

REGIONALISM AND POLITICAL ALIGNMENT
IN CANADA

BY

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A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Studies
University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, Manitoba

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ISBN 0-612-13327-3

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In preparing for my Masters thesis, I have experienced and survived many obstacles and frustrations. The fact that the following pages comprise my Masters thesis is to me, a miracle. I feel blessed to have been given the faith and dedication of which this thesis has required of me.

Without the faithful guidance and encouragement of my advisor, Dr. Ken McVicar, I believe this would not have been possible. I feel fortunate to have had the opportunity to receive his support in this endeavor. His helpful criticism and editing skills were invaluable to me. Of course, I am solely responsible for any remaining errors and omissions.

Finally, I would like to recognize the extraordinary contribution of my husband, John. He became my pillar of strength and always believed in my abilities. I thank him for all of his wonderful qualities and for being my best friend.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is concerned with analyzing regionalism in Canada. Specifically, it examines the effects of region on political alignments. The significance of regionalism to all Canadians is paramount. As Jeffrey Simpson has said, Canada has never been a cultural union or a natural economic community but rather a sort of political arrangement. (1) It is this political arrangement that results from the vast diversities that exist between populations in Canada. It is expected this examination will find distinct cleavages in political alignment throughout Canada.

For purposes of this study, region is representative of the legal boundaries by which Canada is structured through provinces. At times the literature may group together two or three provinces to form a specific region that lends itself as such. For example, many researchers refer to the "Atlantic" or "Prairie" provinces when recording electoral data.

The term, political alignment, as used in this thesis refers to the relationship that is formed by members of a specific region and the electoral results that emerge from that specific population. This is recognized through historical election data which measures the distribution of popular vote and the number of parliamentary seats won across provinces. Supplemental information is provided by measuring public support with political parties and public policy across the country to detect the formation of potential

electoral outcomes.

The first chapter will seek to define regionalism and its' relevance in Canadian politics. This chapter will discuss some of the significant research that has been done in identifying Canadians' attitudes towards region as well as identifying regional disparities throughout the country. As noted in the book, Political Choice in Canada, regional consciousness among Canadians is quite high and this in turn shapes political activities. Regionalism in Canada has been sustained and reinforced by many demographic factors. It is the intention of this chapter to explain and verify the concept of regionalism in Canada.

The second chapter will examine the historical and political foundations for such a study as derived from Stein Rokkan and Seymour Martin Lipset. In essence, the formation of political parties themselves initiated the creation of such cleavages as political parties were created for the purpose of representing regionally based needs or interests. Lipset and Rokkan provide a model by which to examine the various differences that emerge between provinces as a result of regionalism and consequential political results. Regionalism has always been an important factor in Canadian politics and through Lipset and Rokkan, region can be understood historically through a territorial and functional dimension. This provides the foundation from which this study evolves.

In Chapter Three, regionalism as it applies to Canada,

is further explored in terms of the economic differences that persevere among provinces. This is accomplished by utilizing various relevant economic indicators from the Provincial Economic Accounts. Federal governments have often attempted to correct the disparities that exist between regions with limited success. Provinces have various economic bases that generate economic differences which inhibits the development of a national economic policy. Therefore, regional economic disparities persist and become an integral part of Canadian politics.

Chapter Four explores the political ramifications of regionalism. While the importance of the social structure in explaining political choice has been recognized, it has been argued that the key to the dynamics of political behavior lay in voters' reactions to changes in the political landscape - the personalities and the salient issues. However, there is evidence in the Canadian case that issues are particularly attractive to the Canadian electorate and they can polarize regions. Issues either have the potential to divide previous support on a given cleavage or make what might be termed a social dimension into a cleavage. In conclusion, the intention of this study is to explore the importance and relative strength of regionalism in explaining political alignments in Canada.

ENDNOTES

1. Simpson, Jeffrey. Faultlines: Struggling for a Canadian Vision. (Harper Collins, Toronto. 1993)
p. 1

CHAPTER ONE
Regionalism Defined

The perception of Canada as a regionalized country is well established. Distinctive regional societies with unique histories and economies have flourished. To gain content, the term region must be associated with some other politically relevant differences either in attitudes, identities, economic or other interests. In Canada, regions may be discussed in a variety of ways and within provinces, certain subprovincial regions have considerable political relevance.

Regionalism is a multidimensional concept and can include differences in demographic makeup: in ethnic and religious background, in occupational structure, age profiles and patterns of urban and rural growth. Interregional differences in history and earlier development, along with differences in economic structure, contribute to defining regionalism in Canada. (1)

As Black and Cairns have pointed out, since 1867 Canadians have been involved not only in nation-building but in province-building. (2) One of the reasons for the post-war decentralization of the Canadian federal system, they suggest, is "a relatively great increase in the competence and confidence of provincial administrations and a consequent growth in elites who identified their prospects with the fortunes and favors of the provincial governments". (3) The growth of provincial governments has enabled provinces to increasingly shape their own societies as the national

government has tried to shape the national society.

A variety of meanings and a great deal of confusion are associated with the spatial dimension of Canadian politics largely because, as Matthews points out, social scientists often unconsciously interchange four distinct terms - region, regional differences, regionalism and regional disparities. (4) The first term region, refers to some sort of spatial unit. It is a "territorial entity having some natural and organic unity or community of interests that is independent of political and administrative boundaries". (5) The term region simply implies a sameness within a geographic space that separates or differentiates it from some other geographic space. There are several criteria for designating regions and their selection can be artificial and arbitrary. This is the conclusion drawn by Simeon in his oft-cited article "Regionalism and Canadian Political Institutions," in which he argues that "regions are simply containers... and how we draw the boundaries around them depends entirely on what our purposes are." (6) Regions can be defined in terms of topography, climate, land use and demography for example. All of these criteria signify regional differences and these are real differences that can be use to describe geographic space. (7) Most studies of regionalism in Canada simply document regional differences, either in attitudes or economic indicators. For the most part, social scientists have limited the study of regionalism to demonstrating that people in different parts of the country either think

differently about politics or have different economic opportunities. These studies of regional differences begin with predefined geographic units and measure differences in the location of attitudes or things. Social scientists have used the spatial distributions of attitudes and behavior for evidence of regional political cultures. (8)

Schwartz was one of the first to use this approach to study Canadian regionalism. In *Politics and Territory*, she examined the attitudes of Canadians living in Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies, and British Columbia during the 1960's to discover differences in levels of party support, political awareness, political efficacy and regional orientations. After discovering considerable attitudinal diversity among citizens from these five geographical units, she concluded that regional tensions were an inevitable component of Canadian politics. (9)

Continuing in the tradition, Elkins and Simeon examined provincial variations in public attitudes along a number of dimensions similar to those studied by Schwartz, as well as on controversial public policy issues. Comparing 1965, 1968 and 1974 National Election Study data, they found what they believed to be sufficient evidence to suggest that Canada is "becoming even more a country of regions." Canadians, they found, think of their country in regional terms, although there is not much public agreement about what the actual boundaries of Canadian regions are - provinces or groups of provinces. They conclude that the roots of a regionalized

country were firmly implanted among the general public long before the intense regional conflicts of the late 1970's and 1980's. (10)

Although the mapping of attitudes in geographic space has been a popular approach to Canadian regionalism, Brodie questions its' utility. There is no question that public opinion polls consistently show that people in different parts of the country feel differently about both the political regime and a limited range of public policy issues. She argues that these data however, are not stable over time and are difficult to interpret. While Elkins and Simeon found that between 1965 and 1974 there was increased identification with provincial governments, more recent national election studies indicate that this trend waned in the 1980's. Canadian public opinion especially with respect to political parties is extremely volatile. (11)

Brodie concludes that both subjective and objective measures suggest that geographic space is a relevant element in the Canadian political economy. These studies she suggests, do not justify either the five-fold or provincial demarcation of Canadian regions as an appropriate way of studying space. More to the point, she argues that the spatial dimension of Canadian politics involves more than sterile analytic distinctions, drawing lines on a map and searching for empirical irregularities in the location of things, attitudes, and events. Regions in Canada have concrete political and social dimensions that are deeply

embedded in our collective historical experience. (12)

The concepts of regionalism and regional disparity are at the heart of the spatial dimension of Canadian politics. Regionalism refers to a political phenomenon wherein politics is judged to be about "place" prosperity. Consequently, conflict revolves around the allocation of power and resources across geographic units rather than, for example, among social classes. It emphasizes relationships in geographic space, so that some territorial units gain or lose in relation to other territorial units. Regionalism is a class of political expression and often mobilization, that focuses on spatial inequalities. (13)

Canada's ten provinces have increasingly come to emphasize their own development while the federal government has attempted to minimize disparities of fiscal resources along with governmental and social services throughout the country. As a consequence, "rich" provinces, mainly Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia, resent federal policies more than "poor" provinces which receive a substantial portion of their revenues from direct transfer payments. As in so many instances, provincial and regional differences in specific situations hinder consensus and also hinder a united front among provincial governments with regard to federal government policies. While this diversity may be a complicating factor in nation development, the local loyalties on which it is based are an integral part of the Canadian identity. (14)

Even without a federal structure, Canada would be diverse and would contain antagonistic elements such as the linguistic and ethnic hostility between French and English speakers. Under a system of federalism, however, these points of contrast are heightened and emphasized, because of the natural desire of provincial governments to pursue policies beneficial to the unique populations each represents. (15)

There has been continual conflict as a result of each province's attempts to pursue its own planned development and the other contradictory attempts of the federal government to achieve minimum standards of services on a national basis. Poorer provinces, for example, have been forced to accept federal transfer payments in order to finance these services, and to try to catch up economically with the richer provinces. The result is an intermingling of responsibilities not envisioned in the constitution and a degree of dependence of some provincial governments on federal largesse which undermines the normal operations of federalism. (16)

As a result of basic differences compounded by the complex varieties of federal provincial relations, each of the provinces constitutes a "small world" within the wider context of Canada as a subcontinental nation. It is therefore understandable to find that citizens have loyalties to their province and region as well as that the populations of different provinces have different mixes of feelings about

Canada. (17) Cairns argues in fact that the electoral system is a major force in promoting sectionalism and thereby inhibiting national integration. (18)

Territorial cleavages are very much a part of the Canadian electoral scene. Regional alienation, for example in Western Canada, has reflected not only geographic isolation and marginality but also conflict flowing from a distinctive regional economy, an ethnically distinct population, and a distinctive pattern of party loyalties and allegiances. The isolation of territorial conflict is thus complicated because the various regions of Canada differ considerably in their economic, ethnic, religious and linguistic composition. Indeed, it is precisely such differences that reinforce and to a degree underlie territorial conflict in the political arena. (19)

Lipset and Rokkan have seen the process of nation building as involving a gradual reduction of conflict between regional and national interests. In such a process, political parties and other institutions which initially reflect regional or cultural interests gradually come to represent national divisions, such as social class. If, therefore, such a process of de-regionalization is taking place in Canada, one would then expect that older Canadians, those dwelling in rural areas and small towns, those less educated and less travelled, would be more likely to think in regional terms. If these patterns were present, a plausible argument could be that regional ties are a function of older

people's ties with their localities and that as younger generations come along, these regional patterns will be eroded in favor of some other basis of cleavage in a unified Canada. Further, with increasing migration from rural areas to cities and geographical mobility within the country, the breakdown of regional loyalties would become even more likely. In Clarke et al, Political Choice in Canada no support whatsoever was found for any argument that de-regionalization or declining regional consciousness, is taking place in Canada. The data is far more consistent with an argument that regional feeling is increasing. Regional consciousness is highest among Canadians that are young, more highly educated, better off, English speaking, from metropolitan areas and smaller cities, upper middle class in identification, and geographically mobile. (20)

