

UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

"CURB", A CITIZEN USER RESOURCE BASE TO
SOLVE URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

by

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"The disintegration of urban life can only be countered by the increased participation of people in directly fulfilling their most basic needs, so that a new citizen emerges who is more complete, more self-sufficient than his predecessors. The architect who furthers this process must necessarily share in this expanded self-definition."

Stephen A. Kurtz

ABSTRACT

The work presents an argument for a common or shared Information Base to deal with urban physical environmental situations. Two major sections are presented.

In Part One, the three levels of government, Federal, Provincial and Municipal, are examined in an attempt to understand the complexity of the system that delivers housing and formulates housing and urban policies.

In Chapters I and II, the Federal and Provincial levels of government are examined with respect to inter- and inner-governmental communication and what affect this interaction has upon the formulation of housing and urban policies.

Chapter III explains the City of Winnipeg Act and what affect it has upon citizen participation. As it was felt that the problems of citizen participation were more important to the intent of this thesis, no attempt was made to detail the inner-governmental communication modes of the City of Winnipeg.

In Part Two, it is demonstrated how the adversary participants, the "external agency" (or "agencies") and the "in-group(s)", both interact and compete for information in the urban environmental context. The creation of a "Citizen User Resource Base", Curb, shows how, with the use of shared information, effective inter-governmental communication and the involvement or participation of citizens and environmental professionals can be established.

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INTRODUCTION

The intent of this thesis is to identify and suggest solutions to some of the problems of housing and housing policies in the Province of Manitoba. Policies are defined by Erich Jantsch as:

"Policies are the first expressions and guiding images of normative thinking and action. In other words, they are the spiritual agents of change-change not only in the ways and means by which bureaucracies and techocracies operate, but change in the very institutions and norms which form their homes and castles."

The thesis will consist of two sections. Part One, an analysis of the governmental organizations that formulate housing policies for Canada and Manitoba and Part Two; an examination of the roles that the architect and citizen user play in this decision making process. The work will be accomplished through the following tasks.

1) The identification of the process by which the various levels of government interact to produce housing policies and housing for the people of Manitoba; i.e. "The Housing Delivery System".

2) To suggest ways that this system may behave when effective involvement or participation of citizens and environmental professionals is introduced.

The goals of these tasks will be to improve the relationship of the architectural profession and citizen user to the political and economic structure of the housing delivery system. It is my intention to indicate possible future directions that the profession may take in relation to the formulation of housing policies. These housing policies must stimulate and promote a delivery system that will, among others, supply:

- a) quantities of housing equal to the needs, current and projected,
- b) quality of housing that respects our (minimum) social and environmental needs,
- c) housing that strives for the highest quality and variety which the society can generate and economically afford and,
- d) accomplish these objectives in harmony with other societal goals.

It can be assumed that man will continue to build. Of the many people involved in this activity, the architect plays a synoptic role, and on many issues the industry looks to the architectural profession for leadership. In conjunction with this role, the architect is under pressure of technological advance and social change. The question that arises is what role the architect ought to play in the near or foreseeable future?

From discussions with architects it is now clear that, although the architects have a role in the housing process, their role is unstructured and undefined. There is, however, a consensus that there exists a need for housing policies that would generate housing reflective of regional needs. In spite of this, architects feel that they do not have the means (access) to present their views (opinions) to the various governmental agencies who formulate these policies.

This is further complicated by the fact that the architect is serving two masters; one, the client who is the developer, e.g. governmental agencies; and, the user who is rarely the client. Because the architect is so dependant upon the client to provide work and finances, he becomes subservient to their needs rather than to the needs of the user. Consequently the actual or real needs of the user may not be fulfilled. The users plight may be best described as the following:

- a) They have virtually no voice in the design or construction of the buildings in which they live,
- b) they have little, if any, influence in the design of their city or particular community.

The architect should provide professional skills in a service and collaborative role - collaborating with clients, users and fellow professionals. A dilemma arises from the fact that the clients' values may be substantially different from those of the users. Policy decisions are often made by public authorities in isolation without regard for the opinions of professionals, such as architects, and the real needs of the users.

"Where the process is firmly in the control of those who require and intend to use the building, and is directed to ends acceptable in common, the constraints imposed on the architect by users' requirements, budget, timetable, and other practice and social considerations are a positive force. They present him with a challenge and an opportunity. But where, as in the circumstances I have described here, the constraints oblige the architect to work against the promptings (if any) of his conscience, and inhibit the use of his skills, the result is an intolerable degree of frustration, which causes many architects to relapse into the most profound cynicism."²

The architect's role is further weakened because, although he is on the periphery of the political and economic structure, taking little or no part in forming basic decisions about the 'what', 'why' and even 'where' of the built environment. He, however, is indispensable in the implementation of these decisions, and is expected to translate the clients intentions into architectural form. By concentrating on the 'how' the architect assumes a neutral role in the political and economic structure. It is a rare occurrence for an architect to be involved in a work situation where he can exercise all his skills to his professional satisfaction. Often the architects role is reduced to one of cutting costs, increasing densities etc., in an already marginal design solution. It is reassuring that the architects can produce out of the system as much good as they do.

Assuming that the architectural profession is undergoing a change; there will be new and changing roles for the architect to play. Stephen Kurtz, in his book, "Wasteland, Building the American Dream" describes this new architect as:

"Both a designer and an engineer, a space planner and a carpenter, a sociologist and an aesthetician, a teacher, a lawyer, a plumber, a group worker, economist, and bookkeeper. Any architect (and such people now clutter the field) who is exclusively concerned with design and disdains the rest ought to become a sculptor."³

At the same time there is no need for architects to relapse into defeatism or the sterility of anti-architecture. Public authorities are not immune to change and can often be made to respond if people make effort necessary to motivate them.

"The advice of the architect is very much needed in the councils which make political decisions about how to use our resources and what to build for two reasons. First, because the architect, who represents the human aspect is in a way the council for the people who should be the client, ultimately. And, second because if he doesn't speak up, there is nobody else to put the case for humanity in an informed way."⁴

The fate of the city and its inhabitants should be a concern common to all if we want cities to be healthy, exciting and satisfying places that we want to live in and hand on to our children. As stated in "Urban Canada, problems and prospects:"

"There can be little doubt that the locus of most of our social problems in the future will be the city. Already there is widespread concern over the forgotten urban poor, the alienated young urbanities, the frustrated middle class seeking shelter."⁵

These people must be able to acquire the necessary tools and information to allow them to express themselves in such a way that their needs will be acknowledged and acted upon by the individuals responsible for the creation of the urban environment.

"It is not the experts, but the laymen, who hold the key for the urban future. The basic decisions to be made are political ones. They will provide the foundations to be built on by the experts - the technicians, planners, sociologists and civil servants."⁶

If users are to influence the decisions that create the urban environment, it becomes obvious that they must be made aware of and have access to both the tools and the information that create the built-environment. Governments, (Federal, Provincial and Municipal) possess this knowledge and have the everyday contacts with environmental professionals, builders, developers, etc.; those persons who

exert a major influence (directly or indirectly) on the decisions that create the built-urban-environment.

Considering the synoptic role of the architect, it is apparent that he is the individual who could facilitate a necessary interface between the users and the creators of the built environment. Thus, the architect who assumes this new responsibility must be able to work with all kinds of people, even though this will entail a change in the traditional architect/client relationship.

In Part One, the three levels of government, Federal, Provincial and Municipal, are examined in an attempt to understand the complexity of the system that delivers housing and formulates housing and urban policies.

In Chapters I and II, the Federal and Provincial levels of government are examined with respect to inter- and inner-governmental communication and what affect this interaction has upon the formulation of housing and urban policies.

Chapter III explains the City of Winnipeg Act and what affect it has upon citizen participation. As it was felt that the problems of citizen participation were more important to the intent of this thesis, no attempt was made to detail the inter-governmental communication modes of the City of Winnipeg. The study of this field, while impinging to a degree upon the concerns of the thesis, would have necessitated research beyond the constraints of the current work.

Part Two, demonstrates how urban-environmental problems could be more effectively resolved by the creation of a 'Citizen User Resource Base', or "Curb". "Curb" would provide a readily accessible information resource and in turn allow more effective inter-government communication; involvement or participation of citizens and environmental professionals.

FOOTNOTES

1. Erich Jantsch, Technological Planning and Social Futures, (London: Cassell/Associated Business Programs, 1972), p.11.
2. Malcolm MacEewn, "Crisis in Architecture," RIBA Journal, April 1974, p.28.
3. Stephen A. Kurtz, Wasteland: Building the American Dream, (New York: N.Y.: Prager Publishers, 1973), p.78.
4. Ove Arup, "On the Architect's Human Role," RIBA. Journal, November, 1970, p.524.
5. N.H. Lithwick, Urban Canada: problems and prospects. (A report prepared for the Honorable R.K. Andras, Minister Responsible for Housing, Government of Canada) (Ottawa: Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 1970), p.13.
6. Boyce Richardson, The Future of Canadian Cities. (Toronto: New Press, 1972), p.8.

PART ONE

THE PROBLEM

I. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

HAS THE MONEY, BUT NOT THE AUTHORITY OR THE PROBLEM

I. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

CENTRAL MORTGAGE AND HOUSING

When examining housing policies and programs in Canada it becomes apparent that the National Housing Act (N.H.A.) and the agency administering it, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (C.M.H.C.) has had an inordinate influence. Because so much of the provincial and municipal activity has taken place within the context of the Act, its influence can be seen in the form and appearance of our cities and the institutional framework set up in the various jurisdictions to handle housing. The following will be a brief history of the involvement of the Federal Government in housing policies to the present.

Dominion Housing Act

It was through the 1935 Dominion Housing Act that the Federal Government entered the field of housing and housing policy. The federal government recognized that, besides providing accommodation, housing played a vital role in the economic well-being of the country. The objectives of the Act were outlined in a 1937 Dominion Bureau of Statistics publication as follows:

1. to assist in the improvement of housing conditions, and
2. to assist in the absorption of unemployment by stimulation of the construction and building materials industries.]

National Housing Act and the Establishment of Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation.

The next step in the widening involvement of the federal government was the introduction of the National Housing Act of 1944, and the establishment of the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation in 1946. C.M.H.C. was designated as the federal agency responsible for administering the Act, and was supposed to spur economic activity. Additionally it was to provide housing for returning war veterans. Emphasis was placed on C.M.H.C.'s economic role as a direct lender and to assist, but not compete, with other governments or private enterprise. A 1946 amendment to the N.H.A. authorized C.M.H.C. to:

"make loans up to 80% to resource companies in order to finance housing in new development areas where private lending facilities were non-existent."²

C.M.H.C.'s economic role was further defined by the following description of the government's interpretation of its role in housing.

"It has been a guiding principle of national participation in housing that, while the government may act to stimulate and supplement the housebuilding market, it should not assume direct responsibilities which are constitutionally allocated to other governments or which could effectively be borne by private enterprise."³

Thus it can be seen that, while the federal government recognized a need for housing, its policy thrust was mainly economic with emphasis on assistance rather than direct intervention with other

governments or with private enterprise. This emphasis on the strengthening of mortgage and other financial markets (under the N.H.A.) to ensure a healthy flow of funds to residential construction has had a far reaching effect on housing and urban development in Canada. This singular policy direction of home ownership and new construction "led to the expansion of the suburban areas adjacent to every medium-sized and large urban centre,"⁴ and the resulting deterioration of the inner city.

Not until 1949 (following the termination of the veterans' and war workers' housing) did the federal government, because of the demands for low-rental accommodation, become directly involved in the provision of social or public housing projects. The N.H.A. was amended authorizing:

"joining federal-provincial participation in public housing projects.....(and) federal participation in land assembly schemes designed to make reasonably-priced serviced lots available in areas where a shortage of building sites was limiting residential construction."⁵

These two amendments became the major part of federal housing policies, and with further changes to the Act in 1964 (75-25% partnership between the federal government and the provinces was changed to 90% federal loans to the provinces or their agents, along with 50% sharing in operating costs of the projects), the federal government was firmly committed to a major role in the housing field.

Nineteen Fifty Four Amendments to the N.H.A.

