

Public Policy For Downtown
Redevelopment in Winnipeg

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George Siamandas

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Abstract

Downtown redevelopment in general, and its more specific component, commercial development, is an issue that has not received much attention by researchers, especially from the policy formation point of view. The planning and political decision-making process around the formulation of Downtown redevelopment plans and their general proposals for stimulating commercial redevelopment, are the concerns of this study of public policy for Downtown redevelopment in Winnipeg.

This study explores the planning and political decision-making process surrounding the Downtown Winnipeg plan and evaluates both the above process, and the plan itself. The conclusions are that: the policy questions of commercial development and Downtown redevelopment have lacked a proper framework for the establishment of goals and the formulation of viable alternative plans for realizing these goals; citizens have been excluded from the planning process and the political decision-making process; and that politicians lack direction, a sense of priorities, and a real understanding of the public interest in this question. The major purpose is to explore the debate around this issue and raise some important questions for further research and consideration by planners, political decision makers and citizens.

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Chapter I

The Setting

Introduction

In April of 1969, the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg's Planning Department revealed its plan for the redevelopment of Winnipeg's Downtown core¹ - Downtown Winnipeg. This plan was presented at a time of renewed construction activity in Winnipeg's Downtown area. After many decades of stagnation, several new, large scale commercial developments were being built. This was an opportune time for the plan's presentation, and the plan's initial reception suggested that Winnipeg's Downtown was at the beginning of a new period of growth. These new commercial developments began in early 1968 and continued until the end of 1970. But as these buildings were being completed in late 1969 and throughout 1970, no new developments were announced to continue this trend of development. It appeared that Winnipeg's Downtown had received its share of construction and that the building boom was over. Just as suddenly as construction had begun in 1968, it ended abruptly towards the end of 1970. This new situation then placed the Downtown Winnipeg plan in a new perspective. Originally at the time of introduction when the Downtown was booming, it was easy to become enchanted with the plan and welcome its objectives and proposals. But now that development had slowed down, it was time to evaluate the plan objectively.

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the Downtown Winnipeg plan in terms of:

- (i) its goals and proposals, and
- (ii) the process of planning and decision-making that led to the adoption of the plan.

This chapter describes the setting for the evaluation of the Downtown Winnipeg plan. The first section will explore the question of Downtown deterioration by discussing the forces that have been operating in the Downtown and the accompanying problems that have been the consequences of these forces. These problems affecting central areas of cities generally, and Winnipeg's particularly, have served as the stimuli for the formulation of public policy, in this case the Downtown Winnipeg plan. The response of public policy - the Downtown Winnipeg plan, is then presented very briefly, to provide a general understanding of its various elements by way of introduction to a later and more thorough discussion in chapter three. The last section of this chapter presents the purpose and research design of this study, and makes a clear statement of the objectives and of the methodology that was employed to pursue those objectives.

Chapter II will establish criteria for the evaluation of the planning and decision-making process and of the plan itself. It will examine the process of commercial development, Downtown redevelopment and planning and political decision-making.

Chapter III describes the Downtown Winnipeg plan, presents some of the public comment on the plan and then performs the evaluation.

Chapter IV concludes this study with a summary of findings; some recommendations for policy makers; and suggestions for further research.

The Decay of the Downtown: the Problem for Public Policy

Public policy is directed towards the solution of a problem; in this case, the problem is Downtown decay and the policy is a redevelopment plan to reverse the decline. This following section looks at the trends that have been facing the Downtown areas of North America, and particularly Winnipeg, in order to clearly establish the nature of the problem that the Downtown Winnipeg plan is designed to alleviate.

Essentially two forces have been responsible for the decline of the Downtown relative to the city as a whole; these two forces are the demands for new growth, and the mobility that the automobile extended to residents and to industry. Growth in population required the construction of new housing and industry to house and supply this population. But this growth could not be accommodated in the central area that had already been built up as the initial centre of the city. Instead, growth occurred on the periphery of the central area. And when the Downtown was encircled, growth continued for miles in all directions away from the city. The low density nature of housing required large areas for the new sub-divisions and these areas could be found only outside the fringes of the city. The growth of industry and technological change in many industries also resulted in the decentralization of these functions from the central area to new industrial parks. New production methods in manufacturing and new techniques in warehousing now required spacious single story structures. The room for growth to meet these demands of housing and industry was not to be found in the built up central area, so as a result, the Downtown was abandoned. The second force in this suburbanization has been the improvement in transportation methods from the railroad and street car, to the car and truck. Whereas people once lacked effective modes of

transportation and thus had to live as close as possible to work, the automobile has allowed them the mobility to live in one end of the city and drive to the other for work. Various industries that had once relied on the rail lines that converged in the Downtown, now found trucking to be a more convenient form of transportation. They consequently chose to decentralize from the central area to new industrial parks that have been well planned for good transportation links. One third factor, retailing, has also decentralized from the Downtown to the new shopping centres found in the suburbs, as it has followed the shifts in population that now exist in the suburbs. When the market in the form of residents left for the suburbs, new retail establishments followed leaving only the well established large department stores and other small businesses in the central city. These forces that have been responsible for the decline of the Downtown relative to the metropolitan area, have left the central area a relative wasteland compared to the suburbs.

The effects of these forces have been:

to leave behind as the residual resident population the poor and the aged of the city; to leave a high proportion of floor space either vacant or occupied at very low rentals by in many cases marginal tenants; to leave large site areas either vacant or used as surface parking lots; to create serious over-congestion on the Downtown streets and on the major arteries between the residential suburbs and the Downtown employment centre, particularly at peak hours; and to spread a general air of deterioration and neglect, even of abandonment, over the entire central business district.²

As the above excerpt notes, this decline has had psychological, social, economic and physical manifestations. The psychological factor relates to the image that the Downtown projects as an area for either commercial or residential development. Once a Downtown deteriorates, investors and developers are unwilling to undertake new construction in the area. The social manifestation is especially obvious and reveals itself in the slums of

the central city that serve as the homes of the very poor. The economic manifestation of this decline reflects in poor business for existing establishments located in the Downtown and lack of new businesses of all kinds willing to locate in the central area. The hardship of this economic decay reflects upon the general economic image of the city as a whole and more particularly weakens the tax base that the local government draws upon to finance its activities. Physical decay in the Downtown consists of old, obsolete and decrepit businesses, homes, vacant lots and surface parking lots that are visually unattractive and non-productive both for the value of the land and the tax revenue accruing to the public sector. All of these factors combine to portray a very poor environment for work, business, recreation, entertainment and living. These characteristics are typical of many North American cities in America and Canada, large and small, poor and wealthy.

According to the Downtown Winnipeg plan, "Winnipeg has not escaped these common experiences, and its Downtown, along with that of so many North American cities, shows the ravages which have been worked by these forces."³ Winnipeg's poor physical planning is partly responsible for the present condition in the Downtown. A study by the University of Manitoba's Department of City Planning found that the past development of Winnipeg has not utilized any coherent planning principles; rather

The physical form of Winnipeg is the result of a laissez-faire development which began with the spread of settlers along the river banks to the north, to the south and to the west. It is apparent that this impetus, when unguided is not in the best interests either of the region or of the city itself.⁴

Those that once were responsible for the development of Winnipeg, exploited Manitoba's agriculture economic base. Since Winnipeg's original development, no major responsibility has been taken for continued growth:

Originally the fortunes of the City of Winnipeg were built largely by exploitation of the wheat-growing potential of the prairies.

Today, judging by the fact that the downtown area has been financed by outside capital, local interests seem to be reluctant to invest in the community.⁵

The reasons for Winnipeg's slow growth have included a poor economic base and an unwillingness of local developers and financiers to invest in the city. As a result, the growth of the Downtown area has stopped, until just recently, while the suburbs expanded significantly:

In more recent times, because of the large physical expansion of the settlements and because of the rapid development in methods of transportation and communication, many of the original central area functions - such as retail, commerce, manufacturing and education - have gravitated towards the rapidly developing suburban areas. At the same time, the central area did not or was not able to match the intensity of the development of the outlying areas, resulting in its gradual economic stagnation and physical decay.

As a result of these (suburban) developments, the central areas of most North American Communities - Winnipeg included - have lost much of their original social and economic vitality and contain today only a fraction, or pale resemblance of those functions which formerly were essential to the entire community.⁶

Till the mid and late 1960's, Winnipeg's general building stock dated back to the first World War:

The rapid decline in economic activity following World War I has resulted in the virtual standstill of building construction in the central area. Even since the end of World War II, the amount of construction in the core has not kept pace with the construction in the overall metropolitan area.

...Except for a few isolated areas, the central area is a chaotic conglomeration of low and tall buildings.

It is significant to note that the few large buildings which have been built in the core in the past decade, have been located within the framework not according to any planning and urban design principle, but simply according to land values.⁷

In the absence of new development and construction, Winnipeg's central area has gradually deteriorated as the following physical characteristics suggest:

- relatively low building density
- the majority of buildings are fifty years or older

- the majority of buildings are one or two stories in height
- approximately 50% of the downtown area is devoted to the movement and storage of vehicles
- the amount of green space is low and located in poor relation to core functions
- a high vacancy rate of commercial and office space
- a very small amount of resident population⁸

The Downtown Winnipeg plan suggests that Downtown Winnipeg's decline can be seen in the trends in population growth, retail sales, construction values, and the changes in the manufacturing, wholesaling and warehousing and service industries. In terms of population, the resident population in the central area has declined both relatively and absolutely: while Metro Winnipeg's population increased 68% from 1941 to 1966, the Downtown population decreased 47% from 15,567 to 8,706*. The retail trends parallel this decline in resident population - retail sales declined 4.9% from 36.7% of Metropolitan area sales in 1961 to 31.8% in 1966. And in merchandising, the Downtown's share fell from 85.7% in 1961 to 72.2% in 1966 - a decline of 13.5%. Moreover, these trends do not include the large recent proliferation of suburban shopping centres in Polo Park, Garden City, Assiniboia, St. Vital, Grant Park and North Winnipeg. Construction values confirm the decline in population and retail sales: while the value of building permits in Metro Winnipeg increased 35% from 1961 to 1966, the Downtown share of these permits declined .6% from 2.4% in 1961 to 1.8% in 1966. In manufacturing, the number of firms in the Downtown fell from 83 to 70, while in the Metropolitan area they grew from 984 to 1,027 between 1961-1966. This new growth occurred in the new industrial parks. In wholesaling and warehousing, the trend to suburban locations that provide more space and better transportation facilities seems to be draining the

* All of the statistics are from the Downtown Winnipeg plan, pages 6 - 8.

Downtown of a large sector of its economic activity. The service industry appears to be the only sector to hold its own and promise some growth.

The look at the forces operating on Downtown Winnipeg, has left the authors of the plan without much hope that these forces will abate or reverse themselves:

The picture (of the Downtown) which emerges is not one which reveals flourishing development and vigorous activity in the central area, in spite of the indicated strength of the services sector of the economy. Nor is there any reason to believe that whatever new growth is taking place is of a sufficient order of magnitude to fill all the empty spaces and generate a new vitality in the Downtown. The overriding impression is one of very slow growth, perhaps even too slow to offset the continuing loss of population and enterprise; of large areas used for surface parking; of old and obsolete buildings with low silhouettes; of an extensive segment of the business activity devoted to automobile repairs, storage and sales; of a general atmosphere of vacancy, decline, and dereliction hanging over most of the central business district, relieved only by one or two busy thoroughfares and one or two major nodes or concentrations of activity.

But these characteristics, too, are not peculiar to Winnipeg. They belong almost universally to the cities of this continent. And other cities of this continent have also found that the Downtown has required deliberate and specific programs to enable it to overcome some of the forces tending to reduce its strength and scatter its resources.⁹

The Response of Public Policy: the Downtown Winnipeg Plan

The Metropolitan Corporation Planning Department's response to the problem of Downtown deterioration is Downtown Winnipeg - a plan for the redevelopment of the Downtown. The plan concluded in its survey of the sources of deterioration, that the only way of reversing Downtown Winnipeg's decline would be by a reattraction of a Downtown resident population. And this population can only be attracted if people want to live Downtown and if developers want to develop apartments in the Downtown. The plan then has two goals: firstly, the improvement of the Downtown as a living environment, and secondly, the encouragement of commercial development.

Presently, the Downtown does not contain much housing, since private enterprise does not find it profitable to locate apartments in the Downtown because of the prohibitive costs of providing parking and because the environment in the Downtown is not particularly attractive as a place of residence. In order to relieve the private developer of the high costs of providing parking on very expensive land, the plan suggests the provision of publicly provided parking facilities. And to improve the quality of the environment of the Downtown, the plan proposes the construction of public amenities, parks and weather protected pedestrian systems.

The plan's aim is to make the Downtown a city within a city with a twenty-four hour day. The five basic elements of the area include the encouragement of high density apartment development, the development of public parking structures in strategic locations, the creation of a weather protected pedestrian circulation system linking major Downtown facilities, the establishment of a public open space or park system, and the construction of public recreation facilities such as a conservatory, aquarium, enclosed skating rink, swimming pool and library. The plan calls for a public investment of about

\$46 million - \$17 million for parking structures, \$19 million for land acquisition and \$20 million for amenities, open spaces and enclosed pedestrian systems. The plan expects to attract a resident population of 17,000 in the central area over a twenty year period of time.

The specific objectives of the plan are to:

1. improve the quality of life in the Downtown
2. widen the tax base
3. utilize the existing services and utilities in the central area
4. protect the private investment that already exists in business and buildings
5. improve the economic image of the city

The plan argues that large public expenditures are required to redevelop the central area and contends that successful redevelopment and growth in other cities has required a large degree of public planning and expenditure on facilities and transportation. The Downtown plan suggests that its proposals are feasible, that there is enough of an apartment market, and that in the long run, the public expenditures will be recovered through an improved tax base, a more dynamic economic image, and through the immeasurable benefits of an improved quality of life.

Since the plan was originally presented in early 1969, various efforts towards implementation have been taken. The first was to inform prospective investors in Winnipeg and Eastern Canada of the existence of the plan and of the incentives available to developers who are willing to develop projects as called for in the plan. More recently, discussions have been held between the Metropolitan Corporation and the Manitoba Provincial Government for the public construction of a convention centre to bring larger conventions to the City of Winnipeg and consequently encourage hotel and

commercial development. No other major steps have yet been taken to implement the plan.

The reaction to the plan was mixed. The City of Winnipeg and the City of West Kildonan were against the public development of the parking structures and questioned the need for public expenditures, contending that development was proceeding in the Downtown on its own. The mass media were enthusiastic in their reception of the plan as were the Downtown Businessmen's Association, the Industrial Development Board of Greater Winnipeg and related interest groups. The Metropolitan Council supported the plan strongly and adopted it once it had passed the public hearings.

Research Design

Purpose and Organization

The debate surrounding the Downtown Winnipeg plan has raised several contentious issues that this study will explore in order to provide some empirical answers based on fact and observation. These issues fall into the following categories:

1. The plan's perception of Downtown Winnipeg's decline and the need for major redevelopment.
2. The planning process that resulted in the plan.
3. The various justifications for and benefits of redevelopment.
4. The necessity for public expenditures.
5. The decision-making process that identified Downtown redevelopment as a priority and that approved the objectives and proposals of the plan.
6. The objectives and proposals contained in the plan and the recent steps towards implementation.

Under these six categories, the various issues were then listed in the form of a question. The purpose of this study is to explore these questions and to provide some empirical argument to answer them. The questions are:

1. Perception of the Problem

Is the Downtown Winnipeg plan's perception of the Downtown's decline accurate and does the condition of the central area warrant the major redevelopment that is proposed?

The answer to this question will require an examination of the plan's perceptions of the decline and the establishment of criteria for determining whether redevelopment is necessary.

2. The Planning Process

What was the nature of the planning process that resulted in the Downtown Winnipeg plan and did this process satisfy established criteria for planning?

The approach that will be taken in exploring this question will be to establish principles and criteria for planning, to determine the planning process that led to the plan, and to see to what extent the planning process used in formulating the Downtown Winnipeg plan, satisfies these criteria.

3. The Rationale for Public Policy

What will the benefits of Downtown redevelopment be, and do these benefits warrant the public policy that is reflected in the plan?

This question will require an analysis of who will benefit from redevelopment and how, and whether there is a justification for Downtown redevelopment.

4. The Need for Public Expenditures

Are massive public expenditures required to redevelop the Downtown or can redevelopment occur on its own through the efforts of private developers?

The answer to this question will require an examination of the process of commercial development to see how it occurs, and an examination of the larger process of public-private redevelopment. It should be noted that there is a distinction between commercial development and Downtown redevelopment. Downtown redevelopment is a public-private effort requiring joint participation and development, whereas commercial development is strictly private development of various structures. In order to provide the answer to this fourth question, two additional questions were posed:

- (i) What is the nature of the process of commercial development and what are the factors that encourage or inhibit this process?
- (ii) What is the nature of the process of successful Downtown redevelopment, what roles are played by the private and public sectors and in general what are the principles of successful redevelopment?

5. The Political Decision-Making Process

Did the politician decision-making process that resulted in the adoption of the Downtown Winnipeg plan and all that this adoption implies, follow established criteria for political decision-making?

This question will require the establishment of criteria for political decision-making and an examination of the process of political decision-making that identified Downtown redevelopment as a priority for governmental involvement, and that decided that the Downtown Winnipeg plan is the best available program for the redevelopment of Winnipeg's Downtown.

6. The Goals and Proposals of the Plan and Steps Towards Implementation

Is the Downtown Winnipeg plan a good social and economic plan in terms of its goals, proposals and efforts towards its implementation?

In order to answer this question we will draw on the research used to answer question four above on the successful principles of Downtown redevelopment to see whether the plan is consistent with these principles.

Data Sources

The data sources for this study were literature and personal interviews. The literature that was available included newspaper articles and reports, journals and periodicals, government reports, consultants' reports, academic monographs and other secondary sources. The literature could be divided into basically three categories: the first category contains descriptive literature - newspaper articles and journal articles documenting various commercial developments and redevelopment projects; the second category includes interpretive literature on redevelopment mostly in the nature of monographs, government reports and other consultants' reports; and the third, theoretical literature for the development of concepts on public policy, planning and decision-making. The literature was used in two ways: as primary source material which was interpreted and analysed, and as data on a primary level which was further analysed and refined.

This literature was found to be useful in establishing the theoretical concepts and in exploring the North American experience in redevelopment, but proved to be an inadequate data source for providing information for the Winnipeg situation. This deficiency in the literature was supplemented by a program of personal interviews with selected people such as planners, politicians, academics, developers and realtors. In order to explore the commercial development process in Winnipeg, the developers responsible for selected projects were interviewed and their comments and interpretations as well as arguments were treated as data. Interviews were also conducted with planners, politicians and academics, and again, the arguments presented were used as a data source for subsequent interpretation and analysis. A list of those persons interviewed can be found in the section following the bibliography.

Methodology

Since this study attempts to evaluate the Downtown Winnipeg plan and the planning and political decision-making process that resulted in the plan, the main focus of the methodology involved a clear statement of the questions being explored, the establishment of criteria for evaluation, and an evaluation of the plan and the planning and decision-making process to see whether there is a consistency with the criteria that have been established.

This first chapter has provided the setting for the study. The next chapter addresses itself to the establishment of criteria for the evaluation. When all the criteria have been established, we move on to the actual evaluation itself contained in chapter three where the ~~answers~~^{questions} that have been posed in the preceding section are answered.

The major part of the research involved a study of the process of commercial development in Winnipeg and a study of the process of public-private redevelopment in North America. Since the plan is trying to encourage approximately \$200 million of private development, it was thought necessary to explore the process through which this private development would occur in order to see whether the plan indeed was being consistent with this process. Consequently, a study of eight selected commercial developments was made in order to properly understand the process of commercial development as it operates in Winnipeg. The next step was a study of the larger framework in which commercial development occurs - public-private redevelopment. It was decided to use the case study method in exploring the process of redevelopment and to develop principles of successful redevelopment that would later be used to evaluate the Downtown Winnipeg plan.

When the evaluation is complete, the next step is a proposal for changes in the plan itself and in the planning and decision-making process.

