

THE MODERNIZATION OF QUÉBEC  
AND THE PURSUIT OF SPECIAL STATUS

BY

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For Family and Friends  
who always wondered why  
a student with no courses  
was so busy.

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## ABSTRACT

The thesis argues the proposition that special status cannot prevent the assimilation of Québec into the North American mainstream culture because special status brings Québec towards what George Grant calls the 'universal and homogenous state.' Throughout the 1960s, Québec's programme of modernization led Québec away from its traditional culture, imposing a framework within which the dominant principles of the age of progress could take hold in Québec.

George Grant argues that the modern era is homogenizing, washing away all traditional cultures. The Government of Québec believed that the central threat to the Québec culture and language was the centralizing policies favoured by the federal government after the Second World War. Thus Québec felt secure in adopting the precepts of the era of progress.

Through looking at the impact of US investment in Canada and the attitudes of the *Québécois* towards the USA, it can be determined that the US has a heavy impact on the culture of the province. Finally, the paper looks at Sovereignty-Association and separation in the light of the overall thesis.

The conclusion suggests that special status went from a method of preserving the unique culture of Québec to a way to reinforce the new culture of Québec; modernity in a French-language environment.

## INTRODUCTION

In 1839, Lord Durham described Canada as "two nations warring in the bosom of a single state." In 1979, 140 years later, the Pepin-Robarts Task Force on Canadian Unity reached the same conclusion. The Task Force reported

...that the heart of the present [national unity] crisis is to be discovered in the intersecting conflicts created by two kinds of cleavages in Canadian society... The first and most pressing cleavage is that old Canadian division between 'the French' and 'the English'...<sup>1</sup>

Successive governments both in Ottawa and in Québec City have tried to resolve the unity crisis in Canada. Since the Quiet Revolution, various Québec governments have put forward demands for special status as a strategy to ensure the survival of the French Canadian culture on the North American continent.

Political thinker George Grant discusses Québec's survival. Journalist Charles Taylor writes that

Grant... is sympathetic to French-Canadian aspirations. But the reality of their culture, and their desire not to be swamped, cannot save the French-Canadians from the relentless pull of continentalism. While they want to preserve their culture, they also want the benefits of progress. These are contradictory

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<sup>1</sup> D.V. Smiley, The Federal Condition in Canada, (Toronto, 1987), p.125.



goals. [Grant says] '[n]ationalism can only be asserted successfully by an identification with technological advance; but technological advance entails the disappearance of those indigenous differences that give substance to nationalism.'<sup>2</sup>

This paper is an examination of what Taylor and Grant have said above. It will argue that special status cannot prevent the assimilation of the *Québécois* into the English-dominated, North American culture because special status brings Québec toward what Grant calls the 'universal and homogenous state.' Special status has led Québec away from its traditional culture through imposing a framework within which the dominant principles of modernity could take hold in Québec. Post-war economic changes in Canada and the Quiet Revolution in Québec presented Québec with a contradiction: the province wanted to preserve its culture while adopting the trappings of a modern, progressive state.

The paper will argue from Grant's perspective regarding the modern progressive era and its effect on mankind. That is to say, the philosophy of progress places Canada, and therefore Québec, on a march toward the universal and homogeneous state. The major cause of assimilation is the age of progress and the corresponding cultural impact of that age. Once this progressive mind set is adopted, aspects of the age of progress tend to generate a new culture; a new philosophy of life is created. Grant argues that in the face

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<sup>2</sup> Charles Taylor, Radical Tories, (Toronto, 1982), p.147.

of this new culture, traditional cultures are washed away.

It is only since the 1960s that Québec governments have begun to demand more formal, constitutional accommodation. This comes as a result of the adoption of a strong centralizing and interventionist mind-set by the central government in the immediate post-war era. The adoption by Canada of Keynesian economic principles signalled the full integration of Canada into the modern, progressive era. In accordance with the principles of Keynesianism, the Canadian government began to press for a greater centralization of powers. This caused consternation in Québec. The province adopted the view that economic, social and fiscal powers should be held by Québec, and not the federal government. In this way the province could retain control of cultural aspects of Québec life. This was the goal of special status.

There is a strong link between legislative power and culture. This link is noted by the Québec government in its 1956 Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems which states that:

As regards economic, social and fiscal legislation... [it is] difficult to deny its present profound repercussions on the people's way of life and thought, and, consequently, on cultural and national values in particular. This fact seems obvious to us, when we consider social policy, that is, the overall legislative and administrative measures relating to the public welfare, to health, to hygiene and to social security. In each of these cases, there are involved particular institutions which are already existent, or which are being set up to meet new needs, such as hospitals, hospices, asylums, orphanages,

hygiene and health services... etc. It is through these institutions it creates that a people translates its philosophy of life and these institutions become, at the same time the manifestations and the guardians of its cultural and national values... <sup>3</sup>

It is the changes in the philosophy of life discussed in the Report which causes some concern to its authors. Economic, fiscal and social legislation do not simply affect one's personal wealth and status, they affect how that person views the world and therefore, must ultimately affect culture. Consequently, if the economic and social philosophy is directed from outside Québec, then culture too will be directed from outside of Québec. As the Report goes on to say, "with what philosophy of societal life will a centralized social legislation be inspired in Canada- with that of the Anglo-Protestant majority, or with that of the French-Catholic minority?"<sup>4</sup> The Commission members feared that institutions in Québec which articulate culture would begin to articulate an English-Canadian culture were social and economic decisions to be made by the English-dominated central government. Thus, by the end of the 1960s, the Province of Québec, as the centre of French culture in North America was demanding that its special status be entrenched in the Constitution by way of a devolution of powers.

Modern Québec nationalism can be seen in this light.

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<sup>3</sup> Government of Québec, Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, vol. 2, 1956, p.280.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., vol. 2, p.280.

The Québec government wanted to ensure that economic prosperity and growth would occur without threatening the unique culture of Québec, and would allow Québec to be in charge of its own destiny within the framework of the Canadian federation. Nationalism has been defined as "the collective will of a distinctive community to survive and grow according to its own cultural imperatives."<sup>5</sup> The nationalism that dominated the era during and after the Quiet Revolution was reflected in the drive for *l'épanouissement* (expansionism).<sup>6</sup>

Influenced by the growth of new economic principles in government, Québec society in general found that the traditional ultramontane and rural ideology which characterized *la survivance* undervalued and constrained economic progress.<sup>7</sup> During the Quiet Revolution, the state became the central institution in the lives of the *Québécois*.<sup>8</sup> In a phrase, the Quiet Revolution was about entering the modern world.

The Quiet Revolution was a social and economic change. The nationalism which arose in the 1960s was "...the Québec people's search for a new security compatible with an

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<sup>5</sup> Ramsay Cook, "The Evolution of Nationalism in Québec," British Journal of Canadian Studies, vol.4, no.2, 1989, p.307.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p.316.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p.311.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p.313.

economic and social modernity they no longer shunned. This elicited seemingly insatiable demands from Québec for funds and jurisdiction...<sup>9</sup>

There was an attitudinal change among the Québec people. The Catholic Church was no longer the protector of the French culture in North America. The Québec state would, through increased intervention, protect the French island in the North American sea. To achieve cultural security it was determined that Québec would have to be recognized as a province *pas comme les autres*. Québec would need a special status among the Canadian provinces.

However, the strategy of special status was flawed. Québec determined that it would need greater jurisdictional leeway in order to have more control over its culture. With the Quiet Revolution Québec accepted modernity, and demanded more influence over the forces of progress. However, as Grant argues, progress comes with its own cultural imperatives which subsume more traditional cultures. Thus, by accepting the age of progress, the *Québécois* accepted the forces that would see their unique culture eventually disappear from the North American continent.

Grant's ideas regarding the homogenization of cultures will be outlined in Chapter One. This theoretical framework entails George Grant's ideas on the economic implications of

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<sup>9</sup> Alan C. Cairns, "Politics of Constitutional Renewal," Disruptions, Douglas E. Williams, ed., (Toronto, 1991), p.70.

the technocratic, materialistic philosophy that has been adopted by man in the modern era. Grant argues that the modern era is homogenizing in that progress has become associated with economic growth. Once on the path of progress, Grant argues that the march towards the universal and homogenous state is unstoppable.

Chapter Two will examine more closely the concept of special status. Over the years, special status has been defined in terms of redistributing the constitutional jurisdictions of the federal government to the provinces, or at least to Québec. The argument will be made that the Québec government's goal in achieving special status was to protect culture through increased provincial control over economic and social powers. Special status was and is a power struggle.

Chapter Three will argue that the Québec government began to demand provincial autonomy in the area of economic and social powers in an attempt to control the effects of the new economic principles and therefore protect the culture of Québec. In part, Québec adopted special status as a result of a misunderstanding of the post-war adoption of Keynesianism; the *Québécois* felt that centralization represented the major threat to the French Canadian culture, and not the economic system as Grant argues.

"French Canada is quite prepared to take up the awesome cultural challenge it faces on the North American

continent..." said Daniel Johnson at the 1967 Confederation of Tomorrow meetings.<sup>10</sup> Chapter Four will explore the extent to which this is possible; the fact is that the United States is the dynamic centre of the era of progress. The Canadian government itself does not have full control over economic decisions made in the pursuit of progress. Thus, the federal government cannot devolve that power. This chapter will suggest that Québec cannot get sufficient economic control through special status so that it could protect its culture.

Finally, Chapter Five will look at the options for Québec outside special status. One of the key options available to the citizens of the province has been that of Sovereignty-Association. Chapter Five will look at how this option fits in with Grant's ideas about the homogenization of cultures.

When one looks at the pressures that are being put on Québec's culture *vis a vis* the economic and related international pressures, one can see that any formal recognition of special status could not be made broad enough to give the Québec government power enough to check both the effects of the modern economy and the effects of Americanization. Lord Durham's war continues, but it is a war that the *Québécois* cannot win.

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<sup>10</sup> Daniel Johnson, "What Does Québec Want?-1967," Canadian Federalism, Myth or Reality, J. Peter Meekison, ed., (Toronto, 1971), pp.427-428.

## CHAPTER ONE

### GEORGE GRANT AND MAN IN MODERNITY

Modern civilization makes all local cultures anachronistic.

George Grant, Lament for a Nation

In his book Lament for a Nation, George Grant offers a biography of a nation. Grant's essential argument in Lament is that distinct national cultures are being homogenized and unified into the culture of the liberal-oriented, modern progressive state. Chapter One will examine this argument.

Grant believed that the progressive era is homogenizing because that era has become associated with economic growth and the accumulation of wealth. The end product of this effect is what Grant calls 'the universal and homogenous state,' which Grant defines as

...the pinnacle of political striving. 'Universal' implies a world-wide state which would eliminate the curse of war among nations; 'homogenous' means that all men would be equal, and war among classes would be eliminated. The masses and the philosophers have both agreed that this universal and egalitarian society is the goal of historical striving... This state will be achieved by means of modern science- a science that leads to the conquest of nature... Man will conquer



man and perfect himself.<sup>11</sup>

Grant was interested in how Canadians were affected by what he terms the 'age of modernity' or the 'age of progress.' Grant defines this modern age as a society in which there is high individual consumption of many goods in return for shorter hours of work. Further, there is a requirement for a high degree of technical competence to the extent that people specialize in a small area without necessarily understanding the whole. Finally, the population of the modern world is urbanized, and that fact leads to a highly complex lifestyle.<sup>12</sup>

Grant argues that the origins of the universal and homogenous state lie in technological and scientific advance. This chapter will first examine technology and how it has affected mankind. From this discussion will be drawn the concept of liberalism and how it has become associated with economic growth. Liberalism has become the dominant ideology of the western world, and has its roots in technological advance.

#### TECHNOLOGY

Much of Grant's writing is devoted to studying people in modern society. Grant says that "the great fact of... the

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<sup>11</sup> George Grant, Lament for a Nation, (Ottawa, 1986), pp.53, 54.

<sup>12</sup> George Grant, "An Ethic of Community," Social Purpose for Canada, Michel Oliver, ed. (Toronto, 1961), p.7.

whole of the modern world is that we are now living in the mass scientific society and this is something totally new in the experience of the human race.<sup>13</sup>

Throughout his discussions, Grant had a particular concept of technology in mind. He believed that

the dominant spirit of modern societies...is that of modern practical science... it aims to build a better life for all mankind, and it believes that the attainment of this goal depends upon the careful investigation of natural processes together with their redirection to alleviate human suffering and to increase the pleasures of life... This is what Grant sometimes calls 'the objective spirit,'... 'the will to technology,' 'expansionist practicality,' 'the drive to unlimited mastery,' or simply 'technology.'<sup>14</sup>

Grant believed that it was technology that laid the foundation for the modern society of today. Grant says of the modern scientific era that "we can now as never before choose to make our world, to use nature and abuse her, but less than ever before need we submit to her necessity."<sup>15</sup> When humanity is freed from a life of subsistence, it can develop more fully; individuals can self-actualize. Thus Grant argues that mankind has become interested in dominating the natural world- it is in this way that

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<sup>13</sup> George Grant, "The Minds of Men in the Atomic Age," Canadian Political Thought, H.D. Forbes, ed., (Toronto, 1985), p.284.

<sup>14</sup> H.D. Forbes, "The Political Thought of George Grant," Journal of Canadian Studies, vol.26, no. 2 (Summer, 1991), p.48.

<sup>15</sup> Grant, "Minds of Men", p.285.

humanity can free itself from the bonds of subsistence.

Grant argues that "liberalism is the fitting ideology for a society directed towards these ends. It denies unequivocally that there are any given restraints that might hinder pursuit of dynamic dominance."<sup>16</sup> "It is only necessary to think what modern men have done to make life pleasant, to cut down the curses of pain and work (and they are curses) to see how great the achievements of the modern world have been."<sup>17</sup> Technological advances in the modern era have been essential to the development of liberalism- mankind cannot be free if its day to day life is concerned with survival and subsistence. Humanity now has the time needed for freedom; leisure requires time.<sup>18</sup> Freedom is essential to liberalism, the great ideology of modern times.

#### LIBERALISM

Grant defines liberalism as "a set of beliefs which proceed from the central assumption that man's essence is his freedom and therefore that what chiefly concerns man in his life is to shape the world as we want it."<sup>19</sup> Thus the age of progress as discussed above is inseparable from liberalism. This philosophy is intimately connected with the

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<sup>16</sup> Grant, Lament, p.57.

<sup>17</sup> Taylor, Radical, p.143.

<sup>18</sup> Grant, "Minds of Men", p.285.

<sup>19</sup> Taylor, Radical, p.152.

concept of freedom. First the concept of freedom in Grant's context must be established, then liberalism and its effect on humanity can be examined.

Isaiah Berlin discusses two senses of the term freedom: the first is negative freedom. Negative freedom is the answer to the question "what is the area in which the subject- a person or group of persons- is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?"<sup>20</sup> Berlin also discusses positive freedom as the answer to the question: "what, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?"<sup>21</sup>

Grant argues that humanity is moving, on an individual level, towards more negative freedom. People are becoming concerned about not having limitations, within reason, on their ability to live a lifestyle they feel most comfortable with.

Grant believed that liberalism was changing the way in which people viewed their relationship with each other. Grant believes that implicit in liberalism is the idea that "... man in his freedom creates the valuable. The human good is what we choose for our good."<sup>22</sup> Grant has concerns about

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<sup>20</sup> Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," Four Essays On Liberty, Isaiah Berlin, ed., (London, 1969), pp.121,122.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p.122.

<sup>22</sup> Grant, Lament, p.57.

a philosophy that gives people choices in moral standards and behaviour. Grant maintained that

...ancient philosophers had viewed man as part of a natural order, and as subject of divine law; whereas the modern philosophy [of liberalism] placed him in full control of his destiny. The question thoughtful people must ask themselves is whether the progressive spirit is going to hold within itself any conception of spiritual law and freedom; or whether our ...spirit will degenerate into a rudderless desire for domination on the part of our elites and aimless pleasure among the masses.<sup>23</sup>

Essentially, Grant wonders if mankind is strong enough to hold itself to an external code of ethics, or if it will apply free choice to ethical decisions as well. Grant argues that, in a liberal society, liberal values will become supreme and therefore the human spirit will opt for the 'pleasure' route. This is simply because the liberal ideology suggests that there should be no unreasonable limits on man's freedom. Liberalism, by defining unrestricted choice as 'the good,' therefore allows 'moral rightness' to be decided by the individual- an internal self-created, as opposed to externally imposed code of ethics.