The next major step to be taken by the federal government occurred in 1954 when it changed the format of the N.H.A. mortgage. Until that year, the N.H.A. mortgage was structured to allow the federal government to:

1. make loans jointly on a 25-75% basis with authorized lending institutions;
2. provide an interest subsidy and capital guarantee which virtually eliminated all risk of capital and interest on funds advanced by institutions; and
3. have the right to set the lending terms and conditions under which funds would be advanced.⁶

The N.H.A. revisions of 1954 enabled the federal government to:

(alter)"the basic method of financing residential construction in Canada from the joint loan system to one of insured loans whereby, rather than participating with private lenders in mortgage financing, the federal government guaranteed loans made entirely by the lending institutions under the terms of the N.H.A."⁷

The abandonment of direct participation in favor of mortgage insurance had the effect of lowering the residential mortgage interest rate by lowering the risks involved to lenders.

"The operative rate was set by the Governor general in council (in effect the Cabinet) and was extensively used by the government as a tool in the government's overall economic policy."⁸

This change, together with amendments to the Bank Act, allowed the chartered banks to enter the residential mortgage field and stimulated the flow of funds into residential mortgages.

It should be noted that the federal government's involvement in housing was still economic in character, aimed at promoting the construction of single-family dwellings, and was not concerned with the problems of urban growth. The following quote outlines the government's philosophy as of 1956.

"Broadly, the governments' contributions to housing are of an economic character, while provincial and municipal governments are mainly concerned with the administration of urban growth."⁹

Although the 1954 Act continued to emphasise slum clearance and redevelopment for housing, it was through the 1956 amendments to the Act that the Corporation (C.M.H.C.) became directly involved in urban renewal. An amendment to section 23 provided for 50% federal cost-sharing for undertaking urban renewal schemes. Other amendments loosened control over final use of cleared land and pointed the need to construct replacement dwellings for those destroyed by slum clearance. In 1960, amendments passed introduced the concept of "urban renewal area", (federal-provincial cooperation for the acquisition, improvement and conversion of buildings for housing purposes--an alternative to the bull-dozer clearance technique) and in 1964,

amendments removed the residential requirement. The major problem associated with urban renewal has been that it has led to the removal of more low-income housing than has being built by public housing programs. The 1969 Task Force on Housing and Urban Development stated (in regards to urban renewal):

"the Task Force considers it a mixed priority to be demolishing even older housing units at considerable public expense at a time when some urban Canadians are without housing of any kind, new or old. It believes that on grounds of humanity, efficiency and plain good sense available public funds should be directed to creating a sufficient housing stock first and then - and only then - to destroying any numbers of existing stock."¹⁰

The Task Force made the recommendation that:

"The wholesale destruction of older housing under urban renewal schemes should be suspended until the total housing stock has increased to the point where a reasonable number of vacancies exist."¹¹

Thus, through the period 1949-1964, it would be fair to say that, although the federal government had made attempts to make low-cost housing available, its major policy thrusts were those of lowering mortgage costs, stimulating the economy, and promoting home ownership.

Nineteen Sixty-four Amendments to the N.H.A.

Until 1964 the federal-provincial partnership provided the capital required for federal-provincial-municipal housing on a 75-25% basis. In 1964 the N.H.A. received a major overhaul. Part IV of the

Act was titled Public Housing and new provisions were introduced which allowed C.M.H.C. to make loans to "a province, municipality or public housing agency for the purpose of:

Section 35C - to acquire and service land for public housing purposes,

Section 35D - for the construction or acquisition of a public housing project.

These loans were not to "exceed 90%" of the cost of the acquisition of the land or the project "as determined by the corporation." The old provision of 75% federal grants was retained under Section 35A, and the new 90% loans allowed C.M.H.C., under Section 35E, to enter:

"(I) Into an agreement with any province, municipality or public housing agency operating a public housing project.....to provide housing accommodation to individuals or families of low income at rentals that are less than the rentals required to meet the cost of amortizing and operating the public housing project."¹²

Also, under Section 35E, the corporation would contribute up to a maximum of "50% of the annual operating losses" incurred by an agreement with a province, municipality or public housing agency. Alternatively, under Section 35A, the corporation would contribute up to a maximum of 75% of the losses generated by a public housing project. This 25% difference in Federal contributions towards operating deficits does not appear to have affected the decisions of the provinces to build more public housing under Section 35D rather than 35A.* For example, in 1973, under section 35D the federal government

* In 1972, Section 35D became Section 43, and Section 35A became Section 40.

contributed \$139,698,000 for public housing as compared to \$36,000,000 for rental housing under Section 35A.¹³

Also introduced under Section 35B was the new definition of "Public Housing Agency", which allowed the provinces to undertake housing programs on their own. To this date, housing was a field in which the provinces had not played an important role, but with emerging constitutional issues (between the federal and provincial governments) this amendment allowed the provinces to enter the housing field in a big way.

In 1964 the Ontario government had established the Ontario Housing Corporation, and this amendment (Sect.35B) "now unexpectedly gave strength to O.H.C. which was able to operate independently instead of being tied in a partnership with C.M.H.C."¹⁴

Thus, by this amendment, the federal government finally allowed the provinces independence from the cumbersome federal-provincial partnership even if:

"It seemed a rather retrograde step to diminish the partnership of communities in dealing with their own social housing problems, the federal government was in no position to resist the claims for provincial authority in the housing field."¹⁵

Another important amendment introduced in 1964 was the addition of Section 16A to the limited-dividend (L.D.) housing Section 16. This section, previous to 1964, had allowed C.M.H.C. to make loans at a preferred interest rate (below market) to private entrepreneurial

limited dividend companies in exchange for a limited rate of return (5% on total investment), initial rent below market rates, and a fifteen-year agreement which limited rent increases to increases in operating costs. As the majority of the L.D. companies consisted of private builders activity under Section 16 was sporadic. In good financial times few limited dividend companies were established. In slow periods there would be increased activity in the construction of low-rental housing under Section 16. Section 16A expanded the scope of L.D. housing by allowing the federal government through C.M.H.C. to:

"(A)authorize loans to non-profit organizations owned by a province, municipality or any agency thereof, or by a charitable corporation for the consideration or purchase of a housing project or housing accommodation of the hostel or dormitory type for use as a low-rental housing project."¹⁶

Enacting these amendments to the N.H.A. redefined the federal government's role in housing policy by emphasizing a stronger initiative by local or provincial governments in the housing field. The federal government now had placed the problems of adequate housing and all its related social problems squarely in the laps of the ten provinces. It (the federal government through C.M.H.C.) now assumed the role of advisor and assisted the provinces in establishing housing corporations. By 1968, eight provinces had established provincial housing corporations which were largely the result of the 1964 amendments and:

"partly because of the success of the Ontario Housing Corporation in doubling the stock of public housing dwellings in four years."¹⁷

Thus, even though the federal government was encouraging a more direct involvement of provincial responsibilities in housing, it still played a dominant role in the housing field by controlling the financial arrangements whereby housing was undertaken.

During this period of time the federal government also began to realize that, besides providing the direct funding to the various levels of governments for housing, it had a considerable influence on other segments of urban Canada. The Federal Task Force on Housing and Urban Development, led by Paul Hellyer, in 1968, and the later creation of the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs in 1971 confirmed the magnitude of the federal governments involvement in housing and urban problems.

The following chapter describes the reasons for the creation of M.S.U.A. and the significance of the federal role in urban Canada.

MINISTRY OF STATE FOR URBAN AFFAIRS - Early Stages.

In the late 1960's there was a growing awareness by the federal government that there were serious problems developing in the urban centres across Canada. In 1968, seven out of ten Canadians lived in urban areas and the problems of housing and urban development could not

be considered as a routine matter. Rather, they were of prime importance to the large majority of the population. Canada was in fact a highly urbanized society and the emerging urban problems were becoming too complex for the existing bureaucracy to cope with.

The federal government found itself administering a huge array of programmes, of which some had been started as far back as the depression years but had never been cancelled. New programs and policies were constantly being added to this menu, substantially increasing the federal governments costs, but not having the desired effect on urban problems. Instead, many seemed to be working at cross purposes and in the process compounding the problems. It was becoming increasingly obvious that these problems would not disappear and the city as we know it was becoming an endangered species.

The federal government could no longer rely on a disjointed-uncoordinated - ad-hoc - approach to these problems and the majority of programmes or policies coming from the bureaucracy seemed to be a justification of past decisions. There was no attempt being made to find and cancel unproductive programmes or to put forward new solutions. Also, there seemed to be no department capable of laying out all the facts in such a manner as to present all available options to the government. To further complicate matters, the federal governments involvement in urban policy was questionable on constitutional grounds.

"The federal government never had an urban policy since according to the B.N.A. Act municipalities are creations of the province, and it is constitutionally improper for the federal government to be in contact with them."¹⁸

But, it was obvious that every federal decision affected the cities in many and various ways. The federal government through C.M.H.C. (which supported the construction of homes), determined to a large part the character of the suburbs surrounding every major urban centre in Canada. Also, the numerous federal departments and agencies located in the cities were major owners of land and buildings. The decisions of where to build government offices, locate armed forces bases, airports etc., were made in isolation of each other and their impact on the surrounding urban fabric was seldom if ever considered.

Task Force On Housing

It was with these problems in mind that the federal government attempted to come to grips with the problems of Urban Canada. On July 17, 1968 the federal cabinet authorized the Minister of Transport, Paul T. Hellyer, to establish a "Task Force on Housing". The objectives of this task force were to:

"(E)xamine housing and urban development in Canada, and to report on ways in which the federal government in company with other levels of government and the private sector, can help meet the housing needs of all Canadians and contribute to the development of modern, vital cities."¹⁹

Between September and December of 1968, the task force held hearings in 27 Canadian cities, received almost 500 briefs from national, regional and local organizations and came up with 50 recommendations for changes in the way things were being handled in Canadian cities. However, these recommendations were not intended to be taken as a group of separate and isolated proposals, but as a framework for a broad and integrated approach to housing and urban development. The task force realized that urban problems were too complex and interdependent for separate and individual consideration. One of its recommendations was for the creation of a Federal Ministry of Urban Affairs.

On January 22, 1969, Hellyer presented the Task Force report to Cabinet. Hellyer stressed the need for action and attempted to get approval for the implementation of the proposals.

"The Cabinet would not buy them, either because they felt that more presentation was needed, or because the way in which the proposals came forward injected personal biases into the decision making process."²⁰

Whatever the reasons, Hellyer quit the Cabinet and two years later left the Liberal Party. In the meantime Robert Andras was put in charge of C.M.H.C., the first time a minister was made responsible for a Crown Corporation. It was hoped that "Andras would spend most of his time golfing or smoothing over feathers that Hellyer had ruffled."²¹ Instead, Andras immersed himself in the operation of C.M.H.C. Up to now, the corporation had functioned without any ministerial surveillance and now it had to account for its actions.

It became clear (to Andras) that C.M.H.C. operated under the notion that it "should perform only functions laid upon it by the National Housing Act and not concern itself with the wider urban context."²²

Andras decided to make use of a commitment left behind by Hellyer, which involved a paper on low-income housing and what should be done with it. Andras gathered together a small team from C.M.H.C. with the idea that this paper would be the means that he could indicate to Cabinet that there was an urban context that the federal government could operate within. This paper was presented to Cabinet on July 3, 1969 and it provided the initiative for a federal involvement in urban policy. The paper, indicated that the problems of low-income housing were closely associated with the complex issues of the urban phenomena. The Cabinet asked for a more detailed report to be done on the trends in urban development in Canada.

Lithwick Report, "Urban Canada".

In September 1969, Andras hired Harvey Lithwick to undertake this comprehensive study of Urban Canada. The resulting document, "URBAN CANADA" Problems and Prospects", along with six research monographs (in Lithwicks' own words) was an attempt to, "write a report which would assist the federal government to determine what, if any role it should play in urban affairs and the likely consequences of such a role."²³

The report indicted all three levels of government for their

failure to establish an integrated approach to urban problems. Lithwick found that urban problems shared an unique characteristic; there was a high interdependence of the different parts of the urban system.