Problems

The intent of this study is to highlight the relevant issues pertaining to the Downtown Winnipeg plan. Each of the questions that have been posed deserve much more analysis than they are given in this study. The purpose, however, is more to raise relevant questions than to provide exhaustive and definitive answers for these questions. This is a relatively virgin area for research, and even though plentiful literature on redevelopment and planning and policy making exists as yet there is no previous study that examines a particular example of public policy for redevelopment with concern for the policy itself as well as the planning and decision-making process that led to this policy. Consequently, this study is a pioneer effort and as such it faced several problems that accompany such an initial effort.

The first such problem is in the relatively crude and unsophisticated methodology being employed. The method is based on the presentation of arguments rather than on the presentation of an analysis of quantitative data. Unfortunately, there was no existing methodology to borrow or even modify for the purposes of this study. Another problem is a result of the nature of this study. The data was not quantifiable, but consisted instead of impressions, observations, arguments and analyses by the various people interviewed and by writers in the area. As a result, the answers provided consist mostly of the raising of important questions and the offering of an argument as opposed to providing statistical support from data. It is hoped that this argumentative approach can provide a beginning for the development of a methodology for research on this question.

Chapter II

The Basis of an Evaluation: the Establishment of Criteria

Introduction

Chapter one has provided the setting for the study by indicating the context in which the plan was introduced, presented the plan and the nature of the problems the Downtown Winnipeg plan is expected to overcome, and outlined the research design that this study will utilize. The research effort presented in this chapter is directed towards an understanding of the process of private commercial development, the process of public-private Downtown redevelopment, and the process of planning and political decision-making that results in plans for Downtown redevelopment. The first section explores the question of commercial development in order to provide an understanding of the various forces and factors that a successful redevelopment plan must influence in order to encourage the large degree of commercial development that is required by a redevelopment project. The next section explores the question of public-private Downtown redevelopment in order to determine what the principles of successful redevelopment are, and to see if these principles are contained in the Downtown Winnipeg plan. The third section explores the question of planning and political decision-making that formulates plans and policy for Downtown redevelopment. Ultimately this chapter is designed to provide the relevant criteria by which the planning and political decision-making process that led to the plan and the plan itself can be evaluated.

Commercial Development

A successful Downtown redevelopment plan expects that much of the redevelopment be undertaken by the private sector: the Downtown Winnipeg plan hopes to encourage approximately \$200 million of private development in the next two decades. Since a large part of the plan's success will be contingent on the private sector's role in acting as the major source of development, the whole question of commercial development must be studied in order to see that the plan has adequately taken account of the preconditions and motive forces of this process. A study of the process of commercial development will establish certain criteria that will be used in determining the plan's general economic feasibility. This section on commercial development will explore the process of commercial development, establish the variables determining this process, seek to determine the influence of these variables on recent developments in Winnipeg, and finally provide some general conclusions as to the process of commercial development and the kind of public policy required to encourage it.

The Variables in Commercial Development

In order to establish the variables involved in the question of commercial development, the literature in this field was examined, and developers and real estate promoters were interviewed to identify the relevant variables. This research has shown that the following variables determine commercial development:

1. The Supply and Demand for the Particular Type of Construction the Developers were Considering

This variable is generally referred to as the market.¹⁰ The market for these various forms of accommodation, no matter whether apartment suites, hotel suites or office spaces, is usually expressed in terms of a vacancy rate. This vacancy rate is a function of the relationship between the supply and demand for accommodation. The demand for apartments is usually a function of population and more particularly those age groups in the population who seek this kind of accommodation. These are the 18-30 year old persons, either single or young marrieds, and people just past middle age.¹¹

Other significant factors operating on the nature and size of the market are changing lifestyles (such as the trend towards high density living). The main determinants of the hotel market are the tourist trade and the facilities available to large conventions.

The office market is a function of the extent of administrative, financial and institutional character of the city and the trends developing in the city: in other words, is the city becoming a headquarters city for business and government?

The supply factors include the extent and availability of the

various kinds of accommodation - the numbers of office, hotel and apartment structures and their capacities.¹² An increasingly important factor in the demand side of the market equation is the kind and quality of accommodation being offered. Prestige office space for instance is at times in more demand and similarly in regards to apartment suites, the price level of the rents and the extra features, such as swimming pools, recreational facilities and the like, are increasingly coming into vogue, and consequently, play a significant role in the kind of accommodation preferred.

2. The Availability and Cost of Borrowed Capital

This variable includes two intimately related factors - the rate of interest and the ease of obtaining loans.¹³ The general state of the financial market provides the framework within which developers and investors must make decisions. When money is easy to obtain at low interest rates, developers will be able to calculate a higher rate of return, whereas when money is hard to borrow or if it is available only at high rates of interest, it will be difficult to come up with appropriate rates of return on contemplated projects for which there appears good demand. A related factor in this category is the psychological influence of the general economy on investment decisions. When there is a period of easy money and when the economy is expanding, investors are more confident about going ahead with projects, whereas during times of mild recession, a conservatism dampens investors' willingness to undertake new projects.

3. The General Development "Climate" of a City

Two factors are important here:¹⁴ the first is the reputation of the city for economic development, climate for business and growth; and the second is the perceived reputation of the city's political and governmental leaders. The first category is part of the psychological influence on developers: some cities like Edmonton and Calgary project a "boom" and strong growth image that extends much further than the real growth and market demand in that city. But because these cities have a good reputation for growth, developers are more willing to invest. The second factor is both perceived and real. Developers and investors want work with co-operative governments who are interested in economic development and the promotion of business. Some cities, either through actual policy (zoning, tax advantages, land assembly, etc.), or through good personal and business relationships between politicians and businessmen, command the attention of investors and developers. The ideology projected by the local or provincial government, or even perceived by the developer, is another significant factor. Manitoba, for instance, has a ruling social democratic party which is perceived to have an ideological distrust of the free enterprise system. Beyond this ideological perception, however, is the real framework of public policy in each particular province or city. Differentials in tax rates, economic incentives, zoning, and provision of services, have a psychological, as well as real, influence on the attractiveness of a location to a developer or investor.

4. The Framework of Public Policy

The framework for public policy-making includes all elements of public policy that have a bearing on investment and construction,

such as:

- the existence of a general development plan for the area.
- zoning - the density, set back, height and parking space regulations.
- the willingness of the public sector to construct related structures such as a convention centre, parking structure, mall, etc.
- provision for land assembly such as the use of the power of expropriation on behalf of private developers.
- provision of utilities and services by government and the willingness of government to construct new streets, sewer water and other utility connections without full assessment on the developer.
- tax structure - the general level of taxation in terms of rate and assessment, provisions for tax holidays or other incentives.
- building codes in regards to materials, design and building methods.
- provision of amenities such as open spaces, parks, recreation facilities, cultural facilities such as libraries, theatres, etc.
- the plan approval and decision-making process - whether it is slow or quick and whether there is solidarity and consensus in the public sector.*

*These factors were identified by developers.

The Dynamics of Commercial Development in Downtown Winnipeg

We have considered the variables in the commercial development process. We will now consider the dynamics of the commercial development process in Winnipeg's Downtown. It was decided to study the process of commercial development by examining selected large scale developments that have been constructed in Winnipeg in the last three years. An examination of these projects would put the theoretical background in real context of the actual process of development and reveal the nature of the process in a real situation.

The news reports and editorials pointed to eight projects that seemed suitable - they were all large in terms of value, they were all in the Downtown area and they were all strictly private undertakings. The eight projects that were selected were:

- | | |
|----------------------|----------------------------------|
| Lombard Place | - The Richardson Office Building |
| | - The Winnipeg Inn |
| Chateau 100 | - The Office Building |
| | - The Apartment Structure |
| Place Louis-Riel | |
| Cumberland House | |
| North Star Inn | |
| Beacon Hill Lodge | |
| The Bank of Montreal | |

There is enough variety in the kind of construction - two hotels, two office buildings, three apartment blocks and one nursing home - so that the sample is not biased towards specific kinds of development. Also included in this study is one project that was announced but never materialized, Centrepoint, in order to consider the reasons for the failure of this project.

In order to find out the raison d'etre of each of these projects it was

decided to approach the developers involved and to examine the accounts provided by the two newspapers and the Manitoba Business Journal.¹⁵

The newspapers were a particularly good source since they give this kind of news good coverage. The developers were able to supplement these newspaper accounts by going into greater detail about the planning of these projects. Interviews were arranged with these developers so that they could be asked to explain the reasons behind the development of each project.

The following is a brief descriptive account of eight private developments in the Downtown area. This descriptive section gives information such as the type of building (office, apartment or hotel), the height, the cost, the geographical location, the composition of each structure and the developer of each project, followed by a brief analysis of the reason for building each project. Only one of these projects has not been constructed: the Centre-point Development. All of the others are close to completion or are already finished.

1. Lombard Place

Lombard Place Limited are the developers of this project representing James Richardson & Sons and Oxford Leaseholders. This project at the north-east corner of Portage and Main, the heart of Winnipeg's central business district, includes a 33-storey \$15 million office building - the Richardson Building, the Bank of Canada Building, a parking structure, another office building and the Winnipeg Inn Hotel - a twenty-one storey, \$5.5 million structure. The whole Lombard Place project will cost \$40 million.

The Richardson family has a historical and sentimental attachment to

Winnipeg and particularly to the present site at Lombard Place. They have owned the land for many years and have previously made many plans to build a head office at that site of Portage and Main. The Richardson Building was built to house and consolidate the activities of James Richardson and Sons who were and still are dispersed in various locations in Winnipeg's Downtown area. They also felt that there was a market for office accommodation at the "hub" of Winnipeg's central business district. The reasons for the Richardson Building's existence are partly psychological and sentimental, and partly economic. Financing was certainly no problem since the firm has access to its own funds and a very good external credit rating with financial institutions. At the time of financing, money was easily available and at reasonable rates of interest.

The hotel part of the complex, the Winnipeg Inn, now serves as one of Winnipeg's truly first-class hotels in the Downtown. The Bank of Canada Building is now under construction and the other office buildings will be built as conditions warrant it. Meanwhile, the parking structure is a welcome addition in that particular part of Downtown that lacked parking space.

2. Place Louis-Riel

Place Louis-Riel is Winnipeg's first truly Downtown highrise apartment building in the heart of the central business district. Imperial Construction Limited is the developer of this \$6 million structure located on St. Mary's and Smith. The first floor will have retail and commercial space, the next two levels are parking facilities for 250 cars and the remaining 22 storeys will be apartment suites. Also included

in this building are recreation facilities and a health club. A representative with Imperial Developments revealed that a good market, easy financing and the tax incentive of a temporary tax freeze added up to a project that would provide a reasonable rate of return on the company's investment. The developers have owned the land for a long time, and two years ago they finally decided to take advantage of the good apartment market in the Downtown. Vacancy rates have been at a very attractive level to developers - 1.5 per cent. Financing had been arranged before the presently high rates of interest and the tax incentives of Mayor Juba provided the "clincher", according to this spokesman.

There were problems in dealing with local governments before finally deciding to go ahead with the building. It took 67 meetings with the City of Winnipeg and Metro before the decision to build was finally made. The points of conflict were zoning and building code requirements and the size and time period of the tax freeze.

3. Nursing Home - Beacon Hill Lodge

Imperial Construction Limited is also the developer of a nursing home at the south-west corner of St. Mary's and Fort Street. This \$2 million, 12-storey building is part of Metro's Downtown plan and represents the first decision of a developer to follow the plan.

Imperial Construction Limited decided to enter this new area of development because of the success it has had with this kind of development in other Canadian cities.

The spokesman for Imperial Construction indicated that there have been

many problems with Metro on this development. "Stupid" building code requirements increased the construction costs by 5 per cent, to a point almost high enough to make the project prohibitive. He could not understand why the company could not take advantage of new building techniques and materials in this project as they had done in other cities in Canada.

4. North-Star Inn

Western Theatres, in conjunction with Famous Players, have constructed a hotel complex of 29 storeys at a cost of \$8.5 million at the south-east corner of Portage and Carlton, adjacent to the Somerset Building.

This hotel will have retail space on the first floor, 9 levels of parking for 375 cars, hotel facilities such as banquet space, cabaret, restaurants, recreation facilities such as a pool, sauna and health club, and 280 hotel rooms. This hotel will connect with the adjoining Somerset Building and both will then be connected to Eaton's by a pedestrian skyway. In addition to the hotel construction, the Somerset Building will receive \$1.5 million of interior and exterior renovation.

A representative of Western Theatres who is now Assistant Manager of the North-Star Inn indicated that the market for first-class hotel facilities in the heart of Winnipeg's Downtown was the main reason for building the North-Star Inn. Western Theatres has for a long time owned the land (previously the site of their Lyceum Theatre) and finally decided that there was a market in the central area for a first-class hotel. They found their previous hotel venture, the "Airliner", successful, and decided to try and realize the same success with a

Downtown location. The firm, being in the hotel and restaurant business, naturally decided to expand its activities. The financing was arranged at more reasonable interest rates and the tax freeze was a helpful incentive in making the investment more profitable. Western Theatres have found the various levels of government helpful and have not encountered any problems in their discussions on the project.

5. Bank of Montreal

The Bank of Montreal has constructed a 17-storey office building for approximately \$3.8 million. The bank will occupy three floors and the rest will be available to other tenants as commercial office space. This building is at the south-west corner of Portage and Hargrave next to Eaton's.

The Bank of Montreal decided to consolidate its Saskatchewan and Manitoba operations in one place, therefore deciding to build a new building in Downtown Winnipeg. The company felt that there was a market for office space in that part of town (14 of the 17 storeys will be commercial office space) and that the project would be profitable. The location was described as excellent by a bank representative, because of the great pedestrian traffic in that bustling retail and shopping part of town.

6. Chateau 100

Metropolitan Estates Planning Corporation and Canadian Properties Limited have completed an office, parking and apartment complex at the south-west corner of Broadway and Donald. The front building is an office building, 8 storeys high and will be available as commercial

office space. Behind the office building is the apartment complex consisting of commercial space and a recreation area on the first floor, four levels of parking and 21 floors for apartments at a total cost of \$6 million.

Metropolitan Estates Planning Corporation and Canadian Properties Limited have owned the land at this site for a long time and had planned to build several years ago, but the high and rising property tax rates and the general stagnancy in Winnipeg caused cancellation of the plans. Meanwhile, new investment was channeled to Vancouver, Edmonton and Calgary that were experiencing a development "boom".

But just over a year ago, the Branch Manager of the firm decided that it was time that the company continue development in Winnipeg, feeling that at last there was a good market for office space and apartments. Since Winnipeg was starting to develop, the company approved the proposal to build in Winnipeg. Mayor Juba's tax freeze as first announced (to run for five years rather than two) was the final factor in deciding to build. In regard to the apartment complex, the firm had good experience with apartment development in Edmonton and felt that there was a market for good quality apartments in Downtown Winnipeg. The low vacancy rates and easy financing at lower interest rates assured the company of a fair return on the investment.

7. Cumberland House

Northwest Trust and Allarco Developments, who operate and own the Regency Towers, are responsible for the building of a 20-storey, \$4.5 million apartment building. The first floor will be available as

retail space, three levels are devoted to parking and the rest of the 16 floors will be apartments. This building is located at the southwest corner of Cumberland Avenue and Carlton Street.

Northwest Trust and Allarco Developments own the Regency Towers now and have for a long time had a "private urban renewal" scheme in mind for that part of town, according to a representative for Northwest Trust. The firm owned the land and expected at some time to build an apartment complex in that park area of the city. They had good success with the first project, the Regency Towers, and the low vacancy rate as well as the trend to Downtown living, encouraged them to put up another apartment building. The area is particularly attractive, being very close to Downtown and being situated by Central Park. The rates of interest at the time of financing were reasonable and a good return on the investment was expected. The tax incentives (as first proposed) were very attractive and would have brought down the overhead considerably, but now the tax freeze is considered insignificant by the spokesman for this project.

Many troubles occurred with government: there was a disappointment with the tax freeze not turning out as expected, and there were long and intense consultations on approval of the plans. The representative for these developers complained that "government hasn't done much for development, especially in Manitoba," and that there are too many governments and agencies involved in the process of planning and decision-making.

8. Centrepont

The Centrepont Development has gone into limbo. The site was to be

Eaton's parking lot at the south-west corner of Hargrave and Graham, formerly the site of the bus depot. This project has been rated at anywhere from \$15-50 million. The participating parties were Canadian Pacific, Eaton's and Investors Group, while R.C. Baxter was the developer. Eaton's was to make its land available, while Canadian Pacific wanted a hotel, and Investors Group an office building. The development was also planned to have twin theatres, retail space and a connecting skyway. It was expected that there would have been highrise apartment complexes. The size of this complex was to range from 26 to 40 storeys. This is the only project being discussed in this paper that was aborted in the planning stages.

The Centrepont development is now another ambitious plan that has miscarried. The reasons from Mr. R.C. Baxter, the developer, have been the change in business climate (Schreyer's assumption of power), the uncertainty as to whether the province would build a convention centre and the currently prohibitive rates of interest. Although no direct contact was made with a representative for this project, other developers suggested that the announcement was too premature and that the project was plagued with poor planning and organization.

The Factors Responsible for Commercial Development in Downtown Winnipeg

Interviews with developers provided the data which was then related in a causal way to each of the previously identified variables in order to determine the main factors behind the development of the projects under discussion. In every case, at least two factors were suggested as having great significance: the market and the rate of interest. Other factors, such as the end of stagnation of the City's reputation and image, and the tax freeze on building taxes, were also mentioned in secondary importance to the first two.

The Market

According to the developers, there was a growing market for apartments at the time that the three apartment buildings were planned. The vacancy rate was very low - just over 1 per cent.¹⁶ There was a trend toward Downtown living, and there generally seemed to be a low supply of good apartment accommodation in the Downtown. Consequently, the decision to build was made. In regards to the hotel construction, the developers suggested that there really was not a first-class hotel in the Downtown area. Consequently, the obvious deficiency in supply for hotel and entertainment facilities encouraged these developers to build in the Downtown. The developers of the office buildings contended that there was shortage of good and prestige office space at the time that the projects were planned. There was a particular need for the kind of park-like office space found along Broadway Avenue. In the case of

the other two developers, there was an attempt to consolidate their large business operations in one structure, resulting in their respective decisions to build an office space for themselves as well as to offer commercial office space to other tenants.

The Money Market

At the time that all of these projects were planned and financed - late 1960's - a general economic expansion prevailed: money was easy to borrow and was available at comparatively low rates of interest. In certain cases, financing was even arranged internally further facilitating the financing of these projects. Based on the input of a comparatively low rate of interest, there seemed to be a promise of a fair rate of return; consequently the decision to build.

The Psychological Factors

Certain psychological factors have played a significant role in the decision to build some of these projects. In many cases it was felt that the time was "right" for development in Winnipeg. Although Winnipeg had been relatively stagnant for many years, these developers felt that the general economic outlook was changing: the extent of public construction for Centennial year must have had some bearing. The "breaking of the ice", the one big first project, was important in "setting the ball rolling" so that other developers would follow. Only one developer had to indicate his confidence in the future of the City and the other developers would soon follow. In this case it was the Richardson Building

and the accompanying Lombard Place development that was the first project. This project was very much the result of an interplay of psychological factors. The family responsible for it is a native Winnipeg family with a long historical, if not sentimental, attachment to the City of Winnipeg and particularly to the Downtown location of Portage and Main. Once the Richardson Building was begun, other developers followed suit. The Chateau 100 development is another one that was contingent on the coming of the "right time". Once it was felt that Winnipeg was ready, this project that had been in the planning stage for many years was finally announced for development.

Public Policy

Public policy at the time of these projects was rudimentary. The City of Winnipeg, through the assistance of the Provincial Government, introduced an incentive to developers who would build in the Downtown, by offering them a tax freeze on building construction and a further tax holiday after completion for one or two years, depending on the value of the building. Besides this factor of the tax freeze, was the zoning change allowing a 10:1 ratio in height to floor space as well as a change in the parking requirements for apartment developers. The Downtown Winnipeg plan was not presented until the spring of 1969 and by this time many of these projects had long been announced and were under construction.

The Constraints on Commercial Development

Commercial development occurs in response to market demand for particular kinds of accommodation and is a function of both economic conditions (financial market) and psychological factors. Commercial development is hard to obtain when there is no market demand or when the financial market generally discourages investment. But a whole new set of factors, both economic and psychological, are introduced when commercial development in the Downtown is being considered and particularly in Winnipeg's Downtown.

