the north and northwest, where land was not good for agriculture and where non-Chinese groups were stronger. In contrast, military strategies expressed in conquest and expansion were more likely to be the dominant policy toward the tribes in the south where the land was suitable for the Chinese pursuit of agriculture and where the tribal societies were weaker. Therefore, Chinese expansion to the south has been continuous and effective, whereas that into the north and northwest was interrupted now and then and generally less effective, since permanent control over these areas has seldom been achieved. In addition, increasing Chinese migration to the south has helped absorb many southern tribal peoples into Chinese society. However, the incorporation of these ethnic groups could not have been accomplished without Confucianization and direct or indirect Chinese administration. The Chinese administration was expressively manifested in the case of the tu-si system, which was often to be finally replaced by direct Chinese rule.

After some non-Chinese groups became minority peoples, or

inner barbarians, the Chinese exploited, discriminated against and even persecuted these peoples. The Chinese also destroyed the traditional religious and legal systems of minority peoples. They confiscated the tribes' weapons, and enforced the Chinese (Confucian) way in courtship and marriage customs in minority societies. Thus, the Chinese forced acculturation and final assimilation on many minority peoples. Minority responses varied. Uprisings were frequent and long-lasting. Other reactions of minority groups included avoidance or withdrawal from Chinese society and the creation of myths of origin as a psychological compensation for what they had lost. All these developments have shaped the contemporary Chinese ethnic situation.

Chapter Four

Modern Chinese Policies toward Minority Groups

This chapter focuses on the policies of the Han Chinese state toward minority ethnic groups in our era. The modern era as I interpret it includes two periods: the Republican period (1912-1949) and the period of the People's Republic of China (PC) (1949-present). Although space is devoted to a discussion of Guomindang policies of the Republican period, my interest here is centered on the Communists' policies and practices, especially those in the PC period. The Guomindang Nationalist regime was never stable because of its competition with warlords, and then with the Communists; therefore, its policies were largely ineffective. However, it is instructive to examine these two periods so that we can see both the continuity of tradition and the influence of new elements in the policies and attitudes of the central government toward minority peoples. I have chosen the recognition of minorities and the establishment of autonomous regions as examples to illustrate the differences between Communist policies and those of previous regimes. As well, these examples will serve to show the continuation of Chinese tradition in the PC's policies toward minority groups.

Republican Period

1. Nationalists' policies

Republican times did not witness significant developments in the relationship between the Han Chinese and the non-Han. This resulted largely from the diffusion of power caused by internal conflicts among warlords and between the Guomindang and warlords, foreign powers, and the Communists. During this period policies were formulated, but they lacked consistency and could not be implemented effectively.

Before the Nationalists took over power, they were concerned with the overthrow of the Manchu emperor -- regarded as a foreigner. Zou Rong, one of the most important figures in the revolution which founded the Republic of China, called for a revolution to "wipe out the five million barbarian Manchus" (Tsou 1957:331). Another important pioneer Nationalist, Hu Han-min, sounded racist when he said that: "the Manchus' evils are not confined to a few political measures, but are rooted in the nature of the race.... and can neither be eliminated nor reformed" (in Tsou 1938:442-3). In 1909 Tong-meng-hui (Association of Unity), the predecessor of the Guomindang, enunciated the concept of assimilation and urged all nationalities to walk one road (Deal 1984). This idea is represented in the first national flag of the Republic of China with five stripes in five colors symbolizing the five largest ethnic groups united into one nation -- a Chinese nationality.

However, the idea of assimilation also stressed unity and equality of the various ethnic groups, as Sun Yat-sen, the founder

of the Republic of China, stated:

> The Chinese Republic unites the five great races of the Han,
> Manchus, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans to plan together for
> happiness. How can we have the division of North and South?
> Moreover, how can we treat the Manchus cruelly? (Sun 1953:174-
>
> 5)

In this vein, article five of the Provisional Constitution of the
Republic in 1912 stated that all citizens were to be equal, with no
racial, religious, or class distinctions.   As well, special
provisions were made for members of the Legislative Assembly to be
elected from Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet, and Qinghai.

Other indications of the new government's interest in minority
problems were manifested in the establishment of official
institutions: a Department of Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs within a
Ministry of the Interior was established in 1912.   In the same
year, the department became a bureau directly under the cabinet.
Two years later the bureau was given a Yuan (similar to a ministry)
status directly under the president.   In 1929 a Mongolian-Tibetan
Commission directly under the Executive Yuan was created.   It
contained three bureaus (in charge of Mongolian, Tibetan and
general affairs) and four sections (personnel, accounts,
publications, and investigation).

The Constitutional Compact of 1914 included provisions for
favorable treatment of the Manchus, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans,
but the nature of special treatment for these peoples was not
specified.   The 1923 Constitution stipulated that Inner and Outer
Mongolia, Tibet, and Qinghai should have a measure of local self-
government; however, it was left undefined. It should be pointed

out that both constitutions were made during the period when warlords-turned presidents ruled North China in Beijing. The special treatment urged in the constitutions was more of a pose than anything else, as these warlords needed support from minorities in their competition among themselves and with the Nationalists (Guomindang).

The Guomindang's policies toward minorities underwent some important changes. Prior to the 1923 constitution, Sun Yat-sen still advocated assimilation. In 1921, Sun talked about the Han Chinese leading other ethnic groups of China, "to be melted in the same furnace, to be assimilated within the Han nationality. He further explained that: " the Han are the center, the other four must come and assimilate to us" (cited in Deal 1984). However, this view of assimilation, which saw its resurgence later when the Guomindang came to power, changed dramatically by 1923. The Guomindang Manifesto of 1923, for example, went so far as to affirm the principle of self-determination for all peoples within China:

> Guomindang hereby formally declares: We recognize the right of all racial groups of China to self-determination; and as soon as militarism and imperialism have been expelled from the land.... we will do our best to organize (upon the voluntary agreement of all racial groups) a free and united Republic of

China (Tseng 1930:93).

I agree with Deal (1984:25) that the formulation of the principle of self-determination in 1924 was influenced by the Soviets. Sun Yat-sen put forward the famous slogan that the Guomindang should unite Russians and the Chinese communists, and the Guomindang did form a coalition government in Canton, joined by

the communists and supported by the Soviet Union. It is interesting to note that this principle was also adopted by the Chinese communists in their early days, but it was dropped later by both the Guomindang and the CCP when they came to power.

In the 1931 constitution passed by the Guomindang, the equality of citizens regardless of race was reaffirmed; and the system of local government in Mongolia and Tibet was to be "determined separately by law in the light of local conditions." However, the doctrine of self-determination was explicitly denied (Deal 1984). The denial of the right of self-determination for minorities, as we will see later, marked the start of a return to Guomindang's earlier policy position of assimilation.

In 1937, the Guomindang announced that ethnic groups through the course of history had already mixed with the Chinese and had already become citizens of the Chinese nation. In 1938, during the Sino-Japanese War (1931-1945), the Nationalists made it clear that it was not possible for ethnic minorities to express their desires freely until after Japan was defeated. After the Sino-Japanese War, however, the principle of self-determination was not resumed, not even in the 1946 constitution which has been regarded as "surprisingly democratic" (Deal 1984). Self-government took the place of self-determination, but the latter did not include the right of secession from China. The assumption behind the principle of self-government seems to have been that if local administrative units were given a measure of self-government, and if national minorities were given equal status and enough help to develop their

economy, culture, and communications, then ethnic minorities would have no desire to split off from China or to demand self-government based purely on ethnic lines. This assumption had its echo later in the PRC policies toward minorities (Deal 1984:28).

To sum up, the Guomindang vacillated in their policies toward minorities, and this vacillation depended mainly on political circumstances. One thing is clear: Nationalist policies were not designed with the interests of minorities in mind. On the other hand, in many respects these policies anticipated Communist minority policies, such as guaranteeing equality to all minority groups, giving them freedom in religion, language, customs, and providing them with economic and cultural aid. The central difference lies in the fact that most of the Guomindang's policies were not implemented thoroughly. The principle of self-government, for example, was hardly put into effect at any level of the Guomindang administration (Deal 1984:28).

During this period, the Chinese Communist Party developed its own policies toward minorities. These policies, as well as the practices which followed, are important in that they provided a basis for the present PRC policies and practices toward minority peoples.

2. CCP policies

Ever since its founding, the Chinese Communist Party, "has consistently recognized the nationality question as being one of

the major questions of the Chinese revolution, and the liberation of national minorities as being a part of the liberation of the Chinese people" (Hsieh 1986:7). In its 1922 Manifesto of the Second Congress, the CCP proposed that "China proper (including Manchuria) be a true democratic republic and that the three regions of Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkestan (Xinjiang) be autonomous, forming democratic self-governing regions. China, Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkestan would then unite on the basis of their own free will, thereby establishing a Chinese federal republic" (Brandt et al 1952:64). Here we find the introduction of some important concepts such as "free will", "autonomous", "self-governing" and "federal republic". As we will see later, some of these ideas were dropped, while others remained active throughout the entire evolution of the CCP's minority policies. In 1931, the Communists established their Jiangsi Soviet government. The "Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic" declared, "the right of self-determination of the national minorities in China, the right to a complete separation from China, and the right of each national minority to form an independent state" (Brandt 1952:219-224). Here we find a parallel between earlier Guomindang policies and those of the Chinese Communist Party at this time, and each can probably be best seen as the result of Soviet influence. This declaration of self-determination also reflected the fact that the young and weak Communist Party made a generous gesture to gain the support of those minorities surrounding the Chinese Soviet in its struggle against the imperialists and Guomindang (Hsieh 1986:7).

The principle of self-determination was dropped after the so-called Long March. As Hsieh (1986:7) notes:

> From 1936 to 1949 the CCP began to create formal guidelines for its minority policies. This was somewhat different from that of Soviet Russia. The most significant change was the abandoning of the rights of self-determination and the right to secede from China. Instead, Mao now stressed that all minority groups would be given the right to administer their own affairs while at the same time establishing a unified state with the Han.

During this time, one of the most important bases for the later CCP's minority policies was a report by Mao to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1938. In this report, Mao outlined four means by which all "nationalities" might be united to counter Japanese aggression: (1) minorities were to have equal rights with the Chinese; (2) they were to have some power over affairs concerning themselves in local and provincial governments; (3) the cultures, religions, and customs of minorities were to be respected and encouraged, and (4) Han chauvinism was to be forbidden (Deal 1984:33). The previous "right to complete separation from China" was replaced by the "right to unite with the Han in building a unified country." Another landmark was Mao's 1949 speech entitled "On People's Democratic Dictatorship." This speech had many ideas which were to become law soon afterwards. Mao also stressed equality of all ethnic groups; regional representation on the county and provincial levels of government; respect for religions, cultures, and customs of minority groups; the preservation of minority languages; and the elimination of Great Hanism (Mao 1954:411-424).

In summary, during the period from 1921-1949 the CCP considered various approaches for dealing with minority ethnic groups. One of the most important changes was the shift from self-determination and the right of separation to unity in diversity. Mao's 1938 report and 1949 speech laid a theoretical basis for minority policies after the founding of the People's Republic of China. Finally, the CCP's efforts to train minority cadres and its experimental work with regard to the Hui and Mongols, after it had established its government in Yanan, prove to have been of a great help to its work in the minority areas of the PRC.

An Overview of PRC Minority Policies

1. Mild policies in the early 1950s

The first effort of the PRC with regard to minority issues was reflected in the Organic Law of the Central People's Government, adopted on September 29, 1949. Two articles related to the role of minority groups under the new government. One included all ethnic groups of China within the alliance of workers and peasants in the form of the people's democratic dictatorship of the People's Republic of China. The other article empowered the Administrative Council to set up various organs, including a Nationalities Affairs Commission under the Committee of Political and Legal Affairs. Nineteen of the twenty-one members and the three vice-chairmen of the commission were from minority groups. The first chairman was

a Han Chinese (Deal 1984:33).

At the same time, the Common Program was adopted. It functioned as the legal basis for government policies, until the promulgation of a Constitution in 1954. Five of the sixty articles in the Common Program focused on minorities. In addition to guaranteeing equality of rights and duties within a familial-like unity of diversity, and expressing opposition to Han Chauvinism, the Common Program also promised regional autonomy and minority representation in local government, and granted minorities the right to join the People's Liberation Army and to organize local defense forces. In addition, all minority groups were given the freedom to "preserve or reform their traditions, customs, and religious beliefs," and to develop, with the assistance from the central government, their own languages (Chen 1967:36). All these ideas, which formed the legal foundation for most of the later policies toward minority groups, followed the principles set forth in Mao's 1938 report and 1949 speech. Furthermore, the idea of regional autonomy became the key feature in minority policies of the People's Republic and replaced forever the principle of self-determination and the right to secession which had been declared by the communists in their early days.

In the summer of 1950, the Marriage Law and the Agrarian Reform Law were passed. The by-laws attached to each stipulated that the Marriage Law could be modified in minority areas to conform to local conditions, and that the Agrarian Reform Law did not apply in minority areas. It could, however, be applied to

minorities living in areas where the Han Chinese were the majority. While these principles showed the new government's respect for minorities' histories and cultures, it has also been suggested that they were adopted to avoid alienating certain minority elements by forcing a rapid change upon them (see Deal 1984).

The efforts of the new government to appeal to minorities could also be seen in a directive signed by Chou En-lai, late premier of the State Council. The directive ordered the elimination of place names, inscriptions, and monuments which were insulting and offensive to minority peoples. It also prohibited the writing of tribal names using the "dog" radical (Deal 1984:35). In addition, the government promulgated two measures concerning ethnic minorities the following year. The rights promised by the central government to minorities included: rights to elect and be elected as officials, the right to preserve or change their ways of life, the right to engage in any trade or profession and to join any "people's organization," the right to use their own languages in all legal proceedings, and the right to bring charges against acts of national discrimination, oppression, or insult perpetuated against them. These guaranteed rights were to apply "equally " both to minorities in autonomous regions inhabited by other minority groups and to Han people living in such regions (Deal 1984:35). These principles not only ensured quite a degree of autonomy for minorities, but also protected the Han Chinese living in minority regions from any threat by minorities toward them.

In 1952, a program of regional autonomy was implemented. The

government defined three kinds of autonomous regions:

> (1) Autonomous regions established on the basis of an area inhabited by one national minority.
> (2) Autonomous regions established on the basis of an area inhabited by one large national minority, including certain areas inhabited by other national minorities with very small populations who, likewise, shall enjoy regional autonomy.
> (3) Autonomous regions jointly established on the basis of two or more areas, each inhabited by a different national minority (Blaustein 1962:182).

Two points are noteworthy about this program. First, it explicitly stated that each autonomous region was to be an integral part of China and that the people in each autonomous region were to advance along the same general line -- China's march towards socialism. For minority peoples, as Deal observes (1984:36), this policy meant the precedence of building a united country over the internal well-being of any single minority group. Secondly, interpretation and amendment of this document on regional autonomy could only be done by the Central People's Government. This meant that ultimate responsibility and control remained in the hands of the central government (Deal 1984:36). Both points meant that the autonomy enjoyed by minorities was limited, and that the former right to secession was abolished.

The Electoral Law of 1953 further defined the way in which minority groups would be represented in the various levels of government. At the national level, minority peoples were allowed to have 150 seats in the National People's Congress. Thus, minorities with a population equal to one-fourteenth the total population of China would have as their representatives

approximately one-seventh the total number of delegates to the National People's Congress (Deal 1984:36). At the local level the law required that every minority group, no matter how small, was to have at least one delegate to the local people's congress.

The new national constitution was adopted in 1954. The paragraph devoted to general policies concerning minority groups reads as follows:

> All the nationalities in our country are united in one great family of free and equal nationalities. This unity of China's nationalities will continue to gain in strength, founded as it is on ever-growing friendship and mutual aid, and on the struggle against imperialism, against public enemies of the people within the nationalities, and against both chauvinism and local nationalism. In the course of economic and cultural development, the state will concern itself with the needs of the different nationalities, and in the matter of social transformation, pay full attention to special characteristics in the development of each. (Chen 1967:76)

These words contain some items of interest apart from the old but reaffirmed principles of freedom to use, preserve, or reform minority languages and a statement that all the autonomous regions are "inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China." An examination of these general policies shows, first, that by stressing unity, mutual aid, and anti-imperialism, the consideration of other choices of development for minority peoples was precluded. It was taken for granted that minorities would participate in general economic and cultural development as well as in the transformation to socialism. Secondly, opposition to local nationalism was spelled out officially. Third, the principle of self-government was formulated in such a way that the autonomous areas had the power to administer their own local finances and to

organize local security forces. However, this must be seen against a background in which all the self-governing regions were compelled to obey the national and provincial governments. They were subject to the "party's leadership" (see Chang 1956-57:521), and their self-governing power was actually limited.

The policies of the People's Republic toward minorities from 1949 to 1956 provided at least some limited degree of cultural autonomy. This is manifested especially in the attack on Han chauvinism as the main cause of tensions and contradictions between the Han Chinese and minorities. In this respect, Liu Shao-qi, the late state president, was a major defender of Chinese cultural pluralism. He not only saw Han chauvinism as the major danger in improving relationships between the Han and minorities, but also urged the Han cadres to learn from minorities (Deal 1984:39). However, the year of 1957 saw a shift from an attack on Han chauvinism to one focused on local nationalism. This shift marked the start of the first period of forced assimilation in the history of the PRC.

2. Shift to assimilation

The Anti-rightist Campaign started in 1957. This was one of several large-scale efforts by the Communists to silence dissidents both within and outside the Party. Many people who criticized practices of the Party were labelled "rightists," a term which proved to be a death sentence to their political and personal careers. This political movement paved the way for the Great Leap

Forward in 1958, and it anticipated in many ways the Cultural Revolution of 1966 to 1976. During the Anti-Rightist campaign, some minority students at the Central Institute for Nationalities were persecuted because they spoke against the cadres' Han chauvinism, lack of equality, and lack of respect for minority languages and customs. In the minority areas, the campaign was aimed primarily at local nationalism, which was defined as expressing a desire for separation from China and opposition to Chinese settlers, the leadership of the central government, and the learning of Chinese. Many minority leaders were accused of being local nationalists. Besides, some minority groups were accused of forcing out Chinese cadres or of rejecting Han help, and of refusing to cooperate with the Han cadres. It is important to note that local nationalism was now considered to be a "contradiction between the enemy and ourselves", rather than as Mao had defined it earlier. Furthermore, the eventual fate of minorities was seen at this time to involve the gradual fusion of various ethnic groups. Minority customs and traditions must change, it was felt, because some customs were, "incompatible with socialism" (Deal 1984:41). This change of attitude of the Chinese Communist Party toward minorities was partially caused by disaffection on the part of many minorities. This disaffection was made manifest in the 1959 Tibetan revolt, the departure of Thai-speaking people from southwest China for Southeast Asia, and that of the Kazakhs for the former Soviet Union in 1962.