This acceptance of an internal morality concerned Grant. He agreed with Nietzsche's statement that "progress was the doctrine which held men when the conception of history in western Christianity had been secularized by

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<sup>23</sup> Taylor, Radical, p.142.

modern philosophy and science."<sup>24</sup> It would seem that mankind, now free from the restraints of nature, wants to be free from the restraints of and external code of ethics.

Grant argues that where man is in charge of his moral destiny, he will make moral decisions in terms of liberty; something becomes good if it increases one's freedom of choice. Therefore, if an external moral precept prohibits some alternate lifestyle such as homosexuality or cohabitation outside of wedlock, then that prohibition is unacceptable and must be discarded. The externality is the key; because it is not a product of free choice, that external code is invalid. Modern times demand that society accept all reasonable choices because each individual has the right to be free from societal rules regarding his or her own life choices.

Berlin, referring to Mill, says that

...unless men are left to live as they wish 'in the path which merely concerns themselves' civilization cannot advance; the truth will not, for lack of a free market in ideas, come to light; there will be no scope for spontaneity, originality, genius, for mental energy, for moral courage. Society will be crushed by the weight of 'collective mediocrity'. Whatever is rich and diversified will be crushed by the weight of custom...<sup>25</sup>

Here Berlin suggests that unless society pursues increased

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<sup>24</sup> George Grant, "Teaching What Nietzsche Taught," Canadian Political Thought, H.D. Forbes, ed., (Toronto, 1985), p.434.

<sup>25</sup> Berlin, Four Essays, p.127.

freedom, there can be no progress in any field involving spontaneity, originality, etc. People, then, must be free to make life choices as they see best. The only restraint on this freedom should be that they do not restrict the freedom of another.<sup>26</sup>

Grant calls this moral democracy the "religion of humanity and progress."<sup>27</sup> Liberalism has become the yardstick of morality- if freedom is increased, then good is increased. Grant believes that this new system of belief "... will bind together the lives of individuals and give them some consistency of purpose."<sup>28</sup> Grant implies this leads to a cultural change. In this light, liberalism is not an ideology, rather it is an anti-ideology.<sup>29</sup> An ideology imposes an order on man; liberalism, with its cornerstone of freedom as man's essence, could not impose an ideology; it liberates man from ideology. "The end of ideology is the perfect slogan for men who want to do what they want. Liberalism is, then, the faith that can understand progress as an extension into the unlimited possibility of the future."<sup>30</sup>

In this sense, liberalism is a drive for the

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p.127.

<sup>27</sup> Forbes, "Political Thought," p.54.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p.54.

<sup>29</sup> Grant, Lament, p.58.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p.58.

emancipation of the human spirit. One can see here the influence of the liberal mind-set on the economy. There should be no unreasonable restraints on a person's lifestyle- all aspects, including business. Therefore, if an ideology or law should restrict business, it is not just and must be discarded. Thus liberalism has become associated with a drive for economic expansion. This is because economic expansion has become associated with freeing the human spirit; the richer a people is, the freer that people is. However, while economic advance was intended to grant mankind greater freedom, Grant notes "...expanding [the] economy is no longer a means to us- a means for the liberation of the spirit- it has become an end to itself..."<sup>31</sup>

The work of Francis Fukuyama elaborates on Grant's work regarding liberalism and economic growth. Fukuyama's thinking follows in the same vein as that of Grant. He argued that

the liberal state must be universal, that is, grant recognition to all citizens because they are human beings, and not because they are members of some particular national, ethnic or racial group. And it must be homogenous insofar as it creates a classless society based on the abolition of the distinction between masters and slaves.<sup>32</sup>

Here Fukuyama outlines the steps to the recognition of the

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<sup>31</sup> Grant, "Minds of Men", p.286.

<sup>32</sup> Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and The Last Man, (New York, 1992), p.204.



universal and homogenous state. He first says that essentially, each person searches for dignity, and therefore is free and autonomous. Second, he argues that all are equal.<sup>33</sup> This argument is similar to Grant's discussion of liberalism- man's essence is his freedom.

Dignity is the link between economic prosperity and liberalism as Grant discusses. Fukuyama concludes that man in modern society searches essentially for dignity. Yet Fukuyama does not explore the connection fully- he does not, as does Grant, conclude that economic expansion is the chief purpose of modern society. However, Fukuyama does provide the groundwork for such a conclusion.

Humanity's search for dignity has come to mean the search for economic expansion. In master- slave societies, the master is in charge and owns property. The slave does not own property, rather, the slave is property. Yet, modern society emphasizes the freedom of all. If the slaves can master technology and themselves through education and work, they too can become masters.<sup>34</sup> All people can gain dignity through gaining wealth; dignity comes through becoming 'masters in their own house.'

Liberalism allows mankind to choose what it sees as 'the good.' As freedom, a liberal society's ultimate good, is more and more tied to economic growth, that economic

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p.200.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p.205.

growth becomes more and more associated with 'the good.' Richer means freer and therefore better. Thus the drive to free the human spirit becomes intimately linked with the drive to expand material wealth. Further, this link is seen as good.

Economics is not simply about fiscal progress, it is about how people live their lives. Economic progress cannot be divorced from people's day to day lives because "philosophy must arise from the most immediate and concrete experience of our lives, both public and private..."<sup>35</sup> Grant argues that fundamental to the age of progress is the fact that

economic expansion through the control of nature by science has become the chief purpose of our existence. It has become the goal to which everything else must be subordinated, the God we worship... Now at last in North America this has become the dominant religion, which shapes our society at nearly every point.<sup>36</sup>

Here, then, is the link between the 'religion of humanity and progress' and 'the universal and homogeneous state.' The priority in the western world has become progress and increased wealth- all else, according to Grant, is subordinated to that goal.

When a society equates its identity with economic progress, it exposes itself to the culture of the universal

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<sup>35</sup> Taylor, Radical, p.132.

<sup>36</sup> Grant, " Minds of Men," p.285.

and homogenous state. As Grant said, "when the majority equate their own material well being with technological progress, it becomes impossible to preserve any remnant of tradition."<sup>37</sup> George Grant says

...men assume in the age of progress that the broad movement of history is upward. Taken as a whole, what is bound to happen is bound to be good. But this assumption is not self-evident. The fact that events happen does not imply that they are good. We understand this in the small events of personal life. We only forget it in the large events when we worship the future.<sup>38</sup>

Modernity's homogenizing force comes through the desire of the people to progress economically. Liberalism suggests that what people want is good, and they should not be inhibited in their desires. The desire to progress affects people, and culture derives from the day to day lives of those people.

In the face of the individualistic universal and homogenous state, a society which emphasizes other things-family, spiritual life, community- cannot survive. Grant says "...technology is not simply a... means which men can use well or badly. As an end in itself, it inhibits the pursuit of other ends in the society it controls."<sup>39</sup>

Were Grant alive today, he would most likely see the

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<sup>37</sup> William Mathie, "The Technological Regime: George Grant's Analysis of Modernity," George Grant in Process, Larry Schmidt, ed., (Toronto, 1978), p.158.

<sup>38</sup> Grant, Lament, p.38.

<sup>39</sup> Mathie, "Technological Regime," p.145.

current debate over Sunday shopping as an example of the ingress of the homogenous state. Western society, shaped by Christian values, has traditionally held Sunday to be a day of rest. As such, governments have long held restrictions concerning the business hours of stores and the number of employees allowed to work on Sundays.

However, since the middle of the 19th century, Sunday closing laws have been under attack by businesses as a drain on their potential profits, and as a restriction of freedom.<sup>40</sup> Society today continues to push at a more feverish rate for the introduction of liberalized Sunday shopping laws. Surely this makes economic sense in a liberal society? In Canada today, the argument is made that the Canadian retailer gets a day off while the American retailer makes money from cross-border shopping.<sup>41</sup> The question that is being asked is "why should retailers in Canada be deprived of a choice to earn more money...?"<sup>42</sup> Note that making money, or not making money is labelled as a *choice*; it is an exercise in freedom.

Grant would see the debate over Sunday shopping as a deeper reflection of a society which has lost value for tradition. In place of tradition is found 'economic common

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<sup>40</sup> Leo-Paul Dana, "Why Do We Export Shopping," Policy Options, v.13, no.5, (June, 1992),p.13.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.,p.14.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.,p.14.

sense.' Society sees making money and freedom of choice as values that are greater than long held traditions.

Grant said:

capitalism is... a way of life based on the principle that the most important activity is profit making. That activity led the wealthy in the direction of continentalism. They lost nothing essential to the principle of their lives in losing their country. It is this very fact that has made capitalism the great solvent of all tradition in the modern era.<sup>43</sup>

These words relate well to Québec. The 1960s and 1970s saw Québec adopt a philosophy best summarized in the slogan *maîtres chez nous*. Québeckers identified French nationalism with economic progress. The growth of state and francophone businesses after 1960 bear this out.

On the surface it would seem that the *Québécois* were adopting what Grant called the 'Gaullist' method of resisting a capitalist empire.<sup>44</sup> Grant describes Gaullism as harnessing "the nationalist spirit to technological planning and to insist internationally that there are limits to the western 'alliance.'"<sup>45</sup> However, the analysis of Québec in modernity does not end here. Grant continues

Gaullism is only possible when nationalism is such a dominant motive among certain elites that they are able to control the economy so as to stop the tendency of capitalism to

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<sup>43</sup> Grant, Lament, p.47.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p.45.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p.45.

become international.<sup>46</sup>

That is to say, Québec would have to be willing to pay an economic price to stave off the universal and homogenous state. However, the events surrounding the Quiet Revolution suggest that the new French nationalism was too closely linked to economic progress.

To assert Gaullism in Québec, the political elite would have to subordinate economic progress to things like laws to protect their language. Evidence suggests that the trend was the reverse; language laws were weakened in favour of economic considerations. Further, American investment, a source of wealth for the *Québécois*, would have to be controlled. The Québec elites identified closely with American investment, however. Thus Gaullism was not to be established in Québec. The issues discussed briefly above will be expanded upon and explored throughout the rest of the paper.

There is no magic force to the homogenization of a culture. Cultures change because its people wish it. The rest of the paper focuses on the *Québécois* wish to change. Through the 1960s and 1970s, the province of Québec went through a radical change in terms of its economic and social perspectives, as well as its attitudes towards the protection of the French language as well as to the

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p.46.

viability of remaining in the Canadian federation. While the other aspects of this 'new nationalism' will be explored later on, Chapter Two explores the economic and social changes that occurred to the *Québécois* in the 1960s and 1970s.

Since the 1960s, Québec has wanted to have formal recognition of special status. In light of what has gone above, demands for special status can be seen as Québec's desire to adopt the principles of modernity within the framework of a French-Canadian culture. However, it is debatable whether the adoption of special status protects against assimilation of the North American culture into Québec. While francophone Québeckers wish for the protection of their society, they adopted the principles of modernity that give rise to the concerns of the French regarding assimilation into the mainstream culture.

## CHAPTER TWO

### SPECIAL STATUS

...French-speaking Québeckers who say that they are *Québécois* and that their homeland is Québec usually call for a maximization of the Québec government's power over Québec territory. These pro-Québec French-Canadians are clearly a majority in Québec...

André Bernard, What Does Québec Want?

Since the 1960s, the *Québécois* have argued that, in order to protect their distinct culture, Québec needs jurisdiction over those constitutional powers whose overall effect is to stimulate the economy. The strategy of successive Québec governments has been to seek special status in the form of increased social and economic powers for the province. The *Québécois* sought these powers through both increased legislative and constitutional powers of government and through an increased presence of francophones in business circles. The struggle for cultural protection is and has always been essentially a power struggle.

Writing about the 1976 provincial election, André Bernard summed up what have been the goals of all political leaders since the Quiet Revolution:

- 1) any government of Québec should be committed to ensuring the survival of French in Québec, and;
- 2) any government of Québec should be committed to ensuring economic prosperity for Québec and increased



control of the Québec economy by Québeckers.<sup>47</sup>

These two imperatives have come to mean the same thing; the protection of the culture in Québec and the achievement of special status both refer to a commitment to acquire more jurisdictional powers.

This chapter will discuss much of the work regarding the 'New Middle Class.' This class is described as being mostly francophone white collar bureaucrats who were more modern and progressive thinkers than their traditional counterparts.<sup>48</sup> While authors such as Guindon and McRoberts advance the 'New Middle Class hypothesis' as a cause of the Quiet Revolution, this chapter agrees with Coleman's critique of the New Middle Class hypothesis; Coleman suggests that it is more likely that the New Middle Class was a result of, rather than a cause of the Quiet Revolution.<sup>49</sup>

Whatever the cause of the Quiet Revolution, this chapter will focus on the growth of government during the 1960s and the effect it had on the francophone population. This chapter will argue that the Quiet Revolution saw the *Québécois* adopt the principles of modernity. It is those principles which form the basis of special status. The

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<sup>47</sup> André Bernard, What Does Québec Want?, (Toronto, 1978), p.23.

<sup>48</sup> William D. Coleman, The Independence Movement in Québec 1945-1980, (Toronto, 1984), p.5.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p.8.

average francophone Québecker became concerned with economic growth.

The chapter will first examine the economic prosperity of the *Québécois*. The growth of the public sector will be put forward as the one area in which French Québeckers could achieve social mobility. Through the enhanced economic status of the francophones, a new French-Canadian nationalism was born. This enhanced status of the French in Québec expanded in the 1970s to include an increase in francophone representation in the higher levels of the business world such that the English-Canadian elite was replaced.

The new nationalism rested on the ability of Québeckers to be *maîtres chez nous*. Economic prosperity came to be associated with the power of the state, and threats to that power became a threat to the new nationalism. By way of conclusion, it will be put forward that the structural and institutional changes in Québec during the Quiet Revolution legitimated for the *Québécois* demands for special status that have been made from 1960 to the present day.

#### THE QUIET REVOLUTION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIAL STATUS

Provincial intervention in the economy increased the economic prosperity and the status primarily of the francophone Québeckers. The policy of the Lesage government was to expand the state into new areas and modernize the

Québec state. Québeckers were to have more control over the day to day aspects of their lives.

Before the Quiet Revolution, the francophone population was marginalized in terms of their employment opportunities. The Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism described the situation:

Francophones are owners and proprietors in large proportions in agriculture and to a lesser degree in the service fields and retail trade. In wholesale they play a still smaller role, while in finance and manufacturing they account for about one fourth of the total. Moreover within manufacturing itself, the pattern of ownership is also uneven. In small scale manufacturing, such as the production of wood products Francophones predominate; but in fields requiring large capital investment and highly advanced technology, such as the manufacture of chemicals and petroleum products, they play virtually no role in ownership or control.<sup>50</sup>

By the late 1950s, the *Québécois* turned to the provincial government to redress this situation. However, it was only after the death of Premier Duplessis and the election of the Liberals in 1960 that the government took action.

In the 1960s, the provincial government took on a new air of legitimacy as an active participant in the economy. During the Quiet Revolution

...Québec discovered that its best tool was the provincial government... We were generally aware that our problems could be solved by our government, our social values could be protected, and our desire for *épanouissement*

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<sup>50</sup> Marc Renaud, "Québec New Middle Class in Search of Social Hegemony," Québec, State and Society, Alain G. Gagnon, ed., (Toronto, 1984), pp.160-161.

could be developed and translated into reality by parliamentary institutions controlled by ourselves.<sup>51</sup>

"In fact it was the very embrace of the state by the Lesage government which constituted the essence of that celebrated 'revolution': that was, more or less, what was revolutionary about it."<sup>52</sup> Expansion opened up career opportunities for the francophones in the civil service and state-owned enterprises.

From 1960 to 1966, the Liberal government under Lesage moved the government into many of the areas of Québeckers' lives previously dominated by traditional elites, such as the social services and education. The rapid expansion of government included the creation of new government departments. The Lesage government created many new ministries, as did the subsequent Johnson-Bertrand administration. In 1961 the Ministries of Natural Resources and Cultural Affairs were created, as was Federal-Provincial Affairs, which was replaced in 1968 by Intergovernmental Affairs. The first Ministry of Education in Québec was created in 1964, Industry and Commerce in 1968, and Public

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<sup>51</sup> Robert Cliché, "Québec Since Duplessis," Québec, Year Eight, Glendon College Forum, (Toronto, 1968), pp.20-21.

<sup>52</sup> Ralph Heinzman, "The Political Culture of Québec, 1840-1960," Canadian Journal of Political Science, v.16, no.1, (March, 1983), p.4.