The first problem facing Winnipeg as a potential city for development is its image in terms of real or perceived growth. Winnipeg does not have the reputation of Edmonton, Calgary or Vancouver and lacks the growth image and the feeling of "boom" that developers and investors consider very important. Other cities such as Vancouver are more attractive because of climate and a favourable growth rate, and Calgary and Edmonton because they are developing in tune with the general economic activity in Alberta.

A second disadvantage of Winnipeg relative to other cities is its population characteristics and the lower prevailing income scale.¹⁷ This factor is especially important to apartment developers, and indeed, the representative for Imperial Construction Limited said quite emphatically that there are not enough people making enough money to afford the rents in a highrise apartment building. The rents at Place Louis-Riel, Imperial's present Winnipeg large development project, range from \$137 to \$267. A secretary in Vancouver makes \$400 a month and can afford the rent, whereas a secretary makes only \$300 in Winnipeg.¹⁸ And furthermore, it has been

suggested by several developers that Winnipeg does not have an existing or growing market for apartment developers to provide for.

The third problem facing developers and investors is the economic stigma that seems to have covered Manitoba since the election of the NDP to the provincial legislature.¹⁹ Manitoba's high corporation tax rate for instance is one real factor discouraging businesses from locating their head offices in Winnipeg. But the problem is not what the NDP Government has done but what they may do in the future. One developer unequivocally said that investors and developers are very leary when looking to Winnipeg for expansion or new projects because of their feelings of uncertainty.²⁰ This makes the financing of projects even more difficult because financiers in the East and in the United States seem to hear only reports on Cy Gonnik's speeches.²¹

The question of financing is further complicated by the tight money situation and the accompanying high interest rates that prevailed until just recently. This seems to be one of the reasons for the recent stall in Downtown Winnipeg's commercial development.²²

The high cost of land is an obstacle when a developer considers building in a Downtown rather than a suburban location. A survey of land prices by M.V. Jones reveals the extremely high cost of land in the Downtown compared to other locations:

Land Prices in Selected Metro Locations:²³

<u>Location</u>	<u>Price per square foot</u>
-Broadway to Portage	\$7.00 - \$7.50
-Broadway to Assiniboine	\$6.00
-Roslyn Road	\$3.50

<u>Location</u>	<u>Price per square foot</u>
-Grant Avenue	\$1.00 - \$3.00
-St. James	\$.60 - \$1.00
-Henderson Highway	\$.75
-St. Vital	\$.50 - \$1.00
-North West	\$1.00

The consultants that presented the above land survey explain the relatively high cost of land by pointing to the pattern of its ownership and the attitudes of the owners. Most of the owners are not developers or real estate people but are professional and business people who are not familiar with the real estate market and therefore are not behaving according to the dictates of the market. They are holding on to their land until some unidentified time in the future when its value will increase. The problem of land acquisition further complicates building in the Downtown when it is found that Downtown land is held by a relatively large number of individual speculators.

Another obstacle preventing profitable commercial development is the relatively higher tax levels in Downtown Winnipeg compared to other cities in Metropolitan Winnipeg, as well as other Canadian cities. The mill rate for the City of Winnipeg is 11.32 mills above the mean for all the Winnipeg municipalities.²⁴ The per capita tax levy in Metropolitan Winnipeg was found to be higher than any other western city. In 1966, Winnipeg's per capita levy of \$156 was 37% higher than Edmonton, 30% higher than Saskatoon and 15% - 17% higher than Regina and Calgary.²⁵

The question of high land prices is quite obvious, but construction costs are also high due to zoning regulations and building code requirements. Although Metro did change its zoning laws to allow higher densities in the

Downtown area for apartment development, the question of building code requirements still plagues developers who find that what they could do within code regulations in Montreal, they cannot do in Winnipeg because of more strict (developers say stupid) regulations.²⁶ Imperial Construction found trouble over building codes in getting its plans approved for their nursing home on Smith and St. Mary's and as a result construction costs were five per cent greater.

The Process of Commercial Development: Conclusions

The study of commercial development was undertaken primarily to understand the nature of the process that the Downtown Winnipeg plan hopes to encourage and facilitate - private construction of apartment and other structures. It was discovered that the process of commercial development requires the operation of certain fundamental forces before development can occur in any location: a demand for construction, availability of capital at reasonable rates of interest and a suitable rate of return to the developer. Commercial development in the Downtown is discouraged by high costs of land and high property taxes. And when commercial development in Downtown Winnipeg is being considered a whole new set of variables (mostly constraints) are introduced, such as a poor image, and population characteristics not suitable for profitable residential apartment construction.

This is the commercial development process that the Downtown Winnipeg plan must influence if the expected \$200 million in private development is going to be forthcoming and the necessary elements of a policy to encourage development are as follows:

1. Improve the image of the Downtown in economic terms.
2. Facilitate construction on very expensive land and minimize the obstacle of high property taxes.
3. Improve the market for various forms of commercial development.
4. Indicate the public sector's willingness to cooperate with the private sector and to play a supporting role.

But it must be realized that there must be a market for the proposed development; otherwise, incentives will prove to be unsuccessful.

Downtown Redevelopment

Consideration will now be given for the larger context in which commercial development must work - in public-private redevelopment. What can we learn from the experience of other cities that have undertaken major redevelopment of their central areas? The purpose of the inquiry into the North American experience is to provide some positive as well as negative criteria by which the Downtown Winnipeg plan can be evaluated. What were the successful principles of redevelopment and what were the failures and to what extent does the Winnipeg plan contain these successful or detracting principles?

This section is based almost exclusively on the available literature in the area of Downtown renewal. It begins with a presentation of the problems that redevelopment must overcome. It continues with a statement of the pre-conditions for Downtown redevelopment. Following this is a presentation of the literature of the principles of successful redevelopment. Finally, the many issues relating to the questions this study considers are raised by an examination of the process of planning and political decision-making in particular American and Canadian cities.

The Problems Confronted by Redevelopment

All of these cities have a particular problem or set of problems that were overcome by the efforts of both public and private authorities and organizations. It is useful to outline these problems so that the various solutions that were developed can be seen in their proper context.

In many cities, the over-riding problem was one of leadership both in the political and business community. And since business leadership is the usual motive force for major undertaking in urban redevelopment, this problem of a leadership vacuum becomes increasingly acute. One source emphasized that "no old American city can rebuild without business leadership."²⁷ Cities such as Denver and Philadelphia are particularly good examples of cities that were once faced with a leadership vacuum. But the absence of leadership is symptomatic of a deeper problem. When there is no leadership from the business community, this indicates that private interests have no stake, or interest, to defend or promote in the Downtown. In other situations, the problem of leadership was compounded by the problem of lacking native or local large developers to undertake the necessary steps to renew the central area. Again the experience of Denver highlights this problem.

In other cities such as St. Louis, Boston and Milwaukee, development was unprofitable because of the existing condition of the private market inhibiting development. Consequently, development could not proceed until certain incentives were given by the public sector to overcome the constraints. In other cities such as Rochester and New Rochelle, major public improvements in streets and selected transportation facilities were required before development was deemed possible.

Once these various problems had been identified, the appropriate steps were taken to overcome them. At the outset, one important fact must be

appreciated: in every instance of Downtown renewal, there was effective market demand for the contemplated redevelopment. In Denver for instance, the need for office space was a necessary key to its redevelopment. In Rochester and Minneapolis there was enough of a market for the new mall shopping facilities that have been developed. Similarly, the apartment development in St. Louis has been constructed to meet the market demand that existed. A good market then is a necessary pre-condition of any redevelopment effort. This market demand must exist in order that the private sector play the necessary development role. All of the redevelopment in the American experience has been undertaken by:

...local businesses and by investors who saw the economic need for revitalizing the Downtown area and were willing to back it with sizeable investments of their own.

Let me assure you that we have no interest in any venture unless it is supported by a basic economic need. We have no interest at all in a "do-good" program which, while it might achieve the objective of building some attractive buildings would result in the building of apartments which are not needed, or cannot be rented at levels to provide a return on the investment necessary for their completion, or beautiful office buildings for which there are no tenants; or stores for which there are no customers.²⁸

Having established the economic need for development we can now proceed to a discussion of the various principles that characterize the American experience in Downtown redevelopment.

Pre-conditions to Successful Redevelopment

Leadership

The overwhelming problem of leadership in many of these cities was overcome by the establishment of special purpose interest groups that organized around the issue of Downtown renewal. These groups are exclusively private in their initiative and membership, and usually contain the top civic and business leaders of each city. One of the earliest of these groups was Philadelphia's Old Philadelphia Development Corporation. Other examples are Minneapolis' Downtown Council, St. Louis' Civic Progress Inc., Pittsburgh's Allegheny Conference and Denver's Downtown Denver Inc.

These special purpose interest groups harness the energies, talents, influence and money of the top business and civic leaders behind their goal of redevelopment. In some cities like Boston and Kansas City, businessmen have come together in Development Corporations that provide financing for their members' redevelopment projects.²⁹

Other groups have been responsible for initial planning and funding of technical redevelopment plans that were later presented to the public authorities for approval. Baltimore's Charles Center project originated in such an early effort on the part of the business community that provided \$225,000 as seed money for the original plan.³⁰ In other cities, such as Cleveland, private donations from wealthy families have funded such groups and their efforts.³¹

Many of the groups, such as Philadelphia's Greater Philadelphia Movement, have played principally a public relations role by creating a favorable image of proposed projects, while others like St. Louis' Civic Progress have been active in organizing public support for bond issues to finance the public portions of particular projects.

Business Stake

The leadership that was provided by the business community was based much less on civic responsibility and public concern than on the very real and direct interest of these businessmen in the future of the Downtown. In many instances, the people who served as members of these interest groups also belonged to a Downtown businessmen's association. Many were retailers, real estate people and related businessmen with a large stake in the present state and future condition of the Downtown of these cities. Consequently, they organized to protest and promote their own interest that was vitally connected to the future of the Downtown. The developers of Rochester's Mid-Town Plaza were two existing retailers in the Downtown area, McCurdy's and Foreman's, who wanted to improve business. Unless such a stake by businessmen exists, the private sector will not be as concerned with the state of the Downtown.

The Public Role

The public sector played a varying role in the redevelopment process of these cities. It acted in the role of public developer and law-maker to facilitate and encourage private development. The role has included public construction of institutional and related structures, road, street, highway, bridge and parking facilities; the provision in law, for the establishment of private redevelopment corporations, public redevelopment corporations and redevelopment authorities to supervise the redevelopment effort.

The public sector has been important in its role as a developer in its own right, by constructing public institutional facilities such as

governmental offices and related structures. In Denver the public sector developed a convention centre, in Peoria court facilities, and in Chicago governmental office space. Public participation has complemented private redevelopment by providing new transportation access in the form of streets, bridges and parking structures. The Rochester Mid-Town Plaza for instance, would not have occurred had public expenditures on a \$9 million parking garage, closing of an existing street and the building of a new street not been provided to improve access to the new shopping centre. The same kind of public activity in provision of transportation facilities occurred in Pittsburgh and many other cities.

Public policy has been established to encourage private commercial development by legal provisions allowing the creation of private redevelopment corporations with powers of financing and expropriation. These corporations must serve a public purpose, and they are ably assisted in their efforts by various tax benefits. The cities of Boston and St. Louis have these provisions for private redevelopment corporations and projects such as Bush Memorial Stadium and various large apartment developments attest to their success. Other cities like Milwaukee, also offer tax incentives to developers but have not developed the development corporation provisions. Public redevelopment authorities have been established in these cities to supervise the activities of these corporations and to prepare renewal and redevelopment plans. These authorities have been instrumental in land acquisition and in providing this land to private developers at "write-down" prices. Cleveland's Erievue project for instance required a large public input for land acquisition which included \$5 million in local bonds, \$10.7 million in a federal grant and \$33.8 million in a federal loan.

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Only New York State has gone as far as to establish a powerful public development corporation, the Urban Development Corporation, with powers to actually implement redevelopment plans as well as plan them as many other authorities in other cities do. One reason why this agency is particularly effective is because of its wide scope:

It has the most extensive and all-encompassing sets of powers held by any of the new generation of urban development agencies; and is charged with a broad-ranging set of objectives, ranging from the construction of low-cost housing to the planning, financing, construction and administration of industrial and commercial development.³³

The corporation can condemn and clear land, over-ride municipal zoning by-laws and enter into all forms of legal contracts. It is ably financed by one billion dollars of tax exempt public bonds. This agency is successful because it is well equipped to perform its role:

The real innovative character of the UDC lies in the underlying concept of a multi-purpose public authority empowered to act out any or all of the roles associated with urban development from land acquisition to management. It thus can act as promoter, financier, consultant and developer; and through these powers is able to overcome the time lag and red tape difficulties normally encountered in development activities.³⁴

Public-Private Co-ordination

The key to successful redevelopment efforts has been a co-ordination of public and private development. The participation of the public sector is essential in situations where proper planning is necessary in the provision of necessary public improvements. Co-ordination of public and private development serves the interests of both the developer and the local government:

Successful co-ordination of public and private projects requires more than a plan and program for public works in the hope that they will produce a stimulus to private action. Public officials need to understand more fully the economics and market forces which motivate or inhibit the private developer in investing his time, money, and effort in a specific project in a particular location. Public interest and private profit are not inherently antagonistic. As a matter of fact, both the municipality and the private developer are profit motivated, although the yardstick by which "profit" is measured is different. In either case, investment in new facilities represents expended capital and the extent of their use measures the productive return on the investment.

Obviously, the addition of private improvements results in increased revenue in the community through expanded tax yields; increased economic activity; more employment and the like. Conversely, the addition of public improvements often opens the way for increased private property values (impact of highways interchange locations, street improvements, major assembly centers, auditoriums, parks, etc.) again increasing the tax base from which so much of the local revenue or "profit" is derived.

On the other hand, the subtraction or loss of value of private improvements reduces the fiscal base of the municipality. Some cities are so acutely aware of this problem, especially in the central business district, that they are making unusual and large scale public improvements (parking garages in Boston for example) to sustain downtown values. Thus, "shoring up" private values through public improvements is not only sound but essential.³⁵

Leadership is the important element that must be cultivated to spearhead public-private redevelopment. In Pittsburgh, the financial and business community provided the leadership to redevelop the Golden Triangle Area. In Chicago it has been political leadership that provided the

motive force for industrial and commercial development, slum clearance and general revitalization of the central city. In Chicago all of the efforts by political leadership were actively supported by the City's business leaders. The Philadelphia experience involved a public-private coalition to overcome the inertia plaguing the city and to engage in large scale central business district renewal.

The experiences of the above cities suggest by implication the principles of successful Downtown renewal. Since much of the literature on Downtown redevelopment is still in the formative stages, much of it is merely descriptive or prescriptive. The previous section summarized the descriptive literature. The next section reviews the prescriptive literature on Downtown development.

Principles of Successful Redevelopment

James Rouse writing in Urban Land, several years ago cautioned that the solutions for the problems of Downtown areas will require more than the promotional campaigns and parking garages being incorporated in recent public policy for redevelopment:

The hope that downtown may have turned the corner in the battle with its problems and that its future looks better than its immediate past is a fervent but not realistic anticipation. I believe that downtown has not yet begun to feel the real impact of the forces working against it; that so far, the battle for downtown has been waged against the symptoms not the sources of its troubles; that we have yet not come to grips, in most American cities, with the problems besetting the future of downtown.

The fight for downtown has been a panicky, piecemeal defense consisting largely of tricks, gimmicks, and promotional ideas plus a few parking garages and one way streets. There has been little study of broad development programs designed to make downtown into the strong "heart of the city" which it ought to be.³⁶

Effective programs for Downtown renewal must reverse the cycle of decay. The cycle of decay consists of the suburbanization of much of the population, the immigration of lower-income people crowding into homes, municipal neglect and general blight. Once this decay sets in, offices and new business begin to locate in parklike environments in suburbs leaving the existing central city with lower market volumes. According to Mr. Rouse, the problem is this:

How to reverse the cycle and make the central city fit for modern living, working and shopping. Programs for more public transit, more parking garages, more dollar days and downtown properties simply fail to deal with the facts. They are part of the losing battle for they fail to cure the deep seated obsolescence that renders unfit downtowns and the inner city which surrounds it.³⁷

In order to solve its problems, the Downtown must find its proper role in relation to the metropolitan areas. Any plan for the Downtown must incorporate several elements if it is to be successful. Among these, the most

important is to determine the Downtown's optimal function:

If you were planning your metropolitan area from scratch, wouldn't it make sense that those facilities used by all the people should be located in the central city - government buildings, hotels, major recreation centres such as coliseums, stadiums, museums - and yet how often do you see such facilities being driven to the suburbs to find enough space and a suitable environment?

...The purpose of such a metropolitan study should not be to promote downtown, but to find its legitimate functions. Uses which can best be accomplished elsewhere should be left to make room for the space and buildings which belong downtown.³⁸

The second element should be proper planning of the area just outside and adjacent to the Downtown: "these huge areas can be made attractive to middle income families and to upper income families."³⁹

The third element must be to formulate a plan with public appeal: "the plan must be big, bold and defensible. It must appeal to the people as the kind of place they would like to see. It is little plans that are hardest to sell and most difficult to execute."⁴⁰

The fourth necessary component in a successful plan for a Downtown must be the creation for broad and adequate implementation powers: "Without the necessary power, unreasonable, unco-operative or simply disinterested property owners will endlessly frustrate the finest efforts to remake the city into what it should be."⁴¹

And finally, if the plan is to ever reach fruition, active leadership must be found and organized: "The development and execution of a bold and effective Downtown plan will require the vigorous and dedicated leadership of merchants, bankers and the entire business community. It will require a sympathetic attitude in City Hall. It will call for lots of time and money. It will mean substantial sacrifice by some businesses and property owners."⁴²

In another source, a leading Denver businessman has contended that Denver's successful redevelopment has been based on two key principles.

The first principle contends that the city must be part of a healthy and growing metropolitan region:

Growth requires a broad viewpoint...downtown Denver is dependent for its dynamism upon a healthy metropolitan area, an economically successful state, and influential business ties throughout a wide region of the nation. Successful promotion of downtown development must be co-ordinated with successful promotion of the metropolitan and regional complex.⁴³

The second principle reiterates the importance of leadership and co-ordination of interested groups and agencies:

There must be continual communication and co-ordination between many and diverse organizations, and between government and citizen efforts. The co-ordinated efforts of the Downtown Denver Improvement Association, Downtown Denver Master Plan Committee, and Chamber of Commerce in concert with some 40 other public and private agencies were... instrumental in creating a healthy climate for new investment in Denver's central core.⁴⁴

In a speech to a Downtown improvement group in Baltimore, the following principles were identified as providing the necessary role in Downtown redevelopment:

1. Proper zoning for the best relationship of land uses.
2. Transportation for the official moving of people and goods.
3. Adequate parking must be provided and by private developers.
4. Regulation of air and water pollution.
5. Planning and provision of public buildings.
6. Co-ordination and co-operation of city government, planning groups, property owners, businesses and tax-paying citizens.
7. Good public relations and effective sale promotions.
8. Patience for the realization of plans (20 years).⁴⁵

Another article by Robert Armstrong suggests that the efforts of public and private authorities in reversing the decline of the Downtown have been based on outdated principles. Public policy he feels has tried to remake

the Downtown into what it once was:

To date, many have attempted to solve the downtown problem by what might be described as a conventional approach based on our past and historical pattern. That, in our opinion, is hopeless. What we must not find is new uses for those parts of downtown which are dying or withering. However, the withering or decay that has been mentioned does not constitute, as many think, a bad or evil condition. Birth, growth, withering and decay must be recognized as normal processes, whether they relate to personal and physical well-being or to a city or town or even to a neighbourhood. Too many are trying to reincarnate the patterns of a half or quarter century ago when, instead, a revitalization will come only if it can be attuned to be in consonance with the demands and requirements of present day living.⁴⁶

Instead of continuing to follow the same steps taken in the past, the author suggests new approaches directed at working with the strengths of the Downtown rather than against the weaknesses:

As viewed at the present time, the downtowns of American cities will continue to be the centre of commerce, management, professions, culture, the fine arts, and even education. However, they unquestionably will become less important in terms of retail trade. Hence, all efforts to revitalize the country's downtowns should be directed towards their strengths and not their weaknesses.⁴⁷

The Process of Redevelopment

As yet, a body of analytical literature on Downtown redevelopment does not exist. The literature is just now beginning to reach the analytical stage. We have already considered the descriptive, interpretive and prescriptive literature. This category includes some of the literature that considers the process of redevelopment itself and that comments on this process. By process we mean the decision-making that surrounds redevelopment projects and the issues that decision-making and the projects raise. The first selection is Banfield's Political Influence and

the second, Collier's Contemporary Cathedrals⁴⁸. Edward C. Banfield's Political Influence documents the decision-making process that occurred between the public and private sector in regards to a Downtown redevelopment scheme - the Ft. Dearborn Project. The following is a precis of Banfield's account. It raises many of the questions surrounding Downtown redevelopment.