The hard line policy was strengthened in 1964, when Liu Ch'un,

vice-chairman of the State Council's Nationalities Affairs Commission wrote:

> ...the question of nationalities is the question of classes....It is only with the coming of Communism and the gradual extinction of classes that by the merging of nationalities, national peculiarities and differences will disappear (Liu 1964).

Thus we find the nationality question identified with that of class; an identification which reached its extreme during the Cultural Revolution.

Together with the later Cultural Revolution, the Great Leap Forward movement in 1958 proved to be the period in which a policy of assimilation was most often advocated and carried out. The Great Leap Forward had several effects on minorities. First, many minority customs which had previously been respected were now declared to be detrimental to production and were prohibited. Secondly, class struggle was introduced into minority life, which meant that class differences was used to discount ethnic differences (Dreyer 1977:105). Prior to this period, the Party's policies in minority regions had been featured by the character of "no struggle", or uniting the traditional minority elites. At this time, the concept of class struggle was introduced into minority areas, and the traditional upper class was overthrown, with their land and property redistributed. The people of this class had become the people's enemies, instead of the objects of cooperation. Third, several high-ranking traditional minority leaders were purged as counter-revolutionaries, and local nationalism replaced Han chauvinism as the chief problem to be overcome. Fourth, a new

campaign was launched for learning Chinese, and it became unacceptable to speak minority languages or to wear traditional minority costumes. In sum, conformity instead of diversity became the watchword during the Great Leap Forward (Dreyer 1977:106).

The period of the Cultural Revolution, a political revolution lasting from 1966 to 1976, turned out to be another difficult period for minority peoples in China. Contrary to Dreyer's assertion that this period produced less severe and far-reaching effects on minorities (1977:107), there were many damages inflicted upon minorities in this period, as will be discussed in the case of Tibet in the next chapter. Now, it became the official ideology that even in socialism the national issue was ultimately a "class issue" (Heberer 1989:24). The earlier minority policy which recognized the uniqueness of minority groups was labelled a "bourgeois reactionary line". The former president of state Liu Shao-qi was persecuted because he was said to have denied that the ethnic issue is a class one. His earlier demands for regional autonomy were described as, "opposition to national unity and advocation of national separatism;" and his proposal for prudence in the redistribution of land and in the reform of customs and manners was seen as "suppression of the revolutionary demands of the national minorities for liberation" (Heberer 1989:24).

At the same time, the concept that minorities and their territories were distinctive was totally rejected. All agencies for minorities were disbanded, and all special privileges for members of ethnic minorities were eliminated. All these actions

were based on the claim that special treatment would keep minorities from being fused into Chinese society and would prevent them from participating in the revolution on an equal footing (Heberer 1989:25). Now, minorities were to be treated as Han, an indication that assimilation had become the guideline for minority policies and practices. Moreover, it was declared that China was not a multiethnic country in that the ethnic issue was settled and thus a minority policy was no longer needed (People's Daily October 3, 1978).

A partial list of assimilationist policies and practices at this time includes the fact that traditional items for minorities were no longer produced or grown. Cultural traditions were denied on the premise that, "They should live in houses instead of tents; wear normal clothes instead of their costumes, pigtails instead of turbans; and they should eat and drink in messhalls" (Heberer 1989:18). Autonomy, which was accused of creating "independent regions" and "dividing the nation", ceased to exist, and special financial allowances from the central government were stopped. The minorities who had traditionally raised livestock were forced to destroy their pastures, plant grain, and become farmers. Minority languages, or scripts, and customs were condemned as backward and feudalist, and an attempt was made to abolish them officially. Religious traditions were forced to be abandoned and traditional minority health practices which were seen as superstitious were strictly curtailed. Finally, minority dance, films, folk songs, and operas were prohibited or adapted to Han taste (see Heberer

1989:25-27). The 1975 and 1978 constitutions, the products of the Cultural Revolution, deleted most rights of minorities such as 1) the prohibition of prejudice and discrimination against members of ethnic minorities, 2) the freedom to preserve or reform languages and scripts, manners and customs, 3) the right of regional autonomy.

This policy change from the Great Leap Forward to the Cultural Revolution could be explained by the general political climate, which was dominated by the radical Maoists. According to these people, the advance toward communism in China was too slow. Steps were consequently taken to speed up this march to communism. With regard to minority questions, the Maoists believed that ethnic differences were harmful for the march, and they were determined to abolish ethnic uniqueness. Another reason for this change is said to be that the Party was disappointed by minority discontent about the Party's practices, as was expressed in the Tibetan Revolt in 1959 (Dreyer 1976).

3. A return to a milder policy

From the end of the Cultural Revolution to the present, China resumed the policies and practices of the early fifties. This tendency reflects post-Mao Chinese politics formulated by Deng Xiao-ping which is more "practical" than Mao's ideology, and which places more stress on economic construction than on class struggle. The politics of this period are more liberal than even the early period of the PRC. In terms of minority affairs, there now exists

a language of cultural pluralism showing respect for minority customs, languages, and the right to minority self-government. In the 1982 constitution, for example, sixteen articles out of a total of 138 deal directly with the issue of minority ethnic groups. As Hsieh observes (1986:10), not only was there an increase in the number of articles but the wording was also more complete and precise. Many principles formulated in the early 1950s became more elaborate. In addition to restoring some articles of the 1954 constitution, the 1982 document gave emphasis to the organs of self-government in national autonomous areas. It stipulated, for example, that the administrative head of an autonomous region, prefecture, or county should be a member of one of the ethnic groups in the region. The present constitution also allowed the independent arrangement and administration of local economic development (under the guidance of state plans) and of cultural affairs in the national autonomous areas.

In general, the 1982 constitution had the same spirit as the one of 1954; that is, unity of diversity. The constitution guaranteed both material and non-material development in minority regions. It was also opposed to both Han chauvinism and local nationalism and prohibited any act which might undermine the unity of the country (Hsieh 1986:11). Based on this constitution, China also passed a "law of regional autonomy of the nationalities of the People's Republic of China" in 1984. Heberer compares this law with all other laws since 1949 and finds that it:

> provides distinctly broader rights of self-administration, and defines more specifically the

functions and rights of certain administrative bodies, as well as outlines the interrelations between bodies of self-administration and higher authorities of the state

(1989:42).

According to this new law, leading officials must now be members of the minority group or groups exercising autonomy. Resolutions and instructions from higher political organs which do not take into consideration conditions in an autonomous unit need not be unconditionally implemented. The broader rights received by minorities embraced fields such as regional planning, economic development, protection and administration of their resources, foreign trade, the financial and tax sectors, education, health and others. More important is the fact that autonomous units were empowered to enact laws which give legislative guarantees for minority customs and traditions in education, language, and marriage (see Heberer 1989:42-4). As Heberer (1989:43) notes, the 1984 law was the most far-reaching legislation to date on the rights of ethnic minorities, though it was still too general and vague to be effective without supplemental and substantial legislation.

Pluralist Elements In PRC Minority Policies

The major difference between the present government's minority policies and those of imperial and nationalist regimes lies in the fact that the former contains elements of cultural pluralism. As

Heberer notes (1989), the People's Republic of China was the first government in Chinese history to officially recognize the status of minorities in China. It has granted, at least in principle, certain rights to minority groups such as self-government, and it has encouraged respect for minority languages, customs, and history. Therefore, the present government appears to be more democratic than all previous regimes, nationalist or imperial. I consider two central pluralist elements in the present government's minority policy to be of particular importance: recognition of minorities and the establishment of autonomous regions.

Recognition of minorities

The work of classifying minorities started soon after the Chinese Communists came to power. The first missions for this purpose found more than 100 minorities; the number was reduced later. In the early fifties detailed studies and field research were undertaken under the leadership of some well-known social scientists such as Fei Xiao-tong and Lin Yue-hua. By 1957 fifty-four ethnic groups were officially recognized as distinct minority groups. In 1979 the Jinou was added to make the total number fifty-five. Official recognition was granted to these ethnic groups by the Chinese State Council. However, some problems cropped up during the process of minority classification. A large number of those who claimed to belong to separate ethnic groups were actually members of the same group; others belonged to the same ethnic group but used different names; and still others were

Han who had no clear recollection of their origins (Fei 1981; Heberer 1989).

There were Han Chinese whose forebears had migrated into minority regions and had retained some Han language and cultural characteristics but were uncertain of their identity. They registered under names that native inhabitants had given them. Within this category, there were still other Han people who migrated into the same minority region but at different historical times. The earlier Han immigrants differed from Han newcomers in language and manners, and were discriminated against by the latter. The descendants of these earlier Han groups demanded the recognition of a minority identity. The same thing occurred among minority groups themselves. Branches of a group which had been separated over the course of history and were scattered in colonies among the Han, or which had separated from the rest and migrated to non-Han regions, considered themselves to be different from others of the same group and registered under different names. In other areas, the independent communities of a splintered group were known by the same name for registration.

One telling example was the Chuanqing (clad in black) group. They applied for recognition as a minority group because they lived in their own compact communities and differed from the local Han population in language, dress, hairstyle, religious belief, manners, and customs. More importantly, they had been discriminated against by the Han people in the region. However, the other ethnic minorities in this region did not regard them as

a minority but as a special group of Han. While the Chuanqing were distinctive in some ways, studies revealed that they were Han rather than an independent ethnic group (Fei 1981). Thus, the Chuanqing (and other groups) were denied the status of a minority group in the fifties.

The government had the final power to decide on the status of a minority group. As Wu (1990:2) observes, political considerations carried great weight in these decisions. The fact of easy recognition for frontier and powerful ethnic groups and a corresponding denial of minority status to smaller and scattered groups (including 2,000 Jews) illustrates the weight of political factors. In addition, the names of minority groups have generally been fixed or decided upon by Han authorities. For example, the Yi, as called by Han people, actually call themselves Nuosu. The Benglong's term for themselves is "Deang."[1]

The People's Republic of China recognized not only the status of minority groups but also the existence of a minority question. In the 1950's, the government repeatedly stressed the special conditions of minority groups, and urged the cadres working in minority areas to pay close attention to these special conditions. The most telling example is that the Party, which has always stressed the importance of class struggle, made it clear that class struggle should not be applied in minority areas because of their special conditions (Dreyer 1976). Thus, a policy of "no struggle" was carried out in these areas in the early 1950s, which means in practice that the traditional minority elite was allowed to remain

in their leadership positions, and that their land and property was not redistributed (Shu 1989).

Minority groups have also received special treatment by the government. In terms of family planning the one-child-per-family policy has not been enforced in minority regions. In these regions couples in the countryside are permitted to have two or three children. This fact made Jing Shu state that, "the particular family planning policies for the Chinese minorities in the 1980s are viewed by the government as a portion of an overall plan in China to attempt to respect their traditions, and to increase the prosperity of minorities" (Shu 1989:130). In addition, minority peoples are also treated favorably with regard to job and university placements. It is because of these special, favorable treatments to minorities that some groups are eager to obtain the status of a minority, even though they have long identified themselves with the Han Chinese (Wu 1990).

2. Establishment of autonomous regions

Cultural pluralism is best represented in the PRC's efforts to establish autonomous regions in minority areas. The idea of autonomous regions, first developed by Lenin, was adopted by Mao Tse-dong in 1938. In 1952, the concept of an autonomous area was refined. In the General Program for the Implementation of Nationality Regional Autonomy of the Chinese People's Republic of that year, three types of autonomous areas were classified:

> 1. areas in which the inhabitants belong to the same minority (e.g., a Miao Autonomous Zhou might be set

up in a predominantly Miao area);
2.   areas in which the inhabitants belong to the same minority nationality with certain districts inhabited by a smaller number of people of a different nationality, these latter peoples having the right to autonomy (e.g., a Yao Autonomous Xian might exist under the jurisdiction of a Miao Autonomous Zhou);
3.   areas in which two or more minority groups form a significant proportion of the population. In this case, a multinational autonomous area might be set up. Where either group formed a cohesive bloc in part of this autonomous area, they would have the right to establish an autonomous government in that part (e.g., a Yao Autonomous Xian might exist under the jurisdiction of a Miao-Yao Autonomous Zhou) (Dreyer 1976:104).

The key word in the formation of autonomous area was "nationalization," which means "national in the form of autonomous organs, languages, and cadres." Within minority areas, minority languages were studied and a dictionary was compiled for the Han cadres. The old scripts were modernized and Latin alphabets developed. The term bu-lo (tribe) was abolished and derogatory place names were changed. The previous Chinese symbols for tribal names, which had been written with character for animals indicating the nonhuman nature of the tribes, were ordered to be written with the character for man (human being), an innovation already introduced by the Nationalists. There was an important rule that the minority language was not the only language to be spoken in a minority area and that the leaders in such an area did not have to be members of the minority; that is, they could be Han Chinese. It was also stressed that all autonomous areas were inalienable parts of the motherland and that all organs therein were to be formed in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism. No special financial or military exemption provisions were made by the program

(Dreyer 1976:105).

By 1952, there existed 130 autonomous areas and over 200 coalition autonomous governments (Eherhard 1982:157). From 1956 on minority areas underwent several organizational changes. There were forty-six such groups in 1957, and we hear of autonomous regions, prefectures, counties, and even villages. Later, some new autonomous regions were created, while other areas came under regular Chinese administration. In 1989, there existed 141 areas with regional minority autonomy, including five autonomous regions at the provincial level: Inner Mongolia (established in 1947), Xinjiang of the Uygur (1956), Ningxia of the Hui and Guangxi of the Zhuang (both in 1958), as well as Tibet (1965). There are 31 autonomous prefectures and 105 autonomous counties.

Regional autonomy in minority areas was implemented in accordance with plans drawn up by the central authorities, rather than in accordance with the wishes of minority peoples. As Moseley (1973:78) observes, representatives of the state in Guangxi and Yunnan had a particular plan when they began carrying out national minority work. Their task was to mobilize and involve the native peoples in a largely pre-determined process. The general pattern went as follows: a convening of a representative people's congress which hears certain reports and passes certain items of legislation, election of a government council which reflects fairly precisely the ethnic composition of the area, and despatch of a laudatory telegram to Chairman Mao. Since these autonomous areas were created from the top, they could also be dissolved from the

top. Furthermore, since the 1954 constitution did not provide a sufficient guarantee of the rights of minority groups, their rights basically did not exist (Heberer 1989:41).

During periods of political radicalism (i.e. the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution), the general policy was one of assimilation. The intensity of assimilationist efforts depended on the political climate. In the 1978 constitution, for example, even the rights that minorities had been given under the 1954 constitution were withdrawn. The discontent felt by minorities was best represented by a Li representative to the National People's Congress in September 1980:

> There were laws for national minorities as early as the fifties. But in 1958 they were criticized and the Autonomous Prefecture of Hainan of the Li and Miao was dissolved. In 1962 it was reinstated. In 1966 it was once again declared that autonomous regions were no longer necessary. Later the autonomous prefecture was once more reinstated. Today a party secretary comes and abolishes it, tomorrow comes another one and restores it again. Often the autonomous region and its development depend on the attitude of this or that leader or this or
>
> that course (Heberer 1989:41-2).

Because of the demands made by the minority representatives to the People's Congress, and the more liberal atmosphere of the post-Mao period, the Chinese government enacted the "law of regional autonomy of the nationalities of the People's Republic of China" in 1984. Compared with other regulations since the founding of the PRC, this new law provided distinctly broader rights of self-administration, and it defined more specifically the functions and rights of administrative bodies. It also outlined the interrelations between bodies of self-administration and the higher

authorities of the state. According to this law, leading officials must be members of the ethnic groups (groups) exercising autonomy. Resolutions and instructions from higher political organs that do not take into consideration the conditions in an autonomous unit need not be unconditionally implemented. The autonomous units received broader rights--for regional planning, economic development, and protection and administration of their resources. Rights were also granted dealing with foreign trade, the financial and tax sectors, education, and health (Heberer 1989:43).

Recognition of minority status and the establishment of minority autonomous regions represent two pluralist elements in present government's minority policies. Neither had been seen before the founding of the PRC. However, these policies, which were largely intended by the PRC to distinguish itself from previous regimes (Dreyer 1976), lack firm legal basis and are therefore changeable according to the political climate. More importantly, these policies have not encouraged the long-lasting diversity of minority cultures; rather, they have served the purpose of the PRC in merging minority groups into the Han along the road to socialism, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Summary

To this point I have presented an outline of the evolution of

modern Chinese policies and practices toward minorities. There are quite a few differences between Guomindang and Communist policies. Generally speaking, the Communist government was more detailed in its laws and other documents regarding the ethnic question. Moreover, the Guomindang's fully voiced intention of assimilation, manifest especially in its announcement that all ethnic groups are but the branches of one Han Chinese nationality, stands in contrast to Communist policies which seem to be pluralistic. Despite these differences, there are important similarities between the policies of the Guomindang and the Communists. As Deal (1984) notes, the Guomindang foreshadowed the Communists in granting freedom of language and religion and in promising the economic development of minority regions. More important is the fact that both policies shifted from the principle of self-determination to that of self-government. The similarities between the two periods, which are often considered to represent two contrasting ideologies, are striking.

The government of the People's Republic of China has been the first in Chinese history to recognize minority ethnic groups. Compared with the Guomindang and still earlier imperial governments, the PRC appears to be democratic and liberal with regard to minority issues. Equality of minorities with the Han and respect for minority traditions, customs, and languages have been watchwords in PRC policies. Moreover, the establishment of autonomous regions has been considered by the present Chinese government, as well as some scholars in the West, to be a PRC

innovation which represents Chinese goodwill toward minority peoples (Sinclair 1987; Thompson 1989).

It should be pointed out that pluralism in Chinese minority policies and practices is not complete. In the case of minority autonomy, for example, laws have not guaranteed protection of the rights of minorities. Laws have quickly meant nothing during periods of ideological and political radicalization, as Heberer (1989:43) correctly points out. At the core, Heberer also finds that the law is subject to the power monopoly of the Communist Party, and that it is ineffectual because it remains subordinate to the party's claim to supreme political power, leaving "the minority populations subject to the despotism and arbitrary wills of authorities and functionaries" (Heberer 1989:43).

