CHRISTIAN FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT:

An Inquiry into the Relations between Religion and Science.

by

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PREFACE

The title of this thesis is Christian Faith and Modern Thought, and its purpose is to enquire into the present relations between the Christian religion and contemporary secular philosophy. At first sight this might seem an overly ambitious undertaking, but one very important fact serves to reduce it to manageable proportions. The spirit or attitude of "Modern Thought" is in very large measure the creation of "Modern Science", and the Christian religion faces in this same science its most serious challenge to its claim to reveal "the life, the truth, the way". A study of the relations between Christian Faith and Modern Thought must of necessity concentrate on the conflict, real or alleged, between religion and science.

We shall approach the problem by considering the the main tenets of the three philosophical schools, Pragmatist, Realist, and Idealist, and shall then examine what each conceives the relative importance of religion and science to be and the relation between them. It is this approach which justifies the choice of title; we believe it indicates the nature and scope of the inquiry better than an alternative such as Religion and

Science. We have allowed the latter to stand in the sub-title, however, as an indication of where the main problem lies.

As to the importance of the subject, there ought to be general agreement. Alfred North Whitehead has written: "It seems as though, during the last half-century, the results of science and the beliefs of religion had come into a position of frank disagreement, from which there can be no escape, except by abandoning the clear teaching of science, or the clear teaching of religion. . . When we consider what religion is for mankind, and what science is, it is no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends upon the decision of this generation as to the relations between them. We have here the two strongest forces (apart from the mere impulse of the various senses) which influence men, and they seem to be set one against the other - the force of our religious intuitions, and the force of our impulse to accurate observation and logical deduction". (1)

Confronted with this conflict, the individual has three ways open to him. He may affirm as irrecovable truth some particular formulation of the Christian Faith and ascribe all that we understand by Modern Science to the machinations of the Evil One. This attitude is known as Fundamentalism. Or, he may cling just as dogmatically to the latest hypotheses of science as a revelation of

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(1) Science and the Modern World, pp. 224-225.

Ultimate Reality and dismiss religion as an outmoded superstition. This attitude, which we may describe as Dogmatic Materialism, is, perhaps, less common than it was half a century ago. (1) The third way is to discover some method of thinking religion and science together, an approach which will do justice to the facts of man's religious consciousness without flying in the face of the assured results of scientific investigation, or, conversely, will conform to the legitimate demands of scientific method without denying the claims of man's moral and religious experience. This attitude is known in religious circles as Modernism, and it includes thinkers whose outlook varies all the way from orthodox theism to non-theistic humanism. (2)

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(1) A distinguished scientist, R. A. Millikan, defines dogmatism as "assertiveness without knowledge". "This", he writes, "is supposed to be the especial prerogative of religion, and there have been many religious dogmatists, but not a few of them, alas, among scientists. Everyone will recognize Mr. Bryan, for example, as a pure dogmatist, but not every scientist will realize that Ernst Haeckel was an even purer one". (Evolution in Science and Religion, p. 60.)

(2) There is a fourth alternative and that is to keep one's religion and one's science in water-tight compartments, all the while hoping that time, in conjunction with the efforts of other thinkers, will bring about a reconciliation. But although this alternative seems to be one actually adopted by many people it will not be considered here. It is not a possible solution for anyone who has seriously and sincerely faced the problem; rather it is a refusal to face the issue and follow the argument whithersoever it leads.

It is not difficult, as Sir James Arthur Thomson has pointed out, (1) to see why the rapid development of science should have worked to the detriment of religion. "For religion has given man an astonishingly increased mastery over nature; science with its numerous analytic triumphs has tended to diminish, in the shallow-minded, the sense of wonder. . . Moreover, the scientific mood has been widely diffused; it has a growing fascination of its own; it easily comes to preoccupy the mind and thus tends to crowd out the aesthetic, the poetic, the religious moods". The prestige of science has declined rapidly in these last few years, however, as it has become more clearly recognized that there are some problems which science cannot solve. (2) "Bertrand Russell and other observers of our civilization see that the development of scientific technique affords no guarantee of any significant use of that technique. The great question of their later use is as to where and how there are to be found means for relating knowledge to the great values and ends of life". (3)

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(1) Article "Science" in Hastings' E.R.E., Vol. XI, p. 260. The attitude of

(2) Cf. Le Roy's somewhat flambuoyant description of the rise and fall of modern science: "Genuine philosophy had had its day: all metaphysics seemed deception and fantasy. . religion itself paled before science as poetry of the gray morning before the splendor of the rising sun. However, after all this pride came the turn of humility. . This deified science, borne down in its hour of triumph by too heavy a weight, had necessarily been recognized as powerless to go beyond the order of relations. . . And in this way destitution arose out of ambition itself, since thought, after trusting too exclusively to its geometrical strength, was compelled at the end of its effort to confess itself beaten when confronted with the only questions to which no man may ever be indifferent". (Bergson's New Philosophy, p. 129)

(3) E. S. Ames: Religion, p. 69.

dogmatic materialism could only be maintained as long as the facts upon which the religious interpretation of life is based were ignored. Our present situation, the threatened collapse of Western civilization under the impact of economic depression and global war, makes it impossible any longer to ignore the primary significance of values and ends. But whether this be the reason or not, "it is undeniable that. . . there has sprung up a wholly new appreciation of the independent and permanent significance of religious experience in human life". (1) Evidence of this fact is to be seen in the earnest efforts put forth by pragmatist and realist philosophers to find a place for religious values and ideals in their systems. The interpretation put upon religion by these philosophies may not be such as to satisfy the orthodox, but the fact that the attempt is made to do justice to the claims of religion marks a very significant change of attitude, and should be welcomed by every one who is interested in a comprehensive philosophy.

Our investigation of the subject will be introduced by a brief historical survey. Then we shall consider the solution offered by the pragmatist, realist, and idealist respectively. We begin with the pragmatist because this school of thought, with its emphasis on the immediate and the practical, is, perhaps, especially characteristic of the modern spirit. The pragmatist, however, relies exclusively

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(1) J. H. Muirhead in the Preface to Second Series of Contemporary British Philosophy.

on method and eschews the necessity of a Weltanschauung; therefore we turn next to the realist who, beginning with the results of scientific investigation, attempts to build up a philosophical system which will correspond with reality as disclosed to natural science. The idealist joins the realist in protesting the pragmatist's neglect of ultimate questions, but accuses the realist of ignoring the witness of our values and ideals to the nature of reality. We shall, therefore, examine the idealist's claim to complete the partial insights of pragmatism and realism and to present us with a more complete and adequate picture of that Ultimate Reality which religion knows as God. A further chapter will compare and evaluate the three contributions to a solution of our problem, and we shall then attempt to set forth our own conclusions.

Finally, let us acknowledge that we are under no illusions as to the difficulties that beset our path. "We are", as Cromwell said before Dunbar, "upon an engagement most difficult". All the great problems with which the human mind has wrestled rise up before us. But, as W. Mc Neile Dixon has well said; "Our business is not to solve problems beyond mortal powers, but to see to it that our thoughts are not unworthy of the great theme". (1)

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(1) The Human Situation, p. 22.

CONTENTS

Preface		page ii
Synopsis of Chapters		ix
Chapter I.	Introduction	1
II.	Pragmatism	25
III.	Realism	45
IV.	Idealism	70
V.	Comparison and Criticism	102
VI.	Vindication of the Supernatural	121
VII.	Conclusion	154
Bibliography		168

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTERS

I. INTRODUCTION Page 1

The conflict traced back to the beginnings of science in Ancient Greece. Rise of scepticism and materialism. Plato's attempt to provide a rational basis for religion. Triumph of rational theology in Aristotle fatal to religion. Eclipse of philosophy by Christianity. The Mediaeval Synthesis puts an end to the conflict, but jeopardizes both the freedom of science and the inwardness of religion. Renaissance and Reformation both liberating movements. Science gains its freedom. Religion still in bondage to rationalistic presuppositions. True insights of Kant and Schleiermacher. Challenge of mechanical and evolutionary determinisms. Apparent unchallenged position of science. Dramatic change in the last fifty years and reasons for it. New conceptions in physics. Growing realization of importance of values and ideals. Crux of present-day argument is relation of values to Reality. Gains to science and to religion from the conflict.

II. PRAGMATISM 25

Main tenets. Conception of mind as intelligence, instrument of adaptation. Embraces scientific method as only road to knowledge. Emphasis on experimentation. Concern for social betterment. Criticism of religion on account of its "supernaturalism". "Intellectually false"; "morally vicious". Dewey's distinction between religion and the religious. Defence of objectivity of values and ideal ends. His idea of God. Bewkes' views noted. Ames' criticism of traditional religion. His view expounded. Religion quest for values. God the idealized Spirit of Humanity. Objectivity of this idea of God defended. Positive values in the pragmatist conception of religion. Some mental reservations.

III. REALISM 45

Main tenets. Accepts results of scientific analysis as knowledge of Reality. Sellars' conception of mind. The world as revealed to science. Reduces to schedule of pointer-readings. How related to empirical world? Russell's uncertainty. What of the valuational aspects of the world? Sellars' defence of objectivity of values. Alexander's philosophical system. His conception of religion and of God. God as the whole Space-Time Universe big with deity. Religious values in this philosophy. Comparison with views of some other realists. Tendency to identify value producing factor in the universe and to identify God with this. "Tough-minded realists". Some mental reservations.

Subjective approach. Centrality of subject-self. Descartes, Hume, and Kant. Main tenets derive from Plato. The rational also the real. Actual basis of idealism a value judgment. Variety of schools noted. Attitude towards science. Opposition to materialistic science. Science can not give us knowledge of the real, deals only with phenomenal. Other aspects of experience need to be taken into account. Value judgments as objective as those of science in its field. Idealism and evolution. Pringle-Pattison's view of man as organic to nature. Implications of this view. Nature inexplicable apart from mind. Some problems. The Eternal and the temporal. Relations of idealism with religion. Bowman's vindication of our right to believe in God. Argument from subject-object, and from subject-subject relationships. Experiences presupposes Universal Person. Why idealism cannot provide a basis for religious faith.

V. COMPARISON AND CRITICISM 102

Realist interested in knowledge. Believes science provides it. Pragmatist not interested in scientific results, but in scientific method. Pragmatism accuses realism of following false ideal of knowledge - of setting up an antecendently real physical system from which values are divorced and thus bifurcating experience. Sympathy for pragmatist in his concern for values, and for realist in his desire for world view. Scientific knowledge is knowledge of the real - as far as it goes. Inadequacy of pragmatist conception of truth. Criticism of scientific method as method of all possible knowledge. Contradiction in pragmatist attitude. When deals with values, pragmatist falls back upon "moral faith". Science can tell us nothing of values. Idealist approach held to be justified.

VI. THE VINDICATION OF THE SUPERNATURAL 121

Pragmatism and realism purge religion of supernatural elements. The Supernatural rejected a priori. Naturalistic presuppositions criticized. Pragmatism denies that religion depends upon belief in the Supernatural, and that morality needs religion. Examination of these contentions. The witness of our values. Fact of moral obligation unintelligible unless derives from personal Source. Consistent naturalism has no place for values or ideal ends. Consideration of claim that religion does not need God. Evidence of primitive religion. Sociological theories of religion examined. Inadequacy exposed. Much criticism of traditional religion due to lack of discrimination. Ignores fact of bad religion. Bad religion due to faulty conceptions of the Supernatural and external way of relating Supernatural to the natural. How the Supernatural is known.

Submergence of religious outlook by the secular since the renaissance. Exposition of Bowman's view that the development of a secular point of view can only be understood from a religious stand-point. Relative autonomy accorded to natural science and to moral sciences. Yet each implies an autonomy greater than its own. Religion as concerned with the final dimension. What religion may not ask of science, and what it may legitimately ask. Religion must respect the autonomy of science. Presence of ideals evidence of God's presence in human experience. Conscious and unconscious knowledge of God. The commitment of faith.

CHAPTER I

A HISTORICAL SURVEY

The conflict between religion and science is not of recent origin. It dates from the time when, in ancient Greece, adventurous minds turned from the tales of the gods to the independent investigation of nature. Religion, as Clement C. J. Webb has said (1) is incorrigibly "cosmological" in character; hence it has never failed to provide itself with mythologies. Part of the function of religion is to help man feel at home in the universe by giving him assurance of cosmic interest and support; mythology bolsters man's morale by helping him to relate himself and his life to the life of the cosmos. It assures him that the powers which reveal themselves in the world around him are not alien or hostile but are of the same nature as those which he experiences within himself; hence he can enter into personal relationships with them and appease, if need be, their apparent unfriendliness. Rejecting these mythological interpretations, pre-Socratic philosophers (or physicists) asked: "What is the secret, the underlying principle, of the way things as a whole grow?" Something like this seems to have been the meaning of the question: "What is nature (φύσις)?". (2)

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(1) Group Theories of Religion, p. 151. Quoted from A. S. Pringle-Pattison: Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, p. 39.

(2) Περὶ φύσεως was the stock title of early dissertations.

A diversity of answers was given to the question, but it was generally assumed that the First Principle of all things thus disclosed to scientific investigation was to be identified with the gods of religion (1). The question then arose as to the relation of what religion believes to what science teaches. Where do the gods come in ? In other words, the dispute between religion and science is as old as science. (2)

By the fifth century B.C. a movement of thought had developed which was both sceptical and materialistic. The underlying principle of all things was believed to be some physical principle (3) and the existence of the traditional gods was denied. Plato found himself out of sympathy with much that passed for religion in his time, but as a deeply religious thinker he was still more out of sympathy with atheism and materialism. (4) In face of the prevailing

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(1) This is denied, however, by Etienne Gilson who holds (God and Philosophy, chap. I) that Aristotle was the first to identify the First Principle of philosophy with the idea of God, with the result that "the Greeks gained an indisputably rational theology, but lost their religion". (Ibid., p. 34) See also the monograph of Pierre Bovet: Le Dieu de Platon, chap. I. For the contrary view see F. M. Cornford: From Religion to Philosophy.

(2) It is important to understand why this is so. The Ionian philosophers began to investigate the physical aspect of reality under the impression that they were studying the nature of things as a whole; the next step was to assume that religious mythologies were primarily concerned with the same kind of investigation, i.e. that religion was concerned with "nature" and was, therefore, a kind of primitive science or philosophy.

(3) Cf. the infinite number of "uncutables" (atoms) of Leucippus and Democritus.

(4) "Atheism" historically signifies the negation of religion rather than the existence of the gods; it is "impiety". Cf. C.C.J. Webb: Problems in the Relations of God and Man, p. 23.

tendency to assert that either the gods were non-existent or, if they existed, they did not concern themselves with man, or, if they were concerned with man, they could be easily mollified with sacrifices, Plato set out (in the tenth book of the Laws) to maintain the existence, the providence, and the incorruptibility of the gods. This marks the emergence of something quite new in the history of thought, and its significance for future generations was immense. It was not only the beginning of rational apologetics, but the first clear emergence of the idea that correct belief is of prime concern to religion. Moreover, the logic by which Plato proceeded to defend his propositions set the standard for generations to come; the so-called theistic proofs have often been restated but the latest formulation scarcely goes beyond that of the great Greek thinker. In particular, Plato's argument that mind, or spirit, is prior to matter and must be regarded as the source of all motion remains the fundamental basis of the system of philosophy known as idealism, and indeed of all theistic argument. Plato, however, did not identify his highest philosophical principle, the Idea of Good, with the traditional gods. The gods of religion stand on a level below that of the Ideas. (1)

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(1) A. E. Taylor says "it does not appear that the Platonic God is all that later theists have meant by the Supreme". (Article "Theism", Hastings' E.R.E., Vol. XII, p. 263.) One wonders, however, whether Plato, with his insistence that nothing evil could be attributed to the gods (which actually makes a fairly clean sweep of the traditional Greek gods) did not, for himself, identify the Idea of Godd with the One God worthy of worship. This question is still in dispute among scholars; for a recent discussion, cf. R. C. Lodge: Plato's Theory of Ethics, Chap. XI, "The Divine and its Value".

When we come to Aristotle, however, we find that the First Principle is explicitly conjoined with the religious idea of God. (1) And there is some justice in Gilson's complaint that the Greeks gained a rational theology and lost their religion, for the God of Aristotle is scarcely the answer to the practical needs of religion. He is the Platonic Ideas rolled up in one; the unmoved Mover; Thought eternally thinking upon itself. (νόησις νοήσεως) Moreover at the end of his Ethics Aristotle expressly denied that moral goodness is predicable of God, and as A. E. Taylor says, "a non-ethical deity, who knows nothing of humanity's needs and aspirations, can never become the centre of an enduring religion". (2) Thus the Greek search for a principle of explanation of all things ended with the confident assumption that this principle must be identical with what religion had always understood by God. It was but a step to the further assumption that religion's right to believe in God depended upon the good offices of philosophic argument. The possibility was never seriously considered that religion might stem from some other source than intellectual curiosity about the nature of things, or that it might have native insights of its own to contribute towards the understanding of reality. (3)

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(1) Cf. Physica, Book VIII; Metaphysica, Book XI, chaps. VII, IX.

(2) Op. cit., p. 264. The reference in Aristotle is to Ethica Nicomachea: 1178b 7 - 23.

(3) Socrates, apparently, made a start in the direction of an empirical study of religion (cf. Euthyphro); but the predominant interest of his successors in physical nature and in speculative theology led to the eclipse of this significant beginning.

In Greece religion was submerged by philosophic speculation because of the serious inadequacies of Greek religion. But a new religion was gaining adherents, a religion which was destined to engulf philosophy. Christianity laid hold, first of Neoplatonism and then of Aristotelianism, and wedded them to its own Biblical ways of thinking. Aristotle's First Principle was identified with the Biblical Creator and Governor of the universe, and gradually the mediaeval synthesis developed. The conflict between religion and science was at an end, temporarily, but to the great loss, paradoxically, of both religion and science.

Saint Thomas Aquinas, architect of the mediaeval synthesis and of the Catholic system of theology, attempted to harmonize the Hebrew-Christian tradition with the scientific methodology of ancient Greece. Hence arose the doctrine of the two ways of knowledge - revelation and science, faith and reason. The angelic doctor accepted from Plato and Aristotle the belief that the main truths of religion - the existence, unity, and providence of God, and the immortality of the soul - could be demonstrated by logical argument. In fact, accepting Aristotle's epistemology also, Aquinas believed that all our knowledge was derived from the five senses and that we could therefore have no direct knowledge of God but were dependent upon inference from the world as we experienced it. (1) "The only

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(1) Summa Theologica, 1. 2,11; Summa contr Gentiles, i.12. It should be noted that for the same reason Aquinas denied that we can have any direct knowledge of other selves or of our own souls. We are left not only with an inferred God, but with inferred friends! Cf. J. Cook-Wilson: Statement and Inference, Vol. II, p. 853. "We don't want merely inferred friends. Could we possibly be satisfied with an inferred God?"

road which can lead us to a knowledge of the Creator must be cut through the things of sense. The immediate access to the Cause being barred to us, it remains for us to divine it with the help of its effects". (1) But if reason suffices to establish the fact of God's existence, we must fall back upon faith for our knowledge of His Nature. (2) And faith for Aquinas means acceptance of the Biblical revelation, the truth of which is evidenced by miracle and fulfillment of prophecy and guaranteed by the Church as custodian of the apostolic tradition. (3)

This magnificent attempt to merge two divergent attitudes to the religion was wrecked by the twin movements which heralded the dawn of the "modern world", namely, the Renaissance and the Reformation. The Renaissance brought to men's mind the stimulus of first hand knowledge of Greek speculations and rekindled their interest in the question of the essential nature of things as a whole. The Protestant reformers turned their backs upon the speculative approach to theology, preferring to let religion stand or fall by its own native sources of insight. Natural theology, freed from subservience to revealed theology, became natural science, pursuing its independent investigations into the causes of phenomena and divesting itself in the process of all theological presuppositions.

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(1) E. Gilson: The Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 2nd. ed. p. 64. Quoted from J. Baillie: Our Knowledge of God, p. 109.

(2) This distinction between knowledge of God's existence and knowledge of His Nature must surely be dropped, on both philosophical and religious grounds. The distinguished Roman Catholic theologian, Von Hugel, writes: "We shall have to drop any hard and fast distinction between knowledge of God's Existence and knowledge of His Nature, since both necessarily more or less stand or fall together". The Mystical

The harmony of all truth is an ideal fervently to be pursued, but the mediaeval synthesis broke down because it was premature. It did justice neither to religion nor to science. The truth of religion was made dependent upon dubious inferences from the natural order, and progress in science was held back by the dogmatic assumption that there was nothing more to be known. Set free from bondage, each was able to study its own study matter, develop its own technique, and arrive at its own conclusions. At some time in the future a real synthesis may be achieved.

The keystone of the Thomist system was (and is) the theistic proofs. Starting from his particular presuppositions he had to demonstrate the existence of God by logical argument before his theological scheme could take shape. Faith in God's revelation presupposed the work of reason in establishing God's existence. (1) But just as the Renaissance marked the beginning of the modern inductive or

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(1) This is still true of Roman Catholicism as a reference to the literature of neo-Thomism will show. Hubert S. Box writes: "An act of divine faith is an act by which one believes whatever God has revealed on God's authority. It is, therefore, obvious that we cannot make an act of divine faith before we have been convinced by reason that God exists and that He has spoken. . . The conviction that there is a God can only be reached by reasoning which, when fully thought out, is tantamount to a metaphysic. . . The ultimate basis of religion is reasoning. . ." The World and God: the Scholastic Approach to Theism, p. 32f. (Quoted from J. Baillie: Op. cit., pp. 174-175.) It is only fair to add that some Protestant theologians who have not emancipated themselves from the rationalist tradition take precisely the same stand.

Element of Religion, Vol. II, p. 290.

(3) Summa contra Gentiles, i.6.

empirical approach to the study of nature, so the Reformation ought to have marked the beginning of a new approach to the study of religion. For the Reformation implied an altogether different conception of the seat of authority in religion. It was hard for Luther, however, and still harder for those who followed him, to escape the influence of the ideas in which they had been raised and which had molded men's thinking for generations. The old rationalistic presuppositions lingered on. Protestantism developed its own scholasticism which differed little from the mediaeval save in its scope. "Instead of attempting to cover the whole field of human knowledge, and bring science and philosophy and politics under the dominance of religion, the schoolmen of the seventeenth century confined themselves strictly to the sphere of theology". (1) But the

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(1) A. C. Mc Giffert: Protestant Thought before Kant, p. 145. It ought to be noted that the disastrous Wars of Religion that followed the Reformation profoundly influenced the development of both Protestant and Roman Catholic theology. In fact Dean Inge blames the religious wars for "the fatal rift between religion and science which we are now trying to close. It was a really disastrous accident that the greatest threat which the Christian Church has ever had to face was thrust upon it when it was distracted by an internecine conflict. That problem was the destruction of the geocentric view of the universe by the discoveries of Copernicus and Galileo. . . the Church of the Roman Renaissance would probably have withdrawn from an untenable position. Not so the Church of the Spanish Inquisition, of Luther and Calvin. Catholic and Protestant vied with each other in denouncing the new theories. Nor has this disaster been retrieved. . . The task has been put off from generation to generation, and to this day little has been done to relieve the strain upon the intellect and the conscience of the Christian world." W. R. Inge: Science, Religion, and Reality, pp. 356-357.

theology was largely the same, and the method of approach the same. Reason was employed to establish the fact of God's existence, and then the theologians fell back upon a supposedly authoritative revelation in the Bible to provide the content of Christian belief. The Reformation principle of saving faith as personal trust in the God revealed in Jesus Christ was largely lost to sight. Faith was identified, as in the Thomist scheme, with intellectual assent to a body of doctrine. (1) "The religion that began in vision ended in orthodoxy" (2)

Outisde of orthodox circles, however, a new confidence was developing in the unaided powers of human reason. Men were beginning to wonder if it were not possible to have a completely rational theology. If reason were competent to prove the fact of God's existence, why should revealed theology be needed at all? The Age of Rationalism had dawned. Religion was reduced to a few basic beliefs which were held to be native to the human soul and demonstrable by reason. (3) The proponents of this "Natural Religion" attacked the believers in a supernatural revelation, but it was not long before their own presuppositions were under attack from the empirical philosophers. (4) "The Deists in their dream of a Natural Theology mistook the result of reflexion for the

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(1) This is still the only conception of faith with which some writers on religion seem acquainted. Cf. E. A. Burtt: Types of Religious Philosophy.

(2) H. R. Mackintosh: Lecture Notes. Cf. Types of Modern Theology. pp. 8-10.

(3) Cf. the notitiae communes of Lord Herbert of Cherbury. C.C.J.Webb: Studies in the History of Natural Theology, p.350f.

(4) Cf. Locke: Essay of Human Nature, Book 1.

primitive germ of religion". (1) The time was ripe for a completely new approach to the study of religion. For too long it had been taken for granted that the essence of religiom consisted in a body of doctrine. Almost the only point of difference between the rationalist and orthodox thinkers was precisely how much one was required to accept, and on what grounds. Religious thinkers in both camps were too much under the influence of the rationalist tradition inherited from ancient Greece to be able to break free and devote themselves to the empirical study of religion as men of science were giving themselves to the study of nature. The rationalists showed no interest in religion itself as a living process; their interest was absorped in the effort to discover non-religious premises from which the truth of religion could be established. (2) A religious believer may set out, aided only by the light of reason, to see how far his beliefs can be justified by an independent investigation into the nature of things; this is no doubt a legitimate intellectual exercise. But he would be more profitably employed in exploring the road by which man has actually arrived at faith in God, and in inquiring into the real basis of his own faith. (3) Kant and Schleiermacher were the two

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(1) C.C.J. Webb: Op. cit., p. 357f.

(2) For a judicious appraisal of the truth and error in Rationalism see J. Oman: The Natural and the Supernatural, pp. 99-102. Cf. J. Baillie: The Interpretation of Religion, Pt. 1, ch. IV; and Pt. II, ch. II for a thorough analysis of the whole rationalist tradition in its approach to the study of religion.

(3) Cf. J. Cook-Wilson: Statement and Inference, Vol. II, p. 849 "Now if these thinkers engage in a mere speculative argument, it is with little profit either to themselves or others, because they are not talking of the conception of God as it is for themselves; of the living reality of it in their own minds. In its true reality for them it cannot be considered

pioneers who first recognized clearly that the question of the validity of religion could not be separated from the investigation into the nature of the religious witness to reality. It was they who put the study of religion upon an empirical basis.

Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, attempted to prove the impossibility of any and every speculative theology; it was his avowed aim to do away with knowledge to make room for faith. (1) God, the soul, and immortality were postulates of the moral life; they could never be matter of scientific knowledge or investigation. Science is an attempt to understand the world by observation, analysis, and experiment. Religion is an attempt to grasp the meaning of the world by an act of faith which involves the whole man. Kant was the first systematic thinkers to make this distinction clear. He upheld what he called the primacy of

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(1) Critique of Pure Reason, preface to the Second Edition. This statement of purpose is an indication of the depth of Kant's insight into the religious problem. The scholastics had believed it possible to argue from the empirical world to knowledge of super-sensible realities such as God and the soul. Kant denied the legitimacy of this approach both on philosophical grounds and also on the basis of religious experience. Religion is not matter of knowledge (in the narrow sense of the word) but of faith. "The religious source of Kant's attitude is Protestantism. Luther's doctrine that faith, and faith alone, can constitute man's relationship to God has found an adequate philosophic ally and its expression in Kant's Critique". Richard Kroner: The Primacy of Faith, p. 31.

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as a matter of argument. What they ought to do is to try to come to as clear a consciousness as possible of the nature of their conviction; that is the important thing and vital to science and philosophy; this is what they ought to do if they would help in a discussion like this."

practical reason. (1) By this he appears to mean that the deepest and most important truths are disclosed to us, not in abstract speculation, but in response to the demands of our moral nature, in the effort not simply to live but to live well.

Kant's work was immensely fruitful but his actual solutions of his problems proved unsatisfactory. He left the existence of God dependent upon the cogency of a moral argument not so very different from those which he had demolished, and he jeopardised the autonomy of morality by the arguments which he employed to prove the immortality of the soul. (2) Moreover his tendency to regard religion as a useful buttress for morality does scant justice to religion as an end in itself. (3) There was a good deal of the rationalist left in Kant. Schleiermacher, however, was drenched in romanticism. Revolting against the dominance of abstract ideas in rationalism , and against the tendency to make religion a mere handmaid to morality in Kant and others, he sought to vindicate the autonomous status of religion. Religion was to be lived and to be enjoyed. He

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(1) "In the whole faculty of reason it is the practical reason only that can help us to pass beyond the world of sense, and give us knowledge of a supernatural order and connection. . " (Critique of Practical Reason, tr. T.K. Abbott, p. 200)

(2) It is suggested by many interpreters of Kant that he himself came to recognize the unsatisfactory state of his position as set forth in the second and third critiques, and that his opus postumum indicates that, towards the end of his life, he was "veering towards the view that God, instead of being merely reached by deduction from the profound experiences of the moral life, is Himself directly present to us in these experiences". J. Baillie: Our Knowledge of God, p. 131. Cf. authorities there cited.

(3) In this regard, however, religion was to fare much worse at the hands of some of his successors - as we shall see.

defines religion in the Reden (1) as the living awareness of the infinite in the finite, and in his Glaubenslehre (2) as the feeling of absolute dependence. And this feeling of absolute dependence, he maintains, entirely takes the place of the theistic proofs for purposes of doctrine. (3) Working with a faculty psychology, Schleiermacher identified religion with a quality of feeling because it seemed to him that feeling was the point of creative contact between the individual and Ultimate Reality. He has been accused of making religion purely subjective, but it is truer to say that he regarded feeling as a mode of emotional apprehension. The great merit of his work was his insistence that religion possessed a life and reality of its own. Henceforth we find investigators less inclined to assume that religion is a kind of primitive science or philosophy, and more ready to investigate the facts of the religious consciousness to find out what religion actually is. (4)

The contributions of Kant and Schleiermacher indicated the direction in which religious thinkers were to move, but radical changes in men's thinking take place slowly. The majority of religious people, including most of the theologians, continued to take it for granted that religion had a particular stake in questions which were properly the subject of scientific investigation, while scientific workers

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(1) E.T. J. Oman: Addresses on Religion.

(2) E.T. H.R.Mackintosh and J.S.Stewart: The Christian Faith.

(3) Cf. The Christian Faith, ## 33, 34. H.R.Mackintosh: Types of Modern Theology, chaps. II and III, has a full discussion of Schleiermacher's contribution to religious thought.

(4) Schleiermacher's work gave rise to the modern science of psychology of religion. The rationalists whom he assailed would doubtless consider themselves

on the whole, quietly assumed that religion was purely a matter of subjective feelings and desires and need not be seriously considered when it came to propounding theories of the universe. As the conflict developed in intensity, both sides became increasingly dogmatic. It seemed to some scientists that all reality might be subsumed under Mass and Motion, the basic concepts of Newtonian physics, and a mechanistic scheme was produced as a result of the selection of those aspects of the physical world which lent themselves to scientific analysis and to formulation in mathematical terms. One of the best descriptions of the character and range of the mechanical theory of the Universe comes from La Place: "We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state and as the cause of the state which is to follow. An intelligent being who at a given instant knew all the forces animating Nature and the relative positions of the beings in it would, if his intelligence were sufficiently capacious to analyse these data, include in a single formula the movements of the largest bodies of the universe and those of its lightest atoms. Nothing would be uncertain for him; the future as well as the past would be present to his eyes". (1) This deterministic

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(1) Philosophical Essays on Probabilities, first published in 1812. Quoted from E.W.Barnes: Scientific Method and Religion, p. 578.