In their study, Clarke found that the distribution of regional awareness that does exist is not uniform across provinces. The four provinces west from Manitoba are more likely to think of Canada in regional terms, and much more likely to be sure of their thinking in this regard. Regional consciousness in Canada, they conclude, is much more a Western than an Eastern phenomenon. (21)

In the Atlantic provinces, they found that only two of the four provinces show substantial degrees of regional awareness. Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia both have close to half of their populations who conceive of themselves as citizens of an Atlantic or Maritime region. The other two

provinces possess substantially lower feelings of regionalism. Newfoundland's lack of common feeling with an Atlantic region is explained by its' geographical separation and the separate development of the society. (22)

It was found that within Quebec, residents were just as likely to name a specific location inside the province as their region, as they were to name the province as a whole. This finding has been interpreted as a genuine cultural difference between Quebec and the other provinces. (23)

Ontario also displayed a considerable consciousness of regionalism within the province, coupled with the existence of some feeling for a Central region. It is the four Western provinces however, which displayed the highest level of regional consciousness in the country. (24)

Regionalism involves values, sentiments and beliefs. The term regionalism implies a sense of regional identity, an attachment to one's own region, and usually a belief that is somehow at the mercy of other regions. Mildred Schwartz states that,

we associate regionalism with situations of politically relevant divisiveness and territorial cleavages, often accompanied by some consciousness on the part of the residents that they have distinctive, regionally based interests. (25)

It is this subjective element of awareness that leads to the overt political problems implied by the term regionalism. To describe regionalism as an ideology would be an exaggeration, but it is an important aspect of political culture which represents the politically relevant values, attitudes,

beliefs and symbols that exert an unseen but crucial influence on the political life of a society. Political culture helps shape the outlook and discourse of both citizens and political leaders. When regional identities, allegiances, and grievances are embedded in a society's political culture, residents and political leaders of different regions will perceive political problems and priorities differently. (26)

Regionalism is affected by a number of objective factors: the economy, settlement patterns and other demographic patterns that reinforce territorially based cleavages in Canadian society. The various regions of Canada have historically had different economic bases.

Louis Hartz's theory suggests that the culture and institutions of societies founded by immigration are significantly and permanently affected by the early settlers. They introduced to the new society a particular cultural and ideological slice of Europe. Isolation from their home culture allowed these fragment groups to experience a different pattern of development. (27)

Each region of Canada has had a different "fragment origin." The Maritimes were settled partly by migration from Europe but mainly by a wave of American colonists and Loyalists who moved north in the late eighteenth century. Newfoundland was founded by English and French settlers associated with the fishing trade, who settled as early as the seventeenth century, followed by a wave of nineteenth

century Irish immigration. Quebec was founded by francophone immigrants who came here in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from a parent culture that was largely feudal. Ontario was settled by an influx of Loyalists immediately following the American revolution and then by British immigrants during the early nineteenth century. Manitoba was initially a bi-cultural society settled both by anglophones from Ontario and by francophones from Quebec; it received Central - European immigrants in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century. Of the many different ethnic groups that settled in Saskatchewan and Alberta, a number retained their own languages until very recently. Alberta was also strongly influenced by nineteenth and twentieth century American immigrants. British Columbia has absorbed several immigrant groups, including the Chinese and Japanese, but was most influenced by British settlers, again in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The North -the only region where the aboriginal population remains high in proportion to the non-aboriginal settlers - grew most dramatically during the gold rush at the turn of the century. (28)

Given the diversity of the cultural backgrounds of the founding groups, it is not surprising that each region appears to have unique and distinctive cultural traits. This diversity is a source of richness. Socially, it has resulted in wide variations in culture and lifestyle, and politically it has created a series of settings in which the various

political cultures have played out different policy scenarios. The diversity of Canadians' backgrounds has made it difficult for an over-arching national political culture to emerge. The Western provinces have spawned third parties with distinctive ideological perspectives, just as Quebec has created distinct regional political parties. (29)

One force that tends to erode regional difference is inter-regional migration. Whatever their historical origins, people tend to change their perspective and adapt to the outlook of their friends and neighbors when they move to another province. But throughout Canadian history, the amount of inter-regional migration has been relatively small. Canadian usually go to university in their home town or at an out of town university in their home province. (30)

This lack of demographic mobility in Canada has reinforced historical regional differences. Canadians tend to live and die in the province or region in which they were born. National migration figures for the 1980's show a few significant changes but the overall pattern has remained constant. Approximately 6% of Canadians move from one region to another. Nationally, such a figure is relatively high compared to European countries. Statistics provided by the 1986 Census reveal the stability of the Atlantic provinces' populations, the immobility of Quebecers, the inter-provincial migration to Alberta and British Columbia, and the heavy immigration into Ontario. (31) Demographic mobility can however, challenge historical cleavages. Net migration

can potentially alter the political culture of a given area and have political consequences.

Another important source of demographic change in Canada is immigration. Approximately one Canadian in seven was born outside the country, a ratio that has remained relatively constant for the past forty years. Very few of these immigrants have settled in the Atlantic provinces or Quebec. Indeed, for the period 1951 to 1971, fewer than 5% of the residents of the Atlantic provinces were foreign-born. Between 5% and 10% of Quebec residents were foreign-born. The comparable figure of the Prairies was close to 20%; for both Ontario and British Columbia it was above 20%. Hence, the ethnic composition of the five provinces east of Ontario is quite different from the rest of the country. (32)

With very few migrants from the rest of Canada and a negligible number of immigrants from outside the country, the resulting population in the Atlantic provinces is one that is largely native born and long settled in its ways. With high unemployment in other provinces, the flow of migrants from the Atlantic provinces significantly drops. (33)

Quebec is the only province with a francophone majority. In the 1986 Census, 79.7% of its residents were of French background compared with 7.7% of British background with non French speaking groups concentrated in Montreal. In total, 87% of Quebecers were born in the province, five percent came from elsewhere in Canada, and eight percent from abroad. (34)

It has been said that by and large, Ontarians have lacked a distinctive regional identity and have been the most federally oriented of all Canadians. As long as the federal government was pursuing policies favorable to Ontario, the province equated its interests with that of the country as a whole. The high immigration rate and the migration of other Canadians to Ontario certainly contribute to this phenomenon. These newcomers identified more with Canada or their ethnic sub-culture than with Ontario. (35) There is dynamic, acquisitive aspect to Ontario not always found elsewhere in the country and as a result of immigration, it is a very pluralistic and multi-cultural society.

The Western provinces have the highest proportion of residents of non-British, non-French descent. Other ethnic groups make up between 44 percent and 54 percent of the Western provinces' populations, a much higher proportion than else where in the country. (36) Since most Western settlers emigrated directly from Britain, the United States, or continental Europe, they were never imbued with the central Canadian concept for French-English duality, and have demonstrated widespread opposition to federal bilingualism policies. Given that most non-French ethnic groups in the West have been settled for some time and are already assimilated, they tend to regard recent federal multiculturalism policies as catering to post World War II immigrants in Ontario and Quebec. Thus, they feel resentment against federal language and multi-cultural policies. Given

their common frontier experience, physical isolation and economic and demographic similarities, the Western provinces have developed a regional political consciousness.

The Yukon had a 1986 census which found that nearly 20 percent of the population were native while the majority was non-Native. The Northwest Territories consists of approximately 35 percent Inuit, 16 percent Dene (natives), 6 percent Metis and 43 percent non-Native. (37) The differences of race, language, values and interest are reflected in concerns about governmental structures for future territories. The Natives want sure protection for their cultures and their ways of life. (38)

The resource basis for social and economic life varies in Canada and has given rise to a great diversity of regional communities, large and small, wealthy and poor, rural and urban-industrial. The resultant disparities in economic activity are of great and increasing political significance, especially in view of the universal desire for an ever-higher quality of living and for greater social security. Much of the internal political activity in Canada is powered by these disparities, and takes many forms, from party formation and allegiance to national energy questions. (39)

The configuration of the population in relation to the territory is an important approach in understanding the dynamics of regionalism. It is a fact that people tend to cluster rather than spread themselves evenly over the earth's surface. They cluster in villages, towns, cities and certain

linked sets of metropolitan urban complexes often termed "megalopolises". One set of clusters and the associated rural dependencies forms a geographical entity termed a regional system, containing an urban "hierarchy". The relationships between regional systems and among the clusters of different rank within one system are very much involved in many political issues, especially those considered under the concept of centralism. (40)

Each major population cluster with its dependent territory comprises what may be called in political terms a core-periphery system. The cluster comprises the core and the rest of the area is the periphery. The major aspect of the core-periphery concept that has relevance is that the core tends to provide the political leadership and local source of authority for its dependent periphery. As a result, each regional system or sub-system has tended historically to function as a political community and to become formally delimited by boundaries as a political territory under the authority of its respective core.

The great size of Canada with its immense distances and energy requirements for surface travel has meant that through historical settlement processes, a number of distinct regional core-periphery systems have become established. The type of terrain and the pattern of land resources suitable for permanent agricultural settlement mean that some regional systems are large and some are small or fragmented. The northerly latitudes of Canada inhibit intensive settlement,

so the major regional systems are in the south of the country. (41)

The vast bulk of Canada's territory forms a dependent periphery to the strong southerly populated cores. The North is largely administered federally. Both historically and at present, this vast periphery has been seen as a zone of expansion, exploitation and investment by the respective provincial cores. A more direct political consequence of the geographical process of centralization is the steady accumulation of political power by the core cities and the weakening of such power or influence in the periphery areas. (42)

It can hardly be disputed that regionalism is a central issue in Canadian politics. The differences that exist between regions have been well established and Canadians themselves think "regionally." Continuing to understand these regionally variations and how they translate into political alignments, require further study. Chapter Four will focus on how economic conditions can polarize the attitudes and beliefs of specific regions and the political ramifications of that.