"Housing is related to transportation and land use; these affect the urban poor, the quality of the environment, and the fiscal resources of the local governments; and these in turn have severe consequences for housing."²⁴

He further stated that:

"This fundamental interdependence has serious implications for a policy approach that deals with each problem in isolation.....and that no department (all governments sic) has been found that seriously considers the impact of its policies on the urban system, despite a widespread awareness of the importance of that impact."²⁵

He also offered an explanation that this interdependence was largely the result that urban problems are generated by the process of urbanization itself.

"The growth of large cities leads to competing demands for the one common feature of all cities, scarce urban space, driving core prices upward and households outward. Transportation, pollution, and poverty problems flow from this. Contained within the process of urbanization, then, are the seeds of the majority of the problems found in the city. From this perspective these problems do not just happen to occur within cities - they are fundamental aspects of the growing city."²⁶

Lithwick also found that because of our present attitudes towards economics, (i.e. - in achieving national goals we tend to sacrifice most others for the sake of economic progress) equilibrium

in urban growth must be restored by intervention in the urban system.

"Lithwick cannot hold out much hope for restricting economic growth, (and with it, the future size of our cities); the problem is therefore to manage urban growth, to intervene in it and to direct it."²⁷

The challenge as Lithwick saw it was; to achieve economic progress while moving towards the attainment of other objectives, or in other words, the momentum of urbanization will have to be sustained, but carefully controlled.

Andras presented the results of this study to Cabinet and convinced them of the enormous complexity of the urban system. He suggested the formation of a federal urban organization, as the report indicated the federal government had an obligation to provide initiative and leadership in order to ensure that Canada's urban future would be coherent and not unplanned.

Ministry of State for Urban Affairs

In the speech from the throne October 1970, the decision to set up an urban affairs ministry was announced and the ministry was officially created in June 1971.

The Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, (M.S.U.A.) role is one of coordination; as it tries to determine what are the policies and programmes of the various federal departments; and then attempts to coordinate them on an urban focus, directed both inwards to the fede-

ral system, and outwards to other governments and non-government interests. The ministries emphasis is on policy development, coordination and research, which are treated as means (not ends) to develop a more integrated federal approach. M.S.U.A. does not attempt to set policies for the cities or provinces, but rather to identify their policies and to direct the federal government's policy towards regional needs.

M.S.U.A. realized that the cities and provinces must function together better, so it (M.S.U.A.) will be able to accomplish the objectives of the federal government.


Thus, in Manitoba, a Tri-level committee was established (initiated by M.S.U.A.) so that the three levels of government could discuss common problems. This was a preliminary move to set up a communication system to prod the other two levels of government (prov. - city) into recognizing that they have joint responsibilities (i.e. - what each group does affects the others). Conceptually, Tri-Level is a permanent mechanism for co-operative planning and policy formulation among the three levels of government.

It was felt (by M.S.U.A.) that Tri-Level would at least initially force the other two levels of government to come up with policies as they go along. Although this is not the ideal approach to policy formulation, it is hoped (by M.S.U.A.) that this method will gradually lead to a greater understanding of policy formulation by all parties concerned.

Accepting this proposed direction of M.S.U.A. (as stated above), there seemed to be a contradiction in the implementation of their efforts. The provincial secretary for M.S.U.A. has indicated (by interview) that his contacts with the two levels of government are strictly at the administrative level as he feels there is no need for contact at the political level (see diagram 1).

If the definition of policy formulation*proposed at the beginning of this paper is accepted, then this course of action is then unacceptable. According to the above definition, policy has to be initiated from the top down as well as from within the administrative structure.

FIGURE 1.



* See Introduction, p.1.

Thus, it seems that even though M.S.U.A. recognizes there is an urban problem, and insists there must be inter-governmental co-operation (at all levels) it plays down (ignores) the political link; and completely ignores involving the citizen in the process. This is contrary to the philosophy of M.S.U.A. as stated in a paper on the research programme of M.S.U.A. by Professor Leonard O. Gertler on April 27, 1973 in which he stated:

"A final factor shaping the research program is the need for flexibility. This is inherent in the Ministry as a process, in the progressive exploration of urban problems, in finding out what concerns people and agencies and governments, and attaining of some measure of consensus on priorities. The research system must be able to respond to the maturing policy process."²⁸

To further back up this need for flexibility Lithwick in "Urban Canada", stated that:

"While urban goals must, in the large, be consistent with national goals, they must also, in the small, be based upon the wishes of the inhabitants of the various urban areas.....Any attempt to reverse this trend, in which decisions are made increasingly by bureaucrats and politicians generally neither familiar with nor sensitive to local needs and wants, must involve an attempt to provide machinery for including urbanites at a very micro-cosmic level within the process of interest accumulation."²⁹

To the best of my knowledge there has been no encouragement by M.S.U.A. to seek out local needs and wants at the provincial or municipal level. This can be exemplified by the fact that there is one provincial secretary for M.S.U.A. who deals directly with the

administrative levels and the majority of the research is done at Ottawa far removed from the local scene. So, even though M.S.U.A. claims to recognize the problems of Urban Canada, it seems to have become the bureaucratic empire that it claims it set out to destroy.

A further complication is the jurisdictional squabble between M.S.U.A. and C.M.H.C. as each one feels that the other should be its subordinate. Originally M.S.U.A. was intended to be a small policy-making secretariat and C.M.H.C. would be the programme delivery unit.

In reality, M.S.U.A. has become an urban research empire; C.M.H.C. now has a policy division (created for Hellyer's Task Force); and the end result is much duplication of efforts and little co-operation between both parties.

M.S.U.A./C.M.H.C.

Though M.S.U.A. is supposed to realign the overall federal government's role in urban policy, C.M.H.C. still plays the major role in housing urban Canadians.

It must be remembered, that the federal government in 1946 consolidated "into a single agency the responsibilities for both the private housing market and public action programmes."³⁰ This was accomplished by assigning to C.M.H.C. the "responsibilities, both for the N.H.A. mortgage lending system and the management of the direct action programmes."³¹ Consequently, C.M.H.C. became the sole agency

by which the federal government implemented its urban policies and objectives.

It has been argued, however, that the influence of the federal government in urban Canada is minimal for the following two reasons:

- (1) constitutionally, cities are the creatures of the province, and
- (2) the 1964 amendments to the N.H.A. permitted the establishment of provincial housing corporations across Canada.

In reality, the housing programmes of the provinces are dependent upon federal policy, as the federal government (via C.M.H.C.) regulates the allocation of funds necessary for these programmes. In the past the funding was divided up (in an ad hoc fashion) to the various provinces, but now C.M.H.C. must analyze the various programmes and needs of the provinces in order to decide how much funding each of them will receive. This has proved to be a very difficult task for C.M.H.C. for each province has its own programme and naturally wishes to receive as much funding as possible. The resulting conflicts between the provinces and the federal government can best be described in the following statement made by the general manager of M.H.R.C.:

"The corporation (M.H.R.C.) planned a \$46 million public housing programme, approved by provincial cabinet. But the corporation's major financing source, the federal government, had indicated that only \$11 million would be available for 1975-76. Communities expectations housing will have to wait.... The province is considering other ways and means of dealing with this crisis --- and it is indeed a housing crisis.³²

This example points out the need for a coordination of policy objectives and goals for both levels of government. As C.M.H.C. has a policy division, and M.S.U.A. is policy orientated, one would expect that the federal government would be in possession of a comprehensive housing policy. Unfortunately, the converse appears to be true. Saul Miller, Minister of Urban Affairs for the province of Manitoba recently stated in the Manitoba legislature:

"The federal government's policy is to turn on the money one year and turn it off the next.... That's not a housing policy."³³

In January, 1973, the delegates to the Federal-Provincial Conference of Housing in Ottawa supported and endorsed the "need for a new and more effective intergovernmental approach"³⁴ to housing and community improvement. In November, 1973, the C.M.H.C. Board of Directors approved a plan for the reorganization of the corporation. The basic objectives of the reorganization were:

"(T)o decentralize more authority and resources to the field offices so that they may better meet housing and community development needs and to provide, through Head Office, coordination of activities and distribution on a national basis; to strengthen the planning function; to anticipate and adapt to changing needs; to organize for the delivery of programmes on the basis of programme objectives."³⁵

Thus, in Manitoba, under reorganization, the regional office which was originally responsible for the entire prairie region is now responsible for only the province of Manitoba. This administrative change by C.M.H.C. was a response to the realization that if the

corporation was going to better understand the needs of the individual provinces, it had to formalize, or at least strengthen, its links with the provinces.

One cannot fault the good intentions of C.M.H.C., but the above does not appear to have happened. Information gained from personal interviews (in the fall of 1974) with C.M.H.C. officials indicated that the only official link the Corporation has with the Province is with M.H.R.C. This link, however, is one of necessity as M.H.R.C.'s major responsibility is public housing. Therefore, M.H.R.C.'s major financing source is the Federal government, and it must work in close liaison with C.M.H.C.

C.M.H.C.'s relationships with other bodies, both provincial and municipal are very weak, consisting mainly of informal contacts. Thus, when the local C.M.H.C. staff hears of something happening in regards to provincial or municipal affairs, they get in touch with their informal contacts and acquire the necessary information. This is not the most efficient information-gathering system and is definitely not in accordance with the objectives of C.M.H.C.'s reorganization plan which emphasized:

"...decentralization of authority and resources to local offices, a more deliberate and planned approach to intergovernmental and interdepartmental consultation and coordination."³⁶

The regional coordinator of planning and research for the C.M.H.C.

regional office indicated that there was very little communication between both the provincial offices of C.M.H.C. and M.S.U.A. At the time of the interview, this person stated that there had been no personal contact with the M.S.U.A. provincial representative. It appears that the previously mentioned jurisdictional squabble between C.M.H.C. and M.S.U.A. has percolated down to the provincial level.

All the blame cannot be put entirely at the feet of C.H.M.C. however, as there appears to be a reluctance (or mistrust) by the other levels of government (particularly the province) to share information with the federal agencies.

To sum up, C.M.H.C. seems to be concerned more with the reorganization of its internal functions than with the intergovernmental consultation and coordination. The majority of intergovernmental communication that does occur is mainly of a bureaucratic nature (e.g. approvals, inspection of C.M.H.C. funded projects, etc.) and is not related to the policy making levels.

Both C.M.H.C. and M.S.U.A. are going to have to establish formal links with the various agencies of the provincial and municipal governments that are concerned with housing and urban problems.

These linkages will by necessity encompass the normal bureaucratic functions of government and attempt to open up new and productive channels of communication with decision and policy makers. If the federal government is going to develop a federal (national)

housing policy that will "expand the frontiers of our knowledge about housing and community problems"³⁷ and that truly responds to and respects the individual needs of the provinces, it is imperative that it establish these links so that this information can be compiled.

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30. C.M.H.C. 1946-70, p.41
31. Ibid.
32. Winnipeg Free Press, 2 April, 1975.
33. Winnipeg Free Press, 15 March, 1975, p.7.
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II. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

HAS THE AUTHORITY BUT NOT THE MONEY OR THE PROBLEM.

II. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY

INTRODUCTION

The first two chapters of this paper were concerned only with the agencies of the federal government that formulated or implemented housing and urban policies. There was no attempt made to explain the executive structure of the federal government.

In this section there will be a brief description of the two departments in the executive structure of the Manitoba government which are concerned with the formulation of Housing and Urban policy.

The two departments are:

1. Housing and Urban Development (H.U.D.), which is a policy desk of the Planning Secretariat of Cabinet, and
2. The provincial Department of Urban Affairs.

It is hoped that by describing the roles and functions of these two departments the reader will better understand the nature of the provincial decision making process and the problems therein.

Following this, there will be a chapter which will describe Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corporation (M.H.R.C.), and the role that the corporation has played in implementing the government's Housing and Urban policies.

Before describing the provincial executive structure, the government's objectives in relation to the formulation of Housing and Urban policies should be stated.

PROVINCIAL OBJECTIVES

The primary objective of the provincial government as stated in "Guidelines for the Seventies", (is) "the provision of adequate housing for all Manitobans by 1980".¹ There are four principles outlined in the "Guidelines" which are considered to be critical to the formulation of housing policies and programmes for the next decade. These four principles and how they interact with the various Provincial agencies, the Federal governments, the City of Winnipeg and its citizens, and the various environmental professionals (architects included), will be of paramount significance if the objectives of the provincial government are to be realized.