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avenged by the fact that much modern psychological study of religion takes as its subject matter the subjective states of the religious consciousness but dismisses the objective reference as illusory. In this, however, psychology exceeds the bounds of its competency. by the same methods all knowledge would be shown to be illusory. Cf. William Brown: "Religion and Psychology" in Science, Religion, and Reality, pp. 305 - 308.

scheme found poetic expression in Fitzgerald's lines:

"With Earth's first Clay They did the Last Man knead,
And there of the Last Harvest sow'd the Seed;
And the first Morning of Creation wrote
What the Last Dawn of Reckoning shall read". (1)

Theories involving a complete system of mechanical determination are interesting as examples of speculative ingenuity. In practice, however, they meet the decisive objection that man cannot live by them; inevitably man lives as though he were a free moral agent. Scientific determinism, therefore, did not unduly perturb the upholders of a spiritual interpretation of life; one could always take Dr. Johnson's method of rebuttal. (2)

It was far otherwise, however, with the next scientific theory to appear - the theory of organic evolution. (3) This theory seemed to offer the sharpest possible challenge to traditional religious views. Not only did it contradict the Biblical account of creation - that in itself would have been a relatively slight matter - but it seemed to dethrone man and to substitute the working of blind natural forces for the intelligent Creator. Moreover, it was not

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(1) From The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam.

(2) The German materialists (Karl Vogt, Jakob Moleschott, etc.) made determined efforts to explain the facts of human physiology and psychology mechanistically. The former was quite sure that "thought stands in the same relation to the brain as gall to the liver or urine to the kidneys". The latter is famous for his "No phosphorus, no thought". Cf. H. Hoffding: On. cit., Vol. II, Book X, ch. II, "Materialism".

(3) By this we understand the theory that "the present day animals (including man) and plants and all the subtle interrelations between them have arisen in a natural knowable way from a proceeding state of affairs on the whole somewhat simpler, and that again from forms and interrelations simpler still, and so on backwards and backwards for millions of years until we lose all clues in the thick mist that hangs over life's Beginnings". J.A.Thomson: The Gospel of Evolution,p.32.

long before the concept of evolution, first applied in the biological realm, was extended as a principle of explanation to the whole universe. The result was a full-fledged philosophy of naturalism. James Ward defines naturalism as the doctrine that: " Nature, to which we entirely belong, is an unbroken continuity of necessary causes, and of these our mental conditions are simply the inefficient symbols. We have no knowledge how these symbols are connected with those causes, but we are confident that volitions do not enter into this chain of causation at all". (1) Again, as in the case of La Place, the results were obtained by a process of abstraction but science seemed to have little concern for such facts as could not be brought with in its general scheme. Such facts as man's concepts of beauty, of truth, and of goodness were dismissed as subjective embellishments of reality. (2) Religion was forced to take refuge in the inner world of feeling.

"If e'er when faith had fall'n asleep
I heard a voice 'Believe no more'
. . . . . .
A warmth within my heart would melt
The freezing reason's colder part,
And, like a man in wrath, the heart
Stood up and answered 'I have felt'".

Tennyson's protest was justified. But little was to be gained by setting feeling in opposition to reason. The fact was that reason had been too narrowly and abstractly conceived.

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(1) Naturalism and Agnosticism, Vol. II, p. 212. That this definition is not unfair to nineteenth century naturalism is shown by the following quotation from T.H.Huxley: "If these positions (Huxley's own) are well based, it follows that our mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes that take place automatically in the organism; and that, to take an extreme illustration, the feeling we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of the act. We are conscious automata,

The function of intelligence is wider than merely cognitive - what Pringle-Pattison calls the "barren rehearsal of an independent, finished reality". "Cognition is but an element in living experience, steeped in feeling, and instinct with action". (1) A new day dawned when it became clearly recognized that any view of the universe which claimed to be true must do justice to the facts of man's moral and spiritual nature.

The dramatic change in the relations of religion and science which has taken place in the last fifty years would have seemed unimaginable to the nineteenth century protagonists. Bergson's Evolution Creative (2) marked the turn of the tide. Biological science appeared to reveal the impossibility of applying mechanistic concepts to the evolution of living organisms. Moreover, the physical sciences were confronted with phenomena which did not fit readily into a mechanistic scheme. Experiments with the atom necessitated a radical change in the concept of matter. When asked why he did not describe himself as a materialist, Dewey replied that no one could say what matter was. (3) The old concept of matter as solid particle distinguished by certain primary characters

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(1) The Idea of God, p. p. 113-114.

(2) Paris, 1907. E.T. Creative Evolution, 1911.

(3) See his reply to the question by W. Savery in The Philosophy of John Dewey (ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp), p. 604.

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endowed with free will in the only intelligible sense of that much-abused term - inasmuch as in many respects we are able to do as we like - but none the less parts of the great series of causes and effects which, in unbroken continuity, composes that which is, and has been, and shall be - the sum of existence". (Quoted James Ward: loc. cit.,)

(4) The locus classicus is T. H. Huxley's Romanes Lecture.

has been discarded and its place taken by the notion of electric charges or wave radiations. That is to say, the new concept is dynamic not static; "events" rather than "substance" is the key word of modern physics. (1) Next in importance to the new theories of the nature of matter is Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy (2) which seems to have replaced the notion of causal determination upon which the older generation of scientists had insisted and which was the basis of the mechanistic philosophy. Then again, philosophers have been paying more attention to the metaphysical implications of scientific procedure and questioning the validity, or, at least, the adequacy of the claimed results. (3) In recent years a number of first class scientists have ventured into the field of philosophy to confess their faith that the results of scientific investigation are not incompatible with a spiritual interpretation of the universe. Some of these, notably Eddington and Jeans, seem to have swung over to an extreme idealistic position; the nature of the physical universe, they suggest, can only be expressed by mathematical formulae

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(1) This is especially brought out in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead.

(2) "Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy states that an electron may have position or it may have velocity, but it cannot in any exact sense have both". (J.W.N.Sullivan in An Outline of Modern Knowledge, p. 110.) "Hence, unless he confines himself to non-quanta phenomena, La Place's Supreme Intelligence is not able to start his calculations, since he cannot know precisely the initial conditions". L. Susan Stebbing: Philosophy and the Physicists, p. 182.

(3) Cf. E. A. Burtt: The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, and A. N. Whitehead: Science and the Modern World.

which are frankly symbolical (1); the universe, it is said, resembles nothing as much as a "thought", and God a "cosmic mathematician". (2)

The fact is that the battleground has shifted. The arena is no longer the cosmos, but the inner world of the spirit of man. What is now at stake is the relation of what we call our values to reality. The importance of values and ideals is recognized on all sides; the question that remains to be settled is their status in the universe. It is at this point that the battle is now joined. What Urban (3) calls "the Great Divide in modern philosophy" separates "those who regard value as a subjective addition to reality and those who regard it as part of or even as the essence of reality itself". On the one side are the pragmatists and the realists, and on the other the various branches of idealism. (4) It is unlikely that the dispute will ever be settled by argument because it is a debate over First Principles and First

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(1)Eddington stresses the symbolical character of modern physics but he does not profess to know what it symbolises. "Something unknown is doing we don't know what - that is what our theory amounts to". (The Nature of the Physical World, p.291) The unquestioned assumption in Eddington's philosophy is that there is an "inscrutable absolute behind phenomena" - the ghost of the Kantian "things-in-themselves". (Cf. L. Susan Stebbing: On. cit., p. 132.)

(2) Cf. Sir James Jeans: The Mysterious Universe, p. 149. Because the universe as the physicists conceive it falls into and intelligible mathematical pattern, Jeans feels justified in positing a Divine Mathematician, but his description of the universe as a "thought" reveals his "failure to distinguish between saying that the universe is created by God's thinking and saying that it is God's thought". (Cf. L. Susan Stebbing: On. cit., p. 28.)

(3) Robinson's Anthology, p. 262.

(4) As we shall see, all pragmatists and a good many realists strenuously deny that they "regard value as a subjective addition to reality".

Principles cannot be demonstrated by logic. (1) What divides philosophers into these two groups is the initial weight they are prepared to give to man's moral and spiritual insights. (2) One can attempt to show the inadequacy of any view of organic process that does not give full weight to the place of mind and to the values which emerge with mind. One can also attempt to expose the inadequacies of all purely naturalistic accounts of the moral consciousness. But the most logical argument will fail when confronted with a scepticism that refuses to credit the insight upon which it is based.

We shall conclude this chapter by summarizing the gains that have accrued to science and to religion as a result of the long conflict. Science has achieved autonomy; it is free to pursue its independent investigations untrammelled by the claims of an authoritarian Church. Religion has been compelled to examine itself, to clarify its own sources of insight, and to relate its own vital interests to other human interests. The process of self-criticism which has always

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(1) The limits of logical argument are clearly acknowledged in the following quotation from Bertrand Russell:- "In every writer on philosophy there is a concealed metaphysic, usually unconscious; even if his subject is metaphysics, he is almost certain to have an uncritically believed system which underlies his explicit arguments. Reading Dr. Dewey's makes me aware of my own unconscious metaphysic as well as of his. Where they differ, I find it hard to imagine any arguments on either side which do not beg the question; on fundamental issues perhaps this is unavoidable". ("Dewey's New Logic" in The Philosophy of John Dewey: p. 138.)

(2) "What was it, ultimately, that put Leucippus, Epicurus, Hobbes, d'Holbach, and Bertrand Russell into the one camp and Socrates, Plato, Descartes, Berkeley, and T.H.Green into the other? We submit that nothing had more to do with it than the initial weight they were willing to give to our ethico-religious insights". (J. Baillie: The Interpretation of Religion, p. 39.)

been characteristic of religion has been speeded up with consequent anguish of mind and soul for many who found it difficult or even impossible to adjust their thinking to the new outlook. But religion has been purified in the process and religious thinkers are coming to see that the same whole-hearted devotion to truth is demanded of them as of the scientists. "Science is the great cleanser of human thinking; it makes impossible any religion but the highest". (1)

Many factors have contributed to the happier relations now prevailing, but none more than a humbler attitude on the part of both protagonists. Religious thinkers (with the exception of the militant fundamentalists) admit that it is to the results of scientific investigation, and not to sacred books, that we must look for knowledge of the world and, to some extent at least, of our own nature. On the other hand, many scientists are acknowledging the limitations of scientific method (2), and freely admitting that qualitative aspects of reality cannot be reduced to quantitative terms. It is now apparent that much of the heat generated in the course of the conflict was due to representatives of each party invading the sphere of the other with theories based on partial views but claiming to be valid for the whole of reality. Moreover a great deal

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(1) B. H. Streeter: Reality, p. 272.

(2) "Science is knowledge gained by certain methods; to apply these methods usually demands a partial or abstract consideration of the subject-matter; "Divide et impera" is the scientific rule". J. Arthur Thomson: Article "Science" in Hastings' E.R.E., Vol. XII, p. 257.

of confusion was due to the fact that religion had taken up into itself a great many primitive scientific beliefs and come to regard them as essentials article of faith. (1) In large measure the dispute was between ancient and modern science, rather than between religion and science.(2) It should be added, however, that the tendency on the part of some scientists, or popularisers of scientific views, to make quite unwarranted claims for science widened the dispute into a life and death struggle for religion, as well as for every world view that cherished the rich fruits of the spiritual life.

How long the present more harmonious relations will last none can say. It is likely that there will always be tension between religion and science, as between faith and reason. (3) Religion begins where science ends; for religion is concerned with man's practical life and cannot wait until the evidence is all in and assured results attained - even if one can reasonably expect that science will one day be able to answer all man's questions and

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(1) Which is a good argument for not following the advice so freely offered today and wedding our religious faith to the latest scientific hypotheses. Cf. E.A.Burtt: Religion in an Age of Science; A.Compton: The Religion of a Scientist; etc. "Those of our contemporaries who are so eager to express their Christianity in terms of the "scientific" thought of their own decade. . are running the serious risk of appearing to their successors of a future age ten times more antiquated . . than the authors of the De Civitate Dei, the Summa Theologica, and the Institutio Christianae Religionis". J. Baillie: Op. cit., p. 405.

(2) A distinguished scientist, Sir Richard Gregory, says the dispute was between "obscurantism and enlightenment". (Religion in Science and Civilization). C.E.Raven reminds us that Darwin's Origin of Species met with as much, if not more, opposition from his fellow biologists as from the theologians. Cf. Science, Religion, and the Future, pp. 35-40.

(3) The tension will only be relaxed, says Temple, "when one of the two assimilates itself excessively to the other", Nature,

solve all life's mysteries. Man needs an Object of worship and a faith by which to live. It is to religion that he will always turn when he seeks an answer to the question about the meaning and end of existence. William Temple sums it up well when he says that the primary assurances of religion are the ultimate questions of philosophy (and of science). He sets forth three religious convictions as instances of this fact:-

1. That Spirit is the source of initiation of all processes;
2. That all existence finds its source in a Supreme Reality of which the nature is Spirit;
3. That between that Spirit and ourselves there can be, and to some extent already is, true fellowship. (1)

It will readily be seen that these basic convictions are not essentially different from those which Plato enunciated in the Laws and set out to defend with all the powers of his great intellect. (2) Indeed these are the fundamental convictions which have been the driving force behind all idealist argument, and as long as they lay hold of men's mind with coercive power philosophers will employ all their persuasive powers in their defence. But their religious value does not depend upon such vindication, for they were not born of philosophical speculation. Nor can sceptical arguments disprove them; their roots lie deeper in the

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(1) Nature, Man, and God, p. 35.

(2) Laws Bk. X, XII, 967. Cf. Timaeus 51. Jowett in his introduction to the Laws (The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. V, p. ccvi) draws attention to the remarkable parallel between the intellectual climate of Plato's time and ours. Cf. Republic Bk. VII, 537-538; Sophist, 246-247. Cf. also C.C.J. Webb; Studies in the History of Natural Theology, pp. 87f.

Man, and God, p. 55.

human soul than logic can reach. Philosophic criticism has its legitimate function, but the appeal of religious faith is, in the last resort, to that moral insight out of which it was born.

CHAPTER 2

P R A G M A T I S M

The philosophy known as Pragmatism (or Instrumentalism) is characterized by a radically new conception of the nature of knowledge, of the nature and purpose of philosophy, and of the relation of philosophy to the special sciences. We shall not be surprised, therefore, to find that it has its own characteristic solution of the problem of the relations of religion and science. But before considering this specific question we shall attempt a brief exposition of the main tenets of the pragmatist system.

Perhaps the word "system" is out of place here, for the pragmatists do not profess to supply a metaphysical system which will hold up a mirror to reality. In fact, the possibility , and even the need, of having a metaphysics, or Weltanschauung, is generally denied by members of this school. (1) They hold that the older schools of philosophy have erred in conceiving of the philosophic task as the attempt to comprehend ultimate reality, and that the error

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(1) "Empirical method works only with reference to particular beliefs, to beliefs about specific items of experience. It is doubtful whether we can make any clear or meaningful statement about 'ultimate reality'. Indeed there are many factors in modern thought which lead us to have sincere doubts as to whether metaphysics is possible or even as to whether there is any need of having a metaphysic or general world view". (Eugene C. Bewkes: Experience, Reason, and Faith,)p. 631.

stems from a serious misconception of the nature and function of mind. The Greeks, it is claimed, pictured reality as a timeless, perfect realm of Being, because they thought of mind primarily as an organ understanding. Beginning with this view of mind as a spectator of all existence they were naturally led to a static conception of reality under the guise of eternal forms because that is the only possible view when the concrete flow of experience is treated as unreal or illusory and the mind's knowledge of universals as the type of all knowledge. (1)

The pragmatist, on the contrary, thinks of mind as intelligence, as an instrument which has evolved step by step with the evolution of the organism in the effort to master the environment and adapt it to the needs of the organism. It is primarily an instrument for the mastery and control of the environment, physical and social, rather than for understanding it or framing theories about it. Thinking is an activity that is only called into play when the organism is confronted with some concrete difficulty or problem. (2) On this view of mind as intelligence it is only natural that the pragmatist should eschew the attempts of speculative philosophers to elaborate a comphrehensive world view and confine himself to the task of solving immediate, practical problems. It follows also that he should reject the time-honored criteria of truth as correspondence with reality or coherence within a given system of propositions. Truth cannot be correspondence with reality because there is no

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(1) Cf. J. Dewey: The Quest for Certainty.

(2) "Thinking arises out of problematic situations or occasions on which the thinker is in doubt". Bewkes: Op. cit., p. 618.

other reality than the concrete flow of experience which can only be known by committing oneself to it experimentally. (1) Neither can coherence be the measure of truth since the logical system which coherence presupposes can only issue from the abstract activity of mind. The test of truth for the pragmatist is prediction under conditions of experimental verification. In fact, most pragmatists would go further and say that "truth is verifiable prediction". (2)

The pragmatist, that is to say, accepts wholeheartedly what he conceives to be the very essence of the scientific method - experimentation. The scientist accepts no proposition as true which he cannot prove will work under experimental conditions, and the pragmatist is so impressed with the achievements of modern science that he believes scientific method to be the method of all possible knowledge.(3) Furthermore

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(1) In ordinary usage the word "experience" refers only to conscious subjects. Not all modern philosophical schools, however, concede the existence, or the importance, of consciousness in their accounts of experience, and tend to define experience as a mere cross-section, or interference-point, where the organism, whether conscious or not, interacts with the environment. This is true of members both of the pragmatist and realist schools.

(2) "The effective working of the idea and its truth are one and the same thing - this working being neither the cause nor the evidence of truth but its nature". J. Dewey; (quoted by J.B.Pratt: What is Pragmatism? p. 136.) C. S. Pierce was the originator of the "principle of work" as the test of truth. The idea was developed first by William James and afterwards by John Dewey. Cf. Joseph Ratner: Introduction to Intelligence in the Modern World: John Dewey's Philosophy, p. 46n.

(3) "The primary designation of Dewey's whole philosophy is experimentalism because its foundation is his philosophy of the experiment . . Grant that Dewey's analysis of scientific experimentation is in its principle contentions sound and valid and you will have to grant that pretty much everything else fundamental in his philosophy is sound and valid."(J. Ratner: Op. cit., p. 58. Italics his.) This is also the main thesis of J.L.Childs: Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism, 1931.

he denies the validity of any beliefs which cannot be subjected to empirical investigation and experimental verification. (1) It is evident, therefore, that if modern man is to accept scientific method as the method of all possible knowledge, and as his only guide to the fruitful management of his world, he must face the necessity of revising all his inherited ideas and reorienting his entire outlook. This, indeed, is what John Dewey conceives the task of philosophy to be, viz. "the old and ever new undertaking of adjusting that body of traditions which constitute the actual mind of man to scientific tendencies and political aspirations which are novel and which are incompatible with received authorities". (2)

Religion is quite evidently one of the "received authorities" which stands in the way of this process of adjustment which Dewey regards as essential if scientific method is to have its perfect work in dealing with our manifold social and political problems and in making possible

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(1) Thus religious beliefs are ruled out a priori. "It is at once evident that if verification means the appearance in consciousness of sense data predicted by the hypothesis under consideration, then verification of religious ideas is impossible. It is also evident that religious phenomena do not behave in accordance with mathematical formulae, as sense data do under experimental conditions." (E.S.Brightman: A Philosophy of Religion, p. 485.)

(2) Intelligence in the Modern World, p. 246. The pragmatist conception of the function of philosophy and its relation to science is well brought out in a comparison by Ratner between Dewey and the Greek philosophers:- "Now Dewey's whole philosophic effort is concerned with doing for our epoch what the classicals did for theirs. Just as they took their science as exemplar of what knowledge is, and the method of their science as standard of the method of knowing, so Dewey takes modern science as exemplar of what knowledge is, and the method of modern science as standard of the method of knowing." (Italics his.) (Op. cit., p. 57).

a better, richer life for mankind. In some of his earlier writings, therefore, Dewey seemed inclined to dismiss religion summarily as an outmoded superstition, intellectually false and morally vicious, from which modern man must emancipate himself. More recently, however, and particularly in A Common Faith, (1) He has dealt more fully and sympathetically with the subject and has attempted to find a place for the religious, if not for religion, in his philosophy. (2)

Dewey rejects the historic religions because of their "crass supernaturalism" which he regards as not simply intellectually false but as fatal to the moral life. He also rejects the dogmatic atheism which results from the simple denial of the supernatural. Dogmatic atheism ignores the elements of value in the religious point of view which can, Dewey believes, be adapted to serve the ends of social progress and reform. He finds the essence of religion in its concern for ideal ends and values; the apparatus of dogma and doctrine with which historic religions have encumbered themselves must be stripped away and discarded so that the true value of religion may be revealed. "The reality of ideal ends and values in their authority over us is an undoubted fact. The validity of justice, affection, and that intellectual correspondence of our ideas with reality which we call truth (sic!), is so assured in its hold upon humanity that it is unnecessary for the religious attitude to encumber itself with the apparatus of dogma and doctrine". (3)

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(1) Yale University Press, 1934.

(2) The words italicised represent a distinction Dewey himself makes. Cf. A Common Faith, Chap. I.

(3) Dewey: Ibid, p. 44.

Dewey recognizes the difficulty of dissociating the religious attitude from a particular religion, but he believes that the history of religion proves the possibility as well as the desirability of doing so. A particular religion is a reflection of the cultural level of the people professing that religion. Men and women have religious experiences which they interpret in terms of the religious ideas that belong to that particular stage of culture. The experiences, however, are independent of the interpretation; "the actual religious quality in the experience described is the effect produced . . . not the manner and cause of its production". (1) If we are thinking, for example, of the integration of the self, religion claims to bring this about by the process known as "conversion". Dewey claims, however, that we can reverse the formula and say that anything which brings about this change should be called religious. (2) What goes by the name of "religion" is simply an interpretation of the fact which depends upon inherited and widely held ideas concerning the supernatural, whereas a naturalistic explanation is quite possible. The claim of religion to be the source and explanation of religious experiences "stands in the way of the realization of distinctively religious values inherent in natural experience". (3)

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(1) Ibid., p.14.

(2) Ibid., p.17.

(3) Ibid., pp. 27-28.

Having shown that the religious attitude can be dissociated from religion, Dewey proceeds to define the religious attitude. Essentially it is "moral faith", but this only becomes specifically religious when it is "actuated and supported by ends so inclusive that they unify the self. (1) Moral faith is faith in possibilities yet unrealized by human nature and human society; it depends upon open-mindedness, the spirit of adventure, and experimentation - which Dewey regards as the opposite of the virtues inculcated by traditional religion. The historic religions have attempted to bolster moral faith by claiming that the ideal "is already the final reality at the heart of all things that exist". In this way they have substituted intellectual assent for moral faith, and thereby "evinced lack of moral faith". In other words, religion has made belief in God, regarded as the Source and Guarantor of values and ideal ends, the criterion of the religion attitude, rather than moral faith in those values and ends. Religion has assumed that the efficacy of faith depended upon an assurance that "the ends worked for must surely prevail and come into embodied existence". And at this point Ethical Idealism has joined forces with traditional religion to rob moral faith of its revolutionary zeal and transform it into an innocuous "system of beliefs about antecedent reality". (2) Because religion has identified the ideal with what eternally is, and because Dewey believes that this identification has proved disastrous to the moral life and to the cause of social progress, we are abjured to renounce traditional religions, with their doctrinal and ceremonial trimmings, and to accept

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(1) Ibid., p. 22. (2) Ibid., pp. 21-24.

moral faith in ideal ends inclusive enough to unify the self as the essence of that attitude which is universally recognized as religious. (1)

As we have seen, Dewey distinguishes very sharply between moral faith and intellectual assent (2); between the conviction that some end should be supreme over conduct, and the belief that some object or being exists as a truth for the intellect. "Conviction in the moral sense signifies being conquered, vanquished, in our active nature by an ideal end; it signifies acknowledgement of its rightful claim over our desires and purposes". (3) Dewey admits that his view is "sometimes treated as if the identification of the divine with ideal ends left the ideal wholly without roots in existence and without support from existence", and he affirms, on the contrary, that our ideals have their roots in natural conditions. What he denies is not that values are linked with existence, and that they themselves exist, but that "their authority and value depend upon some prior complete embodiment". Our values exist; they are good; "we need no external criterion and guarantee for their goodness". (4) Our idealizing imagination seizes upon the actual values we have found in experience and projects them. But this is not a subjective operation of the

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(1) Ibid., p. 27. Cf. E.A.Burtt: (Types of Religious Philosophy, p. 358.) "True religion, for any man or woman, is wholehearted absorption in whatever envisioned greatness empirically brings wholeness of self-hood and promises to be a constant, dependable source of continued growth towards the goal of perfect harmony, within and without."

(2) He also recognizes that the Protestant reformers drew the same distinction, although he is not concerned, perhaps, to realize the significance of this. (Cf. p. 20)

(3) J.Dewey: Op. cit., p. 20. (4) Ibid., pp. 48-49.

human mind. "The aims and ideals which move us are generated through imagination. But they are not made out of imaginery stuff. They are made out of the hard stuff of the world of physical and social experience." (1) Imagination for the pragmatist is not a psychological faculty but a natural process; it takes place, not in our heads, but in interaction with nature. It is "the name for a creative interaction that goes on between man and the rest of nature whenever that relation between them rises to the level that we call intelligent". (2) Nature for the pragmatist is not simply the realm of law and order, but the source of endless possibilities. Hence the emphasis which he lays upon experimentation. We can only discover the possibilities ahead for mankind by reacting experimentally to the stimuli which come to us from creative interaction with the environment, social and physical. (3)

The belief that values and ideal ends are not the expression of subjective desires, but are rooted in nature since there is that in nature which "supports our undertakings and aspirations" is the basis of Dewey's "natural piety". "The essentially unreligious attitude", he says, "is that which attributes human achievement and purpose to man in isolation from the world of physical nature and his fellows". (4) And because

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(1) A Common Faith, p. 49. (2) E.A.Burtt: Op. cit. pp. 401-402.

(3) Henry Nelson Wieman puts it thus: "The supreme good will only be found as we learn how to select stimuli and develop systems of response in such a way as to give rise to the most delightful of all possible worlds. There is no way of finding what stimuli to select, nor how to react, except by selecting experimentally and reacting experimentally until the best selection and the best reaction are discovered". (The Wrestle of Religion with Truth.) Now we shall know when the happy end has been attained Wieman nowhere explains. (Cf. p. 158)

(4) A Common Faith, p. 25.

Dewey believes that values are superhuman and supersocial, though not supernatural, he can find a place in his terminology for the word "God". As he uses the word, it stands for the relation between actual and ideal. "We are in the presence", he asserts, "neither of ideals completely embodied in existence nor yet of ideals that are mere rootless ideals, fantasies, utopias. For there are forces in nature and society that generate and support the ideals. They are further unified by the action that gives them coherence and solidity. It is this active relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name 'God'". (1)

Dewey recognizes that his use of the word "God" is open to misunderstanding, but he claims that the function which his use of the word signifies is "identical with the force that has in fact been attached to the conception of God in all religions that have a clear spiritual content". (2) He goes on to maintain further that a clear idea of this function, viz. the working union of the ideal and the actual, is urgently needed at the present time. In this he is doubtless right. Another reason for his use of the word "God" arises from his opposition to certain forms of militant atheism. "The attitude taken is often that of man living in an indifferent and hostile world and issuing blasts of defiance. (3) A religious attitude, however, needs the sense of a connection of man, in the way of both dependence and support, with the enveloping world that the imagination feels is a universe. Use of the word "God" or "divine" to convey the union of actual with ideal may protect man from a sense of isolation and from consequent despair or defiance". (4)

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(1) J.Dewey: Op. cit., p. 51. (2) Ibid., p. 52. (4) Ibid., p. 53.
(3) Cf. Russell: A Free Man's Worship.

It is evident that Dewey has rejected much which religion has always regarded as important. His philosophy can give no answers - or only negative answers - to the ultimate questions raised by religion - questions about the origin and destiny of man, the meaning or purpose of existence. (1) But these are questions to which no verifiable answers can be given, and, as a disciple of Dewey puts it: "If we mean by religion the possession of specific beliefs about these things, and if at the same time we adopt an empirical philosophy of knowledge, then religion cannot occupy an important place in our lives". (2) Bewkes argues that religion need not be thought of as consisting in a set of fixed beliefs, and he draws a parallel between religion and science. "There was a time when science, too, was thought to consist primarily of a system of beliefs - beliefs about the physical world; now we believe that science is primarily a method of enquiry and of controlling physical phenomena. . . May it not be the case that religion is primarily devotion to the highest conceivable ideals, rather than the intellectual acceptance of fixed creeds?" (3) The problem then becomes that of defining the religious attitude instead of defining

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(1) Cf. what Hoffding says of Comte: "Many will think that the religious problem proper only begins where Comte's religion ends, viz. at the question as to how the development of the world is related to that of the human race and of the human ideal". History of Modern Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 359.

(2) Eugene G. Bewkes: Experience, Reason, and Faith, p.633.

(3) Ibid., p. 633. But if scientific enquiries do not yield some knowledge of the world, or lead to some beliefs about the world, are they not rather futile? Can one devote oneself to ideal ends without being led to adopt certain beliefs regarding them, e.g. that they are the highest conceivable?

religious beliefs. "One is religious when he senses the claim that worthy ideals make upon his allegiance." (1) Radical empiricism cannot, as Bewkes admits, offer finality or security; it can only offer a reliable procedure of investigation. He quotes Dewey as follows: "There are a steadily increasing number of persons who find security in methods of enquiry, of observation, experiment, of forming and following working hypotheses. Such persons are not unsettled by the upsetting of any special belief, because they retain security of procedure". Then he adds: "In a day of accelerated change it is undoubtedly wise to place our trust in a reliable procedure rather than in a specific set of beliefs." (2) He goes on to admit that most of us "seem to find meaning in life by attaching ourselves to those great traditions which are a part of our social and religious heritage", and he allows this to be legitimate providing we test the working of the ideals, and providing "we do not confuse our attachment to tradition with attachment to specific beliefs which the empirical method has shown to be erroneous". (3)

We shall now turn to Edward Scribner Ames, who is usually regarded as the representative religious philosopher of the pragmatist school, to see if he has anything to add to Dewey and Bewkes. Ames accepts the general results of modern science as assured, and the empirical method as the only road to knowledge. He therefore rejects traditional religion with all its dogmas and doctrines as decisively as Dewey, and

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(1) Ibid., p. 633. (2) Ibid., p. 620.