In order to understand the establishment and existence of modern political parties along with their capacity to generate their support, an examination of the historical circumstances under which the party system evolved is necessary at this point. Political parties are the vehicles by which alignments are formed and Seymour Martin Lipset

along with Stein Rokkan have examined this process in depth. The following chapter will discuss the development of party systems and voter alignments through Lipset and Rokkan.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER TWO

The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of
Regionalism and Political Alignment

Lipset and Rokkan's analysis of party systems and voter alignments examine the following phenomenon: the genesis of the system of cleavages, the conditions for the development of a stable system of cleavage and oppositions, and the behavior of the mass of rank-and-file citizens. Their analyses have an important historical dimension and confront a developmental task to understand the current alignments of voters behind each of the parties. Parties do not simply present themselves to the electorate, they each have a history along with the constellations of alternatives they present. (1)

Lipset and Rokkan propose that an analysis consider the initial developments toward competitive politics and the institutionalization of mass elections, as well as to disentangle the constellation of cleavages and oppositions which produced the national system of mass organizations for electoral action. Only then, they suggest, can an understanding of the forces producing the current alignments of voters behind the historically given alternatives be established. (2)

Lipset and Rokkan propose a possible model devised by Talcott Parsons for the classification of the functions of a social system. It serves as a basic paradigm to map the flows and the media of interchange among the actors and the collectivities within social systems or within total territorial societies. Lipset and Rokkan are interested in those interactions which press forward the development of

systems of competing parties insofar as they help establish distinct links of membership, identification and readiness for mobilization between given parties and given categories of subjects and households. They are also interested in those interchanges that find expression in elections and in arrangements for formal representation. (3)

This Parsonian paradigm includes examining the internal structures in a range of territorial societies and what cleavages had manifested themselves in the national community in the early phases of consolidation and consequently what cleavages emerged in the phases of centralization and economic growth. It also seeks to compare and trace the regularities in the processes of party formation, including how the inherited cleavages find political expression and how the territorial organization of the nation, the division of and the broadening of political participation and consultation affect the development of alliances and oppositions among political tendencies. The consequences of these developments can influence which identities, solidarities, and commonalties of experience and fate could be reinforced and made use of by the emerging parties. Finally, all of this diverse data can bear on the analysis in the operation of elections and the recruitment of representatives. (4)

Underlying this interpretation of the Parsonian scheme is a simple three phase model of the process of nation-building. In the first phase, the process of penetration and

standardization from the national center increases territorial resistances and raises issues of cultural identity. In the second phase these local oppositions to centralization produce a variety of alliances across communities of the nation. In the third phase, these alliances will gain some measure of control not only over the use of central national resources, but also over the channeling of the flows of legitimation. This may find expression in franchise reforms and in new rules of electoral aggregation. (5)

Lipset and Rokkan propose that crucial cleavages and their political expressions can be ordered within the Parsonian dichotomy: a territorial dimension of the national cleavage structure and a functional dimension. At one end of the territorial axis there exist strictly local oppositions to encroachments of the aspiring or the dominant national elites and their bureaucracies which represents the typical reactions of peripheral regions, linguistic minorities and culturally threatened populations to the pressures of the centralizing, standardizing and "rationalizing" machinery of the nation-state. At the other end of the axis there exists conflicts not between territorial units within the system but over the control, the organization, the goals, and the policy options of the system as a whole. (6)

Conflicts in the functional dimension produce alliances of similarly situated or similarly oriented subjects and households over wide ranges of localities and tend to

undermine the inherited solidarity of the established territorial communities. At one end of this dimension one would find the typical conflict over short-term or long-term allocations of resources, products and benefits in the economy: conflicts between producers and buyers, between workers and employers, between borrowers and lenders...etc. At this end, the alignments are specific and the conflicts tend to be solved through rational bargaining and the establishment of universalistic rules of allocation. At the other end of the axis one find the typical "friend-foe" oppositions of tight-knit religious or ideological movements to the surrounding community. The conflict is not over specific gains or losses but over conceptions of moral right and over the interpretation of history and human destiny. (7)

Historically documented cleavages rarely fall at the poles of the two axes: a concrete conflict is rarely exclusively territorial or exclusively functional but will feed on strains in both directions. The model essentially serves as a grid in the comparative analysis of political systems. The task is to locate the alliances behind given parties at given times within this two-dimensional space. In the one case the decisive criterion of alignment is commitment to the locality and its dominant culture: one would vote with one's community and its leaders irrespective of their economic position. In the other, the criterion is commitment to a class and its collective interests and one would vote with others in the same position as oneself

whatever their localities. They are willing to do so even if this brings them into opposition with members of their community. It is rare that one criterion of alignment completely dominates. There will be deviations-defections from straight territorial voting just as often as from straight class voting. There are often marked differences between regions in the weight of the one or the other criterion of alignment. Here ecological analyses of electoral records and census data for the early phases of mobilization may help to map such variations in greater detail and to pinpoint factors strengthening the dominance of territorial politics and factors accelerating the process of class polarization. (8)

Territorial oppositions set limits to the process of nation-building and when pushed to their extreme they lead to war, secession, possibly even population transfers. Functional oppositions can only develop after some initial consolidation of the national territory. They emerge with increasing interaction and communication across the regions, and they spread through a process of "social mobilization." To account for variations one clearly cannot proceed cleavage by cleavage, but must analyze constellations of conflict lines within each polity and to account for the variations in such constellations. Lipset and Rokkan have distinguished four critical lines of cleavage. Two of these cleavages are direct products of what can be referred to as the National Revolution. The first is the conflict between the central

nation-building culture and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct subject populations in the provinces and the peripheries. The second conflict is between the centralizing, standardizing, and mobilizing Nation-state and the historically established corporate privileges of the Church. The other two cleavages are products of the Industrial Revolution and include the conflict between the landed interests and the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs, and the conflict between owners and employers on the one side and tenants, laborers and workers on the other. These four critical cleavages were all movements of protest against the established national elite and its cultural standards and were parts of a broad wave of emancipation and mobilization. (9)

Thus far the focus has been on the emergence of one cleavage at a time and only incidentally concerned with the growth of cleavage systems and their translations into constellations of political parties. However, cleavages do not simply translate themselves into party oppositions as a matter of course. They are considerations of organizational and electoral strategy and results in the weighing of payoffs of alliances against losses through split-offs. To approach an understanding of the variations in such processes of translation one has to sift out a great deal of information about the conditions for the expression of protest and the representation of interest in each society. These series of questions represent a sequence of thresholds in the path of

movement pressing forward new sets of demands within a political system: legitimation, incorporation, representation, and majority power. Empirically, changes in one such threshold sooner or later generated pressures to change one or more others, but there were many variations in the sequences of change. (10)

This review of the conditions for the translation of socio-cultural cleavages into political oppositions suggests three conclusions. The constitutive contrasts in the national system of party constellations generally tended to manifest themselves before any lowering of the threshold of representation. The decisive sequences of party formation take place at the early stage of competitive politics. Second, the high thresholds of representation during the phase of mass politicization set severe tests for rising political organizations. The surviving formations tended to be firmly entrenched in the inherited social structure and could not easily be dislodged through changes in the rules of the electoral game. Third, the decisive moves to lower the threshold of representation reflected divisions among the established "regime center" parties rather than pressures from the new mass movements. Lipset and Rokkan propose a framework for the explanation of variations in cleavage bases and party constellations, two of which are products of what is referred to as the National Revolution and the other two generated through the Industrial Revolution. (11)

The contrasts among the Western party systems clearly

reflect the differences in their national histories of conflict and compromise. The "center-periphery", the state-church, and the land-industry cleavages generated national developments in divergent directions, while the owner-worker cleavage tended to bring the party systems closer to each other in their basic structure. (12)

As Lipset and Rokkan have noted, the party alternatives and the party organizations are older than the majorities of the national electorates, reflecting the cleavage structures of the 1920's. In the Canadian case, it is the 1930's which would seem to be the decisive period for the freezing of party alternatives. All of this suggests that to understand the basis of party support it is not enough to understand contemporary issues and contemporary social structure. Parties in a sense represent frozen elements of earlier alignments. (13) One of the consequences of the failure of the major Canadian political parties to adapt adequately to the social changes of the 1920's and 1930's was the rapid rise of a host of minor parties. These movements represented the relationships between markets and regions and reflect many of the same concerns and conflicts present in current Canadian politics.

The Progressive Party became the second largest group in the House of Commons in the 1921 federal election relying upon a relatively homogeneous electoral base. The groups' support was almost entirely rural capturing 28 percent of the vote in Ontario, 44 percent in Manitoba, 61 percent in

Saskatchewan and 56 percent in Alberta. (14) Generally, the more agricultural the economy of a province, the more likely it was to support the Progressives. In the period following World War I, a number of factors increased support for the farmers' movement. The federal government was largely dominated by Eastern urban and big business interest, and these interests utilized the traditional political parties as their means of control. Rural Ontario was becoming rapidly depopulated as farm families moved into the city. Tariff structures has been hurting the farmers by keeping produce prices down and farm equipment prices up. The federal governments' ignoring of farmers protest marches helped to convince farmers that the older parties were not responsive to their needs. Structurally, the Progressive party was an alliance of sub-coalitions. Each coalition was a regionally based collection of farm organizations. Collectively, they represented opposition to the old party system and to Eastern business interests. There was considerable emphasis among Progressives on grass-roots democracy, but the means of achieving it varied from one regional coalition to another. By the mid 1920's, the Progressive party had ceased to be an institution in Canadian national politics, although it continued to be important in provincial governments in the West, remaining in power in Alberta until the Social Credit sweep in 1935. (15)

As with the Progressive Movement, Social Credit also featured a critique of parliamentary democracy, pointing out

that control over MP's had escaped the little person and now rested with large financial interests. The Quebec based wing of the party, the Rallement des Creditistes was basically provincial in orientation but its real presence was felt only in federal politics. Social Credit was not a single party at all, but rather a set of at least three separate parties operating largely independently of each other while there were common threads. In Alberta, Social Credit was essentially a people's movement which sought to reform, but not to revolutionize the existing social order by changing the patterns of certain institutions. It was created with the amalgamation of the social disruption of the Depression, the alienation of Westerners from Eastern institutions, the conservative entrepreneurial ethic of Alberta and by the mind of William Aberhart. (16)

Most similar to the Alberta party has been the Rallement des Creditistes, the Quebec wing of the party. It is characterized by the same pragmatism and leadership orientation allowing it to exploit regional cultural characteristics and it has shown a similar vulnerability to decline once the strong leader disappears. The Creditistes began as a protest movement and were successful in Quebec largely due to the fact that rural Quebecers did not find the federal Conservative party a credible alternative to the Liberals and because in the minds of many, the Liberals had ceased to represent their interests. For a time following the 1962 federal election they were, outside of Montreal, the

dominant federal electoral force in the province. With the death of their leader, the party seemed to have lost not only its' founder, but its organizational base as well. (17)

In British Columbia, it has been said that Social Credit caught on because a charismatic leader, skilled in using a new medium, arrived at a time when there were no other effective vehicles of protest. The party was virtually non-ideological, although Bennett, a dissident former Conservative, once defined his party as the opposite of socialism. It retained a base of middle class and small entrepreneur support. (18)

The relative success of Social Credit provincially can be explained due to the fact that the impossibility of gaining national power with a regionally based protest group forced their conscious to focus on their real chance to gain power would be in provincial elections. This is a similar pattern with which to also measure the success of the CCF-NDP.

The declaration of principles reflected in the "Regina Manifesto" were passed at the first annual convention of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation and include the following, " We aim to replace the present capitalistic system...in which economic planning will supersede unregulated private enterprise...economic equality will be possible". (19) While the party continued to call for an egalitarian and classless society, it began to shift toward the ideological centre in Canadian politics in response to

the fact that its national electoral support appeared to have peaked in 1944-1945 without moving the party into national power. No longer did the CCF consider it necessary to nationalize all industry, and no longer did it call for the eradication of capitalism. Its new ideology was expressed in the Winnipeg declaration of 1956 calling for a set of principles which either the Liberals or Progressive Conservatives could have happily endorsed. (20)

Meanwhile, organized labour in Canada, (Canadian Labour Congress) began to take an interest in openly supporting a political party and the logical choice for them was the CCF. However, the party name was associated with a Western rural image and the result was the dissolution of the CCF and the birth of the New Democratic Party in 1961. For the most part, NDP activists consisted of the same people as had the CCF, but sufficiently willing to modify their principles somewhat in order to gain power. These changes, coupled with the influx of labour influences into the party added an element of pragmatism to the NDP. The party however, remains committed to economic equality than the older parties. The Liberals and Progressive Conservatives both express their allegiance to the concept of "equality of opportunity" while the NDP has tended to favor the concept of equality of outcome. The party's impact has been the greatest with respect to health and social welfare. (21)

The profile of NDP supporters suggests that while Canadian politics is not generally class based, support for

the NDP to some extent is. There is also a strong regional bias to NDP support. The CCF was born in Saskatchewan, had its first substantial victory there, and both the CCF and its successor, the NDP, have been strong there ever since in both federal and provincial elections. Winnipeg has also provided consistent support for the NDP and their support has also moved to northern rural areas of the province. However, the party remains largely without support in Quebec, most of the Atlantic and large sections of Ontario outside the metropolitan areas. (22)

There is much in common among various third party movements in Canadian politics. Virtually all of them originate either in Quebec or in Western Canada with the exception of the United Farmers of Ontario. It is interesting to note at this point that the regionally based parties that currently emerge with success in the recent 1993 federal election originate in Quebec and Western Canada once again. It is also important to mention that the Reform party was largely successful in Ontario in terms of the percentage of popular vote and Reform tended to do well in more rural areas. Virtually all of these "third parties" have expressed discontent with Canada's central political institutions. The coincidence of social cleavage with some provincial or sectional boundaries and the relative homogeneity of the provinces have also been important in fostering third party movements.