Following the previously mentioned document the four principles may be outlined as follows:

1. Maximization of the general well-being of Manitobans:

It is stated that housing policy will be directed to ensure that Manitobans will be able to afford satisfactory housing, i.e. housing that meets their needs. Needs being defined as people having a real choice in the marketplace. This means that besides providing more housing units there has to be more diversity in the types of units provided.

2. Greater equality of the human condition:

The aim is to eliminate substandard housing. Housing policy will be directed to ensure that the housing which is provided will meet at least minimum social and environmental standards.

Standards being defined in terms of shelter costs, overcrowding and poor building conditions.

3. The Stay Option:

The intent of housing policy will be to ensure that the resulting programmes will not prevent the people of Manitoba in choosing where or in what they live in or permit the unnecessary deterioration of neighbourhoods.

4. Widening Participation:

It is stated that housing policy will have to encourage and create opportunities for local residents to participate in the decision making process affecting their community and housing developments. This participation will require some decentralization of housing programs in order to assure that the citizens do have an effective role in the decision making process.

Underlying these four objectives, the provincial government states that "in order to derive sensitive and responsive housing policies for the next decade, we must understand people's needs and be prepared to take action where necessary to meet them."²

In numerous publications, there have been repeated references about the need for co-ordination and co-operation amongst the three levels of government in urban and related problems. The provincial government, therefore, enacted changes in its executive structure to improve this inter-governmental cooperation and to develop a closer

relationship between itself and the citizens of Manitoba.

PLANNING SECRETARIAT OF CABINET

In 1969, the Manitoba government initiated changes in its executive structure which were designed to make it possible to develop comprehensive provincial and urban policies. A Planning and Priorities Committee of the Cabinet (now called the Planning Secretariat of Cabinet) was established. The role of this secretariat was to "supervise the formation, by a strong Secretariat, of broad provincial development strategies and to coordinate the overall operation of government programmes."³

Following their election in 1969, the newly elected NDP government decided to elevate and strengthen the role of this Secretariat. The Premier assumed the chairmanship and the Minister of Finance became a permanent member. Other members include the ministers of: Agriculture, Mines and Natural Resources, Industry and Commerce, Attorney General, Municipal Affairs, Urban Affairs, and also MLA's with a special interest in areas of policy planning.

The Planning Secretariat is basically a service mechanism between the Premier and Cabinet, and is the means by which the Premier and Cabinet can ask direct questions and get direct answers as a cabinet. Thus, its major responsibility is to support and advise Cabinet on a variety of policy matters.

The Secretariats' function is to provide when necessary, a communications link to bring together all provincial line departments, and to facilitate inter-governmental co-ordination as well as co-operation of a number of outside institutions and agencies where they deal with more than one department of government. It is also a vehicle for policy formulation and research and an additional means of articulating policy alternatives for Cabinet. The role of the Secretariat, however, is to augment and supplement the line departments where necessary, but never to replace them. Because of these unique responsibilities, the Secretariat is able to provide the government with opportunities to examine comprehensively alternate provincial policies.

HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

The secretariat was assigned many roles and one of these was to interpret the social orientation of the government in terms of specific problems and policies. In the area of housing and community development, the provincial government recognized the important role that urban and regional planning had on the process of urbanization and the future social and economic development of Manitoba. In response to this concern, the Housing and Urban development (H.U.D.) policy desk was created within the Planning Secretariat of Cabinet.

Responsibilities of H.U.D.

The responsibilities of this department as described by the

Assistant Secretary for H.U.D. are:

1. Interpretation of public policy alternatives in terms of their implications for processes of urbanization and specific planning programmes and vice-versa,
2. to provide technical advice to Cabinet on matters of urban policy and planning strategy, as well as to elicit interest of Cabinet on matters of public concern in areas of urban and regional policy,
3. when requested, to review various alternatives under consideration by line departments and to suggest additional alternatives which might be usefully explored,
4. to monitor the effectiveness of various public programmes and policies in Manitoba with respect to their effect on urban policy, and
5. to serve as an additional information pipeline on matters of current urban policy concern as well as information on the range of human resources available and different problem solving techniques.

From this description, one can see that H.U.D.'s role is the formulation of urban policy. Because of this emphasis, the H.U.D. group is the main arm in the Planning Secretariat responsible for areas of urban development. As H.U.D.'s role is to formulate, and not implement, urban policy, it can be assumed that there would be a department responsible for the implementation of urban policy. A Provincial



Department of Urban Affairs was created in 1971, but for a different purpose which will be described in the following chapter. Before proceeding to the next chapter, H.U.D.'s relations to other agencies should be briefly explained.

Up to this point, emphasis has been placed on H.U.D.'s role rather than the policies it has formulated. This fact could be explained by the following: H.U.D. was only created in 1972, and H.U.D.'s function is to augment and supplement the line departments and not to replace them.

H.U.D. has intimate contacts, however, with other policy desks within the Planning Secretariat, and is an important communication link with other agencies concerned with the development of urban policy.

From conversations with officials from C.M.H.C. the federal agency responsible for housing delivery, it was observed that communication between H.U.D. and itself was relatively weak and other than Tri-level meetings, consisted mainly of informal contacts.

The regional coordinator for Planning and Research with the regional C.M.H.C. office expressed interest in establishing closer and more formal contacts with H.U.D. It was felt that if the regional office was going to represent the true policy objectives of the province to C.M.H.C. head office, it was necessary for them to have the contacts with the parties that are formulating provincial urban policy.

The provincial secretary for M.S.U.A. expressed similar views, but felt that his main function was to keep the monthly Tri-level meetings operational.

Relations with C.M.H.C. and M.S.U.A.

The H.U.D. staff generally felt that adequate communication does exist with C.M.H.C. and M.S.U.A. This communication is concentrated mainly at the Head Offices of these federal agencies as their field offices often lack the authority to make final decisions regarding fundamental policy matters.

Recognizing this problem, C.M.H.C. (in 1973) proposed to reorganize the corporation and redistribute functions between Head Office and field offices. Regional housing and community development needs are better understood by the field offices, and it was hoped that by decentralizing authority and resources to the field offices, a more effective, co-ordinated intergovernment approach to these needs would be realized.

These adjustments to the Corporations organization were to be implemented in the first half of 1974.

In the fall of 1974, however, local C.M.H.C. officials stated (by personal interview) that they had made commitments to M.H.R.C. but could never get them approved at higher levels. Either, the planned reorganization of C.M.H.C. has not occurred, or there is a reluctance at Head Office to decentralize authority to the field offices.

Whatever the reasons, the need for intergovernment co-operation is immediate, and it appears that Federal agencies (i.e. C.M.H.C.) will have to take the initial steps. The field offices are in the position to provide valuable advice and assistance to the province, all that is required is mutual co-operation.

Besides this intergovernment role, H.U.D. plays an important role within the Provincial government. This role and its relationship with other agencies will be included in the summary following the next chapter.

THE DEPARTMENT OF URBAN AFFAIRS, MANITOBA

In 1971 the provincial government restructured the metropolitan government of Winnipeg by creating Unicity. To compliment this new form of municipal government the province designated a minister responsible for Urban Affairs and established a Department of Urban Affairs. Under the act, Urban Affairs had the responsibility to administer the city of Winnipeg Act (Bill 36) and to coordinate and improve the "performance of the provincial government as a whole in its relationship with the Greater Winnipeg region."⁴

One Desk Approach

The provincial government initiated a one-desk approach between the city and itself to establish more effective communications with the city. Urban Affairs was assigned the responsibility to co-

ordinate this one-desk approach and provide a single provincial focus "which would function at once as a scanning device and a clearing house ...to coordinate programmes in which there are intersecting or conflicting lines or provincial and local authority."⁵

To compliment this one-desk approach an Urban Affairs Cabinet Committee and an Interdepartmental Co-ordinating Committee on Urban Affairs were also established.

By these measures, a continuous political and administrative consultative process was to be developed, to ensure that provincial and local programmes and policies would constitute a coherent whole in relation to both the Winnipeg region and overall provincial development. It was the aim of the provincial government, "by strengthening the autonomy of the city of Winnipeg and by providing a definitive co-ordinating focus within the provincial administration,"⁶ to create a "mechanism for a new and more freely co-operative relationship... a partnership...in the service of the citizens of Winnipeg."⁷

The province also recognized that if this new urban partnership were to be successful it must also include the participation of the federal government. It was hoped that Urban Affairs (Manitoba) would form a close liaison with the newly formed federal Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. Consultative relationships were established between the province, the city, and the Federal government, and in the summer of 1972:

"a tri-level committee on Winnipeg, consisting of city, provincial officials was established...for the purpose of providing continuous discussion on matters of common concern.⁸

It now appears that a true urban (municipal, provincial, federal partnership) exists (at least structurally) in the province of Manitoba. The only question to be raised is: does the Department of Urban Affairs fulfill its role and meet the needs and aspirations of the citizens of Winnipeg and those who are economically, socially, or culturally dependent upon Manitoba's dominant urban centre?

Some may agree that it is too early to judge the performance of Urban Affairs, as it is just four years old. This may be a valid point of view, but unfortunately, the problems of urbanization are with us now and will not wait.

Responsibilities of Urban Affairs.

So that the performance of Urban Affairs may be evaluated, its functions and duties as laid out in the Province of Manitoba's General Manual of Administration will be listed. For the sake of brevity, only the areas of responsibility that are relevant to Urban Policy development will be considered. These are as follows:

1. Advises the Minister on Urban Affairs policy matters; coordinates and manages the activities of the department; establishes and maintains effective intergovernmental and inter-departmental communications with respect to urban affairs.

2. Designs, directs, and evaluates on-going research into the efficiency and effectiveness of the City of Winnipeg Act and makes recommendations for appropriate revisions; advises with respect to coordination of government and government-assisted research into urban affairs.
3. Coordinates the planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation of provincial services delivered in urban areas; coordinates provincial urban financial relationships; provides for the administrative services required by the Department; oversees the collection, storage, and dissemination of information relating to urban affairs; and
4. Advises with respect to the planning and development of urban communities; provides liaison with other government agencies in matters related to urban planning.

From the above description one can see that the major role of Urban Affairs, with the exception of administering the City of Winnipeg Act, is to coordinate, advise, and provide administrative services to the provincial government with respect to urban affairs and planning.

However, the provincial government also assigned to urban affairs the responsibility for maintaining "effective inter-governmental communication with respect to urban affairs."

Relations with C.M.H.C. and M.S.U.A.

From conversations with federal officials there is evidence of some dissatisfaction with the performance of Provincial Urban Affairs in this area. Both C.M.H.C. and M.S.U.A. stated that there was very

little communication between themselves and Urban Affairs. M.S.U.A.'s only official contact with Urban Affairs is through the Tri-level meetings, and the provincial secretary for M.S.U.A. indicated all that Urban Affairs has done is to maintain the "status-quo", and arrange for the city to receive its budget allotment every year. He further stated that there existed a policy vacuum between the city and province and attributed this to the weak role played by Urban Affairs. Officials from C.M.H.C.'s regional office indicated, that they too had very little contact with Urban Affairs, and generally had little knowledge of the Province's plans in urban affairs. C.M.H.C.'s only contacts with the province were through the Tri-level meeting and its dealings with M.H.R.C. (The latter contact only existed because the Deputy Minister of Urban Affairs was the chairman of the Board of Directors of M.H.R.C.)

Urban Affairs is also responsible for maintaining "effective inter-departmental communications with respect to urban affairs." From conversations with officials from the provincial department of Urban Affairs and H.U.D., it became evident that inter-departmental communication was poor and there was some duplication between these two departments in the area of urban policy development.

Relationship with H.U.D.

It seemed very inefficient for the provincial government to have two separate departments responsible for the coordination of its urban policies and programmes. A much more effective use of these depart-

ments and their resources was necessary if the provincial government was going to formulate a coherent approach to urban affairs.