The autonomous regions in China may be significantly different from the former Soviet minority republics (Dreyer 1976; Eberhard 1982). The minorities in the former Soviet Union were considered to live in republics which at least in theory could secede from the Union, and this is actually what has happened over the past few years. This is not true of the autonomous areas in China. Besides, in the former Soviet Union there existed a somewhat greater freedom in the development of national languages and cultural forms, and individuals of minority origin (such as Stalin who was a Georgian) were able to reach key positions in the government. So far in China no Party leader of minority origin has even been assigned work in Han areas or in areas of other minorities. China's policies are more assimilationist than those

of the former Soviet Union - which, though, was never an example of pluralism. They appear to be closer to Nationalist and imperial policies which have long stressed the superiority of Chinese culture. In this sense, I will argue that contemporary Chinese minority policies and practices are pluralist in form but assimilationist in content.

Chapter Five

Assimilation in Modern China

This chapter focuses on the assimilationist strategies of the Chinese government vis-a-vis minority ethnic groups. On the surface, assimilationist and pluralist elements seem to contradict each other. However, it is my intention to show that in the case of contemporary China assimilation is the ultimate end and cultural pluralism is merely a means to that end. This "pluralism in form but assimilation in content" is best represented by the policy of training minority cadres.

The Training of Minority Cadres

The establishment of autonomous areas could not have been possible without the government's efforts to train minority cadres. The PRC government promised in 1952 that one of the most important aspects of nationalization in minority areas was to be administration by minority cadres. However, the early strategy of the Chinese communists with regard to minority affairs was that of compromise and cooperation with the "patriotic upper strata", or the traditional elite in minority regions. This came from the fact that the government at that time had little knowledge about, and few personnel in, minority regions. For this reason, the Xinjiang "United Democratic Government", established in 1949, was comprised

mostly of the public servants of the Guomindang regime. In Yunnan, Long Yun and Long Han, who had been governors of the province since the Nationalist regime, remained in their offices after 1949. This was also true of many other minority regions such as Tibet and Gansu. However, this policy proved to be transitional; the traditional elite were later replaced by those who were trained by and loyal to Beijing.

The Chinese Communist Party began training minority cadres during the Yanan period (1935-1948) when a special Nationalities Institute was opened. From 1945 on this institute was merely a cadres' training school in which the selected future minority leaders were taught the Chinese language as well as Marxist theory. Although the party had trained quite a number of minority cadres by 1949, their number was not sufficient for post-liberation tasks. Therefore, high priority was given to the training and recruiting of minority cadres immediately after the Chinese Communists came to power. These efforts were confined to a relatively small proportion of China's minority groups; chiefly Mongols, Zhuang, and Hui. Especially lacking were representatives from Xinjiang, Tibet, and Southwestern areas. In 1949 Mao stated that, "without a large number of cadres recruited from the minority nationalities, we can never succeed in thoroughly solving the nationality problem or in completely isolating the reactionaries of the nationalities" (quoted in Min-Zu Tuan-Jie, or Nationality Unity no.8 1955:13). The recruting and training of minority cadres ranged from a search for activists at the grass roots level to the founding of a

hierarchy of cadre training schools. It culminated in the establishment of the Central Nationalities Institute in Beijing.

In the Tibetan area of Sichuan province, training classes had been offered to some minority youth by underground party workers and then by the People's Liberation Army before any kind of government training schools were set up. In some slave-owning societies such as the Yi, the PLA offered asylum to slaves who had escaped from their owners. These runaway slaves were provided with food, clothing, and education -- which included lessons in theories of Marxism, Leninism and Mao Tse-dong Thought (Dreyer 1976:110). Those minority group activists involved in the destruction of traditional social structures came mostly from the lower strata of their societies. Serfs in Tibet and slaves among the Yi were given the highest priority as potential cadres. They might participate in one of the local-level governments, attend higher-level cadre schools, or both (Dreyer 1976:110). Cadre training classes were intended to instruct these promising activists in ideology, organization, and production techniques. Successful graduates would then be sent to more specialized institutions which had been set up to give advanced training. Inner Mongolia, according to Dreyer (1976), provides an example. It had the earliest Communist movement among all minority areas; it had been the first large minority area to be "liberated", and the first to attain the status of an autonomous region. In 1946 an Inner Mongolia Military and Political College and an Inner Mongolia Autonomy College had been founded. The establishment of a People's Government in 1947 was

followed by the setting up of a wide variety of cadre training institutes, which included the Inner Mongolia Cadre School, cooperative cadre training classes, animal pestilence training classes, and accountants' training classes. In 1950 a Workers and Peasants Short Term Middle School and a Workers and Peasants Cultural Spare Time School were set up. By the end of 1951, a total of 485 cadres had been sent to universities and schools outside Inner Mongolia for advanced studies. Over 25,000 cadres had been trained by that time.

In November, 1950 the Government Administration Council issued a directive on founding the Central Nationalities Institute in Beijing with branches in the Northwest, Southwest, and Central-South. According to Dreyer (1976), the purpose of this effort was:

1. to train higher- and intermediate-level cadres for service in minority areas
2. to do systematic research in minorities' spoken and written languages, history, culture, and society
3. to compile and translate works on minority nationalities

Both the Han and non-Han were eligible for entry into this network of advanced minority education. Two kinds of courses, short-term and long-term, were available. The short-term course was a four-to-six-month political training open to cadres at the special administrative district level and above and to "patriotic democratic personages" at the xian (county) level and above. The second kind of course, which would last two to three years, would allow specialization in either politics or language. The Central Nationalities Institute was at first under the supervision of the Nationalities Affairs Commission and then became part of the

Ministry of Education.

These efforts produced a large number of minority cadres. In Xinjiang, for example, over 85 percent of the xian (county) magistrates and deputy magistrates were of minority origin by mid-1961. Over half of the commissioners and their deputies at the administrative district level, governors and vice-governors at the autonomous zhou (prefecture) level, and directors and vice-directors of departments and bureaus at the regional level were cadres of minority groups (McMillen 1979:48). Tibet is another case in point. According to Grunfeld (1987:165) all district level cadres' positions, the lowest level in the Chinese administrative structure, were filled by Tibetans by 1975. The next level contained 58-60 percent Tibetans, but the regional level had only 44 percent Tibetan cadres.

The development of minority cadres' training and recruitment in these two areas is instructive in that both areas had been characterized by less Chinese acculturative influence, looser control by the Chinese, and the absence of communist movements before 1949.

These two regions represent a general pattern of leadership via minority cadres by the Communist Party. For the most part minority cadres have been relegated to low-level positions.[1] The low percentage of cadres at higher levels shows the degree to which Han peoples still control minority areas, and this is confirmed by the fact that the leading positions at higher levels, or key organs or departments of minority administration, are in the hands of Han

CCP members. In Xinjiang in 1965, despite the fact that 56 percent of cadres belonged to minorities, less than 10 percent of leadership positions at the commune/county level and above were held by minorities. Between 30 and 40 percent of commune/county positions were held by active or demobilized People's Liberation Army elements belonging to the Party, with the remainder being staffed by civilian Party cadres (McMillen 1979:48). Most importantly, a Party committee existed at every level of minority administration, from the regional level down to the grass-root level, exercising de facto control and authority over policy implementation. They are the real holders of power, a fact which discounts the nominal minority predominance in administration in some minority areas. It should be added that the first secretaries or the ranking secretaries of these committees are predominantly Han. This is especially true at the higher levels.

The purpose of training minority cadres has been to use them as a bridge between the Party and minority masses. One of the most important training courses has been political eduction. The minority cadres have to be well versed in Marxism and Mao's thought before they can assume posts of leadership at different levels. Party membership has been closely connected with minority leadership, and it is stressed that Party membership should be a prerequisite for cadre status, especially for "responsible" or "leadership" cadres, as is shown in the case of Xinjiang after 1960. In this case, the 1965 figures for minority cadres and minority Party members were reported as being identical--106,000

(McMillen 1979:77). All these factors ensure that minority cadres function more as spokespersons for the Party than for their own peoples. Thus we find that the autonomy minority peoples exercise actually is limited and under the tight control of the Party.

Transformations of Minority Groups

The assimilationist thrust of the Chinese government is better shown in its efforts to transform minority areas both socially and physically. This transformation has been achieved by the means of so-called "democratic and socialist reforms", as well as by large-scale Han resettlement in minority areas.

The overt recognition of minority groups and their right to autonomy and self-administration distinguishes the present communist government from earlier regimes in Chinese history. These efforts make the PRC policies and practices concerning minorities appear to be liberal or pluralist in nature. Pluralist elements prove to be limited, however, as the present minority policies actually are assimilationist. This assimilationist nature has meant that minority societies have had to change not according to their own desires but according to the will of the state. Transformations of minority societies include the destruction of traditional social structures and the establishment of a new and uniform form of society, a socialist society. In addition, large scale resettlement of the Han in minority areas has facilitated the process of transformation. In the long run it may make a considerable degree of assimilation inevitable.

1. Land reform -- the structural transformation of traditional
            societies

Though most scholars who study modern Chinese policies toward minorities refer to land reform and collectivization or socialization in minority areas, few have paid enough attention to these factors. In my opinion, land reform and collectivition represent the real forces working to assimilate minority groups into Han Chinese society and culture. These processes have created an almost uniform social and cultural form, so that various minority groups have had to abandon their traditional ways of life and adopt this new form. Such action is the first step toward complete assimilation. In many ways imposing "socialist" form on minority groups can be compared to the age-old implementing of Chinese jun-xian administration and Confucianization in minority areas in imperial China. Both practices were aimed at assimilating non-Chinese groups. I believe that the present government in China has been more successful in this regard in that all minority groups without exception have been brought along on the "road of socialism".

Two stages can be identified in this process. The first step involved land reform in which land was redistributed. This was the part of the process most supported by minority masses. In Yunnan the Hung-ho Hani autonomous area and the Meng-zi Yi area had completed land reform by 1957 (Moseley 1973:95). In the Te-hung and Xishuangbanna Dai areas land reform had been completed by the end of 1955. In Xishuangbanna land reform involved dividing up the

holdings of the Xishuangbanna "king" and assigning them to the lesser princes. Later, the farmers came into actual possession of the land they tilled thus ending an 800-year-old feudal land system in the area. Uniform land reform was carried out among all the frontier Dai, and as a result it was claimed that the typical Dai farmer received lands producing from 230 to 600 kg of grain (Moseley 1973:116-7). It should be noted here that there had been a great deal of Han participation in the land reform movement in these areas, and land reform was consequently seen by some minorities as a Han Chinese contrivance (Moseley 1976:119).

In Xinjiang land reform started as early as late 1950, and it was for the most part under the control of the Party. The PLA (People's Liberation Army) work teams propagandized the Party's land reform policy, organized the masses into peasant's associations, led the masses in public trials of local landlords, and aided in the reduction of rents and the confiscation and redistribution of land and property. By late 1951, the provincial authorities had laid the foundation for a coordinated land reform campaign throughout Xinjiang. Land reform in Xinjiang was intensified during 1952-53. The authorities proposed that over 80 percent of peasants were to receive some land, with most of it going to the 60 percent who were poor and landless (McMillen 1979:133). The landlords were forced to confess their sins publicly and were either imprisoned or liquidated. In 1954 it was announced that 3,168,317 mu (about 211,221 hectares) of land had been confiscated from landlords, and that another 1,197,731 mu

(about 79,849 hectares) had been requisitioned during the movement. These lands had been distributed among some 450,000 poor and landless peasant households, with each receiving about 2.3 mu (about 0.16 hectares) of land. In 1959 it was revealed that the final figures included 7,370,000 mu (491,333 hectares) confiscated and redistributed to over 650,000 households (McMillen 1979:134). In Tibet land reform was carried out as soon as the revolt was put down in 1959. It involved two stages. The first was known as "three antis and two reductions" (anti-rebellion, anti-corvee, anti-slavery; reduce land rent and interest). The second stage involved the confiscation of land, livestock, and tools from lords who fled Tibet after the revolt. These were distributed to the serfs. The aristocracy who remained were also deprived of land, tools, and livestock, though they were monetarily reimbursed. By late 1960 it appeared that the movement of "democratic reform" had been successfully carried out (Grunfeld 1987:162).

2. Cooperativization -- the imposition of "socialist society"

The completion of land reform, as well as the establishment of the "people's governments," marked the end of many traditional social structures in minority areas. However, the setting up of a new social structure came only after the next stage: cooperativization and communization, which together were called socialization or "socialist reform". Normally, immediate steps were taken after the completion of land reform to encourage the peasants to organize themselves into mutual aid teams (MATs). Once

permanent MATs were organized and consolidated, lower-stage agricultural producer's cooperatives (APC) would emerge which would produce higher-stage APCs later on. In the form of MATs, several families jointly worked the land, while each retained private ownership of its portion. In the lower-stage APCs (which might consist of between five and ten MATs), landholdings were pooled, boundary markers destroyed, and the entire holding was cultivated as a single farm with members paid according to shares. In the higher-stage of APCs, which were to be fully socialist collectives in which the members were paid as wage laborers according to work points, all land, tools, and animals were to be owned by the collectives.

About one year after the start of land reform in Tibet the Chinese press reported that 100,000 households were organized into 8,400 mutual aid teams. By late 1962 all Tibet's 166,000 rural households were reported to have joined MATs, which totalled 22,000 (Grunfeld 1987:162). In this respect, however, Xinjiang was more advanced than Tibet. By the end of 1953 the estimated 95,000-plus MATs were consolidated and readjusted into 51,600 (of which 5,100 were of a permanent type), and ten lower-stage agricultural producers' cooperatives had been established. Altogether, about 34 percent of the peasants had been organized in Xinjiang (McMillen 1979:134). In 1955 the process of cooperativization was stepped up, leading to 75,215 MATs (28 percent permanent) claiming over 63 percent of the peasants as members. In addition, nearly 50,000 peasant households (or slightly over 5 percent) were in 1,702

lower-stage APCs. A year later, however, the number of co-ops reached 10,781 (McMillen 1979:136).

The rapid increase in cooperativization between 1955 and 1956 in Xinjiang reflected the political climate of China at that time, which urged speeding up of

Table 5.1 Development of MATs and APCs in Xinjiang

	1953	1955	1956
MATs	51,600	75,215	
APCs	10	1,702	10,781

collectivization. In 1956 an article published by Xue Xi cited Mao as saying:

> Some people say that among the minority nationalities cooperativization cannot be carried out. This is incorrect. We have already come upon many cooperatives run by people of Mongol, Hui, Uygur, Miao and Zhuang nationalities, and they have registered very good achievements. These refute the mistaken viewpoint of those who adopt an attitude of looking down on the minority nationalities (Tang 1956:13).

Mao's words had an immediate impact in minority areas. In the West Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Area, for example, only 8.6 percent of the households had joined lower-stage co-ops before 1956, but by September of 1956, 86 percent of the population had joined higher-stage agricultural producers' cooperatives. The same thing also occurred in Guizhou. According to Dreyer, lower-stage APCs came

to minority areas of the province in the spring of 1956, but by the end of that year higher-level APCs had become "widespread" (Dreyer 1976:148). In addition, herding areas also saw an increase in collectivization. The first herdsmen's co-ops were set up in Inner Mongolia in 1954. By the end of 1957 24 percent of the Inner Mongolian herdsmen--all of ethnic minority status--were reported to have joined co-ops. In Xinjiang, 40 percent of herdsmen had joined mutual aid teams by the mid 1956.

Socialist reform in minority areas like that in China proper was at its height during the Great Leap Forward. According to Dreyer, communes were formed in nearly all minority areas outside Tibet in the same few days of August, 1958:

> Zhuang and Korean higher-level agricultural producers' cooperatives, the lower-level co-ops and mutual aid teams of herding areas, and primitive southwestern areas, which had only recently carried out democratic reforms, were transformed, literally overnight, into communes (Dreyer 1976:163).

Dreyer might exaggerate somewhat. According to Moseley (1973:130), cooperativization in Yunnan minority areas, still incomplete at the time of the launching of the Great Leap Forward, had been fully realized by early in 1959, and communes had been established in fifty percent of the area. In Xinjiang preparations were made for the establishment of 102 trial communes in the agricultural areas in July, 1958. In September of the same year it was announced that some 625,000 rural households, or 59.3 percent of the total, were organized into communes. The average size of a commune was placed at 1,607 households. But by the end of 1958

there were 451 communes in Xinjiang, containing 93 percent of the peasants in the rural areas and 70 percent of herdsmen in the pastoral areas (McMillen 1979:140).

The commune movement was especially important in its effects on minorities' lives. The Xinjiang herding areas are illustrative. When communes were established elsewhere in Xinjiang in the autumn of 1958 the herding areas were undergoing the transition from lower-stage to higher-stage co-ops (McMillen 1979). The original practice of allowing the herdsmen and herd-owners to share in profits was replaced by the requirement that herd-owners turn over their livestock to the co-op ranches at fixed prices on which a standard rate of interest was to be paid. This signalled a transition from the joint state-private livestock ranches to state-owned ones under the system of "ownership by the whole people."

The formation of pastoral communes was gradually undertaken during the spring of 1959. Once established, the pastoral communes selected settlement points for all nomadic herdsmen. In the Altai area, for example, resettlement villages were built in 150 locations for some 80,000 Kazakhs. This was in line with instructions from Beijing which forbade some 2 million herdsmen in Xinjiang, Gansu, and Qinghai to travel freely and which required them to settle in designated areas. The important results which emerged from the commune movement included the virtual destruction of the ethnic herding groups by incorporating them into multi-ethnic communes and reducing them to a position of dependence on the Chinese state. Commune mess halls were established in the

winter of 1959-60, and they served as an important device in achieving the pastoralists' compliance. When combined with a policy of settling the herdsmen, regulatory measures such as these rapidly transformed the nomadic pastoralists into laborers and undercut a central element of their ethnic identity. Wang En-mao, the first secretary of Xinjiang, stated in 1960 that, "the communes are of great significance to the minorities of Xinjiang in that they are yet another step which will eventually lead to the blending of all nationalities" (McMillen 1979:159).

The Great Leap Forward period also saw the emergence of multi-ethnic communes. Whereas previously the inclusion of more than one nationality in socialist cooperative units had been done cautiously and only where prospects seemed promising, the authorities were convinced that ethnic relations had entered a new era and announced the formation of multiethnic communes. Later on, messhalls were opened for the purpose of mixed ethnic dining.