(3) Ibid., p. 620-621. The attitude of Santayana to religion might be suggested as an example of what Bewkes has in mind.

for the same reasons. Not only does traditional religion consist of a set of beliefs inconsistent with the results of modern scientific investigations, beliefs that cannot be verified under experimental conditions, but it has also proved a serious obstacle to moral progress. Being concerned with values which man esteems, it is innately conservative, and by hypostatizing those values in a supernatural Being it has introduced a cleavage into the conception of life which obscures and confuses all important problems. (1) The spiritual is attached to the supernatural and consequently the natural is emptied of all meaning and significance. Moreover religion is accused of making men slavish by setting up fixed codes of morals for reverence and obedience, and of hindering social reform by diverting attention from the duties of the present to the future joys of heaven. (2) It is a mistake to think that religion springs from man's sense of communion with superhuman or supernatural beings or powers; this is simply a convenient way that " the old world view " had of explaining all the "really significant experiences of life". "Religion is the quest for the largest and fullest satisfaction of felt wants." (3) Belief in gods arose through the transfer of attention from ends to means. Primitive man desired certain goods, and he also had "sacred objects" upon which he thought those goods depended. Ames asserts that in the course of time "these sacred objects came to be regarded as the sources and ends of existence", and thus attention was diverted from the ends desired to the gods

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Religion, pp. 64-65. (2) Ibid., pp. 92-94.

(3) Ibid., pp. 5, 9.

who were believed able to fulfill them. (1) That is to say, Ames argues that the essence of religion is the search for the satisfaction of felt needs, and the urge towards the realization of values; belief in divine beings is purely adventitious. It follows therefore that religion can discard everything which stems from the primitive belief in the supernatural, accept wholeheartedly the results and methods of modern science, and still fill the essential place in human life which it has always filled.

The function of religion is to aid man in the adaptation of his environment to his needs; to aid in the establishment of more harmonious human relations; and to help man feel a part of a vast cosmic process. Once released from its absorption in the worship of the Supernatural, religion would be free to turn to these practical tasks, and modern science, in alliance with such a religion, would have an opportunity to prove its serviceableness to spiritual ends. (2) Modern science has great achievements to its credit, but Ames recognizes clearly that unless the power that modern science puts into our hands is guided and controlled by moral and spiritual ends we have no guaranty as to how it will be used. But if modern science is dependent upon religion for the values and ends which alone can give significance to the scientific technique, it is also true that religion is dependent upon science to translate its ideals into actuality, otherwise "religion would be as helpless still as it was in the days when it had no other means than magic and incantation for its ends". (3) Religion and

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(1) Ibid., pp. 11-13. (2) Ibid., p. 66.
(3) Ibid., pp. 67, 78.

science, therefore, are to be partners in the building of a brave new world, and in the creation of a finer race of beings to inhabit that world. Each needs the other; "neither one is complete in itself". (1)

But because Ames thinks of religion as supplying the ideal ends and science the technique, it would be wrong to assume that he looks upon these as separate fields of experience. "It would be truer to regard science as the method of all possible knowledge, and religion as one of the subjects to which it may be applied". (2) For Ames, therefore, there is no conflict between religion and science. Conflict has arisen only through the dogmatism of religion regarding facts or practical ends, or because religion is thought of in terms of outworn scientific concepts. (3)

Like Dewey, Ames finds it possible to adapt much of the traditional language of religion to his own purpose. In a sense one might say that faith is the key word in the pragmatist interpretation of religion. It is not trust in a beneficient Deity, however, but the plunge into the unknown in the hope and expectation of finding the solution of a problem. When one takes the plunge, the waters bear one up, and the meaning emerges. Ames uses the word "Providence" to express his belief that the values and ends which we project upon the environment take hold and find lodgment there. "This forward thrust of every deed into an unknown and inexhaustible future calls for faith, and for a certain commitment to the nature of the world, to what may be meant by the providence of

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(1) Ibid., p. 67. (2) Ibid., p. 74.

(3) Ibid., p. 72.

God". (1) Ames uses the word "God" more freely than Dewey and in a rather different sense. Afetr examining the idea in the light of its history, and in terms of social psychology, he concludes that "God is thus shown to be the Spirit of a people, and in so far as there is a world of humanity, God is the Spirit of the world". (2) He illustrates his meaning by reference to the way in which Americans have hypostatized "Uncle Sam" as a symbol of their country, and to the love and loyalty shown by college men towards their "Alma Mater", and he adds: "No doubt the reality of God is greater but it is of this kind". (3) "We love God as surely and as intelligently as we love our country or our Alma Mater, but with deeper and more consummate affection". (4)

A more extended consideration of Ames' use of the word "God" will reveal more clearly wherein he considers the significant value of the religious outlook to lie. Since man's development as a person depends upon creative interaction with his environment, physical and social, it is essential that he should relate himself rightly to this environment. And it is through his powers of generalization and imagination that he does succeed in relating himself to these larger wholes. "God" stands for the largest and widest relation in which man conceives himself to stand; the concept of God is therefore extremely valuable for the progress of the self towards more complete self-realization. "In religion the self stands in relation to the largest whole, to the universe, to God . . . The whole meaning and urge of life then enters into the Other . . . It is not a

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(1) Ibid., p. 98. (2) Ibid., p. 132. (3) Ibid., p. 133. (4) Ibid., p. 145.

figment or an illusion any more than the state or the family is an illusion . . . Philosophy calls it the Universal or the Absolute; Science designates it as Nature or Life; Religion names it God. Psychologically it belongs to the inescapable sense of the self and the other." (1)

From another point of view God is idealized reality. Man has discovered certain values such as order, intelligence, and love. These he identifies with reality, and he is justified in so doing because "only by them is sanity and achievement possible", and because "a positive and pleasurable emotional tone" goes along with them. (2) We have seen that Dewey acknowledges the claim upon our lives exerted by values and ideal ends. Ames goes further and asserts that "the impulses and desires of the hearts of men on behalf of moral ideals are evidences of the presence of God and of the will of God". (3) One must be careful not to read into this statement the meaning that it might bear if it came from an idealist philosopher. "God is reality idealized and glorified with all the attributes of complete and flawless personality". (4) Such a "God" is quite frankly a projection of the ideals and values cherished by mankind, but these ideals and values are not mere projections of the individual consciousness; they are actually discovered or generated in the creative intercourse between man and his environment and therefore "God" is credited with objective existence of a sort. He lacks the existential

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(1) Ibid., p.145. (2) Ibid., p.157. (3) Ibid., pp. 158-159. (4) Ibid., pp. 161-162.

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status of the Supreme Being of Christian faith, but he shares in the assured reality and objective existence of the values and ideals of which he is the embodiment. (1)

It might be objected that Ames' retention of the term "God" is an unnecessary concession to tradition, and that his use of it is open to misunderstanding. It might even be claimed that such a radical reinterpretation of the meaning of the word is dishonest, since it cannot but suggest to ordinary folk the God of Christian faith. But Ames' defends his use of the word because of its utility in bodying forth the ideals and values which lay hold upon us and in surrounding them with the rich warmth and color of the emotional life. He argues further, as Dewey does, that his use of the word corresponds to an objective reality of which account must be taken. He quotes the verdict of Leuba: "I cannot bring myself to believe that divine beings, be they primitive gods or the Christian Father, have more than a subjective existence". Ames replies: "Evidently this conclusion is based upon the idea that God must be conceived as a metaphysical being of the anthropomorphic type. It does not apply to the conception of God as experienced reality, taken in a socialized way . . ." (2) God stands for the total reality towards which man must adjust himself and in proper relation to which he finds his truest and richest life. He represents "the order of nature including man and all the processes of an aspiring social life". (3)

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(1) Ibid., p. 174. (2) Ibid., p. 176. But is Ames' conception of God any the less "anthropomorphic" because it is "taken in a socialized way"? Or any the less "metaphysical" because described as "experienced reality"?
(3) Ibid., p. 177.

What Ames understand by "God" and the manner in which he justifies his belief in the objectivity of his God is well summarized in these two sentences. "The term God expresses order and purpose and moral values in the great reality which we call Life or the World. Reality conceived as friendly, as furnishing support for man's existence and for the realization of ideal ends, is God". (1)

We must leave consideration of the adequacy of this conception of God to a later chapter. We offer only two comments at this time. Ames does not go beyond Dewey; he makes explicity what in Dewey is more or less implicit. But both thinkers have a great deal more to say about values and ideal ends than their naturalistic assumptions would appear to justify. One wonders whether their position is really tenable. Perhaps it is a kind of half-way house from which they must advance to a more definitely theistic position or else retreat to a more frankly naturalistic account of value judgments and moral obligation. They pay high tribute to the claim of values and ideal ends upon us, but does their implied metaphysic render the claim intelligible?

Whatever be our answer to that question, we must acknowledge positive religious value in the pragmatist conception of religion. The emphasis is on the practical; religion is directly related to the needs of personal and social life. There is an appeal to the spirit of adventure and a sphere for creative activity and cooperation. The pragmatist takes the moral struggle seriously; life is a battleground and not a puppet show. And any religion which

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(1) Ibid., p. 178.

is to prove worthy of the acceptance of modern man must do justice to these factors. It remains to be seen, however, whether pragmatism, in laying emphasis exclusively upon these factors, has not ignored others equally vital to the religious interest.

As regards our special problem, the relation of religion to science, we may note that while for pragmatists there is no conflict, nevertheless, for those who do not accept the pragmatist solution, the problem is brought into the sharpest possible focus by the nature of the "solution" offered. The solution rests upon the assumption that the method of experimental science is the method of all possible knowledge. If this assumption is false, the "solution" falls to the ground. The vital question which arises from the pragmatist conception of religion is whether the claim made for scientific method is well founded. Bewkes sums the matter up very well: "The problems raised by modern science did not result in a simple conflict between science and religion; rather, they resulted in the conflict among various methods of arriving at beliefs and of testing their truth". (1) This question, also, must engage our attention in a later chapter.

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(1) E. G. Bewkes: Op. cit., p. 614.

CHAPTER 3

R E A L I S M

While Pragmatism is captivated by the possibilities of scientific method when applied to the solution of concrete problems and is convinced that it must be the main function of philosophy to make use of this method in subduing the environment to man's needs and in solving urgent social problems, Realism is impressed with the apparently secure results of scientific investigation and is convinced that upon these scientific findings it is possible to build a world view which will avoid the transcendental flights of Idealist metaphysics.

Unlike pragmatist, realism believes that it is both possible and desirable to frame a consistent picture of reality, but, unlike idealism, realism will not admit the primacy of mind. Reality is what it is independently of being known. (1)

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(1) "The effort of the empirical method in metaphysics is seriously and persistently to treat minds as one among the many forms of finite existence, having no privelege among them except as it claims such from its greater perfection of development. Should enquiry prove that the cognitive faculty is unique, improbable as such a result might seem, it would have to be accepted faithfully and harmonized with the remainder of the scheme. But prima facie there is no warrant for the assumption, still less for the dogma, that because all experience implies a mind, that which is experienced owes its being and its qualities to mind. Minds are but the most gifted members known to us in a democracy of things". S. Alexander: Space, Time, and Deity, Vol. I, p. 6.

Philosophically, modern realists are the successors to the nineteenth century materialists and some members of the school, while rejecting the strict mechanical determinism of the older scheme, do not hesitate to describe themselves as such.)1) Roy Wood Sellars rejects what he calls "reductive naturalism" because it leaves no room for values; reductive naturalism implies the mechanical ideal which, he says, "was a hasty dogma set up in opposition to final causes". (2) But Sellars does hold that physical systems are ultimate. He stresses the importance of organization in nature - organization is the "go" of a system and nature is intrinsically dynamic - and asserts that "causal uniformity reflects causality" and causality if the "onward go" of physical systems. Realists are, therefore, thoroughgoing naturalists in the sense that nature is, for them, a completed and self-explanatory system, and that within the system of nature physical causation rather than conscious spirit is the determinative factor. Realists also tend to be monistic, in the sense that they conceive of reality as composed, ultimately of one kind of "stuff" or one order of "events". (3)

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(1) Cf. William Savery: "The fundamental tenet of the materialistic tradition is that nature is, for the most part unconscious (in the widest sense of that word) and that consciousness (in the narrow sense of objective reference) awareness, feelings, emotions, desires - in a word what are called psychical states - are on a relatively small scale and are derived in some sense, emergent or other". (The Philosophy of John Dewey, p.512.) Savery, however, while claiming Dewey for the materialistic tradition, will not admit Alexander - "Alexander's orthogenic nisus makes his universe too heaven-bent to be regarded as purely naturalistic. The nisus is an attenuated Jehovah". (Ibid., p. 499n.)

(2) Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 275. Sellars' "reductive naturalism" would seem to correspond to what Pringle-Pattison calls "the lower naturalism". (The Idea of God, p. 90

For the realist, the world which science studies is there to be known prior to the activity of the knowing mind. It is revealed to us through sense perception, for sense perception, as Sellars puts it, "is revelatory of nature and the proper use of it enables us to penetrate into the characteristics of the world". (1) In knowing we do not begin (as Hume and Kant assumed) with a chaos of sensations but with a patterned field, and realists hold that the pattern is controlled in us by the actual arrangement of the stimuli coming to us from physical reality and not by the activity of mind. Mind is a form of interaction between the organism and its environment. (2) Through response to stimuli coming from the environment, the brain and nervous system take on a certain pattern, and this pattern modifies other stimuli coming from the environment to the organism and is in turn modified by them. The whole process is completely explicable

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(1) Op. cit., p. 273. Pragmatists define perception as a sign of what to do and where to go, and therefore do not share the realists' interest in metaphysics. The exposition of the realist theory of knowledge in this paragraph draws largely on Sellars.

(2) Alexander's word is "compresence".

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(3) Most realists describe themselves as "neutral monists", i.e. neither material nor mental events are ultimate, but each is the expression of some underlying reality. Dewey is also a neutralist. "Nothing," he writes, "but unfamiliarity stands in the way of thinking of both mind and matter as different characters of natural events, in which matter expresses their sequential order, and mind the order of their meanings in their logical connections and dependencies". Experience and Nature, p. 74.

in physiological and biological terms. (1) Where the interactivity of the organism and the environment does not result in overt action we have "attention", "apprehension", "awareness"; all forms of mental imagery, including concepts and other ideal forms, are reducible to highly refined action-tendencies. Conceptual thinking develops as the mind learns how to use "internal substitutes" for the external object. Knowing is therefore a mediated process in which the initiative lies with physical reality. Knowing, says Sellars, is a way of looking at objects through the windows of ideas; it is sui generis; there are no physical analogies to it. (2) If the question is asked whether the characters held before the mind as predicates resemble the qualities of the object, Sellars answers, "Yes and no". Yes, because the structure conceived in the mind does correspondend to the structure of the object; no, because qualities fall away as the mind's appreciation of structure and relation increases. Sellars warns, however, that we must not confuse characteristics of the object with the old notion of substance with qualities adhering to it; the characteristics reveal the nature of the physical system known.

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(1) "What do we know from outside of that pulsing integrated system, the brain? We can guess, at most, about the action-tendencies which are built up within it under tensions and which discharge into the motor-nerves and thence into the muscles. We know that past experience is somehow conserved in this delicate organization and past facilities preserved. The brain in its organic setting of muscle and gland is the mind". (Sellars; Op. cit., p. 278.) Sellars asks what we know of the brain from the outside. One might suggest that we know still less from the inside.

(2) Ibid., p. 273.

Accepting the fact that man can know his world, that the world exists independently of his knowing, and that it is a world of physical reality, one may next ask what it is that we know about the world. The answer is: "Exactly what science has worked out".(1) We turn therefore to the scientific account of the world. And here we run into an initial difficulty, for we are told the scientific view of the world is not picturable. One imagines that every one had a mental picture of the old mechanical universe based upon Newtonian physics. It was a picture of physical particles being pushed and pulled around by "forces" conceived anthropomorphically after the analogy of muscular activity. But now, the solid particles have been replaced by wave radiations or electric charges; the universal reign of law (2) by the law of statistical averages; and the idea of an absolute three dimensional space by that of a four dimensional space-time continuum. One gathers that the universe of modern physical science is a rather complicated system of differential equations. But although "the commonplace view of the world is almost unrecognizable in the scientific view", the scientists claim "that it is the common element abstracted from the experiences of individuals in all variety of physical circumstances". (3) Eddington refers to the spiritual phenomenon of consciousness as "the one thing of which our knowledge is immediate and unchallengeable";

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(1) Sellars: Op. cit., p.

(2) An anthropomorphic idea if there ever was one! "The use of the term 'law' to express the regularity of natural phenomena is clearly reminiscent of the 'law and order' decreed and enforced by a sovereign power in society". A. Wolf: An Outline of Modern Knowledge, p. 5.

(3) Sir Arthur Eddington: "The Domain of Physical Science", in Science, Religion, and Reality, (ed. J. Needham) p. 196.

then he adds: "But physics in alliance with common sense brings before us a different kind of reality - a world of matter and electricity, space and motion, which seems to us even more real because it is so clear cut, accurately described, governed by precise and unfailing laws". (1) He also makes it quite clear why the reality which physics brings before us seems so real; it is because physics deliberately abstracts from the empirical world exactly those aspects of it which can be measured accurately by precision instruments and reduced to mathematical formulae. "Our discussion has prepared us to admit that physics (or exact sciences) can only take within its scope certain aspects of the external world; and that there remain other aspects which have been excluded, not because they are of less importance, but because they have not the specialized property of measurability". (2) As an illustration Eddington brings in his well known reference to the elephant and the grassy slope. Physics is not interested in the elephant but only in his weight - two tons; nor in the grassy slope but in the angle - 60 degrees. "leaving out all aesthetic, ethical, or spiritual aspects of our environment, we are faced with qualities such as massiveness, substantiality, extension, duration, which are supposed to belong to the domain of physics. In a sense they do belong, but physics is not in a position to handle them directly . . . And so in its actual procedure physics studies not these actual qualities, but pointer readings which we can observe . . . our exact knowledge is of the pointer readings, not of the qualities. The former have as much resemblance to the latter as a

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(1) Ibid., p. 202. (2) Ibid., p. 203.

telephone number has to a subscriber." (1) What exact science gives us as knowledge of our world is, therefore, a "schedule of pointer readings".

This conception of scientific procedure, as Eddington points our, "transforms our view of the nature and status of scientific knowledge in a fundamental way. Until recently physicists took it for granted that they had knowledge of the entities dealt with; which was of a much more intimate character; and the difficulty which many of them find even now in accepting the theory of relativity arises from an unwillingness to give up those intuitions or traditions as to the intrinsic nature of space, time, matter, and force, and substitute for them a knowledge expressible in terms of the readings of measuring instruments." (2)

But what is the relation of the physicists' mathematical construct to the world of every day experience? For Eddington, as we have seen (3), it is a purely abstract construction which symbolizes an unknown and inscrutable absolute behind phenomena. Mind is charged with responsibility for the common sense world. (4) Bertrand Russell wrestles with the problem in his Analysis of Matter, and his language suggests that the physicists' elaborate construct may be purely formal. "The laws of physics are believed to be approximately true, although they are not

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(1) Ibid., p. 199.

(2) Identid. Eddington adds: "In considering the relations of science and religion it is a very relevant fact that physics is now abandoning all claim to a type of knowledge which it formerly asserted without hesitation". (Ibid., loc. cit.) This suggests that Eddington does not regard the physicists' knowledge as any more real than other forms of knowledge.

(3) Supra, p. 19. (4) Op. cit., p. 209 seq.

logically necessary; the evidence for them is empirical. All empirical evidence consists, in the last analysis, of perceptions; thus the world of physics must be, in some sense, continuous with the world of our perceptions, since it is the latter that supplies the evidence for the laws of physics." (1) In many places in his writings Russell admits the plausibility of Berkeleyan idealism but he rejects it because he thinks it involves solipsism. (2) However, his dualistic theory of knowledge compells him to affirm that all we know for sure is what is in our own heads: "whoever accepts the causal theory of perception is compelled to conclude that the percepts are in our heads, for they come at the end of a causal chain of physical events leading spatially, from the object to the brain of the percipient . ".(3) The causal theory of perception, therefore, is our guarantee that the world of physics is, "in some sense", continuous with the empirical world, and therefore the physicists' knowledge is, in some sense, knowledge of the empirical world. There is, however, some knowledge of the world which physics does not give us, for, says Russell, "a blind man could know the whole of physics". (4) "Thus the knowledge which other men have and he has not is not a part of physics" (5) However, this other knowledge is not very important; it turns out to be purely subjective. "As regards the world in general, both physical and mental, everything that we know of its intrinsic character is derived from the mental side, and almost everything that we know of its causal laws is derived from the physical side". (6)

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(1) The Analysis of Matter, p. 6. (2) Ibid., p. 387-388. Cf. Religion and Science, pp. 219-22.
(3) The Analysis of Matter, p. 319. (4) and (5) Ibid., p. 389.
(6) Ibid., p. 402.

From this we might gather that knowledge of the world's intrinsic character, which "is derived from the mental side", is at least as important as the knowledge of causal laws which is derived from physics. But Russell has decided that " from the standpoint of philosophy the distinction between physical and mental is superficial and unreal", so it would seem to follow the only knowledge we can claim is the knowledge of mathematical relations. (1) Sellars, on the other hand, is more positive that the physicists' world is the real world and that it is continuous with the world of sense perception. Its reality can be established, he claims, by four tests; the consilience of established fact, the logical coherence of ideas, the agreement of investigators, and its usefulness in providing guidance and control over nature. (2) Sellars, moreover, does not dismiss our non-scientific knowledge as summarily as Russell. He does not believe that secondary qualities should be regarded as purely subjective, or that there is no room in naturalistic philosophy for values. We shall therefore turn to his theory of value. (3)

Sellars sharply distinguishes value judgments from cognitive judgments. At the level of practical life, value-predicates inter-mingle with descriptive-predicates, but as

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(1) Ibid., p. 402. It seems a strange contradiction in Russell's philosophy that he should deny any direct knowledge of material objects and yet be such an uncompromising materialist. Cf. The Analysis of Mind, p. 308. "All our data , both in physics and psychology, are subject to psychological causal laws; but physical causal laws, strictly speaking, can only be stated in terms of matter, which is both inferred and constructed, never a datum. In this respect psychology is nearer to what actually is". And yet in the Preface he had said that the permanent value in behaviorism was the "feeling that physics is the most fundamental science . ."

(2) Op. cit., p. 273.

(3) Op. cit., pp. 282 - 285.

the ideal of pure cognition arises it becomes a desideratum to abstract from the valuational aspects in order to see the object as it really is apart from our practical interest in it. In ordinary life we are not really concerned to know the object as it is; we are interested in the way it bears upon our lives and in the use we can make of it. The scientific ideal, however, is to become "spectators"; to attain to pure cognition. Value-predicates, therefore, are objective in the sense that they are interpretations of objects, but they are not cognitional. "They make explicit what the object means to our lives and not what the object is in itself". (1) For our human purposes, that is to say, we are interested in objects as they can be related to our interests, our desires, and our purposes. Interpreting them thus, they come to have value-meanings for us as distinguished from the descriptive-meanings explicit in pure cognition. What we call values are the result of a subjective interpretation put upon objects by the desires and needs of the human organism. In other words, the world of everyday experience is a subjective construction, and it is what it is for us precisely because of the valuational aspect from which the scientist, in his concentration on pure cognition, has abstracted.

In spite of his admission that values are a subjective contribution to the interpretation of physical reality, Sellars defends their objectivity. The existential status of values, we are told, is that of consciousness itself. (2)

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(1) Ibid., p. 283. (2) Ibid., p. 278. Consciousness is defined as the "qualitative web of events intrinsic to the operations of the brain-mind."

They get a grip on reality by the part they play in our volitional decisions. Apart from the self values are abstractions. The concrete agent is the self and the values are expressions of the self and hence inevitably pass over into action. According to Sellars, it is only " those who look upon values as transcendent and eternal who find the matter of their efficacy puzzling". They must postulate a power in values to attract our souls. But, he asks, is not this metaphor? Is not self-realization the thing? "Are we not integrations of tendencies so that attraction expresses the stirring of some impulse in ourselves when exposed to stimuli interpreted to our souls by our minds?" (1)

There is a wide difference of opinion among realists on this question. Some of them do not attempt to defend the objectivity of values. They are content to say that values are human values, they are here and we must make the most of them; but we must not look for cosmic sympathy or support - that is wishful thinking. (2) Other realists go further than Sellars

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(1) Ibid., p. 285.

(2) "Let us admit that, in the world we know, there are many things that would be better otherwise, and that the ideals to which we do and must adhere are not realized in the realm of matter. Let us preserve our respect for truth, for beauty, for the ideal of perfection which life does not permit us to attain, though none of these things meet with the approval of the unconscious universe . ." Bertrand Russell: "A Free Man's Worship", Mysticism and Logic, Chap. II. When Russell wrote his Problems of Philosophy he declared his belief in the objectivity of moral values, but the belief has been entirely surrendered. Russell now, it appears, would not stand by his declarations in the famous essay from which I have quoted. "Truth" is what we have been conditioned to believe, and "good" is what we have been conditioned to approve. Value judgments have no objective reference; they are expressions of personal likes and dislikes. "The theory which I have been advocating . . consists in maintaining that, if two men differ about values, there is not a disagreement as to any kind of truth, but a difference of taste". Russell: Religion and Science, pp. 237-238. Cf. p. 243.

in maintaining the objectivity of values. (1) Santayana posits a "realm of essence" inhabited by values and other universals, and this belief has been taken over by William Pepperell Montague. (2) The tendency among realists seems to be to maintain that, in some sense, values are objective. (3)

We shall now proceed to sketch the outline of a philosophic system formulated on the basis of "what science has worked out". It is that of Samuel Alexander and has been hailed as possessing " the great merit of unusual harmony with the broad results of modern science and with the whole spirit of science". (4) The title of the work in which his philosophy is elaborated, Space, Time, and Deity, indicates the vast sweep of Alexander's thought. Beginning with Space-Time and utilizing the category of "emergence", he pictures an evolving universe straining towards

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(1) Cf. Alban G. Widgery: "The thoroughgoing realist will be realistic in all directions, with regard to the aesthetic, the moral, the religious, as all else. The judgment, 'This statue is beautiful', qualifies the object. It does not simply mean, on the part of the person making it, 'I like this statue', which is a statement about the person himself. "Religious Realism and the Empirical Facts of Religion", in Religious Realism, pp. 106-107. (ed. D.C.Macintosh)

(2) "Now if we turn from existence to subsistence and survey that Realm of Essence which has been discovered by Plato . . and gloriously proclaimed in all its dimensions by Santayana, we find, I think, traces of that same principle of fecundity, self-increase or growth to a maximum which we postulated at the core of the naturally existing world of matter".(W.P.Montague: "The Trinity" in Religious Realism, p. 498.) This doctrine of "subsistence" has been described as "little more than a verbal trick to obtain the transcendental status of universal without facing its difficulties, a kind of metaphysical representation without taxation". Dorothy M. Emmet: Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, pp. 138-139.

(3) Cf. A.K. Rogers' contribution to Religious Realism entitled "Is Religion Important". It is a penetrating criticism of the scepticism and relativism of Walter Lippman's Preface to Morals.

(4) By A. Wolf in An Outline of Modern Knowledge, p.579.

the birth of deity. (1) Space-Time is the stuff of which all matter and all things are specifications. All existents are bits, or modes, of space-time. Since time is not static but dynamic, space-time is the same as pure motion. To describe how this primary reality transforms itself into the familiar world of our experience, Alexander resorts to metaphor. Space-Time is a womb or matrix which breaks up into finites of ever-increasing complexity. Within the whole of space-time, point instants may be distinguished; these are the elementary events. Space-Time also possesses categorial characteristics which subsequently become characters of all existents. The point-instants break out from the womb of space-time and combine into many different configurations; when these become sufficiently complex the quality of materiality emerges. In this way matter is generated. A new emergent appears as space-time resolves itself into finites of ever increasing complexity. Under certain conditions such qualities as color emerge. Under certain further conditions life emerges. And under certain further conditions consciousness emerges as an additional quality of living organisms. Consciousness is the highest emergent thus far to appear, but it is reasonable to suppose that there are higher existents to break forth from the womb of space-time. The next highest, towards the production of which the universe is now straining, Alexander calls deity. "Deity is the next higher empirical quality to the highest we know . . . at any level of existence there is a

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(1) We follow Alexander in not capitalizing this word.

next higher empirical quality which stands towards the lower quality as deity stands towards mind". Space-Time is endowed with certain "categorial" or primary characteristics such as existence, relation, order, etc.; when matter emerges it is endowed with secondary characters; when mind emerges the tertiary characters emerge with it. (1) What the quality of deity will be we cannot tell, " for we can neither enjoy it nor still less contemplate it". (2) When deity emerges it will no longer be deity, for deity is " a variable quality, and as the world grows in time, deity changes with it. On each level a new quality looms ahead, awfully, which plays to it the part of deity". (3)

Accepting the ultimate existents into which physics has analysed the world as the raw material of the universe, Alexander thus strives to describe how the empirical may be conceived as having come into being. But how does he find a place for religion? He faces the question very fairly, acknowledging that the religious sentiment is a factor which an empirical philosophy cannot ignore. Why, he asks, should we

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(1) Thus secondary qualities are characteristics of physical reality while values are the "creations of mind". They result from the com-presence of mind and object.

(2) Space, Time, and Deity, p. 345. "Enjoyment" is a relation between an existent and its highest quality; "contemplation" is a relation between an existent and its lower qualities. Thus, a man perceiving a body, say his own, "enjoys" (erlebt) the act of perceiving, but "contemplates" his body.

(3) Ibid., p. 348.

seek to go beyond Space-Time? Why not identify God with Space-Time? His answer is that no one could worship Space-Time. This consideration would be irrelevant, however, if philosophy were forced to the conclusion that God is nothing but Space-Time. But then philosophy would be open to the grave objection that it had left "one portion of human experience suspended without attachment to the world of truth". To identify God with Space-Time, moreover, is to neglect "the development within Space-Time of the series of empirical qualities in their increasing grades of perfection". (1) Alexander also acknowledges the objective reference implicit in the religious attitude; he recognizes that religion is not the projection of our wishful thinking upon the universe but a response to an objective Reality. "The religious appetite, like the comparable appetite for food, does not create its object but discovers it".(2) Alexander discovers that in the universe which answers to the quality of deity (3), and this is the service which metaphysics renders to religion. (4) But no proof of the existence of a metaphysical God would make him worshipful "were the passion for God not already lit", and this is the service which religion renders to metaphysics. (5)

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(1) Ibid., p. 353. This is a most significant admission and one which most realists do not follow Alexander in making.

(2) Ibid., p. 374. The comparison may be odious, but at least Alexander recognizes that the religious sentiment is a response to the Given; it is not something man "grows out of the depths of his own life", as Ames maintains. (Religion, p.15)

(3) ". . from the metaphysical approach, God must be defined as the being, if any, which possesses deity or the divine quality . ." (p. 342) But Alexander insists that we cannot know the quality of deity since it has not yet emerged. Presumably we know that it is worshipful.

(4) "Religion leans on metaphysics for the justification of its indefeasible conviction of the reality of its object". Ibid.,p.342.

(5) "Philosophy leans on religion to justify it in calling the possessor of deity by the religious name of God". Ibid., p. 343.