Service and Communications in 1969.<sup>53</sup>

Concomitant with the establishment of these and other ministries was the creation of a bureaucracy to administer the various policies emanating from the new departments. There was an expansion of civil servants- from 36 000 provincial employees in 1960 to 350 000 in 1971.<sup>54</sup> The growth in the Québec civil list reflects a deeper trend in governance in the Western world. "[S]ince 1945, the forces that will shape our future in the West show themselves to be bureaucratic state capitalism."<sup>55</sup> The Québec government was interested in creating a modern, competent civil service capable of running the new ministries being set up. Such changes were not meant as an attack against the old order and traditional elites who previously were involved in the civil service. Rather, the new society challenged incompetence.<sup>56</sup>

It was no longer sufficient to be a priest to run an agency or a university department, a nun to run a hospital board or the nursing department, or a public official with a long record of service to head a ministry. What was necessary was that one should be professionally qualified. If he were not, he must forfeit the right to bureaucratic power. That scientific or technical competence should

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<sup>53</sup> Alain G. Gagnon and Mary-Beth Montcalm, Québec: Beyond the Quiet Revolution, (Scarborough, 1990), p.45.

<sup>54</sup> Renaud, "New Middle Class," p.151.

<sup>55</sup> Grant, Lament, p.75.

<sup>56</sup> Hubert Guindon, Québec Society: Tradition, Modernity, and Nationhood, (Toronto, 1988), p.48.

be the overriding concern in the selection, hiring, and promotion of bureaucratic personnel marked the claim to supremacy of bureaucratic leadership over traditional leadership.<sup>57</sup>

Québec developed a new order of government, one willing to legislate in many areas of its citizens' lives. This kind of order needed a large and competent bureaucracy. "The new order was a bureaucratic one. It involved a high degree of state-initiated political integration and bureaucratic centralization."<sup>58</sup>

A second area where the government demonstrated a willingness to intervene was in the area of state-owned enterprises. As Kenneth McRoberts has said,

[i]n the case of public enterprises, the most notable achievement was, of course, the nationalization of the existing private electrical utility companies, which were owned and managed by English-Canadians, and their incorporation into Hydro-Québec. Whatever may have been the economies gained through the integration of Québec's hydroelectric facilities, the primary benefit was the creation of new opportunities for French-Canadians in managerial and technical positions.<sup>59</sup>

The 1963 nationalization of Hydro-Québec was an outgrowth of the government's desire to take control of the economy away

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid., pp.48-49.

<sup>58</sup> Hubert Guindon, "The Modernization of Québec and the Legitimacy of the Canadian State," Modernization and the Canadian State, Daniel Glenway et al., eds., (Toronto, 1978), p.214.

<sup>59</sup> Kenneth McRoberts, Québec: Social Change and Political Crisis, 3rd. ed., (Toronto, 1988), p.132.

from the anglophone elites running the major components of the Québec economy. The nationalization of Hydro-Québec was seen as the important first step in attaining control of the economy because electricity was the basis for the entire industrial development of Québec.<sup>60</sup>

Hydro-Québec and the other newly created state corporations in the 1960s provided the francophone population with an invaluable opportunity for social mobility. Not only were managerial positions opened up, but technical and other professional jobs were made available through the development of resources and facilities surrounding the building of new dams and other projects.<sup>61</sup>

There is evidence to suggest that the expansion of the state in the areas of bureaucracy and state-owned corporations had a role in increasing the economic prosperity of the francophones in Québec. Renaud cites empirical data which suggest that francophones are over represented in state-run fields such as education and health. Renaud says that

if we break down the 1971 census category 'professional and technical' into occupational specialties, we notice that anglophones are over represented in the natural sciences, engineering, architecture, mathematics and related fields...; the francophones [here are] under represented. Health and education are, however, significantly over represented by

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<sup>60</sup> Herbert F. Quinn, The Union Nationale, 2nd ed., (Toronto, 1979), p.192.

<sup>61</sup> McRoberts, Social Change, p.133.

francophones...<sup>62</sup>

Renaud argues that until 1971, hard sciences jobs have remained inaccessible to francophones, job opportunities in the social services have increased with the expansion of the state. From the above evidence, Renaud concludes that most of the newly created public sector jobs were filled by francophones.

Further, Renaud cites evidence which suggests that more francophone than anglophone university graduates were employed by the state. Of those students graduating before 1960, 53.8% of the francophone graduates worked for the state in the 1960s, while only 25.6% of anglophone graduates worked for the province. Of those graduating in the 60s, 65.3% of francophone, and 33.8% of anglophone graduates worked for the province.<sup>63</sup>

The majority of the new wave of university students found employment within the civil service and public sector corporations. It is they who have come to form the backbone of what has been termed the 'new' or 'bureaucratic middle class.' For this group, the enhancement of the status of the Québec government is very much a matter of self interest.<sup>64</sup>

State expansion was one way the francophones found

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<sup>62</sup> Renaud, "New Middle Class," p.172.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p.174.

<sup>64</sup> Phillip Rawkins, "The Role of the State in Transformation of the Nationalist Movements of the 1960s: Comparing Wales and Québec." Ethnic and Racial Studies, v.7, no.1, (Jan., 1984), p.92.



prosperity. Not only were job opportunities increased for university educated francophones, but their incomes rose as well.<sup>65</sup> While throughout the 1960s the income status of private sector jobs remained stable, or even decreased, the income status of those in the public sector increased.

Renaud, writing of the 1960s, said:

[i]n short, all the evidence seems to point to the fact that state expansion has provided job outlets to the majority of educated francophones within Québec. It has created jobs that presumably were much more powerful, prestigious and well-paid than the jobs the same individuals could have found in the private sector of the economy.<sup>66</sup>

#### THE NEW NATIONALISM

Premier Lesage said "[t]he *Québécois* have only one powerful institution: their government. And now they want to use this institution to build a new era to which they could not formerly aspire."<sup>67</sup> Lesage's use of state intervention had established a new nationalism, based on the ability of *Québécois* to be *maîtres chez nous*. Thus, the French Québeckers, whose economic status was being turned around, came to associate economic prosperity with the powers and abilities of the provincial government. This fact, more than

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<sup>65</sup> Renaud, "New Middle Class," p.174.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p.174.

<sup>67</sup> Mary-Beth Montcalm, "Québec Nationalism in a Comparative Perspective," Québec, State and Society, Alain G. Gagnon, (Toronto, 1984), p.46.

any other, legitimated the demand for special status.

However, in the 1960s "[t]he new middle classes that emerged as a consequence of this institution building process [were] confined to the public sector, and, because of their language, [were] practically unrepresented in the ranks of large private enterprises."<sup>68</sup> In a study of the Canadian corporate elite in 1951, John Porter concluded that in the private sector corporate world, francophone Québeckers constituted only 6.7% of the corporate elite in Canada. This, Porter estimates, is equal to 51 persons.<sup>69</sup> By the end of the 1960s, the francophones were not doing much better. Milner and Milner estimated that by 1971, French corporate elites included only 8.4% of the elite, or 65 persons.<sup>70</sup> While the opportunities opened up for the French through the expansion of the state, the private sector remained closed to francophones before 1971.<sup>71</sup> Wallace Clement goes on to argue that this trend includes small and medium sized corporations as well as the larger ones.<sup>72</sup>

As a result, French-speaking Québeckers in the 1960s came to associate economic growth with the powers and expansion of the state. Québec had a double economy;

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<sup>68</sup> Guindon, "Modernization of Québec," p.244.

<sup>69</sup> Renaud, "New Middle Class," p.163.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p.163.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p.163.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p.164.

francophones were predominant in the public sector while anglophones dominated in top levels of the business sector.<sup>73</sup> In the 1960s, "... it was only by means of the expansion of provincial government powers that the new class could hope to advance their careers."<sup>74</sup>

However, the 1970s saw the *Québécois* expand into the upper levels of the business world at the expense of the English-Canadian business elite.<sup>75</sup> Yet McRoberts argues that these gains did not wholly fulfil the goal of becoming masters in their own house.<sup>76</sup> There is evidence to suggest that francophones came to run major enterprises in Québec and top management jobs began to be filled by francophones. However, an argument can be made that the close integration that exists between francophone and anglophone business elites in the rest of Canada compromises to some extent the ability of the francophones to truly control their enterprises.

Institutions set up in the 1960s designed to support francophone businesses had their effects in the 1970s. After the 1972 nationalization of the *Caisse de dépôt et de*

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<sup>73</sup> Guindon, "Modernization of Québec," p.217.

<sup>74</sup> Janet Ajzenstat, "Liberalism and Nationality," Canadian Journal of Political Science, v.14, no.3, (Sept. 1981), p.593.

<sup>75</sup> Pierre Fournier, "The New Parameters of the Québec Bourgeoisie," Québec, State and Society, Alain G. Gagnon, ed., (Toronto, 1984), p.220.

<sup>76</sup> McRoberts, Social Change, p.176.

*placement du Québec* and the creation of other such investment corporations there was a renaissance in French owned enterprise development.<sup>77</sup> Financing of industrial complexes such as the forestry complex at St. Filicien spurred job growth and the francophone economy in general. Francophone Québeckers found places on the boards of many new or expanded enterprises.<sup>78</sup>

Many of the new firms that took shape in the 70s were related to finance. In fact, Niosi suggests that more than half of the new enterprises were financial institutions.<sup>79</sup> This is significant in that prior to the 1960s and into 1970, much of the financial sector was dominated by anglophones. The new francophone institutions include the *Banque nationale*, which in 1982 was the sixth largest chartered bank in Canada, and which held almost 50% of the Canadian chartered bank branches in Québec. In addition, Great-West Life and the Laurentian Group which were the third and ninth largest insurers respectively were owned by Québeckers. Also, Montreal Trust, the sixth largest and Central Trust, the seventh largest trust company are both run by francophones. Fournier estimates that over 50% of

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<sup>77</sup> See Appendix A for a list of larger corporations in which the *Caisse* invested.

<sup>78</sup> McRoberts, *Social Change*, p.174.

<sup>79</sup> George Niosi, "The Rise of French-Canadian Capitalism," *Québec, State and Society*, Alain G. Gagnon, ed., (Toronto, 1984), p.189.

Québec banking assets are controlled by Québeckers.<sup>80</sup>

These financial institutions, as well as the other enterprises which arose in Québec through the 1970s gave many Québeckers the opportunity to rise to managerial and CEO positions. However, while there were many francophones entering the top levels of business in Québec, there is evidence to suggest that there was significant integration with other enterprises from the rest of Canada. Thus the new growth in the private sector may not have provided Québeckers with the opportunity to be fully masters in their own house.

Pierre Fournier points to the Power Corporation Group as an example of integration with Canadian business. Power Corporation is owned and operated by francophones in Québec. While Niosi argues that Power is part of the Québec bourgeoisie, Fournier disagrees, suggesting that Power is part of the Canadian bourgeoisie.<sup>81</sup> Fournier claims that Power is closely linked with the Canadian financial network, even to the extent that the Royal Bank has approved, "if not directed," a large proportion of Power's expansions and absorptions.<sup>82</sup> Thus Power and its affiliates (listed in Appendix A) are too closely linked with the Canadian

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<sup>80</sup> Fournier, "New Parameters," p.220.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., p.202.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., p.203.

business interests.<sup>83</sup> Thus these corporations exert a Canadian influence as opposed to a Québec influence on the prevailing business trends in Québec. Grant suggests

...when French nationalists derive satisfaction from [management] appointments, they would do well to remind themselves of the ancient adage: 'I fear the Greeks, especially when they come with gifts.' Corporations make concessions about management personnel for the sake of better relations with the alien community. These do not involve the basic control of the economy...

... it is to be expected that the new managerial élites (sic) will sustain their culture for very long? ...Even when much of the economy is socialized, the managers will gradually become indistinguishable from their international counterparts.<sup>84</sup>

What is important to draw from this discussion is that the *Québécois* moved into areas once dominated by the English-Canadian elite. Francophones' prestige and incomes grew through a private sector takeover. These advances indicated that Québeckers would be driven by the business trends of the progressive era, not of the traditional, organic culture described in the Tremblay Report.

The new nationalism professed a strong Québec, capable of being *maîtres chez nous*. This nationalism was dependant on the ability of the provincial government to intervene and legislate in areas of economic and social matters. Further,

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<sup>83</sup> See Appendix B for a breakdown of Power's holdings. Notice that there is overlap between the corporations listed in Appendices 'A' and 'B'.

<sup>84</sup> Grant, Lament, pp.78-79.

it was dependant on the province's ability to intervene in the private sector through such organizations as the *Caisse*. If the government could not legislate in a specific area, or if another government could, then the new nationalism was threatened.

The new nationalism seeks to employ all the powers of the modern state: In the economic realm as in others progress requires that this fundamental condition for an appropriate policy be first realized: ONE complete government, given the whole range of powers and machinery required for the development of a society at once modern and unique.<sup>85</sup>

Thus, protection of the new French society came to be associated with the powers of the state. If the Québec provincial government was weak, then the whole society was weak.

The *Québécois* came to identify the province as their 'nation.' Any outside influence over Québec was perceived as a threat. Francophone Québeckers began to feel that

...French-Canadians constitute a nation, but a nation which does not control all of the economic and political institutions operating in its own territory... the French-Canadian nation is threatened by 'outsiders' who control those institutions which, although they operate in French-Canadian territory, are not French-Canadian. And finally, the ideology of national survival prescribes specific goals: the protection of the French-Canadian population and territory and the gradual accession by French-Canadians to control over the economic and political institutions which

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<sup>85</sup> W. Christian and C. Campbell, Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada, 2nd ed., (Toronto, 1983), p.206.

remain outside their command.<sup>86</sup>

This new nationalism would require Québec to attain authority in almost every legislative area of the government. Thus, Québec would have to challenge the federal government's constitutional jurisdictions.

#### POLITICAL MANIFESTATIONS OF SPECIAL STATUS

Every single party that has held power in Québec since 1960 has made demands for devolution in the areas of economic and social affairs.<sup>87</sup> The theory of special status has become firmly rooted in the politics of post-Quiet Revolution Québec. Devolution of powers has taken on one of either two forms; 1) 'asymmetrical federalism,' meaning that Québec would have powers the other provinces would not enjoy, or; 2) decentralization, meaning that powers would be transferred from the federal jurisdiction to the jurisdictions of all the provinces. The particular format of devolution demanded often depended on the party in office or the mood of the times. What is important to realize is that, whatever the manifestation, the essence of special status is jurisdictional change that would give Québec an increased ability to influence its economic and social life.

The theory of special status draws substance from the

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<sup>86</sup> Bernard, What Does Québec Want?, p.43.

<sup>87</sup> See Appendix C for a list of demands made by governing parties since 1960.



demands made throughout and after the Quiet Revolution. Devolution of powers from the federal government to the Québec government began to be an issue with the release of the 1957 Tremblay Report. The Report's call for more provincial control over taxation<sup>88</sup> set the stage for more demands for increased provincial control over constitutional jurisdictions, specifically in areas related to economic and social controls.

The first Liberal government under Jean Lesage is credited with starting the Quiet Revolution. To the Lesage government, whose slogan *maîtres chez nous* was based primarily on economic concerns,

...the most important item on the agenda ... was the active intervention of the government in the economy with the goal of bringing about greater participation and control by the people of Québec over the economic development of their province...<sup>89</sup>

In 1966, the *Union nationale* surprised Québeckers by defeating the Liberals. However, Premier Daniel Johnson demonstrated that his strategy, captured in the slogan *égalité ou indépendance*, was not very different from the previous Liberal's *maîtres chez nous*. In a preliminary statement to the 1967 Confederation of Tomorrow Conference, Johnson said:

In sociological terms, Québeckers have witnessed the disintegration of the way of

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<sup>88</sup> McRoberts, Social Change, p.140.

<sup>89</sup> Quinn, Union Nationale, p.192.

life which traditionally protected them. They had survived in good part because they lived in isolation, locked in upon themselves, clinging to the past in a typically rural environment where the state's presence was marginal. Almost overnight, they found themselves in an industrial society requiring massive intervention by the state, open to the whole of North America and exposed to the influence of foreign, especially American culture...

... [Québeckers] have come to understand that the industrial society in which they were henceforth to live had not been created by them, but by others not sharing their cultural values. And also that, in a world where economic might confers enough *de facto* advantages to make *de jure* claims unnecessary, they were... seriously lacking in means for effective action.<sup>90</sup>

Here Johnson is arguing that the *Québécois* need more control over their economic affairs if they are to attain the ability to make *de facto* claims; Québec wanted 'in' on economic decisions because those decisions affect culture.

The 1970 Liberal government under Bourassa pursued a strategy similar to that of its predecessors. In 1970, Bourassa wrote:

our great priority, first and foremost, has to be economic development. We must, by all the means at the disposal of the state, get our economy moving again. Without economic prosperity, we will never be able to attain the cultural and social objectives that we are seeking.<sup>91</sup>

Even the *Parti québécois* (PQ), in power after 1976, was

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<sup>90</sup> Government of Québec, "Preliminary Statement," Confederation of Tomorrow Conference, Government of Ontario, (Nov. 27-30, 1967), pp.4,5.