Comparing the two departments, Urban Affairs is much stronger than H.U.D. (*vis a vis* Winnipeg) in the diplomatic and political arena. H.U.D., however, because of its relationship with the Planning Secretariat, has more capability and credibility in the problems of social and economic urban problems.

A practical solution would be to re-structure these departments in some manner so they would compliment rather than compete with one another. Two possible ways in which this could be accomplished are:

1. Make H.U.D. a separate department by designating a minister responsible for it. This would allow H.U.D. to be the policy making secretariat and Urban Affairs to be the program delivery unit;
2. Unify H.U.D. and Urban Affairs under one department.

The first solution might prove unsatisfactory as it would replicate in many ways the problems that presently exist between C.M.H.C. and M.S.U.A. As stated earlier in this paper (page 28), C.M.H.C. and M.S.U.A. are separate agencies (although they are responsible to the same minister) and both have policy divisions. This causes many problems, as each one feels that the other should be its subordinate when it comes to matters of policy formulation.

For the above reasons, any re-structuring that would create

similar problems at the provincial level would be questionable.

The second solution which proposes to unify Urban Affairs and H.U.D. appears to offer the most benefits. Many of the problems that currently exist between these two departments would be eliminated by such action.

By utilizing the resources of H.U.D., Urban Affairs would be able to:

- provide a stronger single provincial focus for urban policy development and coordination,
- achieve a more comprehensive evaluation of provincial services delivered in urban areas, and
- provide a more comprehensive liaison with other government agencies in matters related to urban planning. This liaison would also be strengthened by H.U.D.'s contacts with other policy desks within the Planning Secretariat and other agencies concerned with the development of Urban policy.

This unification would effectively eliminate the lack of communication between H.U.D. and Urban Affairs and allow Urban Affairs to:

- direct its energies more effectively in evaluating the on-going research into the efficiency and effectiveness of the City of Winnipeg Act, and
- devote more time to advising upon the political issues that emerge in provincial-municipal urban negotiations.

H.U.D. would also benefit from unification as it would allow

H.U.D. to:

- focus all its resources to do what it does best...urban policy research and formulation, and

-improve its performance in urban policy development by being able to utilize the resources, including the staff, of Urban Affairs.

This unification would improve relations between the provincial administration and the City of Winnipeg. The one-desk policy approach that now exists between these two levels of government would be able to operate more effectively. At the present time Urban Affairs attempts to have its staff on every committee that deals with the city. This has proved to be a difficult, if not impossible, task, because of the overlaps of responsibilities and different departments involved. Although this one-desk approach is mandatory for official negotiations, it is unworkable for day to day problems. The availability of H.U.D.'s staff to Urban Affairs would greatly facilitate these negotiations (both official and day to day problems) and also allow H.U.D.'s staff to deal directly with the city officials in some instances. (Currently this is discouraged as Urban Affairs feels that the city is their responsibility and any negotiations should be through Urban Affairs).

In conclusion, the provincial government will have to improve performance in the development and delivery of urban policies. While it may be fair for the provincial government to criticize other levels of government (federal, municipal) the province is not free of criticism for its weak performance in respect to urban affairs.

It has been shown that the province is at times reluctant to communicate freely with other levels of government and lacks coordination in its urban affairs policies. The provincial government has a responsibility to the citizens of Manitoba to provide coherent urban policies and programmes, designed and delivered in the most effective, efficient manner possible. It could honor this responsibility by the commitment of more resources (human and economic) towards the development of a more determined approach to urban affairs.

MANITOBA HOUSING AND RENEWAL CORPORATION

The Housing and Renewal Act

On May 4, 1967, the Progressive Conservative Government passed "The Housing and Renewal Act", creating the Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corporation (M.H.R.C.). The purposes and objectives of the Act were, by definition to "improve standards of living accommodation in the province and to assist residents of the province to obtain living accommodation of reasonable standards."⁹

Compared to previous provincial housing legislation, (passed in Manitoba) the Act is much more fully developed in its organization and scope. Dr. Albert Rose noted in his article on "Canadian Housing policies" that:

"On prima facie evidence, the Manitoba legislation appears to be a full-blown development of provincial assumption of responsibility, at least in legislative terms. In scope and format this legislation rivals the National Housing Act itself."¹⁰

Prior to the Act, the initiative to develop public housing was left to the municipalities as the former Liberal and Progressive Conservative Governments lacked any real commitments in this area.

The 1967 Act, however, differed from previous legislation in that the province now took the initiative in the provision of Public Housing. The new legislation provided that the Corporation (M.H.R.C.) rather than the province may "with the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, enter into agreements with the Government of Manitoba...the Government of Canada, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, a municipality or a housing authority or with all or any of them...to provide housing, land, servicing...etc."¹¹

Although this legislation was passed in 1967, little was done at that time to implement the objectives of the Act. It was not until the election of the New Democratic Party in 1969, that the full potential of the Act was realized.

Prior to this, the former provincial governments had been firmly committed to home-ownership and the single family home. To this extent the NDP government's commitment to meet the housing needs of the poor through a massive public housing programme, has removed this ideological barrier.

The new government made no changes to the Act, as it was satisfied with its objectives and the strong role created for M.H.R.C. The Public Housing programme of M.H.R.C. as defined by the Act is to:

"(create) housing accommodation, for leasing to persons or families of low income in need of decent, safe, and sanitary housing...having regard to the shortage, overcrowding or congestion of housing accommodation."¹²

There was, however, an urgent need in Manitoba for public housing suitable for low-income families. Recognizing this need, the provincial government enlarged the staff of M.H.R.C. and instructed it to build as many public housing units in as short a time as possible.

Dependance on C.M.H.C.

It should be noted, that the success or failure of M.H.R.C.'s public housing programme is dependant upon the policies and financial support of C.M.H.C. The Corporation (M.H.R.C.) receives, a loan of 90% of the capital costs and a subsidization in the amount of 50% of the interim financing and operating costs, from C.M.H.C. to develop public housing. The Corporation has no guarantee that it will receive all the funds that it requires for its programmes. This can best be illustrated by the following remark made by Frank Fedoruk, general manager of M.H.R.C., at a recent conference describing the province's rental housing programme.

"The corporation (M.H.R.C.) planned a \$46 million public housing program, approved by provincial cabinet. But...the federal government (C.M.H.C.) had indicated that only \$11 million would be available for 1975-76!"¹³

Thus, even though the provincial government and M.H.R.C. are committed to a large public housing program, the scope and nature of this programme is largely determined by the annual budgetary decisions of C.M.H.C. C.M.H.C.'s annual budget is in turn dependent upon the budgetary decisions of the Federal Government.

Any decision by the federal government to divert funds from public housing to other programmes such as assisted home-ownership (A.H.O.P) limited dividend low-rental housing (L.D.) would have a direct influence (maybe detrimental) on Manitoba's public housing programme.

Changes in the Federal Government's Position on Public Housing.

Pierre De Bane, parliamentary assistant to Urban Affairs Minister Barney Danson, indicated in a recent speech that "the (Federal) government was taking a 'close look' at the entire public housing programme with a view to making changes."¹⁴ He continued to say that:

"Public housing will always have to be a useful solution to peoples housing needs....at least for the foreseeable future. But this does not mean it can't change in form, design and administration.

Even the best of programmes must be adjusted at times to social changes or to accommodate new and challenging ideas."¹⁵

He also emphasized a recent change in the N.H.A. which would:

"...make more privately built multiple-unit accommodation available at reasonable costs to low and moderate income families."16

More recently, Federal Urban Affairs Minister Barney Danson, announced that the federal government would be unable to finance "many good proposals" for rental housing units from the present rental housing budget.

"He (Danson) said in a news release that he may find some more money for the rental program.....which provides low interest loans to builders (private) for low-rental units." 17

The forementioned statements indicate that changes are occurring in the delivery of federally sponsored public housing programmes. These are programme, not policy, changes, as C.M.H.C. allocates the greater part of its budget to public housing.

By emphasizing privately built public housing, both single family (A.H.O.P.) and multiple-unit accommodation (L.D. Sect.15), it appears that the federal government is seriously questioning if public housing is a viable alternative to meet the housing needs of low-income families.

A federal emphasis towards privately built public housing might lead C.M.H.C. to decide that public housing under Section 43, is no longer a priority; C.M.H.C. could then divert funds from this programme to privately built public housing (e.g. A.H.O.P., L.D.... etc.). Such a decision would be damaging to Manitoba, as M.H.R.C.'s public hous-

ing is based upon funding under Section 43 of the N.H.A.

As previously mentioned, the NDP government has committed itself to a massive public housing programme. This fact was recently re-emphasized in a speech by Frank Fedoruk, general manager of M.H.R.C., in which he stated:

"...the first main objective of the government and the corporation is to meet the needs of the low-income people...not the wealthy, and not even the middle income person, but...families of low income."18

If C.M.H.C. financial support under Section 43 is severely curtailed, it is questionable if Manitoba has the necessary financial resources to meet this commitment on its own.

It is evident that the Manitoba government will have to convince the federal government that its continued financial support is essential to the housing needs of the province. In order to accomplish this, the provincial government must possess a housing policy that reflects the total needs of Manitoba; and be able to communicate the intent of this policy to the federal government.

Need for Improved Communication with the Federal Government

To some extent the policies and objectives of the government and M.H.R.C. are expressed through the monthly Tri-level meetings. Although Tri-level was established to provide communication between the three levels of government, it also enables some federal-provincial communication to occur. (M.H.R.C. is represented on Tri-level by: the Deputy

Minister of Urban Affairs, Manitoba (Chairman of the Board of Directors for M.H.R.C.); and the Assistant Secretary of H.U.D. (Vice-chairman of the Board*). This format is not entirely satisfactory as Tri-level was not designed to facilitate only federal-provincial communication.

One alternative to Tri-level would be to create a Federal-Provincial Bi-level Committee. The purpose of this committee would be to provide a forum where both governments could discuss common urban and housing related problems; and make decisions in regards to future programmes and policies. Membership would consist of both federal-provincial Ministers, senior officials and administrative personnel concerned with housing and urban policy formulation.

Meetings would occur on a semi-annual basis between the Ministers, and the senior officials and administrative personnel would meet monthly forming joint federal-provincial working sub-committees. These sub-committees, consisting of local federal-provincial officials, would provide valuable support, information and advice to the Ministers at the quarterly meetings.

These sub-committees would also provide the means for both governments to develop a more continuous dialogue between each other, and enable them to better anticipate any major differences in housing

*At the time of writing this thesis, the Assistant Secretary of H.U.D. was still Vice-chairman of the Board of M.H.R.C. However, he has now resigned his position.

programmes and policies that might occur.

The creation of such a dialogue would result in a tremendous improvement in federal-provincial inter-government communication. For, throughout this paper repeated references have been made to the inadequate state of such communication and M.H.R.C. is no exception.

From conversations with federal officials responsible for housing and urban affairs, it was stated that there is insufficient communication between M.H.R.C. and themselves, and any that existed is of an informal nature. The only significant federal-provincial liaison is between M.H.R.C. and C.M.H.C. and this existed only because of M.H.R.C.'s dependence on the housing programmes and financial support of C.M.H.C. Consequently communication between these two agencies consists mainly of official business (e.g. C.M.H.C. inspections, project approvals...etc.) rather than policy related issues.

At the provincial level, M.H.R.C.'s performance in inner-government communication appears to be just as inadequate as its federal-provincial inter-government communication.

As previously indicated, Urban Affairs and H.U.D. are represented on the Board of Directors of M.H.R.C. therefore, communication between M.H.R.C. and these two departments exists at this level. These three departments, however, share a common goal -- adequate housing and a healthy urban environment. Housing and Urban problems are highly interdependent, (as Lithwick indicated in "Urban Canada: problems and prospects.") and their solution requires an integrated approach by all

three levels of government. Such an approach at the provincial level would require some restructuring of these three departments.