Alexander's God is not the creator. It is Space-Time that is properly described as the creator. (1) "God himself, that is the universe as tending to deity, is creative only of deity". (2) Alexander maintains that this conception of God coincides with the Object of religious worship and thus answers to the needs of the religious spirit. Worship involves an attitude of reverence and awe, and this attitude is evoked in us by the universe in virtue of the fact that it possesses a nisus towards perfection. (3) Deity is thus the something evermore about to be, but God as the whole universe tending towards the production of deity exists always. And it is this which accounts for the human longing for God and for communion with him. It is the universe with its nisus that stirs this longing in us. Practical religion consists in doing our part to advance the progress of the world towards deity by helping the good to triumph over evil in human affairs.

Unquestionably, as we have already indicated, there is a genuine religious feeling in this philosophic system as worked out by Alexander. Like the pragmatist, he leaves us with an

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(1) "Space-Time itself, by virtue of its own nisus, elaborates without forethought a 'hierarchy of ministration' which if it were produced by mind would imply a vast and all-wise forethought or providence." Ibid., p. 413.

(2) Ibid., p. 398. "As an actual existent, God is the infinite world with its nisus towards deity, or to adapt a phrase of Leibnitz, as big or in travail with deity". Ibid., p. 353.

(3) Alexander points out that if deity is only in process of realization, i.e. is still in the future, it might be asked how it could influence us. His answer is that "the future is the causal outcome of the present". Ibid., p. 379.

unfinished world and calls us to cooperate with the nisus in the universe which is straining towards the production of higher grades of perfection. But, unlike the pragmatist, he does not regard the significance of religion as exhausted in the moral struggle but makes room for the religious attitudes of worship and contemplation. We do not intend to offer any detailed criticism at this point, but we shall, for purposes of comparison, make some reference to the views of other realist philosophers on the subject of religion.

In connection with values we pointed out that the tendency among realists is to defend the objectivity of values. Many of them go further and ask if we are not justified in positing, as Alexander does, " an upward tending power in nature " (1) to account for the presence and persistence of values. It is agreed that the primary interest of religion is in the relation of values to reality, that "the central note of religion is the need man has of finding the human values that particularly appeal to him rooted in the more ultimate structure of the universe".(2) How far human beings are justified in making this venture of faith is a matter of dispute. It depends upon the extent to which the particular philosopher is under the dominance of materialistic conceptions of reality.(3) Arthur Kenyon

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(1) The phrase is Montague's. Cf. Belief Unbound, p. 97.

(2) A. K. Rogers: Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II, p.230.

(3) "The chief defect of modern Realisms is their narrowness. There are forms of Realism which are simply naturalistic; treating the physical as though the only reality". A. G. Widgery: Op. cit., p. 106.

Rogers has recorded his conviction that "any wholehearted exercise of the practical intelligence in terms of an ideal must needs be backed by a belief, or at least a hope, that the universe is friendly to man and ready to meet him half-way". (1) The "subtler values", he says, are "precarious", "and in proportion as one's intelligence is realistic it is likely that as he looks about him he will be tempted to doubt whether natural forces, and in particular the forces that lie in human nature itself, are not too strong for those incipient strivings after a more humane and lovelier career for man, unless we can be permitted to trust that something not ourselves is at work to supplement human efforts". (2) And his conclusion is that this faith justifies itself in practice and must be recognized not as sentimental bravado, or a forlorn hope inspired by the courage of despair, but as the outgrowth of confidence that the world is so framed as to put within our reach the goal which we recognize as desirable. (3)

Another realist who have written a good deal on the subject of religion is William Pepperell Montague. Religion for him involves the "acceptance neither of a primitive absurdity nor of a sophisticated truism (4), but of a momentous

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(1) Op. cit., p. 233. (2) Identem

(3) Ibid., pp. 234-235.

(4) "Primitve absurdity" seems to refer to belief in the Supernatural, and "sophisticated truism" to the suggestion made by pragmatists and some realists that an adequate definition of religion is "faith in values". The following words by Eustace Haydon may be compared with Montague's rejection of a "sophisticated truism". "To be called an atheist . . has now become meaningless. If to live in dependence upon the cosmic and social environment for the achievement of our values is to have a belief in God, then there are no atheists, for we can live in no other way". This has particular reference to attempts such as Wieman's to prove God's existence "by definition" (his own phrase) which simply means identifying God with something the existence of which almost no one has ever thought

possibility - the possibility namely that what is highest in spirit is also deepest in nature, that the ideal and the real are at least to some extent identified, not merely evanescently in our own lives but enduringly in the universe itself. If this possibility were an actuality, if there truly were at the heart of nature something akin to us, a conserver and increaser of values, and if we could not only know this and act upon it, but really feel it, life would suddenly become radiant." (1) Montague finds materialism unacceptable because the evolutionary process cannot be attributed to Chance. (2) There must be some upward urge,

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(1) Belief Unbound, pp. 6-7. To judge from their writings Christian believers have always thought that this was what religion was. And some unbelievers have thought so too. Bertrand Russell in his Philosophical Essays (1910) admits that the view of life "which we have been accustomed to regard as specifically religious" is the view that "in some hidden manner the world of fact is really harmonious with the world of values". And in an article in the Hibbert Journal a year later he puts forward the view that there is a higher religion, viz. a worship of our ideals conceived merely as ideal, and an "impartial" worship of the real order, considered merely as an existent. "The two worships subsist side by side without any dogma; the one involving the goodness but not the existence of its object, the other involving the existence, but not the goodness of its object". (Quotations from Russell cited by J. Baillie: The Interpretation of Religion, pp. 323-324.)

(2) By "Chance" Montague means the exclusion of all causality save that recognized by physics. Ibid., pp. 72-73.

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of denying. Thus "it all becomes a fruitless process by which we discover nothing about reality, except that something familiar may be called by a name which we and others had always used with a different meaning - the proverbial giving of a stone to those who are asking for bread". D. C. Macintosh: "Experimental Realism in Religion", in Religious Realism, p. 398. (Quotation from Haydon cited ad loc.)

a wholly imanent and limited diety to account for such elements of order and goodness as we find in the universe. (1) He defines God as " an all-inclusive cosmic life, whose will to good is single, pure, finite, one force among many in that chaos of existence which God finds within himself and which is the world he would perfect . . " (2) There is a chance, he affirms, that such a God exists, and there is also a chance, however slight, of attaining union with the holy spirit of this Promethean God, a union which will make one's world radiant and one's life a high adventure". (3)

John Elof Boodin is another realistic thinker who finds a purely naturalistic philosophy inadequate. Writing of evolution he says that " for any advance to a higher level there must be what theology has called grace - the active presence of something higher in nature . . " (4) But Boodin

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(1) "There seemed to be too much of goodness and purposiveness in the world to be the outcome of blindly or mechanistically determined particles; but also too much evil and inconsequentiality to be compatible with any power at once omnipotent and benign. There must be a God, a force or trend upwards, to account for the more than casual amount of goodness in existence, and there must be a tremendous limitation in such a power to account for the evil." W. P. Montague: Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 148.

(2) Belief Unbound, p. 91.

(3) Ibid., pp. 97-98.

(4) "God and the Cosmos" in Religious Realism, p. 486.

is not satisfied with a wholly immanent diety. He recognizes that while the human soul craves the conception of a God who is perfect and eternal, the highest religious consciousness has conceived of God as entering into the process of history and sharing the life of man. (1) "We cannot hope to reconcile these two needs of the human mind. But where our human insight fails, we must hold fast to what is of ultimate importance for our living. If this seems unsatisfactory to the rational consciousness, we may learn modesty from the procedure of science. The scientific mind does not hesitate to work with irreconcilable conceptions if they seem to be required by experience".(2) There are other realists whom we might quote, but enough has been quoted already to show that Alexander is not alone in recognizing the importance of religion and in seeking to find a real place for it in his

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(1) Boodin says of Christianity that its "intuition has been sound, but its theology has been intellectualistic and barren".(Ibid., p. 490) It would be interesting to know what theology he has in mind. He uses the doctrine of the Trinity as an example, and remarks; "It is no wonder that such abstract logic has left the human heart cold". But probably no contemporary theologian would recognize his interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity. So far from being an exercise in abstract logic it is generally affirmed that the doctrine of the Trinity grows out of the Christian experience of God as expressed in the Apostolic Benediction, II Corinthians, XIII, 13. Cf. A.E.Garvie: The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead; L. Hodgson: The Doctrine of the Trinity.

(2) J. E. Boodin: Op. cit., p. 488-489.

philosophy. (1)

None of these other thinkers, however, has followed Alexander in putting deity at the end of the cosmic process. Nor are they altogether satisfied with an impersonal nisus. D. C. Macintosh describes Alexander's nisus as unscientific and fantastic. "What might have been asserted with scientific justification was the existence of a nisus

towards a divine humanity, i.e. toward a humanity with divine qualities in the character of the individual and of society ('the Kingdom of God')." (2) Boodin makes no direct reference to Alexander, but he does definitely dissociate himself from any conception of an evolving deity. "There can be no evolution of God, for in that case there can be no guidance, no impetus to higher evolution. God must therefore, it seems, be transcendent in the world and perfect in himself".(3) Alexander, himself, attributes to nisus results which, on his own admission, suggests the work of a vast and all-wise forethought or providence. His nisus, therefore, seems more than a blind urge, or unconscious process; Alexander has imported into it something of the capacity which we associate with conscious mind or spirit. Alexander's philosophy has certain affinities with that of Alfred North Whitehead, but their doctrines of God stand in the sharpest possible contrast. For Whitehead, God is the necessary metaphysical ground of all possibilities whatever. (4) We may note,

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(1) Cf. the contributions of Durant Drake and Morris R. Cohen to Contemporary American Philosophy. Both find it possible so to define the idea of God that they can confess their faith in Him. "God is not only an existence power but an ideal of holiness". (Cohen). " . . Intellectual honesty does not necessitate a rejection of the belief in God. . . I will say that in a very real sense I believe in God, both transcendent and immanent".

(2) Op. cit., p. 394. (3) Op. cit., p.489. (4) Emmet: Op. cit., p. 251.

therefore, that while modern realists, or, at least, a good many of them, are anxious to recognize the claims of religion, there is little unanimity among them on the subject.

There are still, however, a few tough-minded realists who feel bound to maintain the naturalistic point of view in its stark nakedness. They refuse to recognize any trace of of purpose in the universe, regard values as purely subjective, and are forced to conclude that religion is illusion from beginning to end. Russell is one of these. He will not hear of a cosmic purpose. The concept of "emergent evolution" seems to him merely a way of escape from determinism because it makes prediction impossible, and he will not accept it. "The argument, in any case, is extraordinarily thin". (1) As for those who think that the fact of evolution, culminating in self-conscious, moral beings, justifies the assumption of a cosmic purpose, his answer is - "Man, as a curious accident in a backwater, is intelligible: his mixture of virtues and vices is such as might be expected to result from a fortuitous origin. But only abysmal self-complacency can see in Man a reason which Omniscience could consider adequate as a motive for the Creator". (2) But Russell, as Rogers well says, "with his air of serene and somewhat intolerant finality might be impressive as a spokesman of science if that were really what he had a claim to be; he is much less impressive as spokesman of a particular and subtle brand of metaphysics whichbhas entered very recently the field of historic systems and which quite conceivably may in a few years be found to have

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(1) Religion and Science, p. 214.

(2) Ibid., p. 222. Cf. the whole chapter "Cosmic Purpose".

suffered the fate of its numerous predecessors . . . That the laws of science have as such no reference to human meanings is of course indisputable; but at least it still remains to show that the human mind is bound to stop with purely scientific formulations." (1) We may, therefore, safely leave Russell to his fellow realists. (2)

Briefly, now, we shall indicate some of the questions to be taken up later. Many of them will emerge in the next chapter when we come to consider the idealist point of view. Is the conception of God and of religion which the realists offer us adequate for religious purposes? And do their philosophical presuppositions actually permit them to believe as much as profess to or would like to? Or do not their beliefs suggest another, and quite different, conception of ultimate reality? Are they not offering mankind a bare minimum of what religion has always asserted and stood for, and must they not, as we suggested in regard to the pragmatists, either advance to a full theistic faith or revert to a barren but logical naturalism? Are they justified in beginning their

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(1) Op. cit., pp. 20-21.

(2) There is, however, a measure of justice in Russell's criticism which is levelled at Alexander but hits some others: - "People are more unwilling to give up the word "God" than to give up the idea for which the word has hitherto stood. Emergent evolutionists, having become persuaded that God did not create the world, are content to say that the world is creating God. But beyond the name, such a God has almost nothing in common with the object of traditional worship". (Op. cit., p. 215.) Roy Wood Sellars, we should surmise, stands closer to Russell than to some of the other realists whom we have been considering. He seems content not to look for or desire cosmic support for man's values. The concluding sentence of his Next Step in Religion runs: "Man's life is spiritual in its own right. So long as he shall dream of beauty and goodness and truth his life will not lack religion". (p. 325)

philosophic adventure with the resultant of scientific analysis? Is the ultimate in analysis also the most real? Such a starting point involves the assumption that Mind does not count; it is , as Alexander says, one physical fact among others. But if one starts with mindless fact, one cannot bring mind in afterwards without destroying the unity and continuity of the system. The end is determined by the beginning. Mind itself must be interpreted wholly in terms of physical categories. Is not this the position in which the realists find themselves? They are trying to make room for aspects of human experience which were excluded by their premises. But is philosophy obliged to accept the resultant of scientific analysis as the starting point of its own synthetic operations? Can scientific method introduce us to Ultimate Reality? We turn to idealism for its answer.

CHAPTER IV

I D E A L I S M

Pragmatism is essentially sceptical in its attitude towards the knowledge-problems with which philosophers of the European tradition deal. Realism believes that real knowledge is possible but accepts the world of physical fact as the alpha and omega of reality. Idealism takes as its starting point the knowing mind and seeks to interpret reality in terms of that which we feel in our own experience to be of highest worth - self-conscious spirit. (1) Believing that ultimate reality is thus akin to the highest we know in our own experience, idealists explore every avenue of human experience for the contribution it can make to a fuller knowledge of reality. (2) They regard the activity of mind as the process through which reality reveals itself; and they look upon the worlds which mind creates, the worlds of art, of religion, and of science, as the highest manifestation of the Absolute Spirit or God.

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(1) "The only basis upon which idealism can rest . . is the contention that spiritual no less than intellectual criteria have an absolute validity." Norman Kemp Smith: The Present Situation in Philosophy, p. 5.

(2) The evidence for idealism, says Smith again, " is to be found only through the exhaustive study of all that the human spirit has brought into existence, in the arts, in the moral, social, and religious spheres, as well as in science". Ibid., p. 39.

Some idealists, however, reject the conception of an all-inclusive Absolute; they prefer to think of the universe as a society of spirits. (1)

Modern Idealism begins with Descartes who, seeking a sure foundation on which to build his philosophy, resolved to doubt everything that he possibly could. He discovered that he could not doubt the fact of his own doubting. Thus he was led to adopt as his starting point the dictum: Cogito ergo sum. (2) Descartes, therefore, intoduced into modern philosophy a profound dualism - res cogitans and res extensa. The latter field was promptly preempted by science and interpreted according to mechanical and naturalistic principles. Philosophers were left with the inner world of subjective experience and the insoluble problem of how to put together what Descartes had put asunder. (3) One solution was to treat mind as one object among others in the physical universe and to regard its structure and its filling as due to impressions received from the external world. The other solution was to accept mind as the prior reality and to interpret all reality as fundamentally mental in character. Hume tried the first way; Berkeley the second. Hume, however, was forced to abandon his attempt

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(1) Cf. R. A. F. Hoernle in Robinson's Anthology, pp. 96-117. Cf. also Mary W. Calkins: Contemporary American Philosophy, pp.

(2) Descartes (Selections)(ed. R. M. Eaton) p. 29.

(3) Most modern idealists repudiate the subjectivism which idealism inherited from Descartes, and regret that modern philosophy has been thereby absorbed in epistemological problems. Cf. A. S. Pringle-Pattison: The Idea of God, Lecture VI "Man as Organic to the World". Cf. also William Temple: Nature, Man, and God, Lecture III, "The Cartesian Faux-Pas".

to explain mathematics as an empirical science, and "with the most conscious purpose aimed at reducing all knowledge to experience, found he could not rationally explain something so apparently obvious as causation without importing from the human mind elements not, in his view, to be counted among the given facts". (1)

Kant took up the problem where Hume had left it, starting with Hume's conception of experience as an undifferentiated flow of particulars, and seeking to effect a reconciliation between "reason" and "experience" as contributors to knowledge. His solution was to affirm that the mind had a structure of its own which enabled it to deal with sensuous experience and reduce it to order. In mathematics he believed that reason yielded genuinely new truth independently of experience, but he held that this truth was purely formal, having no necessary application to experience. It is fundamental with Kant that because the forms of our understanding are contributed by mind we cannot know things-in-themselves. (2) We know "only the mode in which our senses are affected by an unknown something". As far as the natural world is concerned, science can proceed to its task of investigating phenomena and amassing a body of knowledge secure in the assurance that its results will check with natural phenomena because these have first been strained through the sieve of the mind's categories. But we can have no scientific knowledge of super-sensible realities. "Knowledge is of things we see", and these are purely phenomenal; it is only moral experience that brings us into touch with the real world. Science can deal with particulars and relate one to another

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(1) T. Whittaker: Reason and Other Essays, p. 2.
(2) As Hegel put it, Kant held that we could not know anything because it is we who know.

but it cannot bring them together in a completed system explanatory of all experience; only pure reason, with the aid of the transcendental ideas, can do this. (1)

Kant drew a distinction within reason itself, a distinction which goes back to the Platonic usage. On the lower level we have the understanding (Verstand - the Greek διάνοια); and on the higher level we have pure reason (Vernunft = the Greek νοῦς). Pure reason, by affirming the transcendental ideas of the soul, the world, and God, is able to deal with the important problems which arise from the moral life. The transcendental ideas are not derived from sense experience, neither can they be subjected to logical demonstration, but pure reason is justified in assuming them as postulates of the moral life. (2) Kant's

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(1) Kant's phenomenalism was one source of nineteenth century agnosticism. "It is due to a one-sided exploitation of Kant without regard for Kant's moral certainty. To Kant the moral nature of man planted man in an intelligible real world, although knowledge left him only in the phenomenal, with just a glimpse of the noumenal breaking through, but this transcendentalism which, as in Lange's case, pretends to be its lawful heir finds the phenomenal the real, and the transcendental the vague and shadowy". (D. Mackenzie: Art. "Transcendentalism", Hastings' E. R. E. Vol. XII, p. 422) Herbert Spencer held that the existence of God was certain but that we could know nothing about Him. As Balfour said, he appropriates all that is knowable for science and leaves the unknowable for religion. The one possesses all that can be known, the other all that seems worth knowing. Spenser rejected Kant's moral certainties and he failed to distinguish between the inherently unknowable and the imperfectly known. Ultimately this is traceable to a false ideal of knowledge which has had a long history in philosophy - the idea that perfect knowledge of any substance would be knowledge of its substratum on which the qualities or "accidents" are hung. Cf. Pringle- Pattison: Op. Cit., Chap. VIII.

(2) A good example of the way in which Kant's argument is distorted by philosophers who are sceptical where he was sure, viz. regarding the facts of the moral life, is to be found in Sellars. Sellars says that Kant's agnosticism allowed him to use the moral argument; if you cannot say anything about the nature of the world or the nature of the self, "you can allow demands, which you regard as ethical and primary, to dictate your ultimate beliefs". The Next Step in Religion, pp. 147-148.

attempt to mediate between the claims of rationalism and empiricism was not altogether satisfactory, but his emphasis upon the importance of the knowing self and upon the practical demands of the moral life proved a very powerful stimulus to the development of philosophic idealism.

We have brought before us, by this brief survey, the two dominating principles of idealist theory. The first is the concpetion of the centrality of the mind, or self, in all experience. By building up ever wider systems of belief mind seeks to comprehend and to interpret the meaning of experience, and apart from the activity of mind experience could have no meaning. The other principle is the fact of moral obligation, or the constraining power of values. Both principles ultimately derive from Plato. It was he who first taught men that "soul was older than body" and that the Good was the ultimately real. (1) In reality one might say that we have here not two principles but one, namely the idea of value. (2) We should suggest that Plato's conviction of the prior reality of mind rested upon a value judgment; only a world in which Spirit was supreme could possess value and thus satisfy man's rational and moral nature. (2) Plato's whole soul revolted against the materialistic outlook which insisted upon the priority in the universe not of Spirit, but of Nature (φυσις) and Chance (τυχη). The idealistic

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(1) Laws, 892, 896ff; Cf. Republic, 379f., 505, 509; Tim., 29a.

(2) "There is no such thing as a philosophy without assumptions. Every idealistic theory of the world has for its ultimate premise a logically unsupported judgment of value - a judgment which affirms an end of intrinsic worth, and accepts thereby a standard of unconditional obligation." (Pringle-Pattison: Man's Place in the Cosmos, p. vii.) Cf. Pringle-Pattison's later verdict: "It is the moral impossibility of conceiving anything devoid of values (such as an unconscious mechanistic system) as a res completa, rather than the impossibility of a world unperceived that is the real driving power of the idealistic argument." Idea of God,

philosophy stands or falls by the conviction that the values we cherish but which are only very inadequately realized in our experience do not depend upon our appreciation for their reality, are not projections of our desires, but are rooted in the essential nature of things.

We must now follow some of the arguments by which idealists seek to strengthen and uphold this conviction. It has already been noted that for the idealist experience is neither self-contained nor self-explanatory. Experience stands in need of explanation from some frame of reference beyond itself. Plato saw the world of sense experience as a world of flux and change; such a world could not be truly real because it was not rational. A rational world - a world that can be grasped by thought - must be a world of Being not of becoming. Plato, therefore, was led to postulate such a world - the world of forms ( ). This world is eternal and unchanging. The world of common experience was striving to approximate to the world of forms, and such reality (was) it possessed was due to its participation in the perfection of the eternal forms. Plato conceived the Idea of Good as presiding over the realm of ideas: "the Good transcends existence in dignity and power". Perfection is of the essence of real Being and man's sense of moral obligation derives from the nature of Being. (1)

(1) Cf. Republic, 509 bc.

For Aristotle, no less than for Plato, the real world must be an intelligible world. And an intelligible world is one in which mind can discern four causes at work - the material, the formal, the efficient, and the final causes. The final cause - the end (telos) towards which all things move - is what gives meaning and value to existence. It is axiomatic with Aristotle that all existence is due to some prior actuality; is prior to . Purposive activity - experienced by ourselves in consciousness - is the final principle of explanation. Aristotle's conception of the universe as a system of final causes continued to hold the field until final causes were excluded from the categories of scientific explanation. Realist and pragmatist philosophers have followed the practice of scientists in excluding final causes, but no idealistic philosophy can dispense with them, for only in a purposive universe can values be supreme. And, as we have seen in the previous chapters, the concern of some realists for values has led them to flirt with the idea of reintroducing the idea of a telos. Aristotle's philosophic system was crowned by his concept of God as the Supreme philosopher - Thought eternally thinking upon itself. Thus his conviction that pure thought was the highest human activity finds its expression in his conception of Ultimate Reality.

What we have said thus far suggests that idealism in philosophy is a method of approach rather than a system of beliefs. Starting from what seemed to them the indubitable

fact of consciousness as the highest reality known to us, idealist philosophers have developed widely divergent systems. Some, like Plato, posit an eternal reality - either a world of forms or an Immutable Being - from which all existence derives its dependent being and of which our consciousness is a broken reflection. Others, like Henri Bergson, posit a creative urge or elan which brings into being all that is but which only comes to full self-consciousness in man. But the main division is, perhaps, that between the monists and pluralists, or the absolutists and personalists. The former believe in an all-inclusive Absolute to which finite personalities are only adjectival, while the latter affirm each individual to be a unique centre of consciousness and the Whole a community of spirits or monads. (1) A distinction might also be drawn between speculative and practical schools of idealism; the distinction, in general, would be the same as that between the absolutists and the pluralists. In modern times the former are associated with the name of Hegel and the latter, while owing much to Hegel, are associated more closely with the point of view of Kant. Speculative idealists believe that it is possible for the mind to frame a system of ideas, according to the laws of thought, which will embrace reality, or express the nature of reality. The underlying assumption

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(1) Royce, in America, and Bradley, in England, are outstanding modern representatives of the absolutist school. Ward and Pringle Pattison represent the second point of view. Most modern American personal idealists go further than Pringle-Pattison in the direction of pluralism.

would seem to be that since the universe is a rational order and man is a rational being, it is possible for man's thought to grasp the nature of reality. This corresponds to the Stoic belief that the logos in man is one with the logos in nature. Practical idealists of the Kantian type take their stand upon the facts of the moral life and refrain from speculation about ultimate questions or else content themselves with the answers of religious faith. There is also a distinction between apriorist or rationalist and empirical idealists. The former make the analysis of the nature of knowledge their starting point, and the latter begin with human experience. But in spite of all the differences there is general agreement on certain main points; - (1) Self-conscious spirit is the highest reality known to us; (2) the meaning and value of experience derive from the self-directing and self-organizing activity of the knowing self; (3) the universe is a realm of ends or the scene of a cosmic purpose.

We shall now consider the attitude of idealist thinkers towards modern science and to religion. Historically, as we have seen, idealism has waged unremitting warfare against the tendency of some scientists to adopt a materialistic conception of reality. Briefly, the idealist case against materialistic science is that scientific investigation is necessarily restricted to sensory experience and therefore cannot claim to pronounce judgment upon reality as a whole. The idealist could not admit that all our knowledge is derived from sense experience, nor could he grant the claim that all beliefs must pass the test of empirical verification.

The world that modern science presents us with is an abstraction from the world of our everyday experience, and there is no reason why we should accept it as more real that the world which we know so much more intimately by living in it and with it. (1) Moreover the aspects of the world which science selects are those which are susceptible to exact measurement and formulation; the aspects of the world which give it its meaning and value for us as human beings are simply left on one side. Idealism takes its stand upon those aspects of our experience which present themselves to us as real and valuable, even though empirical science is forced to exclude them from its purview.

Idealists do not content themselves with denying the competency of modern science to pass judgement upon their major assumptions - such as the transendental self; they carry the battle into the enemy's camp and affirm that upon its own presuppositions no materialistic science would be possible. The achievements of science depend upon the scientist, and he cannot be explained in terms of his own laboratory technique. And against the positivist who contends that human experience is what it is, and that even if the materialistic view turns out to be true, we can still

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(1) "Science serves its purpose precisely by its limitation. Its justification is that it extends a process of arresting and stereotyping which has already begun in perception; that it enlarges man's practical management of his world by isolating quantity from all else, both the mind that knows and the varied meaning by which it knows; and that it goes behind all meaning the world manifests to find the means whereby we can make the world speak our meaning. Thus it is an effective instrument precisely because it is not fitted to provide a cosmology". John Oman: The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 357.

live as men and cherish the values and ideals which man has discovered - against such arguments as these the idealist protests that it is not possible for the human mind, being what it is, to rest finally in any such position. Mind must posit an adequate ground of existence which will provide an intelligible reason for things being for what they are, and in particular for the existence of finite beings who cherish ideals and esteem values which, on the relativist theory, have no necessary connection with reality. Man cannot live without faith in the meaning and value of his own existence; he cannot remain content for long with a philosophy of meaninglessness. And, further, many idealist would affirm that if man did come to take the naturalistic hypothesis seriously, that would spell doom for the values and ideals he cherishes. Man's faith in values and ideals has grown out of his faith in the reality of a spiritual order, and could not long survive the destruction of that faith. (1)

Opponents of idealism dismiss this argument as wishful thinking. We must not, they say, make our desires

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(1) "If, then, naturalism is to hold the field, the feelings and opinions inconsistent with naturalism must be foredoomed to suffer change; and how, when that change shall come about, it can do otherwise that eat all nobility out of our conception of conduct and all worth out of our conception of life, I am wholly unable to understand". (A. J. Balfour: Foundations of Belief, Pt. I, ch. IV.) Cf. Nels Ferre: " A few generations can, of course, live on inherited spiritual capital, but in the end the ethos without the faith loses its compelling power. Today that tragedy moves to a climax. Will there be a rebirth of faith, cleansed and deepened, or will our kind of civilization drift towards dissolution?" "A Theological Doctrine of Man" in Religion in Life, Vol. XI, No. 4, p. 578.

the measure of what is. (1) And the critics think they find support for this argument in some of the more recent psychological discoveries, particularly those associated with the unconscious. (2) But this criticism, according to the idealists, misses the point. However important the discoveries of modern psychology, men and women have always known that it was possible for subjectibe desires to influence their thinking (3), but nonetheless they clearly distinguished between such illegitimate "wishful thinking" and the acknowledgement of the claim of an objective realm of values and ends. (4) Because the method of science is impersonal, its procedure is believed free from bias and its results above suspicion. But by the same token it is only fitted to deal with the impersonal. A very different attitude and method are

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(1) Cf. J. W. Krutch: The Modern Temper, Chap. I. Burtt summarizes his argument thus: "The universe of religious belief is the universe as they passionately wish it to be, superimposed upon the world of harsh fact which is then industriously harmonized with it as far as possible". Types of Modern Religious Philosophy, p. 371.

(2) Burtt says that Freudian psychologies upset complacent rationalism and moral optimism by proving that the empirically dominant forces are not man's intelligence which he shares with the gods, but "a horde of subrational drives, passionate impulses, and cantankerous emotions, only fitfully illuminated and weakly guided by gleams of reason. Reason is at best largely 'rationalization', and the operations of what we call 'understanding', especially in matters metaphysical and religious, are mainly wishful thinking". Op. cit., p. 370

(3) And if the critics would read some of the abler modern theologians they would discover that even theologians are aware of the extent to which our thinking is influenced by "ideological" factors. Cf. in particular almost any of the writings of Reinold Niebuhr; e.g. The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. II, pp. 214, 238, 320.

(4) Cf. H.W.Wright: "We are not attributing to the Universe any special solicitude for, or sympathy with, these private schemes and ambitions of ours. What we have in mind is rather the objects and experiences to which we as intelligent persons attach intrinsic or absolute values. It is these values whose reality is at stake".(The Religious Response, p. 11.) Cf. also Pringle-Pattison: "Our sense of value is not a matter of selfish preference or individual desire; the judgment of

needed when we come to investigate the personal aspects of life. This attidue and method must also be scientific (in the broad sense of the term) but will not make the mistake of taking the relation between mind and physical objects as the standard of all relations. (1) It is not by scientific method that we know our friends or discover our values. The personal elements can be excluded from the physical sciences because we are dealing with the impersonal, but when we deal with man and his experience we are dealing with persons and personal values; we are dealing with a different order of reality. (2) And, after all, man's hopes and fears, desires and wishes, are empirical factors. "There must be at least as much to learn about the inmost character of the real from the fact that our actual spiritual life is controlled by such-and-such definite conceptions of good and right, such-and-such hopes and fears, as there is to learn from the fact that the laws of motion are what they are, or that the course of biological evolution on our planet has followed the lines it has followed". (3) And, here again,

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(1) "The tacit assumption that experience is all of the subject-object type has played havoc with much European philosophy". A.A.Bowman: Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. II, p. 239.