Noting that Chicago's Downtown business district was deteriorating after having lost its market to suburban shopping centres, Arthur Rubloff, a local businessman, envisioned a plan to clear one hundred acres of Chicago's downtown of its warehouses and slums and to redevelop this area with apartments and public buildings in a garden setting. As a businessman, Rubloff knew that a form of public subsidy, in this case, public buildings (and not public housing) were needed, so he conceived of a large civic centre for the area.

Rubloff contacted Nathaniel Owings of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, a top architect, to help with the preparation of the plans. Owings showed interest and put his staff to work on it. Meanwhile, Rubloff then went on to contact a group of "top civic leaders" such as Hughton McBain, the largest retailer in the area, whose concern was purported to be not only the profit motive but the desire to provide civic leadership and public service which would in turn be good for business. McBain contacted several insurance companies to discuss possible financing, and an old friend, Chesser Campbell, publisher of the "Tribune". McBain, being one of the most prestigious businessmen in Chicago, was able to contact several other key individuals to sponsor the project, such as chief officers of banks, chairmen of companies and partners in real estate firms. This process had taken approximately five years and none of it had had any public exposure.

Finally, after these five years, the Sponsors and McBain invited 21 business leaders for a public showing of their plans. The meeting was based and directed entirely on the purpose of what business would gain from such a project. Some businessmen were not interested since there was no profit for them. The newspapers, however, were very enthusiastic, describing it with colourful phrases such as "breathtaking" and showing in "soaring imagination". The mayor was finally informed of the plan and he referred it to the appropriate city agencies for detailed study that subsequently gave favourable comment to the concept of dense development and approved the plan for a city centre.

The role of the public sector became one of facilitating the development by giving approval in terms of zoning and clearance through the various departments and authorities responsible, and one of encouraging development by offering to assemble the land and provide it to developers at lower costs.

Earl Kribben, who had handled public relations and similar functions for McBain's firm, Marshall Fields, was appointed as executive for the Sponsors. Kribben handled publicity for the project giving items to the press and speaking frequently at civic gatherings and associations in order to create support for the project.

There were several obstacles that Kribben tried to overcome. One of these was the question of public support that he tackled by publicity and public relations. The next was arranging financing for the public component of the project - the Civic Centre. Since the public would have to approve this bond issue, the whole project became contingent on public approval. To avoid this problem, the legislature was asked to establish a redevelopment authority with the power to issue bonds, buy land and erect buildings - the Public Buildings Commission - so that the public would not have the

opportunity to veto the project, i.e. no public control!

Next, the new Mayor, Richard Dailey, and Daniel Ryan, President of the Cook County Board, were approached to arrange as much governmental occupancy as possible in the new civic centre. The mayor realized that this project was basically a real estate project as opposed to a government project but if both the developers and the city could benefit, he would agree to it. Dailey played the role of a booster trying to make the project appear bigger and better and more worthwhile.

As the affairs of the project became more and more complicated, and the participation of the sponsors waned as they gave attention to other things, Kribben became "the project" and was no longer just the organizer for it. Also by this time, Rubloff's identification with the project had been lost.

A controversy arose over whether new courthouse facilities should be established in the city centre. Those who had an interest in keeping courthouses in the same place such as banks and law firms, and those like Dailey who did not want the derelicts brought before court around the civic centre, opposed a new courthouse; the judges and others, however, wanted new facilities and established a pressure group - The Committee for a New Courthouse. This controversy and others concerning the relocation of the main library began to threaten the idea of a civic centre, and made the Sponsors uneasy as to the future of the project. The Building Managers Association of Chicago opposed the civic centre because many of their clients would be drawn away. Negotiations between Kribben and Aldis (who was a member of the Building Managers Association) were held in a private discussion to reach a solution. The Building Managers tried to present their case in such a way that they were not opposing the project strictly because of selfish interests as opposed to public interests and formed an alliance of 28 business, real estate and professional men in the Committee

for Government Buildings Downtown. The Committee had difficulty in trying to gain exposure, in identifying itself with the public interest (the committee was in a sense opposing development) and in obtaining political support (the committee was Republican while local politicians were Democrats).

Other organizations such as the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, the Real Estate Board, and the Civic Federation were too divided to take a stand. A new group, The Near Northside Land Use Committee was established to unify the opposition to the Ft. Dearborn Project. All of these groups represented strictly private selfish interests, mostly real estate interests.

Many public and private decisions had to be made concerning the project. In December 1955 the Sponsors asked the Chicago Land Clearance Commission to declare the area an urban renewal area to take advantage of federal aid but there were problems; the Land Clearance Commission had to engage in a lot of administrative work in order to decide whether the project qualified (project had to be 55% residential and half of existing buildings had to be sub-standard).

Meanwhile, life insurance companies that had originally expressed great interest in the project were now reluctant to participate because of psychological reasons - they were awaiting a move by someone else to "get the ball rolling" to establish faith in the area's future.

The Mayor could have done much for the project and could have influenced the Land Clearance Commission but he had lost interest. Many public agencies were non-committal about taking space in the Civic Centre and since decisions by private developers were contingent on the public sector's willingness to build a civic centre, the project stalled.

The Sponsors saw themselves as public spirited citizens waiting to

do something for the area and were trying to pave the way for developers. The Mayor, not being close to the business community and not sharing their outlook, saw the project strictly as a real estate promotion, and one that would not really benefit the city or his position of power. Opinion on the Ft. Dearborn Project was not encouraging. A study by a research group showed that there would not be a great need for a centralized civic centre and that the law courts should not be moved. The Land Clearance Commission was indecisive and sought more and more information.

Finally the City Planning Department drew up a Development Plan for Central Chicago rejecting the Ft. Dearborn concept of a civic centre and not suggesting residential development.

It seemed that the interest involved were simply too diverse to find expression in one project. Finally the Federal Government in 1954 through the General Services Administration decided to set up a new federal building just outside of the project area effectively ending the future of the Ft. Dearborn Project.

Certain observations can be made concerning the process of decision-making and the roles played by the various agencies, groups and individuals in the history of the project. First of all, the plan was conceived entirely within the private sector by a prominent developer and businessman. In the early stages of the planning, he used his chain of personal contacts and influence in the business community to plan the project. Each new individual that was brought into the project was able to use his influence to spread the chain even further but still entirely in private sphere; the public sector was not yet involved. Another factor to note is that the impetus of the project and the motives for continuing it were profit oriented. Although there was an element of public spiritedness among some of the "civic leaders" most of the businessmen were interested only in business and profit. The "boosters"

are those who have no direct interest in the project as such but would benefit politically and who thought that it would be beneficial for the city. People such as Mayor Dailey and the newspapers fall in this category. A key "mover" was essential to act as co-ordinator for the various people involved in the project and to handle publicity. Since the public buildings formed an essential part of the project, public support had to be generated so that the governmental agencies would take space in the new civic centre. As the project continued in the planning stage (10 years had elapsed since its original inception) the interest of the earlier supporters had been lost.

Several controversies erupted between various interest groups that stood to gain or lose by the project. These controversies that threatened the very life of the project were not based on whether the Ft. Dearborn Project was in the public interest, but on disagreements between selfish, profit-motivated businessmen. This poses an interesting question. Does this mean that selfish interests between real estate groups, businessmen and developers determine the nature and extent of development? Where is the public interest represented? Certainly not by public officials, because they were not involved in the decision-making process.

In conclusion, it can be seen that the chain of influence and decision-making was very much in the private arena. Public authorities played only a facilitating and co-operative role; the initiative came from the private sector - from developers who expected to make money, and from public spirited "civic leaders" who wanted to redevelop part of the city.

The next selection is Robert Collier's Contemporary Cathedrals, a study of large scale commercial developments in selected large Canadian cities. Although Dr. Collier was interested primarily in the public-private relationship that occurs in these developments, he has raised

some more general questions concerning public policy and commercial development.

The Place Ville-Marie development highlighted the question of the supporting role that the public sector plays in redevelopment. In this case the public role involved the construction of new transportation facilities. This project was delayed at first because there was a disagreement between the developers and the local government over who would absorb the \$7.5 million in improvements to a street, abutting the project. Originally, the city wanted to assess a charge against the developers for these improvements, but the developers were not willing to share these costs. Instead, a variety of interest and business groups in the Downtown urged the city to build the road. The developers argued that a \$1.5 million gain in taxes would accrue to the public sector in spite of the proposed public improvements. While the city stalled on a decision to build the street, developers warned that such delay tactics could hurt or even kill the project. The city finally yielded to these threats so that the much sought-after development project would be built.

Commercial development so mystifies and attracts the imagination and interest of politicians, that local politicians will make many concessions in order to obtain large scale developments. And to get this development other priorities are ignored, concessions are made and the decision-making occurs in a behind-the-scenes setting that is beyond public scrutiny:

Because these modern day cathedrals perform a wide variety of uses and functions in the city, they do not fit the established administrative procedures for civic development. Thus, zoning by-laws, building codes and other legal procedures have been altered to meet the competition and to facilitate the development of our Ville Marie.

Often it appears to the public that the city is making concessions to the developer on all sides, while the developer laments that

the city is being too restrictive and inhibiting "imaginative" development. And finally it appears to many that decisions are reached in secret (in camera) negotiations between the developer and the city officials. The results of such negotiations have ranged from acrimony to disenchantment - with no one really very satisfied with the process.⁴⁹

Dr. Collier notes that "the impression that any major development is a good development has pervaded both City Council and the City's Planning Department"^{49(a)} in Vancouver. In all cities, politicians, planners and Downtown businessmen aggressively pursue this much cherished development:

Local businessmen, civic officials and civic arts committees have concentrated their efforts on building and maintaining a "vibrant and beautiful" downtown...the hunger for development -- of any kind -- is a deep seated concern in every Canadian City.

This hunger for development takes on dream-like qualities. Even though suffering serious financial limitation, cities and towns search for the elixir which will lead them into their "promised land"...Though the "cathedrals" are important too as tax sources, they satisfy less tangible desires such as notoriety and publicity and magnet-like, these cathedrals seem to draw other opportunities and developments to their cities...

If any one class of people is susceptible to dreams of this sort, it is the locally elected officials. With few exceptions, they see their political careers resting on their ability to attract these large scale developments to their city.⁵⁰

And such an aggressive pursuit of developments seem to be based less on how it will directly benefit the city than on the undefinable "mystique" that skyscrapers hold for public officials. A Vancouver project, Project 200, appears to be a project of dubious value to the city. This project was promoted through vigorous public relations efforts and the politicians quickly responded with facilitating efforts. Although the city had not made a cost-benefit analysis on the Project 200, the project was highly rated for the increased tax revenues and general uplift it would give Vancouver's economy.

An interest group that appeared at the public hearings on this project, offered some reserved judgement which might serve as a caveat for similar projects:

Too many concessions may be made to the developer; the project may stand idle for a long time after approval, awaiting suitable market conditions; the original concept may have been over-promotional and based on unrealistic projections; growth in the surrounding area may be depressed, and the project may strain the existing municipal services and facilities at the expense of other taxpayers.⁵¹

All of these doubts about a goal that has been for a long time a sacred cow and continues to be highly desirable, provide some of the principles by which other similar projects may be judged. Dr. Collier questions the desirability of commercial developments as a priority, given the existence of other issues requiring public attention:

Place Ville-Marie and Place Bonavenutre were successful and well worth the money the City expended on them. But there were other areas where money and much imagination could have been diverted to deal with pressing social problems. Only the residents of Quebec can say which areas these were, but it is important for all Canadians to remember from these experiences that while we are caught up in the dream and romance of the shining new cathedrals in our downtown areas, there are other areas of the city that are equally as important and must not be ignored.⁵²

Downtown Redevelopment: Conclusions

The study of the process of Downtown redevelopment yields much experience that is useful in evaluating the Downtown Winnipeg plan's proposals and context in which it appeared. Both positive principles and negative ones emerge from this study. When allowances are made for the varying circumstances between these other North American cities and Winnipeg, the redevelopment principles serve as valid criteria for evaluating the

Downtown Winnipeg plan . The following outline summarizes these criteria :

1. An accurate perception of the obstacles facing a redevelopment effort. These problems may include the absence of political and business leadership and a general unattractiveness of the Downtown as a location for development.
2. A large private role. Since the private sector will be the major instrument of redevelopment, its participation is absolutely necessary. There must first of all be a significant private sector interest in Downtown redevelopment; there must also be a native developer interested in the development of the city and with resources large enough to carry out the development. The private sector must provide leadership and initiative and organize special interest groups to support and encourage the redevelopment effort.
3. A public role including the following elements :
 - an integrated and feasible development plan
 - establishment of a public authority to implement the plan and supervise and co-ordinate the redevelopment effort
 - facilitating zoning and building code provisions
 - incentives in the form of public land acquisition for developers and tax advantages to developers
 - public development of integrated institutional and public facilities and amenities structures or key incentive structures such as parking garages or convention centres
 - public improvements to the transportation system

But several negative principles also emerge from the redevelopment experience and warn against repetition in the Winnipeg situation :

- a poor perception of problems that results in treating symptoms

rather than the underlying problems

- unnecessary and unjustified subsidies to developers
- an overzealous and unjustified pursuit of commercial development
- a closed planning and decision-making process preventing public participation and scrutiny

The Process of Planning and Political Decision-Making

The previous section has examined the nature of the process of Downtown redevelopment and has concluded by raising some issues relating to the process of planning and political decision-making. This section will explore planning and decision-making as it relates to the establishing of public policy for Downtown redevelopment with the objective of establishing relevant criteria by which the process of planning and political decision-making that led to the Downtown Winnipeg plan can be evaluated.

The Planning Process

The literature in the area of urban planning has recently been critical of the traditional planning style that worked in isolation from the people for whom plans were being made. Herbert Gans outlines this question in People and Plans:

Planning is a method of public decision-making which emphasizes explicit goal-choice and rational goal-means determination, so that decisions can be based on the goals people are seeking and on the most effective programs to achieve them. In theory, city planning should be an application of that method to cities, but in practise, it has been an art plied by a profession dedicated to a set of narrowly architectural goals and to land-use and design programs for realizing them. As a result, city planning has not paid much attention to people's goals, effective means, or to the urgent problems of the cities.⁵³

One basic principle of planning is that it be goal-oriented and that:

Planners must begin with the goals of the community - and of its people - and then develop these programs which constitute the best means for achieving the community's goals, taking care that the consequences of these programs do not result in undesirable behavioural or cost consequences.⁵⁴

Gans presents a methodology for societal planning to replace the old physical, professional, and isolated form of planning. Gans notes that "planners and other professionals do not monopolize on wisdom about

goals and values"⁵⁵ and that the planner ought to respect people's own goals and values and "give people the opportunity, resources and freedom to change what they want to do."⁵⁶

Gans has provided some general criticisms of planning and has proposed some new directions for planners that can serve as criteria for evaluating the planning process. The next part of this section supplements the criteria for planning by presenting an example of a good planning process.⁵⁷ The following case study briefly outlines the planning process that led to the formulation of a development plan for central Minneapolis.⁵⁸

The planning in Minneapolis began with an exhaustive program of research into both economic aspects and social factors, especially for the setting of goals. The planning took place in a context of little political leadership. Because the political structure was fragmented and disorganized, little direction on planning goals could come from City Council. Another planning problem was the absence of a strong, well staffed and financed planning department. In 1955, as federal highway construction reached Minneapolis, the need for a proper harmony between the highway program and Minneapolis' central area was realized. The question of the future of Downtown also served to provide the reason for the establishment of a planning department to play the planning role. A Downtown business and civic leaders group, the Downtown Council, spearheaded the establishment of a new planning department. A new director of planning, additional staff and appointment of concerned businessmen to the planning commission established the structure for planning.

Planning began with a program of research on the Downtown economy and the market potential for varying forms of construction. The research was done by outside consultants whose subsequent findings convinced

businessmen that planning of Minneapolis' Downtown was necessary.

Once this research was completed, the next problem that faced planners was the question of goal determination. The planners wanted to include the participation of the directly affected Downtown business groups but at the same time, to provide for general community interests. After "bull sessions" and discussions, the planners published a brief tentative statement of goals for public discretion before more detailed planning continued. The planners wanted to maximize consultations during the initial planning process but they found that the people and organizations that they contacted could not provide the necessary time. The next step in the planning process required the consultation with other city agencies, particularly the City Engineer's Department. Finally, a draft plan for discussion was presented for public discussion. City Council was unreceptive to the plan and did not give it much attention because it did not contain specific proposals for action. The City Engineer's Department was even more unreceptive because the Department's thinking was incremental and technical, and could not comprehend the radical and conceptual proposals in the plan. The reaction to the plan was cool and slow.

This brief look at the planning process yields several principles that can serve as the criteria for proper planning:

1. Adequate program of research on the problem, economic and social, and information to serve as the basis for the solution. This information must then be analyzed and evaluated towards the development of a plan.
2. The determination of planning goals with provisions for consultation and discussion with other governmental agencies, interest groups and citizens in general.
3. Plan formulation, including the participation of some groups involved in the goal setting process.

The Process of Political Decision-Making

This section is interested in the making of decisions for public action; Dahl and Lindblom call it the process of rational calculation.⁵⁹ According to their framework for rational calculation, which serves as the model for political decision-making, three categories are relevant:

1. the process for information and communication by which decision makers are given information on people's goals and preferences;
2. the process for reducing the number and complexity of variables - the process of research and formulation of alternative policy choices;
3. the mechanism for scheduling goals which include voting and autonomous goal choice by political decision makers.⁶⁰

Democratic political theory has developed the principle that decision makers are to represent, protect and promote the public interest. Recent writing, however, has questioned this principle. Anthony Downs in An Economic Theory of Democracy, has contended that "political parties in a democracy formulate policy strictly as a means of gaining votes. They do not seek to gain office in order to carry out certain preconceived policies. Dr. Collier's Contemporary Cathedrals has made the same point.⁶²

The following principles, based on the principles of democratic political thought should guide political decision makers:

1. a direct knowledge of public preferences and goals that is a result of consultation with the public;
2. public participation to avoid the community of interest approach to planning and decision-making⁶³, and to properly result in the expression of the public interest;
3. the principle democratic morality and the making of decisions in the public, not private interest.⁶⁴

4. encouragement of direct citizen participation in decision-making by offering effective opportunities for participation. The citizen's rights include the right to know, the right to access, the right to fair forum, and the right to appeal;⁶⁵
5. a cost-benefit approach in decision-making to avoid the making of poor economic decisions.⁶⁶

Conclusion

This second chapter has provided the basis of an evaluation of the Downtown Winnipeg plan by establishing criteria relevant to such an evaluation. We looked first at the question of commercial development and found that a market for commercial development was the key factor required before any plan, no matter how replete with incentives, can encourage large scale development. The examination of the process of Downtown redevelopment has shown that leadership and participation by the private sector is absolutely essential, as is a strong facilitating role on the part of the public sector. Finally, the examination of the process of planning and political decision-making has indicated that this process has been the weakest link in the making of good policy for Downtown redevelopment.