The commune drive slowed down in the period between 1961 and 1965 due to the resistance of minorities. Resistance was expressed either in a passive way or in open criticism of communization. As a result, many communes were disbanded. The commune movement was strengthened during the Cultural Revolution. The process of democratic reform (land reform) and socialist reform (socialization) has integrated various minorities politically, economically, and culturally. Moseley (1973:125) observes that land reform and cooperativization worked together in Yunnan to overturn a whole way of minority life by destroying Yunnan's

feudalism which had involved a complex pattern of rights and duties, as opposed to privileges of ownership (I am not implying that the feudal system was egalitarian). Talking about the effects of the commune drive during the Great Leap Forward, Dreyer observes that some of the more distinctive minority cultural traits were effectively destroyed and never revived. A wide variety of economic arrangements used by minorities were replaced by communes, and the development of agricultural and pastoral techniques introduced by the Han helped foster a sense of innovation and a willingness to throw off the "fetters of tradition." Therefore, minority groups have never fully returned to their pre-GLF ways of life because of these changes (Dreyer 1976:171).[2]

3. The Han influx into minority areas

The past forty-three years have seen attempts of the PRC to reduce the percentage of minority populations within minority areas by encouraging or forcing the migration of the dominant Han Chinese into minority areas. The hsia-fang policy, for example, sent millions of young men and women from China's urban centers to distant places, many located in minority regions. Apart from making potentially or actually disenchanted young persons politically harmless, the policy also was aimed at changing the ethnic balance in minority areas, which is best represented in Xinjiang where minority proportion of population in this area has dropped greatly.

The Han Chinese presence is visible in almost all border-

minority areas. In Inner Mongolia, for instance, the ratio of the Han-Chinese to Mongolians increased between 1958 and 1968 from 6:1 to 12:1. In Xinjiang, the Han portion of the population increased from 6.2 percent in 1953 to almost 40 percent of the total in 1973. Between 1953 and 1970 an estimated number of 12.25 million Han migrated to the northwest from other parts of the country (Heberer 1989:93). The same trend occurred in other minority regions. According to Heberer (1989:93-7), migration resulted mainly from resettling Han Chinese from the crowded centers of Eastern China, restationing of army units, dispatching secondary-school graduates from cities, and by unofficial immigration. Four migration periods are distinguished involving about two hundred million Han migrants. This is summarized in Table 5.2.

The presence of Han immigrants was greatest in the northern part of China which included Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Heilongjiang. However, Han migration into Xinjiang is the most significant of these movements. It is assumed that up to 1911 the population characteristics and agricultural development of Xinjiang did not change much (Eberhard 1982). After the establishment of communist power in this region,

Table 5.2 Han Migration to Minority Areas in the PRC

Years	Han Migrants (million)
First Period (1954-60)	108

Second Period (1961-65)	47
Third Period (1966-76)	30-36
Fourth Period (1977-84)	14-23
Total Years: 30	Total Number: 199-214

however, both population and cultivated land have greatly increased, mostly due to Han migration. This movement began with the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, which consisted mainly of demobilized army troops. Over 90 percent were Han Chinese. As McMillen (1979:58) observes, the role of the Production and Construction Corps was similar to that played by the military colonists in Xinjiang under the Manchu regimes. Colonization was to become an important function of these units during later years when large numbers of additional demobilized PLA-men and Han personnel from China proper, including skilled workers, peasants, and educated youths, would join their ranks.

4. Colonization -- the role of the Xinjiang PCC

The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (PCC) was officially established in August, 1954, and placed under the Ministry of Agriculture. In 1956 it was placed under the Ministry of State Farms and Land Reclamation in Beijing and its subordinate organs in Xinjiang in matters of production, and under the Xinjiang Military District in military affairs. The PCC aimed at ensuring that the local minority peoples followed the socialist road. The PCC's first tasks included participation in the development of the

rent-reduction and anti local-landlord campaigns. In addition, long-term and systematic assistance ranging from production techniques to business management was provided by these units. Later, the PCC units established state farms and livestock ranches, and they continued to render aid in economic development and cooperativization by providing various ethnic groups with political and organizational guidance and technical assistance. In addition to involvement in production and construction projects throughout Xinjiang, the PCC also played an important role in the Party's policy of resettling the Han from China proper. Starting in 1952, the PCC provided organizations to which Han settlers could be assigned for production and construction. These organizations were used to further strengthen national security and increase the Han component in the region by recruiting a large number of Han migrants.

In 1954, the Xinjiang PCC sent its men to various provinces and cities in China to recruit workers and youths for participation in the work of building up the frontier in Xinjiang. Later, the PCC established offices and maintained liaison groups in many areas of China. In Xinjiang, the PCC units opened reception stations to receive Han settlers and to provide them with further physical and ideological training prior to their assignment to various PCC enterprises. In 1954 the PCC men totalled more than 200,000, and 90 percent were of Han descent. PCC membership had reached over 300,000 by 1957.

During the Great Leap Forward between 1958 and 1959, and at

the time of the outbreak of hostilities along the Sino-Soviet border in the late 1960s, tens of thousands of young and middle-aged Han settlers poured into Xinjiang. Over three-fourths were assigned to various PCC units. By 1966, the Xinjiang PCC units had an estimated membership of 500,000 to 600,000 and were mostly Han in composition (McMillen 1979:65). It should be added that Production and Construction Corps also existed in other border-minority areas such as Yunnan, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Heilongjiang. This quasi-military organization contributed greatly to the increase of Han components in the local population, thus consolidating Han rule in the minority-border regions.

The so-called xia-fang movement has also played an important role in promoting Han role. It reinforced the impact of the PCC in some areas. From 1968, when Mao called for urban educated young people to go to the countryside to receive reeducation by so called "poor and lower middle peasants", to the beginning of 1975, an estimated 10 million young people were sent to rural areas (Dreyer 1976:252). Although the exact number sent to minority regions is not available, in 1974 alone 21,000 middle school graduates were settled in Yunnan's rural, predominantly minority areas. In Guizhou the figure exceeded 28,000, and in Xinjiang 200,000 educated young people had settled in the rural areas. While these young Han people were not always deliberately "mixed" with other ethnic groups (see Dreyer 1976:253-4), the actual presence of Han in minority areas has produced some profound acculturative effects on minority peoples. These young educated people introduced,

though not by force, a completely different life style into minority regions -- one which was often proclaimed by the authorities to be superior to that of minorities.[3]

Generally speaking, the Han influx into minority areas, especially in the northwestern parts of the country, served to make ethnic minority groups numerical minorities in their own homelands. A considerable degree of acculturation has taken place as the result of the presence of a large number of Han Chinese, as occurred in South China in the past. The destruction of the old (minority) social structures and establishment of the new, brought about by the so-called "democratic and socialist reforms," was intensified by the large Han resettlement in minority areas. Heberer observes (1989:98) that while assimilation was not directly intended in the immigration policy, the creation of a Han majority in the homelands of minorities undoubtedly encouraged it. The government justified the large scale resettlement of the Han as a way of correcting a uneven population distribution. Population density in the eastern zone is 207 per square kilometer while that in the western is only 6 per square kilometer. According to Heberer (1989), minority peoples see the government's immigration policy as both a violation of their rights to autonomy and as a disruption of their economic structures, facilitating the cultural dominance of the Han.

Assimilation and Ethnic Conflicts

The PRC policies and practices toward minority ethnic groups have produced both assimilation and ethnic conflict. This comes from the contradictory character of these policies and practices, which, as noted by Dreyer (1976), aim at assimilation, by using the means of cultural pluralism. Shu's study of residential, educational, birth, occupational and industrial differentiation between the Han majority and minority groups and between minority groups themselves, is instructive in this regard. The importance of Shu's study lies in her finding that assimilation has indeed occurred among some ethnic groups, but that there are still many groups which have not been assimilated. According to Shu (1989), the fifty-five minority groups of China show varying levels of assimilation. Of all of them, the Hui, Manchus, Mongolians, and Koreans appear to be most integrated into the socioeconomic and demographic structures of Chinese society. On the other hand, the Dongxiang, Lahu, Tajik, Menba, and Jinow are much less integrated. Shu's measure of educational differentiation, for example, compares the distributions of the Han with that of each minority group with respect to their populations 6 years of age and older across six educational categories. The results indicate that the Mongolians and Zhuang are the least differentiated educationally from the Han, and that the Dongxiang and Lahu are the most differentiated (Shu 1989:101). Shu also compares the percentage distribution of the Han labor force with that of minority groups across eight occupational categories. As a result, Shu finds that Mongolians

are the least differentiated in occupational structure, but that
the Russians and the Usbeck are the most differentiated from the
Han. This finding is also true of the industrial differentiation
score, with the Mongolians most similar to the Han majority (Shu
1989:107-8).[4]

The work of Shu (1989) and others such as Wu (1990) makes it
clear that some Chinese minority groups have been greatly
acculturated into Han culture.[5] They are also structurally
assimilated into the Chinese state because of the imposition of the
"democratic and socialist reforms" as well as because of Han
resettlement in these minority areas. Assimilation is not the only
process to occur in the PRC. Ethnic conflicts also exist in
contemporary China, and have occurred in Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner
Mongolia, and Yunnan. Despite the ongoing process of assimilation
of minorities into Han society and culture, opposition from
minority groups, which has ranged from passive resistance to
grumbling and small-scale sabotage to rebellion, has never stopped.
In 1957, for instance, the exodus of the Yunnan Dai into the Shan
State of Burma, the Munong Sing area of Laos, and northern Thailand
reached sizeable proportions. There were several reasons for this
exodus. As the state took the place of local landlords,
agricultural taxation actually increased, and the Dai of the
Xishuangbanna had to work harder than they ever had before. In
addition, the Han flooded into the area, becoming a majority within
a dozen years or so. Finally, the anti-rightist campaign
persecuted quite a number of the Dai people (Moseley 1973:121). In

Xinjiang, militant opposition to the government occurred in several areas in Xinjiang in 1958 and 1959. When they were put down by the Chinese army, an exodus to the Soviet side began and an estimated number of 70,000 Uygur and Kazakhs refugees crossed into former Soviet Kazakhstan by 1963 (Dreyer 1976:170). Ethnic tensions and conflicts still exist today. Uygur protests against the Beijing government took place both in Urumuqi and in Beijing in the early eighties. Among other demands, the demonstrators asked the government to get rid of the nuclear base in the region, and to stop sending prisoners to Xinjiang. According to Heberer (1989:128), separatist tendencies among minorities emerged in the eighties. Seven known separatist organizations of different nationalities are listed in Xinjiang. They call themselves "Turkic" movements, and have connections in the former Soviet Union and Turkey.[6]

Summary

Chinese policies and practices toward minorities over the last four decades have produced both assimilation and ethnic conflict. However, the present Communist government has been more successful than previous regimes in assimilating various minority groups. It has done so by transforming traditional minority social structures through the imposition of socialism. It has also added a large Han component to the population composition of minority areas.

Compared with the past Chinese regimes, whose rule in many non-Han areas was nominal, the present government's control is seen in almost every corner of the country. Minority peoples have to follow the Party's teachings and "walk along the road toward communism". Some traditional minority social structures have been replaced by a uniform "socialist society" which is based on the Han Chinese model. Minority group members have increasingly abandoned part or the whole of their traditional ways of life and adopted Han Chinese standards. Finally, an increasing Han population in minority regions has helped acculturate minority peoples into Han culture and assimilate them into Han society. In spite of this, ethnic identities still persist and have in some cases been made manifest in open ethnic conflict. This is the case in Tibet.7

Chapter Six: Conclusion

This thesis has examined the state's relationship with what Sinclair terms the, "forgotten tribes of China" (1987). It has discussed relations between the Han and non-Han ethnic groups both in the past and the present. In this concluding chapter, past and present Chinese attitudes and practices toward minorities will be compared so that we can more clearly see similarities and differences between them. I will then examine whether similarities or differences are more significant in evaluating the present ethnic situation in China. By doing so, I hope I can show that present Chinese policies and practices toward minority peoples are part and parcel of the Chinese tradition. Finally, I will point out the limitations of this thesis and the direction in which further studies will be done on this topic.

Comparison between PRC and Previous Policies

There are striking similarities between traditional and present-day Chinese attitudes and practices toward minorities. First of all, Sinocentrism can be seen in both past and present policies and practices. The central feature of this ideology rests on a sense of superiority felt by the Chinese. For the Chinese in the past, the Chinese way of life was believed to be the only

proper one for human beings to follow. Non-Han peoples were seen as barbarians, i.e., closer to animals and beasts than humans. The Chinese believed that the only course of action was to acculturate and eventually assimilate barbarians into Han Chinese society. It was manifest in the claim that barbarians, a term reserved for all the non-Han peoples whose customs and cultures were different from those of the Chinese, should be assimilated.

Sinocentrism over the past 100 years has been greatly constrained because China was repeatedly defeated by the Western powers and even turned into a "semi-colony" of these powers. As a result, most Chinese realized that China was far from being a leader in the modern world and that Chinese culture was not the most advanced. While Sinocentrism today may differ from that in the past, it has not disappeared. The modern Chinese believe that they are most suitable carriers of Western technology and science, and that they have been "selected" to represent socialism and communism: the most advanced ideology and social organization in the world, which are professed to be the final destination of all peoples throughout the world. As Watson (1966) points out, many Chinese communists have long believed that China is the center of the world proletarian revolution, replacing the Soviets who are regarded as modern revisionists. In terms of minorities, many modern Chinese think that other ethnic groups are backward, feudalist, and superstitious. They feel that minorities must depend on the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party to be liberated and led out of their "deplorable" conditions. In other

words, other groups have to be helped by the Chinese to "walk on the socialist road". This,too, may be a source of some present-day Chinese attitudes and practices concerning minority peoples. To sum up, Sinocentrism today may differ from Sinocentrism in the past, but it has not changed much in nature.

One can find many parallels between traditional and modern Chinese practices towards minority peoples. As was discussed in Chapter Four, Han Chinese migration into South China contributed greatly to the incorporation of various southern non-Han tribes into Han society and culture. Likewise, the modern era has also witnessed a large-scale Han resettlement in minority areas such as Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. The Han Chinese today have accomplished something which all the previous governments had failed to do--colonizing areas which used to be believed to be unsuitable for the Chinese way of life and turning them into Chinese areas. This kind of "spatial assimilation" has made it possible to strengthen Han rule over these minority areas by increasing the Han component of the population. Thus, the increased Han components in minority areas have provided a fundamental basis for the Chinese state, yesterday and today, to impose its rule in the form of direct administration over minorities.

The creation of a uniform culture and uniform social institutions has also played a very important role in Han rule of minority groups. At first, imperial governments developed a system of indirect rule, the tu-si system, which was institutionalized and

formalized during the Ming and Qing periods. This practice proved to be transitional and indirect rule was replaced by direct rule when Jun-xian (district and county) administration was imposed upon minority groups. This trend continued until the Republican period when Inner Mongolia was divided into three administrative provinces and Xinjiang was regarded as a province of China. In the period of the People's Republic of China we find a similar pattern of transition from "indirect rule" to direct rule. At first, the Chinese Communist Party adopted a policy of cooperation with traditional minority leaders in administrating minority areas. Later, the proportions of traditional elite in the "people's governments" of minority areas decreased until, at last, collectivization or communization transformed traditional minority social structures. Now we see a uniform social structure of socialism all over China, including minority areas. It should be added that all these structural changes have been augmented by the imposition of a common culture.

In ancient and imperial times Confucianization was the most important process in acculturating and in incorporating various non-Chinese groups. This process actually meant that these ethnic groups had to abandon part or all of their cultural past and adopt, or attempt to adopt, the Han Chinese culture; and with it, Confucianism. In modern times the tendency to impose the Chinese way of life on minorities has continued though in a different form. In socialist China minority peoples have been forced to follow a "socialist culture" which includes values such as anti-imperialism,

patriotism, class struggle, and atheism. All ethnic groups have had to adopt this common culture, even at the cost of aspects of their traditional ways of life. Many elements of this common culture of socialism are based on Han culture, and in adopting it various minority groups have been further Sinicized. During the process by which they are transformed into "new socialist men (or women)," as they are often called in China, they come to dress in Han clothing, speak and write in the Han language, and to behave according to Han standards. Thus, we see a continuation of the acculturation and assimilation of other ethnic groups into Han culture and society in modern times.

However, there are differences between traditional and present Chinese policies and practices toward minorities. Discussed in detail in Chapter Four, most of these differences can be summarized thus: assimilationist attitudes in the past were outright, pronounced, and complete whereas present policies have cultural pluralist elements. The clearest example of cultural pluralism is the establishment of minority autonomous regions and areas (prefectures, counties, districts, and even villages). The government has also repeatedly announced that minority languages, customs, traditions, and history should be respected and encouraged to develop. Such positions would have been unthinkable in traditional China.

It should be repeated that Marxism and Leninism are the direct sources of cultural pluralist elements in present Chinese policies. Therefore, present Chinese practices such as the establishment of

minority autonomous regions, the training of minority cadres, special treatment of minority peoples, and encouragement of respect for minority languages, customs and history, all come from Marxist doctrines. A contradiction in present Chinese Communist policies -- cultural pluralism on the one hand and an assimilationist thrust on the other -- can be related to the paradoxical character of Marxist-Leninist ideas on ethnicity, which advocate cultural pluralism but at the same time claim that ethnic differences will disappear, merging into a common proletarian society and culture. As Dreyer (1976) points out, cultural pluralism is only one part of Marxism and the other part (perhaps a much larger one) is assimilationism which sees the disappearance of ethnic differences as inevitable in the long run. However, this apparent contradiction can be resolved when we realize that the assimilationist thrust of contemporary Chinese policies and practices toward minorities is primary and persistent. On the other hand, cultural pluralism is secondary and changeable. It varies according to different political climates in China.

Conclusion

Many scholars (DeGlopper 1990; Heberer 1989; Schwarz 1971) in Chinese ethnic studies believe that present Chinese policies and practices toward minority groups are as assimilationist as those in the past.[1] Other scholars (Enloe 1977; Sinclair 1987; Thompson 1989) consider these policies and practices to be cultural

pluralist. The first viewpoint ignores the differences between the past and present policies and practices, while the second overlooks similarities. A comparison of traditional and contemporary Chinese policies and practices toward minorities reveals that while both similarities and differences exist, the former are more important than the latter.

Traditional Chinese policies and practices can be called "vanguard assimilationism", but modern ones are better described as "vanguard assimilation cum pluralism". The terms, vanguard assimilation and vanguard assimilation cum pluralism, were first developed by Enloe (1977), and adopted by Thompson (1989) in the Chinese context. According to Enloe (1977), the goal of vanguard assimilation is the elimination of those intercommunal cleavages which generate antagonism. The intention of the state elites is to establish one of the country's ethnic groups as the standard bearer of the future which the rest should learn to emulate. Gradually, with the encouragement of the state and the fraternal assistance of the vanguard group, less fortunate ethnic groups will catch up to the point that all groups share equally in the benefits of current opportunities.