(2) Contemporary idealist and religious philosophy is exploring the realm of personal relationships. Science works on the basis of the subject-object relationship; he is an observer. But when we come to the subject-subject ("I - Thou") relationship the observer attitude is out of place. "No person as such can exist for another merely as object, and to treat a person as an object is to fail to do justice to his nature" (Bowman: On. cit., p. 391) Just as the scientific or observer attitude is out of place in dealing with one another, so is it out of place when we approach God - He is the Subject of subjects. Cf. Oriesbach: Gegenwart; Martin Buber: I and Thou; E.F.Dickie: Revelation and Response, Chap. X.

(3) A.E.Taylor: The Faith of a Moralist, Vol. I , p.65.

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value is as impartial as it is unhesitating. It is as objective in its own sphere as a scientific judgment on matters of fact". On. cit., p. 41.

the idealist finds an *argumentum ad hominem* ready to his hand. If a philosophy which bases itself in man's consciousness of values is ruled out of court on the ground that it is related to the vital interests of the subject and therefore may be nothing more than a projection of human wishes on the universe, what is to be said of the philosophical constructions based upon the results of modern science? May not they also be subjective constructions, and may not the exclusion of values and ends reflect ulterior motives? (1) Such an argument makes all knowledge suspect and leaves no escape from thorough-going scepticism. (2) The idealist would probably admit that his theories of the nature of reality are a "projection" but he would affirm that the materialistic conception is likewise a projection. And he would go on to defend *his* projection on the grounds that it does justice to the more significant aspects of human experience. He would maintain, moreover, that his critics mistook the nature of thought. It is characteristic of the thinking process that it interprets what comes to the experiencing subject so that it has meaning and value. This process goes on in all thinking, and probably in some rudimentary form in the simplest perceptions. But it does not follow from this that thinking is a subjective process dominated by the wishes of the thinker. Thought is always

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(1) Aldous Huxley makes such an affirmative quite deliberately. Cf. *Ends and Means*, Ch. XIV, "Beliefs". "Those who detect no meaning in the world generally do so because for one reason or another it suits their books that the world should be meaningless". (p.270)

(2) Cf. C. S. Lewis: "The Poison of Subjectivity" in *Religion in Life*, Vol. XII, No. 3, pp. 356-365. Cf. also Arthur E. Murphy: *The Uses of Reason*.

thought of something; true thinking is thinking carried on under the constraint of the given. Mind is active but does not manufacture its own data; what we perceive comes to us, and what we think comes to us. "It is as true to say that the world thinks in us, as that we think . . . Our activity and life is the activity and life of the Universe in us." (1) If some modern psychologists profess to believe that mind can be adequately interpreted in biological and physiological terms, and suggest that consciousness is but a fitful light playing around highly complex neurological process, the idealist can only retort that such a description is utterly inadequate to describe the life of mind as we know it from the inside, and as it is revealed in the work, e.g., of the psychologist himself. (2) In short, the incompetence of scientific method as a basis for philosophizing is due precisely to the fact that it does, and must, approach its subject matter from the "outside in" point of view, whereas human things can only be truly known and studied from the "inside out". In pursuing its own investigations, science is warranted in ignoring the unique presence of mind, and in rejecting final causes, but when it comes to offering an interpretation of the whole of human experience other factors must also be taken into consideration.

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(1) R.A.F. Hoernle; Op. cit., p. 115. Cf. G.P.Adams in Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 77-80.
(2) Burtt writes: "And the behavioristic trend in psychology, whatever may be thought of its theoretical adequacy, at least startlingly indicates how little verifiable fact is omitted when we interpret the entire field of human experience in terms of concepts which imply no recognition of conscious or spiritual entities whatever".(Op. cit., p. 371.) But there is nothing "startling" about this statement; it is sheer tautology. Insertion of the question-begging word "verifiable" gives the whole show away and obscures the point

It is claimed that idealism met with considerable success in resisting the materialism of the nineteenth century but has met a more formidable opponent in the evolutionary views of the twentieth and the philosophies based thereon. These philosophies differ from the mechanistic theories of the nineteenth century by accepting the principle of "emergence". At certain levels of the evolutionary process, it is suggested, new structures "emerge" which would have been unpredictable at the lower level. This is an attempt to safeguard the continuity of process and, at the same time, allow for the appearance of novel structures and capacities. (1)

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(1) Russell, as we have seen, does not accept the principle of "emergence"; he stands by mechanism. So, apparently, does E.S. Goodrich: "A living organism, then, from the point of view of the scientific observer, is a self-regulating, self-repairing, physico-chemical complex mechanism. What, from this point of view, we call 'life' is the sum of its physico-chemical processes . . No hard-and-fast line can be drawn between the living and the non-living . . Every step in the process is determined by that which preceded it and determines that which follows." Art. "Evolution" in Encyclopaedia Britannica. Goodrich, however, has to meet the criticism of his fellow biologists who claim that mechanism in biology "is not only not practised but not practicable".(Cf. J.H.Woodger: Biological Principles, pp. 311-317) We might distinguish scientific mechanism from philosophical mechanism. (Cf. E.S.Brightman: A Philosophy of Religion, pp. 378-379) Thus Joseph Needham says that mechanism is a justifiable assumption in biology but not in philosophy; it cannot be applied to mind. "Mind and all mental processes cannot possibly receive explanation or description in physico-chemical terms, for that would amount to explaining something by an instrument itself the product of the thing explained".("Mechanistic Biology" in Science, Religion, and Reality"). Cf. also his appendix to C.E.Raven's Creator Spirit in which he claims that mechanistic biology is not inconsistent with teleology in the universe as a whole.

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at issue which is whether there are not some factors in human experience, and those the most significant, which are not amenable to the scientific test of empirical verification".

On the basis of this new evolutionary hypothesis it is claimed that a sufficient explanation of the origin of life and mind can be given without recourse to the assumptions which idealism has been accustomed to make. However, the idealist would affirm that the process is unintelligible apart from the purposive activity of mind. He might draw attention to the fact that "emergence" is a term which really explains nothing. The scientist may be content with recording what he finds, but the philosopher must seek some more satisfying explanation. (1) He could also point out that a number of non-idealist philosophers find themselves unable to account for the evolutionary process without postulating some principle at work which empirical investigation does not disclose. Alexander needs his nisus, and Whitehead his "eternal objects" and his "principle of concretion". He might point triumphantly to the fact that any purely naturalistic account of evolution must perpetrate the same absurdity as the nineteenth century materialists - they must ultimately derive mind from what is not mind. If mind were nothing more than what the pragmatists and realists take it to be, such derivation might not be so incredible; but if mind

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(1) Lloyd Morgan introduced the concept of "emergence". As a scientist he proceeds on the naturalistic assumption, trying to tell a "plain tale" and avoiding the temptation to "interpret events in terms of concepts appropriate to a higher level if they can be adequately interpreted in terms appropriate to a lower". (Cf. Life, Mind, and Spirit, p. 61) But if, as a philosopher, he is asked to explain the process' he falls back upon religious presuppositions, writing, as he puts it, "under acknowledgement". "Divine purpose is inclusive of all advance - physical, vital, mental, social and in spiritual regard". (Ibid. p. 306) Cf. also Emergent Evolution, and Mind at the Crossroads.

were only that, we should have no pragmatist and realist philosophers.

Some idealist philosophers have welcomed the evolutionary theory of man's origin and development and have made use of it to escape one of the insoluble puzzles of the past. We have seen that Descartes, working with the Greek notion of "substance" as the essential core of a thing with "accidents" attached to it, came to believe in the reality of two such substances - a soul substance and a material substance - neither of which was derivable from the other. The materialists, however, were determined to derive mind from matter, and the idealists were left with the problem as to how mind could know a non-mental reality. The only solution appeared to be to assume that all reality was really mental in character. Epistemology has always been haunted by a spectator theory of knowledge which had its origin in the Greek assumption that the preeminent function of mind was to contemplate a super-sensible world of universals. (1) When the old notion of "substance" was dropped and the newer conception of "organism" took its place, a fresh approach to the problem of knowledge was possible. An organism lives and grows in interaction with its environment, and our human faculties have developed in interaction with physical nature - how absurd to suggest, as some older theories of knowledge did, that they somehow get between us and the world so that we

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(1) "The so-called epistemological problem which obsesses modern philosophy . . - this problem, with all the varieties of subjective idealism, agnosticism, phenomenalism, and sceptical relativism to which it has given rise, depends upon the presupposition of a finished world, as an independently existing fact, and an equally independent knower, equipped, from heaven knows where, with a peculiar apparatus of faculties". Pringle-Pattison: Op. cit., p. 112. This is one of the main features of the pragmatist criticism; in fact, these words might have been written by John Dewey.

cannot know it as it is! Consciousness doubtless has arisen within the process of which it is conscious; it is of process and is itself process. But the earliest form of consciousness is not cognition but feeling - sympathy and antipathy. (1) Mind, too, emerges within the process which it apprehends; but here we may distinguish two levels. The first is intelligence which is the ability to adapt ends to means; an essentially practical function which some of the higher animals seem to possess to some extent. The second is mind proper with its ability to form "free ideas" and develop systems of knowledge. (2) With the emergence of mind, whole new worlds come into being, worlds which are the creation of mind and depend upon mind: the worlds of art, literature, politics, religion and science. It is not the bare fact of consciousness which the idealist is concerned to emphasize, but the content of consciousness. "The organism is developed and its powers perfected as an instrument of nature's purpose of self-revelation". In man we have "the organ through which the universe knows and enjoys itself". (3)

If we admit that man is organic to nature, it may seem that we have surrendered the main bastion of idealism, for non-idealists also claim that mind emerges in the process of evolution and that "thinking is grounded in the process

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(1) Cf. Henri Bergson: Creative Evolution, pp. 185-186.

(2) Following the terminology of some evolutionists we might have described this second level by the more inclusive term "spirit".

(3) Pringle-Pattison: Op. cit., pp. 111, 137. Cf. the whole of Lecture VI entitled "Man as Organic to the World". Cf. also Temple: Nature, Man, and God, Lecture V, "The World as Apprehended".

of adjustment between the organism and environment as it is indeed an extension of that process". (1) It is not so, however. If we include mind within nature any but a spiritual interpretation of the process becomes unthinkable. For some people it is the world as known by mind that gives rise to wonder, but for the idealist the most remarkable fact is that the cosmic process has given rise to organisms with the capacities exhibited by mind. (2) "That the world should give rise to minds that know the world involves a good deal concerning the nature of the world". (3) Once man, with the arts, science, morality, and religion to which his spirit have given birth, is taken as organic to the cosmic process, nature cannot be conceived in mechanistic or naturalistic terms without doing violence to a fundamental postulate of the human mind. For, as Temple points out, we find among the functions of mind "a principle which is self-explanatory - the principle of Purpose or of Intelligent Choice". "This", he says, "is an ultimate principle of explanation. . . When we have traced an occurrence to the Purpose of an intelligent being we are satisfied". (4) "The more completely we include Mind within Nature, the more inexplicable Nature becomes except by reference to Mind". (5)

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(1) Temple: Op. cit., p. 128.

(2) And for some scientists. Cf. R.A.Millikan: Evolution in Science and Religion, p. 69. "The most amazing thing in all life, the greatest miracle there is, is the fact a mind has got here at all, 'created out of the dust of the earth'!"

(3) Temple: Ibid., p. 130. (4) Ibid., pp. 131, 219-220.

(5) Temple: Ibid., p. 133 (Temple italicises the sentence).

The argument points in the direction of a theistic interpretation of the universe.(1) Naturalism sees the process of evolution as a unitary development but is confronted with the fact of new emergents. (2) And how these are to be reconciled is the problem that any naturalistic philosophy must face. The concept of emergence was introduced to meet the difficulty and the rejection of this concept by Russell and the mechanists would seem to be prompted by the recognition that it is logically irreconcilable with naturalistic presuppositions. Explanation of the more developed in terms of the less is illusory; to refund the outcome into the starting point is to throw doubt upon the fact to be explained. "It is the process as a whole that must be considered if we wish to know the nature of the reality revealed in it". (3) And logic demands that we interpret the process in terms of its end. (4) Many popular philosophies based upon evolution seem to deny Aristotle's principle that the actual (ἐνεργείᾳ) is prior to the potential (δυνάμει) and to assert that the stream can rise higher than its source. But it is difficult to think of values as coming into existence with man, "shaped by him out of nothing, and added henceforth to the sum of existence". The presence of ideals

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(1) As several of the realists referred to in the last chapter admit.

(2) "Continuity of process and the emergence of real differences - these are, in short, the twin aspects of the cosmic history, and it is essential to clear thinking that the one be not allowed to obscure the other". Pringle-Pattison: Op. cit., p. 103.

(3) Pringle-Pattison: Ibid., p.106. This, says Pringle-Pattison, is the philosophical meaning of potentiality, and of the profound Aristotelian doctrine of the Telos. (Loc. cit.)

(4) "The process is a contradiction, and only because it is a contradiction can it be a process. . . the solution of the contradiction is in every sense the end of the contradiction". F.H.Bradley: Ethical Studies, p. 101n.

involves the presence of the infinite in the finite. We must, as Pringle-Pattison says, look to the end. The process as a whole wears an aspect of progressive revelation, not of sheer addition. We can hardly think of time, and life, and development, without being lifted above it and bringing in the eternal. (1) And so the universe is seen, not as a collection of unknowing material facts, but as "the expression of a transcendent Greatness and Goodness". (2)

This brings us face to face with the problem of the relation of the eternal to the temporal. This also has always been a difficulty for idealism. Plato's divorce of the world of forms from the world of becoming left him, as Aristotle said, with two worlds to explain instead of one. Moreover there are ways of conceiving the relation of the eternal to the temporal which seem to empty the latter of all significance and meaning. If Time is, as Plato said, the moving image of Eternity, then human history is meaningless. (3) "God abides and human history occurs because of Him but it makes no difference to Him". The ethical struggle is thus reduced to insignificance". (4)

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(1) Cf. Pringle-Pattison: Ibid, pp. 152-157.

(2) Ibid., p. 40.

(3) "Transcendentalism has no eschatology, because to it the Absolute - i.e. all that is - is already perfect and cannot be more so, and yet a philosophy or a religion without an eschatology offer nothing to man's needs, imposes a veto on man's passion for reformation, and does away with the felt need of redemption".(D. Mackenzie: art. "Transcendentalism", in Hastings' E.R.E. Vol.XIIp. 434f.) To Bergson "radical finalism" and "radical mechanism" are equally objectionable examples of the geometricizing faculty of the intellect. (Cf. Creative Evolution, pp. 39-41.) For the quotation from Plato see Tim. 37d.

(4) Temple: Op. cit., pp. 434-435.

Moreover there is the age old problem of evil. This problem only arises for those who believe that the cosmic process is purposive and means good; and difficulties connected with the problem go a long way towards explaining the inability of many thinkers to attribute purposiveness to the universe. Absolute idealists have sought to escape the difficulties by taking evil as essentially good in the making; the evil is the way things look to finite beings, from the point of view of the Absolute it is taken up into the whole and falls into place in the entire scheme of things. Other idealists, like James Ward, have sought to avoid the rebuke of making human history meaningless and also the difficulties inherent in the problem of evil by letting contingency into the heart of the universe. Still others, like Brightman, have felt it necessary to sacrifice the omnipotence and transcendence of God in order to preserve His goodness. But Brightman's God, though finite in some respects, is infinite in others; " for example, He must be infinite in time, of unbegun, and unending duration . . At all stages of progress, He is the fulness of all actual objective being, the creator of all created being, the unity of all energy". (1) Other idealists have thought it necessary to limit the infinitude of God in order to safeguard the personality of finite selves. They believe that to conceive of God as personal and as absolute inevitably implies that man's destiny is absorption in the life of the Absolute Being. (2) Others, finally, dismiss the idea of God altogether and conceive of an immanent principle

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(1) A Philosophy of Religion, pp. 335-337. Brightman says that belief in a transcendent being such as theism has conceived makes the problem of evil insoluble, but he so hedges his conception of a finite God with qualifications that it is difficult to see how it advantages him in solving his problem.

(2) For this reason McTaggart denied the existence of God. On

of order and purposiveness that in some way acts as the bearer and conserver of values. On such views as these, history and the moral struggle are invested with capital significance, but the inevitable consequence is to introduce uncertainty about the outcome of history and so consequently about the character of the eternal. (1) These are perplexing problems for thought, but, as we have already quoted J. e. Boodin as saying, "where our human insight fails, we must hold fast to what is of ultimate importance for our living. . . The scientific mind does not hesitate to work with irreconcilable conceptions if they seem to be required by experience". (2) The attempt of speculative thought to fathom the mysteries of existence runs into insoluble problems, as Kant so amply demonstrated. Yet thinker after thinker proceeds to wrestle anew with the problems. Mind is somehow related to the Eternal Mind and to the community of Minds; but the precise nature of the relationship appears to be beyond our comprehension. God is the source of all good; we dare not make Him responsible for evil. He is the Source of all process and history moves towards

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(1) "However it may be with popular religion, the deeper expressions of religious faith and emotion - the utterances of the saints, the religious experts - appear quite irreconcilable with the pluralistic conception of a finite God, an unfinished world, and a dubious victory. In fact, it is not too much to say with Mr. Bradley that 'to make the moral point of view absolute' is to have 'broken with every considerable religion'. The victory for which morality fights is for religion already, or rather eternally, won; and it is the assurance of this victory which inspires the finite subject with courage and confidence in his individual struggle". Pringle-Pattison: Op. cit., pp. 395 - 396.

(2) Supra, p. 65.

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the matters raised in this paragraph see Pringle-Pattison: Op. cit., Lecture XX.

Him as its fulfillment; yet man's freedom is not taken away or destroyed. (1) But the inability of thought to solve these problems does not prove that they are unreal; nor does it follow that the time given to the study of them is time wasted because withdrawn from the practical problems of life. It merely shows that even if finite minds are participators in the Infinite Mind, they are nevertheless still finite. It reveals, moreover, that in spite of the urgency of practical problems, the question of greatest interest and urgency for man is the question of his own origin and destiny. We might suggest that problems which appear as insoluble antinomies for logical thought are often transcended in religious experience. Life is more than science, and religion is more than theology or philosophy. Science is abstract reflection upon natural organisms and processes; theology and philosophy of religion are abstract reflection upon religion and the problems arising from it. But the depth and richness of the living experience always transcends the capacity of abstract thinking to fully comprehend it. (2)

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(1) Temple writes: "The end is not predictable from the beginning and the beginning can only be understood in the light of the end. Consequently our apprehension of the Meaning of History is very meagre. But we apprehend these two points. It can only have meaning at all if Eternal Life is a reality; and the meaning then is one which we do not so much discover as actually make." Op. cit., p. 451. (Temple italicises the whole passage).

(2) "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

Shakespeare: Hamlet, Act. I, Scene 5, Line 166

The relations of idealist philosophy with religion are somewhat perplexing because of the many points of view represented in the idealist movement. In general one might say that upholders of the religious viewpoint have looked to idealist philosophy for justification of their position, and that many idealist philosophers have regarded themselves as the champions of the religious world view against all forms of materialism and naturalism. It is now evident, however, that the Absolute Idealism so much in vogue during the latter part of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth centuries was an ally of dubious value. Absolute idealism tended to treat religion as a sort of poor relation. Hegel, for example, recognized that religion possessed genuine insights into the spiritual nature of reality, but he believed that philosophy could go beyond religion and gain a more complete and more satisfactory conception of reality. It was the task of philosophy to set forth in clear concepts what religion had grasped in imagination and portrayed in picture form in its doctrines. Religion was all very well for the simple and unlearned; the wise man would turn to philosophy. By the time the Absolutists were finished with religion, there was little left of any practical religious value. (1) Idealism, however, has become less speculative. Present-day thinkers of this school start from the facts of experience rather than from the laws of thought. They tend to recognize, therefore, that religious experience is of the utmost significance in their task of achieving a systematic and

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(1) See p. 91 <u>supra</u>, esp. note 3. Benedetto Croce's attitude towards religion seems identical with Hegel's. Cf. Baillie: <u>The Interpretation of Religion</u>, p. 177.

comprehensive view of reality as a whole. We might say that idealism has become less rationalistic and more empirical. In particular, it is less inclined to put complete confidence in the speculative powers of "pure reason", and more willing to admit the legitimate place of moral and religious faith in human affairs. Most recent and contemporary idealists would probably agree with Arthur E. Murphy that "'Reason' as one competitor among others for an unqualified primacy in human concerns has no special sanctity about it, and is quite as much in need of criticism as the rest". (1) Perhaps we might also add that idealists are more aware that their philosophy has grown out of convictions about the nature of reality which have their roots in man's moral and religious experience, and that because of this fact they are not in a position to pronounce judgment upon the validity of religious belief. In any case, the fundamental question with which both religion and idealistic philosophy are confronted is that which concerns itself with the meaning and significance of human experience. If the rival philosophies, relying upon the methods of modern science, can persuade men that its naturalistic interpretations of their moral and religious experience are adequate, nothing can save idealism or religion. This, therefore, is the problem with which contemporary idealist philosophers are wrestling, and we shall conclude this chapter with a summary of the conclusions

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(1) The Uses of Reason, p. 13. "It would be folly to claim that we can dispense with faith, or that 'reason alone' can remedy our spiritual ills. Indeed, as we shall see, it is a distinguishing characteristic of reason when it is about its appropriate business that it never works alone, but has its function in the criticism, coordination and redirection of impulses, emotions, and beliefs, which, apart from their contribution to or conflict with the order it proposes, are neither rational nor irrational in character." Ibid., p.10

reached by a recent investigator, Archibald A. Bowman. (1)

After an analysis of the meaning of experience Bowman reaches the conclusion that the characteristic human experience is the experience of being persons. Thinking of experience almost wholly in terms of the subject-object relationship, both rationalist and empiricist philosophy has failed to do justice to what is most characteristic of human experience. But the relation between persons is of a different order from that which obtains between things or between persons and things. At any rate, relations exist, not simply <u>between</u> persons, but <u>for</u> persons. All human experience, Bowman contends, defines itself within the framework of an ideally universal experience, i.e., " Human Experience is an <u>Experience</u> of the Whole". (2) "The whole logic of the position points not only to a universal experience but to a universal subject creative of its own experience". (3) Religion is the progressive exploration of the meaning of our experience of being persons. Following Bowman, therefore, we shall first summarize what he calls the argument from the relation of subject to object, and secondly the argument from the relation of subject to subject.

That the subject of the knowing relation may become a person it is necessary to add to mere <u>awareness</u> the postulate of order. The possibility of finding meaning in the world depends upon the presence of order, and "meaning" is "the connecting link between personality and the objective world". (4)

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(1) <u>Studies in the Philosophy of Religion</u>, Vol. II, chap. XXV.
(2) <u>Ibid</u>., p. 412. (3) <u>Ibid</u>., p. 417.
(4) <u>Ibid</u>., p. 396. Cf. John Oman: <u>The Natural and the Supernatural</u>, pp. 264-271. "All environment deals with us and we deal with it as meaning. . "(<u>Ibid</u>., p. 96.) ". . life works with meaning not impact . ." p. 264.

"Personality, then, is the counterpart in the world of consciousness and activity, of the fact that there is at least a certain amount of order and meaning in the objective world". (1) But man asserts his right to be considered a person far beyond what could be justified by the discovery of order in his world. Moreover, for the guarantee of such order as he finds he is dependent upon a community of minds. "In the last resort, therefore, there is no justification for the unconditioned claim which we all make for ourselves to the right to be considered persons, unless there exists a person not limited as we are, but commensurate, as a subject, with the ordered totality of nature, and capable, through our trust in him, of vicariously fulfilling for us the conditions upon which our claim to personality depends". (2)

Just as man is never confronted with the objective world as a completely organized system, so he is continually baffled in his efforts to relate himself to other persons as persons. He finds himself treating them as objects, and even in his most intimate personal relations he is confronted with the insuperable barrier that separates one soul from another. And again we must suppose that there is a person capable of sustaining for us vicariously the burden of those personal relations which we are only able to sustain in a very halting and inadequate way for ourselves. "We entrust to him a function we cannot fulfill ourselves - the function of knowing all persons as persons". (3) Bowman states his conclusion

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(1) Ibid., p. 396. (2) Ibid., p. 398.

(3) Ibid., pp. 400-401.

in the following words: "Man's practical belief in his own personality, in his right to organize his life upon a personal basis implies, whether he recognizes it or not, the existence of a personal God . . . We have no right to believe that we are persons unless we are prepared to admit, as the ground of our right, the existence of a personal God." (1)

This is not an argument for the existence of God. Bowman would probably agree with Cook-Wilson that the true office of argument is not to induce belief but "to bring the belief to a consciousness of itself" (2); not to prove that God exists or to show why people should believe in Him, but to show that, in some way, they already do believe, and that their experience, properly understood, implies the knowledge of God. "The argument", says Bowman, "is not a logical deduction from given premises, but an attempt to extract from the actualities of human experience - the experience of what it is to be a person - the logic which such experience implies. More specifically, it is not an attempt to establish a fact upon the evidence of other facts, but to justify a belief on the ground of certain other beliefs which are so completely one with it and with the very texture of experience itself, that we cannot repudiate it or repudiate them, without repudiating experience in its most universal aspects." (3)

To sum up. The idealistic argument is grounded in our consciousness of value. As personal centres of consciousness we have emerged from the cosmic process endowed with the capacity, by means of "free ideas" and standards of worth, to

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(1) Ibid., pp. 399, 401.
(2) Statement and Inference, Vol. II, p. 851.
(3) Op. cit., p. 394.

look back upon the process and not only survey but evaluate it. And this fact, as Tennant affirms, " is as significant for our estimation of Nature as for our anthropology. If man is Nature's child, Nature is the wonderful mother of such a child. Any account of her which ignores the fact of her maternity is scientifically partial and philosophically insignificant. Her capacity to produce man must be reckoned among her potencies, explain it how we may". (1) It is not pride or vainglory which leads the idealist to affirm that the cosmic process must be interpreted in terms of man, its highest product. The justification of this procedure is to be found in the undeniable claim of an objective system of values. It appears to the idealist that there is nothing in the assured results of scientific investigation which forbids such an approach; all that stands in the way is an unjustifiable methodological assumption and the spurious kind of certainty attaching to scientific beliefs. (2)

But however logical the argument may be, it is not enough to provide religion with a starting point. (3) It may suffice to demonstrate the reasonableness of religious faith, but it will only carry conviction to those who through religious experience already have knowledge of God. Idealist argument may help to clear the way for faith by criticizing the

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(1) F. R. Tennat: Philosophical Theology, Vol. II, p. 101.

(2) i.e. the assumption that no belief is justified which cannot be justified in the way that scientific beliefs are. I have described the certainty attaching to verifiable scientific beliefs as "spurious" because it has no relation to moral experience. If such certainty were available in the moral and religious life, moral and religious experience would be neither moral nor religious.

(3) A. C. Widgery quotes James Ward as saying that any exposition of theism is wasted time until the truth of the idealistic view of the world has been sustained, and most modern idealists would probably concur with his criticism of this assumption. (Cf. Religious Realism, p. 101)

inadequacies of all philosophical world views which minimize the centrality of Mind and ignore the witness of our values to the nature of reality; but since it is itself grounded in our consciousness of value it can only appeal, for final confirmation, to that religious experience out of which it grew. Idealist philosophy cannot prove the truth ~~of religion~~ of religion because such certitude as it possesses is derived from our consciousness of value which is also the basis of religious faith. As a philosophy, idealism can only take up into itself the native assurance that already belongs to faith.

CHAPTER V

COMPARISON AND CRITICISM

Since Present day Pragmatism and Realism have both come into being as reactions against traditional Idealistic ways of thinking, we shall begin by comparing and contrasting these two philosophies.

Both are frankly naturalistic, both accept scientific method as the only reliable guide to knowledge, yet both believe that room can be found, indeed must be found, for values and ideals. Where does the one differ from the other?

The realist believes that science gives him reliable knowledge not only of natural phenomena but of the essential structure of nature. When the scientist has analysed any object or process, then the resultant description is what we know about that object and process, that and nothing more. The pragmatist believes that the universe is in constant flux and that nothing can be known of its essential structure; indeed we cannot even affirm that it has a structure. (1)

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(1) "Scientific method is indifferent to a world of things-in-themselves . . . It is a method not of knowing the unchangeable but of determining the form of the world in which we live as it changes from moment to moment. It undertakes to tell us what we may expect to happen when we act in such and such a fashion." George H. Mead: Creative Intelligence, p. 225.

Moreover, the pragmatist does not forget that the scientist, in his process of analysis, has ignored those factors and relations which are not susceptible of exact measurement. The scientist's method does not allow him to take these imponderables into account, but this is no reason for regarding them as subjective embellishments of an objective physical reality in which they have no standing. All experience, as the pragmatist maintains, is interaction with nature and is due to "properties and potencies in her as much as to needs and capacities in us". (1) The objective physical reality with which the realist begins and ends is an abstraction from the world of common experience and has no legitimate claim to be regarded as more real than the empirical world. The scientist isolates those aspects of the world which he can deal with mathematically because he is interested in predicting and controlling phenomena. That is why he untangles from the totality of experience exactly those phases which will enable him to predict future appearances. But when the realist takes the further step of identifying the physicists' mathematical construct with reality he is making an unjustifiable assumption. The pragmatist, therefore, returns to the world of common experience to retrieve the wealth of aspects and phases which the scientist has ignored and which the realist dismisses as purely subjective. (2) The radical separation which the realist thus effects between man and nature strikes

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(1) E. A. Burtt: Types of Religious Philosophy, p. 408.

(2) The criticism which we are here reporting applies to the neo-realist school; naive realists are not so ultra-mathematical.

the pragmatist as unreasonable and unscientific. Man is surely a part of nature. (1)

The pragmatist maintains that realism has never escaped from the false ideal of knowledge established by the Greeks. (2) Taking as his startingpoint the "refined, defined objects of reflection", the realist juggles these about in mathematical fashion to give him a logical construct which he calls Reality; quite forgetting "the gross macroscopic, crude subject-matters in primary experience" from which he abstracted his "objects" and to which they should lead him back. (3) As a result, the realist accepts the refined "objects" of scientific analysis as constituent elements of reality and dismisses common sense objects as mere "appearances". (4) The latter owe their appearance to subjective interpretation. In fact, the whole valuational aspect of the world is due to subjective interpretation. Most modern realists, however, deny that they regard secondary qualities and values as "purely subjective". They maintain that values and secondary qualities arise from interaction between the nervous system and physical reality.

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(1) Cf. E. A. Burtt on the differences between what he calls Realistic and Pragmatic Humanism. Op. cit., pp. 394-402.

(2) "The (Greek) prescription says; only the eternal and immutable Reality or Being can be scientifically known and studied. The moderns perforce had to read this backwards so as to make it retroactively mean; whatever we scientifically know is ipso facto eternal and immutable Reality. Do we know, scientifically, the shapes and sizes and motions of things? We do. Hence these are constituents of ultimate Reality. Do colors and sounds, etc., form part of our body of scientific knowledge? They do not. Hence they are not constituents of ultimate, eternal, and immutable Reality." J. Ratner: Intro. to Intelligence in the Modern World, p. 53.

(3) Cf. J. Dewey: Experience and Nature, chap. 1. Quotations from Intelligence in the Modern World, p. 1044.