FOOTNOTES

1. Government of Manitoba, Guidelines for the Seventies,
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2. Ibid., p.55.
3. N.H. Lithwick, Urban Canada: problems and prospects. (Ottawa,
C.M.H.C., 1970), p.182.
4. Government of Manitoba, Proposals for Urban Reorganization in
the Greater Winnipeg Area. (Winnipeg, 1970), p.28.
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6. Government of Manitoba. Guidelines, Volume 3, p.18.
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8. Ibid., p.19.
9. Government of Manitoba. "The Housing and Renewal Corporation Act",
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11. Government of Manitoba. The Housing Act, Part II, Public Housing
Sect. 15.
12. Ibid., Sect.1(s).
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III. CITY OF WINNIPEG

HAS THE PROBLEM BUT NEITHER THE MONEY NOR THE AUTHORITY.

III. CITY OF WINNIPEG

INTRODUCTION

"On January 1, 1972 a unique form for a major Canadian city area came into legal existence in Winnipeg. The legislation which gave birth to this new government replaced the previously fragmented municipal structure of twelve municipalities and a metropolitan corporation with a single unified city government which has exclusive municipal jurisdiction for the Greater Winnipeg area."

The establishment of the City of Winnipeg, or Unicity, was the result of legislation by the province of Manitoba. The provincial government in its White Paper December 1970, "Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater Winnipeg Area," recognized the fact that Winnipeg is a prime generator of economic life in the province. As stated in the White Paper the greater part of all the goods and services in the province are produced or generated in this area. It provides the most jobs and produces most of the tax revenues needed to support the province. From the province's point of view, it (Winnipeg) has become the greatest single repository of social ills within the province.

METRO

The previous two-tier system of local government (Metro), was an attempt by the provincial government to recognize that the Greater Winnipeg Urban Area was one interdependent unit, and there was a necessity for area wide coordination and control to ensure orderly growth. Unfortunately, the modified form of metropolitan government introduced

at the 1960 session of the provincial legislature was incapable of dealing with the very problem it was designed to solve. Although Metro effected major improvements in the quality of services under its jurisdiction, it could not solve effectively the problem of area wide finance, i.e. the equalization of expenditures and revenues throughout the entire metropolitan area. Metro's greatest weakness, however, was its inability to attract public and political support.

"Many citizens in Greater Winnipeg, faced with the complexities and confused authority of a two-tier system of local government, now find themselves unable to focus clearly on the responsible authority. The citizen often knows neither whom to blame for a given situation, to whom to turn for remedy, not to whom to tender advice if he feels he has a worthwhile idea to offer. The inevitable result is that the citizen begins to feel frustrated, alienated, and hence withdraws from active participation in the community. He is unable, in short, to exercise his full rights of democratic involvement in the level of government theoretically most responsible to his wishes."²

It was the view of the provincial government (in the White Paper), that if the local governments find themselves unable to meet the legislative needs of the community, it is, at least in part, because the senior government has failed to equip them with the structural machinery equal to the task. It then becomes the responsibility of the provincial authority to provide the necessary framework which will enable the local government (Winnipeg) to provide the necessary services and be brought closer to the people.

If the province accepts this responsibility and provides this framework to the local government, it must also acknowledge the fact

that the issues and problems generated by urban growth are not the whole responsibility of the senior government. In fact, the city government must be able not only to exercise fully the decision making process granted to it, but also to advise and counsel the senior government on matters which, while not within the city's complete jurisdiction, have a bearing on urban life. Thus the city must have the means to influence the decisions of the senior government when those decisions affect the city's residents.

UNICITY

Organization of Unicity

The provincial government, therefore, proposed a new and different solution to these problems which resulted in the formation of "Unicity".

"It is proposed that all major services and all fiscal resources, at the disposal of the community, be unified under central council....It is proposed that this council be so elected, and its duties so arranged as to afford direct contact, communication, and interaction between the citizen and his elected councillor."³

To achieve the above objectives, the structure of Unicity would consist primarily of a large representative city council and a number of community committees. The councillors would have two roles; one, as members of the council, and two, as members of the community committees.

"The unified council would be the exclusive law-making body responsible for all programmes under its control, for budgets, and for relationships with other jurisdictions."4

City Council: The size of the city council (50 members) was deliberate, so that it would be more directly responsible to the electors. Emphasis was placed on its role in the establishment of policy and the evaluation of its implementation. This new role for council was in direct contrast with the traditional role of focusing on housekeeping matters which were largely administrative in nature.

In order to allow council to effectively consider the major issues of urban policy, a system of committees was created: the executive policy committee and the standing committee on environment, finance, and works and operations (See Chart 1).

"It is through these committees that council is enabled to review the implementation of the programmes and the policies that have been decided upon."5

Executive Policy Committee: The principal task of the executive policy committee (EPC) of which the mayor is chairman, is the formulation and coordination of policy recommendations to council. The standing committees are linked to the executive policy committee by virtue of the fact that three of the committee's eleven members are the chairmen of their respective standing committees.




CHART 1.

In brief, the three main areas of responsibility assigned to the Executive Policy Committee are:

1. Formulation of policy recommendations to council
2. Coordination of policy proposals from standing committees, and,
3. programme review and coordination of policy implementation.

Thus, the executive policy committee would be the overall policy arm of the council and the three standing committees would concentrate on policy related to their specific functional areas.

Standing Committees: In brief, the responsibilities of the three standing committees (composed of 11 members of council) are:

1. To advise the executive policy committee with respect to the responsibilities assigned,
2. To ensure the implementation of city policies and programmes as assigned,
3. To review the annual estimates of revenues and expenditures of the city departments and services that have been assigned.

Thus:

"The act places emphasis on the primary responsibilities of the committees as being the formulation of policy recommendations and the evaluation of policy implementation by the administration."6

This structure provides the means whereby council can concentrate on "policy decision making" initiated by the committees. It will also allow council to be concerned largely with the issues and policies rather than the administrative detail that had been the frequent pre-occupation of municipal councils in the past.

Administrative Organization: To compliment this unified legislative structure the act also provided for the unified management of the administrative organization. This was achieved by council establishing a board of four appointed commissioners. These commissioners are: 1) the chief commissioner, 2) the commissioner of environment, 3) the commissioner of finance, and 4) the commissioner of operations. The chief commissioner acts as chairman of the Board of Commissioners and the Mayor is "ex officio" a member of the Board. (See Chart 2).

Thus, the Board of Commissioners constitutes a body parallel and complimentary to the unified legislative body and establishes a unified and cohesive form of general management on at least two levels. This management is structured in the following manner: the Commissioner of Environment serves the committee on environment, and so on. The Chief Commissioner serves in a capacity similar to that of the Executive Policy Committee, i.e. standing committees serve the Executive Policy Committee and the commissioners serve the Chief Commissioner.

Section 54 of the "Act" makes the Chief Commissioner responsible




CHART 2.

for the coordination of the implementation of all policies and programmes... He is authorized to direct any other appointed commissioner or employee in the performance of duties and responsibilities assigned to him by the Act or by council. More specifically, the Chief Commissioner is required by the Act to direct the budget bureau, the information system, law department, and the clerk's department.

Section 49 of the Act defines the responsibilities of the Board of Commissioners as:

1. The supervision of all employees and the operation of all departments and services, subject to general directions given by a standing committee or by a community committee, and
2. The implementation of all policies and programmes.

It is important to note that the commissioners have dual roles; as members of the Board of Commissioners (described above), and as persons responsible to their parallel legislative body, e.g. the Commissioner of Environment serves the Committee on Environment. Thus, each individual commissioner serves as a sort of chief administrative officer for the committee concerned with the services under its jurisdiction.

Community Committees: In the White Paper the provincial government stressed that the prime objective of the "Act" was to develop a "closer relationship between citizens and the local government system that serves them." In order to achieve this objective, in conjunction with

increasing the number of elected representatives per citizen, the concept of Community Committees was developed and incorporated into the "Unicity" legislation. Section 20(1) of the City of Winnipeg Act established 13 such community committees.

"Each is really a community committee of council and comprises the councillors who represent the wards within each particular community." 7

Section 23 of the Act, states the responsibilities of the Community Committees as being essentially to develop and implement techniques to:

1. maintain the closest possible communication between the city and the residents of the community,
2. provide the residents of the community with information concerning existing and potential city policies, programmes, and budgets.

The implementation of the above objectives is especially vital, as the citizens must be well informed before they can actively and effectively interact with the local government.

Section 24(1) of the Act also stipulates that each Community Committee shall hold meetings:

1. at least once a month....to consider the business of the community.
2. to facilitate participation by residents....in the preparation of submissions concerning the annual and capital budgets.

3. to consider progress reports on programs and projects of the city, and
4. at least once a year, hold a community conference which all residents of the community shall be invited to attend and participate in discussion of city programmes.

Resident Advisory Groups: To facilitate citizen involvement, provision is made in the Act, (Section 21(1)) for the formulation of Resident Advisory Groups (RAG's) which may be elected at any community conference referred to in Section 24(1) by the residents present at the community conference. The number of members, the manner of their election, and the period for which they are to serve, however, is to be determined solely by the residents. Thus, councillors in the community committee should have no direct influence on the election of the RAG group.

The designated role of the RAGs is to:

"assist the members of a community committee, i.e. the councillors comprising its membership, as to the performance of their functions under the Act."⁸

There must be an understanding of how Winnipeg is functioning in response to the creation of the City of Winnipeg Act. From reading this explanation of the Unicity legislation one could assume that "Unicity" is capable of dealing with all the issues and problems generated by urban growth. It may be recalled that the legislated intent of Unicity was twofold; policy making, and stimulation of citizen involvement. Any realistic discussion on Unicity must use these two stated functions as a basis for comments.

Performance of Unicity with regards to:

Policy Making

"The Act implied a programmatic policy development structure of decision making in which Council would delegate administrative details and implementation of policies to the administration through the Board of Commissioners, and the legislative details (as well as supervision of policy implementation) to the two sets of committees (standing and community) through the Executive Policy Committee. This delegation of responsibilities would leave the Council, operating on a party basis, to deliberate on and decide general policies, programmes and resolve major issues." 9 (see chart appendix 1).

Unicity Councils: As previously mentioned, Unicity Council was structured in a manner such that emphasis was placed on its role in the establishment and evaluation of policy. From personal unstructured interviews and documentation there is growing evidence that the policy role cast for council is not occurring. The creators of the Act assumed that the Act would work in its original state with minor, if any, modifications. This assumption is being very optimistic, not only in hoping for policy formulation, but also in assuming the councillors would coalesce around this policy, and the electorate were supposed to elect councillors according to policy.

The major failure of the Act was the assumption that the councillors (being lawyers, small businessmen, etc.) do in fact understand policy formulation and have a policy background. In fact, the reverse is true situation. This is further reinforced by the following quotes:

"The third motion of the first new council's meeting (12 October, 1971) was for adoption of the old City of Winnipeg's procedure by-law on an interim basis. With little deliberation as to alternatives, and with few changes in Council procedures, it was adopted on 25 October, 1972. As a result, Unicity Council (and committees) continued an unbroken tradition which dictates item-by-item consideration."¹⁰

The author of the above quote further stated: "I have searched in vain for any consideration of alternative procedures by the sub-committee on legislation, the I.C.E.C. and N.D.P. Caucuses. So far as I have discovered no one (including the drafters of the legislation and the Task Forces members) who has considered policy-oriented rules necessary or relevant."¹¹

The councillors tend to focus on the details, item by item problems rather than being concerned with a policy of programmes for guidance. This performance of the Councillors could be attributed for the following reasons:

1. They are not oriented towards policy.
2. They deal with items not policy.
3. Electorate does not relate to policies and does not elect the councillors on policies but rather on personalities,
4. The traditional disposition of the councillors, (which binds most of them together) is to keep local government costs down as much as possible.

It is important to note however, that the author is not stating that Unicity has made no policies. (In Professor Wichern's study he

indicates that there was an increase from 8% to 12% in policies considered by Unicity over the years 1972-73.) It is the manner in which these policies were handled by council that one has misgivings about Council's role in policy making. At a regular Council meeting everything from minor issues to overall development policies is included and almost all of these issues and policies are passed without anything more than (perhaps) discussion and a voice vote. Floor action (referring, tabling, amending, calling for a roll call vote) occurred in a minority of cases, although that minority includes major policies and issues such as proposals to amend the City of Winnipeg Act, Trizec, Centennial Celebrations, etc.