The difference between vanguard assimilation and vanguard assimilation cum pluralism lies, as Enloe sees it, in the fact that the latter is intended to achieve ends for the state roughly equal to those of the simpler vanguard assimilationist strategy but to do so without openly admitting it. In other words, it permits the dominant ethnic group to continue to spread its values without

giving that dynamic such prominence that it becomes the rallying point for other ethnic groups' disaffection. The formula enhances state stabilization and thus elite security as long as the assimilation factors overrun or outstrip the continuing pluralist forces.[2] From the above description of the two formulas, we can see that vanguard assimilationist strategy fits traditional Chinese attitudes and practices toward non-Han groups. The second formula is more ambivalent, subtle, roundabout, and even contradictory, as are present Chinese policies and practices.

This explains why some people (Dreyer 1976) consider Chinese Communist policies and practices toward minorities to be contradictory. However, I should point out that these two formula differ only in degree, not in kind. Similarities between traditional and present policies are more important than differences. In other words, present Chinese policies and practices toward minorities are better seen as the continuation of the past, even though the former contain overt elements of cultural pluralism. For this reason, Chinese practices and policies toward minority ethnic groups today are assimilationist in nature, and cultural pluralist in form.

However, there seems to be a scholarly disagreement as to whether present Chinese minority policies are assimilationist or pluralist. For example, Heberer (1989) examines the Chinese minority policies and practices since the late 1970s with regard to economic development, Han migration in minority areas, religion, the operation of minority autonomous regions, and the Tibet

question. His conclusion is that what has happened to Chinese minorities is assimilation instead of autonomy as economy, politics, and education in minority areas are under the tight control of the Chinese central government. Heberer's viewpoint represents that of many authors I have cited in this thesis. On the other hand, some scholars consider the PRC's policies and practices to be pluralist. Thompson, for example, says that the PRC's minority policies are pluralist throughout most of the PRC's history. By comparing Chinese minority policies and Canadian multicultural policies, this author finds an absence of ethnic stratification in China and a presence of this phenomenon in Canada (Thompson 1989). Similarly, Sinclair (1987) considers Chinese minority policies such as family planning, automonous regions, and some favourable treatment of minority peoples in university and job placements to be pluralist.

It is clear that my argument favors those who believe that present Chinese policies and practices toward minorities are ultimately assimilationist in nature. The difference between these scholars and myself rests in the fact that this thesis provides a historical dimension, placing the discussion of present Chinese policies and practices toward minority peoples in the framework of the Chinese tradition. In addition, my stress on the creation of uniform cultural and social forms in minority areas in the PRC and a comparison of this practice with Confucianization and Chinese administration of minority peoples in Chinese history acts to distinguish this thesis from the work of other scholars who

argue that present Chinese policies and practices toward minorities are assimilationist.

However, taking into account the fact that this thesis is mainly based on library research, though reinforced by my own limited experience in China, I think my conclusion needs to be proved by further systematic studies. Future work on this topic should be solidly based on field studies, so that we can clearly see what has actually happened and is still happening to minorities in China. Wu's work (1990) is a good example in this regard because it results from the author's fieldwork in a Bai village. Field studies can also tell us to what extent minority societies have been transformed by Chinese minority policies and practices and what minority peoples think about these social and cultural changes. In addition, further studies of China's minority question should also include ethnographic studies of minority cadre schools. We can interview students and teachers and investigate the school curriculum. In this manner, we can find out how and to what purpose the Chinese government trains minority cadres. Ethnographic studies on the composition of local governments in minority areas would also reveal to what extent the central government controls local politics, economy, and culture in minority areas. Finally, additional research should also ideally include investigations of government records, files, and the correspondence of appropriate bureaus and officials. This investigation would shed light on some policy-making problems. We can know, for example, to what extent the state has subsidized

minority areas, and we would also understand the real purpose and the result of Han resettlement in minority areas.

Despite all which needs to be done, the evidence available now seems to bear out the central thesis of my work. All the information I have been able to obtain suggests that the Chinese government has encouraged, and in some cases even forced, assimilation in minority areas. The government's policies and practices in the training and recruitment of minority cadres, Han resettlement in minority areas, and the social reforms of minority societies have contributed together to the transforming of minority societies on the basis of the Chinese model. Hence the conclusion of this thesis is that present Chinese minority policies and practices are assimilationist in nature, but pluralist in form.

Notes

Notes for Chapter One

1. The conceptual confusion in ethnic studies is manifested, first of all, in the fact that many scholars fail to establish a difference between "ethnicity," "ethnic group", and "ethnic identity". Thus, we see "ethnicities" as the short form for ethnic groups. Ethnicity is often defined in terms of the ethnic group. It is also sometimes regarded as the sense of ethnic identity felt by a member of an ethnic community (De Vos 1975:9). This state of confusion is best manifested in the fact that we can detect some disparities in different definitions of ethnicity by the same author. George De Vos, for one, also defines ethnicity as the attribute of membership in a group set off by racial, territorial, economic, religious, cultural, aesthetic, or linguistic uniqueness (1975). Now, ethnicity is not the same as ethnic identity, as his other definition indicates (see above). Rather, it means the characteristics of a group which we call an ethnic group. Besides, Schermerhorn sees ethnicity as referring to the fusion of many traits or components which belong to the nature of any ethnic group (1978:12). Likewise, Glazer and Moynihan define ethnicity as the character or quality of an ethnic group. Here, ethnicity is at a higher level of abstraction which embraces meanings of both the ethnic group and ethnic identity. Furthermore, ethnicity can be more than this. Glazer and Moynihan also consider ethnicity as a phenomenon in society and politics, a phenomenon different from class and sex (Glazer and Moynihan 1975). A.D. Smith holds the same view in his work discussing the "ethnic revival" (1981). Moreover, van den Berghe entitled his book on racial and ethnic relations as The Ethnic Phenomenon (1981).

Generally speaking, there are two kinds of definitions of the term, "ethnic group". Subjective definitions take the psychological identification of an ethnic group member as the basis of the ethnic group; objective definitions stress cultural traits-- real phenomena "out there" (Isajiw 1985). In reality, many scholars combine the two approaches in defining an ethnic group. Therefore, Barth sees an ethnic group as:

1) largely biologically self-perpetuating
2) shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms
3) makes us a field of communication and interaction
4) has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order (Barth 1969:10-11).

In addition, it is often noted that the term, "ethnic group", implies the meaning of a "minority", or "dominated" status (Banton 1983; Cohen 1978; Reminick 1983), though Glazer and Moynihan insist that the dominant group of a society should also be seen as an

ethnic group (1975).

Similarly, there are also many definitions of "ethnic identity". It could indicate a we/they dichotomization as manifested in a role assignment process (Kunstadter 1978) or a form of role attribution (Devereux 1975). Also, it is often expressed as an orientation or a generalized attitude involving a personal attachment to an ethnic group and toward being a member of that group. De Vos regards ethnic identity as a sense of social belonging and ultimate loyalty, which is essentially subjective and past-oriented (1975). However, Cohen (1978:387) notes that the concept indicates "a series of nesting dichotomizations of inclusiveness and exclusiveness", thus forming and maintaining the group boundaries.

However, greater confusion is produced when "nation" and "ethnic group", as well as other terms related to them, are often interchangeably used in many works. Isaacs notes that the word, "nation", has been used interchangeably with "tribe," "people," "ethnic group," "race," "nationality," "country," and "state" (Isaacs 1975:175). This is also Banton's observation when he tells us that the concepts of "nation," "race," and "ethnic group" have until recently been used in Europe to denote groups of the same order of magnitude, and not segments one of another (Banton 1983:64). W. Lloyd Warner was among the first to make a distinction between nation, race, and ethnic group. His distinction consists of three sequences -- nation, race, and ethnic group -- with decreasing sizes (Warner and Srole 1945). In this view, the nation, the total population of a given state, is composed of races whose segments are ethnic groups. Here, we find the connotation of the nation as the state. Connor also makes a distinction between an ethnic group and a nation on the basis of self-consciousness and self-definedness. However, other scholars make the distinction between an ethnic group and a nation on the basis of political dimensions. For van den Berghe, a nation is an ethnic group which aspires to political autonomy and legitimizes its political demands on ethnic grounds (1976). Elsewhere, he defines a nation as a politically conscious ethnic group which claims the right to statehood by virtue of being an ethnic group (van den Berghe 1981:61). Here, we see that a nation can be connected with political autonomy, and even statehood. Thus confusion is produced about the definition of an ethnic group, a nation, and a state, though efforts have been made to distinguish among these three terms (Breuilly 1985; Connor 1978; Gellner 1983; Smith 1986; van den Berghe 1981). However, all these efforts seem to make the term "nation" more confusing and ambiguous.

2. The following quotation from Lenin represents his ideas of cultural pluralism:

> This demand [for the right of self-determination] therefore is not the equivalent of a demand for separation, fragmentation, and the formation of small states... The closer a democratic state system is to

complete freedom to secede, the less frequent and less ardent will the desire for separation be in practice, because big states afford indisputable advantage, both from the standpoint of economic progress and from that of the interests of the masses... (Lenin 1964:146).

3. The following quote is instructive:
What would be the results of national cultural autonomy? ... to organize [the Tartars] into a national cultural union would be to ... deliver them to the mercies of the reactionary mullahs, to create a new stronghold of spiritual enslavement of the Tartar masses to their worst enemy... The national problems can be solved only by drawing the backward nations and peoples into the common stream of a higher culture. It is the only progressive solution, and the only solution acceptable to Social Democrats (Stalin 1934:185).

Notes for Chapter Two

1. The designation for southern barbarians (Man), for example, is written with an "insect" radical; that for the northern barbarians (Di) is written with a "dog" component; Qiang, a west tribe, is written with a "sheep" radical.

2. Mencius (Meng Zi) was born in the state of Lu in 371 B.C., and died in 289 B.C.. He was brought up by his widowed mother, a model figure in Chinese history, who is said to have changed her lodgings three times in order not to expose Mencius to unsuitable surroundings. Mencius received Confucian education in the very family of Confucius. He has been considered to be the second greatest Confucian in Chinese history. During the second half of the fourth century B.C., he gave Confucianism some distinction, and refurbished Confucius' doctrines by introducing new ideas to make Confucianism suit the taste of the times. Also see the brief discussion of his ideas in this chapter.

3. These include the clear separation of the court and the government with the government often under the leadership of a scholarly prime minister, the process of recruiting officials through a dual mechanism of recommendation and selection, the conception of social structure as family-centered, the agriculture-based economy, and the state sponsorship of education.

4. According to Hsu (1969:19), the central attempt of the national character approach is to relate as many institutions of any culture with some overall pattern. Benedict's scheme of the Apollonian vs. Dionsian is most illustrative (see Benedict 1934). Within this trend Kardiner (1939:237) developed a concept, "basic personality structure," which refers to "the effective adaptative tools of the

individual which are common to every individual in the society."
Du Bois tried to take into account variability in personality type
that exists in any society, and she formulated the concept "modal
personality," which was defined as the "central tendencies in the
personalities of a group of people" (DuBois 1944:xix).

5. For example, a man who is unfilial to his parents is believed to
be bound to be treacherous to his friends, colleagues, and
employers.

6. Often considered to have been the most unassimilated barbarian
conquerors of China, the Mongols in the Yuan dynasty (1272-1368)
were very much Confucianized, especially in politics. The Mongols
conquered the whole of China under Khubilai Khan in 1279. Later,
Khubilai moved the center of the Mongol empire from Mongolia to
Peking, which entailed a basic reorganization of the state along
traditional Chinese bureaucratic lines. In other words, a tightly
centralized regime built on the Chinese model came to exercise a
predominant authority over the collection and disbursement of
revenues (Dardess 1973:21). During this process, Confucians proved
to be of great help in achieving a centralized monarchy. As early
as the Khubilai reign, two major schools of Confucianism played an
important role in the Mongol Court. One school (Tong-ping)
remained prominent in government, especially in the Han-lin
Academy, while the other (Neo-Confucianism) later took over the
Imperial University. Both exerted a great influence in terms of
the introduction of traditional Chinese methods of administration
as well as of Confucian ways of behavior into the Mongol conquest
regime. Also during this period the government sponsored the
translation from Chinese into Mongolian of such Confucian classics
as the Four Books, the Xiao Jing, the Zi Zhi Tong Jian, the Ta
Hsuen Yen I, and the Zhe Guan Zhen Yao (Dardess 1973:34).
    A milestone in Confucianization of the Yuan government was
reached in 1315 when for the first time in Yuan history the civil
service examination system was instituted. The contents of the
examinations were restricted almost entirely to questions of
Confucian ideology (Dardess 1973:33). In addition, ever since
1298, the Pao-ju, or recommendation, system had been revived, and
Confucianized. It came to be based on more typically Confucian
qualifications for office, as it demanded evidence of filial piety,
fraternal submission, righteousness, knowledge of the classics, and
correct behavior. However, the true triumph and dominance of
Confucianism in the Yuan government came in 1341 when the official
appointment of many Confucians to the Central Chancellery showed
a definite Confucian bias. Besides, the Ching-yen, or Classic Mat,
was reopened as an avenue of Confucian approach to the emperor.
The Classic Mat was actually a kind of imperial seminar held at
periodic intervals, in which Confucianists expounded on Confucian
doctrines directly to the emperor (Dardess 1973:76). More
importantly, the central government officials from that time to the
end of the dynasty were almost exclusively Confucianists or those
with strong Confucian connections. Confucianism had become the

only political language to define the policies and to evaluate or criticize officials. Though conflicting factions still existed then and thereafter, Confucian ideology nevertheless predominated on both sides. According to Dardess (1973:83), by 1347 Confucian political ideology had at last become a controlling force in Yuan government.

This fact was made manifest in the following events. In April, 1347, students in the Imperial University were examined and chosen for positions as directors of Confucian studies in local governments and in the elite guard units. Even the clerks attached to the Central Chancellery were ordered to study the classics and histories in the afternoons. Besides, between 1348-49, the Yuan government had renowned and upright officials study the (Confucian) classical precedents and propose appropriate methods for achieving good rule and order as defined by Confucianism. Meanwhile, supernumerary Buddhist clerics were defrocked and neglected Confucian worthies were recommended to the Court (Dardess 1973:86). Another telling example of Confucianization of the Yuan government was the fact that the regime between 1347-48 was so conscious of and bound by Confucianism that it had to allow its most powerful political opponent to return to the capital for the sake of his father's death--an unmistakable sign of recognition of filial piety one which could not be denied. Finally, and most importantly, political division at the highest levels of power in the Yuan dynasty after 1340 had come to express itself in terms of the conservative and reformist tendencies within Neo-Confucian ideology. Both sides had to couch their differences, justify their political activities, and formulate their ideas in Confucian language - each attacking the other by questioning the validity and honesty of the opponent's Confucianism (Dardess 1973:93). All these facts show that the Mongol conquerors had to give in finally to the power of traditional Chinese culture, thus establishing the foundation for their later acceptance of Chinese rule as a minority group.

Notes for Chapter three

1. The following two quotations convey a similar message:

> Do not fail in due attention to laws and ordinances...
> Do not oppose the people to follow your own desires. Attend to these things without idleness or omission, and from the four quarters the barbarous tribes will come and acknowledge your sovereignty (quoted from "The Counsels of the Great Yu" in Hsu
>
> 1971).

and

> The intelligent kings have paid careful attention to their virtues, and wild tribes on every side have willingly acknowledged subjection to them. The nearer and the more

remote have all made offerings of the productions of their countries (quoted from the "Hounds of Leu" of the <u>Book of Zhou</u> in Hsu 1971).

2. According to Lattimore (1951), the Chinese carried out their expansion in several ways. Along the main course of the lower Yellow River they moved downstream, spreading out over the Great Plain. In the valleys of the Lo in Honan and of the Fen in Shanxi they moved upstream from the wider terrain they had presumably first brought under irrigated cultivation, toward the headwaters, and into the side valleys. In Shenxi they moved from valley to valley, first occupying the valleys of the streams that flow into the Yellow River from the west and then, successively, the northwest of Shenxi, the east of Kansu, and south of Ningxia. In short, the Chinese had expanded greatly to the north, east, and west by the start of the imperial period. This was followed by much larger expansion under the Qin (221-206 B.C.) and Han (206 B.C.-220 A.D.) emperors.

3. According to Eberhard (1982), the Xiong-nu were the first tribal federation in the Far East which arose a short time before 200 B.C.. They were powerful nomads occupying present-day Mongolia and large portions of Central Asia. Under the leadership of Shan-yu, something like Khan in later times, these people had posed a serious threat to the Chinese government during the Han period (206 B.C.- 220 A.D.), until they dissolved into two groups, the Northern and Southern Xiong-nu during the Later Han dynasty (25-220 A.D.). Later, the Southern Xiong-nu surrendered to the Chinese, while the Northern group migrated northwards.

4. It is very interesting to compare the Chinese Tu-si system with indirect rule of British colonial empire. Cameron, who served in Nigeria in the 1920s, defined the principle of indirect rule as that " of adapting for the purposes of local government the institutions which the native people have evolved for themselves, so that they may develop in a constitutional manner from their past, guided and restrained by the traditions and sanctions which they have inherited (molded or modified as they may be on the advice of British officers) and by the general advice and control of those officers" (Cameron 1930:6). According to this principle, the Governor was an absolute ruler. Under him were provincial and district officers, all of whom came from Britain. The next level within this hierarchy is that of native authorities, composed of traditional chiefs and elders. These native leaders carried out day-to-day administration of the African population, and they were actually the primary vehicle through which the proponents of indirect rule implemented their policies. The chiefs were responsible for explaining government policies to their peoples, enforcing them among the people at large, maintaining order in the area of their jurisdiction, assisting in the prevention of crime and the arrest of offenders, controling alcohol and the carrying of

arms, overseeing the regulation of the cutting of timber, preventing evasion of tax, and the spread of disease (Morris and Read 1972).

5. By the concept of caste I mean those who have hereditary status, hereditary occupations, and perhaps some religious customs and beliefs of their own. According to Eberhard (1982), there are several reports that the women of common Mongols became hereditary prostitutes in Nanjing, where they inhabited a special quarter of the city from the fall of the Yuan dynasty down to the end of the Ming dynasty or perhaps even later. Other most important caste peoples in China include: duo-min (lazy men) in Zhijiang province, whose hereditary occupation has been concerned with marriage, funeral, and burial activities; and boat people in Fujian and Guangdong, who handled pleasure boats for the rich people.