<sup>91</sup> Bernard, What Does Québec Want?, p.131.

not much different. In a statement of its nationalist theory, the PQ said that a nationalist culture requires a strong interventionist state with full jurisdictional capacity, "for coherent and effective policy cannot be applied by a government if it has only partial powers and mere portions of the fiscal resources."<sup>92</sup> While the logical conclusion to this particular expression of the theory is separation, it rests on the underlying assumption that Québec needs more powers if it is to protect and promote its unique culture.

Finally , the Bourassa government after 1985 demonstrated that economic prosperity is part and parcel of cultural security. The Allaire Report reads:

The Québec Liberal Party has always promoted economic development. In this exercise of redefining the Canadian political framework, the economic interests of Québeckers must take precedence. Indeed, recent years have taught us that social and cultural development depend largely on economic development. The true autonomy of a society depends on the strength and vitality of its economy.<sup>93</sup>

Each government has demonstrated the same basic belief regarding special status. The various Québec governments were interested in having more influence over its citizenry than the federal government. Cairns explains this phenomenon

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<sup>92</sup> Alan C. Cairns, Charter Versus Federalism, (Montreal and Kingston, 1992), p.39.

<sup>93</sup> The Constitutional Committee of the Québec Liberal Party, A Québec Free To Choose, 28 Jan 1991, p.29.

in terms of federal-provincial relations. He says that

federalism involves the coexistence of two orders of government with separate jurisdictional responsibilities which govern a common citizenry. Both the federal and provincial governments are concerned that the policies of the 'other' will conflict with their own policies and/or will subject members of 'their' community to contradictory requirements.<sup>94</sup>

Control over the levers of economic growth would therefore be central if one wanted to influence the citizenry of a political community. The battles that have occurred over special status can be seen as fights for economic and social powers which necessarily influence culture.

The institutional and structural changes surrounding the Quiet Revolution and the expansion of the state are key to understanding the demands for special status. Québeckers had realized that the best protection for their culture lay in a strong government, and the ability to control their economy. Further, the new nationalism included that the francophones would control their economy themselves. They would not be dominated by an anglophone business class. Special status demanded that Québec would be run by *Québécois*.

Special status then can be seen as a concept which embodied the notion that the *Québécois* should live a life where they control the financial, economic and constitutional levers of the Québec state without

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<sup>94</sup> Cairns, Charter, p.56.

interference from anglophones of the English-Canadian dominated federal government. A mind-set was developing; being masters in their own house entailed that economic growth, prosperity and progress be part of the Québec society and nationalism.

Québec nationalism in the 1960s came to be identified with the ability of the state to legislate for the good of the *Québécois*. Any assertion or intervention made by the Canadian federal government came to be regarded as a threat. Thus special status was a legitimate option in the eyes of the *Québécois*.

However the economic changes which occurred after the Second World War came to be seen as a threat to the *Québécois*. After the war the federal government moved to centralize powers in Ottawa in order to maintain and expand the national wealth generated during the war. These post-war changes were perceived as a threat to provincial dominance in the economic and social fields. Thus, the battle lines were drawn; both federal and provincial orders of government were interested in controlling the levers of economic stimulation.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### INTO THE HEART OF MODERNITY

In no society is it possible for many men to live outside the dominant assumptions of their world for very long.

George Grant, Lament for a Nation

Internal provincial socio-economic changes did not act alone in lending credibility to the pursuit of special status. Federal economic changes in the post-war era played a key role in the acceptance of special status in Québec. However, the political elites in Québec misunderstood the role of the federal centralization. They believed that centralization was the chief threat to Québec, and adopted special status partially as a reaction to that centralization. Québec in the 1960s assumed the functions of a modern, progressive state.

This chapter will first examine Canadian post-war economic changes which will include a brief exploration of Keynesianism. The Canadian government tried after the war to centralize the major economic powers to itself for the purpose of increasing the wealth and prosperity of all Canadians. Important in this discussion is the reaction of the Québec government to that centralization.

The Québec government felt that the primary threat to the French-Canadian culture was English-Canadian centralization, and not the adoption of an economic system which, as part of its theory, demanded centralization. It will be demonstrated that the Québec government misunderstood the relationship between, on the one hand, centralization and assimilation, and on the other hand, progressive economic theory and assimilation. In the conclusion, it will be advanced that the new nationalist movement in the 1960s helped, and not hindered Québec's assimilation into North American mainstream culture.

#### ECONOMIC CHANGE AND CENTRALIZATION

The impact of Keynesian economics during the Second World War on post-war Canadian economic strategy was profound. Keynes' ideas were adopted by the central government as a way of assuring the maintenance of the economic growth which began during the war.

Keynes' theories challenged the classical economists who believed that an economy has the ability to correct itself, and that a government's attempts to intervene in that economic downturn are essentially ineffective.<sup>95</sup> Instead, Keynes believed that government action could

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<sup>95</sup> W. Carl Biven, Who Killed John Maynard Keynes?, (Homewood, Illinois, 1989), p.189.

stimulate a weak economy; he supported intervention.<sup>96</sup>

Government intervention in the economy had as one of its requirements the central control of the economy. In The General Theory, Keynes said that

[t]he State will have to exercise a guiding influence... through its scheme of taxation, partly by fixing the rate of interest, and partly, perhaps, in other ways. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the influence of the banking policy on the rate of interest will be sufficient by itself to determine an optimum rate of investment. I conceive, therefore, that a somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment will prove the only means of securing an approximation to full employment; though this need not exclude all manner of compromises and of devices by which public authority will co-operate with private initiative. But beyond this no obvious case can be made out for a system of State Socialism which would embrace most of the economic life of the community. It is not the ownership of the instruments of production of which it is important for the State to assume.<sup>97</sup>

Thus the role of the state in Keynes' eyes was to have control over fiscal and monetary tools so as to influence the economy. In this way the government could regulate such things as economic growth and employment.

As discussed in Chapter One, the age of progress has as an underlying theme the expansion of the economy. If economic growth is the object of Keynesian theories also, then Keynes' principles can be equated to the age of

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid., p.189.

<sup>97</sup> John M. Keynes, The General Theory, (Cambridge, 1973), p.378.



progress. In addition, as Grant believes, science and technology are the important first steps toward economic growth. Thus, a government which controls the economic levers of society, but not necessarily the 'ownership of the instruments of production' would want to work closely with private enterprise so that private enterprise technological growth and governmental fiscal and monetary controls could collude to create economic growth.

The significance of these new economic considerations did not escape the Liberal government of Mackenzie King. The federal Liberals were interested in insuring that there would be growth in the national economy and that the pre-war Depression would not return. To the Liberals,

[t]he war bonanza seemed conclusive evidence that a modern government could orchestrate the peaks and troughs out of the business cycle... the important point was the apparent efficiency with which the government took control of the collective resources and seemed to manage them competently for the goal of victory. Naturally, many people came to the conclusion that if a country could spend billions fighting wars and plan the economy for the good of that cause, the same bureaucracy might also control production to ensure peacetime prosperity and promote the general welfare by adding other social security programs to unemployment insurance.<sup>98</sup>

This realization was to ensure that Keynesianism would be adopted in Canada.

Prime Minister MacKenzie King saw nothing the matter

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<sup>98</sup> Robert Chodos, et al., The Unmaking of Canada, (Toronto, 1991), p.11.

with a close relationship between business and government. In fact, King believed that their union would be inevitable. In Industry and Humanity, he said:

[w]hether political and industrial government will merge into one, or tend to remain separate and distinct, the one being supplementary to the other, is a moot question. The probabilities are that for years to come they will exist side by side mostly distinguishable, but, in much, so merged that separateness will be possible in theory only.<sup>99</sup>

Such was the mind set of the King administration. The federal government was willing to centralize in accordance with Keynes' theories because that was believed to create the greatest harmony in society between industry and government. Finance Minister Walter Gordon believed that Keynesian economics would lead to a strong, centralized, interventionist government guaranteeing high social standards.<sup>100</sup> The Reconstruction Conferences after the Second World War emphasized the need to ensure that national wealth continues to grow.<sup>101</sup> This would come through greater centralization.

This new view of the economic role of the government was to require that "the federal government... retain the new powers it had gained during the Depression and

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<sup>99</sup> Reginald Whitaker, A Sovereign Idea, (Montreal and Kingston, 1992), p.73.

<sup>100</sup> Chodos, Unmaking, p.27.

<sup>101</sup> Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction, Proposals of the Government of Canada, (August, 1945), p.27.

especially the war."<sup>102</sup> The Rowell-Sirois report recommended centralization in four areas:

1. The federal government solely administer unemployment benefits.
2. The federal government assume all provincial debts.
3. Provinces renounce some tax powers such as personal and corporate income taxes and succession duties.
4. The federal government provide grants to the provinces for the provision of national social services.<sup>103</sup>

Further, the Commission argued that if the federal government was to be responsible for the maintenance of the unemployed, it should then be able to act to prevent unemployment. This would mean the federal government would have to have control over things such as monetary, credit and trade policies.<sup>104</sup> This in essence represented the government's acceptance of Keynesian economics.

The conclusions of the government's proposals at the 1945 Reconstruction Conferences demonstrate that the Dominion was accepting modernity:

Broadly what is proposed is that the Dominion Government should take the initiative in the maintenance of employment and income, (1) by achieving the best possible agreements with other United Nations in the field of economic relations, agreements which would encourage and permit the expansion of world trade and full use of our resources; (2) by pursuing fiscal and other policies which will create "favourable conditions within which the initiative, experience and resourcefulness of

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<sup>102</sup> Chodos, Unmaking, p.18.

<sup>103</sup> Government of Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book 2, 1940, pp.270-272.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., Book 2, p.27.

private business can contribute to the expansion of business and employment"; (3) by so managing its public investment expenditures and making it financially advantageous to provincial and municipal governments so to manage theirs, that they will contribute to the stability and not to the instability of employment; further to direct those expenditures particularly to the development and conservation of our natural resources, improving thereby the opportunities of the Canadian people and the financial position of the provincial governments who administer them; (4) by maintaining and stabilizing by a comprehensive system of social security, incomes which are largely spent on consumption and by contributing thereby to the health, welfare and productive capacity of the Canadian people and to their employment.<sup>105</sup>

The government concluded that "it is the responsibility of government to pursue policies that create conditions in which the initiative, energy and resourcefulness of individual citizens can achieve rising standards of life."<sup>106</sup> The best method to achieve this was seen as centralization. The centralization of economic powers was seen as important by the Rowell-Sirois Commission members because "of the need for uniformity throughout Canada..."<sup>107</sup> Herein lies the sense of threat posed by centralization perceived by Québec.

#### QUÉBEC'S REACTION

The Québec government proceeded on the assumption that

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<sup>105</sup> Reconstruction, Proposals, p.52.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., Book 2, p.5.

<sup>107</sup> Canada, Dominion-Provincial Relations, p.13.

there was to be a high degree of centralization in the post-war era. This assumption was justified by the 1968 White Paper Federalism for the Future. In that document, the Pearson government declared that the federal government is responsible for economic stimulation and redressing regional disparity. The federal government would administer social programs such as OAC, UIC, family allowances and medicare.<sup>108</sup> Further, the White Paper recognized the need for the federal government to extend its jurisdiction to fulfil these roles.<sup>109</sup> Centralization was to continue, according to the Québec perspective, and the province had to deal with that.

The federal attempt at economic centralization reconfirmed the basic premise of the traditional intellectual view of Québec nationalism; the central threat to Québec was and is the English-Canadian culture and its ability to promote that culture through its economic and jurisdictional means.<sup>110</sup> Thus, Keynesian economics, adopted at the federal level, was seen as a significant threat by the Québec government.

Through the Tremblay Report, the Québec government

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<sup>108</sup> Edmond Orban, "Québec Alienation and the Trend Toward Centralization," Québec: State and Society, Alain G. Gagnon, ed., (Toronto, 1984), p.41.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., p.41.

<sup>110</sup> William Johnson, "Separatism and the Québec Intellectual Tradition," Federalism in Peril, A.R. Riggs and Tom Velly, eds., (Vancouver, 1992), p.142.

admitted that Keynesianism was worthy of trial. Yet the Report revealed that the Québec government was insecure about Keynesianism:

...we are not opposed to a Canadian trial of Keynesian theories, but it seems to us that the latter should adopt themselves to our political structures and not vice versa, while, in any case, it would be an imprudence as well as a defection to think that there is nothing to be done except to submit to the centralizing requirements of the 'new economy.'<sup>111</sup>

The Québec government was worried that, should the system of controlling the economic activity of the nation change, there would be a corresponding change in the culture.

Regarding the adoption of Keynesian principles, the Report asks:

[are the] Canadian Keynesians... fully taking into account the importance of the political, national, and even the straight human values with which they gamble so light-heartedly in this adventure[?] Do they believe themselves able to control the forces which, if they did not unchain, they at least sought to concentrate, in such effective manner as to prevent them from destroying these values? For, it should be clearly noted, once it is brought about, the centralization they preach for a country as dependent as Canada has, from the economic and financial viewpoint, no reason to stop at Ottawa, but has very strong reasons for extending itself over the entire North American continent. Thus, if one follows their reasoning, a truly effective policy of economic stability would, in the end, no longer have to be worked out by Ottawa, but by Washington.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Québec, Report, 1956, vol. 2, p.299.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., vol.2, p.299.

The Report here suggests that federal centralization was the primary threat to the French Canadian culture. The fear expressed was that centralization would lead to Americanization of Canada and the ultimate extinction of the French-Canadian culture.

This set the stage for the changes that occurred in the 1960s. The Quiet Revolution saw Québec increase state control over social services, and the increase in demands for greater controls in these and other areas. In short, Québec began to demand the same powers which the federal government adopted as a result of the Reconstruction Conferences. However, Québeckers came to believe that "only within secure government boundaries could they embark on modernization without endangering national identity."<sup>113</sup> The province did not oppose Keynesianism *per se*, but it did oppose the adoption at the federal level of Keynes' theories. The changes in the 1960s in effect signalled the adoption of the functions of a Keynesian state by Québec.<sup>114</sup>

Yet, supporters of this strategy of increased social and economic controls believed that "if control of economic activity by the francophone community could be expanded significantly, the new capitalist order could be directed so as to be compatible with the established culture of the

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<sup>113</sup> Ajzenstat, "Liberalism", p.606.

<sup>114</sup> Reginald Whitaker, "The Québec Cauldron: A Recent Account," Quebec: State and Society, Alain G. Gagnon, ed., (Toronto, 1984), p.76.

French Canadian community."<sup>115</sup> While Chapter Four will discuss the possibility of the francophone community controlling the 'new economic order', the remainder of this chapter will focus on the possibility of directing modernity (i.e. the new order) to the ends of the Québec culture.

#### THE MISUNDERSTANDING

Increased political intervention and control through special status may not be a panacea. The Quiet Revolution and the shift from a traditional culture to a technocratic state emphasizing economic progress signalled the encroachment of modernity. George Grant does not believe that modernity can be directed to some end, rather, modernity is a directing force on its own. As such, George Grant's words may come back to haunt the *Québécois* today and make the "new nationalism... a victim of its own success."<sup>116</sup>

Québec saw centralization as the primary threat. However, Grant argues that centralization plays a very limited role in the promotion of the universal and homogenous state. Grant says

it is often maintained that, because of the increasing role of the government... our society is not dominated by a capitalist elite. This is, however, a misrepresentation of the facts... Canadian governments...have in their major decisions identified their interests and the interests of Canada with

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<sup>115</sup> Coleman, Independence Movement, p.93.

<sup>116</sup> Grant, "Minds of Men," p.285.



those of the business élite (sic).<sup>117</sup>

As with King, Grant here argues that government simply aligns itself with business. Centralization plays a role in homogenization insofar as the government identifies with, and implements the precepts of the economic culture into the lives of their citizens. Centralization is the efficient agent of homogenization, yet it is not the necessary agent. The main thrust of homogenization rests with the economic philosophy of the Western world.

The distinction between the role of central control and the economic system itself is key to understanding the Québec-Canada debate. The Tremblay Report demonstrates Grant's insight into the nature of the new economic system, but fails to emphasize implications of that system separately from centralization. Grant's central assumption is that "the threat [of cultural assimilation] stems from the very character of the modern era."<sup>118</sup>

While centralization is the method of implementation of Keynes' ideas, it can be separated from the progressive mind-set. The Québec government realized through the Tremblay Report that the economic philosophy arose not from government policy, but from a belief held and lived by people in general. The Tremblay Report says:

[the liberal] economy itself arises from a

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<sup>117</sup> Grant, "Ethic," p.5.