The problem is best described by Professor Wichern as:

"Unicity has centralized and focused issues into an area-wide political arena....and there are many of them. Combined with the routine, detail discussions and decisions on policies, these issues produced what is perhaps best described as "decisional overload" for the Unicity System." 12.

Because Council seems to have interpreted its role to be the consideration of many minor items; (in the proper procedural manner, item by item) it leaves very little time (or no time as stated by Prof. Wichern) to fulfill its role of policy-programme deliberation and determination.

"In fact, Council rejected meetings for consideration of policy. As early as 7 June, 1972, his worship the Mayor suggested that both the EPC and Council hold at least one meeting per month "to be devoted to exclusively to policy matters and delegation of authority." The clause was referred to council, laid over to a special meeting on 25 October and finally filed."13

Thus, it becomes obvious that the councillors either, do not want to consider the major issues of urban policy or do not have the expertise (or understanding) to think in policy terms. This behavior or lack of behavior towards urban policy is not just peculiar to the councillors, it is a common characteristic that permeates the entire Unicity structure.

Executive Policy Committee: The EPC, whose principal task has been described as the formation and coordination of policy recommendations to Council, has followed in the footsteps of Council in regards to Urban Policy. From the composition of the EPC (Mayor, Deputy Mayor, 3 chairmen of the standing committees and 6 members of Council) one would expect it to be a source of leadership for Council. Unfortunately the EPC also chose the path of least resistance and serves as a mini-council, but purely advisory to the main Council.

In 1973, the EPC handled over 600 items from other committees, as well as several hundred items from the Board of Commissioners. To 50 or 60 of these the EPC added its recommendations; to another 50 it referred back to committees, or to the Board of Commissioners. The majority it sent on to council with no action. It also had to deal with the greatest number of Council-referred clauses. As a result, it too spends most of its time dealing with clauses." 14

From the above quote, it is apparent that the EPC (like Council) devotes the majority of its time to the consideration of many individual items and in the process abrogated its responsibility to policy deliberation. The administration, not the EPC, has been the origin of most of the policies adopted.

"It (EPC) has reported crucial items such as appointments, organization of committees and subcommittees, environmental impact statements, etc. However, it still tends to spend most of its time in standing committee reports sometimes adding its recommendations to Council. This can be considered no more than a minor part of the activities prescribed for it in the Act. It is very weak on formulation of policies, weaker still on coordination of their implementation. Its implied performance (as a "cabinet") is virtually non-existent."¹⁵

This view is further reinforced by the Axworthy and Cassidy study, "Unicity The Transition", which found that 58% of the councillors felt the EPC was not acting as a "central policy-making unit", while 20% felt it was not decisive enough and 18% thought it had bad relations with the Council. Thus, even the councillors (whose own role in policy making is dismal), view the EPC as not providing the necessary leadership in the direction of policy formulation. Mayor Juba summarized the role of the EPC as:

"This Committee has a place in our new civic government. If it spends more time on policy matters and less on trivial things, it will succeed. But if it only scrutinizes everything that the standing committees recommend, then we don't need it."¹⁶

Standing Committees: The three standing committees, Environment, Finance and Works and Operations, emulate the performance of Council and the EPC with the exception that they handle only their own business and referred items. As stated earlier, the Act placed emphasis on the responsibilities of the committees to be the formulation of policy recommendations and the evaluation of policy implementation by the administration. The committees, however, have a

fairly good record and the environment committee has shown initiative and imagination in its performance. It has endorsed and gained council approval for programmes such as Neighbourhood Improvement Programmes, etc. Overall, the committees appear to be fulfilling their role as stated in the Act.

Board of Commissioners and Administration: It appears that much of the strength of Unicity lies in its administration. The Board of Commissioners appears to be performing its role as prescribed by the Act (see Appendix 1). As stated by Prof. Wichern:

"At the councillor's request...the administration has suggested many of the proposals that become policies. Most of the major policies, appearing in committee clauses received Board of Commissioner consideration, as did all budgets before and after going to standing and community committees."¹⁷

There exists, however, what has been described as a love/hate relationship between the councillors and commissioners. The councillors feel the commissioners have become too powerful and therefore view them with suspicion. "Many councillors feel that the commissioners are too 'powerful and independent' of council."¹⁸ It has been stated by some councillors that the commissioners became powerful by filling the vacuum left by council by not assuming a decision-making and policy-oriented role.

It appears that one of the main causes of friction between the councillors and commissioners is that the councillors feel that they should be involved in the administrative details as well as policy

matters. By attempting to do both, the councillors end up doing neither effectively. This attitude of the councillors towards the commissioners can best be summed up by the following quote:

"The attitudes (of the councillors) are a reflection of the separation of administration from policy-making, making it more difficult for councillors to be involved in everyday administration (especially with regards to streets, dogs, land development, etc.)"19

Citizen Involvement

"No attempt at urban reform can succeed unless it succeeds in strengthening the sense of identification, and intensifying the communication, between the citizen and his local government.....
...in a democracy, the elected representative must always be as responsive to, and as accountable to the people he represents as is humanly possible."20

Community Committees: As stated previously, the White Paper on Urban Reorganization, stressed the importance "that a closer relationship between citizens and their local government be made possible."21 The most important function for the Community Committees was "to provide ready access by the people to the local government system."22 Both Axworthy and Wichern state that the community committees are not fulfilling their intended roles (see Appendix 1) even though the Act assigned community committees the responsibility to "develop and implement techniques to maintain the closest possible communication with citizens."

This loose definition has caused much confusion in determining the exact role or responsibility for the community committees.

Prof. Wichern stated that "so far as I can determine from my own students', or others' research, no community committee is complying with the spirit or intent of the (Act)". Axworthy further backs up this view in stating:

"Administrators and councillors are not sure what the right steps are between Community Committees and Council, so they insist that every possible step be taken. The result is confusion. On the one hand, in the matter of zoning a number of costly and duplicate hearings must be held. On the other hand, Council may disregard the position of Community Committees on matters of local plans and services."²³

It appears that the community committees have lost most of their decision-making and supervisory activities to the central administration by lack of action. Indeed, according to Prof. Wichern, "The only powers the community committees have on their own at present is directing the uses to be made of unused city property and granting certain types of conditional uses."²⁴

The community committees spend most of their time involved in matters concerned with zoning. Under the Act, there was supposed to be developed District Area and Action Area Plans at the community levels. It was thought that if the land use for communities was understood then the lengthy discussions involved in individual applications could be minimized. To this date, none of these district area plans have been completed. As a result, citizens do not know what uses vacant lands are slated for, nor do developers who own land or plan

to purchase land know what type of project they can plan to build. The councillors only become concerned when an individual application comes before them. Consequently the citizens become frustrated and at times object to planned projects (i.e. Safeway in Ft. Rouge) as they do not know how their community is going to be developed.

The councillors have to deal with these irate citizens at community committee meetings and in the process devote considerable time to requests for zoning changes and variations. Prof. Wichern aptly summed up the performance of the community committees as:

"It is not surprising to find that less than a third of the councillors are satisfied with the role of the community committees; and that the majority of councillors think they don't have enough power and that more local control is needed."²⁵

Resident Advisory Groups:

"The Resident Advisory Group System built into the new local government structure was perhaps the most innovative aspect of the entire reorganization. It was an attempt to provide a legislated framework for citizen involvement."²⁶

The Resident Advisory Groups (RAGS) have attracted much attention but they seem to be the least defined and least powerful in the Unicity structure. Only their selection and duties are prescribed in the Act without any real definition of role. This has created much criticism of them and "they have been referred to as 'ineffectual' as a 'failure', as 'meaningless' and press reports have tended to emphasize

their problems.²⁷ Also, "slightly over half the councillors believe that citizen participation is necessary"²⁸ and for them this means citizens attending meetings and voting on election day. Once elected, councillors seem to find no further usefulness in citizen participation and expect any citizen involvement only when there is something to complain or protest about. They also believe that they were elected to make decisions, so they personally feel that they should make decisions based on their views and judgements.

In the fall of 1972, there was an attempt to form an Advisory Resource Council to assist the RAGs in their activities. Efforts to secure funding from the Federal government failed and the EPC decided not to grant funds as it felt this organization would "impose a shadow government on the elected representatives."²⁹ In Ft. Rouge, a storefront information centre called The City Plans and What Do You Think Shop was set up to provide information to local citizens but this operation recently closed.

Thus, even though the community committee system does provide the councillor with some flexibility (i.e. councillors may agree with constituents but be overridden by a majority of councillors in council) the decentralized decision-making structure leads to both councillor and citizen frustration. It has led to an increase in power for the central administration and a decrease in the strength of the community committees and RAGs. This in turn reduces the chances for effective citizen participation. The result is frustration and minimum involvement by citizens as they cannot affect decisions in any effective manner.

FOOTNOTES

1. City of Winnipeg, Winnipeg: Canada's Third Largest City.
(Winnipeg, 1973), p.8.
2. Government of Manitoba. Proposals for Urban Reorganization
in the Greater Winnipeg Area. (Winnipeg, 1970), p.5.
3. P.H. Wichern, Jr. (ed.). The Development of Urban Government
in the Winnipeg Area. (Winnipeg, 1973), p.62.
4. Government of Manitoba, Urban Reorganization, p.14.
5. Winnipeg, Canada's Third Largest City, p.25.
6. Ibid., p.24
7. Ibid., p.31.
8. Ibid., p.8.
9. P.H. Wichern, Jr. Winnipeg's Unicity After Two Years: Evalua-
tion of an Experiment in Urban Government. (Unpublished paper
presented at The Canadian Political Science Association Annual
Meeting, 3-6, June 1974, Toronto). (Winnipeg, 1974), p.18.
10. Ibid., p.20
11. Ibid., pp.19-20.
12. Ibid., p.25.
13. Ibid., p.28.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p.29.
16. Winnipeg Tribune, "Mayor Juba Looks Back on a Year of Frustration"
13 January, 1973, p.25.
17. Wichern, Unicity After Two Years, p.32.
18. Lloyd Axworthy and Jim Cassidy, Unicity: The Transition. (Winnipeg,
The Institute of Urban Studies, 1974), p.63.

19. Wichern, Unicity:After Two Years, p.32.
20. Government of Manitoba, Urban Reorganization,pp.9-10.
21. Ibid., p.18.
22. Ibid., p.19.
23. Axworthy and Cassidy, Unicity, p.191.
24. Wichern, Unicity: After Two Years. p.42.
25. Ibid., p.39.
26. Axworthy and Cassidy, Unicity, p.107.
27. Ibid., p.108.
28. Ibid., p.103.
29. Wichern, Unicity: After Two Years, p.41.

PART TWO

THE SOLUTION

I. ESTABLISHMENT OF A SHARED INFORMATION RESOURCE

INTRODUCTION

In order to understand the myriad difficulties involved in confronting the problems discussed in the thesis, we should first quote from Stafford Beer's CBC Massey Lectures of 1973; in his book "Designing Freedom" Beer states:

"Variety is the number of possible states of the system, and that number grows daily, for every institution, because of an ever-increasing range of possibilities afforded by education, by technology, by communications, by prosperity, and by the way these possibilities interact to generate yet more variety. In order to regulate a system, we have to absorb its variety. If we fail in this, the system becomes unstable."¹

Further, to paraphrase Ashby's Law, "The Law of Requisite Variety", Variety absorbs variety, and nothing else can. Therefore, this organ of administration to which we are referring must be able to collect, collate, correlate and disseminate information from a variety of sources to a variety of people. It follows, therefore, from part one that there currently exists:

1. inadequate communication between the three levels of government in matters concerning housing and urban problems,
2. inadequate inner-departmental communication within the various levels of government, and
3. very little effective citizen and professional involvement or participation in influencing the decisions that shape the urban environment on a micro or macro scale.

Part two will examine some of the reasons for these obstacles and demonstrate some alternative ways of allowing effective participation and communication to occur within the urban system.

In Manitoba, an accessible information resource and professional/citizen participation are both lacking in the present provincial decision making structure. It is proposed that a mechanism be established to enable this participation to take place in matters that directly or indirectly influence the built environment and human settlement.

It is reasonable to assume that man will continue to build and to be forced to make decisions that will reshape his urban environment. Decisions are currently being made by government bodies that result in the implementation of basically standard solutions. These solutions, however, in altogether too many cases, do not reflect the actual needs and desires of the users or the

character of the urban environment in question.