Lipset and Rokkan provide an important historical

element in the study of regional cleavages. Certainly in the early phases of centralization and economic development in Canada, territorial cleavages manifested themselves especially among peripheral regions. As a result, alliances are formed within regional communities strengthening territorial politics.

The various regions in Canada have historically had different economic bases and efforts to integrate regions into the national economy have not been successful. These varying economic bases have generated conflicting political interests resulting in specific regional alignments. Chapter Three will focus upon the effects of regional economic development and disparity upon political alignment.

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CHAPTER THREE
Regional Economic Development and Disparity

Different regions in Canada have historically had different economic bases and efforts to integrate the regions into a national economy have had only limited success as regional differences persist. It has been suggested that as a result of these differences Canada exhibits a pattern of heartland and hinterland. (1)

Manufacturing has become the economic mainstay of Central Canada while agriculture and more recently, the petroleum and potash industries have been the sources of economic support in the Prairies. Similarly, forestry and mining have been dominant in British Columbia, fishing in the Atlantic region and mining, particularly of precious metal in the North. (2) Thus, each region has specific economic interests and has experienced markedly different economic fortunes in terms of unemployment rates, income per capita, and the structure of the economy. These vary significantly as one moves across the country. Furthermore, these varying economic bases have generated conflicting political interests that have inhibited the development of an overall economic policy for the country.

McCann explains regional disparities in Canada through the heartland - hinterland dichotomy,

regions vary widely in their capacity to achieve full development, and certainly in their ability to attain heartland status. Few regions ever achieve a position of dominance in an economic system. Not only is it difficult to overcome the cumulative advantages of an existing heartland but a rationalized and diversified profile of economic functions, which might serve as

a basis for heartland power, is unlikely to develop in a region which does not have good access to large external markets. (3)

Therefore, variations in regional economies persist as the structure of core and periphery remain.

While the Canadian economy has diversified, its distinct spatial dimensions have remained unchanged. Quebec and Ontario continue to house the greatest proportion of manufacturing workers, while the Atlantic and Prairie regions have the greatest proportion of workers employed in the extractive sector. The largest employment in all regions however, is found in the trade, finance and service sectors. (4)

By examining some selected economic indicators provided by the Provincial Economic Accounts, the variations that exist between provinces become quite evident. The economic indicators this study will focus on are the following: net migration, unemployment, personal income per person, personal disposable income per person, and gross domestic product. (5)(See tables)

The levels of migration clearly fall as one moves from the center of the Canada to the peripheral regions. One also finds correspondingly, that the unemployment rate decreases moving from outer Canada towards central Canada. As one would expect, the population will increase in a specific area when the opportunities in that region appear to be more plentiful as opposed to another area. One also finds that both personal income and personal disposable income per

person decrease as one moves away from central Canada to the peripheral regions, especially towards the eastern provinces. This is certainly explained by their higher unemployment rates and the continual deterioration of those economies. The GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per person for each of the eastern provinces is substantially lower than the national averages which explains this regions' economic frustrations.

To understand these differences on a more provincial level, these factors will be discussed further in more detail. The net migration rate for all of the Atlantic provinces, as well as both Manitoba and Saskatchewan, has been consistently lower than the rates for Quebec, Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario. Looking at the unemployment rates might help explain the reason for this dramatic variation. The unemployment rates for Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia have been consistently lower than those in the Atlantic provinces, which is notable considering the heavy migration to these provinces. When analyzing the rates for personal income and personal disposable income, again the highest rates are found consistently in Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia with the lowest rates again found in Saskatchewan. Looking at GDP rates, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia once again have the highest along with consistently rising above the national average. On the other hand, as one would expect the Atlantic provinces and Saskatchewan are consistently under the national average.

All of these economic indicators have perpetuated over

time continuing to put stress on the Canadian political system. Part of the problem in the poorer areas in Canada is based upon the type of industry located there. Relative to the rest of Canada, the Atlantic provinces have a very low proportion of their production in manufacturing industries and a very high proportion in primary industries, such as mining, fishing and forestry. These industries are less likely to create jobs and more likely to hide "under employment". Under employment refers to the employment of people in jobs which do not really need to be done or the employment of people for longer periods of time than are really necessary to do the job. (6)

It is therefore understandable to find that these differences reflected by the economic indicators become manifested politically. The provinces of Alberta and British Columbia which are considered to be "rich provinces" are searching for a more regional party to represent their particular interests. Quebec as well has opted to support their own regionally based party in order to protect their culture. In such a vast and diverse country in so many ways, some Canadians have decided that in order to protect and serve their own interests, they will support more regionally based political parties.

Geographic factors have been very important in creating regional economic disparities. Differences in terrain, climate and the distribution of mineral and forest resources by themselves create regional disparities. Only on the

Prairies and in the Great Lakes - St. Lawrence Lowlands is there any extensive region of fertile soil combined with a climate conducive to agriculture. The regions which do possess good climate and good soil tend to have higher population, better per capita income and superior services, while other regions are more sparsely populated and poorer.
(7)

Canada's vast size and expanses of Precambrian rock have provided at least four crucial resources which are water, forests, petroleum and minerals. However, Canada's primary resources are not evenly distributed. Significant amounts of hydroelectric power can be generated only in large watersheds, and mineralization occurs in isolated pockets in the rock. The best forest stands tend to be in provinces already better off than the others. Ontario, whose secondary industries are the largest in Canada, in addition has one of the largest mineral production. British Columbia, with fertile interior valleys and a congenial climate, also has large deposits of minerals and the best timber stands; and Alberta already agriculturally advanced, currently has the largest confirmed reserves of oil. With the exception of Newfoundland, the Atlantic provinces, also lack the large mineral deposits, petroleum reserves, stands of timber and hydroelectric power resources of Central and Western Canada.
(8) It is clear then that the geographical environment has also contributed to perpetuating regional economic differences.

Federal national policies have also contributed to perpetuating regional differences. Subsidies and transfer payments have often been use to equalize the regions. Indeed, the British North America Act itself spelled out the amounts the federal treasury was to pay individual provinces for entering Confederation. Regional disparities have been discussed at countless federal-provincial conferences and have occasioned numerous commissions of inquiry, the most influential of which was the Royal Commission on Federal-Provincial Relations, appointed by Prime Minister Mackenzie King in August 1937. The Depression had burdened the provinces with expenses that far exceeded the revenues to which they were entitled under the BNA Act. This 'gulf' between assigned responsibilities and available revenues created a fiscal crisis for Canadian federalism, made worse by the vast discrepancy between provinces in overall wealth and level of economic development.

The Commission's 'Rowell-Sirois Report' which diagnosed and prescribed treatment for Canada's ailing body politic has become a landmark document. The commissioners found that the fiscal crisis was a product of public policy, economic change and constitutional rigidity. to resolve it would require transferring large doses of federal funds to various provinces to enable them to discharge adequately their constitutionally defined duties. Tax equalization, unconditional federal grants and regional development programs became increasingly important aspects of federal

policy. (9)

After the Second World War the federal government set up many agencies to reduce regional disparities in income, employment and living conditions. Yet a government study in 1968 found that these agencies had only managed to prevent inter-regional gaps from widening even further. Much greater effort would be needed, the report continued, to reduce them.

In 1969, the federal government established a Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) to foster co-operation in regional economic development. Aimed especially at helping the poorest regions of the country, DREE would oversee federal economic policies for all of the Atlantic provinces and certain areas of central Canada and the West. One year after accepting this newly created portfolio, the Hon. Jean Marchand summed up the government's philosophy of 'co-operative regionalism': "A nation is nothing, it will not survive unless its parts can see their problems, and their solutions, in a national context; unless the federal government can and does act to assist in the solution of regional problems". (10)

DREE failed to bring about any significant change in regional inequality. As in 1927 so in 1976, per capita income in the richest province was almost twice that of the poorest. The proportion had shrunk slightly by 1989, but it was still well over half as great. Unemployment rates varied among regions by a factor of almost three in 1976, just as in 1950. (11)

In 1982 the Trudeau Liberals restructured DREE and gave it a new mandate. It was combined with the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce and renamed the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion (DRIE). Five years later, the Mulroney Conservatives transformed it again, this time folding in the Ministry of State for Science and Technology and calling it the Department of Science and Technology (DIST). Under this reorganization, the responsibility for regional economic development was hived off and given to various new agencies including the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA), The Western Diversification Office (WDO) and FEDNOR which focused on the development in Northern Ontario. The many efforts to correct regional disparities reflect the existence of the "redistribution culture". Its central "ethic of redistribution" expresses the Canadian belief that justice requires the rich provinces to help out the poorer ones. (12)

The term "province building" is generally used to refer to the use of provincial state power to create and maintain locally regulated and relatively autonomous political economies. (13) This term embodied a new approach to economic and regional development that began with two fundamental premises which state that economic development should be resource led and that the producing regions should retain the surplus rents from resource extraction for regional capital formation. Further, once the development of key resources is firmly under provincial control, the

resources could then be used for securing more diversified development. Obviously, the advantages would differ from province to province, but all provinces, it was argued could prosper from decentralized interventionism. (14) Province-building became an important agenda for those who wished to see economic development in those regions considered to be in the "periphery".