<sup>118</sup> Grant, Lament, p.53.

certain concept of economic and human relations, from a general philosophy of life which is seldom formulated but which is spontaneously and generally lived. Now, if we look at it more closely, we observe that this philosophy is in complete discord with the Catholic French-Canadian culture... <sup>119</sup>

Here one is reminded of Grant's words quoted earlier in this paper: "philosophy must arise from the most immediate and concrete experience of our lives, both public and private..."<sup>120</sup> French Canada has adopted the lifestyle of the modern state and, therefore, its homogenizing philosophy.

There is evidence, provided by the Tremblay Report itself, that suggests that the government understood that the economic philosophy itself had homogenizing tendencies:

under pressure from the materialistic, technical, quantitative and collectivist economy, social institutions born of a spiritual, personalist and qualitative concept have been shaken and overturned. Now, in [society's] line of development, and as one of its natural requirements, there is what is called "mass" civilization, which, insofar as it can be judged up to now, is the very antithesis of civilization because that latter, by definition, is the fruit of liberty and of the development of the individual.<sup>121</sup>

The significant part of this quote bears repeating: "in [society's] line of development, *and as one of its natural requirements*, there is what is called "mass civilization..."

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<sup>119</sup> Québec, Report, 1956, vol.2, p.84.

<sup>120</sup> Supra., note 36.

<sup>121</sup> Québec, Report, 1956, vol.2, p.86.

The Tremblay Report was saying that the eventual outcome of the new economic order is mass civilization. This mass civilization equates to Grant's 'universal and homogenous state.' These passages from the Report would suggest that the Québec culture is threatened by the economic philosophy. Québec emphasized the threat from centralization in its struggle to remain a unique society, however, it did not emphasize the economic system which the Tremblay Report demonstrated to be a threat.

The extent to which the modern philosophy of liberalism invaded Québec can be seen through a brief examination of Québec's language laws. In 1967, René Lévesque said

[b]eing ourselves is essentially a matter of keeping and developing a personality that has survived for three and a half centuries... At the core of this personality is the fact that we speak French. Everything else depends on this one essential element and follows from it or leads us infallibly back to it.<sup>122</sup>

Thus, Lévesque would agree that language is the chief expression of the French Culture. However, this is not to say that language itself is culture. The distinction is important. George Grant argues that "culture will become the empire's to which it belongs."<sup>123</sup>

In the 1970s, Québec governments took steps to preserve their language; if the central argument of this paper is

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<sup>122</sup> René Lévesque, An Option for a New Canada, (Toronto, 1968), p.14.

<sup>123</sup> Grant, Lament, p.41.

Firms']. The *Office*, by regulation, shall define 'head office' and recognize such head offices as may avail themselves of this section.

Thus "Bill 101 stopped short of tampering with the operations of the power centres of the Québec economy."<sup>126</sup>

The 1972 Gendron Commission provides clues for understanding the hesitance of the 'head office clause' of Bill 101. The Commission displayed hesitation when it discussed the presence of North American companies in Québec. The Commission reported that

[t]he... result of... economic integration is the administrative integration of the decision centres which, very often, are situated outside Québec. The language implications of this are difficult to estimate. Certainly a parent company, especially when it is American, will tend to use English, which is its language of use; this also applies to other parent companies, however, since English has become the *lingua franca* of business throughout the world. Though there is an understandable need for coordination and efficiency, this nevertheless imposes a certain limit on the diffusion of French. The difficulty lies in determining the exact point at which this limit is reached, and the Commission lacks the means to do this.<sup>127</sup>

The Commission did not take any strong position on the use of French in the upper strata of the business world. This in itself, however, would indicate that the Commission is reluctant to make any recommendations that might offend

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<sup>126</sup> Ibid., p.144.

<sup>127</sup> Government of Québec, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Position of the French Language and on Language Rights in Québec, Book 1, December 1972, p.126.

the 'decision making centres' of businesses. It would seem through the inclusion of section 144 of Bill 101, the PQ shared this reluctance. The 1970 PQ economic manifesto demonstrated the same commitment to economic progress as the Gendron Commission when it said "[t]here can be no healthy capitalism in a sick economy... [our] objective is to fully understand the evolution of contemporary capitalism, so as to insure the prosperity of a majority of *Québécois*."<sup>128</sup> Thus one can see that the PQ, like the Gendron Commission after it, emphasized economic prosperity.

The development of Bill 101 showed that the PQ would bow to economic pressures. The PQ had created with Bill 1, the first incarnation of Bill 101, a coercive law that would penalize businesses which would not comply with the various provisions of the law. One such measure was found in Article 106, which would not allow firms without a certificate the right to receive government subsidies, premiums or permits. These permits might include a license to operate a business or access to facilities such as Hydro-Québec.<sup>129</sup>

Businesses, both anglophone and francophone, protested Article 106. The Canadian Manufacturers' Association said

l'implantation d'une politique linguistique ne

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<sup>128</sup> Daniel Latouche, "Québec," The Provincial Political Systems, David J. Bellamy et al, eds., (Toronto, 1976), p.24.

<sup>129</sup> William D. Coleman, "A Comparative Study of Language Policy in Québec: A Political Economy Approach," The Politics of Canadian Public Policy, M.M. Atkinson and M.A. Chandler, eds., (Toronto, 1983), p.28.

devrait pas se réaliser au sacrifice d'une liberté aussi fondamentale que celle de pouvoir exploiter une entreprise. Il ne s'agit pas ici de sémantique, mais bien d'une liberté essentielle sous un régime de libre entreprise.<sup>130</sup>

When Bill 1 was presented a month later as Bill 101, Article 106 had disappeared.<sup>131</sup> The PQ, the party of separatists, had held business interests above language protection in order to minimize economic hardship during implementation of the language laws. Ironically, this action was taken in the interests of the 'new nationalism' in Québec; protection of economic growth and the *Québécois* right to be *maîtres chez nous*.

Bill 101 was also intended to bring francophones to middle management and therefore put a French face on the businesses in Québec. However, the law did not necessarily give control of business to the French community. Coleman argues that Bill 101 fit in nicely with the policies associated with *rattrapage* (catching up).<sup>132</sup> As more francophones entered management positions, North American economic institutions came to be seen as part of Québec society; the industrial centres of the age of progress "were made to appear more a part of Québec's francophone

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<sup>130</sup> Ibid., p.29.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., p.29.

<sup>132</sup> Coleman, "Social Class," p.145.

community."<sup>133</sup> Here one is reminded of the English-Canadian and francophone integration in the Power Corporation discussed in Chapter Two.

There is also evidence that suggests that important aspects of industry, such as research and development, were untouched by Bill 101. Coleman compares Bill 101 with the Liberals' Bill 22. He notes that, under pressure from business interests, the PQ included a section that was also in Bill 22. Article 23 of Bill 22 exempted professionals who worked for one employer, and were not in contact with the public. This was significant in that it allowed large national and multinational corporations to bring in outside people to work in research and development or other non-public fields without necessarily knowing French.<sup>134</sup> Thus the 'francization' of large companies in Québec tended to exclude head offices and R and D facilities, an area where research has shown there to be a significant over representation of anglophones.

Through looking at the above mentioned aspects of Bill 101, it can be determined that, as the *Québécois* attempted to garner more control over the economic sphere, they allowed the French society and North American business interests to become more closely integrated. While the PQ government wanted to protect the French language, they did

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid., p.145.

<sup>134</sup> Coleman, "Comparative Study," p.31.

not want to upset the economic growth of the province. The economic system effected the *péquistes* to such a degree that they would not enact a law that would challenge the centres of economic power.

Québec is dominated by a culture that emphasises the liberal and progressive ideals of the English-North American culture. The new nationalism brought with it a new philosophy of life which arose out of the every day public and private lives of the Québeckers. The imperatives of the new nationalism, economic prosperity and progress, subordinated language laws to economic growth and stability. The new nationalism was a victim of its own success.

Professor Charles Taylor argues that there has been a steady disappearance of the French Canadian culture since the 1950s. In the '50s, the values were organized around a traditional, ultramontane and Catholic view of the world. However, today the differences between the English and French Canadians are minimal.<sup>135</sup> Today the post-Quiet Revolution French culture and the English culture agree on aspects of society such as non-discrimination, rule of law, representative democracy, violence and gun control, etc. Professor Taylor argues that the reason for the shared values is

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<sup>135</sup> Charles Taylor, "Shared and Divergent Values," Options for a New Canada, Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown, eds., (Toronto, 1991), p.53.



that French Canada has rejoined 'English Canada'; more accurately one might say that forces within Québec that were always striving for a liberal society have won out. Perhaps it would be more insightful to say that both parts of Canada have been swept up into the liberal consensus that has become established in the whole western world in the wake of World War II.<sup>136</sup>

Québec and the rest of Canada, indeed the rest of North America, have come to share the same values in terms of economic and business interests.

In order to complete the Quiet Revolution, Québec leaders have called for a transfer of powers from the federal level to Québec. They want to control the fiscal, economic and social powers so as to preserve and promote the economic gains made during the Quiet Revolution.

However, by identifying centralization as the chief threat, not the economic system, and adopting special status as a way of protecting and nurturing the 'imagined community,' the province set out on the path to the universal and homogenous state. As Québec entered the mainstream economy, it surrendered control of economic decisions to the forces of progress. The devolution of powers to Québec will not give the province the economic and cultural influence it seeks. That influence rests with the United States, the heart of modernity.

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<sup>136</sup> Ibid., pp.53-54.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### QUÉBEC AND MANIFEST DESTINY

Québec society is an integral part of the major commercial and financial trends prevailing in North America and the world.

Bélanger-Campeau Report

Québec has pursued special status in an attempt to give it the economic, fiscal and social powers it needs to protect its unique culture in North America. However, despite whatever powers special status would confer on Québec, the province will still be beholden to economic decisions which are made outside of Québec. Continental integration weakens the ability of Canada to control its own economy and culture. Thus jurisdictional transfers of economic and social powers from Ottawa to Québec are ineffective. Increased integration with the rest of North America blunts the effectiveness of increased provincial powers and limits the ability of Québec to protect its culture.

Chapter Three discussed the possibility of directing the modern era to the ends of the French-Canadian culture. This would require that the francophones control the

province's economic activity.<sup>137</sup> However, Coleman argues that

[t]he degree of economic control desired by the traditional middle class was not achieved, and it continued to experience the breakdown of traditional French-Canadian culture. In the early 1970s, the nature of economic policy was changed in order to de-emphasize competition between a nascent francophone capitalist class and other factions of the capitalist class in North America.<sup>138</sup>

This increased integration has its effects on the Québec culture. Coleman goes on to say that "...the more the francophone community becomes integrated into the North American economy... the more difficulty it will experience in defining for itself and maintaining a distinctive culture."<sup>139</sup>

The chapter is divided into two sections: first, there will be a general discussion of continental integration. The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA) will be presented as an example of ongoing continentalization. Second, the paper will look at the reactions and attitudes of Québec towards that integration.

#### CANADA AND CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION

The Canadian economy can be understood only as a

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<sup>137</sup> Coleman, Independence Movement, p.93.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., p.93.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., p.132.

"regional sector... of the North American economy."<sup>140</sup>

Increased continental integration has led Canada to lose control of its economy by threatening the policy tools of the government. Continental integration can be demonstrated through examining the influence of the presence of US capital in Canada.

American capital and investment do two things: first, it increases the wealth of Canadians; second, there is a decrease in the control that governments in Canada have over the economy. These two aspects of US investment provide a source of conflict among Canadians. As Grant said, the problem with US integration is that Canadians "...want to preserve their culture, [and] also want the benefits of progress."<sup>141</sup>

It is clear that US investment has provided a source of increased prosperity and economic growth for Canadians. In 1957, the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects (the Gordon Commission) reported that

[t]he increase in United States investment in Canada accompanied as it has been by new technology and managerial skills, has clearly resulted in a faster rate of economic growth than would otherwise have been possible. At the same time, since it has chiefly taken the form of direct investment, it has led to United States residents acquiring a

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<sup>140</sup> Paul Phillips, "National Policy, Continental Integration, and National Disintegration," Canada and the Burden of Unity, David J. Bercuson, ed., (Toronto, 1986), pp.19-20.

<sup>141</sup> Taylor, Radical, p.147.

controlling interest in many of our largest and fastest growing industries.<sup>142</sup>

The Report goes on to say that "[a]ll our periods of great economic activity and expansion in peacetime have been characterized by heavy inflows of capital from abroad..."<sup>143</sup> Thus, according to the Gordon Commission, US investment has been a key factor in the economic growth of Canada.

However, increased wealth has not led to universal approval of US investment in Canada. The post-war era saw an increased concern on the part of Canadians regarding the effect of these multinational subsidiaries in Canada. Speaking to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defense, US Undersecretary of State George Ball said that the logical and inevitable conclusion of this process was economic union between Canada and the United States.<sup>144</sup> This represents the essential concern of Canadians who think that the US is too heavily involved in the Canadian economy.

Christian and Campbell's words give substance to the fear of losing economic control in Canada:

[f]oreign ownership and control drain profits out of the country and make it possible to alter the terms of trade between foreign

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<sup>142</sup> Government of Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, 1957, p.41.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., p.380.

<sup>144</sup> Robert Gilpin, "Integration and Disintegration on the North American Continent," International Organization, v.28, no.4, (Autumn, 1974), p.861.

parent and Canadian subsidiary, so as artificially to lower the price of Canadian exports or raise the price of imported goods, technology or services. Foreign ownership may result in a reliance upon imported technology and neglect of Canadian research and development. In an age where technology is more and more the key to economic prosperity, such reliance may mean effective economic serfdom. In addition, it may restrict the career prospects for Canadians in many fields or force them to emigrate. Indeed, when foreign controls result in integration of industry on a continental basis, many high level jobs are closed to those Canadians who are unwilling to spend much of their lives outside Canada. The continental integration of economic elites which often follows on foreign control threatens large scale assimilation or the breaking-down of Canadian values and attitudes in an important segment of the population.<sup>145</sup>

The Americans need not maliciously set out to effect the Canadian economy, they may simply overlook or disregard legitimate Canadian concerns.<sup>146</sup> Paul Phillips provides an example of this dilemma:

assume that the Canadian government would wish to dampen inflation by increasing corporate income taxes. Integrated multinational companies can, in the absence of direct controls, by international bookkeeping shift their profits to other countries... The purpose is to make the profits appear in the country with the lowest corporate tax. This means that the firms which suffer most from increased taxes of a tight fiscal policy are the wholly owned Canadian companies who are in competition with the multinationals.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> Christian and Campbell, Political Parties, pp.212-213.

<sup>146</sup> Canada, Economic Prospects, p.392.

<sup>147</sup> Phillips, "National Policy," p.23.

Such limits are the result of the size of the US economy and the level of integration.<sup>148</sup>

While the large amount of American investment threatens the ability of Canadians to control their economy, federal government initiatives, such as the Canada- US Free Trade Agreement further lead to increased continental integration, and therefore a decreased ability for domestic control of economic matters. This paper will go on to examine how the FTA has effected Canada, in terms of continental integration, and particularly, how that agreement affects Québec in Canada.

#### THE CANADA- US FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

The federal government announced in late 1986 that it would pursue a policy of increased free trade with the United States. This was met with both criticism and praise. The FTA was passed in November of 1988, and became law the following year. The passage of the FTA ensures that the process of integration will go on. This in turn means that Canadians will continue to lose economic control.

The importance of the FTA on the Canadian economy is noted by Daniel Drache,

[w]hen implemented, the Free Trade Agreement becomes, by virtue of its scope and regulatory importance, the new national policy for Canada. All other federal and provincial policies will have to conform to its

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<sup>148</sup> Ibid., p.24.

framework and goals.<sup>149</sup>

Much criticism of the FTA was focused on its assimilating and integrating function. The 1988 election television ad depicting a person erasing the Canada-US border was a dramatic example of this criticism. Yet, this is not the reality. The FTA did not initiate continental integration, it is simply a continuation of integration that has been going on for years.<sup>150</sup>

The trade deal reduces more than just tariff barriers, it also reduces the restrictions on investment in the two nations.<sup>151</sup> This has graver implications for Canada than it does for the United States. The argument has been made that Canada would suffer culturally with the Free Trade Agreement. This argument can be explained in terms of economic levers that could be threatened by the trade deal.