Chapter III

An Evaluation of the Downtown Winnipeg Plan

Introduction

The first chapter provided the setting of this study while the second chapter developed the criteria for evaluation. This third chapter performs the evaluation of the plan by utilizing the criteria that were established in the last chapter. The first section will present the plan in some detail drawing heavily on the plan, itself, the second section will present the findings of a consultant's report on the Downtown Winnipeg plan, and the third section will present some of the criticism that was offered at the public hearings. The next section reiterates the criteria that emerged from Chapter II. Finally, the questions that were posed in the first chapter are answered by performing the evaluation of the plan, and of the process of planning and political decision-making that led to the plan. The evaluation will raise more questions than it will answer. As indicated at the outset, this study is a pioneer effort in a previously unexplored area. The purpose is to raise some of the salient issues and to provide a basis for further research in this area.

The Background for the Downtown Winnipeg Plan

Background and Summary

For decades, the Downtown had remained stagnant in terms of new construction: there had been none since the second world war. The only major structure put up in the Downtown was the Royal Bank Building in 1964. Although various proposals⁶⁷ for Downtown redevelopment had been proposed in the late fifties and throughout the sixties, no major plan for Downtown redevelopment was considered until Earl Levin was appointed Director of Planning for the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg. He was previously with Murray V. Jones Associates in Toronto and had been in the process of working on a report for Winnipeg's Metropolitan Corporation on a Conceptual Redevelopment Plan for Downtown Winnipeg.⁶⁸ Earl Levin was appointed Director of Planning in early 1968 and he immediately began the preparation of a plan for Downtown redevelopment in Winnipeg. The plan was finally completed and presented to the public in April 1969. Public hearings were held on the plan throughout 1969 on three occasions: July 16th, July 30th and November 30th. Immediately after the plan was made public in the spring of 1969 it was met by a large outcry from the City of Winnipeg and particularly Mayor Juba. Many of the proposals of the Downtown Winnipeg plan were questioned, and in order to obtain a sense of validity and legitimacy for the plan, the Metropolitan Corporation hired a group of consultants⁶⁹ to perform an economic evaluation of the plan. Meanwhile, public hearings were held on July 16th and July 30th and on November 30th, just after the feasibility study had been completed.

After the public hearings, the plan was adopted and approved by the Metropolitan Council as by-law 1554. Subsequently, the Provincial Government approved the plan. The Director of Planning and Bernie Wolfe,

Vice-Chairman of Metropolitan Council, and a strong supporter of Downtown redevelopment, made plans to take the plan to Eastern Canada to acquaint developers and investors of the opportunities for commercial development in Downtown Winnipeg. Billboards were made and located in Winnipeg and Eastern Canada to promote the plan. Meanwhile, behind the scenes discussions were held between the private developers and Metro. The convention centre, an issue long in the discussion stage between the Metropolitan Corporation and the Provincial Government, began to absorb most of the energies of the responsible officials. One new announcement, the Holiday Inn, a project proposed several years ago, was announced in response to the proposed convention centre. Other hotel and apartment developments⁷⁰ have been proposed and will be built when there is enough market demand to justify them. At the time of writing of this study, the final steps were being taken towards the financing of the convention centre. Downtown redevelopment had become lost as an issue since the plan was announced in 1969. But more recently, Councillor Jack Willis has been making references to the plan and to Downtown redevelopment in his bid for mayor of Winnipeg,⁷¹ and it is possible that the question of Downtown redevelopment and the plan in particular may again become issues. Given this possibility, the evaluation presented in this study becomes a topical one as well as an academic one.

The Foundation for the Downtown Winnipeg Plan:
The Murray V. Jones Study

The planning process began with a study of the problems of redevelopment and the formulation of a conceptual redevelopment plan for Downtown Winnipeg. The study was undertaken by M. V. Jones and Associates of Toronto. Their report identified the problems of Downtown redevelopment and proposed the concept for redevelopment that was to be the essential concept in the Downtown Winnipeg plan formulated by the Metropolitan Corporation's Planning Department. The consultant's findings were as follows: 72

1. Winnipeg has experienced a decentralization to the suburbs of previously downtown activities that have left behind a lot of vacant land.
2. Feasibility studies show that many downtown functions such as retailing, offices, government, finance, health services will expand but not to a significantly large extent to utilize the vacant space that exists.
3. Consequently the only other use for the Downtown land would be in its redevelopment for residential purposes.
4. There has been a breakdown in the Downtown real estate market for the following reasons:
 - speculation by existing owners of Downtown land who are unwilling to permit redevelopment at a reasonable land price.
 - developers are limited in the rent ceilings they can impose because of relatively lower income levels that prevail in Winnipeg as opposed to other Western Canadian cities.
 - in spite of the large amount of downtown land, there are no willing sellers and no willing buyers.
 - the property tax structure and level in Winnipeg has been rising at a rate higher than in other Western Canadian cities. At the same time, this impediment co-exists with lower per capita incomes in Winnipeg. The City of Winnipeg has the highest mill rate of all Winnipeg municipalities. Particularly with regard to apartment construction, the effective tax burden is higher in Winnipeg than in other Western cities.
5. It is difficult for developers to submit competitive mortgage loan proposals because of high land costs, difficult land assembly, the Downtown's poor residential environment, relatively low incomes

placing limits on rent scales, and the high levels of property taxation.

Given the above findings, the only possible concept for redevelopment is residential apartment construction. But in order to make this kind of construction possible, two obstacles must first be overcome. The first is that the cost of land must be competitive with other locations in the city, and the second is that the Downtown environment must be improved considerably in order to make it into attractive living quarters. The concept of a Downtown resident population then emerges as the key to the redevelopment of Downtown Winnipeg. The report notes that:

As transportation technology permitted the physical expansion of cities, the newly opened land on the peripheries of cities was used for residential construction. When the suburban population had grown enough to constitute a market, retail stores and other commercial services followed...In brief, commerce and industry followed the people.

The obvious corollary is that a significant expansion of the residential population in the downtown would do a great deal to buttress its retail and commercial operations by providing an easily accessible market and pool of labour. Thus, downtown shops, offices and institutions could then fulfill a local as well as metropolitan function.⁷³

The findings of this report then began public policy for redevelopment of the Downtown Winnipeg. The consistency between this study and the Downtown Winnipeg plan is not surprising when it is realized that Earl Levin was the guiding light behind both of these reports: he began the study done by M.V. Jones and he was the chief architect of the Downtown Winnipeg plan.

The Downtown Winnipeg Plan

The Concept

The principal goal of the plan is the attraction of a resident population to the Downtown, through the improvement of the area as a living environment by the provision of public amenities and by offering incentives to developers to build in the Downtown. The plan expects to attract 75,000 new residents and \$260 million in public and private investment, of which \$60 million will be public investment.⁷⁴ This section of the study presents the philosophy of the plan, and the strategies that are expected to result in the realization of the plan. Much of this part will rely on the use of quotes from the plan, the first of which introduces the concept of a Downtown resident population:

If the Downtown is to be revitalized and brought to its appropriate place in the life of the Metropolitan community, it can only be accomplished through the introduction of large numbers of people into the central area; and this can only be accomplished, in Winnipeg's circumstances, through the introduction...of new residents. What is required is a very large increase in Downtown's resident population; which means that some way must be found to stimulate the development of high density apartment blocks in the Downtown.⁷⁵

After having identified the importance of the market, the plan goes on to suggest that there is a sufficient potential market for apartments in the Metropolitan area to ensure the necessary scale of development in the Downtown.

Metro expects to channel approximately 1/4 to 1/3 of the apartment developments from the suburbs to the Downtown area, by making Downtown as equally attractive a proposition to developers, as suburbs, and by eliminating the inhibiting factors of developing apartments in the Downtown area, such as the extreme difficulty in assembling parcels of land large enough to take large-scale apartment development, the higher cost of this land itself, and

and relatively higher tax assessment.⁷⁶ Other deterrent influences have been the generally unattractive environment of the Downtown, the lack of amenities, and the problems of traffic and parking. These problems will be overcome by the Downtown Winnipeg plan:

A plan for the Downtown which has as its objectives the restoration of the centre of the city to a condition of vitality and the creation there of a vigorous centre of the cultural, entertainment, and commercial life of the Metropolitan community, must be based on measures which will overcome the prevailing disadvantages of Downtown residential development.⁷⁷

The plan continues and builds an argument that large steps must be taken by the public sector to rebuild the Downtown because the Downtown cannot rebuild itself. Conceding that the existing downtown has already resulted in apartment developments, the authors of the plan are quick to caution that such incremental development is inadequate:

It is true that most recently, in the last two or three months, there has been a stir of interest in development in the central area, and a number of apartment and commercial projects have been announced. This stir has been interpreted in some quarters as proof that development in the Downtown will occur as part of the normal course of events, and that no special measures are necessary to stimulate such activity. As indicated in an earlier section of this report, such a view is illusory. There may be the occasional project developed as part of the normal course of events -- the Downtown has in fact been receiving about two new buildings per year for the last fifteen years - but the rate of such developments will not be enough to effect any significant changes in the character of the Downtown, and will certainly not be enough to stimulate any large scale investment and development programs, just as it has not been able to do so during the last couple of decades.⁷⁸

The Proposals

The plan then argues that purposive measures must be undertaken to make the Downtown a significantly more attractive area for residential apartment development. One measure has already been undertaken: the re-zoning of land in the Downtown to permit much higher densities of apartment develop-

ment (10:1).⁷⁹ Another factor is the already approved tax freeze for developments in the Downtown area.⁸⁰

The next important contribution that the public sector can make is to facilitate the parking requirement in the Downtown area by relieving the developer of the responsibility for providing parking facilities:

The private developer should not be expected to provide his own parking. Parking should be provided comprehensively, by a public authority or a quasi-public authority on an economic basis, and in accordance with an overall scheme of parking places available so that every specific destination in the Downtown is adequately served by parking in close proximity...

In order to carry these principles into effect, it will require a very considerable degree of public involvement in the acquisition of sites, as well as in the development of parking structures.⁸¹

These measures would:

help reduce the cost of renting an apartment, they could help to increase the amount of landscaped open space around apartment blocks, and most important of all, they could increase the economic attractiveness of building apartment blocks Downtown.

It can be expected that if the apartment developer is relieved of the burden of having to provide very expensive parking spaces on the very expensive land of the Downtown, but at the same time having the assurance that parking spaces will be available to his tenants out of the general supply of Downtown parking, development of Downtown sites for apartments will become an economically attractive proposition.⁸²

The next set of proposals concern the improvement of the quality of the Downtown environment as a place for working and living. The first proposal is for a weather protected pedestrian system connecting much of the Downtown area. The second proposal calls for the provision of open space Downtown including winter gardens, enclosed green spaces, a conservatory and parks. The third proposal designed to improve the environment of Downtown Winnipeg would be the provision of public recreation facilities consisting of an aquarium, a conservatory, a skating rink and a swimming pool and a library.

In summary, the elements of the plan are:

1. The encouragement of high density apartment development;
2. The public acquisition of land in strategic locations for development with parking structures combined with other uses;
3. The creation of a weather protected pedestrian circulation system at a level above ground, probably fifteen or sixteen feet, which will link together all of the major locations of the Downtown, and ultimately provide sheltered access to every part of the Downtown;
4. The creation of a public open space system, including a series of "winter gardens" which would provide year round green spaces;
5. The development of public recreation facilities such as a conservatory, aquarium, enclosed skating rink, swimming pool, etc. as part of the public investment in stimulating the development of the Downtown, but also as part of the public provision of amenities to serve the Metropolitan area.

These are the goals and methods of the plan. But what is the rationale for public policy and for the expenditure of close to \$60 million in public funds?

Rationale for Public Policy for Downtown Redevelopment

The rationale for public action to redevelop the Downtown is developed by the report as follows. The authors of the plan point to several areas such as the need to utilize the existing public capital investment in utilities and services, the large private investment consisting of valuable buildings, a large labour force and payroll and volume of business; the image of Winnipeg as an area of private investment; and the improvement of the quality of life for existing residents of the Winnipeg community.

It is argued that there is already a heavy public capital investment of utilities and services that is being largely under-utilized. At the same time, suburban expansion requires large capital expenditures for utilities and services. It is cheaper to service a concentrated high density population than a lower density situation that is found in the suburbs. Consequently, the plan argues that economics of scale in the provision of services and utilities can be realized by developing high densities in the Downtown.

The private sector's large stake in the Downtown consisting of the value of buildings, the size of the labour force, the volume of business and payroll is higher than in other areas of the city. The public revenues from this private investment are also appropriately high. The report thus concludes that, "it does not seem reasonable that a section of the city which is so important to the area's economy, and which represents such a valuable public and private interest should be allowed to decline and be dispersed through the slow process of decentralization, attrition and neglect." 83

The longest argument that is offered for redevelopment relates the future of the whole of Metropolitan Winnipeg to the health and dynamism of the Downtown. Winnipeg must change its image as a slow growth city in order to attract the necessary investment that will "shore up" its tax base and general economic health. In order to attract this new investment, the authors contend that Winnipeg's image must be changed:

The character and personality of a city are expressed by its Downtown; the image of a city which is presented to the world is that which is projected by its central business district. The truth of this proposition becomes immediately apparent when one calls to mind the great cities of the world. The image which the names Paris, New York, London, Copenhagen conjure up is the image of their central area; and it is so not merely for the greatest cities but generally for all cities.

At the present time, Winnipeg has lost some ground to other cities in the Canadian hierarchy, and particularly has lost some ground to Calgary and Edmonton as the great metropolis of Western Canada. Winnipeg's image has deteriorated to some extent over the last decade or two, which has been a reflection of the city's relatively modest rate of growth of population and new development when compared with other centres in Canada where growth has been dynamic.

Winnipeg is now at the point where it must build a new character and a new image which will command confidence and admiration if it is to attract the type and magnitude of investment which will enable it to continue to occupy a place amongst the first rank of Canadian cities. Such a character and such an image can only be created in the Downtown.⁸⁴

Improving the quality of life is another objective in redevelopment of the Downtown. As the report notes, growth as an end is not to be pursued unless there is an accompanying "growth of personal opportunity and enrichment of life."⁸⁵ But growth and investment are necessary if Winnipeg is to attract people with talent, energy and dedication for high achievement; and it is argued that only an attractive Downtown can attract such people.

Although not much of a case is made for an improved tax base in the report, Metro politicians have been quick to point to this result as a tangible and worthwhile result of Downtown redevelopment. Meanwhile, the director of planning for Metro has indicated that a "nice Downtown" is a worthwhile goal in itself. Others see the plan's main rationale as an economic development plan.⁸⁶ The plan thus is characterized as an aesthetic plan, an economic development plan, and a social plan, depending on the interest and perspective of the individual that supports redevelopment of the Downtown.

The Need for Public Sector Involvement

The author of the plan anticipated many of the arguments that would later be presented against the plan by including a strong section on the necessity for public sector involvement and expenditure. This section makes a strong case for the need for public involvement in Downtown redevelopment and attacks the argument that redevelopment can occur on its own through the efforts of the private sector. According to the plan, the deterioration of the Downtown does not seem to be abating even in spite of the recent trend towards natural private commercial redevelopment:

The picture (of the Downtown) that emerges is not one which reveals flourishing development and vigorous activity in the central area, in spite of the indicated strength of the services sector of the economy. Nor is there any reason to believe that whatever new growth is taking place is of a sufficient order of magnitude to fill all the empty spaces and general new vitality in the Downtown. The overriding impression is one of very slow growth, perhaps even too slow to offset the continuing loss of population and enterprise; of large areas used for surface parking; of old and obsolete buildings with low silhouettes; a general atmosphere of vacancy, decline, and dereliction hanging over most of the central business district, relieved only by one or two busy thoroughfares and one or two major nodes or concentrations of activity.

But these characteristics too are not peculiar to Winnipeg. They belong almost universally to the cities of this continent. And other cities of this continent have also found that the Downtown has required deliberate and specific programs to enable it to overcome some of the forces tending to reduce its strength and its resources.⁸⁷

At the time of the formulation of the plan, the recent developments in the Downtown were just beginning. It was not expected at that time that they would have any significant impact on the Downtown, and even now, although seven or eight new structures have been built in the Downtown, the central area is still characterized as being very much vacant and barren.⁸⁸ According to the plan, this trend of sporadic development will not be adequate to rebuild the Downtown.

The Planning Department's case is that Downtown redevelopment cannot occur on its own without a large degree of public participation:

There is a feeling in some sectors of Winnipeg that the present trends, operating under the influence of the present market forces will somehow or other generate a surge of development in the Downtown, sufficient to overcome its present inertia and remake it into a dynamic, flourishing central area, without any significant public effort or expenditure of public money. On the basis of Winnipeg's record so far, and on the basis of experience in other North American cities, this view is completely illusory.⁸⁹

In fact, Metro's contention is that "in few cases has the reversal of the decline of a central area occurred spontaneously, without deliberate and planned public or combined public and private effort."⁹⁰

The City of Winnipeg and particularly Mayor Juba has opposed the public incentives on the grounds that the city is redeveloping on its own anyway with the assistance of a temporary tax freeze initiated by the City of Winnipeg:

Development is taking place downtown right now...particularly with the tax freeze...

I just don't see the spending of \$50 million in public funds.

Where will the money come from?

I just don't see why they should rush when construction in the downtown area is going ahead.⁹¹

Metro's response is that the experiences of other cities would be a good indication of what kind of planning and public participation was required to bring about redevelopment.

The research for the Downtown plan examined the experiences of other cities and concluded that Winnipeg's Downtown will need a large degree of planning and public investment. In dispelling the theory that development can occur unaided, the report pointed to several significant differences between the situation of Winnipeg and other cities that have been developing rapidly. At least three factors have been different.

The first is the comparatively higher growth rate of other developing cities, like Toronto and Montreal:

Several factors must be recognized in the recent history of the Downtown of these cities which differentiate them markedly from Winnipeg. The first is that the basic size of these cities, and the magnitude of their growth are vastly greater than Winnipeg's. Each of these cities is more than four times as big as Winnipeg. Toronto adds a population of about 70,000 people to its numbers every year...Winnipeg added on the average about 8,000 people per year. The demand created by the 70,000 new people each year, for housing, jobs, services, etc. is enormous, and while much of that demand is satisfied in the suburbs, there is enough of it left over to find its way into the central area and make a noticeable impact there.⁹²

A second factor is that there is a general or specific economic activity very much responsible for the growth in these other cities:

Calgary and Edmonton are also sometimes pointed to as having enjoyed a high level of Downtown investment entirely without public aid or "planning". In the case of the Alberta cities, their stimulus to growth came from the development of the oil industry. Before the discovery of Leduc, they were very small rural service centres. With the discovery and development of the province's oil resources, these two cities underwent a reconstruction and transformation which changed them from rural service centres for servicing the oil industry. But even here it is completely misleading to say that the Downtowns of these cities experienced a "spontaneous" surge in development. On the one hand the surge was stimulated by the profound and revolutionary change in the economic base; and on the other hand "planning" of both of these communities, and in particular the planning of the Downtown, was perhaps the most comprehensive and sophisticated of any in Canada.⁹³

The third factor that Metro discovered is that there was an indirect influence of public investment in the city's transportation system:

But perhaps the most important factor of all, in terms of its direct impact on the Downtown has been, in the case of both of these cities (Toronto and Montreal), the construction of the underground rapid transit system. It is estimated that the building of 4½ miles of the Toronto subway between Union Station and Eglinton Avenue sparked development along its route in the order of \$10 billion. What must be remembered, however, is that it cost \$67 million to build the subway, and this was a public expenditure. In essence, it was the enormous expenditure of public money on the subway systems of both Montreal and Toronto which were the direct spark setting off the so-called "spontaneous" or "unaided" explosion of development in the Downtown of those cities.⁹⁴

Implementation of the Downtown Winnipeg Plan

The real test of a good plan is the feasibility of its proposals and a clear program of implementation. Metro feels that there is enough of an apartment market in Winnipeg to fill 800-1,000 units per year in the Downtown area. (The total apartment units constructed per year are about 3,000)⁹⁵ No new growth is expected - just a rechanneling of part of the present apartment market to the Downtown:

The vast transformation visualized by the plan can be realized within the present means of the community, and does not depend upon some unforeseen new explosion of population or the establishment of large scale new industries. The plan can be realized not necessarily through sudden new sources of revenues or masses of population, but through the relocation of our present resources in these fields. The shift of about 1/4 to 1/3 of the normal expected new population growth from the suburbs to the Downtown, and the re-allocation of relatively modest public expenditures in the same direction can bring the plan to fruition within the proposed plan period.⁹⁶

The public sector's part in the Downtown Plan is to improve the quality of the living environment through the provision of public amenities and by providing incentives to apartment developers through the construction of the parking structures. Since the major public undertakings involve acquiring the land for the parking structures and amenities, the public sector's first responsibility is the acquisition of land.