During the 1970's, the rhetoric of decentralization became ever more steadily spiced with currents of neo-liberal thought. The western Premiers denounced most federal interventions in the economy, calling instead for greater reliance on the private sector, unencumbered free enterprise, and unrestricted trade. They argued that federal initiatives such as the screening for foreign investment were unnecessary intrusions in the market that stifled growth in the peripheries. (15)

The events of the 1970's influenced a shift in the balance of economic power in Canada, challenging both the federal government's role in the economy and Ontario's once unchallenged power in the Canadian political economy. Although economic power had shifted westward with the birth of their petroleum industry, political power had not. Throughout the 1970's, the Liberal Party, which had repeatedly showed itself to be antagonistic toward the aspirations of the province builders, formed the federal government. It did so with little electoral support or representation from the western provinces and by the end of

the decade the province-builders agenda had been embraced by the Progressive Conservative Party under the leadership of a relatively unknown Albertan, Joe Clark. (16) The Conservatives had been relegated to the status of the party of the peripheries since the Diefenbaker years but Clark drew together a powerful coalition of resource capitalists and province builders in order to recast the party as the proponent of decentralized interventionism in the federal party system. (17)

The late 1970's witnessed a complete polarization in federal party politics. The Liberals were defending the primacy of federal power in the economy and the Conservatives were promoting the province builders' concept of Canada as a community of communities emphasizing the reduced role of government in the economy. During the 1979 election, the Conservatives advanced their economic themes, as well as pointing out the lack of western political influence in Ottawa, resulting in the centralist biases of federal policies. They displaced the Liberals with a minority government by gaining almost exclusive support from the resource rich provinces. Only months later however, Clark's government was defeated and the election of a majority Liberal government in 1980 curtailed the momentum that had developed for the province building model of national development. (18)

The events of the 1970's appeared to have effected a permanent shift in Canada's traditional centre-periphery

relationships. Jane Brodie suggests that although wealth had shifted westward, the western economies still had not diversified. The process of steady deindustrialization of the core continued, coupled with the ongoing stagnation of the Maritime economy, which proved immune to more than a decade of concerted federal policy to reverse its economic fortunes. Federal regional policy thus made a complete circle during the 1970's, moving from a design that required close provincial cooperation in the planning and implementation of small development projects, to the total exclusion of the provinces in a resource led national policy that would benefit all regions. (19)

After its 1980 electoral victory, the Liberal Party began to implement its' new economic design. It was a resource led national building strategy that adopted some of the key planks of the technological sovereignty school. One of the governments primary objectives was to shift the balance of power from the provinces to the federal government. Central to the governments initiative through the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, was the idea that the federal government could reassert a new economic union in Canada. The federal government's attack on the power of the provinces was accomplished through the National Energy Program (NEP). The connection between the re-election of the Liberals without support from the West and their new energy policy appeared obvious. (20)

By 1982 much of the country was suffering from the

recession as the Liberals had failed to accomplish their nationalization plan. (21) The 1984 election saw the Tories sweep the West, break the Liberals' traditional hold on Quebec and capture the majority of the seats in Ontario and the Maritimes. (22) The Conservative Party's approach to economic development was market-driven while focusing more on decentralization and factor adjustment than on active state intervention in the economy. By 1987 the government had demonstrated this approach through a series of initiatives inspired to transfer much of the responsibility for regional development to the regions themselves. (23) However by the 1993 election, Canadians were largely dissatisfied with the Conservative party and the result was a complete transformation of Canadian politics. Two very regionally based parties captured a significant amount of support and one, the Bloc Quebecois, was given the status as the Official Opposition.

Peter McCormick discusses the consequences of differences in political culture and behavior in the context of political activity. He suggests that given personal experiences in the workplace are an important part of political socialization, it should only be expected that different patterns generated by the different resource and economic bases of the various provinces will themselves contribute to differences in political styles and expectations. (24) A second consequence of economic regionalism, which McCormick defines as the differences in

political interests that exist as a result, is that a policy that favors one may harm another. (25)

In a country as diverse as Canada, national economic policies impact quite differently upon different parts of the country and the political reactions both exhibit and reinforce regionalism. (26) Where geographic diversity implies a different resource base for economic activity, a political regionalism based directly upon economic and occupational considerations will probably result. (27)

As McCready states, there is a theory that Canadian politics can be explained as attempts to balance regional cleavages. These regional cleavages are based upon the premise that Ontario and Quebec represent the core and the remainder of Canada is seen as the periphery. The political consequences of the core-periphery model are many. It has been suggested that the periphery will display its' alienation in ideological polarization. (28)

Despite attempts by federal governments to diversify and integrate regional economic development, striking disparities exist and persist among regions in Canada. Regionalism has become an integral factor in the political process and in the outcome of electoral contests. The economy has dominated politics in Canada for over a decade and political parties have strived to find their place in representing regional economic demands in attempts to gain political power. The following chapter will discuss the effects of regionalism on political alignment in recent Canadian federal elections.

ECONOMIC INDICATOR TABLES

Canada

Economic Indicator	1988	1990	1992
1. Population (thousands)	26,895	27,791	28,436
2. Net Migration (thousands)	111	163	191
3. Unemployment Rate (percent)	7.8	8.1	11.3
4. Personal Income Per Person (dollars)	18,815	21,198	21,858
5. Personal Disposable Income Per Person (dollars)	14,658	16,322	16,772
6. Gross Domestic Product Per Person (dollars)	22,529	24,143	24,214

Newfoundland

Economic Indicator	1988	1990	1992
1. Population (thousands)	576	579	581
2. Net Migration (thousands)	-3	-2	-2
3. Unemployment Rate (percent)	16.5	17.1	20.2
4. Personal Income Per Person (dollars)	13,981	16,157	17,227
5. Personal Disposable Income Per Person (dollars)	6,707	7,661	8,171
6. Gross Domestic Product Per Person (dollars)	13,955	15,188	15,890

Prince Edward Island

Economic Indicator	1988	1990	1992
1. Population (thousands)	130	131	130
2. Net Migration (thousands)	-	-	-1
3. Unemployment Rate (percent)	13.1	15.1	17.9
4. Personal Income Per Person (dollars)	14,492	16,229	17,915
5. Personal Disposable Income Per Person (dollars)	11,962	13,130	14,485
6. Gross Domestic Product Per Person (dollars)	13,669	15,237	16,546

Nova Scotia

Economic Indicator	1988	1990	1992
1. Population (thousands)	900	913	921
2. Net Migration (thousands)	-1	1	-
3. Unemployment Rate (percent)	10.3	10.5	13.2
4. Personal Income Per Person (dollars)	15,719	17,859	18,680
5. Personal Disposable Income Per Person (dollars)	12,594	14,060	14,615
6. Gross Domestic Product Per Person (dollars)	16,759	18,559	19,530

New Brunswick

Economic Indicator	1988	1990	1992
1. Population (thousands)	733	743	749
2. Net Migration (thousands)	-2	-	-2
3. Unemployment Rate (percent)	12.0	12.1	12.8
4. Personal Income Per Person (dollars)	14,851	16,969	17,724
5. Personal Disposable Income Per Person (dollars)	12,015	13,307	14,037
6. Gross Domestic Product Per Person (dollars)	16,173	17,689	18,529

Quebec

Economic Indicator	1988	1990	1992
1. Population (thousands)	6,860	7,021	7,151
2. Net Migration (thousands)	11	25	30
3. Unemployment Rate (percent)	9.4	10.2	12.8
4. Personal Income Per Person (dollars)	17,633	19,999	20,648
5. Personal Disposable Income Per Person (dollars)	13,313	15,057	15,438
6. Gross Domestic Product Per Person (dollars)	20,751	21,951	21,964

Ontario

Economic Indicator	1988	1990	1992
1. Population (thousands)	9,885	10,342	10,611
2. Net Migration (thousands)	98	82	104
3. Unemployment Rate (percent)	5.0	6.3	10.8
4. Personal Income Per Person (dollars)	20,970	23,118	23,593
5. Personal Disposable Income Per Person (dollars)	16,209	17,677	18,083
6. Gross Domestic Product Per Person (dollars)	25,589	26,439	26,148

Manitoba

Economic Indicator	1988	1990	1992
1. Population (thousands)	1,105	1,108	1,113
2. Net Migration (thousands)	-3	-6	-6
3. Unemployment Rate (percent)	7.8	7.2	9.6
4. Personal Income Per Person (dollars)	16,933	19,151	19,862
5. Personal Disposable Income Per Person (dollars)	13,931	15,543	15,966
6. Gross Domestic Product Per Person (dollars)	21,631	23,852	23,969

Saskatchewan

Economic Indicator	1988	1990	1992
1. Population (thousands)	1,032	1,011	1,005
2. Net Migration (thousands)	-11	-19	-8
3. Unemployment Rate (percent)	7.5	7.0	8.2
4. Personal Income Per Person (dollars)	15,566	18,191	18,448
5. Personal Disposable Income Per Person (dollars)	12,719	14,746	14,716
6. Gross Domestic Product Per Person (dollars)	17,630	20,350	20,138

Alberta

Economic Indicator	1988	1990	1992
1. Population (thousands)	2,463	2,556	2,632
2. Net Migration (thousands)	-13	21	11
3. Unemployment Rate (percent)	8.0	7.0	9.5
4. Personal Income Per Person (dollars)	19,272	21,605	22,389
5. Personal Disposable Income Per Person (dollars)	15,352	16,820	17,285
6. Gross Domestic Product Per Person (dollars)	25,345	27,937	27,714

British Columbia

Economic Indicator	1988	1990	1992
1. Population (thousands)	3,128	3,300	3,451
2. Net Migration (thousands)	36	60	64
3. Unemployment Rate (percent)	10.4	8.3	10.4
4. Personal Income Per Person (dollars)	18,631	21,778	22,662
5. Personal Disposable Income Per Person (dollars)	14,775	16,919	17,505
6. Gross Domestic Product Per Person (dollars)	22,399	24,811	25,114

Yukon

Economic Indicator	1988	1990	1992
1. Population (thousands)	27	28	30
2. Net Migration (thousands)	-	-	1
3. Unemployment Rate (percent)	-	-	-
4. Personal Income Per Person (dollars)	20,074	23,643	25,333
5. Personal Disposable Income Per Person (dollars)	15,852	18,536	19,733
6. Gross Domestic Product Per Person (dollars)	30,704	35,071	33,967

Northwest Territories

Economic Indicator	1988	1990	1992
1. Population (thousands)	56	59	62
2. Net Migration (thousands)	-1	-	-
3. Unemployment Rate (percent)	-	-	-
4. Personal Income Per Person (dollars)	17,304	20,102	21,177
5. Personal Disposable Income Per Person (dollars)	12,732	14,915	15,597
6. Gross Domestic Product Per Person (dollars)	34,357	35,881	33,968

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CHAPTER FOUR
The Political Ramifications of Regionalism

Since 1988, the economy has been one of the most important issues facing Canadians from across the country. Indeed the 1988 federal election itself was clearly dominated by the Canada - U.S. free trade agreement and played a decisive role in the outcome. The Conservative party was the only party to emerge from the 1988 election with solid representation in all regions. (1) Economic disparities within Canada however, have polarized regions in their search for political alternatives. Canadians have formed their own regionally-based political parties to meet their own regional interests which are threatening the existence of the traditional federal parties in Canada. There is no doubt that regionalism in Canadian politics is becoming more important than ever and the 1993 election provides a significant body of evidence in support of that conclusion.

One factor of great importance in explaining the Conservative Party's impressive momentum going into the 1988 election was the voters' positive appraisal of the Conservative government's record on the economy. In August of 1988, an Angus Reid poll conducted for the Conservative government's fourth anniversary showed that the public was impressed with the Conservative's record in stimulating economic growth and in reducing unemployment in the country. (2) In addition, when voters looked back over four years of Tory government, they were far more likely to believe that the Conservatives' policies had helped rather

than hurt the national economy as well as their regional economy. The Progressive Conservatives had a poor showing in the periphery of the country however. Quebec was solidly Conservative, and the party even did well in Ontario. In the West however, Saskatchewan and particularly British Columbia gave substantial support to the NDP. Thus, the periphery of the country expressed doubt about the incumbent federal government. (3) Opinions surrounding the free trade agreement were consistent with regional voting patterns in Saskatchewan, British Columbia, New Brunswick and Ontario all of which displayed higher than average opposition to the Free Trade Agreement. Given the overall importance of free trade opinion to the 1988 voting decision, these issue concerns provide a clear explanation of regional voting patterns. (See Table 1)

Harold Clarke and Allan Kornberg, in their study on the impact of economic issues on support for the federal Conservative party in the 1988 federal election, concluded that economic evaluations had important direct and indirect effects on Conservative support. Since the 1988 election, they conclude that there has been a rapid and sharp decline in the electorate's support for the party and its leader. There has also been significant increases in negative evaluations of national and personal economic conditions and the previous Conservative government's capacity to manage the economy effectively. (4)

Canadians have been discontented with national and

personal economic conditions which have had largely adverse effects on Conservative support. Moreover, negative economic evaluations have had indirect effects as well, influencing attitudes toward free trade and the GST, both of which had significant influence on Conservative support. Attitudes toward free trade moved in a negative direction immediately following the 1988 election, and the GST became massively unpopular. The Conservatives failed to convince Canadians of the wisdom of either of these economic policy initiatives. According to an Angus Reid Poll in July of 1989, support for the federal Conservatives had dropped in all major regions of the country. (5)

By 1990, the strong emergence of regionally-based parties began to unfold. The Bloc Quebecois was formed and enjoyed impressive early success which provided evidence of the pull of the "independantiste" position in Quebec. The Bloc proved in the 1993 election to be capable of rearranging Quebec's, as well as, Canada's political map. Lucien Bouchard became very popular within Quebec as he denounced federalism and promoted the benefits he said sovereignty would bring Quebec. Andre Bernard explains the party's success "was simply the long overdue expression in federal politics of the sovereigntist movement that had developed in Quebec over the past twenty-five years." (6) The Bloc successfully altered the pattern of representation at the expense of the Conservative party.