Herschel Hardin argues that public enterprises have been an important aspect of Canadian culture and identity.<sup>152</sup> He says that

...[public]... enterprises are not simply

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<sup>149</sup> Daniel Drache, "North American Integration," The Free Trade Deal, Duncan Cameron, ed., (Toronto, 1988), p.73.

<sup>150</sup> Mary-Beth Montcalm, "Free Trade and Continental Integration," The Free Trade Deal, Duncan Cameron, ed., (Toronto, 1988), p.176.

<sup>151</sup> William Diebold, "Change and Continuity in Canada-U.S. Economic Relations," Canadian-American Public Policy, no.5, (March, 1991), p.4.

<sup>152</sup> Herschel Hardin, A Nation Unaware, (Vancouver, 1974), p.136.



separate economic devices financed with public money. They are part of a dense, continuous economic culture, full of precedents and political history, and of accumulated knowledge about the proper relationship of economic organizations to the community.<sup>153</sup>

This aspect of Canadian culture is threatened by the Free Trade Agreement. Canadian governments, both federal and provincial are limited in their ability to use crown corporations as executors of public policy.

Deborah Coyne argues that schemes administered through crown corporations are called into question by the deal.<sup>154</sup>

She says

the investment provisions of the agreement, specifically Article 1605, make the creation of any such public scheme subject to the requirement to provide 'prompt, adequate and effective compensation' to the privately-owned companies which might be affected. This will be determined ultimately by a binational tribunal where the provinces that would be responsible for initiating the public action will not have the right to participate in the process. In addition, affected American firms can protest that such public schemes contravene the two key principles in the services section of the agreement: the right of establishment and the right of commercial presence.<sup>155</sup>

George Grant has said that

any hope for a Canadian nation... could only be achieved through concentrated use of...

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid., p.136.

<sup>154</sup> Deborah Coyne, "Undermining Canada's Constitution," The Free Trade Deal, Duncan Cameron, ed., (Toronto, 1988), p.243.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., p.243.

planning and control... Only nationalism could provide the political incentive for planning; only planning could restrain the victory of continentalism.<sup>156</sup>

The use of public enterprises, one tool for planning, is threatened by the FTA. Thus, a valuable way of controlling aspects of the economy and culture is threatened. Such is the effect of continental integration.

The effect of increased continental integration on Québec is significant. Mary-Beth Montcalm has argued that Québec's economy is peripheralized by the shift of economic activity from east to west (Britain-Canada) to north-south (Canada-USA).<sup>157</sup> As Gilpin notes

what Canada is to the United States both economically and politically, French Québec is to English Canada. Just as the emergence of English-Canadian nationalism is one response to the economic and political forces integrating the periphery with the American core, so French-Canadian nationalism in Québec is one response to similar forces within Canada itself which are believed to threaten the French-Canadian culture and increasingly have made Québec part of a Canadian periphery centred upon Toronto, the industrial and financial core of contemporary Canada.<sup>158</sup>

One analysis of the 'double peripheralization' of Québec suggests that the unrest in the province has fuelled the movement of capital from Québec, particularly Montreal,

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<sup>156</sup> Grant, Lament, p.15.

<sup>157</sup> Alain G. Gagnon and Mary-Beth Montcalm, "Economic Peripheralization and Québec Unrest," Québec: State and Society, Alain G. Gagnon, ed., (Toronto, 1984), p.15.

<sup>158</sup> Gilpin, "Integration," p.867.

to Toronto. Further, Gagnon and Montcalm suggest that this movement has had the effect of contributing to economic stagnation in Québec and has fostered new economic activity in Toronto and other western centres.<sup>159</sup> The two authors cite a study that reveals that in 1952, Montreal had 124 company headquarters for every 100 in Toronto, whereas in 1972, Montreal had only 62 to every 100 in Toronto.<sup>160</sup> They go on to state:

additionally, the 'relative dependency' of the Canadian economy on that of the United States and the hold of capitalism leave Ottawa nearly powerless to alter this peripheralizing process. Canadian attempts at countering this trend by fiscal and monetary regulation have proved feeble. The Canadian economy is simply too minor within the continental economy and too subject to external decision making for the federal government to effectively control fiscal and economic policy.<sup>161</sup>

Montcalm argues that multinational consolidation in Southern Ontario has lead to the Québec government pursuing policies that would see the provinces economic clout strengthened.<sup>162</sup> However, the FTA continues the process of continental integration, which in turn continues the process of Québec's peripheralization in the North American economy. This weakens the ability of the provincial government to

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<sup>159</sup> Gagnon and Montcalm, "Peripheralization," p.18.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., p.18.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., p.18.

<sup>162</sup> Montcalm, "Free Trade and Continental Integration," p.179.

control economic, fiscal and social aspects of the province.

As the process of integration continues, Canada loses the ability to control its own economy. Therefore, it is also losing the ability to control its culture. The question then arises of how Québec could get the effective ability to protect its culture through controlling its economy. If the central government, peripheral in the continental economy, has ineffective powers over the economy, then transferring those powers to Québec, peripheral in the Canadian economy, will not enable Québec to meet its needs.

Political scientist and Québec separatist Pierre Fournier writes that

[as a result of FTA]... the Canadian tax system must to a large degree adapt to the American system, otherwise, companies located in Canada would be tempted to set up in the United States. Finally, there is a risk that government programs which create imbalances in the free circulation of goods and capital, including purchasing policies, support for regional development, financing for innovation and research and development, marketing bonds, and initiatives by state-run industries will be called into question. Generally speaking, it is easy to predict that the states room to manoeuvre, which to a large degree defines both Canadian and *Québécois* distinctness, will eventually be narrower and more reduced than it is now.<sup>163</sup>

By Fournier's own analysis, increased integration with the USA through FTA would put at risk ventures such as the *Caisse*, Hydro-Québec; in short, the major symbols of

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<sup>163</sup> Pierre Fournier, A Meech Lake Post-Mortem, (Montreal and Kingston, 1991), p.76.

Québec's ability to be *maîtres chez nous* are threatened by closer integration with the United States. Nevertheless, Québec, a strong supporter of Free Trade in the 1988 election, has historically supported increased economic ties with the United States.

#### QUÉBEC AND THE UNITED STATES

Daniel Latouche argued in 1974 that

[t]he PQ leadership shares with most Québec elites a deep admiration for the only North American society that is said to have succeeded in providing itself with an autonomous model of development... The socio-economic model for the *Québécois* is not Canada, for it exists only as an act of will, but the United States, which has succeeded in giving form to the North American myth.<sup>164</sup>

The *péquistes* wanted to distance the Québec economy from the rest of Canada. "... The PQ sees little danger in liberating Québec from the domination of the English-Canadian financial elite with the help of more powerful American capital.<sup>165</sup>

The *Québécois* have historically admired the Americans. René Lévesque himself once said: "I've never had any feeling of being Canadian, but I've always had an incredibly strong sense of being North American. The place where I'm most at

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<sup>164</sup> Robert Chodos and Eric Hamovitch, Québec and the American Dream, (Toronto, 1991), p.13.

<sup>165</sup> Daniel Latouche, "Québec and the North American Subsystem: One Possible Scenario," International Organization, v.28, no.4, (Autumn 1974), p.948.

home outside Québec is the United States."<sup>166</sup> *Québécois* nationalists saw in the USA a society which had developed according to their own imperatives to establish a dominant society, culturally secure. The nationalists sought to emulate this society.

It is the importance of American investment that the nationalists in Québec emphasize. The pursuit of special status, and the reliance on American investment both have come to mean increased economic growth for Québec; economic growth, argue the nationalists "is the only means to preserve French culture and gain control of the Québec economy."<sup>167</sup>

However, as the rejection of *la survivance* represented,

[t]he attempt by Québec to close itself off from its different and more diverse partner in British North America was never successful to the same degree as it was in the United States, for Québec did not possess the political and economic power necessary to enforce its wishes.<sup>168</sup>

As the *Québécois* turn more and more to US investment as a means of escaping domination by English-Canadians, they turn towards the forces of homogenization in the United States. Through rejecting English-Canadian influences, the *Québécois* accept American influences.

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<sup>166</sup> Chodos and Hamovitch, American Dream, p.225.

<sup>167</sup> Gilpin, "Integration," p.870.

<sup>168</sup> Christian and Campbell, Political Parties, p.33.

Grant argues that the only way that a nation could resist the universal and homogenous state is to develop a strong economic nationalism. He says that "... some form of planned economy [is] the only conceivable alternative to Americanization."<sup>169</sup> However, what Québec has developed is an economic nationalism that emphasises the opposite of the English-Canadian economic nationalism; pro-American investment- the very thing Grant was lamenting.

If economic and fiscal powers are central to culture as the Tremblay Report suggested, then by virtue of its economic control, the USA has a great deal of control over the culture both in Québec and the Rest of Canada. In this regard, Grant said that

[b]ranch-plant economies have branch-plant cultures... The power of the American government to control Canada does not lie in its ability to exert direct pressure; the power lies in the fact that dominant classes in Canada see themselves at one with the continent on all essential matters...<sup>170</sup>

Grant's words apply well to Québec. With more integration, Québec becomes more limited in its ability to control the economy. To gain wealth, Québec must accept more US investment, however, this means giving up economic and therefore cultural controls. To get one, Québec must give up the other. George Grant says

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<sup>169</sup> Grant, Lament, p.75.

<sup>170</sup> Forbes, "Political Thought," p.57.

French-Canadian nationalism is a last-ditch stand... Solutions vary to the problem of how an autonomous culture can be maintained in Québec. But all the answers face the same dilemma: Those who want to maintain separateness also want the advantages of the age of progress. These two ends are not compatible, for the pursuit of one negates the pursuit of the other. Nationalism can only be asserted successfully by an identification with technological advance; but technological advance entails the disappearance of those indigenous differences that give substance to nationalism.<sup>171</sup>

This paper has to now argued that the 1960s and the Quiet Revolution represented Québec's acceptance of technological advance and modernity. Now Québec pursues economic growth; it has not been able to sustain its unique culture in the face of the universal and homogenous state. To quote Robert Bourassa, "Québec's economic needs and Québec's cultural problems are pulling in opposite directions."<sup>172</sup>

The final chapter looks at methods whereby the Québec government could by-pass the debate over the effectiveness of special status. Specifically, the final chapter will examine Sovereignty-Association and separation as possible ways for Québec to provide cultural security to its population.

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<sup>171</sup> Grant, Lament, p.76.

<sup>172</sup> Robert Bourassa, "Québec's Economic Future in Confederation," The Future of North America, Canada, the United States and Québec Nationalism, Elliot J. Feldman and Neil Nevitte, eds., (Montreal, 1979), p.299.



## CHAPTER FIVE

### SOVEREIGNTY ASSOCIATION: SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE

A house divided cannot stand.

Abraham Lincon

...two nations warring in the bosom of a  
single state.

Lord Durham

The preceding pages have argued that special status for Québec would not grant that province the cultural protection that it seeks. Many Québeckers have made the case that only an independent Québec can ensure the survival of the French culture in North America. As Claud Morin cogently sums up:

*the Québécois have dealt with Canadian federalism for more than a century. This long experience permits the following fundamental proposition to be drawn: to the extent that the Québécois want to control their own affairs, the Canadian federal system not only represents an obstacle to the fulfilment of this objective, it also inevitably increases Québécois dependence upon outside political, economic and cultural powers over which they could only, in the best of circumstances, exert a fortuitous and short lived influence.* (Morin's emphasis)<sup>173</sup>

Ingrained in this thought is the belief that English Canada,

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<sup>173</sup> Claud Morin, "Québec and Canadian Federalism," Québec Since 1945, Michael D. Behiels, ed., (Toronto, 1987), p.196.

not the economic system, is the chief threat. This misunderstanding was examined in detail in Chapter Three.

This chapter will argue that secession from Canada, even with association, would not protect Québec from the forces of assimilation. The political independence of Québec would separate the powers of government from the central Canadian government and give them to Québec, but the principles of modernity would still exist in the 'nation of Québec.' Québec would be 'independent' on a continent whose culture is dependent on modernity. An independent Québec would still share the values of modernity.

The chapter will first look at Sovereignty-Association. This proposed framework is the most widely known independence proposal, and has been around since the mid 1960s when René Lévesque created his *Mouvement Souveraineté-association*. While the 1980 Referendum is long past, Sovereignty-Association is still the most widely accepted and touted framework for an independent Québec. Thus the chapter's analysis of this framework will focus mainly around Sovereignty-Association as presented by the PQ in the late 1970s and into 1980. Special emphasis will be placed on the 'association' aspect of Sovereignty-Association as a method which attempts to preserve the economic stability of Québec. The chapter will then briefly look at full separation and how that relates to the general thesis of the paper. The conclusion will examine the above mentioned

concepts in light of Grant's thoughts.

#### SOVEREIGNTY-ASSOCIATION

While there have been many separatist proposals put forward, from a slow approach to a unilateral declaration of independence, the most detailed theory set forward is Sovereignty- Association. In 1979, the government of René Lévesque presented its White Paper of its proposal for an independent Québec. The White Paper, entitled Canada-Québec, A New Deal, closely defined the PQ position. While a detailed analysis of the White Paper is beyond the scope of this paper, the following pages will discuss generally the outline of the proposal and analyze it in terms of the general themes of the paper so far.

Sovereignty-Association is essentially a method whereby the province

would acquire in addition to the political powers it already has, those now exercised by Ottawa, whether they were assigned to the federal government under the British North America Act of 1867 or whether it assumed them since that time, directly or indirectly.<sup>174</sup>

Further, the province would remain associated economically with the rest of Canada through a customs, and monetary union administered by special institutions set up by the two nations.

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<sup>174</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "White Paper on Québec's Referendum," The Globe and Mail, 2 Nov. 1979, p.11.

Some have seen the association aspect of the PQ plan as its greatest weakness. Coleman has argued

[t]he leading proponent of independence, the *Parti québécois*, has increasingly weakened its demands for political independence without economic independence. It assumes that common economic institutions now in place in Canada must be retained in the new nation-state and that a common economic culture with North America will be a foundation of that state. Jane Jacobs has asked whether such a policy is wise. She suggests that the future of the francophone nation in Québec will depend upon its capacity to erect its own economic institutions on its own terms. Her advice today was long ago the advice of the Tremblay Commission... An independent Québec and a distinctive culture must rest upon an independent economy.<sup>175</sup>

Réné Lévesque's words give substance to Jacobs' thoughts.

Lévesque has said

[i]t is of course extremely important to keep in your hands all controls and to create or recover all the essential powers that affect international development and allow a national society to ensure that it is being served by the economy which must maintain it and in large measure, shape its life.<sup>176</sup>

In this light, the White Paper calls into question the ability of Québec to ensure that the economy is serving the society that it shapes. The White Paper proposes

...a new system, [that], while freeing Québec from Ottawa's domination, would not break up an economic community that extends from the Atlantic to the Pacific; it would ensure for Québec a maximum of autonomy while maintaining

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<sup>175</sup> Coleman, Independence Movement, pp.227-228.

<sup>176</sup> René Lévesque, Option, p.40.

the natural interdependence and the historical and human links that exist between Québec and the rest of Canada.<sup>177</sup>

Given what has been said in Chapter Four regarding the ability of Québec to control its economy on the continent, it is doubtful that Sovereignty-Association could give to Québec the powers and abilities of which Lévesque spoke.

However, the PQ government proceeded in the late 1970s to define Québec's sovereignty as including association. Coleman suggests that this move was a realistic recognition on the part of the PQ government that the economic culture of Québec is the same as that of the rest of Canada.<sup>178</sup> The White Paper supports this analysis:

Interdependence, considering the economic advantages that it brings, far from being as constraining as some seem to think, can on the contrary result in enriching forms of cooperation and interaction, and thus improve the present and future lot of the societies taking part... Québec has never wanted to live in isolation; from the start it has accepted interdependence.<sup>179</sup>

Yet there was more to the association dimension than simply economics. There was a realization by the PQ that full separation was untenable in Québec society. Premier Lévesque said to the National Assembly in 1978

we have no intention of obtaining sovereignty

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<sup>177</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "White Paper," p.11.

<sup>178</sup> Coleman, Independence Movement, p.221.

<sup>179</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "White Paper," p.12.

and then negotiating an association. We do not want to end, but radically transform, our union with the rest of Canada, so that in the future our relations will be based on full and complete equality. Sovereignty and association should therefore be attained concurrently without any rupture, once the people of Québec have given us our mandate in the referendum.<sup>180</sup>

The Québec government was anxious to avoid creating insecurity among the citizens. They did not want to portray a rupture; rather the PQ wanted to portray a progression. In his analysis of the White Paper, Donald Smiley said

[t]he White Paper is preeminently a political document... The elements of reassurance have no doubt been deemed to be politically necessary because of the polling of public opinion in Québec over a relatively long period of time indicates that no more than a small proportion of the electorate has ever supported independence in any unconditional sense while support for sovereignty increases dramatically when 'softer' attitudes are presented...<sup>181</sup>

Further, Smiley suggests that the PQ sought to lead the *Québécois* to the conclusion that separation with economic association would be a risk free process with no material disadvantages or dislocations.<sup>182</sup>

These factors can be analysed in relation to what has gone above. Essentially, the association aspect of

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<sup>180</sup> Smiley, Federal Condition, p.148.