(4) As Ratner points out (Op. cit., p. 53) the constituents of this scientific reality vary from stage to stage of scientific investigation; at present Eddington's schedule of pointer-readings is the vogue. But the method remains the same.

They are not to be located in our "minds". "Mind", as they see it, is one physical fact among others. The pragmatists insist, however, that in regarding values as resulting from the interposition of the human nervous system they are cutting values off from all connection with non-human nature and thus bifurcating experience. (1) If the realist took the experimental method of modern science seriously he would realize that qualities and values are in the same boat together. (2) The abstractions of physics are abstractions from the world of common experience with its richness of form and color and, for their verification, must lead back to it. There are not two worlds - a world of physics and a worod of common experience - and the realists are merely being distracted by a problem of their own making when they enquire anxiously about the relation of the world of physics to the empirical world. (3) In taking as their starting point the "refined, defined objects of reflection", and in failing to realize that these objects ought to lead them back to the "gross macroscopic, crude subject-matters of primary experience", the realists are splitting human experience asunder by setting up an imaginery distinction between a "real"world disclosed to physics and the common sense world in which we live and move and have our being. The serious practical evil which the pragmatist sees in this procedure is that "the things of ordinary experience do not get enlargement and enrichment of meaning as they do when approached

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(1) Cf. A. W. Moore: Creative Intelligence, pp. 114-116.

(2) "The methods of scientific experimental practice unequivocally and definitively prove that all qualities are in science and for science of equal reality." J. Ratner: Op. cit., p. 50 (Italics his) Cf. also Ibid., pp. 28-56

(3) Cf. J. Ratner: Ibid., pp. 80-82.

through the medium of scientific principles and reasonings". (1) Dewey seems to mean that the philosopher should not be content to stop where the physicist does. The physicist is interested in the quantitative aspect of things and selects his data accordingly. Instead of applying the same experimental method to all human experience and thus making a significant contribution to human good, the neo-realist rests content with the abstract view of physical reality with which the physicist has presented him. He is therefore guilty, the pragmatist believes, of ignoring important aspects of experience and bifurcating reality. Pragmatists and realists differ, therefore, in their estimate of the value of scientific knowledge per se, and in their conception of the relation of man and his interests to the rest of nature.

The pragmatist is not interested in what the scientist says, but in what he does. (2) It is the scientific method that seems to him of greatest value. The scientist does not rely on observation alone. He experiments. Truth for him is not something he discovers by the collection and analysis of data; it is something he discovers by experimentation, and then he does not as much discover truth as make it. The scientist knows that a particular problem is solved when he can start with a set of phenomena, predict the outcome, and find his prediction verified under experimental conditions. Recalling now the pragmatists' contention that mind is not an observer of all time and all existence but a practical

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(1) John Dewey: Intelligence in the Modern World, p. 1004.

(2) Cf. Joseph Ratner: Op. cit., p. 46

instrument for the resolution of problematic situations and the fitting of ends to means, we begin to understand their interest in experimental science. Why not, they ask, apply this astonishingly successful technique to all our problems? If problematic situations in physics can be resolved by experiment, why should the same method not prove fruitful in dealing with life situations? The adequacy of ideas can only be tested by being brought to the test of life itself. Truth is not a quality attaching to propositions but the resolution of a felt difficulty. In science, truth or validity is established by the consilience of opinion among investigators; in the field of social action it is established by social verification. If we could only rid ourselves of the "observer attitude" and apply to the whole of experience the same technique which the scientist employs in dealing with his selected data, many of the strains and stresses of social life could be smoothed out and some of the endless possibilities ahead of the human race might be actualized.

It is impossible not to feel a good deal of sympathy for both points of view. In championing the right of human values and ends to be regarded as of equal importance with the physicist's schedule of pointer readings, the pragmatist is following the tradition of all true humanists. Realism does appear to cut man off from nature and to enthrone a conception of reality so "objective" as to leave no room for personal and social values. It is true that the realist is no longer the radical dualist he once was. The conception of nature immortalized in Russell's famous essay (1) is no longer in favor. The realist accepts the theory of emergent evolution (2)

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(1) A Free Man's Worship. Cf. Chap. III of Mysticism and Logic.
(2) See, however, the qualifications on p. 67 supra.

and acknowledges that man, with all his powers and capacities, is a product of those natural forces which once seemed so alien and aloof. But it still remains true that physical reality is the prime reality, and that our values are something we import into nature, and not something we find there. (1) If ultimate reality is what the realists believe it to be, one cannot but feel that the modern pragmatist, like Socrates and the old time Sophists, is justified in turning from such fruitless speculations to the practical tasks of bettering human institutions and promoting human welfare.

Nevertheless, one is compelled to sympathize with the realist in his attempt to achieve a world view. The human mind is more than an instrument which, as intelligence, is serviceable to the organism in its struggle for survival. There grows up, pari passu with the need to guide and control activity, the need to understand. Dewey is following the tradition of Kant in stressing the primacy of practice over theory, and of the practical reason over the theoretic, but he surely goes too far in denying altogether the claims of theory and the theoretic reason. Whitehead, too, emphasizes the primacy of the practical reason, but he also draws attention to the great practical value of speculative systems of ideas. (2) It is possible, therefore, that the pragmatist exaggerates the part played in scientific method by experimentation and underestimates the importance of theories and hypotheses. (3) If Charles Darwin had not already had the theory of evolution in his mind, would he ever have found the evidence in nature

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(1) This is true, I should hold, of R.W.Sellars. His language implies that it is our desire to use objects to further our interests that invests them with value. See p. 54 supra.

(2) As, e.g., in mathematics. Cf. The Function of Reason, p. 59. Dorothy M. Emmet quotes a biologist as saying that one reason why biology is a backward science relatively to physics is that

to confirm it? In his concern for practical problems, the pragmatist tends to minimize what is most characteristic of mind - the capacity to frame and criticize abstract ideas. Ideas, however, should be put to use in the affairs of men; they ought to be made to justify themselves as far as possible in practice as well as in relation to a self-contained system. Thus far the pragmatist is surely right. But when he proceeds to identify truth with utility and validity with success we must part company with him. The realist is right in claiming what science gives us as valid knowledge. Inasmuch as it is scientifically verifiable, it is real knowledge and it is knowledge of the real. But only as far as it goes. For complete knowledge of the world other aspects of experience must be taken into account. The pragmatist is reluctant to make knowledge-claims because, for him, this raises the ghost of a "pre-existent reality" (1). He will not go beyond the facts constructed or reconstructed in the process of enquiry. Hence he is content to claim that " the ultimate object of knowledge is the satisfactory completion of the activity of enquiry, without being willing to say plainly that what the satisfactory completion of this activity consists in is the attainment of literal, and not merely of 'pragmatic' truth". (2)

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(1) i.e. a reality which is not amenable to scientific investigation but can only be "known" by metaphysical or other esoteric means. Cf. A.E.Murphy: The Uses of Reason, p. 89.

(2) Murphy: Idenism.

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biology is so much less developed on its theoretical side. Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, p. 22n.

(3) Cf. A. W. Moore: Creative Intelligence, pp. 109, 117.

The pragmatist is in revolt against the deification of abstract reason by the absolute idealists. (1) Absolute idealism thought that it was possible to build up a system of metaphysics that would give knowledge of reality simply by an exhaustive analysis of the laws of thought and with very little reference to actual experience. Again, the pragmatist is partly right, but he runs to another extreme. He takes experience as absolute and self-contained and denies that it needs any interpretation by refernce to anything beyond itself.(2) Experience is our teacher, but apart from the knowing self and the capacity of the mind to frame and criticize systems of ideas experience could teach us nothing. As Oman insists again and again, "life works with meaning and not with impact". "All environment deals with us and we deal with environment as meaning, and for this our thinking about it is of the utmost importance". (3) What we do is to frame a system of ideas or beliefs, the most adequate we can, and then attempt to interpret our experience as it comes to us by reference to the system. But our interpretations must be continually checked and rechecked by experience. "If we are not continually seeing our theory through experience, we shall come to see our experience through our theory." (4)

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(1) See pp. 87, 96, supra.

(2) G. P. Adams criticizes the pragmatist's neglect of what he calls the "environment or setting of experience". "All reflection and thought, science and philosophy, even consciousness itself, had its sole function in resolving the strains and problematic situations within the stream of experience; all thought was pertinent only to its temporal antecedents and consequences within this stream, and not to anything outside and beyond. The stream of experience was not thought of as having any banks which were not part of the stream itself." Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. I, p.70.

(3) Oman: Op. cit., p. 96. Cf. pp. 264-271.

(4) Identem.

We beleive, therefore, that the pragmatists are mistaken in denying that truth has reference beyond the immediate prosecution of a particular enquiry. Reason is wider than intelligence and will persist in askihg questions about the meaning of things as a whole. And it will insist upon attempts being made to answer those questions. Man is a metaphysical animal as well as a tool using animal. There must still be room for philosophy, although not for a philosophy which proceeds as if mind were "disembodied intellect" and presumes to apprehend the Infinite by "pure thought". (1) Philosophic method must be determined by the "Human demand for an understanding broad and just enough to learn freely from all that a growing experience has to teach and to accept as finally true only what will stand the test of such experience in the most comprehensively rational interpretation that can be given it". (2) Neither pragmatism nor realism meet this test. The former rejects our demand for a "comprehensively rational interpretation of all experience", and the latter offers us an interpretation of selected aspects of experience - and those the least valuable. We thus part company with both pragmatism and realism. We deny the claim of the first that scientific method is " the method of all possible knowledge", and we deny the claim of the second to tell us all that can be known of reality.

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(1) F. H. Bradley started out (in Appearance and Reality) by abstracting pure thought from all other functions of our being, but was forced to admit when confronted with the Absolute that for any knowledge of the Absolute pure thought must be reintegrated with feeling and volition. (Appearance and Reality, pp. 146 seq. Cf. Pringle-Pattison: Op. cit., pp.233f)

(2) A. E. Murphy: Op. cit., p. 337.

The neorealist view of reality is based upon an investigation of precisely those aspects of the world which would logically lead to a materialistic conception of the universe. This the pragmatist recognizes. But what he does not seem to see is that the scientific method leads directly to the scientific results. The physicist abstracts from the valuational aspect of reality because he is a physicist and not a philosopher. So far from being the method of all possible knowledge, experimental science is simply a technique which has been found to work well with data which can be reduced to quantitative terms. (1) To insist that one particular methodology is valid in all fields of human enquiry is to ignore the gulf which separates the organic from the inorganic, the mental from the non-mental. (2) It ignores the distinction between the natural sciences and what the Germans call the Geisteswissenshaften (3) Dewey takes the

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(1) The extraordinary success of physics and chemistry within their own sphere tempts man to think that the world is simply a physico-chemical system. These sciences, quite rightly for their own purposes, ignore the existence of minds; and scientists are likely to forget that somehow minds have grown up in a world of matter, and that it is by means of their activities that matter and its laws have become known. If a man referred to his brother or his cat as 'an ingenious mechanism' we should know that he was either a fool or a physiologist. No one in practice treats himself or his pets as machines, but scientists who have never made a study of speculative philosophy often seem to think it their duty to hold in theory what no one outside a lunatic asylum would accept in practice. If we remember that physics and chemistry are simply constructed to unify the correlations which we find among a selection of the sensa of three or four senses, the idea that these sciences give us a complete account of the structure of all Reality becomes ludicrous." C.D.Broad: Contemporary British Philosophy, First Series; quoted from Robinson's Anthology, p. 81.

(2) Therefore we find the philosophers who make this assumption tending to minimize or deny altogether the distinction between living and dead matter and between mental and non-mental.

(3) Cf. J. Baillie: The Interpretation of Religion, pp. 4-6. I am not unaware that the point of view expressed above runs counter to a widespread tendency in present day psychology and sociology. Cf. Pareto: The Mind and Society, and the "Neo-positivist" school of Carnap and the Vienna Circle. However, there are thinkers to whom one can refer for support; cf. Murphy: Op. cit., Pt. I, Ch. II, "Some Sceptical Doubts and their Resolution"; Pt.II,Ch.II, "Absolutism,Relativism and Practical Reason".

principle of continuity as one of the guiding principles of his philosophy, and this leads him to the belief that, whatever the subject matter on hand, scientific method is the only method of investigation. (1) If it is suggested that the Geisteswissenschaften have their own appropriate methods of seeking knowledge, Dewey replies that we are contributing to that profound split in human personality and human society which is at the bottom of all our troubles. "Are we compelled to hold", he asks, "that one method obtains in the natural sciences, and another, radically different, in moral questions?"(2) We are, because the subject-matter of the natural sciences and of ethics belongs to different levels of reality, and each has its appropriate method of investigation. (3) But as Robert M. Hutchins points out: "Those distinctions which are indispensable to the advancement of learning need not carry with them any division in the individual or in society, nor need they postpone the ultimate synthesis for which Mr. Dewey yearns. The way to postpone that synthesis is to assert exclusive claims for one discipline and one method which would, if granted, cramp, distort, and thwart the unification of thought and life". (4) "The heart

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(1) Cf. Intelligence in the Modern World, "Comprehensive Working Ideas", pp. 1039 seq.

(2) Article in Fortune magazine, August, 1944.

(3) J. H. Muirhead, writing of British Philosophy, says that the old controversy between spiritualism and materialism has ended in a general acceptance of the levels theory of reality. "There has thus resulted a growing recognition that the world is a house of many mansions, each with its own key, and that the attempt to find in physics a skeleton key that will open all locks is bound to fail. There is nothing more characteristic of contemporary British philosophy than the common sense that leads it to refuse a place to extreme behavioristic theories founded upon the denial of the variety of the variety in unity that pervades Nature". Preface to Contemporary British Philosophy, Second Series.

(3) Article "Education for Freedom" in The Christian Century, November 15th., 1944. p. 1314.

of the scientific method", says Dewey, "is recourse to intelligent observation guided by the best wisdom in our possession". (1) It might be suggested that both religion and philosophy have important contributions to the "best wisdom", but Dewey will not entertain such a plea because they are not scientific - i.e. not scientific in his sense of the word. But, as Hutchins says again: "Careful, honest, objective work, guided by the best wisdom in our possession - this is the method of any respectable investigator in any field and is in no way peculiar to science". (2) It is the pragmatist who is creating a profound split in human personality and in society by insisting upon applying to human studies a method fashioned to deal with facts of a very different order. The result is that man, his mind, his values, and his ideals, are regarded as on the same plane of reality as physical objects and processes. And in the end it cannot be claimed that pragmatism lives up to its claim to stand in the genuinely humanist tradition. From the standpoint of humanism, both pragmatism and realism fall short, and the explanation is to be found in their unrepentant naturalism. (3)"Thus man is made a much poorer measure of the

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(1) On. cit. (2) On. cit.,

(3) Cf. William James: The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 519. "I can, of course, put myself into the sectarian scientist's attitude, and imagine vividly that the world of sensations and scientific laws and objects may be all. But whenever I do this, I hear that inward monitor of which W.K.Clifford once wrote, whispering the word 'Bosh!' Humbug is humbug, even though it bear the scientific name, and the total expression of human experience, as I view it objectively, invincibly urges me beyond the narrow 'scientific' bounds."

On "Humanism" cf. article by John Line, "How Humanism Came and What It Is", The Canadian Journal of Religious Thought, Vol. VIII, No. 2, pp. 98-108. Cf. also Lynn Harold Hough: The Christian Criticism of Life.

universe than he has it in him to be". (1)

Naturalism is a justifiable assumption in the laboratory. "Its aim has always been the laudable one of explaining all phenomena in the simplest, most intelligible fashion, of reducing the complex to simple terms, and of exhibiting all things rising in accordance with some universal principle or law to whatever degree of complexity they may manifest. It sets out to explain everything on the lowest terms, with the fewest possible postulates of agencies required for their production".(2) Science has made such remarkable progress in recent years precisely it has proceeded upon the naturalistic assumption and limited itself to the study of things as they are found, refusing to be drawn aside into speculation regarding to the why and the wherefore of things. (3) But there is no justification for

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(1) J. Oman: Op. cit., p.102.

(2) W.D.Niven: Hastings' E.R.E. art. "Naturalism", Vol. IX, p.195. The same writer points out that Naturalism vindicates the rights of reason to enquire into phenomena and "reprobates a lazy 'supernaturalism' which lays fetters on the spirit of enquiry, and declines the drudgery of trying to understand the world in which man finds himself by saying, 'All things are as they are by the will of God whose ways are past finding'". (p. 196) Cf. Pringle-Pattison: Op. cit., pp. 88-90.

(3) Cf. R.B.Perry: Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 95. "Description means the reporting of things as they are found. The gradual substitution, in the procedure of science, of description for 'explanation', means that science has grown more rigorously empirical. 'Explanation', as constrasted with description, suggests a reference to trans-experiential powers, and mysterious essences, or a one-sided version of things in terms of human interests. Science has abandoned explanation in this sense, because such attempts diverted the attention from its proper subject-matter, and engaged it in irrelevant speculation." (Italics his).

turning a methodology into a metaphysic. (1) There are scientific questions and there are metaphysical questions. (2) The former admit of definite answers based on verifiable fact; the latter do not. But to rule the latter out of court, on that account alone, is not scientific but pure dogmatism. It is an illigimate extension of a particular methodology into a sphere in which it can have no application. For our answers to the metaphysical questions we shall have to fall back upon the "best wisdom" in our possession guided by the moral and religious insights of the human race. Burtt believes that "our view of man and his destiny depends in the main on our answer to this problem of the essential structure of the universe". (4) Science can tell us something about the essential structure of the universe, and doubtless will be able to tell us more as its investigations proceed. But the question of man and his destiny is a metaphysical question,

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(1) It is probably true that this is what most metaphysicians do. Cf. e.g., J.L.Childs: Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism. But how far this kind of procedure is really justifiable may be regarded as doubtful since the publication of F. H. Bradley's Appearance and Reality (1893).

(2) Cf. Etienne Gilson: God and Philosophy, p. 120. "The highest metaphysical problems in no way depend upon the answers given by science to its own questions". Gilson quotes Sir James Jeans as saying that "although many scientists prefer the notion of a cyclic universe, the more orthodox view" is that this universe owes its present form to a creation. Then he adds: "The two doctrines of a 'cyclical universe' and of a Supreme Thought were formulated by pre-Socratic philosophers who knew nothing of what Einstein would say twenty six centuries after them". (Ibid., p. 126) Gilson is surely justified in protesting the assertion often made that philosophy must wait upon the results of scientific enquiry before starting upon its own proper enquiry. We should agree with him that "existential questions cannot possibly be transposed into terms of science, but only into terms of an existential metaphysics".

(3) Op. cit., p. 485.

and we can see no reason for supposing that science will ever be able to answer it. If there is an answer it must come from an investigation of man's moral and religious experience. And the facts of the moral and religious experience are those with which science is least equipped to deal. (1)

It is significant that when the prgmatists come to deal with values and ideal ends, they desert scientific method and fall back upon something more fundamental, viz., moral faith. Dewey and Ames proclaim their devotion to values and ideal ends. They cannot argue for them; they can only say they believe in them. They cannot argue for them because, upon their principles, they can only appeal to science, and science cannot tell them why they should be for science, or for values, or for ideal ends. (2) Science did not give them their values and ideal ends; neither can science tell them why they should set one value above another or seek one end rather than another. Science may be able to give us what we want, but it cannot tell us what we ought to want.

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(1) By "science" we mean exact science. In the broad sense of the term both ethics and theology are scientific (cf. the article "Science" in Ency. Brit. XIV Edit., Vol. 20, p. 115), but not in the sense in which pragmatists understand the term. It is true that there is a psychology, even a psychology of religion, which claims to be scientific in this sense, but it concentrates on behavior and denies the existence, or, at least, the relevance, of what it cannot comprehend by its methodology, e.g. consciousness.

(2) Cf. Robert M. Hutchins: Op. cit., p. 1315.
On this point we can call a pragmatist to our support. E. A. Burtt writes: "The pursuit of science itself implies that we regard the kind of knowledge it discovers as worth pursuing and hence as a significant human good, but its value cannot be established by the method of science." Op. cit., p. 499.

Ames himself admits this. He enumerates the practical good works which science could help us achieve, and then he adds: "There is nothing in the nature of science itself to determine that its knowledge and skill shall have such uses".(1) But if science cannot and does not give us our values and ideal ends, why should it be admitted that science is competent to investigate them and pronounce judgment upon them? Ames also protests that "it is when we allow ourselves to be imposed upon by the natural science point of view as more real, more actual, that the human sphere appears as subjective, illusory, or unreal." But the "natural science" point of view" is an "outside-in" point of view and results from the application of a particular methodology.. If Ames wants to escape from the tyranny of this point of view, he should refuse to allow himself to be imposed upon by this particular methodology. (2) Our moral values and ideals must be allowed to bear their own witness to the nature of reality subject only to the scrutiny of that reason whose function it is to criticize all our beliefs in the light of an ever-growing and ever-widening experience. (3)

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(1) Religion, p. 78.

(2) Ibid., p. 171. "It is just one of the interesting and impressive phenomena of human thought that it is able to take an outside look at the world, but that it is truer or more essential than the inside apprehension of reality through genuinely human estimates is a wholly gratuitous assumption." (Ames: Identem) Then there is some other way of apprehending reality than by scientific method?

(3) The pragmatist appeals to "social verification" as the test of the validity of ideals. It is claimed that belief in God fails to pass this test - it is non-verifiable because not derived from sense-experience. But as Brightman says (Op. cit., p. 322) "society" is a concept that cannot be socially verified; our belief in other minds is a condition of experiment. "The essence of the reply to those who insist upon social verification is that social verification itself rests upon appeal to uses of reason which are more fundamental and broader than experimental verification. Experimental verification, without such use of reason cannot

Our conclusion is that idealism is justified in taking as its starting point the witness of our human values to the nature of reality. What the nature of that witness is will occupy our attention in the next chapter. We are simply concerned at this point to record the fact that our investigations have led us to the conclusion that there is no reason for accepting scientific naturalism as a starting point and then, afterwards, trying to find standing room for values and ideals. (1) We have already quoted Bewkes (2) as suggesting that: "In a day of accelerated change it is undoubtedly wise to place our trust in a reliable procedure rather than in a specific set of beliefs". We agree; but except in dealing with the physical aspects of existence we cannot agree that scientific method has proved itself a reliable procedure. We have seen that when it comes to values and ideals the pragmatists themselves desert scientific method and take their stand upon moral faith. For ourselves therefore we shall take our stand upon the idealist procedure and insist upon our right to interpret reality by the highest we know - our values and ideals. (3) For the knowledge which to all of

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(1) Cf. W. R. Sorley: Moral Values and the Idea of God, ch. I. Sorley points out that the road from "is" to "ought" is blocked. If you begin your philosophizing by leaving values out there is no logical way in which you can afterwards bring them back. We must therefore recognize values and ideals as an essential part of the data with which we start. We must explore the road from "ought" to "is".

(2) Supra, p. 36.

(3) Cf. Pringle-Pattison: Op. cit., p. 340.

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give us society or nature or God; it shuts us up in solipsism." Cf. also A. E. Murphy: Op. cit., pp. 80-85, "Truth as Social Agreement".

us, pragmatist, realist, and idealist alike, is most sure - the knowledge of our friends and of our duty - does not depend upon scientific knowledge or scientific method. A man will die for his friends, and for his ideals. He will die for them if need be, not because he believes that such conduct is "socially verifiable" but simply because he believes that he ought.

CHAPTER VI

THE VINDICATION OF THE SUPERNATURAL

Pragmatists and realists repudiate the supernatural element in traditional religion. Nature includes all the reality there is; man and his values are part of nature and are wholly explicable in terms of natural processes. If there is to be room for religion, it must be a religion purged of supernatural elements. And if, in connection with religion, we use the word "God" at all, it cannot apply to a Supreme Being but only to some phase or aspect of the natural process which can be scientifically known and empirically verified. Thus, for Ames, God is the idealized Spirit of humanity; for Alexander He is the idealized Space-Time Universe, big with deity; for Dewey, Wieman, Montague, and others, He is the value producing tendencies within the universe. (1)

The ostensible reason for rejecting belief in the supernatural is that such a belief is inconsistent with the methods and results of modern science. But we have already dealt at length with that claim and have found no convincing

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(1) Cf. H. N. Wieman: The Wrestle of Religion with Truth, Part II, passim; and for the others supra pp. 34 seq.

reason for admitting it. (1) In reality, belief in the supernatural is ruled out on a priori grounds. It is assumed for example that sense-experience is the source of all knowledge, and that no belief is justified that cannot be submitted to experimental verification. Any "God" who is believed to exist must be known by sensory experience and His existence must be demonstrable on empirical grounds.(2) A non-empirical deity is, ipso facto, non-existent. In short, a supernatural God is rejected because His existence would be inconsistent with naturalistic presuppositions. But naturalism also denies, or minimizes, the uniqueness of man because that too is inconsistent with its premises.(3) Naturalism is wedded to monism (or to "neutralism") and hence will not admit the dualism of natural and supernatural,

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(1) Cf. A.E.Murphy: Op. cit., pp. 718-719. "There is nothing in the scientific exploration of the natural world that proves that nature, as thus disclosed, is all there is . . . We have, therefore, no standard of antecedent rationality which would justify us in rejecting the supernatural as incredible." Cf. also A.K.Rogers: Op. cit., p. 21. "I have been giving reasons for supposing that the enlistment of science against religion has as yet no sufficient warrant either from the unanimity of scientists or from a body of assured scientific laws which in their own right rather than through the assistance of dubious metaphysical deductions drive the scientific mind to scepticism." (Italics mine)

(2) For an extreme expression of this point of view Cf. R.W.Nelson: "How Do We Know God?", Religion in Life, XI, 4, pp. 584-593. "Thus if men are to know God in any age, their knowledge must be historically rooted in perceptual evidences of God as an existent, functioning Being. God must meet men on the level of their experience and reveal Himself to them. He must behave before them. His revelation must meet the conditions of John Watson's behaviorism." (p.592)

(3) Cf. J.B.Pratt: Religious Realism, p. 52. "Such a creature as man - a being with a mind that is not a brain, a thought that is not identifiable with its distant object, a will that is capable of affecting the actions of the body, a personality that is not reducible to a succession of sensations - such a creature cannot be made to fit into the naturalistic scheme, and it is for this reason that the naturalistic philosophers deny his existence."

material and spiritual. James Bissett Pratt asserts that "the facts of experience and the testimony of consciousness seem plainly to point towards the dualistic view", and that the argument against it is "based not upon any solid fact but on what is called the inherent and antecendently improbability of dualism". And he goes on to claim that "when we analyze this improbability, we find that it comes down ultimately to the improbability of there being in the world any such creature as man". (1) This is identical with the conclusion to which our investigations have led us. Supernatural religion is rejected, not because it is inherently irrational but because of a prior refusal to credit the insight upon which it is based. "We know that there is a spiritual realm", says Pratt, "because we find that man cannot be adequately understood or described without recognizing the independent reality of the spirit. We know that there is a supernatural realm because we find that we ourselves are in part members of it." (2)

The pragmatists and some realists, however, are not content to deny the existence of the supernatural. They go further and deny that the concept is intrinsic to religion. In fact, religion can get along very well without God, or, at least, the kind of God in whom it has been accustomed to believe! Nor do values need any kind of supernatural sanction. Neither religion nor morality requires a supernatural God! We must, therefore, proceed to examine

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(1) Op. cit., p. 52.

(2) Op. cit., p. 54.

these claims. Can our ideal values, and can religion, be adequately interpreted with any reference to the Supernatural? (1) We shall deal first with the witness of our values to reality and afterwards with religion.

I

In an earlier chapter (2) we quoted A.E.Taylor as affirming that there must be as much to learn about the nature of reality from the fact that man is a rational being who cherishes ideal values as from the fact that the laws of motion are what they are. We have accepted the view that man is organic to nature, and in so doing we have noted that this "implies a denial of the assertion that man is an excresence upon Nature in the sense of being an alien in a world that is indifferent to his moral aims, or hostile to his ideas". (3) And we have claimed that this approach is justified by the fact that human beings do acknowledge, in practice if not always in theory, the constraint of absolute values. (4) The philosophical viewpoints which we have been examining all agree that religion is rooted in man's reverence for values and ideal ends, and, on the whole, they are in entire

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(1) We use the word "supernatural" in its ordinary sense as contrasted with the natural or physical order. The extent of the word "nature" in meaning to include the whole of reality leaves us without a term to apply to what is believed to be above nature. This belief may be a delusion, but many people continue to believe in its reality and we need a term by which to refer to it. Cf. J. Oman: "As here used, the Supernatural means the world which manifests more than natural values, the world which has values which stir the sense of the holy and demand to be esteemed as sacred. This is the only way in which the distinction can be drawn, but in this way we draw it quite simply every day . . The two are not in opposition, but are so constantly interwoven that nothing may be wholly natural or wholly supernatural". Op. cit., p. 72.

(2) Supra, p. 82.

(3) F. R. Tennant: Philosophical Theology, Vol. II, p. 102.

(4) "The moment we begin to live in the world as a rational universe, we assume their validity". J. Oman: Op. cit., p.206.

agreement with the Christian believer regarding the nature of those values and ideals. The point at issue between Christian faith and the substitutes proposed by pragmatists and realists is the relation of our values and ideals to ultimate reality. They agree with the Christian believer that:

> "(a) the existence into which you and I have wakened on this planet is well worth going on with, during the little time it lasts;
>
> (b) that what makes it worth going on with is not the mere enjoyment of the passing moment, but the fact that there is something noble which it is our duty to do;
>
> (c) that the nature of this duty has been set forth, with substantial correctness, in the Christian religion.

Christianity, however, has never failed to add to these a fourth proposition, namely:

> (d) that the nature of the thing which it is our duty to do follows closely from the nature of 'the scheme of things entire' in which we live and from the nature of our place in that scheme." (1)

Pragmatists and realists agree in rejecting this fourth proposition. They protest that "our human duties in no sense derive from the nature of the universal system to which we belong and have nothing to do with our station in that system". (2) Here, then, is the problem which now engages our attention, and we must press the question whether we can hold to propositions (a), (b), and (c), while discarding proposition (d). We shall attempt to show that this procedure completely fails to satisfy our sense of moral obligation and lands us in a direct inward contradiction.

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(1) John Baillie: Article "The Predicament of Humanism" in The Canadian Journal of Religious Thought, Vol. VIII, No. 2, pp. 113-114.

(2) Ibid., p. 114.

The sine qua non of morality is the fact of obligation. And the pragmatist fully recognizes the binding quality of moral values. "The reality of ideal ends and values in their authority over us is an undoubted fact". So writes Dewey; and the obligatory quality of moral values is one reason he gives for being able to dispense with religious beliefs.(1) But do the philosophical presuppositions of pragmatism make the fact of obligation intelligible? A great deal depends upon what Dewey actually means by his statement (2), but on the face of it it is a frank acknowledgement of the authority of ideal ends and values. The question is - whence does this authority derive? It cannot derive from the individual will. What I impose I can also relax. But the essence of moral conduct is that something is required of me. Quite obviously the fact of obligation is related to our membership in societies. But is society the source of the obligation? But is society itself not under obligation? The sense of obligation is doubtless mediated through society but that it derives from society cannot be admitted. To do so would rule out the possibility of moral advance. There have been times when conscience has led an individual to set himself steadfastly against the demands laid upon him by custom and tradition as represented by his social group. To interpret the sense of

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(1) Supra, p. 29.