The Bloc Quebecois was built from grass roots support

for Quebec sovereignty. With the provinces opposition to the Charlottetown agreement, demonstrated through the referendum, Quebec continued with its' message that it would not accept compromises from the political elite. The BQ emerged from the referendum strong, stable and secure in pursuit of the party's objective of obtaining sovereignty.

At the same time, the Reform Party continued to grow in the West and particularly in Alberta. The party was created at a Winnipeg convention under the banner, "The West Wants In". (7) The roots of western political protest are both strong and deep in the political culture of western Canadians. As early as 1921 the sense of western alienation was manifest in the party system through support of the Progressive party. For many western Canadians, the heat of the National Energy Program inspired battles between Alberta and Ottawa in the early 1980's. Similarly to the BQ, this regional party demonstrated that it was capable of substantially changing the face of Canadian politics. The Reform Party, also like the BQ, had begun to pose a threat to the Conservatives. (8) In the 1984 federal election, alternative right wing movement could already be traced as a new anti-bilingual party, the Confederation of Regions, was quickly established and had its greatest success in Manitoba, gaining 9.8% of the vote. (9)

The Reform Party formed part of a trend in Canadian society shaking the traditional political culture of Canada as it held uncompromising convictions on every issue.

traditional parties in Canadian politics, more often than not, practised politics of pragmatism which was broadly based and therefore, unsuccessfully tried to develop roots in each region. Manning's party represents reforms designed to restrict the power of elites who exercise undue influence on the public affairs of the nation. This appeal of "The Common Sense for the Common People" was welcomed by many frustrated Westerners who often felt marginalized by the distance and influence from the central powers in Ottawa, Toronto and Montreal. (10)

The Reform Party was also successful in securing its' position on deficit control as it had established itself as the only party with a detailed plan to reduce the deficit. This coupled with the fact that the Conservative Party's campaign became increasingly disorganized, prompted those voters who were concerned with government financing see Reform as their only viable alternative. The challenge to the party will be to pursue its agenda within parliament while being removed from its supporters in the Canadian West. The party's continued success will be measured by its ability to do just that. (11)

The Reid report indicated in December of 1992, that many Canadians were looking beyond the mainstream parties for their vote. (12) Interestingly, support for new federal parties was evident in those regions where new parties have made the most significant inroads. In both British Columbia and Alberta, where the Reform party is strongest, six in ten

polled said they were attracted to the notion of expanded political options. In Quebec, public opinion was also highly amenable to enlarging the political options available as close to six in ten voters said they found the idea of new parties appealing, which makes surprising somewhat less the popularity of the Bloc Quebecois. Elsewhere in the country, opinion was roughly divided as to whether or not new parties were desirable although those residing in the Atlantic provinces were somewhat more likely than others to express satisfaction with the mainstream parties. (13) (See table 2)

As of December 1992, the Liberals were holding the lead in every major region of the country with the exception of Quebec and Alberta. (14) (See table 2) A massive change in Canadians' political allegiances had occurred since the Conservatives won re-election in 1988. A retention rate analysis, examining where the party's 1988 supporters were, illustrates the realignment that has occurred and the substantial erosion of the Tories' support base. (15) Only 28 percent of Canadians who voted Conservative were still with the party by December of 1992, while three quarters (72%) had moved elsewhere. Finally, one-half of Reform's supporters had voted for the Conservatives in 1988. (16) (See Table 3) "The collapse of the Progressive Conservative party was both a cause and effect of Reform's success". (17) The creation of the Reform Party was a result of Western Canadian hostility towards the Mulroney Conservative government and their unpopular economic and constitutional policies. The success

of Reform's mobilization directly contributed to the collapse of the Conservative Party. The Reform Party provided an appropriate alternative to traditionally conservative minded voters who were given little reason to vote for the Conservative Party. Preston Manning was successful in promoting his party as a viable alternative to the electorate and "appears anxious to promote Reform as the logical successor to the Conservatives". (18)

Within the country's major regions, the retention rate analysis illustrates the shifts that have taken place in voters' allegiances. Across western Canada, 1988 Conservative supporters had split into four roughly equal groups, with one in four former Tories still with the party, the same number undecided, and one in four moving to the Liberals and Reform respectively. In Quebec, 1988 Tory supporters were as likely to be backing the BQ or to be undecided as they were to be intending to vote Conservative again. In both Ontario and Atlantic Canada, the Conservatives retention was stronger with the defectors largely split between the Liberals and the ranks of the undecided. (19)

Discontent with the country's economy has been a central theme in Canadian politics during recent years. The Liberal Party's mandate to implement some new "initiatives", create opportunities and their focus on "jobs", enabled them to gain support from all regions of the country in the 1993 federal election. Regionally based parties gained their success

largely at the expense of the Conservative Party. The Bloc Quebecois took one half of the popular vote in Quebec (20) and the Reform Party was very well positioned to capture the allegiances of aggrieved western Canadian voters. The New Democratic Party suffered losses in its' support at the expense of the Liberals as well as to Reform and the Bloc Quebecois. With voters primary concern being the economy, the Liberals were able to capitalize on their support by focusing their agenda on jobs. The NDP did not spend enough time appealing to the electorate's anxiety towards jobs and emphasized NAFTA instead. This was perceived as a strategic error as they targeted issues that were much lower on the agenda of voters. Canadians also believed that social program spending should be maintained to provide cost effective management and the Liberals were more apt than the NDP to carry out such policy initiatives. (21) There were three NDP provincial governments at the time of the election - Ontario, Saskatchewan and British Columbia - and it appeared to the electorate that those governments had failed to implement solutions to the economic problems they were facing. This also explains why the NDP suffered losses in their support.

With the economy at the forefront of the voters' minds, the election results of the 1993 federal election represent the frustrations felt by Canadians in all regions of the country. (See table 4 and 5) The 1993 election can in one sense be interpreted as a revolution in Canadian politics.

Of those who voted in the previous election, over half switched to a different party which represents a massive swing. More importantly, many of the volatile voters switched from traditional parties to new parties. If examined more carefully however, the 1993 election appears less revolutionary. The Liberals are back in power with a majority government as they have been for much of the century. The newly emergent parties represent the old realities of Western protest and Quebec nationalism. Regional consciousness and perceptions of the unequal distributions of the costs and benefits of federalism have been perennial finding of studies in Canadian politics. In 1993, voters took advantage of the new alternative parties to express some of these attitudes. (22)

The Liberal victory of 1993 has been said to be historic. In the Atlantic provinces, where the Liberals already controlled every provincial legislature, the party carried every seat but one. It was an indication of the extent to which the Conservatives had alienated the Maritimes, dependent as they are on federal funding to maintain the quality of social services and even the capacity of the private sector to provide jobs. The captured 57% of the popular vote and took 31 of the region's 32 seats. The Conservatives won 26% of the decided vote and one of New Brunswick's two seats. The Liberals managed to increase their support from the 1988 election when they won 46% of the popular vote and took 20 seats. (Table 4 and 5)

In Ontario, the Liberals also managed to win all but one seat. Free trade, the GST and a Bank of Canada induced recession had devastated the manufacturing economy, notwithstanding the panacea the Conservatives had promised. (23) The Liberals received 53 percent of the popular vote in Ontario and took 98 of the province's 99 seats. (Table 4 and 5) Comparatively speaking, the Liberals' breakthrough in the West was just as spectacular: 45 percent of the vote and 12 seats in Manitoba; 32 percent of the vote and five seats in Saskatchewan; 50 percent of the vote and two seats in the Territories; 25 percent of the vote and four seats in Alberta, the first time that the Liberals had carried a constituency in that province since 1968. (24)

From its best ever showing in 1988, the NDP fell to its worst ever percentage of vote and number of seats. It went from the best of times to the worst without enough seats to be recognized as an official party in parliament. Most ridings gave the party less than 15 percent of the vote. In terms of regional distribution, the largest number of NDP votes came from Ontario, British Columbia and Saskatchewan. In terms of percentages, Saskatchewan led the way with 26.6%, followed by Manitoba with 16.7% and British Columbia with 15.5%. In all other provinces including Ontario, home of an NDP provincial government, the party won less than 10 percent. Both Left and Right variants of populism have had long and important traditions in Canada. Often the two streams have been in competition: Social Credit versus CCF,

and more recently, Reform versus NDP. In this election the Reform party had a higher vote than the NDP in 173 ridings in the nine provinces in which it campaigned, and this of course translated into far more seats. The NDP was ahead of Reform in only 46 ridings. There was a regional pattern to the losses. In the West, the NDP lost 17 seats to Reform and six to the Liberals. In Ontario all 10 NDP seats were lost to the Liberals. In Quebec, the solitary NDP seat won in a by-election fell to the BQ. (25)

As was the case for the CCF in the difficult era of the 1950's, the West - particularly Saskatchewan - largely saved the federal party from oblivion. The NDP elected no members east of Manitoba, which had never before occurred in its history, and in terms of social democracy, it had not happened since 1945 in the CCF era. Thus the central industrial heartland of Ontario and Quebec has no federal NDP representation, nor does economically impoverished Atlantic Canada. One obvious consequence of the regionalized pattern of support is that the NDP, like its predecessor the CCF, continues to be seen by many as a Western based party. A leader from the Yukon, who did capture the party's only seat in the North, accentuates that image. (26)

Preston Manning led his Reform party to electoral success by winning 52 seats, with 51 in Western Canada, just shy of official opposition. The party's success while owing a considerable amount to the collapse of the Conservatives, was also a product of organizational work between elections

and an effective campaign strategy. Following the 1988 election, the ongoing politics of constitutional renewal provided Reform with a foothold in the political arena. In responding to the "leadership crisis" in the country, Manning argued that Western Canada must insist on equal status in confederation. The party took 52% of the decided vote in Alberta, 22 % in Manitoba, 36% of the popular vote in British Columbia and 27% of the popular vote in Saskatchewan. The party also managed to win 20% of the popular vote in Ontario which translated into one seat. Reform captured 22 of the province's 26 seats. It is interesting to note that of the 56 constituencies in which the Reform Party finish second within Ontario, 46 of those were outside the Metro Toronto area. (27) This is significant as the party's appeal appears to be more successful in this province to largely rural areas. This could be explained by the party's opposition to new values and lifestyles of contemporary society which largely represent the cultures of largely urban areas such as Toronto.