<sup>181</sup> D.V. Smiley, The Association Dimension of Sovereignty-Association: A Response to the Québec White Paper, (Kingston, 1980), p.15.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., p.16.

Sovereignty-Association indicates that the PQ government felt the need to ensure Québeckers that there would be no financial loss; often the argument was made that Québec could fair better economically in a loosely associated relationship with the rest of Canada. The Québec population wanted to keep the benefits of progress above all else- even above the ultimate method of cultural survival- full independence.

Sovereignty-Association went counter to what the Tremblay Commission had recommended thirty years earlier:

...to preserve its culture... a national community must have the faculty of freely expressing itself and, therefore, in the very first place, of creating its own institutions and of organizing its economic and social life by itself and according to its own spirit. If it lacks that, then whatever may be the constitutional guarantees, it is stricken in its everyday life, fettered in its material expansion and cultural progress and reduced to the alternative of either allowing its culture to perish, or of accepting, in its own country, the inferior status of a stranger.<sup>183</sup>

However, in the 1960s the *Québécois* ignored this advice and adopted a philosophy of progress and material expansion. Pierre Trudeau critiques the underlying philosophy of the independentists who claim that "independence equals progress. Independence... is good in itself."<sup>184</sup> In Québec,

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<sup>183</sup> Québec, Report, 1957, vol. 2, p.63.

<sup>184</sup> Pierre Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians, (Toronto, 1968), p.151.

as demonstrated by the discussion of the Quiet Revolution in Chapters Two and Three, progress in Québec equals economic growth; progress equals the universal and homogenous state.

The 1979 White Paper itself is fraught with references to progress; the sixth chapter of the document entitled 'Québec, Land of the Future' suggests a movement ahead, a natural progression. The White Paper uses the language of homogenization: "the assumption is that in any society that wants to progress..."<sup>185</sup> Further, the White Paper cites other success stories: "...it is... noteworthy that five of the six richest countries in the world... have a population less than 10 million, as does Québec."<sup>186</sup> George Grant's words parallel the reasoning of the White Paper: "men everywhere move ineluctably toward membership in the universal and homogenous state."<sup>187</sup> Québeckers resist any move that would threaten the progress of the Québec nation, with progress defined in terms of economic viability.

While the above analysis of Sovereignty-Association has leaned heavily on the events surrounding the 1980 Referendum, there is evidence that suggests that the analysis is still relevant today. For instance, there is still a belief that an independent Québec should still be associated economically with the rest of Canada. The

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<sup>185</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "White Paper," p.14.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., p.13.

<sup>187</sup> Forbes, "Political Thought," p.47.



Belanger-Campeau Commission Report states:

[t]he common market undoubtedly contributes to the economic well-being of all Canadians and Québeckers, who thus have a mutual interest in preserving the market's basic components, regardless of their political and constitutional status.<sup>188</sup>

Further, Jacques Parizeau stated that "nobody sees merit in disrupting the Canadian economic space."<sup>189</sup> Thus it would seem that, while the particularities of a 1990s version of Sovereignty-Association may be undefined, the general concept remains intact.

However, recent changes in external economic relationships have added to the debate over Sovereignty-Association. Specifically, pundits wonder whether the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement would apply to an independent Québec with economic association to the rest of Canada. The PQ in 1990 published La Souveraineté, Pourquoi? Comment? where it suggested that Québec would participate in international accords such as the FTA.<sup>190</sup> In its presentation to the Belanger-Campeau Commission, the PQ said that "Québec is already a part of the North American free

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<sup>188</sup> Government of Québec, "Report of the Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Québec," Canada, Adieu?, Richard Fidler, ed., (Halifax and Lantzvill, B.C., 1991), p.304.

<sup>189</sup> Jacques Parizeau, "Who's Afraid of Sovereignty-Association," Canadian Speeches, v.4, no.9, (Jan, 1991), p.26.

<sup>190</sup> Economic Council of Canada, A Joint Venture, 28th Annual Report, (Ottawa, 1991), p.84.

trade area established by treaty and it will remain a member after its accession to sovereignty.<sup>191</sup>

As discussed in Chapter Four, Québec has always favoured increased economic relations with the United States. After the 1980 Referendum defeat, the Lévesque government moved to bring Québec and US economic relations closer together.<sup>192</sup> This in part was an attempt to distance Québec from the Canadian economy as some nationalists felt that the close integration between Canada and Québec was a factor in the Referendum's defeat.<sup>193</sup> Distancing Québec's economy from that of Canada is still a factor in the support for free trade and increased economic ties with the United States. Pierre Fournier believes that "the free trade deal will undoubtedly speed Québec's economic 'de-Canadianization'...thereby making the sovereignty of Québec much more plausible."<sup>194</sup> This is in keeping with Parizeau's belief that free trade will make separation more likely.<sup>195</sup>

Trudeau said in 1962 that "self-government does not mean self-determination."<sup>196</sup> With the PQ proposal Québec

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<sup>191</sup> Fidler, Adieu, p.40.

<sup>192</sup> Fournier, Post-Mortem, p.111.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid., pp.111, 112.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., p.112.

<sup>195</sup> David J. Baugh, "Affirmative Action and the Law," Policy Options, v.13, no.4, (May, 1992), p.17.

<sup>196</sup> Trudeau, French Canadians, p.151.

would become a secondary part of a peripheral economy on a North American Continent. It would be further beholden to the principle of liberalism. The White Paper itself suggests that Canada and Québec negotiate free trade between the new nation and the rest of Canada. Were this to happen, As Kenneth McRoberts says, "the Québec-Canada economic association would in fact be closer to a 'complete' customs union than is the present Canadian system."<sup>197</sup> From what has gone above, one can conclude that the PQ emphasized economic association because the party felt that most *Québécois* were interested in not giving up economic progress.

There is a contradiction in the reasoning regarding association and the distancing from the Canadian economy through Free Trade or some other method. Why would a Sovereignty-Associationalist, wanting to further distance Québec from the Canadian economy then want economic association which would , at least in the 1980 model, bring Canada and Québec closer together in some aspects? This is a valid question and it presents a dilemma for the nationalist who supports this particular framework of independence. While there is not sufficient space in the paper to further explore this idea, it does seem to suggests that Sovereignty-Associationalists want 'to have their cake and eat it too.'

Economic association with the rest of Canada, and the

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<sup>197</sup> McRoberts, Social Change, p.301.

desire on the part of the secessionists to maintain the Free Trade Agreement both combine to create a powerful threat to the culture of Québec. Lévesque believed that the drive towards liberalism

...is the only danger that really can have a fatal effect upon us, because it exists within ourselves... The only way to overcome the danger is to face up to this trying and thoughtless age and make it accept us as we are, succeeding somehow in making a proper and appropriate place in it for ourselves, in our own language, so that we can feel we are equals and not inferiors... It... means that we must build a society which, while it preserves an image that is our own, will be as progressive, as efficient, and as 'civilized' as any in the world.<sup>198</sup>

However, association would only maintain economic integration with the rest of Canada, and adherence to the FTA, assuming all parties agree, would maintain continuing integration with the United States.

The downfall of the Sovereignty-Associationists is the fact that while they want Québec to become independent, they cannot pass up the allure of the continental economy. George Grant says "[c]apitalism is... a way of life based on the principle that the most important activity is profit-making. That activity led the wealthy in the direction of continentalism."<sup>199</sup> Thus Sovereignty-Association would not be a solution for Québec because it tends towards

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<sup>198</sup> Lévesque, Option, p.17.

<sup>199</sup> Grant, Lament., p.47.

institutional ties with the rest of Canada, and, through the FTA, institutional ties with the United States. While these ties have the potential to give Québec controls over the extent of economic integration, it is unlikely, should these institutions ever be created (which is doubtful), that the *Québécois* would act in a way that would threaten economic growth and sever the economic interdependence of the North American community.

#### FULL SEPARATION

Another option for Québec is full separation from Canada without any kind of association as outlined in the Sovereignty-Association framework. While this option has never received much sustained support from the *Québécois* before 1990, it is worthy of mention. It is important to note, however, that support for an independence option has steadily been on the increase in Québec in recent years.<sup>200</sup>

The attention given to Sovereignty-Association by the PQ in the past has weakened the credibility of full separation. "In seeking to minimize the prospect of change, the [PQ] seemed to acknowledge that true independence would have catastrophic effects."<sup>201</sup> Further, the belief in the

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<sup>200</sup> Daniel Drache, "Negotiating with Québec: A New Division of Powers or Secession?", Negotiating with a Sovereign Québec, (Toronto, 1992), p.13.

<sup>201</sup> Kenneth McRoberts, "Québec: Province, Nation or 'Distinct Society'?", Canadian Politics in the 1990s, Michael Whittington and Glen Williams, eds., (Scarborough, 1991),

importance of association continues today. In 1991 Jacques Parizeau stated that "...economic association, indeed with Canada, but also beyond Canada, is a logical outcome of where Québec wants to go."<sup>202</sup> One political party, the *Bloc québécois*, has declared that "... Québec must proclaim its full sovereignty before negotiating any new agreement with English Canada."<sup>203</sup> However, this party maintains that economic association with the rest of Canada is necessary.

At this point, one may wonder why full separation has been unpopular in Québec. Given the grievances of the *Québécois*, alluded to throughout the paper, one would expect a sense that it is time to 'cut the losses and run.' This is not the case.

Opinion polls conducted shortly after the October 26, 1992 Referendum are revealing. An Angus Reid-Southam News poll found that after the Referendum, "53% [of Québeckers] disagreed with the proposition that it would be better in the long run if Québec were simply to separate, while 38% agreed."<sup>204</sup> The poll is contrasted with another taken in May of 1990, at the height of the Meech Lake controversy. In that poll, 53% of Québeckers said that independence was the

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p.112.

<sup>202</sup> Parizeau, "Who's Afraid," p.28.


<sup>203</sup> Fidler, Adieu, p.47.

<sup>204</sup> Juliano Beltrame, "Majority Want Canada to Stay United," The Montreal Gazette, 7 Nov. 1992, p.A1.

best long run solution.<sup>205</sup> The up and down of support suggests that preference for full separation is soft.

In opinion polls on the subject, support for secession fluctuates with the particular term used to indicate the option. Drache shows this in graphical form, and compares it to support for Sovereignty-Association as well as a mandate to negotiate Sovereignty-Association. The graph is "based on the results derived from 153 public opinion polls. The figures are the average by period and by option."<sup>206</sup> The fluctuation with the terms 'sovereignty,'

Public Opinion Support for the Sovereignty Option 1960-1991



'independence,' and 'separatism' can be seen to indicate a softness for the secession-without-association option.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid., p.A1.

<sup>206</sup> Drache, "Negotiating," p.13.

Despite the reluctance of Québeckers to accept full sovereignty, the province might ultimately be presented with just that should the province hold and win a referendum on Sovereignty-Association. While the above discussion primarily focuses on selling Sovereignty-Association to francophone Québeckers, the real difficulty would lie in getting the rest of Canada to agree to the proposal. The fact is it would not be reasonable to assume that the rest of Canada would accept economic association with a separate Québec. Québec political scientist Léon Dion stated that "English-Canada won't give in until it has a knife at its throat."<sup>207</sup> Dion's 'knife' is full separation in the face of Canada-outside-Québec not giving in to the province's demands.

However, evidence suggests that this tactic may not work on the rest of Canada. Canadians outside Québec will not accept substantial change to their country easily. A *Québécois* appearing before the Spicer Commission said "...if English-Canadians couldn't accept the miniscule and defensive provisions of Meech, how will they accept a substantial change in the current Constitution?"<sup>208</sup>

This was born out by later submissions. The range of emotion varied, but the message was the same:

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<sup>207</sup> Philip Authier, " Give Canada One Last Chance, Expert Urges," The Montreal Gazette, 13 December 1990, p.A4.

<sup>208</sup> Citizen's Forum on Canada's Future, Report to the People and Government of Canada, June, 1991, p.52.



I believe that if Québec separates it should separate with good will but with no ties. (PEI)

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If Québec goes, then the rest of Canada must draw a line in the sand: no common currency, do not share defence, share federal debt, stop transfer of \$\$ (sic) and projects in Québec. The rest of Canada must not be held under the gun. (Ontario)<sup>209</sup>

The Commission concluded that "participants outside Québec, by a substantial margin, see Sovereignty-Association as the worst of all worlds. Their message to Québec is stay of leave, but if you leave, it must be a complete departure."<sup>210</sup> Thus Québeckers may prefer Sovereignty-Association, and may even overwhelmingly approve it in a referendum, yet may nevertheless be forced to choose between full separation or continued participation in the Canadian federation. Dion's knife may end up not at the throat of the rest of Canada, but at the throat of Québec.

Trudeau, writing in 1962, suggests that the separatists' arguments are based in emotion.<sup>211</sup> Trudeau does not deny the power of emotion in this case:

"[n]ationalism, as an emotional stimulus directed at an entire community, can indeed let loose unforeseen powers."<sup>212</sup>

Yet the rise and fall of support for separation during the

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<sup>209</sup> Ibid., p.61.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid., pp.56-60.

<sup>211</sup> Trudeau, French Canadians, p.175, *passim*.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid., p.175.

many constitutional crises of Canada is indicative of those emotions. In his unrelenting attack against the separatists, Trudeau writes:

[i]t is predicted that the realization of [Québec's] nation-state will release a thousand unsuspected energies... This is the faith that takes the place of reason for those who are unable to find a basis for their convictions in history, or economics, or the constitution, or sociology...<sup>213</sup>

Trudeau mocks those separatists who argue that

"[i]ndependence is a matter of dignity. You don't argue about it; you feel it."<sup>214</sup>

A weakness with emotional appeals is that, given time, emotion fades away. Strong emotions such as anger do not last; reason takes over. Robert Bourassa has said that

[t]here is a 'reflex of prudence' in Québec regarding the prospect of breaking up one of the most blessed countries in the world... We can't conclude that this majority support for sovereignty is based on a willingness to dismantle Canada as a country... of course they are not satisfied with the present constitutional situation... but they realize also the high degree of tolerance, freedom, prosperity, and social tolerance that we have in this country.<sup>215</sup>

Premier Bourassa here suggests that the liberal elements of Québec, and the prosperity of Québec in Canada will temper the emotions of the *Québécois*.

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<sup>213</sup> Ibid., p.173.

<sup>214</sup> Ibid., p.173.

<sup>215</sup> Don MacDonald, "Bourassa Sees Willingness to Resolve Unity Impasse," The Winnipeg Free Press, 19 Dec. 1991, p.A11.

And thus the native hue of resolution  
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,  
And enterprises of great pitch and moment  
With this regard their currents turn awry  
And lose the name of action.<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>216</sup> Hamlet, Act III, Scene i, lines 84-88.

## CONCLUSION

Québec's unique culture and philosophy, eloquently expressed in the Tremblay Report, has been replaced with the culture of the universal and homogenous state. The 1960s were a watershed for the province; the political leaders decided to actively pursue French-Canadian self-determination and cultural security. Yet the strategy of special status was flawed: it demanded that Québec adopt the Keynesian principles the Tremblay Report warned of as threatening the province's culture. To become 'masters in their own house' Québeckers would have to surrender their unique culture.

Special status represented a movement towards increased provincial control over aspects of the Québeckers' lives. It included the notion that an economically secure Québec would provide a secure culture. While special status began as a series of constitutional demands in the 1960s, it became a broad concept which today manifests itself as a belief that Québec is a 'distinct society' deserving recognition as a province unlike the others, with powers to make this manifest. The people behind the movement toward special status used the argument that

...if control of economic activity by the francophone community could be expanded significantly, the new capitalist order could be directed so as to be compatible with the established culture of the French-Canadian community.<sup>217</sup>

Coleman summarizes the belief by some Québeckers that modernity itself is a force that can be moulded to fit the French-Canadian culture. This belief justified the events of the Quiet Revolution and the demands that have been made by successive Québec governments: a culturally secure Québec is a Québec with jurisdiction over political and economic governmental powers. Here we are reminded of Grants' words: "[w]hile [Québeckers] want to preserve their culture, they also want the benefits of progress."<sup>218</sup> This is their undoing. The would-be Gaullists in Québec could not "control the economy so as to stop the tendency of capital to become international."<sup>219</sup>

Both George Grant and the Tremblay Commission suggested that modernity in and of itself has an assimilating force; it leads to mass civilization, or, in Grant's terms, the universal and homogenous state. In the 1960s, the Québec government proceeded with a modernization program that brought the province in line with the typical North American state; interventionist, concerned with full employment and

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<sup>217</sup> Coleman, Independence Movement, p.93.