Notes for Chapter Four

1. Despite great efforts made by the Chinese government, the problems involved in identification of minority groups have not been·completely resolved. According to Heberer, eighty groups totalling over 900,000 persons have applied for official recognition of minority status since the late 1970s. These include the "Pingwu-Tibetans' in the border regions between Sichuan and Gansu, who numbered a few thousand; the Deng, a group of about 20,000 on the Chinese-Indian border; the Laji who numbered about 1,500 and lived in the Maguan district in Yunnan; the Khmu who totaled about 2,100; the Mangren numbering 500 people in four villages; the Hu who amounted to 2,000 persons in Yunnan; the Kucongs of about 25,000 people who were stone-age hunters and gatherers when they were first discovered in the 1950s in the forests of Yunnan; and finally, the Sherpas of Tibet who numbered about 400 persons and who emigrated from Nepal about 300 years ago (Heberer 1989:37-8).

There are still some other groups who have not applied for recognition at all. The Tuvins who live in the Ili region of Xinjiang, for example, used to declare themselves to be the Mongolians in order to avoid oppression by the then-ruling Manchu regimes which found allies among the Mongolians. However, they actually belong to Turkic stock. In addition, small groups of Jews and gypsies were "found" in China recently.

Notes for Chapter Five

1. Over 85 percent at the county level, and almost 100 percent at the district level in Xinjiang were minority cadres in the 1960s, while 58-60 percent of cadres were Tibetans at the county level. However, only 44 percent of the leading positions at the regional level were filled by Tibetans (Grunfeld 1987; McMillen 1979).

2. By 1952 land reform in China proper was completed, but minority areas were advised to conduct their own land reform only when the

majority of the masses so demanded. In 1955-1956 land reform and collectivization were carried out in the minority areas, but in Tibet this was not attempted until 1958. In 1957, minority peoples who tried to avoid collectivization of their recently received land through Communist expropriation from landlords were branded as antisoicialist.

3. As a rule, the local inhabitants regarded the newcomers as a threat to their economy and culture, especially when Han settlers took pastureland away from minority herdsmen. This was also so when they were contemptuous of the religions and customs of the local minorities and were disrespectful of the people. According to Heberer, the northwest, which is primarily a livestock region, suffered considerably at the hands of the migrants who attempted to convert pastures into tillable fields. As a result, pastureland retreated, and the desert advanced. In Qinghai, the per capita grain yield decreased from 290 kg in 1952 to 284 kg in 1979 and 247 kg in 1985. Livestock diminished from 7.07 million head in 1980 to 5.89 million in 1985. In Xinjiang grain yield decreased from 400 kg grain per capita in 1966 to only 301 kg per capita in 1980. All these changes led to hostility and resentment felt by the local minority peoples toward Han immigrants, as well as to frequent clashes between the two parties (Heberer 1989:97).

4. The problems of this work lies, first of all, in its absence of historical comparison. In other words, if information on the historical development of the degree of integration or assimilation of these minorities is available, we can better see to what extent a specific group has been assimilated due to the PRC policies and practices. Since assimilation is more a process than an occurrence, information on development in this regard is required to assess what the PRC has done to various minority groups. As far as language is concerned, the Manchus were assimilated long before the present Chinese government was set up. Another problem of the work lies in its criteria for integration or assimilation. Socioeconomic attainments as criteria for assimilation are helpful, but they should be used together with the degrees to which traditional minority ways of life have been abandoned and the new (usually Han) way of life adopted by minorities. In other words, we should pay attention to not only the socioeconomic but also cultural aspects of assimilation, i.g., both structural and cultural assimilation (cf. Gordon 1951). In this respect, the Mongolians and Manchus provide good examples. As shown in Shu's work, the Mongolians score highest in their similarity to the Han as far as educational, occupational and industrial factors are concerned. However, as far as I can determine, the Mongolians, who might appear to be greatly assimilated, are one of the few ethnic groups in China who retain a relatively distinct ethnic identity. Contrastingly, the Manchus have almost completely become "invisible" as a distinct ethnic group. There is no doubt that the Manchus are more similar than the Mongolians to the Han majority. Similarly, the Hui, Koreans, and Russians are not as assimilated as

the Hezhe, Dauer, and other small groups, though the former may have much higher socioeconomic attainments than the latter. Therefore, the extent to which traditional ways of life, which include language, religion, and customs, have been abandoned should be assessed in any discussion of the assimilation of minorities.

5. According to Wu (1990), almost all the Bai people he studied have adopted the Han-Chinese way of life, even though they have a minority status. Formally called minjia, the Bai studied by Wu have no idea about two important religious activities identified as uniquely "minjia", and which serve as "Bai" cultural markers in the official ethnography. These are the worshipping of local "Bai" patron gods called benzu (meaning original or indigenous masters), and the Torch Festival, which is celebrated on the twenty-fifth day of the sixth moon. Even the village elders have never heard the term "benzu". The villagers know the date of the Torch Festival but show no interest in the event, and no rituals performed by any villagers were observed by Wu. The Bai people in question are so assimilated into the Han culture that Wu, as a trained ethnographer with thirty years of field experience, could hardly see anything exclusively Bai, except some linguistic differences. However, even the language of the Bai is greatly Sinicized in that between forty and sixty percent of Bai vocabulary is actually Chinese. Furthermore, Wu's ethnobotanical research shows that ninety-five percent of the terms for vegetables and other plants are borrowed from Chinese and are without indigenous counterparts. Even this small number of Bai names for plants include words which sound like a variation of similar Chinese words.

6. During my travel to Xinjiang in 1985, I was deeply impressed by the hostility openly shown by many Uygurs to the Han. During a three-day bus ride, I talked with three Uygurs who had just finished their training in a cadre school in Urumuqi, capital of Xinjiang. Although trained as Party cadres, they openly voiced their resentment toward the Han. They told me how cruelly the Chinese soldiers treated the Uygurs in suppressing a revolt taking place in Kashi (Kashgar) in 1982.

7. Tibet has been a sovereign state for most of history. The relation between the two states was defined on a relatively equal footing (i.e. Uncle-Nephew relationship) in history. Between 1912 and 1950 when China was in domestic trouble, Tibet was free of Chinese rule to the extent that it declared its independence from China in 1949 (see Ginsburgs 1964; Grunfeld 1987; Richardson 1967, 1984).

In 1950 the People's Liberation Army moved into Tibet. A year later the Chinese Communists forced Tibet to sign a peace treaty in which Tibet had to recognize the military occupation of the Chinese. The treaty also recognized the Tibetan "local government" and promised not to interfere with Tibetan internal affairs. However, the promise was broken soon. According to the Dalai Lama

(1990) and Richardson (1984), the military authorities first demanded food and shelter from the Tibetans, which the Tibetans could not afford. Later, the Chinese forced the Tibetan government to fire its two prime ministers. The large number of Chinese soldiers whose food and other daily necessities had to be met produced an economic crisis when the price of grain doubled. Chinese interference with, and destruction of monasteries worsened relations between the invading Chinese and Tibetans. Moreover, the enforcement of "democratic reforms," as I described in Chapter Five caused uprisings in the eastern part of Tibet in 1956. The tension between Tibetans and Han Chinese finally culminated in an unsuccessful uprising in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet in 1959. Afterwards, the Dalai Lama and tens and thousands of Tibetans fled to safety in India.

After the 1959 revolt, the Chinese government tightened its control over Tibet. According to Richardson (1967, 1984), tens of thousands monks, laymen, and women were executed, imprisoned, deported, or put to forced labor. Everyone had to carry an identification card and could not move without permission. The Chinese work teams toured the villages, conducting public trials during which land owners were subject to humiliation, torture, imprisonment, and loss of their goods or families. The traditional Tibetan administrative system was abolished and replaced by an "autonomous government" which was firmly controlled by the Central Government. Furthermore, "democratic reforms," which the Tibetans feared and which the Chinese promised to postpone, went at last in full swing. In this movement (discussed earlier as the "Three Antis and Two Reductions Movement) land and private property were confiscated and redistributed. The Chinese authorities exercised a monopoly on all trade and production.

The most serious damage done by the Chinese to Tibet was the destruction of religion -- the core of the Tibetan life. Han people had a negative attitude toward Tibetan religious beliefs and institutions. This negative view was reinforced after the 1959 revolt, in which many monasteries participated or provided support for the rebels. Thereafter, temples and monasteries were, in the Dalai Lama's words, systematically robbed and reduced to ruins (the Dalai Lama 1990). According to Grunfeld (1987), who has attempted to make his work neutral and objective by carefully balancing both Chinese and Tibetan claims, the 2,469 monasteries remaining in 1959 were reduced to 1,700. The number of clerics fell from 110,000 to 56,000. Finally, the Han-selected Panchen Lama was put into prison from the early sixties until the end of the 1970s. All these measures met strong Tibetan resistance.

During the Cultural Revolution, the treatment of Tibetans became more repressive. According to Grunfeld:

> ... the damage caused by the wanton destruction and the fighting was awesome. Contrary to the propaganda claims that the Tibetans were 'jubilantly' welcoming the Cultural Revolution, the reality was far more cruel. Even if we discount stories of thousands of Tibetans killed ... and of monks and nuns being forced to copulate

with each other in public, to smash icons and kill flies, verifiable activities of the (Chinese) Red Guards are terrifying enough. There were killings and people hounded into suicide. People were physically attacked in the streets for wearing Tibetan dress or having non-Han hair styles. An attempt was made to destroy every single religious item. All but a handful of monasteries were destroyed, many taken down brick by brick until not a trace was left (Grunfeld 1987:181).

Grunfeld cites a story recounted by a Tibetan woman which is illustrative as to what Tibetan life was like under Chinese rule during the Cultural Revolution. According to this story (Grunfeld 1987:181), the Chinese in the woman's commune showed contempt for the Tibetan script and banned Tibetan songs and dances. Tibetans were forced to sing Chinese songs, wear Chinese dress, and practice Chinese customs. They were also asked to speak in "Tibetan-Chinese Friendship Language", which was a mixture of Tibetan and Chinese. The Chinese Red Guards destroyed all the small shrines and pulled the prayer flags. They then confiscated all religious objects and articles, even prayer beads. They also destroyed all religious monuments and paintings in this area. They took the statutes and sold them to Chinese antique shops. They burnt all the ancient holy scriptures. They cut off the long hair of all the men and women and killed all the dogs. Tibetans in this commune were forced to buy Mao's portraits and painted his sayings all over the walls. Everyone was required to carry Mao's quotation book at all times. The Red Guards would stop anyone, any time, to make them recite Mao's words. Anyone who failed was detained.

The end of the Cultural Revolution saw a shift to a more tolerant policy, which actually reflected the general liberal political climate in the post-Mao period. The practice of religion was allowed. Appeals were made by the newspapers not to use Chinese models to rule minorities. The Dalai Lama and his followers were not condemned as traitors but invited back, and Han cadres were encouraged to learn Tibetan. There was an unsuccessful attempt by then General Party Secretary Hu Yaobang to withdraw 85 percent of the Han cadres from Tibet. More importantly, many communes stopped functioning as the basic social unit, and the Tibetans were allowed to have some portion of private land for their kitchens. Finally, Tibet was granted a two-year tax holiday while the Central Government put in large subsidies which are said to amount to 93 percent of the total budget of Tibet (Grunfeld 1987).

Despite these changes, relations between the Han-Chinese and Tibetans have not improved. Tibetan hatred for the Han has often surfaced. Serious conflicts between Tibetans and Han authorities took place in 1987, 1988, and 1989. The Chinese government resorted to bloody suppression by the military. According to information obtained by the Dalai Lama (1990), at least a dozen Tibetans, including several children, died before more than two thousand were imprisoned during the 1987 protest. However, during

the 1989 protest at least two hundred and fifty were killed, and the wounded were numerous. Martial law was imposed in Lhasa for almost a year in 1989. It should be noted that student demonstrations and other forms of unrest also occurred in China proper during those years, but the government did not employ military intervention until June, 1989 in Beijing.

More than forty years of Communist rule in Tibet have greatly disrupted the Tibetans' economic, social, and religious lives. It may be true that some Tibetans have freely abandoned part of their traditional way of life, as reported by some Chinese newspapers. However, it seems that the majority of Tibetans would prefer to be free of Chinese control. The most expressive manifestation of this desire is the Tibetans' longing for the return of the Dalai Lama.

Notes for Chapter Six

1. DeGlopper (1990), Heberer (1989), and Schwarz (1971) accurately identify assimilationist tendencies in present Chinese ethnic policies. Their perspective is ahistorical, however, and it ignores Sinocentrism as a powerful force in Chinese history.

2. According to Wirth (1945:347-372), there are four kinds of minority groups: assimilationist, pluralist, secessionist, and militant. The implication of this four-fold typology is that ethnic relations depend on minority responses. Schermerhorn regards this typology as neglecting dominant group's reactions. Actually, this kind of one-sidedness is also manifest in other scholars' work which sees the dominant group's attitudes toward minorities as the basis for, or, at least, primary to, ethnic relations (see Adam 1989: 19-34).

Actually, both assimilation and cultural pluralism mean more than merely the dominant group's attitudes and practices toward minorities. Generally speaking, the concept of assimilation refers to a situation in which subordinate groups lose their identities as separate groups after abandoning their traditional way of life and becoming incorporated into the dominant group's culture and social institutions (see Farley 1982; van den Berghe 1981). As some scholars (Schermerhorn 1970: van den Berghe 1981) observe, assimilation concerns at least two sides: the dominant group accepts the minority group or groups into the mainstream society; and minority groups demand that they be accepted. On the other hand, pluralism refers to a situation in which 1) some aspects of culture and social structure are shared in common throughout society, but 2) other aspects remain distinct in each racial or ethnic society. Contrary to assimilation which calls for uniformity, cultural pluralism stresses one culture made up of a number of distinct parts. In other words, the difference between these two paradigms can be seen as the "salad bowl" as opposed to "melting pot". Cultural pluralism also concerns two sides: the dominant group allows subordinate groups to retain distinct

identities; the latter demand to be treated as separate groups. The reason for me to stress two sides in both assimilation and pluralism is to point out that both situations are dynamic and interactive, rather than static and unidirectional. Therefore, it may be one-sided to say that both phenomenon result from either the dominant or minority group's efforts, as Schermerhorn correctly points out in criticizing Wirth's four-fold typology.

Therefore, we should take into account both the Han attitudes and practices toward minorities and minority responses in China. It is true, as I discussed above, that Chinese attitudes and practices toward minority groups have been assimilationist (vanguard assimilationist in the past and vanguard assimilationist cum pluralist at present). However, the ethnic situation in China is not, and has not been, always that of assimilation. In Chapter Three, I illustrated that both assimilation and ethnic pluralism have existed throughout Chinese history. The Mongolians, Tibetans, Uygurs, Huis, and many southern tribes such as the Yiao and Miao have always resisted Han expansion and assimilation, and these groups, among others, have retained their distinct identities. In Chapter Five, I also illustrated that the Tibetans, Uygurs, Huis, Mongolians, and some southern ethnic groups have not stopped their resistance against Han assimilationist policies today. For many Tibetans, as well as some Uygurs and Mongolians, independence or separation is a more desired goal.

Assimilation requires "two-way traffic"; that is, it requires that minority groups seek assimilation. Some groups discussed here do not seek assimilation. Instead, they demand distinct identities as separate groups. Alternatively, other groups seek assimilation for whatever reasons. The Manchus and Zhuang, among quite a few numerically smaller groups, despite being granted the status of minority groups, have almost completely been incorporated into Han culture and society. That is, they have almost completely abandoned their traditional ways of life, even though the government has periodically encouraged them to "develop their cultures". The situations of assimilation and ethnic persistence, or even conflict, are summed up by Rinder (1965) and Schermerhorn (1970). According to these authors, integration is promoted by agreement or congruence of views on centripetal or centrifugal aims. On the other hand, when there is disagreement or discrepancy of views so that superordinates favor the centripetal policy while subordinates desire the centrifugal (or the opposite) there will be endemic or intermittent conflict (Schermerhorn 1970:83). Seen in this light, centrifugal, or separative, tendencies among Tibetans and Uygurs contradict centripetal, or assimilationist, orientations of the Han, thus producing conflict. However, the Manchus and Zhuang share in common centripetal tendencies with the Han, which results in integration and assimilation.

Apart from dominant and subordinate groups' reactions to each other, the occurrence of assimilation, or incorporation, and pluralism, or ethnic persistence, also depends on some other factors. Lieberson (1961) makes a distinction between two classes of race and ethnic relations in terms of superordinate/subordinate

and migrant/indigenous groups. In societies where the indigenous population at the initial time of contact is subordinate, warfare and nationalism often develops later. By contrast, relations between migrants and indigenous populations which are subordinate and superordinate, respectively, are generally without long-term conflicts. Another example is van den Berghe's formulation of conditions favoring assimilation, which, I think, also implies conditions for ethnic persistence and conflict. According to this formulation (van den Berghe 1981:218), assimilation occurs more often under the following conditions: 1) the greater phenotypic resemblance between groups; 2) the greater similarity between groups; 3) the smaller size of a group in relation to the rest of the population; 4) the lower status of a group; 5) the greater territorial dispersion of a group; and 6) immigration vis-a-vis the indigenous group. Using these ideas in the case of Chinese ethnic situation, we find that the Han has been a superordinate and migrant group dominating various indigenous minority groups. The Han has been superordinate, relative to other ethnic groups, because of its larger population, advanced technology, and superior military forces. This fact may account for repeated conflict between the migrant Han and other groups. However, I think it necessary to add the factor of geographical distance from the home base of the migrant group to the superordinate/subordinate and migrant/indigenous distinction. Generally speaking, the closer a migrant group is to its home base, perhaps the more support it will get in dealing with native peoples. Meanwhile, the closer distance between the two societies in question also means more contacts, which, in a long run, may facilitate the process of assimilation of the native into the migrant society. This, I think, may also help explain why the Han Chinese have been successful in incorporating quite a few native groups into the Han culture and society.