Saskatchewan distinguished itself for carrying on the multi-party tradition. This province produced a fairly close three way race between the Liberals, the NDP and the Reform Party. Both the Liberals and the NDP won five seats while Reform took four. The Conservative party ran poorly in terms of popular vote (11%) and received no seats. It is interesting to note that Saskatchewan supported a three way race between the Liberals, NDP and Reform. As Richard

Johnston explains the NDP "is typically strongest in Saskatchewan and usually gets about one-third of the total vote." (28) Interestingly, he describes the patterns of alignment that emerge from that province in 1974: "Saskatchewan contradicts the trends in its immediate neighbors. In Saskatchewan, the Liberals and New Democrats have strengthened and the Conservatives have declined, yielding the competitive three-party system." (29) This province therefore, following tradition, continues to divide support to perpetuate a multi-party system.

The Bloc Quebecois won 49.5 percent of the votes cast in Quebec, translating into 75 Quebec seats in the House of Commons. It took every riding where French-speaking voters constituted more than 70 percent of the population with four exceptions. The pattern of representation in Quebec was completely changed, in favor of the BQ and at the expense of the Conservatives, just as it had been changed in 1984 in favor of the PC party and at the expense at that time, of the Liberal party. On the whole, the votes reaped by the BQ came from Parti Quebecois sympathizers. The two parties have roughly the same electoral base and have the same long term primary objective to make Quebec a sovereign country. The BQ is meant to promote that objective in the House of Commons where the PQ does not have access. (30)

These election results represent the anxiety and discontent that has characterized the attitudes of Canadians during the past half decade. A number of factors have

contributed to this, with the economic recession and the unemployment problem chief among them. (31) Canadian society also continues to suffer from significant regional tensions and it could be argued that the centrifugal forces working on the federation have never been stronger. (32) Regional consciousness and perceptions of the unequal distributions of the costs and benefits of federalism have been perennial findings of Canadian public opinion studies. Although they have not always been prime motivators of behavior in federal elections, voters took advantage of the 1993 federal election to elect new alternative parties to express some of these attitudes. (33)

The sense of hopelessness and despair which Canadians felt for most of the second Conservative term of office was clearly reflected in the correspondingly record low levels of approval of both the federal government and of Mulroney himself. Canadians were obviously looking for other parties to represent their hopes and beliefs. The success of the two regional challengers - the Bloc Quebecois and the Reform Party - was facilitated by their ability to capture the attention of disillusioned voters and provide a platform which represented their attitudes, beliefs and dreams. Lucien Bouchard led the BQ to success by focusing on an independiste position for Quebec which mobilized the province into a commitment to "rapport de forces". Preston Manning preached "The Common Sense for the Common People" along with his vision of "One Canada" to mobilize Westerners and those

who were disillusioned with the traditional parties. The Liberal party took ownership of the primary issue of concern to voters -the unemployment problem. Their focus on creating opportunities through "jobs" hit home to Canadians and enabled the Liberals in part to achieve such an electoral victory.

The prospects for the Conservative Party do not look terribly promising following the 1993 election. The Conservatives did receive 16 percent of the national popular vote, which was more than the Bloc and only three points less than Reform. However, the caucus consists of only two members and the denial of official party status will make them a good deal less visible than their share of popular support might suggest as appropriate. (34) The Party also faces a dramatically different political landscape. As in the election campaign, they will have to do battle on three fronts if they are to return to the political arena. They are faced with a newly elected Liberal majority government who managed to capture support from all regions of the country, with particular strength in Ontario and the Maritimes. The Reform Party managed to capture the support of Western Canada by focusing on debt reduction and capitalizing on the fact that many Canadians did not see the Conservatives as a viable alternative. The Bloc Quebecois was successful at the expense of Conservative's by focusing on economic issues and independence for Quebec. The Progressive Conservative Party will have to restructure

itself in order to present itself as a meaningful option to Canadians facing new economic and domestic challenges.

The Bloc Quebecois was a primary beneficiary of the collapse of the Conservative coalition. The party's prospects for the 1993 election were aided by Brian Mulroney's departure which accelerated immeasurably Quebec's flight from the Conservative party. The Bloc also has a very charismatic leader in Lucien Bouchard who can be expected to provide his party with solid leadership. The Bloc also faces some significant challenges as they make their debut. As a party whose "raison d'etre" is to preside over the political transition of Quebec from a Canadian province to an independent nation, the future of the Official Opposition is highly dependent upon critical events in Quebec over the next year and a half. (35) In the meantime, however, the BQ will have to confront the contradictory forces of those constituents who demand a strong voice for their province in Canada and those who would prefer a dedicated focus on the developments towards sovereignty. Angus Reid polling among Bloc supporters indicated strong sovereigntist impulses among these voters, although it was indicated that a number of Quebecers would urge the new opposition to play a constructive role in Parliament. (36)

The Reform Party was equally successful in capitalizing on the collapse of the Conservative coalition in western Canada. It elected almost enough representatives to win the status of Official Opposition. (37) Clearly, the Reform

party was very well positioned to capture the allegiances of traditionally aggrieved western Canadian voters, many of whom had supported the Conservatives for similar reasons. As Table 6 illustrates, "right wing" support was clearly as strong in 1993 as it was in 1988, particularly in Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario however, a process of re-alignment has occurred with the Reform Party. After analyzing the success of the Reform party in the 1993 federal election, Sigurdson argues that Preston Manning and his party represent the "New Canada". (38) The Conservatives, Liberals and the NDP in contrast, represent the "Old Canada" with nineteenth century ideas and ideology.

The Reform party's fight for the "No" side in the 1992 constitutional referendum also appears to have paid late dividends to the Reform party. On the campaign front, Angus Reid polling displayed that the Reform party was able to establish a solid position on a number of key issues, particularly the deficit and taxes. (39) The Reform party's emphasis on process issues and systematic reform also played very well to an electorate that is clearly unhappy with the status quo. Preston Manning argued that the status quo vis-a-vis the traditional parties, more often than not practiced politics of pragmatism. As a result, support was very broadly based as the parties tried to develop roots in each region. Reform finds its roots in representing primarily, Western Canadian grievances but has managed to solicit support in Ontario as well. Its success will depend upon the

party's flexibility to effectively represent its' supporters and expand its' base of support.

The political landscape of Canada has changed dramatically. Regional economic discontent is a primary factor in explaining the election results in 1993. Clearly, Canadians were no longer content with the traditional federal parties, with the exception of the Liberal Party, and looked to re-align themselves with regionally based parties to represent their interests.

**TABLE ONE - HISTORICAL ELECTION DATA
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULAR VOTE AND SEATS BY PROVINCE**

	1984					1988			
	PC	LIB	NDP	OTHER		PC	LIB	NDP	OTHER
B.C.:									
Popular Vote %	47	16	35	2		35	20	37	8
Seats #	19	1	8	0		12	1	19	0
ALBERTA:									
Popular Vote %	69	13	14	4		52	14	17	17
Seats #	21	0	0	0		25	0	1	0
SASKATCHEWAN:									
Popular Vote %	42	18	38	2		36	18	44	2
Seats #	9	0	5	0		4	0	10	0
MANITOBA:									
Popular Vote %	43	22	27	8		37	37	21	5
Seats #	9	1	4	0		7	5	2	0
ONTARIO:									
Popular Vote %	47	30	21	2		38	39	20	3
Seats #	67	14	13	1		47	42	10	0
QUEBEC:									
Popular Vote %	50	35	9	7		53	30	14	3
Seats #	58	17	0	0		63	12	0	0
NOVA SCOTIA:									
Popular Vote %	51	33	15	1		41	47	11	1
Seats #	9	2	0	0		5	6	0	0
NEW BRUNSWICK:									
Popular Vote %	53	32	14	1		40	45	9	5
Seats #	9	1	0	0		5	5	0	0
NEWFOUNDLAND:									
Popular Vote %	57	36	6	1		43	44	12	0
Seats #	4	3	0	0		2	5	0	0
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND:									
Popular Vote %	52	41	6	1		41	50	8	1
Seats #	3	1	0	0		0	4	0	0
YUKON/NWT:									
Popular Vote %	47	25	24	5		30	30	37	3
Seats #	3	0	0	0		0	2	1	0

TABLE 2
FEDERAL PARTIES' POPULAR SUPPORT BY REGION (%)
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1992

	PC	LIB	NDP	REF	BQ	OTHER
B.C.	8	37	27	27	0	1
ALB.	13	32	19	34	0	2
MB/SASK.	16	46	24	11	0	2
ONTARIO	19	52	17	11	0	1
QUEBEC	20	26	13	0	38	3
ATLANTIC	17	57	20	4	0	2

TABLE 3
THE FEDERAL PARTIES' RETENTION RATES:
THEIR 1988 SUPPORTERS' CURRENT ALLEGIANCES (NOV/DEC 1992)

(BASE)	VOTED IN 1988			DID NOT VOTE (230)
	PC (551)	LIB (380)	NDP (208)	
CURRENT PARTY PREFERENCE:				
CONSERVATIVE	28	2	1	9
LIBERAL	20	69	19	22
NEW DEMOCRAT	7	7	51	13
REFORM	12	4	9	9
BLOC QUEBECOIS	9	3	6	9
OTHER	1	1	0	3
UNDECIDED	23	13	14	35

**TABLE 4 - 1993 ELECTION DATA
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULAR VOTE AND SEATS BY PROVINCE**

	PC	LIB	NDP	REF	BQ	OTHER
B.C.:						
Popular Vote %	13	28	16	36	0	7
Seats #	0	6	2	24	0	0
ALBERTA:						
Popular Vote %	15	25	4	52	0	4
Seats #	0	4	0	22	0	0
SASKATCHEWAN:						
Popular Vote %	11	32	27	27	0	3
Seats #	0	5	5	4	0	0
MANITOBA:						
Popular Vote %	12	45	17	22	0	4
Seats #	0	12	1	1	0	0
ONTARIO:						
Popular Vote %	18	53	6	20	0	3
Seats #	0	98	0	1	0	0
QUEBEC:						
Popular Vote %	14	33	1	0	49	3
Seats #	1	19	0	0	54	1
NOVA SCOTIA:						
Popular Vote %	23	52	7	13	0	5
Seats #	0	11	0	0	0	0
NEW BRUNSWICK:						
Popular Vote %	28	56	5	8	0	3
Seats #	1	9	0	0	0	0
NEWFOUNDLAND:						
Popular Vote %	26	68	4	1	0	1
Seats #	0	7	0	0	0	0
P.E.I.:						
Popular Vote %	32	60	5	1	0	2
Seats #	0	4	0	0	0	0
YUKON/NWT:						
Popular Vote %	17	50	21	10	0	3
Seats #	0	2	1	0	0	0

TABLE 5
CANADIANS' CURRENT PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES AGENDA (%)

	REGION					
(BASE)	BC (184)	ALB (135)	MB/SK (112)	ONT (562)	QUE (387)	ALT (127)
UNEMPLOYMENT/JOBS	29	39	38	40	38	37
THE ECONOMY	24	21	33	39	46	32
DEFICIT	36	37	21	18	14	10
SOCIAL SERVICES	8	13	10	7	4	10
LEADERSHIP	9	12	11	7	3	3
TAXES	6	5	1	10	6	4
FREE TRADE	10	5	6	8	3	7
ENVIRONMENT	4	4	2	4	3	4
EDUCATION	2	4	2	4	4	4
NATIONAL UNITY	2	2	1	3	2	1