Metro makes few specific proposals about how the plan can be implemented - other than to indicate the nature and approximate cost of the public participation.

More recently a bi-level committee consisting of Metro and the provincial government has been set up to plan for the convention centre. The convention centre is mentioned in the plan but was not an integral part of the public expenditure calculations. There is a commitment to build a convention centre with public funds but as yet the details of financing have not been determined.

The convention centre is expected to bring the larger scale convention market to Winnipeg for the benefit of the commercial and hotel business.

Once the Downtown Winnipeg plan had been presented to Winnipeg businessmen, investors and developers, it was taken to Montreal and Toronto by Metro and the Industrial Development Board of Greater Winnipeg in order to inform these Eastern businessmen of the investment opportunities and the various incentives and advantages for investors in Downtown Winnipeg.

Preliminary Comment on the Downtown Winnipeg Plan

Before proceeding to the evaluation itself, the existing evaluation and comment on the plan will be presented. This comment stands on its own as a worthwhile part of the public record on the debate around the plan, and it also serves as a source of commentary for the evaluation that this study tries to perform.

The Feasibility Study of the Downtown Winnipeg Plan

Metro expected that independent and objective evaluation of the Downtown Winnipeg plan would be a useful way of adding credibility to the plan and to its proposals. Although Metro politicians denied charges that the plan was

merely a dream and that public expenditures would be recoverable and contended complete confidence in the plan, a group of consultants were eventually asked to carry out a feasibility study of the plan.

A feasibility study of the Downtown Plan was commissioned by Metro to comment on the following areas: the general feasibility of the plan; the feasibility of the parking proposals, commercial facilities, and potential for air rights leases; and to provide a cost benefit review of providing the public amenities. At the outset, the report accepted the following criteria as datum:

1. The necessity of providing incentives to developers in order to stimulate development of the city's core.
2. The need to provide amenities presently lacking in downtown Winnipeg, so as to stabilize the long-term desirability of the area.⁹⁷

These questions were not to be considered by the consultants because:

Decisions on these matters are necessarily political ones; as such, it is the responsibility of the elected representatives to place values on the aesthetic, cultural, and other benefits and costs occurring from the plan, and so ascertain whether that plan is desirable.⁹⁸

But the feasibility study did evaluate the proposals in the plan even if it avoided comment on the objectives and the general concepts behind these proposals. The summary⁹⁹ of their findings is as follows:

A. The Overall Plan

1. Whereas the provision of public parking is an incentive, the major attraction is the overall plan with its inherent amenities of parks, climate controlled skyways, etc.
2. That in order for all parking to be centralized in public facilities, a legal commitment for the completion and maintenance of the parking must be made to the developer.
3. A final decision respecting the adoption of the overall plan by the responsible levels of government is necessary immediately, if current development in the area is not to be stifled by lack of direction and interference.
4. In the event that the overall plan cannot be immediately adopted because of the controversy in respect to public parking, then alternatively the plan should be modified so

that the provision of amenities such as parks, winter gardens, climate controlled pedestrian walks, conservatories, etc. may not be lost to Downtown Winnipeg.

B. Parking

1. Initially the provision of public parking must be unprofitable.
2. With the development of existing surface lots and realization of new commercial development, the parking can eventually become profitable.

C. Commercial

1. New commercial development staged to apartment construction is feasible and profitable.
2. The anticipated surpluses from commercial rental will not approach the level contemplated in the report, "Downtown Winnipeg". Your consultants believe that existing retail and service facilities in the downtown area will absorb a larger proportion of the disposable income from the projected increased population than estimated in the report, "Downtown Winnipeg".

D. Air Rights

Potential for air rights lease income exist but only at the later stages of completion of the overall plan.

E. Public Amenities

1. The scope of public amenities presently envisioned in the report "Downtown Winnipeg" cannot be financed in total from surplus revenues accruing from the operation of B, C, and D provisions.
2. However, a commitment for the construction of amenities must be made initially if the plan is to be realized. It is therefore recommended to commit the employment of surplus new tax revenues for this purpose. The apportionment of tax dollars may be revised in the future as surplus revenues from B, C, and D are realized.

The above findings are of course summaries of more specific observations. Some of the more dubious questions, such as air rights lease revenues and public deficits for parking operations, receive sympathetic evaluation in the summary when compared to the more reserved observations contained in the text of the report. With regard to parking, the consultants found that:

In the initial stages of development the corporation will almost of necessity have to absorb fairly large deficits from the operation....

....parking structures will become commercially viable only when almost all surface parking presently in the target area is eliminated.¹⁰⁰

The feasibility study looked at the operations of the Toronto Parking Authority, and found from this experience that the principle of taxing those who benefit most from the public parking structures was used to offset the costs of providing this form of commercially unprofitable parking. This means that those who stand to gain the most - apartment developers and commercial operators - should be assessed either a specific tax or that allocation of surplus taxes resulting from better business in their area be made to support public parking structures. The report concludes this area with this offering:

the principle of a developer paying towards the cost of public parking could be applied here, providing it has not detrimental effects in attracting developers and sustaining non-term desirability of the area.¹⁰¹

The Metropolitan Corporation's Planning Department publicly interpreted the feasibility report as being favourable. The Director of Planning, however, is not particularly enamoured with the plan as a whole, and consequently, the only role the feasibility study has played until now, is as a source of arguments for those who appeared at the public hearings on the plan.

Public Hearings on the Downtown Winnipeg Development Plan

Public hearings on the Downtown Winnipeg plan were held through the middle and end of 1969. Various interest groups, municipalities and other organizations appeared to offer observations, criticisms and recommendations to the plan. There was general support for the concept

and general objectives contained in the plan. The City of Winnipeg and the City of West Kildonan, however, challenged the need for public expenditures proposed to stimulate development. The following is a summary of the main points by the various delegations that presented briefs. The essential points made by each brief are presented in outline form for brevity and to avoid repetition in presentation.

The Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce¹⁰²

The Chamber of Commerce agreed with the general principles contained in the plan. It made several recommendations and observations, the primary one being that one single authority be created for physical planning. The chief criticism was that the Downtown Winnipeg plan was formulated without regard to existing urban renewal plans and the Chamber recommended that integration of all of these plans be pursued. This organization expressed the wish that the private sector should carry out as much of the plan as possible so as to minimize the expenditure of public money.

Committee on Urban Renewal and Redevelopment of the City of Winnipeg

This presentation was very brief and asked for a delay in the hearings until the feasibility study was completed and a time period of six months until new hearings are again convened.

Community Welfare Planning Council

This organization made several observations on the plan. The first was that the plan omitted provisions for low density housing and rehabilitation of existing housing. The plan was also seen as interpreting the trends in the Downtown too negatively. Moreover, the Downtown plan was not related to

any of the urban renewal plans nor to the Winnipeg Area Transportation Study. The Council did approve of the general concept in the plan but at the same time hoped for flexibility in implementing it. The Council's proposals were as follows:

- facilitate citizen participation
- create a single authority for planning in Winnipeg
- give higher priority to housing needs in the plan
- carry out a cost-benefit analysis of the proposals in the plan
- determine priorities for the redevelopment of various areas of Downtown Winnipeg.

Winnipeg Branch of the Community Planning Association of Canada

This organization endorsed the general recommendations of the report but made several specific observations. The first criticism was the conflict in the predictions between the Downtown Plan that expects 17,000 in the St. Mary's-Broadway sector and another 30,000 in the surrounding fringe, while the Winnipeg Area Transportation Study expects a relative decline in the Downtown over the next twenty years. It proposed that the WATS plan and the Downtown Plan should be better integrated. The Association also urged a public-private development corporation to implement the plan.

Manitoba Association of Architects

General support was given for the report's aim to improve the quality of life in the Downtown. Greater depth comment was promised as soon as the organization had finished studying the report.

Town Planning Institute of Canada

Father John Page supported the principle of planning embodied in the

report but reserved agreement with the specific details of the plan.

Downtown Businessmen's Association and Monarch Life

Unqualified approval on behalf of downtown businessmen was registered by C.J. Rogers, the President of the above organization. Mr. Rogers emphasized that the report be adopted as soon as possible so that steps towards its implementation could be taken.

Industrial Development Board of Greater Winnipeg

The goals of improving the quality of life and of economic growth were strongly endorsed by this organization.

The City of Winnipeg ¹⁰³

The City of Winnipeg asked for adjournment of public hearings until the feasibility study on the plan was completed and available, and that six months elapse, after the report is available for study, before comment. The City also expressed its reluctance to agree with the principle of publicly provided off-street parking. Regret that the City had not been consulted during the formulation of the plan was also registered.

The Manitoba Association of Architects

Among the recommendations offered by this group were:

- co-operation of all governmental authorities
- efforts be taken to implement the plan and not to wait for the Boundaries Commission report
- although the establishment of a redevelopment corporation is a good idea, implementation of the plan should not wait until such a body is established

- the plan itself must be made flexible so that just portions of it if necessary, could be implemented
- co-ordinate the plan with other plans such as the Winnipeg Area Transportation Study, Urban Renewal Area #2 and #3 reports and develop a priority system for the public expenditures for these plans.

The architects concurred with the findings of the feasibility study.

Downtown Businessmen's Association ¹⁰⁴

In its second presentation to the hearings, this organization emphasized the following points:

- the plan is desirable, feasible, realistic and essential to an urban living environment for Downtown Winnipeg
- co-operation of all levels of government is urgent in reaching a consensus on the plan
- modifications, variations or division of responsibility be worked out as soon as possible
- an interim plan be worked out.

Like many other organizations had done earlier, the Association urged speedy action in implementation so that this plan does not remain merely a historical document.

City of West Kildonan

This municipality approved the spending of public funds on parking structures for the following reasons:

- they questioned the philosophy of public expenditures for the benefit of private developers

- they questioned the necessity for heavy public expenditures when construction is proceeding in the Downtown already
- the tax freeze is adequate to encourage development for the time
- even in Toronto, developers pay at least 50% of the costs for parking.

There was also concern for Metro's establishment of priorities; Downtown development according to the City of West Kildonan did not rate more public expenditures than other matters such as services. Also questioned was the justification for rechanneling population and investment from the suburbs and at the same time asking these suburbs to financially support this policy. Moreover, the City of West Kildonan suggested that only one authority be in charge of redevelopment and that it be the City of Winnipeg. In conclusion, caution was urged until the extent of natural development could be realized before such large quantities (\$50 million) of public funds were spent.

The City of Winnipeg

After a study of the feasibility report, the City appeared with its comments and criticisms on the plan for the Downtown. The City asked for :

- estimates on costs of land acquisition and potential revenue
- establishment of priorities with regard to Urban Renewal Areas # 2 and # 3
- consideration of consultants' suggestions on the necessity for providing public parking structures and having developers pay towards the cost of public parking
- waiting to see the effect of the tax freeze on natural development in the Downtown
- that no legal commitment be given to developers regarding public parking

- amenities should be for the use of all citizens
- encouragement of private rather than public development as far as is possible
- more accurate figures on the public expenditures as well as an accurate and complete cost-benefit study.

The City-Metro Conflict

The City-Metro conflict has revolved around one central point - the necessity of large public expenditures. Mayor Juba was against the proposal for public expenditures suggesting that development of the Downtown was proceeding without any burden on the public sector:

Development is taking place downtown right now... particularly with the tax freeze...I just don't see the spending of \$50 million in public funds.

Where will all the money come from?

I just don't see why they should rush when construction in the downtown area is going ahead.¹⁰⁵

One specific point of opposition by the City was voiced - the spending of \$17 million for six public parking structures. A report by the City's finance committee found the proposal to provide parking at public expense unacceptable:

We cannot argue with the principle of erecting at public expense parking structures for the benefit of individual private development.¹⁰⁶

The report by the City's financial committee stressed that legal commitment should not be given to private developers for the provision of public parking structures. The report suggested that the developers share the costs of the parking structures as they did in development projects in Toronto. The finance committee contended that citizens should not subsidize the private developer:

While undoubtedly the proposed parking system is in the public interest, it is a matter of real concern we believe to Winnipeg or other municipalities, whether the citizens should be required to completely subsidize the private developers.¹⁰⁷

The City of Winnipeg was not opposed to the principle of the plan as much as it was to the high public expenditures. The City said that it would continue to oppose the public expenditures, even if a cost/benefit analysis showed that the public money could be retrieved. The City recommended that the plan be shelved for two years to see how development proceeds on its own.

Evaluation of the Downtown Winnipeg Plan and the Planning
and Decision-Making Process That Led to the Plan

Introduction

We come now to the heart of this study; an evaluation of the Downtown Winnipeg plan and of the planning and political decision-making process that formulated the plan and adopted it as public policy for Downtown redevelopment. The previous chapter has provided us with the criteria and background for such an evaluation. The preceding sections of this third chapter have presented the various elements of the plan, have indicated the findings of an evaluation of the plan by a group of consultants, and have presented the gist of official reaction to the plan at the public hearings that were held. This section will perform the evaluation, drawing partly on the findings of the feasibility study, on public reaction at the public hearings, and particularly on the criteria that were established in Chapter II. The questions that were posed earlier in the study, in Chapter II, will again be repeated by way of introduction to the evaluation:

1. Is the Downtown Winnipeg plan's perception of the decay of the central area accurate and does Winnipeg's Downtown require redevelopment?
2. Did the planning process that resulted in the formulation of the plan follow accepted criteria for planning?
3. Is Downtown redevelopment and the proposals in the plan in the public interest and a priority for governmental action?
4. Does Downtown redevelopment require the massive public expenditures proposed in the plan or can it occur through the efforts of the private sector?
5. Did the political decision-making process that identified Downtown redevelopment as a priority and the Downtown Winnipeg

plan as the program for this priority, follow accepted criteria for political decision-making?

6. Are the goals, proposals and recent steps towards implementation viable and feasible?

The Perception of the Problem and Need for Downtown Redevelopment

The general finding on this question, is that the plan's perception of the decay of the Downtown is greatly exaggerated.¹⁰⁸ Developers agree that although the goals of the plan are very ambitious and admirable, Winnipeg's Downtown is in fairly good condition compared to the Downtowns of other cities.¹⁰⁹ The experience of American cities also suggests that redevelopment was not undertaken until conditions were generally very poor and redevelopment seemed the only way of reversing the decline. The plan's perception of the generally poor conditions, as presented in the first chapter, are not particularly accurate nor do they in fact justify the aggressive program of redevelopment that is proposed.¹¹⁰

The first perception of the decline is that of a decline in population. The statistics employed are too outdated to reveal a present or recent trend.¹¹¹ In actual fact, the population of Downtown Winnipeg is growing. There are many residents located just to the west, north and south of the 14-block target area. And two recent apartment blocks in the 14-block area itself will soon draw a significant population to the Downtown when fully occupied. The second trend in reduced retail sales is too marginal to justify a program of redevelopment. The trends in manufacturing and warehousing are part of a general secular trend that is irreversible and consequently, irrelevant to a redevelopment proposal. The trends revealed by construction volumes are very poor indicators as the plan itself notes. The trends in construction that the plan reveals are contradicted by the large influx of commercial development that has occurred in

the Downtown in the last three years. These trends reflect a general slow growth that has indeed characterized Downtown Winnipeg. But slow growth does not necessarily imply decay and deterioration as the authors of the plan suggest.¹¹² In summary, the conditions of Winnipeg's Downtown do not confirm the plan's contention that the Downtown requires redevelopment because it is in poor economic and physical condition. But these are negative imperatives for redevelopment. A redevelopment plan can still be based on positive imperatives and be worthwhile. But if this is, in fact, the real motive force for redevelopment, the criteria for evaluating a proposed redevelopment program are very difficult to satisfy.

Interviews with developers, and citizens at Get Together 71 (that was held during the early part of August of 1971), suggested that Winnipeg's Downtown was in comparatively good condition. Although it lacks the high-rise buildings of other larger cities, it also lacks the slums and deteriorated structures. Most people appear satisfied with Winnipeg's Downtown and do not agree that it needs massive redevelopment. The perceptions of the Downtown's poor conditions come mainly from Earl Levin, Director of Planning, and his resulting plan has been endorsed by Downtown business interests and Metropolitan Corporation. The following explorations into the related questions will reveal more in regards to this question.

The Planning Process

To better understand the "need" for Downtown redevelopment, we must examine the nature of the planning process. We have seen that the need for redevelopment is not shared by many people or officials outside of Metropolitan Council and the Planning Department. And yet the Downtown Winnipeg plan stands as the expression of public policy for Downtown

Winnipeg's redevelopment.

The planning process that perceived a deteriorated Downtown and that formulated the Downtown Winnipeg plan appears to have followed the planning style that Gans and other reformers of planning have found unsatisfactory. The planning process that resulted in the Downtown Winnipeg plan was highly personal and exclusive of consultation with other governmental agencies, with organizations, and citizens. It did not follow the kind of process that was followed in the preparation of the central area plan for Minneapolis that has been established as a model for planning. The Winnipeg plan seems to be the personal document of Earl Levin, Director of Planning.

Mr. Levin conceived of the plan before he was in the employ of the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg. While with a Toronto consulting group, he had developed the conceptual redevelopment plan for Winnipeg's Downtown and when he was in fact appointed Director of Planning; he used that concept and built the Downtown Winnipeg plan around this concept. From the concept to the actual completed plan, Mr. Levin was the main, if not sole, architect. Mr. Levin made the analysis of problems and trends in the Downtown, proposed the goals of redevelopment, and developed the proposals of the plan. Unlike the Minneapolis situation, exhaustive research on problems and the Downtown economy, and consultation with governmental agencies, organizations and citizens, did not characterize the Winnipeg planning process. ¹¹³

Mr. Levin is widely recognized for his personal planning style. He has been characterized as being strong-minded and stubborn by those who have had dealings with him. ¹¹⁴ Because of this personal style in plan formulation, he failed to consult with other interested individuals and parties. The goals of the plan have been established by Earl Levin; fortunately, they appear to be sound and desirable. No efforts were ever taken to allow discussion or public

participation in the establishment of goals. Such consultation is essential if the improved quality of life that the plan expects to bring about, is to mirror the aspirations and desires of the actual citizens who will be living in the Downtown. Many of the foundations upon which the plan is based have not been explored adequately with citizens who are to populate the Downtown. One such foundation relates to the concept of a Downtown resident population. The plan proposes a resident population of 17,000, while Earl Levin has at other times used a figure of 75,000. How does Mr. Levin know that people really want to live in the Downtown, and especially in the 14-block area?¹¹⁵ Some of the proposals such as the enclosed pedestrian system, are also goals and objectives that have not been shown to be public goals. It appears that the plan is entirely the conception and personal document of Earl Levin. It is Earl Levin's statement on what the Downtown should be like. Citizens were not consulted for their views on many essential points contained in the plan.

The proposals in the plan that are expected to result in commercial development also appear to have been designed in isolation from the people who are most involved - the developers. Many have said in interviews that the parking proposals are not particularly attractive but that other factors, such as tax incentives and a speedy plan approval process, are more helpful.¹¹⁶ Somehow, the consultation that Mr. Levin undertook in formulating the proposals for commercial development, overlooked these contentions by developers.

Consultation with other governmental authorities, such as the City of Winnipeg, were also lacking and consequently, the planning process fails to meet this important criterion for proper planning.¹¹⁷ Had consultation occurred, then the problems that later occurred with regard to public sector non-consensus, could have been avoided. Also, integration with the City of

Winnipeg's urban renewal plans could have been attempted. Unfortunately, however, due to a history of poor City-Metro relations, consultation did not occur, with the resulting City-Metro conflict over the plan.

The Downtown Winnipeg plan cannot be said to be a plan of the Planning Department. Rather, it is Earl Levin's plan. Mr. Levin prepared it and wrote it with very little assistance from the Planning Department staff. When the plan was finally complete, it was presented to other governmental authorities, and to the public - fait accompli - for acceptance or rejection. Irrespective of whether the plan is a good one, several things are definitely true of the planning process that are out of line with accepted planning principles. The process was highly personal and did not involve consultation with citizens on the setting of goals or with other public authorities or business interests on specific proposals.