Among all other factors favoring assimilation listed by van den Berghe, cultural similarity seems to contribute most to the process of assimilation in China. Cultural similarity includes subsistence mode, social institutions and cultural forms such as religion, language, and so on. In the case of China, most assimilated groups had previously shared much in common with the Han. The Manchus in the north and Zhuang in the south, for example, have been more similar to the Han in their ways of life than other groups. Conversely, Tibetans and Uygurs, who have been the most unassimilated of all China's minorities, have had distinct religions and other factors which distinguished them sharply from the Han. In addition, a large geographical concentration also serves to better enable some ethnic groups to retain their distinct identities. This holds true of many Tibetans, Uygurs, and Mongolians in China. By contrast, the territorially dispersed or small-sized populations are more likely to be assimilated, if they are not geographically isolated from the Han society. The Hezhe, Dauer, Ewenki, and many smaller southern groups are good examples of this. Finally, I should point out that van den Berghe's assumption that immigrant groups are more liable to be assimilated may not hold true in China, because, as Jing Shu (1989) observes,

two most remarkable immigrant groups --Koreans and Russians (mostly White Russians) have maintained a distinct identity and way of life.

All of this points to the conclusion that neither assimilation nor cultural pluralism may be the final destination of minority groups. In Lieberson's words, neither conflict nor assimilation is an inevitable outcome of racial and ethnic contact (Lieberson 1961). Moreover, as Schermerhorn points out, both phenomena are not exclusive, and they actually contain the other within themselves. In other words, integration (or assimilation) is usually compounded with conflict and likewise conflict displays integrative features (Schermerhorn 1970:58). As I have illustrated in previous chapters, Chinese history has witnessed the dynamic and dialectical process of assimilation and conflict -- assimilation and conflict have existed side by side, both in history and at present.

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APPENDIXES

Appendix 1

An Overview of Ethnic Minorities

Introduction: Identification

China is a unified, multiethnic state exhibiting a considerable ethnic diversity. To date fifty-five ethnic groups, apart from the Han Chinese, have been identified, with one being recognized as recently as May of 1970 (Fei 1981:80). However, the actual number of Chinese ethnic groups still remains to be ascertained.

In terms of population size the fifty-six ethnic groups vary between extremes (see Table A.1.1). The Han Chinese alone make up over ninety-three percent of the total population, while the other fifty-five ethnic groups constitute the remaining 6.7 percent and number six-seven million (Heberer 1989:13). Among all minority groups, the Zhuang are the largest with a population of 14 million, while the Louba in Tibet have a little over one thousand people. On the whole, thirteen minority groups number over one million; fifteen are from 100,000 to one million people; eighteen are more than 10,000 strong and another nine groups have less than 10, 000 members (Fei 1981).

Nevertheless, despite their relatively small numbers, the minority groups occupy up to 50-60 percent of the country's total area. The minority-occupied areas include borderlands, north and

Table A.1.1 Minority Ethnic Groups In China, 1982

Group	Population Size (#)	(%)	Geographical Location
1. Mongolian	3,411,367	0.34	Neimenggu, Xinjiang
2. Hui	7,228,398	0.72	Widespread, Mainly in Ningxia, Gansu, Honan
3. Tibetan	3,847,875	0.38	Tibet, Sichuan, Qinghai
4. Uygur	5,963,491	0.59	Xinjiang
5. Miao	5,021,175	0.50	Guizhou, Hunan, Yunnan
6. Yi	5,453,564	0.55	Yunnan, Sichuan
7. Zhuang	13,383,086	1.34	Guangxi, Yunnan
8. Bouyei	2,119,345	0.21	Guizhou
9. Korean	1,765,204	0.18	Jilin, Heilongjiang, Liaoning
10. Manchu	4,304,981	0.43	Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jilin
11. Dong	1,426,400	0.14	Guizhou, Hunan
12. Yao	1,411,967	0.14	Guangxi, Hunan
13. Bai	1,132,224	0.11	Yunnan
14. Tujia	2,836,814	0.28	Hubei, Hunan, Yunnan
15. Hani	1,058,806	0.11	Yunnan
16. Kazakh	907,546	0.09	Xinjiang
17. Dai	839,496	0.08	Yunnan
18. Li	887,107	0.09	Guangdong
19. Lisu	481,884	0.05	Yunnan
20. Wa	298,611	0.03	Yunnan
21. She	371,965	0.04	Fujian, Zhejiang
22. Gaoshan	1,650	0.00	Widespread, mainly in Taiwan (about 300,000)
23. Lahu	304,256	0.03	Yunnan
24. Shui	286,908	0.03	Guizhou
25. Dongxiang	279,523	0.03	Gansu
26. Naxi	251,592	0.03	Yunnan
27. Jingpo	92,976	0.01	Yunnan
28. Kergez	113,386	0.01	Xinjiang
29. Tu	159,632	0.02	Qinghai
30. Daur	94,126	0.01	Neimenggu, Heilongjiang
31. Mulao	90,357	0.01	Guangxi
32. Qiang	102,815	0.01	Sichuan
33. Bulang	58,473	0.00	Yunnan
34. Sala	69,135	0.01	Sichuan
35. Maonan	38,159	0.00	Guangxi
36. Gelao	54,164	0.01	Guizhou
37. Xibo	83,683	0.01	Liaoning, Xinjiang
38. Achang	20,433	0.00	Yunnan
39. Pumi	24,238	0.00	Yunnan
40. Tajik	26,600	0.00	Xinjiang
41. Nu	22,896	0.00	Yunnan

Table A.1.1 Minority Ethnic Groups in China, 1982

<u>Continued</u>

Group	Population (#)	Size (%)	Geographic location
42. Usbek	12,213	0.00	Xinjiang
43. Russian	2,917	0.00	Xinjiang
44. Ewenki	19,398	0.00	Neimenggu
45. Benlong	12,297	0.00	Yunnan
46. Baoan	9,017	0.00	Gansu
47. yugur	10,568	0.00	Gansu
48. Jing	13,108	0.00	Guangxi
49. Tartar	4,112	0.00	Xinjiang
50. Dulong	4,633	0.00	Yunnan
51. Oroqen	4,103	0.00	Neimenggu, Heilongjiang
52. Hezhe	1,489	0.00	Heilongjiang
53. Menba	1,140	0.00	Tibet
54. Luoba	1,066	0.00	Tibet
55. Jinou	11,962	0.00	Yunnan
Others	804,642	0.08	Guizhou, Yunnan
Han	936,674,944	93.3	Majority in all areas, except Tibet and Xinjiang

Source: Data taken from State Statistical Bureau, 1985: Table 27, Pp218-231.

west China plateaus, mountain regions, deserts, and grasslands. The richest farmlands are occupied by the Han people, who have, "elbowed aside the minorities and left them with the poor hilly regions, prairies and forests (Fei 1981:81).

There are six large minority concentration areas where autonomous regions were established in the early years of the People's Republic of China. These are the Inner Mongolian, Ningxia Hui, Xinjiang Uygur, Tibetan and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Regions. However, different minority groups live in such conglomeration that it has been difficult to produce a detailed map of their distribution to this day (Map A.1.1 has actually simplified a more complicated geographical distribution of minority groups in China). In most Han areas today there are individuals and communities of minority peoples. In the provinces and municipalities occupied mainly by the Han Chinese, seventy percent of the counties have one or more resident minorities, with a total population of ten million (Fei 1981). On the other hand, many Han people live in minority areas. Tibet is the only minority region where the Han Chinese are a minority group in China today.

In addition, there has long existed a disparity between the social and economic development of the Han and that of minority groups as a whole, and also between different minority groups themselves. Generally speaking, minority peoples have lived in out-of-the-way places and have led an even harsher existence than the Han. This was noted even at the time of Fei's investigation in the southwestern minority areas in early 1950s. According to Fei

(1981), serfdom held sway over an area with four million minority inhabitants up to 1949, including the Tibetans, Dai (Tai) of Yunnan, and part of the Uygurs (Uighurs) in Xinjiang (Sinjiang). Slavery existed among the one million Yi living in the Liangshan mountain region in Sichuan province. In addition, about 600,000 people mostly in northeast China were principally engaged in hunting, while some groups in the border areas of Yunnan still retained vestiges of a "primitive communal system" and were engaged slash-burn agriculture (Fei 1981:82-3).

Fifty-five Groups and their Geographical Distribution

The geographical distribution of minority ethnic groups in China is characterized by the fact that minority ethnic groups, which make up at most eight percent of the total Chinese population, occupy about sixty percent of China's total area, mostly in the border areas. Thus, minority areas form a protective screen between Han-Chinese areas and other countries. As some scholars have noticed (Shu 1989), this situation reflects both the historical processes by which minority groups have come to be controlled by China, and the Chinese view of the world, in which there are several circles with the Han-Chinese in the innermost and the barbarians in the outside and remote areas. However, it is important to note that even in most these border areas today, the non-Han peoples have become minorities in a real sense due to the expansion and immigration of Han Chinese.

Ethnic minorities in Northeast and North China

The major non-Han peoples in Northeast China (Manchuria) are the Manchus and Koreans. A large number of Mongolians also live in this region. The region is also the homeland to a few smaller groups of Tungusic origin.

Manchuria, which covers the three northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, used to be the homeland of the Manchus who are believed to have descended from Tungusic tribes of nomadic hunters, fishermen and food gatherers. Some thousand years ago, the Jurchens, ancestors of the later Manchus, founded the Jin (Golden) dynasty (1115-1234) and actually controlled most parts of North China. In the seventeenth century the Manchus became so powerful that they succeeded in conquering the whole of China and establishing the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). However, the Manchus became increasingly Sinicized and at last completely assimilated into the Han cultural group. Subsequently, Han-Chinese immigrants settled in Manchuria and became the majority, assuming a dominant place since the eighteenth century.

One of the smallest groups in the region are the Hezhe, who live along the Heilong River in Heilongjiang province. By ancestry, they are closely related to the Manchus. In 1949, the group numbered only about 300 persons. In 1982, according to Shu (1989), their population increased to 1,489. The Daur, another small group in this area, are actually distributed in Neimengu

Map A.1.1 Minority Ethnic Groups in China

(Inner Mongolia), Heilongjiang, and Xinjiang (Sinkang). The Ewenki (means "people living deep in the mountains and forest") are a tribal people and number 19,398. Anthropologists often link them to the Eskimos in Alaska (Sinclair 1987:10).

The Koreans of Northeast China are immigrants to China from Korea in the late 17th century. Many are settled in Jilin Province, which borders North Korea, and others are farther north in Heilongjiang Province. The Chinese Koreans are of the few small minority groups who have not been assimilated. They speak and write in their own language, and they operate their own schools, including a university where the faculty teaches in Korean. In addition, they endeavor to maintain a social organization and customs of their own (Whitaker 1972:100). Today, the Koreans are often employed in the expanding industrial labor force in Northeast China.

The largest herding group in North China are the Mongolians who are heavily concentrated in Neimengu (Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region). Cousins to their northern neighbors in the Mongolian People's Republic, the Mongolians differ in many ways from Han people. Nomadic pastoralists, they depend on their livestock for food, shelter, and clothing. The basic social unit was once the mobile camp, or bok, which was a conglomeration of tents on the open steppe. A larger and relatively more stable social structure is the banner, an administrative unit roughly equivalent to a xian (county) which was first developed by Chengis Khan as a combination of military and civil administration. There

has long been a noticeable and relatively stable difference between the rich and poor among these people.

Northwest China

This area covers Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Qinghai, Gansu and Shensi provinces. The central feature of the region is its large Muslim population which is even larger than that of Saudi Arabia (Sinclair 1987:10). The Hui, or Chinese Muslims, are the second largest minority group and the largest religious minority group (7,228,398 in 1982) in China. The Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region is designated by the government as a special area for the Hui. However, a large population also lives in Gansu, Xinjiang and Honan (in Central China). The Hui are descendants of Chinese converts to Islam and of the Persian and Arabian soldiers and merchants who came and settled in China during the Tang (618-907 A.D) and Yuan (1272-1368) dynasties. The Hui use Arabic script in their religious activities, but employ the Han language in both written and oral forms. Few other Middle Eastern elements have survived except that many Hui people wear white caps on their heads and that pork or the blood of animals are taboo to them. Actually, most Hui today are racially and linguistically indistinguishable from the Han.

Islam is also the religion of many Turkic peoples in Xinjiang, formerly called Chinese Turkestan. The Uygurs (5.9 million) are the dominant people in this region, and they are the most numerous of all the sixteen minority groups in Xinjiang. They inhabit the

Tarim Basin which makes up the southern two-thirds of Xinjiang. Though living in one of the driest deserts in the world, the Uygurs have developed many oases, which enable them to live a sedentary life. The Uygurs have close ties with other Muslims, but they are not as strict in their observance of ritual. However, it should be noted that the Uygurs have recently become a numerical minority due to Han immigration. (Sinclair 1987:68).

The Kazakhs, which means "man without master", are descended from Turkic and Mongol tribes which occupied the Kazakh Khanate of Central Asia, later to become the Kazakh Republic of the USSR. They still maintain many aspects of their traditional nomadic way of life, migrating seasonally in tribal groups to find grazing lands for their cattle and sheep (cf Lawton 1985). Another Turkic people in the area are the Kergez who fled from the Uygur group in 841 A.D., and settled on the Chinese border. After that, they established the Kingdom of Khocho. These traditional nomadic pastoralists now live in communes (Lawton 1985:43). According to the 1982 Census, they number more than 113,000.

Still other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang include the Tajik, the Usbek, and the Tartars. It is said that these groups moved from Central Asia into China in the past. Actually they share much in common with the Uygurs and the Kazakhs. The Tajiks are a Persian-speaking people. Both Usbeks and Tartars have tribal links within the former Soviet Union (Lawton 1985:36). In addition, White Russians, Mongolians and Tibetans also live in this area.

Southwest China

This area covers the Tibetan Autonomous Region, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan provinces. In these southwestern provinces and regions live twenty-five minority groups. The Tibetans are of the largest group and are settled principally in Tibetans highlands in far southwestern China. Others live in Sichuan and Qinghai provinces. They are the most unassimilated of all minority groups in China, and have been the latest to be subjugated. Actually the real control of Tibet by the Chinese did not come about until after the People's Republic of China was established in 1949. Traditionally, the Tibetans had their own theocratic government for centuries, which first existed independently of China proper, and which later became a protectorate of China still governed by Tibetans. Most Tibetans (eighty percent) are sedentary agriculturists, and the remainder are nomadic herdsmen. Other ethnic groups in Tibet include the Menba and the Louba. The Menba have a population of 1,140 and are located in southern and southeastern Tibet. The Luoba are the smallest minority group in China, with a population of only 1.066, and they live in southeastern Tibet. Actually, both names come from an epithet given to them by Tibetans, with "Menba" meaning "people living in Moinyu," and "Louba" meaning "southerners." Both groups have close ties with Tibetans in economy, culture, religion and customs.

Another significant group are the Yi, called the Lolo before 1949. They reside mainly in Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan provinces. They once had a kind of caste system, but after 1949

the traditional aristocratic society was destroyed. These people are agriculturists, and their religion centers on a conception of a world being peopled with good and bad spirits (Chaffe et al, 1967:93). Smaller ethnic groups in this area include the Tujia, Dong, Shui, Gelo, Bouyei, Bai, Hani, Qiang, Dai, Naxi, Wa, Lahu, Jingpo, Bulang, Achang, Pumi, Nu, Benlong, Dulong, Lisu, and Jinou. The Tujia (2,836,814) mainly live in Hunan province, and were not recognized as a separate group until 1956. The Dong, Shui, and Gelo had the same identification problem as did the Tujia. They live in Guizhou, where the Dong do farming and lumbering and the Shui and Gelo engage in growing rice and wheat (Shu 1989:42). The Bouyei are believed to be pure Thais and are said to have been left behind when the rest of what became the Thai nation fled south (Sinclair 1987:83). They live mainly in Guizhou as peasants, with few cultural differences between them and their Han neighbors (Whitaker et al 1972).

The Bai and Hani established a monarchy in Yunnan in the eighth century. Today, they reside mainly in the northwestern parts of Yunnan. Both groups are agriculturalists, but the Bai practice Buddhism, while the Hani are polytheists. The Bai use the Han language, and the Hani had a written script devised in 1957 on the basis of Latin alphabet (Life and Life Styles 1985:75). The Qiang, another group in this area call themselves "local people" (Ermas). They have long lived in what is now northwest Sichuan. Their language belongs to the Tibetan-Burman group of the Han-Tibetan language family, and is divided into two dialects, southern

and northern, but they use the Chinese script. The Naxi are well known for their retention of a matrilineal system of kinship. These people moved south in the seventh century to Yunnan and Sichuan. Although they have two versions of a written script known as "Dongba" and "Geba", most of the Naxi today use the Han language. Among the most ancient people, or the "tribal remnants", of western Yunnan are the Wa, Lahu, Jingbo, Bulang, Achang, Pumi, Nu, Benlong, Dulong, Lisu, and Jinou. Like other southwestern ethnic groups, they were forced southward by the Han Chinese many centuries ago. Many of these groups settled in the rugged mountains, growing millet and wheat by slash-burn farming and engaging in hunting.

South and Southeast China

This area covers today's Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hunan provinces. Actually, all the ethnic minorities in this area and in southwest China were traditionally called, as a whole, "Nan-man," which means "southern barbarians". All minority peoples in both areas have been closely related to each other, and have overlapped in area of residence, economy, culture, and social organization.

The largest group in this area and also largest of all minorities in China are the Zhuang, a Thai-speaking people, who number 13.4 million in population. Their homeland is the present-day Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, though some of them also live in Yunnan, Guangdong, and Hunan provinces. The Zhuang are one of the most assimilated minority groups, and they have adopted many

Chinese practices in farming, culture, and social organization.

The native people in Hainan Island in Guangdong province are the Li, who live in extended families in traditional cylindrical houses. In Fujian and Zhejiang provinces in southeast China, there live the She people who are descended from peoples who have been pushed by the Han from their homeland in Guangdong. With their origins in mind, they call themselves "guest families in the mountains." Another major ethnic group in southeast China are the Gaoshan who were the earliest inhabitants of Taiwan. Traditionally, they were millet farmers and hunters living in all parts of the island. However, they were forced to move into the mountains after the Japanese occupancy of Taiwan. A small number of the Gaoshan can also be found in mainland China. Their language is distinct and is believed to come from the Malayo-Polynesian group, a fact which is explained as the result of several migrations from the mainland or from the Malay Archipelago.

In summary, the geographical distribution of Chinese ethnic groups is complex. Some groups are concentrated in a narrow range of locations, while others are located in many places. Examples of the two extremes are found among the Uygurs who are located almost exclusively in Xinjiang, and the Hui who have spread to many regions of China. According to Shu's research (1989), the areas of the country with the highest percentages of minority peoples include Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai and Guangxi. In Tibet minority group members account to over ninety-five percent of the total

population; Xinjiang has over fifty-nine percent of minority
peoples; Qinghai has over thirty-nine percent; and Guangxi has over
thirty-eight. The areas with the lowest concentrations of minority
groups are Shanxi (0.25%), Jiangsu (0.18%), and Jiangxi (0.07%).
Besides, the other five regions with less than one percent of
minority populations are Shandong (0.55%), Shanghai (0.42%),
Zhejiang (0.42%), Fujian (0.97%), and Shaanxi (0.46%).