TABLE 6
REFORM AND PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PERCENTAGES

REGION	REFORM + PC % OF THE VOTE	
	1988	1993
ATLANTIC	43.4%	34%
QUEBEC	55.7%	14%
ONTARIO	41.2%	38%
MANITOBA	42.3%	34%
ALBERTA	68.7%	67%
B.C.	42.9%	49%
NORTH	32.8%	27%

ENDNOTES

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15. Ibid., p. 33
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17. Sigurdson, R. "Preston Manning and the Politics of Postmodernism." in the Canadian Journal of Political Science. (XXVII:2, June 1994) p. 274
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19. The Reid Report. (Volume 7, Number 10, November/December 1992) p. 34
20. The Reid Report. (Volume 8, Number 9, October 1993) p. 3
21. This discussion follows those conclusions found in The Reid Report. (Volume 8, Number 8, September 1993)
22. Frizzell, A. et al. Op.Cit. p.1
23. Ibid., p.38
24. Ibid., p.38
25. Ibid., p.53
26. Ibid., p.53
27. Ellis, F. & Archer, K. Op.Cit., p. 73
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29. Ibid., p. 140
30. Frizzell, A., et al. Op.Cit. p.86
31. The Reid Report. (Volume 8, Number 9, October 1993) p. 1
32. Ibid., p. 1
33. Frizzell, A., Pammett, J. & Westell, A. The Canadian General Election of 1993. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994) p. 1
34. The Reid Report. (Volume 8, Number 9, October 1993) p. 3

35. Ibid., p. 3

36. Ibid., p. 3

37. Ibid., p. 3

38. Sigurdson, R., Op.Cit. p.250

39. The Reid Report. (Volume 8, Number 9, October 1993) p.3

Table One reproduced from the Reid Report (Volume 3, Number 11, November, 1988) p. 26

Tables Two and Three reproduced from The Reid Report (Volume 7, Number 10, November/December 1992)

Table Four reproduced from The Reid Report (Volume 8, Number 9, October 1993)

Table Five reproduced from The Reid Report (Volume 8, Number 7, July/August 1993)

Table Six reproduced from Table Four listed above and from national election data provided by Micheal Kinnear, History Department, University of Manitoba.

CONCLUSION

Canada is composed of diverse regional and economic communities, large and small, wealthy and poor, rural and urban-industrial. The resulting disparities in the amount and basis of economic activity are of great and increasing political significance, especially in view of the continuing desire for a higher quality of living and for greater social security. Thus, some regions appear as "have" regions and others as "have-not". Some contribute more to the national treasury than they receive in benefits, while some are chronically "receivers" in this respect. Much of the internal political activity in Canada is powered by these disparities and takes many forms including party formation and allegiances. The focus of this thesis has been to examine the effect of regionalism on political alignment measured in terms of voting patterns. Clearly region is and has been an important factor in explaining political behavior and it is the assertion of this paper that in fact, a process of re-alignment occurred in the 1993 federal election.

Region is important in explaining political alignment as regional bases of economic support vary to a large extent from coast to coast. This is exemplified by the economic diversity displayed throughout the country. As a result, some provinces are able to become self-sustaining, while others remain dependent upon the federal government for

support. Therefore, the needs and interests of provinces vary substantially and require specific political representation. This in itself creates fertile ground for political parties to develop policies and initiatives to respond to specific regional interests in their quest for power and political support. Thus, provinces and certain regions, support those parties which will best represent their specific needs and ultimately, facilitate political alignment.

This thesis examined economic conditions as a primary explanation for the differences in political alignment that occur from region to region. The thesis has been developed in this way for two reasons. The economy has been the most important issue facing Canadians during this past decade. Not only has it been a key issue in recent years, but economic disparities and uneven economic development has existed since Confederation as a result of the various factors which have been discussed in this thesis. There are many other cleavages which could be used to explain regional political alignment. Their inclusion would have resulted in a more exhaustive study. While it is recognized that other factors may play an important role in explaining regional differences, for the reasons stated above, this thesis has focused upon economic differences among regions and how they affect political alignment.

Using the economy as a basis by which to examine regional differences was selected as it has been an important

public policy issue in Canada. Using data provided by Angus Reid, it was determined that the economy, including unemployment and jobs, was the number one issue according to Canadians of all regions, in the 1993 federal election. Election data was used to trace the distribution of popular vote and number of seats by province to analyze voting trends between regions. The federal parties' retention rates between the 1988 and 1993 were also analyzed in order to account for the dramatic changes in support exemplified in the 1993 federal election.

As Jeffrey Simpson explains, the 1980's in Canada witnessed what might be termed a democratic surge in Canada. The surge of participation overwhelmed the country's political elites and made the population skeptical of any negotiating or brokering among them. (1) Western Canadians became suspicious of arrangements among Quebec and Ontario elites and their attitudes provided a fertile basis for the launch of the Reform Party by Preston Manning. This revealed the resentment toward large, impersonal government, with its' powers of taxation and regulation. Populism also appealed to some citizens of Ontario who shared the resentments against expensive projects of social and financial engineering. (2)

The struggle over language and jurisdiction were central to Canada's political culture that had been significantly influenced by the existence of French speaking Quebec. When political parties sought in different ways to respond to what they considered Quebec's demands, their efforts called forth

and indeed shaped, a response in all of Canada. The preoccupation with constitutional debates of the late 1980's and early 1990's struck many outside Quebec as just another in a series of efforts to please that restless province. In the act of forcing their demands onto the agenda, those reflecting the new democratic surges in English speaking Canada, clashed with those presenting Quebec's demands. French Canadian nationalism had itself moved beyond a defensive strategy to one of asserting a more prominent role for Quebec and secessionists formed into the Bloc Quebecois under Lucien Bouchard. The fight was about widely differing ideas concerning such complicated issues as Quebec's distinctiveness versus the equality of provinces. (3)

Simpson explains that the traditional political culture has been dominated by inter-regional demands for equity and the political deals which are necessary to respond to these demands. The role of government has been central to that culture as only government possessed sufficient resources to redistribute income and to lean periodically against the forces of geography and demography that concentrated economic activity within Canada in Ontario and Quebec. (4)

Social programs represent a regional dimension since a disproportionate number of disadvantaged Canadians live in the country's poorer regions. Therefore, universal programs such as unemployment insurance or federal welfare payments are far more consequential in Atlantic Canada than in southern Ontario for example. Equalization and federal

payments for universities and health care are also more critical to poorer provinces such as New Brunswick or Newfoundland than to Ontario. Pensions also have a regional dimension because, here too, a larger percentage of the population which requires pensions for basic income live in the country's economically least favored regions. (5)

The literature shows that one of the defining characteristics of the 1980's and early 1990's was a profound disillusionment with the government and those who held power within it. The sharpest focus for this disillusionment was the Conservative Party and the Prime Minister at that time, Brian Mulroney. The role of government, critical in shaping the country's traditional political culture, was also shaken by changes in the global economy that called into question some of the assumptions about exercising sovereignty. The Canadian economy has become more closely integrated and dependent upon the fiscal policies of the global economy, in specific reference to interest and exchange rates. The political system struggled for the most part unsuccessfully, to accommodate itself to the new pressures facing the country. As the 1990's unfold, political debate in Canada will be taken up by attempts to deal with pressures that have shifted patterns of collective behavior that served the country for most of the twentieth century. (6)

The struggle for "equality among regions" has always been present in Canada. It increased in intensity in recent years under strained economic conditions such as the forces

of global competition and fiscal weakness on behalf of governments without resources. The traditional political system was not able to adapt to these changes and only served to further isolate regions which had already experienced a sense of distance federal governments and a feeling of being on the periphery. A new political landscape has emerged as a result, with two new political parties which have a very regionally concentrated base of support. While this support is regional in nature, the Reform Party has been able to extend its support beyond Western Canada as they were able to make some inroads into Ontario. Both the Reform Party and the Bloc Quebecois captured a substantial number of seats in the House of Commons and have truly set a precedent within that institution as largely regionally based parties. The Bloc Quebecois, which has formed the Official Opposition, has a mandate of Quebec sovereignty and has no representation outside that province.

There has been a shift in the economy away from employment in primary resource industries and in secondary manufacturing towards post-industrial, service-sector employment; and Canada has experienced a corresponding realignment of its social and class structure to reflect this growth of service-oriented occupations. Canada has been greatly affected by the process of globalization, which has meant that many traditional blue-collar jobs have disappeared as trans-national corporations moved to southern locations with inexpensive workforces. Canada has also had to

accommodate the rise of centrifugal forces, most notably Quebecois nationalism and western alienation and the national government's autonomy has been further reduced as a result of successive international trade agreements, closer ties with the United States and an increasingly decentralized regime of fiscal federalism. (7)

Along with these institutional developments have come profound ideological, social and cultural upheavals. There is ample evidence that the traditional ideological contours of Canadian politics are being reshaped by a "new politics" of post-materialism. The social visibility and political influence of ethnic and cultural minorities and First Nations persons have increased dramatically in recent years and this has challenged the established ways in which we think about politics. Socio-cultural change, economic transformations and political discontent all contributed to the success of the Reform party. Reform taps into a tradition of right-wing conservatism in Canada and that it brings back memories of both the Progressive movement's populism and the Alberta Social Credit party's social conservatism. Unlike these previous movements however, Reform represents an affluent, urbanized, industrialized, secularized and modernized society. Its birthplace, Alberta, is now the most urbanized province in an increasingly modernized country; and British Columbia, where the party won its most seats in 1993, is one of the most prosperous provinces and one of the most affluent regions in the country. (8) However, Reform also performed

reasonably well in Atlantic Canada and was especially strong in Ontario.

The recent struggles over the constitution have also contributed to Reform's success. Westerners, in particular, have become distrustful of any party that promised to accommodate both western interests and the aspirations of Quebec. The failed Charlottetown Accord precipitated a decline of Conservative support in Quebec and the West, and was coupled with the relative weakness of the Liberal party in both of these areas. This offered Reform and the Bloc Quebecois the opportunity to fill the gap. (9)

Regionalism is multidimensional and can be defined many different ways. It is a political phenomenon that polarizes regions into political expression. As Canadians think of themselves in very regional terms, it becomes an important part of Canadian political life and if the 1993 federal election is any indication, it will continue to be important. Political parties are the vehicles by which alignments are developed. Lipset and Rokkan provide the framework by which to examine the social system and the development of the party system. The provincial and regional oppositions to the centralizing forces facilitate the development of the party system. These oppositions are reflected in the persistence of the economic disparities among provinces and the failure of traditional political parties, or centralizing forces, to accommodate them. As a result, political expression is demonstrated through a search for parties to represent

regional interests. The 1993 federal election represents the dissatisfaction with traditional parties and a resurgence once again to protest or third party movements. A process of "re-alignment" has occurred as provinces continue to evaluate themselves in regional terms and align themselves with parties more accurately reflecting their regional interests.

ENDNOTES

1. Simpson, Jeffrey. Faultlines: Struggling for a Canadian Vision. (Harper Collins Publishers Ltd., Toronto; 1993) p. 3
2. Ibid., p. 4
3. Ibid., p. 5
4. Ibid., p. 7
5. Ibid., p. 7
6. Ibid., p. 9-11
7. Sigurdson, R. "Preston Manning and the Politics of Postmodernism in Canada" in the Canadian Journal of Political Science. (XXVII:2, June 1994) p.257
8. Ibid., p.266
9. Ibid., p.274

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