(2) Edward L. Schaub after considering the possible meanings attaching to Dewey's statement writes: (The Philosophy of John Dewey, pp. 414-415) " . . that one can stop short of admitting a moralische Weltordnung, in the Fichtean sense, if one would do justice to what is involved in the experience whether of moral obligation or of compliance therewith, or would recognize the implications of the recognition, on the part of common men and philosophers alike, of the unique value possessed by the moral as distinct from other motives to conduct - this Dewey has certainly failed to establish."

obligation as derived from the fact of our human situation as members of society fails to account for the most significant of all moral facts - the nonconformist conscience. (1)

The "undoubted fact" of obligation only becomes intelligible when we set society against a larger background, when we see humanity in the context of the Divine. This is shown more clearly when we recognize that while some values are relative, others are absolute - absolute in the sense that they may not be put into the balance with anything else. Absolute obligation can only derive from the Absolute; unconditional demands from the Unconditioned. We only begin to interpret our moral experience seriously and to face its claims sincerely when we recognize that the nature of things is demanding something of us. (2) In other words, morality is an abstraction from the religious interpretation of life. For purposes of study we may treat morality as autonomous but then we may not enquire into the question of sanctions; we must accept the facts of the moral life as they are. To ask why men should be moral is to raise the question of a wider dimension than the sphere of morality - the final dimension, our relationship to God. (3)

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(1) "Nothing is more certain", writes Oman (Op. cit., p. 42), "than that the sacred claims to have its sanction in itself, and that it is corrupted when its sanction is submission to public opinion." This question will come up again in the nextsection when we discuss sociological theories of religion.

(2) John Baillie says that "Every proposition which begins with the words 'I must' can obviously be thrown into the form 'Reality is such that I must'." The Interpretation of Religion, p. 353.

(3) "Morality, then, has the right to be considered independently of religion only to the extent to which we are able, and indeed are compelled, to abstract from the question of sanctions, and to concentrate our attention upon the specific forms which the moral life assumes in the varying circumstances of human life, and in the varying relationships to the finite content of

Idealistic ethics have attempted to assess conduct in terms of motive, and naturalistic ethics in terms of consequences. But neither is adequate. What needs to be accounted for is the "undoubted fact" that I am obliged to entertain certain motives and to seek certain ends. "The ultimate issue in morality turns upon obligation - what is implied in the assumption that human actions are to be viewed, not in the light of the results to which they lead, or of the motives from which they spring, but in the light of an inner necessity which determines what kind of results should be sought and what kind of motive entertained." (1) This obligation covers the whole of conduct, in its inner and outer aspects, and can have only one source. It arises out of the conditions of human existence, out of our situation as persons related to other persons in society and all standing in relation to the Universal Person. The fact of our human existence as persons must be traceable to our relationship to "a being that is a Person and is at the same time the principle which makes it possible that other beings, through relationship to Himself, should assume the attributes of personality". (2) This is to affirm that the fact of obligation,

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(1) A. A. Bowman: Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, p. 101.

(2) Ibid., pp. 102-103. (This quotation together with the previous one is from Vol. II)

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experience which serve to determine these forms." (Bowman: Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. II, p. 100) Cf. also F. H. Bradley: Ethical Studies, chap. I., and W. G. de Burgh: Towards a Religious Philosophy, chap. IX.

unfolded in its full significance implies "that we relate all our activity, and ourselves as moral agents, not only to other agents like ourselves, but to a universal person - that is to say, to a person commensurate with the universality of the demand". (1)

The answer of upholders of naturalistic ethics to this claim that the fact of obligation derives from our relationship to God, the Source of our being and the Source of all Good, and that morality, ultimately, implies religion, is a counter-attack upon religion. The moral life, it is said, is self-sufficient and self-vindicating; to claim that it needs the sanctions of religion is to degrade morality to a prudential regard for consequences. Values, it is claimed, are values whether they are rooted in the ultimate nature of things or not. In fact, whatever our cosmic status may be, whether we are children of God and heirs of immortality, or only high-grade Simians doomed to share the fate of the beasts of the field, we know that we ought to seek what is good and true and that is enough. (2)

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(1) Cf. A. E. Taylor: "The good man who thinks out to the end the implications of his loyalty to the moral good . . will find that he is pledged to something more than simple recognition of an ideal of conduct as entitled to his unqualified respect. He is committed . . to a belief in the final coincidence of the 'ought' and the 'is', in virtue of their common source in a transcendent living and personal Good - one, complete, eternal - the only belief which rightfully deserves to be called belief in God". On. cit., Vol. II, p.1.

(2) Thus W. P. Montague says that he learned from Santayana that "value did not depend on existence, nor right on might, nor ethics on religion. An atheistic nature red with tooth and claw could in no sense absolve man from his obligation to actualize ideals of beauty and goodness; nor could it deprive him of the consolation of knowing that those values were always and eternally there, be the world what it might." Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 138.) Cf. Supra, p. 56.

This counter-attack seems to us to miss the mark in at least two ways. It fails to meet the point of the theistic argument, and it demands an acquiesence on the part of intelligent, moral beings which it is impossible for them to maintain. We are not seeking to justify morality or to vindicate values. The first principles of morality must shine by their own light. Our values must authenticate themselves. Let that be granted. (1) What we are now claiming is that the fact of moral obligation - when we come to examine it from the standpoint of philosophy, and no longer take it for granted as in actual practice - cannot be derived from morality itself but must be referred back to the total conditions of human existence. It is not a matter of justifying morality but of whether the facts of our moral consciousness, when fully examined, do not point beyond themselves to a higher reality. Further, it seems to us too much to ask of intelligent, moral beings that they should not enquire into the source of the authority under which they believe themselves to stand, and wonder whether the obligatory character of the claim laid upon them is not a significant clue to their status in the universe. It is a question as to the intelligibility of values and ideals. (2) And we should claim

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(1) Dewey holds (supra pp. 29seq.) that when we identify ideal values with existent Reality we show that we "care more for force than for ideal values - since all that an Existence can add is force to establish, to punish, and to reward." Moreover we are evincing lack of moral faith and substituting in its place intellectual assent. But this criticism is grievously wide of the mark. It is because of the unconditional claim which ideal values make upon our allegiance that we find it impossible to admit that ultimate reality is reducible to physical terms and wholly explicable in physical categories.

(2) Cf. W. M. Urban: "I find it wholly unintelligible to seek to validate values by carrying them back to life and at the same time refuse to recognize the absolute values which alone give life meaning and without which it cannot be interpreted. But the climax is reached when we assert that the values are there, are valid, and then divorce them from the only metaphysic that makes their validity intelligible."
Contemporary American Philosophy. Vol. II.

that values and ideal ends have no intelligible place in an "atheistic nature". (1) A consistent naturalism cannot admit either values or ideals. (2)

Having attempted to show that the realities of our moral experience presuppose the existence of a Supreme Reality of transcendent Goodness, we now face the objection that such a belief is fatal to moral progress. Such is Dewey's claim. But, as Schaub says, Dewey's argument at this point would seem to depend upon an *a priori* judgment as to what ought to follow from the logic of the position rather than upon the results of actual observation. (3) The facts seem to point in the opposite direction. Belief in predestination ought logically, perhaps, to have produced "timid, weak, and

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(1) The question Montague (Cf. p. 136 n.2) does not face is this: Can a nature in which man recognizes an absolute claim to actualize values be an "atheistic nature"? How, then, account for the unconditional claim? Presumably it derives from the fact that the values eternally "subsist" in Santayana's Realm of Essence - a Realm quite divorced from the "atheistic nature". (Cf. *supra*, p. 56)

(2) Russell is clear minded enough to recognize this fact. (Cf. *Religion and Science*, ch. IX) He admits that science can tell us nothing about values but affirms that this because value judgments are neither cognitive nor objective but merely expressions of taste. But dare one suggest that, in dealing with this subject, Russell writes with his tongue in his cheek? Judging from the strictures he passes upon Nazi "morality" we cannot think that he really believes that moral distinctions are expressive of nothing more than differences of taste!

(3) E. L. Schaub: *Op. cit.*, p. 403. Schaub adds: "When one thinks of religion in general rather than merely of supernaturalism in Dewey's sense of the term, one cannot but be impressed by the magnitude of its constributions, in the way of incentive, to all manner of revolutions against conditions that have oppressed man, to constructive movements of social reform, and to the general cause of human enlightenment and refinement". *Idem*.

sentimental personalities" (1), but in actuality it produced the Scottish Covenanters, Cromwell's Ironsides, and the Pilgrim Fathers! It is charged by Dewey and Ames that belief in a transcendent Source of Goodness leads believers to becomes absorbed in the worship or contemplation of this transcendent Source, with the result that the practical duties of daily life are neglected. A further development of this same argument is that made familiar by its prominence in the anti-religious polemic of dialectical materialism. Religious faith encourages its devotees to look for their blessedness, not to some possible state of things on this earth, but to a promised future life in heaven. Thus again, religion turns man's eyes away from the practical tasks of social betterment that confront him. We should not deny some truth to these complaints, although we should certainly claim that they are exaggerated. Religion is concerned with man's good, but it has tended to conceive this good in a somewhat individualistic fashion and to overlook the importance both of the social and natural environment. But the supreme good for man, as Christianity conceives it, is not a state of things but a condition of the soul - a certain kind of character or quality of personal life - and a social relationship which unites all men to the Supreme Being in the bonds of mutual trust and love. Christians see no need to renounce this belief, but, as recent developments prove, they are becoming increasingly aware that personality depends for its growth and expression

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(1) Ames: Religion, p. 94. For the suggestion that religious doctrines often have different results when they become matter of experience from what might have been expected a priori, cf. Temple: Op. cit., pp. 378 seq.

upon the social life and upon the quality of the environment and that they cannot be indifferent to these matters. However, since Christianity firmly believes in the reality of spirit, it can never accommodate itself to the demands of the pragmatist who thinks of good in purely practical or utilitarian terms.

We conclude, therefore, that the witness of our values points to the reality of a spiritual and supernatural order, and that belief in the reality of such an order in no way detracts from our devotion to ideal values and ends but is, on the contrary, the inspiration of such devotion as is actually found among men. Neither does this belief in the Supernatural frustrate the ends of the moral life, because right relations with the Supernatural is itself the supreme good. (1) To renounce faith in the Supernatural because of the intellectual difficulties involved is one thing; to renounce such faith on the ground that we can get along very well without it is quite another. Such renunciation may seem very heroic, but, as Lotze has said, it is "sham heroism, which glories in renouncing what no man has a <u>right</u> to renounce". (2) "We

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(1) H.N.Wieman says: "All the great religions have assumed that to attain the supreme good involves the ultimate cause. They have assumed that to attain the supreme good we must get into right relations with the ultimate cause . . . If this view is mistaken and people come to see the mistake, we can still have moral idealism which strives towards an unattainable goal, and we can still have metaphysical speculation concerning the nature of the ultimate cause. But what we cannot have, if this view is correct, is the passionate lunge and striving of men to actualize the supreme good by way of experimental adaptations to that ultimate condition which determines what measure of good shall accrue to human living". (Op. cit., pp. 148-149) It is difficult to see the point of this objection. If the "ultimate condition which determines what measure of good shall accrue to human living" is distinguished from the "ultimate cause", then values have no relation to ultimate reality - and this we cannot admit. Wieman's initial error would seem to be his assumption that religion is, or has been, primarily interested in using God to attain ulterior ends, and not in communion with God for its own sake.

can do without the reward, we can do without the glory, perhaps we can do without the spur and the crutch, but we cannot do without the assurance that the struggle on which we are engaged is a real fight and a fight that counts. To renounce that faith is no true heroism but only foolish heroics, no noble self-renunciation but only disloyalty to the deepest thing in our souls, and a selling of our most sacred birthright". (1) The fact is that the pragmatists and realist have no right to speak of "our" values, or to describe them as "human" values. Their reality does not depend upon our goodness, our appreciation, or our loyality. We do not make them; they make us. (2) Our awareness of value can only be explained, as Plato long ago saw, as a progressive participation in a higher world of being whose organising principle is the Good.

II

We turn now to the question of religion. Does religion depend upon belief in the Supernatural? It was once universally assumed that belief in gods was the essence of religion. Critics of religion suggested that primitive man invoked the supernatural in order to explain his world.

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(1) J. Baillie: Op. cit., p. 357. Baillie quotes the following from that doughty fighter William James:-
"I do not consider it healthy-minded to nurse the notion that ideals are self-sufficient and need no actualization to make us content. It is a quite unnecessarily heroic form of resignation and sour grapes." (Familiar Letters: Vol. II, p.370.)

(2) Cf. Rudolf Euken: Christianity and the New Idealism, pp. 6-8
"It (the spiritual life) cannot possibly be a mere product of human reflection. Its forms and powers are far too unique to be in any way derivable from us".
Cf. also J.S.Mackenzie: Robinson's Anthology, p. 260.
"We cannot invent values; we only discover them".

Religion grew out of intellectual curiosity. This mistaken view leads to the assumption that religion is a kind of primitive science with which we can now dispense.(1) And, unfortunately, the tendency of some religious apologists to appeal to the gaps in our scientific knowledge as evidence for the existence of God lends a certain plausibility to the assumption. Recent research into the religious beliefs and practices of primitive peoples, however, is generally believed to show that the origin of religion is to be traced to man's elemental needs and not to his intellectual curiosity. (2) From this fact two different conclusions are drawn. One is that since religion is related to man's practical needs it can be dismissed as an example of the wish being father to the thought. This is the attitude of some realists.(3) The other conclusion is that drawn by the pragmatists. Since religion had its origin in the quest for the satisfaction of felt wants, it therefore "arises from" man's own self and all reference to divine beings or powers is purely adventitious. (4)

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(1) Cf. Gerald Heard: The Third Morality, pp. 23-34. "Newton banished God from Nature . . He had shown that the cosmos was a blind machine." "Darwin banished God from life . . He had proved life meant, and had, as little purpose as the universe . ." "Freud drove God from the last fortress, the soul . . He maintained that conscience is not only harmful, but unnecessary, and as unnecessary as harmful."

(2) Not that primitive man was devoid of intellectual curiosity, but that he knew how to distinguish his science (such as it was) from his religion. Cf. B.Malinowski: "Science, Magic, and Religion" in Science, Religion and Reality, pp. 21 seq.; R.R. Marett: Anthropology, pp. 232f. On primitive religion Cf. Nathan Soderblom: The Living God, chap. I.

(3) "Religion was born from need wedded to ignorance". R.W. Sellars: The Next Step in Religion, p.110.

(4) "Men have been blinded to the fact that religion arises from themselves by the tradition of their own inferiority . . they have been unable to think of noble things as emanating from their own life." E. S. Ames: Op. cit., p. 15.

We have already discussed the view that man's belief in the objectivity of values and ideals is a projection of his own subjective desires, and we do not intend to dwell on the matter at this point. (1) It must be emphasized, however, that those sceptics who dismiss religion so confidently as "wishful thinking" are guilty of taking a very onesided view of religion. Thus Burtt, after referring to the impact of Freudian psychologies upon the modern mind, adds: "From this standpoint, the argument for the reality of God or a spiritual order from the universal consent of mankind loses all its force; in fact, we must admit rather a presumption of the invalidity of any widespread human belief who main tendency is to console people in adversity and encourage them in weakness". (2) But why should it be assumed that the chief function of religion is to console and encourage? Indubitably there are types of religion which are not unjustly described as "dope"; but there are other types which might be called "dynamite". Religion offers challenge as well as consolation; martyrdom as well as comfort. (3) On the face of it, it seems incredible that a force which enabled man to conquer his doubts and fears and assert himself against the cosmic process as judge, not suppliant, should be thus discarded as having its origin in

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(1) See pp. 80-81 supra.

(2) Types of Religious Philosophy, p. 371.

(3) H. H. Farmer says that at the heart of the religious man's awareness of God there is the awareness of God as unconditional demand and final succour. "And these two awarenesses are not, in the living religious experience, separable from one another; they are given in and through one another". The World and God, p. 25.

illusion. (1)

The pragmatists do not argue that belief in God is an illusion; they simply say that religion can get along without it. But the differences between these two conclusions is more apparent than real. What is significant is that they agree in rejecting the objective reference implicit in religious faith. Pragmatism says that religion is the quest for the fullest possible satisfaction of felt needs. But there is nothing particularly "religious" about "felt needs". What is religious is the way man sought to satisfy those needs. He did so by trying to relate himself and his needs to supernatural powers. (2) The pragmatists are thoroughly Kantian in stressing the primacy of man's practical needs in his religious development, but they do not go deep enough in their analysis of human needs. (3) Man's deepest need is the transcendence of the contradiction which he feels between his creaturely status and his highest aspirations. This need arises from the fact that he is, on the one hand, at the mercy of indifferent, even hostile, natural forces, and, on the other hand, feels himself, potentially at least, superior

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(1) For an argument that religion was the means whereby man was enabled to conquer himself and his environment, cf. Oman: Science, Religion and Reality, p. 292. Cf. also The Natural and the Supernatural, pp. 83f. "The moment man said, 'This is sacred . .' Forthwith he began to be master of himself, and, thereby, master of his world. Then, in some true sense of the word, he began to be free".

(2) For a thorough discussion of the thesis that this objective reference is of the essence of religion, cf. Oman: Op. cit., pp. II and III.

(3) Cf. E.L.Schaub's criticism of Dewey's interpretation of the origin of the religious attitude.(Op. cit., pp. 415-416) "Man's sense of dependence is indeed more profound than anything derivable from the experience of those precarious elements of the environment which Dewey stresses, or from the realization by an individual that his successes are conditioned by cooperating factors of his physical and social environment." Schaub refers to the experience of death, and continues: "But through other channels also man comes to experience what has aptly been called a creature-feeling, and is claimed,

to those forces. He sets up the opposition between the natural and the supernatural because he recognizes that within himself which does not derive from natural process, something which "he is bound to set over against nature as a whole". (1) Religion is the attempt to resolve this opposition and achieve a sense of communion with the power or powers upon which man believes his well being to depend. Religion is concern for values, but the highest value known to religion - the supreme end - is communion with God. (2) The pragmatist, in his preoccupation with purely practical values fails to do justice to this aspect of religion.

In support of their contention that the concept of God is not essential to religion, the pragmatists refer to certain facts concerning primitive religion which have been interpreted by Durkheim and his school to mean that religion is entirely explicable in sociological terms. (3) Thus, it is discovered that some primitive peoples have no conception of a

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(1) A.A.Bowman: Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 166. Cf. Albrecht Ritschl: "In all religions man seeks, by the aid of the exalted spiritual power he reveres, the solution of the contradiction in which he finds himself as part of the natural world and as spiritual personality claiming to rule it." Die Lehre von der Rechtfertigung, 3rd. ed., Vol. III, p. 189. Quoted from Oman: Op. cit., p. 20.

(2) "In all ages, communion with God, however crudely conceived, has been the primary concern of religion." H. W. Wright: Op. cit., p. 206.

(3) E. Durkheim: Elementray Forms of the Religious Life, Paris 1913, E.T. 1915.
In recent years great interest has been shown in religious origins, and many people have succumbed to what Bowman calls "the lure of the primitive" (Op. cit., Vol. I, p.44) and Edwin Bevyn "the method of anthropological intimidation" (Symbolism and Belief, p.51)

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quite properly, to derive from man's consciousness, however aroused, of the roots and limitations of his being. Here, again, he encounters Reality both in the sense of antecedent and ultimate, and here, as the weight of the evidence would seem to prove, is the basis of an experience which may be distinguished as religious."

divine being and the conclusion is drawn that this conception is not essential to religion. But if these particular primitives do not have the concept of a supernatural being they do have the conception of a supernatural power. It is generally recognized that the conception of mana brings us close to the historical beginnings of religion. The belief in gods may have arisen when the conception of mana became united with the animistic outlook. (1) Cult and ceremony are also central features of primitive religion. Religion is quite evidently a religious phenomenon. From this the conclusion is drawn that "God" is none other than the clan itself. Religion is "an expression of the forces by which a social group imposes its authority upon its constituent units and ensures thereby the conditions of its own existence." (2) "In a general way", says Durkheim, "a society has all that is necessary to arouse the sensation of the Divine in minds, merely by the power that it has over them; for to its members it is what a God is to its worshippers. The God of the clan can be nothing else than the clan itself." (3)

Ames' dependence on Durkheim and the French sociological school is obvious. But, as Pringle-Pattison has said, "it is one thing to insist that religion is at the outset predominantly an affair of the community, and that society is the medium through which man becomes a rational and moral

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(1) Cf. Baillie: The Interpretation of Religion, pp. 381-385, and authorities there cited.

(2) E. Durkheim. Quoted Pringle-Pattison: Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, p. 37.

(3) Ibid., p. 38 "But", says Oman, "a social sanction is not the kind of sanction which religion itself claims, and in point of fact a social sanction is not by itself more sacred than a personal one, nor is it recognized, at least by any advanced religion, as being so." Op. cit., p. 42.

being; it is quite another to offer as the solid core of religion the dutiful attitude of the individual towards the social structure of which he is a member . . . to make the latter assertion is to proclaim all religion, as it has historically existed - all religion in the ordinary meaning of the term - to be a collective hallucination which fantastically transforms into collective realities the internal structure of society itself." (1) Ames' conception of "God" falls under this same condemnation. Human society can only be the medium of those experiences which man has interpreted as religious. The concept of "society" itself is an ideal rather than an actuality. (2) "Humanity" only becomes worshipful when invested with characteristics which do not belong to it in actuality, but are derived from that larger environment which the positivist denies. "Mankind has no more entitative independence of God, the larger Providence, than the individual possesses of the proximate and lesser providence which the pious positivist recognizes in Humanity." (3)

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(1) Pringle-Pattison: Op. cit., pp. 38-39. Cf. the same author earlier work, The Idea of God, Lecture VII, "Ethical Man: The Religion of Humanity". Cf. also C.C.J. Webb: "Group Theories of Religion.

(2) "The truth is that society is not an organism, but is in a perpetual process of becoming one." W.E.Hocking: "Is the Group Spirit Equivalent to God for All Practical Purposes?", The Journal of Religion, Vol I. No. 5. p. 485. Cf. the same writer's "Illicit Naturalizing of Religion", Ibid., Vol. III. No. 6.

(3) Cf. W.G. de Burgh: Towards A Religious Philosophy, p. 304. " . the conception of humanity is an empty abstraction when severed from the other-worldly view of religion in which historically it had its birth."
Bradley is very clear on this point. Cf. Ethical Studies, p. 205, "Humanity is not a visible community". "Of course, if religion and, more particularly, Christianity be brought in the answer must be different." (p.231).

We conclude, therefore, that the appeal to religious origins does not substantiate the claim that religion can dispense with the idea of God. (1) Religion comes into being as the result of man's recognition of a supernatural environment, and is, in essence, a means of achieving harmonious relations with that environment. The religious spirit finds in highest expression in worship, and worship, as Hocking puts it, "in order to fulfill its social function must be directed to a non-social object". (2) In short, "the essence of religion in all its forms is a response to the ultimate as personal." (3) It is true, as Bowman points out, that in religious development it is possible to trace a turning away from the personal to the impersonal, but it is also true that something is retained from the personal attitude and carried over into our attitude towards the impersonal. We find, therefore, that some people are able to make a religion out of science (4), or out of morality (5), but the attitude of personal devotion which this involves is derived neither from science nor from morality but from religion. It is arguable, therefore, that Dewey does not

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(1) Buddhism is sometimes appealed to as an example of a religion without a divine being. Gautama himself seems to have been an atheist who worked out a system of self-salvation, but his followers soon made him an object of worship. Popular Buddhism has an abundance of divine beings. Cf. Baillie: Op. cit., pp. 386-387, and authorities there cited.

(2) Op. cit., p. 589.

(3) H.H. Farmer: Op. cit., p. 38. (Italics his.)

(4) Cf. Hornell Hart: "Science: the True Religion", Christian Century, August 4, 1943. p. 893.

(5) Cf. Nicolai Hartmann: Ethics. Yet Hartmann, as Webbs says, "uses language which cries aloud for a belief in God to give it meaning".

really succeed in emancipating the religious attitude from religion; what he does is to carry over, surreptiously, an attitude towards reality which was born of religious experience and can maintain itself only for a limited time when uprooted from a vital religious faith. Similarly, the substitute which Ames proposes for historical religion will serve only so long as it is suffused in the "after-glow" of man's experience of God. That it could stand by itself, and maintain an influence comparable with that of historic religion, were all faith in the objective reality of God to vanish, Ames nowhere shows. (1) We are inclined to believe that both Ames and Dewey believe a good deal more in the bottom of their hearts than is allowed to find expression in the philosophy. In any case, their stated philosophy only becomes intelligible in the light of assumptions concerning reality which are quite as much matters of faith as are the assumptions of Christianity. (2)

When Dewey and Ames reject traditional religion because of its "crass supernaturalism", they are thinking of naive and immature conceptions of the supernatural. We should not deny that supernaturalism has found expression in many crude forms, but we should expect philosophers to recognize these for what they are. The supernatural is, as Oman says, "like all our higher environment, opportunity for abuse as well as for use". (3) And, doubtless, man has abused it. But, to

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(1) A.C. Knudson puts it a little more strongly: "The truth would seem to be that the humanistic faith is an offshoot from Christianity, a Christian heresy, and that it derives its moral strength from the faith it denies. It is a parasitic growth and without the mother-soil of historical religion would soon perish." The Validity of Religious Experience, p.136.

(2) We cannot dispense with faith. It is more fundamental than scientific method for science involves faith in reason and faith in the order of nature. "This faith cannot be justified by any inductive generalization". Whitehead: Science and the Modern World, p. 23. (3) Op. cit., p. 14.

quote Oman again, "religion, like all else, suffers from the imperfections, weaknesses, and errors of human nature, and, in consequence, there is bad religion as there is bad business or bad science or bad morals. Nothing gives more unreality to the study of religion that forgetfulness of this fact and the expectation that everything claiming the name of religion ought to be admirable and capable of being defended". (1) Bad religion arises from wrong conceptions of the Supernatural and from wrong ways of conceiving the relation of the Supernatural to the natural. And, in dealing with these questions, one cannot look to primitive forms of the religious life for a solution. Man, in reflecting upon his religious experience, gradually clarifies and purifies his conception of God, and at the same time he has to rethink the problem of God's relation to the world and to his own life. It is only to the maturest reflection that we can look for guidance. (2)

Primitive man, for example, finds no difficulty in thinking of God as a person somewhat like himself only more powerful. The problem of God's relation to the universe does not yet arise. When it does arise we find that rationalistic Deists had no difficulty in conceiving of God as an external Creator and Moral Governor, dwelling apart from the world which He had made and set in motion. But that conception of God and His relation to the world is utterly inacceptable to day. And

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Op. cit., p. 14.

(2) This is what many critics will not do. They seek to discredit religion by reference to outgrown beliefs and practices which no able contemporary theologian would dream of trying to defend. Their writings show no acquaintance with the ablest contemporary religious thinking. Cf. e.g., R. W. Sellars: The Next Step in Religion; W. P. Montague: Belief Unbound; Julian Huxley: Religion without Revelation; etc.

the reason for its unacceptibility is not simply that the progress of scientific knowledge has ruled it out of court, but that maturer religious reflection has shown its unsatisfactory character for religion.(1)

A great deal of misunderstanding would be avoided if it were clearly recognized that religion is not interested in God as a principle of scientific explanation. Man's interest in God is religious, and springs out of his concern for his own welfare and destiny. This concern for his own welfare and destiny led primitive man to produce his cosmogonies and weave his myths. (2) If these are looked upon as attempts at scientific explanation of natural phenomena, they are rightly held to be discredited by advancing knowledge. But, for the most part, their purpose is not scientific but religious. The creation stories in Genesis, for example, certainly do reflect primitive scientific beliefs, but, for all that, their interest (is not?) in the question of how the world was made. That is a scientific question and religion has no particular stake in the answer. But the Genesis stories do proclaim the deep-rooted conviction that the world owes its existence to the beneficient purpose of God, and that it was intended as a home for man where he should work out his destiny. They give a religious answer to a religious question. To regard

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(1) A.A.Bowman: (Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 387-389.) says that both rationalists and empiricists, thinking of experience in terms of the subject-object relationship, took a "cinematographic" view of experience and related God to nature mechanically. See pp. 427 seq. for a discussion of the problem of Creation and a suggestion that Creation may be conceived as a category of Divine self-experience. Cf. Karl Heim: God Transcendent for an application of the "dimensional levels" theory to the problem of God's relation to the world.

(2) "Myth is always concrete and expresses life better than abstract thought can do . . . Myth presents to us the supernatural in the natural . . it brings two worlds together symbolically." N. Berdyaev: Freedom and the Spirit, p. 70.

these stories as attempts at scientific explanation, and then dismiss them because they are not in accord with modern science, is to reveal a signal lack of understanding. Religious thinkers, reflecting upon the meaning of their experience, have attempted to interpret that meaning in terms of the thought forms of their own age. Thus, inevitably, a good deal of primitive science and philosophy becomes embedded in theology, and many people are confused as to what is, and what is not, of vital concern to faith. We have already pointed out that one service which science has rendered religion is in forcing it to face this question and decide by an investigation of its own sources of insight what is, and what is not, of paramount concern for the religious outlook.(1) In general we may say that science is concerned with what is and with how it came to be; religion is concerned with the meaning and purpose of life. Science is concerned with only a part of our life; religion with the whole. Science engages only a part of our nature; religion the whole. And that is why religion has produced cosmogonies and myths, viz., to enshrine its apprehensions of value. (2)

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(1) Supra., pp. 20-22.

(2) Cf. Theodore de Laguna: Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 419-420. "From a logical standpoint, cosmologies are the result of an ignoring of the historical limitations of human knowledge. However, they commonly have motives of another order altogether; they are expressions of the religious spirit. The belief, for example, that the universe is an animate being (Plato) is held, not because of tangible evidence that can be offered for it - though men who hold it may seek to bolster up their faith with proofs - but because it seems to the believer to ascribe the highest possible value to the world in which we live and the life we lead in it."

The contention that supernaturalism is disastrous for morality is obviously due to a wrong conception of the relation of the Supernatural to the natural. We examined some of these objections in the previous section, but we shall look at them again briefly from this point of view. Set God over against the moral life as an external Judge or Governor and you have Kant's definition of religion - "the recognition of all duties as divine commands". (1) As if God were, in Knudson's phrase, " a kind of device for getting us to do our duty!" (2) To make morality dependent upon religion in this authoritarian fashion corrupts both morality and religion. In eighteenth century England, Paley was teaching that "virtue is the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God and for the sake of everlasting happiness". (3) And when Shaftesbury attempted to vindicate the autonomy of morality, his efforts were denounced " as a subtle form of atheism which undermined religion by denying its chief practical utility". (4) "But apart from such gross eudaemonism, religion has constantly been used to reduce morality to a narrow and formal legalism, which deprived it of all its true character as an insight and an

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(1) Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason, p. 142. Quoted from Brightman: Op. cit., p. 15n.