<sup>218</sup> Taylor, Radical, p.147.

<sup>219</sup> Grant, Lament, p.46.

economic growth. This is the crux: because Québec began to equate economic growth with cultural security it thereby doomed its unique culture to assimilation into the progressive mainstream culture of North America. One look at Québec society today would show a reflection of the culture of the rest of the continent. Mirium Smith has argued that both the Québec nationalists and the English-Canadians share similar agendas; preserving the economic benefits that both now enjoy.<sup>220</sup>

Québec had adopted modernity during the Quiet Revolution. So much was this the case that the province could identify with the centre of dynamic progress, the United States. The first separatist premier of the province even went so far as saying that he felt more at home in the USA than in Canada-outside-Québec.

The province was brought into line with the principles of modernity. The progressive, modern mind-set had a homogenizing effect on Québec; the traditional culture, in the face of a progressive culture, could not help but be washed away. Fernand Dumont said

[t]he really decisive factors in the 'Quiet Revolution' were of a cultural nature. There was the educational reform certainly; but there were also vague aspirations, the desire to adopt new attitudes which contributed to it. All the formal ideologies which had given

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<sup>220</sup> Mirium Smith, "Québec-Canada Association: Divergent Paths to a Common Economic Agenda," Negotiating with a Sovereign Québec, Daniel Drache and Roberto Perin, eds., (Toronto, 1992), pp.66,67 *passim*.

us our identity vanished rapidly. For example, within a relatively short period of time, Catholicism ceased to be the backbone of our nationality. Moreover, many believers, of which I am one, are delighted. We all welcome the arrival of pluralism.<sup>221</sup>

It is telling that Québec, the 'Catholic province', is now considering rescinding its laws restricting Sunday shopping.

What, then, has been the effect of the 'new nationalism'? In 1964, Trudeau wrote

[in the Duplessis era]... the French-Canadian nationalism was setting up defense mechanisms the effect of which was to turn Québec resolutely inward and backwards. It befell the generation of French-Canadians who came of age during the Second World War to break out of the dilemma; instead of bucking the rising tides of industrialization and modernization in a vain effort to preserve traditional cultures, they threw the flood-gates open to forces of change. And if ever proof be required that nationalism is a sterile force, let it be considered that fifteen years of systemic non-nationalism and sometimes ruthless anti-nationalism at a few key points of the society were enough to help Québec to pass from a feudal to a modern era.<sup>222</sup>

The French-Canadians have changed a great deal since 'opening the flood gates' to modernity. Reg Whitaker has written that "the dominant discourse of the new Québec nationalism in the 1960s and into the 70s was *statist*..."<sup>223</sup> Latouche has argued that Québeckers are now defining

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<sup>221</sup> Dumont, "French-Canadian Man," p.J5-J6.

<sup>222</sup> Trudeau, French Canadians, p.201.

<sup>223</sup> Whitaker, "Canadian Question," p.289.

themselves as *Québécois*, and not French-Canadians.<sup>224</sup> This suggests that today Québec nationalism is not culturally oriented; rather it is geographically oriented.

Territoriality is a natural result of the changes Québec underwent in the 1960s. The citizens began to associate their government with economic progress, which was equated to cultural survival. The notion of Québec as a 'nation within a nation' was reinforced through the provincial initiatives in social, cultural and economic areas.<sup>225</sup>

Québec came to see itself as at once being part of the North American commercial empire and as being unique within that empire. However, as former Québec NDP leader Robert Cliché has said: "French Canada is ceasing to be a separate society, living according to its own rhythm outside the mainstream of world history. This development is desired by our own people."<sup>226</sup>

The pursuit of special status has not protected the culture of Québec, the major concern of the Tremblay Commission. Rather, special status and the changes surrounding it have changed Québec's culture. No longer is

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<sup>224</sup> Latouche, "North American Subsystem," p.931, note.

<sup>225</sup> Roberto Perin, "Answering the Québec Question: Two Centuries of Equivocation," Negotiating with a Sovereign Québec, Daniel Drache and Roberto Perin, eds., (Toronto, 1992), pp.42,43.

<sup>226</sup> Cliché, "Québec Since Duplessis," p.22.



the province an ultramontane, rural and traditional society. Today, Québec is a modern, commercialized society like the rest of the larger community of North America. Bernard writes that the objective of French-Canadians has become "...the survival of the French language and of a French-speaking Québec society... guaranteed by economic prosperity..."<sup>227</sup>

In this light then, special status can be seen as not so much protecting a distinct culture as solidifying a new one. Demands for special status were initially considered as a method for protecting Québec from the dominant English-Canadian federal government and business elites. However, the 1960s saw the adoption of Keynesianism in Québec, and the 1970s saw the *Québécois* move in to replace the anglophone elites in the private sector of Québec. The pursuit of special status, therefore, established the culture of the universal and homogenous state within Québec. Quite often the necessity for special status is presented as the necessity to preserve and enhance the economy. To justify this, the nationalists refer to the need for action regarding the economic crisis in Canada. The Allaire Report states that

the Canadian state is too cumbersome, too centralized. It suffers from the problems that afflict large organizations: plodding decision making process, poor interpretation of the needs of users, not to mention the waste

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<sup>227</sup> Bernard, What Does Québec Want?, p.127.

arising from overlapping jurisdiction, or the system's vulnerability to special interests... the urgent need to change is just as valid for Québec as for the other provinces.<sup>228</sup>

The Allaire Report goes on to suggest a radical decentralization of powers, giving some twenty-two powers to Québec.

Québec culture is now primarily defined in terms of language. Today, nationalists and separatists present the threat to Québec in terms of the threat of the French language.<sup>229</sup> In fact, the separatists "...do not desire an independent French state in an older sense of political sovereignty, but rather to live more naturally in their own language in the technological empire."<sup>230</sup>

In this light, Québec is distinct; it is the only geographical region in the North American community where the majority language is not English. Further, it has taken legal steps to protect that language. Evidence suggests that the French language is not headed for extinction.

A Statistics Canada report suggested that there is no threat to the French language. In 1900, some 83% of the Québec population spoke French as their first language. In 1986, that number was at 83.1%, while in 1991, the reported

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<sup>228</sup> Québec Liberal Party, Free to Choose, pp.17,18.

<sup>229</sup> Julius Grey, "French is in No Danger in Québec," Policy Options, v.12, no.7, (Sept., 1991), p.17.

<sup>230</sup> James Doull, "Naturalistic Individualism: Québec Independence and an Independent Canada," Modernity and Responsibility, Eugene Combs, ed., (Toronto, 1983), p.29.

number was again 83%.<sup>231</sup> Further, in 1991 38% of immigrants learn French as the first of their official language, up from 27% ten years earlier. Simpson states that by the year 2000, the number will be approximately 50%.<sup>232</sup> Simpson suggests that the cause of this increase is the education provisions of Québec's language laws.<sup>233</sup>

Ironically, Québec does not need any special status provisions in order to protect the French language. Their main cultural attribute is safe without special status. In all fairness, however, it is possible that the debates and acrimony that have surrounded special status throughout the years may have had an motivating impact on the desire to create the laws, and pride in the use of the language. Regardless, what the apparent safety of French suggests is that the language of expression of the traditional culture has become the language of the culture of modernity.

However, Québec is not culturally distinct in terms of the prevailing attitudes towards the role of the state in social areas and in business interests. Further, it is not distinct in terms of the desire to progress economically. Québeckers are presented with the option for Sovereignty-Association while being reassured that this course would not

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<sup>231</sup> Jeffery Simpson, "Drifting Toward a More French Québec and a More English Rest-of-Canada," The Globe and Mail, 14 Jan. 1993, p.A18.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid., p.A18.

<sup>233</sup> Ibid., p.A18.

lead to rupture and economic chaos. In fact, supporters of this option stress that Québec's economic lot would in fact be better outside of Confederation's economic problems.

Québeckers live today in the atmosphere of the universal and homogenous state that they themselves have accepted as proper and good. Grant's lament applies well to Québec; *Tendebantque manus ripae ulterioris amore.*<sup>234</sup>

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<sup>234</sup> Grant, Lament, p.97. From Virgil's Aeneid (Book VI): They were holding their arms outstretched in love toward the further shore.

APPENDIX A

Major investments of the *Caisse de dépôt et de placement du Québec* to 31 December 1982.<sup>235</sup>


<u>Company</u>	<u>Percent of voting interest</u>
Brascade	30.0
Vidéotron	30.0
Provigo	29.9
Rolland Inc.	27.3
Prenor Group	27.2
Domtar	24.2
Québec-Téléphone	17.5
Dominion Textile	14.4
Société d'investissement Desjardins	14.3
Logistec	13.0
La Vérendrye	12.1
Domco Industries	11.6
Canadian Pacific	9.9
Trust Général	9.8
National Bank of Canada	8.7
Gaz Métropolitain	7.7
Alcan Aluminium	7.6
Royal Bank	6.6
Télé-Metropole	5.3
Consolidated Bathurst	3.7

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<sup>235</sup> Niosi, "French-Canadian Capitalism," p.188.

APPENDIX B

The Power Corporation Group (November 1982).<sup>236</sup>



Total assets: \$12 billion Canadian.

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<sup>236</sup> Ibid., p.192.

## APPENDIX C

### VARIOUS DEMANDS FOR DEVOLUTION OF POWERS FROM QUÉBEC GOVERNMENTS 1960-1991

I. In 1960, the newly elected Liberals issued their first demands to the federal government.<sup>237</sup> The six demands were:

- 1) Repatriation of the Constitution,
- 2) A Charter of Rights with guarantees for language and education rights of francophones outside Québec,
- 3) The creation of a constitutional court,
- 4) The creation of a permanent federal-provincial secretariat.
- 5) Annual Federal-Provincial First Ministers' Conferences,
- 6) An end to conditional grants and jurisdictional intrusions.

II. The 1966 Québec provincial election saw a heightening of nationalist demands. The Liberal government, fighting a revitalized and nationalist *Union nationale*, put forward in its campaign a platform that included demands for more powers from the federal government<sup>238</sup>, specifically:

- 1) family allowances,
- 2) more powers of taxation,
- 3) old age benefits,
- 4) immigration.

Compared to later demands, these were modest. The Lesage government also wanted the federal government to get out of areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction.

III. In 1967, at the Confederation of Tomorrow Conferences, the *Union nationale* government under Premier Daniel Johnson, made some informal demands for a redistribution of

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<sup>237</sup> Daniel Latouche, Canada and Québec, Past and Future: An Essay, (Toronto, 1986), p.21.

<sup>238</sup> Quinn, Union Nationale, pp. 217-218.

powers<sup>239</sup>. In addition to all powers reserved for the provinces in the Constitution, the demands included:

- 1) education,
- 2) old age benefits,
- 3) family allowances,
- 4) health,
- 5) regional development,
- 6) municipal aid,
- 7) R and D,
- 8) culture,
- 9) job training,
- 10) manpower
- 11) language

Further, Premier Johnson state at the Confederation of Tomorrow Conferences that Québec wanted jurisdiction over "...to put it briefly, everything that may be used as instruments for French-Canadian assertion and promotion of her economic, social and political institutions."<sup>240</sup>

IV. In 1975, the Liberals under Robert Bourassa made six new constitutional demands.<sup>241</sup> These included:

- 1) A Québec veto over constitutional amendments,
- 2) Participation in nomination of Supreme Court Justices,
- 3) Provincial paramountcy in culture and education,
- 4) The ability to opt out of federal programs with financial compensation,
- 5) Participation in immigration matters,
- 6) Limits on Ottawa's declaratory and spending powers in areas of provincial jurisdiction.

V. In 1979, the *Parti québécois*, whose mandate included a referendum on Sovereignty-Association, presented its model of a new Canada. The White Paper, formally called Canada-Quebec, A New Deal<sup>242</sup>, laid out plans for a fully autonomous Québec with economic links to Canada. The PQ wanted an asymmetrical transfer of all powers from Canada to Québec. The report does not include a devolution to any other province.

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<sup>239</sup> Government of Québec, "Preliminary Statement," p.13.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid., p.13.

<sup>241</sup> Gagnon and Montcalm, Beyond, p.158.

<sup>242</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "White Paper," pp.11, 12.



Québec's powers:

- |                         |                    |
|-------------------------|--------------------|
| 1) all taxation powers, | 6) immigration,    |
| 2) registration,        | 7) court systems,  |
| 3) external affairs,    | 8) defense,        |
| 4) social affairs,      | 9) transportation, |
| 5) culture,             | 10) legislation.   |

Furthermore, the White Paper includes a catch-all phrase:

through sovereignty, Québec would acquire in addition to the political powers it already has, those now exercised by Ottawa, whether they were assigned to the federal government under the British North America Act of 1867 or whether it assumed them since that time, directly or indirectly.

VI. The Québec Liberal Party in 1980 responded to the 1979 PQ position by producing the report called A New Canadian Federation, commonly called the Beige Paper.<sup>243</sup> In this paper, the Liberals recommended devolution of powers from the federal government to all provinces. In 1980, the Liberals did not support asymmetrical federalism.

Proposed areas of solely provincial jurisdiction:

- |                        |                            |
|------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1) education,          | 6) unemployment insurance, |
| 2) family matters,     | 7) natural resources,      |
| 3) labour relations,   | 8) energy,                 |
| 4) health and welfare, | 9) interior fisheries,     |
| 5) social insurance,   | 10) prisons.               |

Proposed areas of solely federal jurisdiction:

- |                              |                              |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1) national defense,         | 5) Canada Post,              |
| 2) tariffs and customs,      | 6) redistribution of wealth, |
| 3) interprovincial commerce, | 7) external affairs,         |
| 4) monetary control,         | 8) citizenship.              |

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<sup>243</sup> The Constitutional Committee of the Québec Liberal Party, "A New Canadian Federation," The Globe and Mail, 10 Jan. 1980, pp.12-18, *passim*.

Proposed areas of shared jurisdiction:

- 1) agriculture,
- 2) transport,
- 3) communications,
- 4) justice,
- 5) immigration,
- 6) means of taxation,
- 7) culture,
- 8) regional development,
- 9) technical and medical controls.

VII. The next demands from a Québec government came in 1985 when the Liberals, re-elected under Robert Bourassa, made their initial demands which led up to the Meech Lake Accord. The five demands are well known<sup>244</sup>:

- 1) recognition of Québec as a distinct society inside the Canadian federation,
- 2) immigration powers,
- 3) the right to opt-out of federal-provincial shared-cost programs with financial compensation,
- 4) a role in the selection of Supreme Court judges,
- 5) a Québec veto over constitutional amendments.

VIII. After the death of the Meech Lake Accord June 23, 1990, the Québec Liberal Party once again set up a party committee to study a new Canadian federation. The report, A Québec Free to Choose<sup>245</sup>, headed by Jean Allaire, was released in January of 1991. Similar to the Liberal's report of 1980, the 1991 document divides the power into three categories:

Areas of exclusive Québec jurisdiction:

- 1) social affairs,
- 2) municipal affairs,
- 3) culture,
- 4) education,
- 5) housing,
- 6) recreation and sport,
- 7) family matters,
- 8) manpower,
- 9) natural resources,
- 10) health,
- 11) tourism,
- 12) agriculture,
- 13) UIC,
- 14) communications,
- 15) regional development,
- 16) energy,
- 17) environment,
- 18) industry and commerce,
- 19) languages,
- 20) R and D,
- 21) public security,
- 22) income security.

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<sup>244</sup> Gil Rémillard, "Accord Vital to Québec's Development as a Nation," Canadian Speeches, vol.4, (June/July, 1990), p.41.

<sup>245</sup> Québec Liberal Party, Free to Choose, p.38.

Areas of shared jurisdiction:

- |                            |                        |
|----------------------------|------------------------|
| 1) native affairs,         | 6) fisheries,          |
| 2) taxation,               | 7) foreign policy,     |
| 3) immigration,            | 8) Canada Post,        |
| 4) financial institutions, | 9) telecommunications, |
| 5) justice,                | 10) transport.         |

Areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction:

- |                         |                       |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1) national defense,    | 3) equalization,      |
| 2) customs and tariffs, | 4) currency and debt. |

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