Shu (1989:57) posits the existence of two contrasting kinds of
regions. The first consists of Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia,
Ningxia and Guangxi, which have a high percentage of minority group
members but low minority diversification. This means that there is
always a dominant ethnic group in these regions: the Tibetans in
Tibet, the Uygurs in Xinjiang, the Hui in Ningxia, the Mongolians
in Inner Mongolia, and the Zhuang in Guangxi. In contrast, regions
located along the eastern coast and the Yellow River valley have a
low percentage of minority populations as well as low minority
diversification. In other words, these regions are largely
inhabited by the Han Chinese. This actually corresponds to a
pattern in which the western part of China has more minorities than
the eastern part. Put in another way, some regions in the west
exhibit a diminished Han influence and more non-Han elements
because of some regionally dominant and historically powerful
ethnic groups.

Han-Chinese expansion is especially manifested in the central,
northern and northeastern China, where minority populations are
small and where minority diversity is relatively high. Take

Jiangxi for example. The province has the lowest minority population percentage (0.1%), but a relatively high minority diversification percentage (0.74%) (Shu 1989:59). However, when we compare these regions with Yunnan, Guizhou and Qinghai -- the regions with both high minority population and diversification percentage--we may infer the possible route for the minority groups to have taken under the pressure of the Han expansion in history. This means that various minority groups have moved from relative northern parts to the south, and from the east to the west. To put it more clearly, these minority peoples were driven from their plain homeland to mountain and other harsh areas at different times in history.

Ethnic Differences

Language

There are almost as many languages as the number of minority groups. Some groups such as the Uygurs, Mongolians, Manchus, Tibetans, Koreans, and Russians have their own well developed written forms, whereas some others had not had a written form before the present government designed Latin-alphabet scripts for them, or before they decided to use the written Han language. These peoples include some smaller groups such as the Hani, Bouyei, Hezhe, Dauer, Kergez, Qiang, Mulao, Maonan, and Jing. In addition, some other groups such as the Naxi and Yi have had their own written forms which, however, have not been popular among the

ordinary people.

Generally speaking, all the minority languages in China belong to five linguistic families: the Han-Tibetan, Altaic, Austroasiatic, Malayo-Polynesian, and Indo-European language families. Moreover, there are different language groups within each family. Within the Han-Tibetan language family, the Hui and Manchu speak the language (Chinese) belonging to the Han group; the languages for the Zhuang, Bouyei, Dai, Dong, Li, Mulao, Shui and Maona belong to the Zhuang-Dong (Thai) group; the languages of the Tibeto-Burman group are spoken by the Tibetans, Menba, Lisu, Naxi, Hani, Lahu, Yi, Jinou, Jingpo, Dulang, Qiang, Tujia, and Pumi; and the languages of the Miao, Yao and She come from the Miao-Yao group.

The Altaic language family consists of four branches which are the Turkic, Mongolian, Manchu Tungusic and Korean. The Turkic group includes the Uygur, Sala, Usbek, Kazakh, Tartar, Yugur, and Kergez languages. The languages of the Mongolian group include Mongolian, Tu, Dongxiang, Daur, Bonan, and Yugur. The Manchu Tungusic group is comprised of the Manchu, Xibo, Hezhe, Oroqen, and Ewenki languages. However, Korean group has only one language -- Korean.

The South Asian (Austroasiatic) language family is represented by two groups; namely, the South Asian and Vietnamese groups. In the first group there are three languages: the Wa, Benlong and Bulong; while the Jing language is the only one in the second group. The Gaoshan language is the only one in the Malayo-

Polynesian language family spoken by a Chinese ethnic minority. Russian in the Slavic group and Tajik in the Iranian group are representative of the Indo-European language family.

Despite these traditional linguistic differences, we should note the influence of the Han language, the dominant language in China. In effect, many minority peoples, especially the young, have totally given up their native languages and use the Han Chinese language exclusively. This has occurred mostly among the smaller groups such as the Hezhe, Naxi, Bai, Dauer, Mulao, Maonan, Jing and Qiang. However, even some larger and more complex groups like the Zhuang, Miao, Yao and others commonly speak and write the Han language. More importantly, even many peoples from well-defined social and cultural groups such as the Tibetans, Mongolians, and Uygurs are found using the Han language more often than their own languages. Another aspect of Han linguistic influence is manifested in a large amount of borrowing from the Han language in some minority languages. The Bai language, for example, has been so much influenced in vocabulary and word order that its status as a distinctive language has become questionable (Whitaker 1972:97). Korean vocabulary has been likewise heavily influenced by the Han language among China's resident Korean population.

Mode of production and subsistence

Examining minority groups in terms of their subsistence modes, we can find that representatives of almost all types of human

society exist in China. In this sense, China is herself a world of different modes of human existence. In the Chinese social science literature these societies are labelled

as being either "primitive", slavery-based, or feudalist societies--a categorical system reflecting Marxist influence. Following commonly accepted anthropological typology, we can see hunting/gathering, tribal, chiefdom, and state-level societies.

Some societies depend almost entirely on hunting and fishing. These peoples include the Jing, Hezhe, Ewenki, and Oroqen. These groups live in deep mountains and forests or by rivers and have been isolated from Chinese society for a long time. The Manchus were once hunters before they were influenced by Han culture, and the hunting and fishing groups in northeast China today are related to the Manchus by ancestry. We can find some societies based on a swidden or shifting form of agriculture. These peoples live in the mountains of south and southwest China. They include the Wa, Lahu, Jingpo, Bulang, Achang, Pumi, Nu, benlong, Dulang, Lisu, Jinou, Yao, Miao and Li. They grow tubers (taro, yam) sown with the digging stick, 'dry' cereals, mountain rice, and, in recent times, maize (Gernet 1982). The third type of subsistence practiced by Chinese minority groups is pastoralism which is especially common in the northeast, north and northwest of China. Pastoral groups include Mongolians, Kazakhs, Kergezs, Tajiks, Usbeks, Tartars, and some of the Tibetans. These peoples tend flocks of horses, sheep, goats, cattle, camels, and yaks. They move between summer pastures in plains and winter pastures in sheltered valleys.

The final mode of production found among minority groups is intensive agriculture. The more important agricultural groups include the Koreans, Uygurs, many of the Tibetans, Zhuang, Dai, Hui, Russians and Bai. Within this mode we can also find variations. The basic distinction is between dry farming and wet rice cultivation. Many Hui and Koreans practice field agriculture which, supplemented by irrigation, produces barley, wheat, and various different species of millet and corn. The Zhuang, Dai and Bai peoples, among others, cultivate paddy rice. However, the Uygurs practice a kind of oases agriculture. Uygur agriculturalists utilize the land according to its proximity to the centers of oases. Near the water source one finds the cultivation of garden crops, such as potatoes, millet and gaoliang. Winter wheat and cotton are also grown in some regions. Uygur farmers also excel in growing melons, grapes and other kinds of fruits.

Social organization

In terms of social organization, a number of different kinds of societies exist among minority groups. It is noted by many scholars (Eberhard 1982; Fei 1981; Moseley 1973; Wiens 1967) that two extreme kinds of social organization can be found. On the one hand, we have complex societies with remarkable degrees of stratification, differentiation and specialization. They include the Tibetans, Mongolians and Uygurs; but on the other hand, very simple societies have lived in the northeast and southwest for a long time. Therefore, it is not accurate and appropriate to label

all non-Han groups as tribal societies. Such labeling would ignore differences, obvious or subtle, among these minority peoples.

However, it is not easy to present a complete picture of social organization of China's ethnic groups, because some societies have not been well documented. What we know is a little more than a brief description of these cultures. The best documented societies are those which have a much higher degree of political centralization.

Sedentary communities of the Tibetans , for example, are usually tightly knit villages consisting of related families living in adjacent permanent houses. Each community is administered by an elected village headman and a council of elders. The basic social unit for both sedentary agriculturalists and pastoralists is the family, which has a varying and complex composition. Several forms of marriage are customary and acceptable: monogamy is the most prevalent; but polyandry and polygyny are also to be found. The eldest son in the paternal line is the head of the family and enjoys privileged rights in marriage, reproduction, and property ownership.

At the top of the traditional social structure was the noble class. Its members lived in cities and comprised the largest landholders. Within this social class were the descendants of former Dalai Lamas and former monarchs, or those of individuals who had performed meritorious political or military service. Among sedentary agriculturalists there existed several categories of peasants at the apex of which were the heads of families and other

individuals who controlled sizable land tracts. Below them were lesser peasants, mainly younger sons and others who had no land in their own right. Many members of this class entered monasteries, but many others became dependent landholders on the property of a noble or as taxpaying tenants.

The strong family ties, patriarchy, and obvious social stratification characterizing the Tibetans and Uygurs were also manifested among the Mongolians, Hui, Zhuang and Bai. Similarly, the Yi, sometimes called the Lolo, were traditionally divided into two castes. The dominant caste was the Black Yi, who owned all property and had political control over the villages. The lower caste had two divisions: the White Yi and Chinese slaves. Both were regarded as chattel property by the Black Yi and were required to do all kinds of domestic and agricultural work. The captured Chinese slaves could acquire a status as White Yi by renting land from their Black Yi masters. However, there was no mobility between the Black Yi and the lower caste, though the barriers between the White Yi and Chinese slaves were less rigid.

The clans in Yi society were patrilineal, each consisting of members claiming descent from a common ancestor. They tended to be fairly large, having several main and auxiliary branches. Members of a clan lived in a village, but larger clans sometimes occupied a number of adjacent villages. The villages were highly cohesive, being tied together by kinship as well as by proximity and matters of common security. There was no formal system of succession to village leadership, as the leader was chosen by common consent and

on the basis of personal characteristics. Wealth may have been a factor, but desirable personal qualities seemed to have been more important. Agricultural land was owned in the past by the clan but was allotted to individual Black Yi families who treated it as private property. They rented excess lands for profit. However, pasture and forest land were communally owned and used. Here, we find a mixed character of the stratified society and a relatively egalitarian society. The elements of the latter type in Yi society include the form of leadership and the common ownership of land, especially that of pasture and forests. However, the rigid system of social stratification and existence of slavery are remarkable features of a stratified society.

In contrast, there were many other societies whose social organization was at a relatively unstratified level. Among these were the Qiang, Yao, Miao, Liao, and Li. They had neither definite tribes nor chieftains; no differentiation of classes existed. According to Wiens (1967), the Qiang only had a sporadic, loose organization; the Yao had no ruling class, clan, or tribal organization; the Liao had neither tribes, nor clans, nor chieftains; and the Li are said to have had no tribal, nor clan organization. In addition, one of the most different aspects of these groups from stratified and complex ones lies in the fact that patriarchy has been minimal, in that women in many of the former kind of societies have enjoyed a much higher social status. Matrilineal practices or their traces existed in some of these societies until 1960s. One more thing is worth noting: almost all

these societies are mountain peoples whose subsistence depended on hunting, gathering, fishing and swidden farming.

Religion

The complexity as shown in differences in minority languages, subsistence modes, and forms of social organization is also paralleled by that of religious belief. In anthropological terminology, we can find shamanism, animism, animatism, polytheism, and monotheism. These differences, too, reflect different modes of production and social organizations.

Most of ethnic groups in northeast China traditionally practiced Shamanism. These groups include the Hezhe, Dauer, Ewenki and Oroqen. Animatism has been common among peoples such as the Miao, Yao, Yi and Qiang. The Miao and Yao practice a mixture of animism and polytheism in that their religious system was based on a belief in supernatural spirits and gods. But "purer" polytheists were the Hani and Bouyei. Monotheistic minority religions include Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity. Buddhist groups include the Koreans, some of the Bai and Bouyei people, the Jing, the Dai (Hinayana Buddhists), Tibetans (Lama Buddhists), Mongolians (Lama Buddhists), Yugurs (Lama Buddhists), and Tu (Lama Buddhists). Islam was first introduced into China in the Tang period (618-907) when many Persian and Arabic merchants and soldiers came and later settled in China. It was further developed in the Mongol regimes when China proper became the center of this great world empire. The Muslims are most powerful in northwest China and consist of the

Hui, Uygurs, Kazakh, Kergez, Sibo, Baoan, Usbek, Tartar, Sala, Tajiak, and Solon. The Hui are the largest religious minority group in China, and they have spread to many places in China. Finally, Christianity groups include the Russians, some of the Ewenki, and some of the Bouyei. The Russians and the Ewenki belong to the Orthodox Eastern Church.

China's minority groups have both influenced each other and together been influenced by the Han Chinese. In many cases, Han society has always been a constant, while non-Han societies and cultures have changed under the Han influence (direct or indirect). Meanwhile, some larger non-Han groups have also been important in shaping other non-Han groups. The Han Chinese influence on these ethnic groups is manifest in the fact that Han expansion and colonization pushed some groups into deep mountains and forests. Many of these peoples who were once cultivators of wet rice possessing more elaborate cultural and social forms had to return to a dependence on swidden agriculture or other less intensive modes of subsistence. The Yao and Miao are good examples, and this process has not been unusual. During the Tang (618-907), the intermixture of three groups, the Zhuang, Bai, and Yi, established a powerful state, Nan-shao, in present-day Yunnan province. The state existed side by side with and even threatened the Tang empire. But after they were conquered in the thirteenth century by the Mongols, and later became subject to Chinese rule after the Mongols were overthrown, some of them resumed a tribal way of life. The Mongol tribes similarly achieved the status of a state-level

society (the states of Xianbei) during the Tang, but went back to their tribal life after they were defeated by Chinese armies. Hundreds of years later between 916 and 1125, these Mongol tribes formed a state again, only to be defeated by Jurchens, ancestors of what we call the Manchus today, who established the Jin dynasty.

Summary

The various Chinese minority groups are different, both from each other and from the Han majority in terms of mode of production, social organization, and culture. These groups live in different parts of China, some in mountains and forests, others on the steppes, or in oases, and valley plains. Therefore, their life strategies are different: some practice intensive agriculture; others animal herding; still others live as hunters and fishers. Besides, these societies exhibit different degrees of politicalization, and they can be roughly divided into stratified, less stratified and unstratified societies. Finally, it should be added that minority peoples may have a different "modal personality" than that of the Han people (see Ekwali 1968 for discussion of modal personality of Tibetan pastoralists). However, the age-old interaction and mutual influence have produced complex patterns. The ethnographic present, on which I rely in my descriptions of these societies, is helpful but also liable to simplification. The kind of life minority groups live now is not

the same as that of their past. In fact, assimilation has been so effective that many of minority peoples have almost totally abandoned their traditional ways of life. In this respect, the Manchus and Zhuang are the most remarkable examples. According to some reports (Heberer 1989), even many Mongolians have become indistinguishable from the Han people. Sedentary living has been adopted and the Han language is used for daily communication, except in some remote corners. Therefore, a discussion of ethnic differences becomes increasingly difficult and complex.

APPENDIX 2

A Brief Chronology

of Chinese History

|	
ca. 5000-ca. 2000 B.C.	A variety of Neolithic cultures appear in north, central, and south China. Primitive agriculture, stone tools, and increasingly elegant pottery. Age of mythical sage emperors: Yao, Shun, and Yu.
ca. 2205-ca. 1766 B.C.	Xia dynasty
ca. 1766-ca. 1045 B.C.	Shang dynasty
1045-265 B.C.	Zhou dynasty
1122-771 B.C.	Western Zhou
770-481 B.C.	Spring and Autumn period
403-221 B.C.	Warring States period
221-206 B.C.	Qin dynasty
206 B.C.-A.D. 220	Han dynasty
206 B.C.-A.D. 9	Western or Former Han dynasty
25-220 A.D.	Eastern or Later Han dynasty
220-285	Three Kingdoms era (Han, Wei, and Wu)
265-420	Jin dynasty (in south only after

316)

|	
317-589	Northern (barbarian) and southern dynasties
386-534	Northern Wei (Toba) dynasty
518-618	Sui dynasty
618-907	Tang dynasty
907-960	North-south divisions
916-1125	Liao (Khitan) dynasty
960-1279	Song dynasty
960-1127	Northern Song dynasty
1115-1234	Jin (Jurchen) dynasty
1127-1279	Southern Song dynasty
1272-1368	Yuan (Mongol) dynasty
1368-1644	Ming dynasty
1644-1911	Qing (Manchu) dynasty
1912-1949	Republic of China (Nationalist government)
1949-present	People's Republic of China

Appendix 3

Maps

Map 1. The Topography of East Asia

Map 2. Prehistoric China

CHINA

JAPAN

Yellow River

Yangtze River

Yellow Sea

East China Sea

South China Sea

0	1000m
0	1700km

Neolithic Remains

Peking Man

Map 3. China in the Zhou Dynasty

CHINA

JAPAN

Yellow River

Yangtze River

Yellow Sea

East China Sea

South China Sea

0 1700km

0 1000m

Area controlled by the Chou Dynasty

Map 4. China in the Qin Dynasty

CHINA

JAPAN

Yellow River

Yangtze River

Yellow Sea

East China Sea

South China Sea

0   1700km
0   1000m

Area controlled by the Chin Dynasty

Map 5. China in the Han Dynasty

HAN DYNASTY

~ Earlier Han
(1st Century B.C.)

— Later Han (c. A.D. 100)

▲▲▲ Great Wall

Map 6. China in the Tang Dynasty

T'ANG DYNASTY

Tang proper
Tang: greatest extent
Silk route
Great Wall
Grand Canal

Map 7. China in the Qing Dynasty

Map 7. China in the Qing Dynasty

Sources

Map 1: Ropp, Paul (eds.). 1990. *Heritage of China*. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp336.

Map 2: *Historical Maps On File*. 1984. New York: Facts on File, Inc. pp8.001.

Map 3: *Historical Maps On File*. 1984. New York: Facts on File, Inc.. pp8.002.

Map 4: *Historical Maps On File. 1984. New York: Facts on File, Inc.. pp8.004.*

Map 5: Ropp, Paul (eds.). 1990. Heritage of China. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp337.

Map 6: Ropp, Paul (eds.). 1990. *Heritage of China*. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp338.

Map 7: Ropp, Paul (eds.). 1990. *Heritage of China*. Berkeley: University of California Press.