(2) Knudson: Op. cit., p. 113. This is, of course, not fair to Kant. Kant believed firmly in the autonomy of the moral life; he was sure that religion depended upon morality and not morality upon religion. But he was sure where the passage from morality to religion took place and consequently left them related quite externally. In other words, as regards the relation of God to the world and the moral order he was still somewhat under the influence of deistic rationalism. However see p. 12 supra. Cf. p. 73.

(3) Quoted from Baillie: Op. cit., p. 267n.

(4) Oman: Op. cit., p. 209.

aspiration and a reaching out to worlds not yet realized; while religion also ceased to be a faith in the unseen and eternal which is an inspiration and a challenge, and which alone makes it truly religion." (1) Ames is thus justified, to some extent, in protesting against the tendency of traditional religion to reduce morality to "the regulation of conduct by set rules" (2); but he does not seem to realize that when religion does this it impoverishes itself and sooner or later a rebirth of genuine religion rekindles a living morality. (3) In his attempt to prove that supernatural religion is necessarily fatal to morality, Ames raises the old question whether the good is good because God will it, or whether God wills it because it is good. But this question can only arise when the relation of religion to the moral life is conceived quite externally. Thus Ames writes: "The idea that a divine being requires obedience to certain rules and ordinances which have no discernible moral quality . . . is repellent to human reason and moral judgment."(4) He is certainly right. But this truth was first clearly enunciated by the prophets of Israel eight centuries before Christ. The ethical religions have long since learned that when the word "good" is applied to God it must mean the same

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(1) Oman: On. cit., p. 209.

(2) On. cit., p. 92. Cf. Reinold Niebuhr: "The weakness of orthodox Christianity lies in its premature identification of the transcendent will of God with canonical moral codes many of which are merely primitive social standards". (An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 19)

(3) As the evangelical revival swept away Paley's nicely calculated eudaemonism and quickened a new sensitivity to social wrongs.

(4) On. cit., p. 225.

thing as when it is applied to man. Does faith in the Supernatural make morality dependent upon the arbitrary will of God? But how can God's will be arbitrary? God's will cannot be considered apart from His Nature, and if His Nature is perfect goodness then His will is the expression of that goodness. Nor is it true to claim that recognition of a supernatural or spiritual realm "introduces into life a cleavage which obscures and confuses all important problems". (1) This is to misconceive the relation of the Supernatural to the natural with a vengeance. If these were two utterly separate realms of being it might be true to say that the distinction "reduces every day experiences to the routine and the common-place, and removes spiritual values out of the reach of the common man". (2) But if in fact the Supernatural is immanent in the natural and is the source of the values manifested in the natural, then it is this interpenetration of the natural by the Supernatural that invests this mortal sphere with the light that never was on land or sea and brings spiritual values within the reach of the common man. And we have argued that this is the only interpretation of our moral experience which gives due weight to the imperative claim of ideal values, and makes of morality an intelligible fact. Any other interpretation cannot fail to treat values as "sports" of a causally determined process, and to leave morality an unintelligible fact. We shall conclude this paragraph with a quotation from Oman which admirably states the point we have been trying

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(1) Ames: Op. cit., p. 65.

(2) Identem

to make and meets perfectly the objections raised by Dewey and Ames . "The wrong way of relating the Supernatural to truth, beauty, and goodness is to set it over them as an external, legal, infallible authority, and make truth what has thus been revealed, right what has thus been required, and, if there be any place for beauty at all, it is only in its austere aspects as a handmaid of the sterner disciplines of faith and practice, and whatsoever things are lovely are left no standing in their own right, nor any reason why they should be thought of and sought for their own sake." (1)

To sum up. We have tried to show that the witness of our values points to the reality of a spiritual order, and we have defended this view against various criticisms of it. Then we tried to show that religion is meaningless apart from the implicit reference to a supernatural order, and we ventured to suggest that many of the objections raised against supernaturalism stem from misapprehensions concerning the relation of the supernatural to the natural. Assuming now that religion is an attempt on man's part to establish harmonious relations with a supernatural environment, we may enquire how that environment is known. It is known, as any environment is known, by the way it manifests itself. The error into which the rationalists fell is that of demanding that the reality of the supernatural should be demonstrated by evidence not depending upon itself. But, as Oman points out, the rationalists overlooked the fact that the empirical philosophers had attempted to prove the existence of the material world by other evidence than the way it environs us, and with results no more reassuring than

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(1) Op. cit., p. 208.

in the case of the supernatural. "On the principle of proving the reality of our environment from something else, the sceptical conclusion is at least as inevitable in the case of the Natural as of the Supernatural . . . It is simply that we cannot prove the reality of any environment while omitting the only evidence it gives of itself, which is the way it environs us." (1) It was for this reason that, in an earlier chapter, (2) we raised an objection to the scholastic assumption that the only road to the knowledge of God must be cut through the things of sense. The only road to the knowledge of God is through religious experience. Some philosophers refuse to admit this claim because they think it is a device for evading the issue. Thus F. R. Tennant affirms that the question whether there is a reality corresponding to the object of religious experience cannot be answered from the side of religious experience because religious experience has begged it in the act of constituting itself religious. (3) How, then, can the reality of God be established? Tennant falls back upon the teleological proof. But we cannot go behind Kant in this fashion. (4) Arguments drawn from the nature of the

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(1) Oman: On. cit., p. 52. (2) Supra, pp. 5-12.

(3) Cf. Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, Ch. XII, "Religious Experience". "Belief in God becomes reasonable", says Tennant, "if the idea of God be found indispensable for explanation of the totality of our scientific knowledge. ." Ibid., Vol. II, p. 254.

(4) "It was, I believe, the immensely important contribution made to the understanding of religion by Kant's attack on the scholastic proofs of God's existence, in combination with his assertion that God was postulated by our moral consciousness, that he thereby established the essential connexion of the idea of God with an experience not merely theoretical." C. C. J. Webb: Religion and Theism, pp. 17f.

world and of man may help to establish the reasonableness of religious faith in controversy with unbelievers , but, apart from some prior experience of God, they are quite powerless to produce faith in God. (1) This is, perhaps, to say what Francis Bacon said of natural theology, that "it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform religion". (2) Our knowledge of God , as L.P. Jacks has so well said, "can be nothing else than his own self-affirmation in the human mind". (3) We can only know God as He makes himself known. John Oman points out that nothing reveals itself to us unless we take up the right attitude towards it, and this "more concerns right feeling, which means sensitive and sincere and objective feeling, than even right acting or right thinking". Moral insincerity and intellectual insincerity we readily recognize, but, says Oman, "there are people who impress us as somehow more fundamentally and radically unreal than the conventionally

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(1) Cf. C.C.J. Webb: "The attempt to deduce the reasonableness of religion from a belief in God's existence based on other than religious grounds is bound to fail; for the non-religious arguments alleged in support of the belief can only help to establish a genuinely religious faith when they are themselves interpreted in the light of that religious experience which alone originally makes us aware of God at all". On. cit. p.25.

(2) The Advancement of Learning, Bk. II.

(3) Elemental Religion, p. 32.[3] We quote the whole sentence. "If the word God has any meaning at all, our belief in him can be nothing else than his own self-affirmation in the human mind, his doing and not ours, and ours only when, in the best language we can find, we try to tell the story of what God has done for our souls, a story always imperfect, an indication rather than a record - for 'the highest cannot be spoken'". Jacks is protesting against a view of religion against which we also have entered our protest - "as though it were a work of the human mind, human thought seeking a solution of its problems, not necessarily untrue but if true having nothing better to rest upon than the validity of human thought". (Ibid., p. 32.)

moral or the merely orthodoxly believing. This concerns sincerity in feeling. They never allow life to impress them as it is, but corrupt experience at its source by the absence of simple, direct, wholehearted response to its witness. It is not a question of having 'inordinate affection', but of school-mastering feeling to make it say what is desired, or turning it into sentimentality divorced from all objective significance." (1) Oman is surely right. Our response to our higher environment does concern feeling as well as acting and thinking, and sincerity of feeling is of prime importance. (2) Religious experience involves the whole personality in a way that our ordinary experience does not. (3) And the truth of religion can only be apprehended by the disciplined use of all our powers. To demand that our knowledge of God should vindicate itself by the same tests that we apply to scientific knowledge of the natural world is essentially irrational and unscientific. (4) We may well be

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(1) Op. cit., pp. 211-212.

(2) Cf. Varisco: The Great Problems, tr. R.C.Lodge. pp.27-30, 274f. Varisco discusses the meaning of ex veritate (John XVIII.37) "To be ex veritate signifies, therefore, in substance, to be in the dispositions which are needed in order that the truth may be recognized immediately it presents itself . . . He who does not approach it (philosophy) with a pure heart and an upright mind approaches it in vain. For the supreme truth of philosophy is an eminently practical truth. He who does not love it seriously and with all his forces does not recognize it." Cf. also Pascal's great saying: "Human things must be known in order to be loved, but divine things must be loved in order to be known." Quoted from Baillie: Op. cit., pp. 364-365.

(3) When we refer to "religious experience" we would not be understood as sharply differentiating religious experience from our ordinary experience. Some writers follow Otto (The Idea of the Holy) in distinguishing the sense of the mysterium tremendum et fascinans as specifically religious, but this view seems to us in error.(Cf. Oman: Op. cit., p. 60) We prefer the sober common sense of L. P. Jacks: Religious experience "is the normal experience of the plain man grasped in its entirety and deeply felt". "All human experience deeply understood turns out to be spiritual. In all forms of it there is an element which reveals the ceaseless impact, the inescapable presence, of the Spirit of the Living God". Op. cit.

expected to be ready to give an answer to every man who asketh of us a reason of the hope that is in us (1), but the answer must be expressed in terms appropriate to the experiences that inspire the hope. Murphy sums it up well. "If the apprehension and valuation of this world as a supernatural order, with God as its author and final cause, can maintain itself together with the rest of what we know and value, as a constitutive element in a total humanly understandable and attainable good, it will, in that process, receive its essential, and sufficient, philosophical justification." (2)

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(1) I Peter 3.15.

(2) Op. cit., p. 321.

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pp. 55, 58. (Italics his.)

(4) "There is no more reason that the validation of religious belief should conform to canons of scientific verifiability than that the substantiation of moral judgments should do so, save where it is with matters of fact, scientifically verifiable, that such belief is concerned." A. E. Murphy: Op. cit., pp. 317-318.

CHAPTER VII

C O N C L U S I O N .

In this concluding chapter we shall consider the relation of religion to the general culture of our time and make a few suggestions as to the terms upon which a rapprochement between religion and science may be effected. (1) "For over two centuries religion has been on the defensive, and on a weak defensive." (2) Where it once held undisputed sway over every phase of life, it now finds its very right to continued existence challenged. The eclipse of religion as a vital factor in modern life is usually attributed to the rise and development of modern science, but modern science is only one phase and expression of a secular attitude to life which has become increasingly predominant since the renaissance. The fundamental question is why the religious attitude should have been so largely displaced by the secular. One possible answer is that the religious attitude is something man has outgrown and can now dispense with. On the other hand, it is equallly possible that the secular attitude is due to short-sighted neglect of significant factors in our total human experience. Before we decide that the rapid extension of the secular outlook spells the doom of religion we ought, however, to consider A. A. Bowman's

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(1) In this chapter we mean by "religion" the view of it we defended in the previous chapter and not the humanistic substitutes which we have been examining.
(2) A. N. Whitehead: Science and the Modern World, p. 233.

argument that religion itself is responsible in large measure for the rise of this outlook and attitude. (1)

Bowman contends that the "development of a secular standpoint can only be understood from the religious point of view. It is a phenomenon of the process by which religion advances beyond its own animistic beginnings." (2) This process of self-criticism required religion to define its vital interests and to differentiate itself from what was not specifically religious. Religion was thus led to recognize the partial autonomy of other fields of interest and investigation. (3) For primitive religion the world is full of gods; primitive man has not learned to distinguish the personal from the impersonal. But religion had to learn to draw this distinction; in its concern for the divine it had to learn to distinguish God from nature. "If God is to be treated as God then nature must be treated as nature." (4) This process of self-criticism is clearly traceable in the Biblical records. The Hebrews had no science but they came to distinguish clearly between God and the natural order. We can see them gradually discriminating the figure of Jahweh from the natural forces under which they had believed Him to manifest Himself until He emerges as the Creator of heaven and earth. No longer is the presence of the

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(1) A. A. Bowman: On. cit., Vol. II, Chap. XVI, "The Self-criticism of Religion in the Defining of its Relations to the Secular". The present chapter follows Bowman's argument closely.

(2) Ibid., p. 42 (Italics his.)

(3) The crux of the dispute between religion and science lies right here. It is not a question of particular beliefs or doctrines but of whether religion "can be retained only in an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility toward the advance of secular knowledge in the fields in which such knowledge has proved its competence". Cf. Murphy: On. cit., pp. 320-321.

(4) Bowman: On. cit., p. 43.

divine sought in localized natural objects or forces; God stands supreme over nature. But that is not all. "As time goes on, the nature of deity defines itself less and less in terms of external relationship to nature, and more and more in terms of an inner moral relationship with man." (1) The self-disclosure of the divine is no longer conceived as taking place through the natural processes of nature but through the moral and spiritual consciousness of man. (2) "The enfranchisement of the spirit in the world of religious values is at the same time the disenfranchisement of nature."(3) No longer does man stand in superstitious awe of nature's might; he recognizes himself as superior to it and to some extent begins to assert his mastery over it.

Similarly, Bowman argues that the rejection of polytheism marks a further stage in the secularization of nature. In ancient Greece and Rome we can see that the borderline between God and man was not clearly drawn. The "abuse of the personalizing imagination" gave rise to legions of dieties. "If God is to be thought of as God, then man must be thought of as man." (4) Thus the progress of self-criticism in religion enables man to distinguish God from man and to define humanity over against God. This is an example of defining God by pointing to what He is not, "showing that the first step in the process of finding the divine presence everywhere in the world of men and things is to distinguish the world of men and things from the divine being". (5) The fierce battle of

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(1) Ibid., p. 44.

(2) Bowman instances the story of Elijah and the storm (I Kings XIX) as an example.

(3) Ibid., p. 45. (4) Ibid., p. 51. (5) Ibid., p. 52.

the early Church fathers against Gnostic speculations is seen as evidence of the same tendency. There must be no fusion of metaphysical speculation and religion. If metaphysics is permissable, then the secular approach is the appropriate approach; such speculation must not be confused with the vital interests of religious faith. (1)

But if the concept of the secular follows as an implication from the concept of religion, this does not mean that it is a possible substitute for it. (2) What this analysis does is to reveal the twofold nature of man. Man is forever finite, but he can relate his finitude to the divine being so that he is saved from the consequences of mere finitude. (3) Man belongs, in consequence of his finitude, to a world of finite things. This is the basis of the secular view. Religion is the clearer definition of the Infinite through a clearer understanding of what it means to be finite, and a progressive clarification of what it means to be finite through a clearer understanding of the Infinite. (4)

Therefore, when God is clearly differentiated from nature and from man, it is possible for the order of nature and the world of human relationships to become objects of investigation quite apart from their relationshp to God. It is to the interest of religion that these studies should enjoy a measure of autonomy because God may not be regarded as one object among others in the world of nature, or as one conflicting will among others in the world of human affairs. Both natural science, and the human sciences may,

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(1) Ibid., pp. 52-57. (2) Ibid., p. 58.
(3) Ibid., p. 63. (4) Ibid., p. 64.

therefore, pursue their investigations into the nature of the physical order and the facts of moral and social life quite disregarding for their purposes the fact of the existence of God. (1) But when we come to look at these special studies from the standpoint of our total human experience, it is evident that both natural science and the moral sciences imply an autonomy greater than their own. We could not have science without the scientist. But the scientist does not fall within the sphere of the phenomena which he is investigating; he belongs to a community of minds for which the phenomena he studies have meaning and value. But the world of humanity is neither self-sufficient nor self-explanatory; it owes its reality to the Universal Person. (2) The concern of religion is that man should come to realize that his life is only complete when seen in its final dimension, in terms of his relationship to God whose existence alone gives reality to his experience of nature and of his fellows.

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(1) We may note, however, the following qualification:- "Where the theory of life and all ideals are entirely secular, instincts and emotions of an essentially religious character may still survive, but religion has broken down, and the adjectival qualifications of the religious life remain only by inadvertence. Furthermore, there is a sense in which, if persevered in sufficiently long, the secular attitude of mind is apt, by a subtle transformation, to pervert even such survivals. To do without God, from being an intellectual ideal, in time becomes a passion. At the same time it becomes necessary to find a substitute for him and for everything that once grew up around the divine conception. Hence the rise in modern times of humanitarianism and the cult of progress." Bowman: Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 39. The application of these observations to the subject of this thesis is too [illegible] to need emphasis.

(2) Cf. supra, pp. 97 seq. Cf. also pp. 128f., 140f.

It follows, therefore, that religion should not ask science to introduce the concept of God into its descriptions of the natural order. Far from it. (1) God does not belong within the system of nature and His relation to that system is of quite a different order from that of one physical fact to another or one physical system to another. Since the way to the knowledge of God is not through scientific investigation of natural processes, science qua science, the scientist qua scientist, can have no knowledge of God. What religion has a right to ask of the scientist is that he should not become so immersed in the technique of the laboratory as to forget that he is a human being. Nor should he forget the community of minds which makes possible the advance of knowledge and control of nature. As a human being and a member of the kingdom of selves, the scientist belongs to an order of reality superior to that which, in his scientifi work, he is concerned to investigate; and in dealing with other selves a different method of approach is appropriate from that which he adopts in his scientific investigations. His aim, as a scientist, is to abstract from the personal factors and approximate pure cognition, but in dealing with his fellows he needs all his powers of sympathetic understanding Even more so, when he approaches the problem of the nature of Ultimate Reality, does he need the disciplined use of all his powers - right feeling is as important as right

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(1) "Science is the system of all that can be known about the world without taking God into account; and for the specific purposes of scientific knowledge it is necessary that the divine being should be kept out of sight." Bowman: Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 100.

as important as right thinking and right action.

Religion has the right to ask further that the scientist, remembering these facts, shall refrain from dogmatizing concerning the nature of Ultimate Reality upon the basis of his own partial survey of the relevant data. Even where there is no desire to dogmatize, but simply to suggest the possibility of a spiritual interpretation of nature, it is doubtful if excursions of scientists into the fields of philosophy and theology do very much good. We have seen that two outstanding contemporary scientists, Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington, have written a number of more or less popular books to prove that the results of scientific investigations as they understand them do not negate a spiritual interpretation of reality but rather confirm it. Doubtless, it is cheering to be told this, but it actually means very little. The simple fact is that the results of modern physical science are utterly irrelevant to the question of whether or not a spiritual interpretation of life is possible. Physical science does not pretend to investigate the evidence upon which such a judgment must be based. Eddington, for example, hails the principle of indeterminacy because it seems to him to allow for man's moral freedom, but the measure of indeterminacy for which Heisenberg's principle allows is entirely inadequate for this purpose, and, in any case, the moral freedom of man has nothing to do with the physical aspects of things - we are dealing with quite disparate questions. (1) And when Jeans writes

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(1) Cf. Max Planck: "The law of causation is the guiding rule of science; but the Categorical Imperative - that is to say, the dictate of duty - is the guiding rule of life". (Where is Science Going? p. 167.) "The fact is that the principle of causality on the one hand and free will on the other refer to totally different matters." (The Philosophy of Physics, p. 73.)

a book and entitles it, This Mysterious Universe, he is being vastly entertaining, but he is not being scientific. For, as Gilson says, "the universe of science qua science exactly consists of that part of the total universe from which, owing to human reason, mysteries have been removed". (1) As Gilson points out, Jeans finds the universe mysterious because he insists upon asking metaphysical questions to which science can give no answers. But it is precisely the metaphysical questions in which religion is interested. (2) Science qua science excludes the idea of God and refuses to recognize "final causes" and is right in so doing. But that is no reason for denying the right of philosophy to ask, and seek answers to, metaphysical questions. Some scientists, however, assuming that their abstract formulations of the nature of reality are complete and final, deny that there is anything to be known that science cannot discover.(3) Others, eschewing the answers which philosophy and religion have given to metaphysical questions, propound answers of their own which they naively assume to free from the fallacies charged against the traditional answers. (3) For its part, religion

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(1) E. Gilson: Op. cit., p. 122.

(2) I had almost written "religion and philosophy", but some schools of philosophy profess not to be interested in metaphysical questions.

(3) E. G., Russell: Op. cit., p.243. "Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained by scientific methods; and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know". This dogmatic assertion concludes a discussion of values. On the "abstract" nature of scientific thinking, cf. Murphy: Op. cit., p. 360. "All effective thinking is abstract and, where what it abstracts from is irrelevant to the problem considered, the better for it. But where something is left out that is, in a further context, relevant and even decisive, the abstraction is illigitimate and misleading in the next context, and an insistence upon its use because it has elsewhere proved its scientific cogency is simply stupid." This criticism is specifically directed at a well known populariser of "science" - Lancelot Hogben.

(4) Cf. Gilson: Op. cit., pp. 128-129. "For centuries final causes have been mistaken for scientific explanation by so many

ought scrupously to observe the freedom of men of science to pursue their own investigations according to their own appropriate methods, and it ought to refrain from the attempt to make religious capital out of their findings. We have rejected the claim of the pragmatists and realists that the truth value of religion must be tested by scientific method; the converse of that is to deny oneself the right to appeal to scientific findings in confirmation of the religious interpretation of reality. (1)

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(1) What we should deprecate above all is the tendency on the part of some religious people to exploit the fact that some distinguished scientists are also Christian believers, as though it were a feather in God's cap to have Eddington believe in Him. Eddington, at any rate, is under no misapprehension that his religious faith rests upon his scientific learning. Scarcely less reprehensible is the attempt to use the latest hypotheses in physics as a buttress for the faith. Thus J. H. Morrison rightly repudiates the notion that the principle of indeterminacy has any bearing upon the problem of free-will, but he adds: "All that the new physics has done is to break the fetters of materialistic determinism and pave the way for a more spiritual conception of causality". (Christian Faith and the Science of Today, p. 123) But it is not easy to see in what way the newer theory is "more spiritual". Cf. the same writer's article in The Expository Times,(Vol. LI, No. 1, P. 60) for a similar suggestion that the newer concept of matter has made matter more spiritual; "it is seen to be no more substantial than moonshine". Cf. also R. J. Wedderspoon (Ibid., LVI, 4, p. 91) for the claim that " the New Apologetic can look with confidence to the findings of our most eminent scientists for support . ." These writers have undoubtedly been misled by a too uncritical reading of some of Eddington's popular books, quite overlooking the fact that in these books Eddington is, very often, not writing as a scientists Some eminent scientists do not accept the new theories of the nature of matter or of indeterminacy as by any means final. Well might Karl Barth warn: "Be not over-ready to baptize into the faith, all unshriven, the last daring hypothesis of science."

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generations of philosophers that today many scientists still consider the fear of final causes as the beginning of scientific wisdom. Science is thus making metaphysics suffer for its centuries-long meddling in matters belonging to physics and biology." Gilson's objection is not that science excludes final causes, but that some scientists, having rejected final causes, go on to make metaphysical assumptions far less intelligible. "They prefer to say anything rather than to ascribe existence to God on the ground that a purpose exists in the universe." His criticism is specifically directed at Julian Huxley. Cf. Essays of a Biologist.

The primary concern of religion is with persons and personal relationships. In this realm the autonomy allowed to ethics, politics, economics, and other human studies can not be nearly as complete as that allowed to the natural sciences. A distinction may be drawn between theory and practice. In his investigations into practical problems of human relationships, the student may abstract from his belief in God and pursue his studies as though God were not. But in his actual practice he dare not do this; nor, in fact, does he. We have claimed that man's moral experience presupposes experience of God. (1) This should not be taken to mean conscious experience. Philosophers and religious thinkers are coming to recognize that a man may believe in God without being conscious of his belief, or even when he denies that he believes. (2) He doubts with "the top of his mind" what it would not occur to him to doubt "in the bottom of his heart". (3) A man may believe in God, and, at the same time, because of the undue influence of theories of knowledge or of scientific techniques, seek to give an interpretation of his experience which excludes all reference to God. Hume found it possible to deny all knowledge of the self (4); some modern

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(1) Supra, p. 96 seq.

(2) J. Cook Wilson (Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 857-858) after considering several examples of unconscious knowledge, concludes that the fact that "some people think they have no direct experience or knowledge of God" is quite compatible with the hypothesis of "His direct presence in their consciousness". Cf. J. Baillie: Our Knowledge of God, pp. 47-54, for a full discussion of this point.

(3) For these phrases cf. Baillie: Op. cit., pp. 52-53.

(4) Cook-Wilson uses Hume as an example; Op. cit., p. 857.

psychologists go even further and deny the significance, if not the fact, of consciousness. But we could not admit that the existence of the self, or of consciousness, was unknown to them; rather should we claim that by a process of ultra-sophistication they had managed to argue themselves into an opinion which, to others, is simply incredible. The solipsist may convince himself that other selves do not exist; and if he adopts this attitude no subtlety of argument will persuade him of his mistake. Similarly, no argument, whether scientific or metaphysical, can suffice to bring a human being to belief in God. (1) The true office of argument, in words which we have already quoted, is "to bring the belief to consciousness of itself"; in other words, to show that a man's total experience presupposes experience of God and that, in actuality, he has been a believer all along. We should claim, therefore, that the philosophers whom we have been considering do actually believe in God, even though their elaborated philosophies allow no room for Him. (2) Their serious efforts to recognize the claim of moral and religious values, even though such recognition introduces a non-logical element into their systems, is evidence of the presence of God in their experience.(3)

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(1) "We can no more prove God's existence than we can prove that of our fellow men; our knowledge of the one as of the other is founded on the experience of their presence." W. G. de Burgh: Op. cit., p. 169. Cf. A. S. Eddington: Science and the Unseen World, p. 43. "In the case of our human friends we take their existence for granted, not caring whether it is proven or not. Our relationship is such that we could read philosophical arguments designed to prove the non-existence of each other, and perhaps even be convinced by them - and then laugh together over so odd a conclusion. I think that it is something of the same kind of security that we should seek in our relationship with God. The most flawless proof of the existence of God is no substitute for it; and if we have that relationship the most convincing disproof is turned harmlessly aside. If I may say it with reverence, the soul and God laugh together over so odd a conclusion."

(2) A. N. Whitehead writes: "It does not matter what men say in words, so long as their actions are controlled by settled

In their theories men may deny the reality of God, but men's actions are often better than their theories. And we have the highest of authority for affirming that the children of God are known by their fruits rather than by their opinions. (1)

The conclusion to which we have come is that religion, since it has to do with that final dimension in which, as human beings, we stand, is sui generis, and that its truth must shine by its own light. This does not mean that religion is either mystical or irrational. (2) It follows from the very nature of religion itself. Religion is ultimate; the knowledge of God is the most intimate knowledge it is possible to have. God, if He really be God, and not some aspect of the natural order which we can discover or invent for ourselves, can only be known as He makes Himself known. (3) And the sphere of His

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(1) Matthew 7:18-20.

(2) Since the word "mystical" is loosely bandied about these days and some would certainly class our view as mystical, we shall define what we mean by it. Christian faith conceives of the relationship of God to man as personal and therefore moral; mysticism substitutes for this moral relationship an absorption in, or identity with, the Divine Being. On the other hand, the word is sometimes used to denote the immediate, or intuitive, character that distinguishes, we should claim, some part of our experience. In this sense we should admit that our view was mystical and we should quote Simmell: "An element of mysticism is an evitable characteristic of every first-rate modern mind". Quoted from Urban: Proceedings, 6th. International Congress of Philosophy, p. 295.

(3) Every historical religion claims to be based on revelation, and this claim is of the essence of religion. Revelation, however, has often been misconveived as the supernatural communication of doctrine. Cf. Temple: Op. cit., p. 332. "What is offered to man's apprehension in any specific revelation is not truth concerning God but the living God Himself." Cf. also Emil Brunner: The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 85. "In His Word God does not deliver to me a course of lectures in dogmatic theology, He does not submit to me or interrpet for me the content of a confession of faith, but He makes Himself accessible to me."

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instincts. The words may ultimately destroy the instincts. But until this has ocurred, words do not count". Science and the Modern World, p. 4.

(3) And in a deeper sense than Ames himself recognizes. Cf. supra p. 41.

self-revelation is our whole human experience, but more particularly that part of it which we call moral. God reveals Himself, we may say, in the unconditional claim laid upon us to seek and actualize the values and ideals which are disclosed to us in our moral experience. (1) The knowledge of God which is given to through the knowledge of absolute values may be unconscious, but as we surrender to the claim the full implications of what it is we do may be disclosed to us and the knowledge of God rise to full self-consciousness. What religion asks of every man is that, putting away sensuality and sophistication, he shall respond with his whole being to this claim; this is the meaning of faith. (2) Faith is not intellectual assent to theoretical propositions; neither is it wishful thinking. It is our whole being going out in solemn affirmation of the reality of that which claims our entire allegiance as holy and good; it is a self-commitment in which a man finds his true life and his true self. Just as a man, by distinguishing God from what is not God, learns to acknowledge the partial autonomy of the natural, so by coming to recognize

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(1) Thus, we believe, are the claims of morality to autonomy, and the claims of religion to ultimacy, to be reconciled. As C.C.J.Webb writes: "Morality cannot dispense with religion; not in the sense that it requires an external sanction, but in the sense that, except as interpreted by religion, it must appear as an unintelligible fact . . and so come easily to be suspected of being no more than an obstinate prejudice which the wise man will endeavour to disregard."(Religion and Theism, p. 116.) For this reason it seems to us that the non-theist humanist is in a state of uneasy equilibrium. He may tip over into moral indifferentism; and that is a serious danger. Or, his loyalty to values may lead him back to God. And this, we believe, is more likely. For, as Baillie writes: "On this matter we cannot permanently deceive ourselves. Hence instead of the denial of God acting as a corrosive upon our directly intuited loyalties, rather will these loyalties stand firm and lead us in the end back to God". Cf. Canadian Journal of Religious Thought, Vol. VIII, No. 2, p. 115.

(2) The faith attitude is the opposite of the spectator attitude proper in scientific method. Cf. the distinction drawn in recent German religious philosophy between existential and spectator thinking. "A proposition is said to be existential when I

the full significance of his finitude does he rise to that knowledge of God which is Eternal Life. Our argument cannot be better summarized than in the familiar words of Blaisé Pascal, deepest of thinkers and truest of mystics, "Tu ne me chercherais pas si tu ne me possédais. Ne t'inquiète donc pas". (1)

(1) Pensées, ed. Brunschvicg, 555.

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cannot apprehend it or assent to it from the standpoint of a mere spectator, but only on the ground of my total existence." Harl Heim: God Transcendent, p. 75n.
We should also distinguish our view of faith from that made famous by William James - "the Will to Believe". James envisaged a situation in which one was confronted by two equally probable hypotheses, and he held that one was justified in accepting that hypothesis which satisfied the demands of our moral nature. But it ought to be obvious that the hypothesis harmonizing with moral facts is not chosen by an arbitrary exercise of the will, but because it is the most satisfactory from a rational point of view. - It takes all the facts into consideration. Cf. Antonio Aliotta: Science, Religion and Reality (ed. J. Needham) pp. 179-180.

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