Downtown Redevelopment as a Priority

The evaluation of the planning process has indicated that the choices open to decision-makers concerning the plan are few. Since there is only one plan, all that can be done is a proper evaluation of this one plan. An earlier section has indicated doubts about the need for Downtown redevelopment, at least according to the plan's perception of the "need". This brings us to the next important question. If the accuracy of the perception of the problem is a poor one, then the justification for public policy also becomes dubious since the justification is dependent on this perception.

The discussion of public policy has indicated that policy must be in the public interest in very obvious and direct ways. A variety of rationales are presented, such as the utilization of existing utilities and services, the protection of private investment, improvement of the tax base, improvement

of the City's image and the development of a new Downtown residential environment. The first objective - the utilization of existing services and utilities - is not a particularly strong argument for the investment of such large public funds. The second objective - the protection of the private investment - is consistent with the majority of public redevelopment efforts in other North American cities. But to what extent public policy should protect and enhance private investments and a private stake, is a question that has not been adequately explored by policy makers. Why should the public sector spend public funds to protect and promote the interests of the private sector? The third objective of an improved tax base is a worthwhile and desirable rationale for public policy, but two questions must be raised in regard to this alleged improved tax base. We have seen from the study of commercial development that it occurs when certain forces are operating - market demand and the promise of a reasonable rate of return on the investment. Much development has already occurred in response to these market forces without the need for public expenditures. If these market forces are not operational, then commercial development will not occur, in spite of public policy efforts to operate on these market forces.

One important question that has not been explored by the planners and decision-makers, is the whole question of the costs and benefits of the proposals in the plan. Although the Planning Department and Metropolitan Corporation Councillors have estimated that \$15.6 million can be expected per year in increased taxes, they have not revealed their assumptions and method of calculation. In fact they have been unwilling to make predictions of how much of an increased tax base will result; instead, they are satisfied to just speak of "an improved tax base" in supporting the plan.

The fourth justification for Downtown renewal is to change the image of

Winnipeg as a city and thereby to attract more business and economic activity. Although image does play a factor in decisions to investors, a more critical and long-run factor is the actual economic situation in Winnipeg as opposed to just its image. And although there are psychological as well as economic motives for the improvement of Winnipeg's image, it is dubious whether an enhanced image is a worthwhile rationale for Downtown redevelopment.

We come now to the last of the justifications for the plan - the development of a better environment in the Downtown. This appears to be a most ambitious and worthwhile objective, but it has not been given as much exposure as the previous two or three objectives.

The purpose of the making of public policy is to pursue an acceptable balance of public and private interests in the chosen area of governmental action. In this case, the plan should yield benefits to the public as well as to developers and Downtown businessmen. But let's consider who the beneficiaries will be: The plan is going to make development profitable to investors and developers. According to a Metropolitan Corporation press release, "the plan will relieve the developer of the burden of having to provide parking spaces, which cost about \$2,500 each on expensive land."¹¹⁸ Developers are still going to make their appropriate rate of return, but the plan will encourage them to make it in Downtown Winnipeg. The parking structures that the plan calls for will be a direct incentive to the private sector - the developer will benefit, not the citizens of Winnipeg. The convention centre, although not an integral part of the plan, is another element of public policy. Who will be the beneficiaries of the convention centre? The hotels that will be built adjacent to it and the Downtown merchants and other places of business! Both of these elements - the parking

structures and the convention centre - are basically economic development schemes to improve the economy of the Downtown area, and indirectly, the citizens of Winnipeg, who benefit from better employment and a better tax base. The last main objective of the plan - the improvement of the Downtown residential environment - contains benefits for both public and private interests. The amenities will assist the developer in promoting his suites, will benefit the immediate residents and employees of the Downtown area, and will be available for the use of the citizens of Greater Winnipeg.

We have looked at the justification for Downtown redevelopment and we have seen who will benefit from the plan and how. The next question is: Is Downtown redevelopment a worthwhile area of governmental action? Since we have seen that the plan is an economic development plan first and a physical plan secondly, if economic development is a worthwhile goal, then public action is justified. If, however, as the plan suggests, a new Downtown environment and a city within a city is the objective, then it does not appear that the proposals and recent efforts at implementation have been directly aimed at the improvement of the Downtown. The commitments of the Metropolitan Corporation and the Provincial Government are to build a convention centre, provide parking for the proposed Holiday Inn, and build a Japanese Garden on the land of the Holiday Inn. These commitments clearly reveal the beneficiaries of the plan! As for the proposed objective of an improved quality of life, no commitments in that respect exist!

The Need for Public Expenditures

We have already seen from the study of commercial redevelopment that there must be an economic need for the proposed private development. Moreover, we have found that although there may be an economic need for development, certain obstacles, such as the high cost of land, prevent development in the Downtown. The study of Downtown redevelopment has shown that these obstacles may be overcome if the public sector intervenes in order to facilitate development by offering tax incentives or by facilitating plan approval requirements and procedures. In any case, developers must realize a certain return from their projects, and unless this return exists on a proposed Downtown Winnipeg project, they will instead undertake development in a suburban Winnipeg location or in another city. Redevelopment was substantially aided by a variety of public expenditures on parking, street improvements and institutional buildings as well as by tax and other incentives.* But does the redevelopment situation in Winnipeg require the large public expenditures that are proposed by the Downtown Winnipeg plan? We have already seen that seven large projects have occurred without the need for public expenditures. But can this pace of private redevelopment of the Downtown continue? Some warranted developments definitely will result if there is effective market demand and so long as other economic conditions of the financial market are favourable, but if the larger amount of private development and the improved living environment that the plan proposes are to be realized, massive public expenditures will indeed be required. The plan suggests a locational shift of about one-third of present development that now occurs in the suburbs. The only way that this development can be induced to locate in the Downtown is if enough incentives are offered in order to make Downtown development as profitable

* In the North American experience, not Winnipeg.

as suburban development. But the plan proposes a major change in the living environment in the Downtown that is to come about by the public development of a variety of amenities, recreational development and weather-protected skyways. These facilities will, of course, require public funds, and in fact, the Downtown Winnipeg proposals in this regard are quite defensible.

In conclusion then, the plan's contention that massive public expenditures are required for the realization of the goals of a new living environment are correct. Similarly, the large private investment that the plan expects to generate will require public incentives in the form of tax advantages, subsidies such as parking structures and public development of institutional facilities such as a convention centre.

Realizing this fact, it becomes all the more important that the goals of an improved quality of life and a large scale of commercial development be demonstrated to be public goals and not just the goals of planners and politicians. The large public expenditures that will be required must have the full knowledge, approval and support of the citizens of Manitoba who will benefit from these goals and who will pay for the realization of these goals through taxes or opportunity costs. The next question explores the political decision-making process that must inevitably decide on these issues.

The Political Decision-Making Process

This question synthesizes the preceeding four questions and asks whether redevelopment of the Downtown is a priority of governmental action and concern. We have already found out that the Downtown is not really in a deteriorated condition to warrant an active program of redevelopment; that the perception of the Downtown's problems and the plan itself were the highly personal feelings of the Director of Planning; that Downtown redevelopment can occur without the necessity for large public expenditures, especially expenditures to act as incentives for developers.

Given this unfavourable verdict on the Downtown Winnipeg plan, it is difficult to see it as a priority for governmental action. But the Metropolitan Corporation Council supported the plan and has adopted it in early 1970. The political decision makers have identified Downtown redevelopment as a priority by adopting the plan in principle. Though Metropolitan Council feels Downtown redevelopment is a priority, as yet there is little evidence that there is solidarity in the public sector, or that the plan has general public support as a priority. The decision-making process that resulted in the Downtown Winnipeg plan being identified as a priority showed two weaknesses of this process that later became apparent at the public hearings:

1. The relatively low level of political integration on this issue between the City of Winnipeg and the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg.
2. The absence of citizen participation.

A low level of political integration characterized public sector reaction to the Downtown Winnipeg plan. The Metropolitan Corporation seemed to be the only governmental authority strongly in support of the plan. Other municipalities were indifferent, while the City of Winnipeg and the City of

West Kildonan were strongly against the proposals for public expenditures contained in the plan. This lack of consensus for public policy is due either to a poor local government structure for decision-making, or a real disagreement over the policy under discussion.

The feasibility study and several of the briefs presented at the public hearings emphasized the importance of public sector integration or consensus on this plan if it were to be realized. The feasibility study had said that:

A final decision respecting the adoption of the overall plan by the responsible levels of government is necessary immediately, if current development in the area is not to be stifled by lack of direction and interference. ¹¹⁹

The briefs by Mr. Schwartz, a lawyer acting on behalf of two developers, the Manitoba Association of Architects and the Downtown Businessmen's Association, repeated this proposal. But this proposal went largely ignored as the conflict between the City of Winnipeg and Metro flared up. Anyone familiar with local politics in Winnipeg could have anticipated this disagreement which results on any question of public policy put out by Metro. The establishment of Metro never was accepted by the City of Winnipeg. Although the establishment of Metro has resulted in better provision of area-wide services, it did nothing to promote political consensus. Indeed, with the establishment of Metro, consensus in the public sector has been less frequent. Interpretations of the City-Metro conflict point to the personality of Mayor Juba and his quest for political leadership and to the ward system of electing Metro Councillors as being responsible for this conflict.

Another weakness of the decision-making process is the complete absence of citizen participation and an awareness of the issue of Downtown redevelopment. Without citizen participation in the decision-making process, the plan can in no way be said to express the public wish as a priority for governmental involvement and expenditure. We have already seen that no

citizens were involved in the planning process, that no real public debate on this issue occurred, and that no briefs by private citizens were presented on the plan. The literature that was examined in the preceeding chapter, particularly Dr. Collier's Contemporary Cathedrals, suggested that the decision-making process around redevelopment projects has not included citizens and that only top civic leaders and businessmen have been involved in the decision-making for large redevelopments in the United States. Redford's criteria for citizen participation have not been met in any way in the planning or decision-making process in Winnipeg.

We have already seen that the low level of political integration between local government jurisdictions has made the decision-making process difficult in Winnipeg, as well as in other Canadian and American cities. Another weakness of decision-making relates to the political decision-makers: the Metropolitan Corporation Councillors, and the basis of their decision-making on the Downtown Winnipeg plan. The previous chapter explored some of the literature on the decision-making process in Canadian cities and revealed some interesting observations that appear to be true of the Winnipeg situation as well.

The first is the enthusiastic pursuit of commercial development, what Dr. Collier has called the "Place Ville-Marie" syndrome. Politicians in Winnipeg show the same hunger for development as they do in most cities, and for what? It seems to be a goal, par excellence, that has never been rationalized to the electorate or even to the politicians themselves. Politicians in Winnipeg have sought commercial development always assuming that it will be good for the city without actually sitting down to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of proposed developments. Rather, the mystique of development in all of its transcendent nature, captures their imagination and commitment with rare reference to its specific virtues.

And why do politicians support commercial development and the whole issue of redevelopment in the absence of any clear indication from their constituents that this issue is an important and worthwhile one for public involvement? Politicians are supposed to express the wish of the public by acting as their representatives on the governmental decision-making bodies. In the case of Downtown redevelopment, it is hard to see how this is a public wish that they are expressing. What constituency contact have they had on this issue? Rather than expressing the public wish in this instance, politicians seem to be acting as opinion leaders, doing what is good for the City of Winnipeg without bothering to consult with their constituents.

Public participation in this issue has been conspicuously absent. No individual or group, other than the directly affected interest groups and the planning associations, appeared at the public hearings. The principle of citizen participation has been inoperative in this circumstance of policy making for Downtown redevelopment. What can the reasons for this be? Can it be disinterest, as many planners and businessmen suggest? When citizens do obtain the opportunity to express their feelings on such a plan, such as in the recent Keystone Park project in Brandon, they overwhelmingly disapprove of public expenditures, suggesting a low priority for this kind of expenditure.¹²⁰

The Goals, Proposals and Steps Towards Implementation

The evaluation of the plan's proposals will require a general evaluation of the context in which implementation must occur; and although this context is beyond the plan's control, the plan should contain an awareness of this context. Context refers to the pre-conditions for redevelopment that were discussed in the section on Downtown redevelopment in chapter two. A good plan must have an awareness of these conditions, refer to them, and make allowances for them. These pre-conditions must exist before any plan, good or bad, can have any chance of success. They include the existence of leadership from the civic and business community, public sector leadership and consensus, a stake by the business community, and a harmonious public-private relationship.

Most of these pre-conditions are missing from the Winnipeg situation. There is no stake on the part of any major business in Winnipeg's Downtown. The two large retailers are doing well and have no real reason to undertake major redevelopment as many have done in the United States. Lacking this business stake or real interest in redevelopment, no large business is interested in initiating a large redevelopment project or becoming involved in the issue. As a result, there is no business leadership to spearhead the drive for redevelopment and to form the necessary interest groups that have been necessary in the American experience with Downtown redevelopment. Winnipeg's Downtown Businessmen's Association has tried to provide leadership, and together with the Metropolitan Corporation, this group has made efforts to implement the plan by arranging publicity. But its members have not yet played the aggressive, leadership role that American businessmen have played within their organizations. Another pre-condition that is conspicuously absent in Winnipeg is a consensus in the public sector, and leader-

ship from public officials. The City-Metro conflict has prevented solidarity in the public sector, and as a result, consensus on the issue of Downtown redevelopment and on the plan has not been forthcoming. Political leadership has been similarly weak. Although two Metro Councillors, Bernie Wolfe and Jack Willis, have publicly supported the plan at every opportunity, these officials have not been able to develop much public enthusiasm, nor have they been able to elicit strong commitments from the private sector. Furthermore, strong ties between the business community and the local governmental structure do not exist in Winnipeg as they do in the United States, where businessmen participate more actively in public decision-making and public affairs.

These pre-conditions for redevelopment do not exist in Winnipeg as they did in other American cities where redevelopment was undertaken only after these conditions had been met. We have seen how in some cities like Denver and Minneapolis, a business group was necessary to provide the leadership necessary to implement the redevelopment plans that were proposed.

A good economic situation is another necessary pre-condition for redevelopment that emerged both from the analysis of successful redevelopment and the prescriptive literature. Where redevelopment did occur, it did so in response to effective market demand for the various forms of redevelopment, such as offices, apartments, commercial space and hotels. Winnipeg, however, does not appear to have the market to support large scale development of apartments and hotels.¹²¹ The plan's analysis of Downtown Winnipeg's economy have been based on optimism rather than accurate and realistic market research.¹²² The feasibility study that lended some legitimacy to the plan's economics, has itself been questioned for its validity by the Director of Planning and other observers.

Although a thorough economic evaluation of the plan is beyond both the scope and competence of this study, several valid comments can be made in regards to the economics of the proposals. The economic evaluation will focus on two key foundations of the plan:

1. the accuracy of its projections on growth and markets; and
2. the costs and benefits of the public expenditures.

The key concept upon which the plan is based, is a Downtown resident population of anywhere from 17,000 to 75,000 residents.¹²³ The wide variance between these two estimates has not been explained. The plan expects to channel 1/4 to 1/3 of Winnipeg's total apartment construction to the 14 block area.¹²⁴ The projections on market demand for apartments in the next two decades are based primarily on demographic data that have held present population distribution and consumer preferences constant.¹²⁵ The accuracy of the projections on the apartment market itself is questionable when compared to Dominion Bureau of Statistics projection of Downtown Winnipeg. The plan expects 800 to 1,000 new suites per year to be channeled into the Downtown from a Metro region estimate of 3,000 units per year (Metro expects 1/4 to 1/3 to be channeled to a Downtown location).¹²⁶ The Census projections call for only 2,430 units per year as opposed to Metro's more optimistic estimate.¹²⁷ Over a ten year period there is a significant difference in the projections. Assuming the DBS figures to be accurate, the Downtown apartment market could not possibly result in the large estimates of \$200-\$300 million of apartment construction and related commercial development.

It is hard to obtain approval for public expenditures unless it can be proven to the public that these expenditures will be self-liquidating. Consequently, planners have had to include even rudimentary cost-benefit

analysis of their proposals in order to rationalize these proposals. Interviews with the Director of Planning suggested that the concept is worthwhile and that a cost-benefit analysis of the proposal is not necessary; apparently, development is bound to be in the public interest. The Director of Planning projected a strong confidence in the plan that seemed to be the result of intuition and personal dedication to the goal of the plan, rather than exhaustive and accurate cost/benefit studies. At best, the evaluation of costs and benefits is an appeasement to the politicians who must "sell" the plan to the public. These cost/benefit studies have centered around the proposal for public parking and air rights leases. No analysis was attempted as to the total costs and benefits of the proposals, either in economic and social terms, or in opportunity costs.¹²⁸ The plan is a good one according to the chief planner, business and Downtown interest groups, and politicians. But on what factors or information is their evaluation based? The various interest groups have calculated its possible effects on their interests and have found it to be worthwhile. The politicians feel the plan is in the best interests of Winnipeg, but just how they have calculated this balance of cost and benefit is unknown. They seem to be playing the role of eager "boosters" for a goal that has captured the fancy and dedication of most local politicians. They seem to have fallen prey to the Place Ville-Marie syndrome discussed in the previous chapter.

The Downtown Winnipeg plan is weak in the economics of its proposals and in the extent of research on alternative plans, even though half of the report contains a large statistical section that is largely irrelevant to the proposals and their feasibility. Rather, the emphasis of the plan is in the concepts. The hard economics, in terms of costs, have been considered by the Planning Department after the plan had been formulated. A recent statement by

Jack Willis contends a gain of \$12 million for the proposed developments and an expected \$250-\$300 million in private development. In conclusion, the plan is painfully weak in its research into the Downtown market, in the feasibility of its proposals, and in the accounting of the costs and benefits resulting from the proposed public expenditures. Such omissions can be tolerated when a plan is still just a plan, and while it has not yet been implemented, but since steps are now being taken to implement the plan, more information on the economics of the proposals must be forthcoming. The convention centre has received financial commitment from the provincial government and the Metropolitan Corporation, without public scrutiny of the decision-making and the economics surrounding it. There are also commitments to the developers to provide parking facilities and a Japanese Garden, all without the public discussion on the economics of these incentives. Instead, these projects continue to receive kudos from politicians, for their benefits to the City of Winnipeg, with no clear indication as to what these benefits and costs are.

Thus far, the plan has not satisfactorily complied with the criteria for redevelopment. Fortunately, its perceptions of the process of commercial development and its allowances for this process are more accurate. The plan accurately perceives the problem of image or accurate information on Winnipeg's Downtown, and proposes that efforts be taken to change this image so that developers know the real conditions for development in Winnipeg. The implementation efforts have also been directed at changing the image of the Downtown: publicity material and a slide show was prepared, and a promotional program for the plan has been carried out in Winnipeg and in Toronto and Montreal. The plan has also realized that steps to facilitate construction on expensive Downtown land must be taken. Already, zoning

changes have been made to allow higher densities and more realistic parking space provisions. The proposal for public parking is designed to relieve the developer of the expense of providing parking on expensive land and of even having to construct the parking structure. This is one of the significant incentives according to one developer, but others have said that it is not the most important incentive. What is more effective is the tax freeze on new construction which minimizes the expenses of the developer during the initial unprofitable construction period.

The plan's proposals of improving the Downtown Winnipeg environment and the building of a convention centre, are both directed at the improvement of the demand side of the various areas of the commercial development market. The convention centre will generate tourist activity (if it indeed can compete with other convention centres in the West and East) and provide business for proposed hotels and Downtown merchants and service oriented business. The proposal for amenities and weather protected pedestrian systems will improve the attractiveness of the Downtown for apartment development and thereby provide a better market for this kind of development. But as indicated earlier, all of these proposals are contingent on market demand that according to developers is relatively limited.

The plan admirably fulfills the fourth criterion of a need for public sector planning and co-operation. Developers want to work with a city and an authority that is interested in development, that formulates plans for development and that is willing to play a supporting role to the private sector. The formulation of the Downtown Winnipeg plan, and related policy decisions in the form of a zoning change, tax abatement and building of a convention centre, indicate the Corporation's willingness to assist developers. The proposal for a Development Corporation, if implemented, would facilitate development by simplifying plan approval and by administering public policy for redevelopment.

Chapter IV

Conclusions

Summary of Study and Conclusions

This study has attempted to evaluate the Downtown Winnipeg plan - the response of planners and political decision makers to the perceived problem of Downtown decline. The plan is characterized more positively as an attempt to build a city within a city with an improved environment for living, working and playing.¹²⁹ The public debate surrounding the introduction of the plan provided the issues that this study attempted to explore. These issues included:

- the perception of Downtown Winnipeg's decay and its need for redevelopment;
- the acceptability of the planning process;
- the relative priority of Downtown redevelopment;
- the need for public expenditures;
- the acceptability of the political decision-making process;
- the feasibility of the goals, proposals and implementation efforts

The second chapter provided the major research effort of this study: the establishment of criteria for evaluating the plan by examining three areas essential to the evaluation. The first area looked into the process of commercial development that the Downtown Winnipeg plan must facilitate and encourage in order to realize its goals of \$200 million of private development. This first question was explored in the Winnipeg situation through the presentation of eight case studies of recent commercial development projects in Winnipeg. The major findings indicated that a

good market for development must exist before commercial development will occur. The plan's success is contingent on the large degree of construction that is proposed. It did not appear that there is enough market demand to absorb the large level of development proposed by the plan.

The second area required an examination of the process of Downtown redevelopment. This area of enquiry explored the experiences of other cities in Downtown redevelopment in order to develop principles for successful redevelopment. This experience offered both positive and negative principles. The positive principles included the need for political leadership, business leadership and participation, and publicly provided incentives and subsidies. The negative principles warned of the hazards of Downtown redevelopment projects such as the exclusive planning and decision-making process surrounding plan formulation and approval, excessive incentives and subsidies that result in losses to the public sector, an overzealous pursuit of commercial development and the absence of the proper setting of goals and priorities for redevelopment projects.

Finally, the third major section in chapter two established some criteria for evaluating the process of planning and political decision-making. The literature suggested that the planning process must incorporate a wide variety of groups and interests in the setting of goals and in the formulating of proposals. The criteria for political decision-making included consultation with citizens, a clear and factual debate on the costs and benefits of proposed commercial development, and a lucid understanding of the public interest.

The third chapter presented the Downtown Winnipeg plan. The plan calls for approximately \$200 million of commercial development through the

expenditure of about \$60 million in public expenditures on parking structures to act as incentives to developers and on public amenities to improve the attractiveness of the Downtown as a living environment. The next section in this third chapter presented the findings of a feasibility study on the plan and the comment offered by various organizations and groups at the public hearings .

The major section of the third chapter finally tackled the issues that had emerged in the public debate on the Downtown Winnipeg plan and offered an evaluation consisting of a discussion of the questions that were posed earlier .

The evaluation of the Downtown Winnipeg plan has indicated that the plan is more a concept for a plan than a plan containing definite proposals for implementation. The plan's perception of the problems of Winnipeg's Downtown have been found to be overly negative. Although the plan contends that its main goal is a new Downtown environment, most of the proposals contained in the plan, and the more recent efforts at implementation, have been directed exclusively towards stimulating commercial development as opposed to bringing about a new Downtown living environment. The planning process that led to the plan was found to be inconsistent with the planning principles that were established in chapter two in that it was highly personal and devoid of consultation with other governmental agencies or jurisdictions and citizens groups. The plan was not based on a cost-benefit analysis of the proposed developments but instead, it has been surrounded by a series of unsupported estimates of the benefits supposedly accruing to the public sector. The plan has not been shown to be in the direct public interest but instead, appears to be an economic development plan based on a small amount of research, especially in the area of market projections and

opportunity cost analysis of alternative proposals and plans. The contention that large public expenditures are necessary to realize the objectives of the plan has been shown to be correct, in regards to the public facilities and amenities, and in regards to the proposed large scale of expected private development. On the other hand, a certain amount of commercial development will occur on its own to meet effective market demand as it exists. This development will occur without the need for public expenditures but not to the large scale (\$250-\$300 million) that officials have been suggesting lately.¹³⁰ The political decision-making process that led to the identification of Downtown redevelopment as a priority for public action and to the adoption of the plan as the appropriate expression of public policy, failed to meet the criteria that were established in chapter two. And finally, the proposals contained in the plan and the recent implementation efforts are not consistent with the principles of Downtown redevelopment that have characterized the successful American redevelopment experience. The plan is over-optimistic and does not give enough attention to the environmental problems inhibiting redevelopment in Winnipeg. The proposal for publicly provided parking structures to developers is an outright subsidy and should not be implemented.

Recommendations

In general, the goal of a redevelopment plan for Winnipeg's Downtown, must emphasize the development of a better living environment, rather than the development of high rise buildings, and formulating of growth for its own sake. Cities are discovering that growth for its own sake is a sterile and vain objective and that the improvement of the quality of life deserves more attention.¹³¹ A plan for Downtown redevelopment must be integrated with other plans for urban renewal and transportation planning.

The planning process that yields plans, such as Downtown Winnipeg, has been shown to fail to meet basic planning criteria of thorough economic research and consultation with citizens, officials, and other interests. In the future, plans should be based more accurately and realistically on information which only results from an exhaustive and intensive research program. The planning process must not be so personal and exclusive as it was in the case of the Downtown Winnipeg plan. Instead, we need new planners who are able and willing to work with other planners, professionals, governments, organizations and citizens in a program of consultation both on planning goals and strategies. Draft plans should be presented for public debate before the preparation of final plans.

In order to determine whether the Downtown Winnipeg plan is in the best interests of the citizens of Winnipeg, people must be included in the decision-making process. The forthcoming urban elections present a wonderful opportunity to create an issue of Downtown redevelopment and to gauge public response to the plan. Such a public debate would force Metropolitan Corporation officials and prospective politicians to clearly demonstrate how Downtown redevelopment is in the public interest, and what specific benefits will accrue to the public sector. In this public debate, arguments in defense

of the proposed public expenditures would be presented so that the public could judge the costs and benefits of Downtown redevelopment and of the specific proposals in Downtown Winnipeg. The vote would reveal whether Winnipeg's citizens agree that Downtown redevelopment is a priority for public action and whether the plan is the best strategy for redevelopment. Such a public forum debate would provide answers to the questions this evaluation has been concerned with, and provide the most demanding and definitive evaluation - public scrutiny and decision at an election.

Since the new direction of Downtown redevelopment is to be an improvement in the quality of life, the appropriate steps towards the realization of this goal must be taken. The proposals for recreational facilities, open spaces, cultural facilities, and other public amenities, must be given higher priority for the benefit of the general Winnipeg area, as well as the Downtown population. Commercial development can be allowed to proceed on its pace to meet market demand. If commercial development is felt necessary to produce increased taxes for the development of the above public facilities, then facilitating steps, such as tax incentives, zoning changes, and building code revisions, are necessary. Commercial development must not be pursued to the point where unjustified incentives and subsidies, such as publicly provided parking facilities and publicly built convention facilities, become necessary.

Downtown redevelopment is a worthwhile area of public activity and involvement but this issue must be seen from a perspective that includes other issues such as urban renewal, poverty, housing, and problems of education and native people. Efforts must be taken to ensure that the planning and decision-making process properly reflects priorities and concerns of

the City's citizens and not just the planners and politicians. Economic development plans, which include Downtown Winnipeg, should receive more public scrutiny as to whether proposals for incentives and subsidies are warranted and whether there is a direct public benefit from such schemes. Fiascos such as the Churchill Forest Industries complex at The Pas, serve as a warning to over-optimistic, and zealous economic development plans for which there is no market, which serve no worthwhile social purpose and which waste public money that could have been better spent on other things. And finally, the concern for growth and high rise buildings must be reconsidered to see whether it is in fact a really worthwhile goal. This study has not given extensive consideration to the economics of Downtown redevelopment, or to the proposed incentives for commercial development. Research into these areas, based on a cost-benefit analysis, would reveal much about the following questions:

Does commercial development always result in benefits to the public sector? What are the costs?

The costs and benefits on the proposed incentives for commercial development such as the parking structures and the convention centre.

Directions for Further Research

This study has raised more questions than it has answered and this is usual of research into new areas. The evaluation has depended on the establishment of criteria that were at best rudimentary. Further research can develop a methodology for enquiry in this area and work towards the establishment of more exhaustive criteria. The whole question of consultation on goals could easily be explored by a questionnaire administered to politicians and citizens in order to obtain their thoughts on the following questions:

Is Winnipeg's Downtown in generally poor condition in the eyes of the people who live and work there?

Is redevelopment of the Downtown a priority of governmental involvement?

What kind of Downtown do people want?

Is commercial development and a prolific skyline a shared goal?

Finally, consideration should be given for the planning of a new community or a "city within a city" as the Downtown Winnipeg plan refers to it. Such a research effort would plan comprehensively and integrate a variety of goals: low cost housing, commercial development, and recreational facilities. The focus of the study would be on improving the quality of life through an improved environment as opposed to the Downtown Winnipeg plan's focus on commercial development. This past summer the author has been involved in research on new community planning and there appear to be implications from this work that can be applied to the above objective of a social planning perspective for planning for the Downtown.¹³²

Footnotes

1. At the outset it is important to define Downtown. The Downtown Winnipeg plan refers to the Downtown as a whole and includes the area bounded by Notre Dame Avenue, Main Street, the Assiniboine River, Memorial Boulevard and Colony Street. The plan, however, is mainly concerned with a fourteen block area bounded by St. Mary's Avenue, Main Street, Broadway Avenue and Edmonton Street.
2. Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, Planning Department: Downtown Winnipeg, April 1969, page 6.
3. ibid, page 6.
4. Planning Research Centre, Faculty of Architecture, University of Manitoba: Transformation. 1966.
5. ibid, page 26.
6. ibid, page 34.
7. ibid, page 35.
8. ibid, page 46.
9. Downtown Winnipeg, op cit, page 18.
10. Unger, Maurice A.: Real Estate Principles and Practises (Cincinnati: South Western Publishing Co. 1969), pages 38-40.
11. Urban Land Institute: The Community Builder's Handbook. (Washington: Urban Land Institute 1968), pages 10-17.
Eichler, Edward P. and Marshall Kaplan: The Community Builders (Berkeley: University of California Press 1970), pages 107-119.
12. Real Estate Principles and Practises, op cit, pages 44-46.
13. Robinson, A.J. and James Cutt : Public Finance in Canada: Selected Readings (Toronto: Methuen 1968), Chapter VI.
14. Much of this discussion is a result of an interview with Paul Nusgart of Imperial Construction.
15. The developers that were interviewed included:
John Tyler, public relations officer with James Richardson & Sons
Don Laney, head of realty division with James Richardson & Sons
Mayer Pavadaghi, representative for Western Theatres

K. Beach, comptroller with Western Theatres

Paul Nusgart, executive assistant with Imperial Developments

Anthony Stephens, branch manager of MEPC and Canadian Properties

Lawrence Luba, representative of Bank of Montreal

John Atkins, representative of North West Trust

News reports of the Winnipeg Free Press and the Winnipeg Tribune were consulted for the time period, summer of 1968 until summer 1971, as were the Manitoba Business Journal reports for the same time period.

The information relating to the following case studies was obtained from the above sources.

16. Most developers agreed on this estimate.
17. This observation was offered by Paul Nusgart of Imperial Construction.
18. The estimates are by Paul Nusgart of Imperial Construction.
19. Several developers offered this interpretation.
20. Interview with John Atkins of North West Trust and Paul Nusgart of Imperial Construction.
21. Paul Nusgart of Imperial Construction offered this comment.
22. All developers agreed on this point.
23. This list is taken from Murray V. Jones: Downtown Winnipeg: A Conceptual Redevelopment Plan, Problems of Redevelopment. November 1968, page 25.
24. ibid, page 32.
25. ibid, page 35.
26. Imperial Construction's representative pointed to this problem.
27. Adde, Leo: Nine Cities (Washington: Urban Land Institute 1969), page 56.
28. Murray, Thomas F.: "The Resurgence of the Downtown." in Urban Land. July/August 1964, page 5.
29. ibid, page 4-5.
30. ibid, page 4.
31. ibid, page 4.
32. ibid, page 4.

33. Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg: The Structure and Organization of Urban Development Corporations. April 1970, see section on New York State. Unfortunately this report's pages are not numbered.
34. ibid
35. Urban Land Institute: "Co-ordination of Public and Private Development". Urban Land. April 1964, page 2.
36. Rouse, James "Will Downtown Face Up to its Future?" Urban Land. February 1957, page 1.
37. ibid, page 3.
38. ibid, page 4.
39. ibid, page 4.
40. ibid, page 4.
41. ibid, page 4.
42. ibid, page 4-5.
43. Urban Land Institute "Three Principles of Downtown Improvement" Urban Land. November 1964, page 7. The remarks are by Walter K. Koch, presented at a seminar on Downtown revitalization.
44. ibid, page 7.
45. This is a summary of remarks by Thomas F. Murray: "The Ressurgence of the Downtown" Urban Land. July-August 1964.
46. Armstrong, Robert H.: "Changing Downtown Patterns" Urban Land. June 1957, page 6.
47. ibid, page 6.
48. Banfield, Edward C.: Political Influence (New York Free Press 1961)
Collier, Robert: Contemporary Cathedrals. This is as yet an unpublished report that has been prepared for the Canadian Council on Urban and Regional Resources.
49. Contemporary Cathedrals, op cit, page 5.
- 49a. ibid, page
50. ibid, pages 3-4
51. ibid, page 221.

52. Contemporary Cathedrals, pages 133-134.
53. Gans, Herbert: People and Plans (New York: Basic Books, 1968), page vii.
54. ibid, page 53.
55. ibid, page 4.
56. ibid, page 4.
57. Good is not used in a normative sense. Instead, its use is to connote effective or
58. This account is drawn from Alan A. Altshuler's The City Planning Process (New York: Cornell University Press 1965).
59. Dahl, Robert A. and Charles E. Lindbloom: Politics, Economics and Welfare (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1963).
60. ibid, pages 57-92.
61. Downs, Anthony: "An Economic Theory of Democracy" in Public Finance in Canada: Selected Readings, op cit, page 52.
62. Contemporary Cathedrals, op cit, pages 3-4.
63. Redford, Emmette S.: Democracy in the Administrative State (New York: Oxford University Press 1969), page 89.
64. ibid, pages 5-7.
65. ibid, pages 136-147.
66. Schultze, Charles L.: The Politics and Economics of Public Spending (Washington: The Brookings Institution 1968), chapters II, III and IV.
67. Tom Haxby, a planner with the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, described the plans in an interview.
68. Murray V. Jones Associates: Downtown Winnipeg: A Conceptual Redevelopment Plan, Problems of Redevelopment. November 1968.
69. Libling, Michener, Hedlin Menzies, Aronovitz and Liepsic and National Garages : An Economic Evaluation of the Metropolitan Corporation Report "Downtown Winnipeg". Fall 1969.
70. K. Tel Motor Inns has proposed the development of a hotel adjacent to the convention centre while other developers have proposed an office and apartment development just around the convention centre.
71. The Winnipeg Tribune, August 17, 1971.

72. Downtown Winnipeg: A Conceptual Redevelopment Plan, Problems of Redevelopment, op cit.
This is a summary of their findings, pages 5-9, and is presented in precis form.
73. ibid, page 19.
74. Press release by the Metropolitan Corporation: "Downtown Development Plan Revitalizing the Core of Metro Winnipeg". November 5, 1970. The estimate of \$60 million is based on \$45 million as the plan proposes, plus \$15 million for the convention centre.
75. Downtown Winnipeg, op cit, page 69.
76. ibid, pages 70-71.
77. ibid, page 71.
78. ibid, page 71.
79. Developers can now build ten square feet of floor area for every square foot of land.
80. The tax freeze applies to new construction in the Downtown area and exempts the developer from taxes on buildings during construction. There is a further exemption of one to two years on building taxes depending on the value of the building. This was initiated by the City of Winnipeg, not Metro, and approved by the Provincial Government.
81. Downtown Winnipeg, op cit, page 74.
82. ibid, page 74.
83. ibid, page 2.
84. ibid, pages 2-3.
85. ibid, page 3.
86. A representative of the Department of Industry and Commerce of the Manitoba Government sees the Downtown Winnipeg plan simply as an economic development plan.
87. Downtown Winnipeg, op cit, pages 17-18.
88. Earl Levin, Director of Planning, still sees the Downtown the same way even with the new buildings - a wasteland - to put his comments very euphemistically.

89. Downtown Winnipeg, op cit, page 8.
90. ibid, page 26.
91. Winnipeg Tribune. October 20, 1967.
92. Downtown Winnipeg, op cit, page 18.
93. ibid, page 19.
94. ibid, page 19.
95. ibid, page 90.
96. ibid, page 90.
97. An Economic Evaluation of the Metropolitan Corporation Report "Downtown Winnipeg", op cit, page 1.
98. ibid, page 1.
99. ibid, pages 3-4.
100. ibid, pages 26-27.
101. ibid, pages 32-33.
102. The following briefs were presented July 16, 1969.
103. These briefs were presented July 30, 1969.
104. The following briefswere presented November 30, 1969.
105. Winnipeg Tribune. October 20, 1969.
106. Winnipeg Free Press. November 7, 1969.
107. ibid
108. The general comment by most people interviewed, both professionals and citizens, is that although the Downtown is fairly vacant and without many buildings, it is comparatively pleasant and it certainly lacks the deterioration found in larger cities.
109. Abe Simkin of BACM Construction.
110. This view was also offered by the Community Welfare Planning Council.
111. The statistics deal with the time period 1941-1966. Furthermore, much of the Downtown has never contained much housing, especially the area north of St. Mary's Avenue.

112. It is, in fact, Winnipeg's slow growth that has not resulted in problems such as traffic congestion, pollution, etc. peculiar to larger cities. Slow growth is not a disadvantage nor is rapid growth a boon.
113. Much of the study contains analyses of the Downtown's economic, physical and social conditions that do not appear to have had any bearing on the rest of the study. They are interesting and useful but unnecessary to the proposals offered in the plan.
114. Dr. Collier, in Contemporary Cathedrals, has offered this opinion, as did Abe Simkin and Bruce Bodie of BACM Construction.
115. Many people that have been interviewed did not share Mr. Levin's perception of a strong desire to live in the Downtown. These people included professionals such as developers and actual citizens.
116. The developers of Chateau 100, Place Louis-Riel and Cumberland House, contended that the parking case was largely unimportant to them but that the process of plan approval, the tax incentives, and zoning and building code provisions were more influential.
117. Mayor Juba and the Chairman of the Committee on Housing and Urban Renewal, were incensed that they had not been consulted.
118. "Downtown Development Plan Revitalizing Case of Metro Winnipeg". op cit, page 3.
119. An Economic Evaluation of the Metropolitan Corporation Report "Downtown Winnipeg". op cit, page 3.
120. Winnipeg Free Press. August 23, 1971.
121. This is the general view of developers.
122. All developers offered this view. Only Metro Councillors and Earl Levin has shown confidence in Downtown Winnipeg's market potential.
123. Both figures have been used by Earl Levin in various speeches.
124. Downtown Winnipeg, op cit, page 90.
125. The recent swell in the population category of young singles that have composed the major part of the apartment market will soon be forming families, and they will want alternative housing in which to raise a family. Furthermore, there are indications that people are beginning to seek apartments in the suburbs, away from the congestion, pollution and noise of Downtown.
126. Urban Canada: Problems and Prospects. A report prepared by N.H. Lithwick for the Honourable R.K. Andras, Minister Responsible for Housing, Government of Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970).
127. ibid.

128. Opportunity costs refer to benefits that could have resulted by spending the same money on other programs (assuming these other programs are successful).
129. See Metropolitan Corporation Publicity Brochure.
130. Jack Willis has indicated that the plan will result in \$250-\$300 million in private development. Winnipeg Tribune, August 17, 1971.
131. Robert Andras has said "In attacking these issues, we hope to raise urban life in this country to a high level of satisfaction and accomplishment that it should have " in a speech during the debate on the establishment of the Department for Urban Affairs, June 28, 1971, Hansard, Volume 18, No. 102.
132. The Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, has been engaged on a Research Project on the Development of a New Community for Western Canada.

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
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"Yoo hoo Reginald . . . Dinner."