As a consequence, there is at present an adversary system based on a lack of information as opposed to a co-operative system based on information obtained and shared equally among all interested parties. It is obvious, therefore, that there should exist an information resource available to all and ready to resolve urban and environmental issues. These issues, of course, would encompass financial, physical and, perhaps, as important and most frequently ignored, aesthetic issues.

Any information, however, in whatever form, whether from libraries of published material or in computer data banks is useful only in proportion to its accessibility. Esoteric facts, available to the few, cannot be utilized by the many. The importance, therefore, of the ease of utilization cannot be overemphasized and all possible steps should be taken in this direction. The expertise and participation of interested environmental professionals is vital to the ultimate users and, ideally, should be readily available through the "shared information resource," as noted earlier.

Presumably the main reason for seeking this participation comes from the belief that people with experience, knowledge and responsibility, that is to say "the professionals", are not by themselves always providing specific solutions to identified

problems. So when one speaks of participation, what we have in mind is some kind of partnership in which the lay public will state the problems and the professionals will provide the solutions. But there are at least two considerable obstacles to overcome if such a partnership is to be successful.

First, design and planning problems are not easily stated without reference to possible solutions. Second, professionals have a continuing commitment to, and involvement in environmental problems, while lay groups rarely have the necessary technical background or the means to solve such problems. Normally such groups become involved in specific issues related to a particular location in order to modify the course of events by either preventing something from happening or causing something to happen. In either case they will confront adversaries, usually in the form of government or private corporate agencies, whom they will attempt to obstruct or to spur into action. Such a contest is frequently ill-starred even when both sides are earnestly and sincerely striving for agreement, and both sides sincerely believe they are right. The real difficulty often lies in the very different levels of information and resources which the adversaries command.

Information, knowledge, skill and experience cost money. Lay groups engaged in an environmental enterprise may be fortunate enough to enlist the "free" part-time services of some sympathetic professionals, some of whom may even be involved as citizens in the issues being contested. But even with professional assistance the

lay groups will still be unevenly matched against opponents who normally employ or retain full time professional specialists or consultants.

The effect of this uneven matching can be corrosive in a variety of ways and one can imagine the dangers surrounding such relationships. It has been said that even where good will exists, there will be cases of genuine misunderstanding.

There will, therefore, always be the likelihood of the specialists impatience with the layman, or the obverse, the layman's suspicion of the expert. The professional may also be less secure in his specialism than he should be and, as a consequence, may react defensively. On the other hand, the layman may react against the paternalistic attitude of the well-armed specialist. In short, everything appears to be against a useful, constructive dialogue in a situation where one side holds, or appears to hold all or most of the information and resources, while the other side has only a combination of modest resources and an acute concern.

There are substantive differences in these two positions, and it is upon these differences that the problems of adverse attitude, suspicion and reaction are based.

It is important, therefore, that we discuss and briefly

elucidate one of the many real human problems with which we are faced. This, of course, is the basic problem of communication.

The complexity of communication may be better illustrated by a brief explanation of Communication (or Information) Theory. Information theory, in fact, is the statistical study of Communication, but it should be noted that "[it] is not in the least concerned with meaning but with the simple mechanics of transmitting messages economically."² As Geoffrey Broadbent in his book, "Design In Architecture" states:

"It [Information Theory] is based on a systems view of the 'communication channel', the name used for any device or assemblage of devices by which information is passed from its original source to its final destination. Any communications channel, whatever its form - radio, television, cinematic, spoken, written, printed, photographed, drawn and so on -- can be represented by the same block schematic diagram which was worked out, initially, to represent a telephone channel."³

The essential elements of a communication channel are shown in the following diagram.




FIGURE 2.

Keeping the above quotations and diagram in mind and using them in conjunction with the following paragraph from Broadbent's "Design In Architecture" the problem of communication is amply illustrated.

"We will assume for our purposes that the information source and information destination are human brains, and the purpose of the channel is to pass messages from one brain to another. We may take it also that the source's intention, essentially, is to pass information to the destination so as to change the state of the latter. This suggests immediately that if the destination knows already what the source is going to say, then there will be no point in passing information; but there is more to this than intentions for, if the destination knows the source's intentions, it will be technically impossible for communication to take place, for communication depends, essentially, on the destination's uncertainty as to what the message is going to be. It will be impossible also for communication to take place if the destination has no means of understanding the source's message. In many cases source and destination share a common language and, in communications terms, language consists of a set of signs, or symbols, and a set of rules for using them. Written or spoken language, for instance, consists of words; these are signs, of which a finite number exist in a dictionary of that language. If transmitter and receiver both have copies of that dictionary - or understand its contents - then messages can be built up which consist of words selected from the list. To put it crudely, the source will have an idea of what it wants to communicate; it will choose the most appropriate words, pass them along the communications channel, the destination will then assimilate those words and, with luck, it might reconstruct some semblance of the source's original idea." 4

The above quotation draws our attention to the degree of difficulty encountered in establishing and transmitting messages accurately by a communications channel. To illustrate this, the process of transmitting information by a communication channel will be further explained.

First, the information must be "encoded" (Translated into a form which can be transmitted) and secondly, at the end of the channel be "decoded" (transmitted form translated back to the original state). The communication channel, in order to transmit the information, must also have a "transmitter", (e.g., a microphone), and a "receiver" (e.g., a loud-speaker).


To further complicate this transmittal process, the above elements are subject to "noise", "which is the communications engineer's term for anything which interferes with the accurate transmission of the message."⁵ In the case of the microphone - loud-speaker example, this may be static which will interfere with the accurate transmission of a message. Further noise may also be in the form of "semantic noise" - the message or information distorted at the source; and "perceptual noise" - the message or information distorted in the process of decoding.

Figure 2 will now be expanded to include these new elements, and will take the form shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3 graphically illustrates the problems involved in transmitting information accurately. It is therefore of paramount importance that whatever information one is trying to transmit, one should choose a language which is known to the receiver - and this will vary according to the needs of the expected users.

Precise information communicated accurately to the benefit of all users, therefore, must be the object of the "Shared Information Resource".

Now let us identify the parties involved.



The information source (e.g. a human brain) wishes to pass a message to the information destination (e.g. another human brain) so as to modify the latter's behaviour.

This information consists of ideas, thoughts, concepts, (signifieds) about people, objects or things (referents), which have to be codified into words, images, symbols (signifiers) selected from those available in the language. Sometimes no precise signifier exists, i.e. one which denotes the referent directly; the message has to be codified in terms of analogies, metaphors etc. selected by the information source for their connotations. This may introduce distortions (semantic noise) into the coding process.

The encoded message is then transmitted by some appropriate medium - speech, writing, drawing etc. according to the nature of the communications channel. The transmitter converts the message into a signal.

The channel may take any form which is capable of conveying information: radio, TV, a book, a letter, a drawing etc. Strictly speaking it is the medium used in transmitting the signal from a pair of wires, coaxial cable, band of radio frequencies, beam of light, marks on surface of paper etc. Whatever channel is used, the signal may be perturbed by mechanical noise - a term which betrays the origins of information theory in telecommunications, where it refers to the clicks, bumps and hisses of a telephone channel. But it can be applied to any disturbance in any channel; smudged lettering, tea-stains on a drawing etc.

The receiver performs a reverse function to the transmitter; it decodes the signal and reconstructs the original message from it.

If the original signals are carried largely denotational meanings, communication will be accurate - provided that the signal was not perturbed too much by mechanical noise as it passed through the channel. But if it contains signifiers with connotational meanings - analogies, metaphors and so on, then it is likely that the decoding will result in meanings which are rather different from those the source intended. The decoder will draw on his own experience of connotational meanings and this will introduce perceptual noise.

The destination's behaviour will change as a result of receiving the message - if only to the extent of rejecting it. But if the change is other than that desired by the message source, the latter will have failed to communicate.

FIGURE 3.

ADVERSARIES IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEST

First, it should be recognized that no one, nor one group possesses all the information or knowledge relevant to an environmental urban issue. There are at least two main sources of information, namely, "inside" or local knowledge, and "outside" or contextual knowledge. No environmental problem exists in a vacuum and however much the local "participants" may wish to exclude extraneous considerations, they are unlikely to be allowed to do so completely. Also, few environmental problems are unique, even though it may appear so to the layman who becomes involved. Every environmental issue belongs to a set of roughly similar issues which may or may not prove to be of any particular value. An awareness of similar problems and their solutions, is, if not a prerequisite to a successful solution, at least a great saver of time and effort.

External Agencies and In-groups

If we think of the adversaries in the environmental contest as the "external agency" (or "agencies) and the "in-group(s)", we can begin to see how they each occupy different parts of this field of information.

The "in-group" will generate a profusion of local knowledge (A), aimed at supporting a predetermined position or direction. It will

not generally know much about the context (B), that is the surrounding conditions or circumstances within which the issue exists; or the precedents (C), those similar issues elsewhere; or the general body of knowledge of environmental matters (D), which is common to all issues. It will, however, have a special or particular expression or concern in the problem which has activated the "in-group", or brought it into being.

The "external agency" will have a less-blinkered overview of the issue, but this is not to say that its "information" will be necessarily superior in all respects. Probably by comparison with the "in-group", it will be deficient in many aspects of (A) local knowledge, particularly in the important area of subjective or qualitative assessment. As regards (B) the context, (C) the precedents, and (D) the general knowledge, the "external agency" should in theory have a sound grasp of all these. In reality, however, its command of the field of knowledge will probably be very uneven. Figure 2 interfaces the various parts of this diagrammatically.

The large broken ring encloses the universal set of environmental knowledge which is constantly expanding by the addition of new knowledge and information. Within this universal set there exists two subsets; (B) and (C). (B) contains knowledge of the context, i.e. all environmental considerations relevant to the local issue, and (C) contains knowledge of all the useful precedents of the particular local issue. As some environmental issues would share the same precedents

and context, (B) and (C) would intersect. This intersect (A)(shaded area) would contain a smaller subset (a) which would represent all of the local knowledge unique to the particular issue. The "intersect" (A) would also contain all the general, contextual knowledge and precedents which were most immediately relevant to a particular local issue within it.




FIGURE 4.

In an attempt to better understand the different information resources of our environmental "adversaries", Fig.2. will be developed further.

Information Resources of the In-groups and the External Agencies

Firstly, those sets which represent our speculations about the knowledge or information of each adversary will be superimposed upon it. The small densely cross-hatched set in the centre will represent the information resources of the "in-group" at its poorest (1) and at its richest (2). (See Figure 3).

It must be stressed that the shape, size and relationship of these information sets are highly speculative and, as shown here, they are completely arbitrary. The main purpose of this example is to demonstrate just how little information the two adversaries might reasonably be expected to hold in common even when each possesses a considerable amount.

What these diagrams illustrate is that even though the adversaries have a substantial amount of information, there is very little cross fertilization and sharing of it, herein lies the crux of the problem.

If it is to be accepted that productive dialogue is aided by common knowledge and hindered by the lack of it, then what we must aspire to in achieving "public participation" in environmental issues (or indeed any other kind of issue) is to match as far as possible the information resources of the two adversaries. Also, of almost equal importance, they must start by recognizing from the outset,

the extent to which, and the ways in which their information resources differ.

As mentioned previously, the efficiency and management of an information resource is dependent upon its expected users: i.e. environmental professionals and citizen users. Before attempting to describe or propose any solution to obtain "public participation", we must consider how the professional and user interacts within the current system.

Role of Environmental Professional

Using the "external agency" (or agencies) and "in-group(s)" model, the following diagrams will demonstrate how the environmental professional is situated in a servant position. (See Figures 5, 6 and 7).

In these diagrams each participant (e.g. Federal government, provincial government, etc.) has information that the environmental professional requires to fulfill his professional role. Also, the participants have the ability to communicate with each other (e.g. citizen \longleftrightarrow provincial government), even though communication is indicated as an hierarchical structure. Under actual (real life) conditions, however, the hierarchical model is the rule rather than the exception.

It becomes apparent from the diagrams that membership in the




FIGURE 7.




FIGURE 8.




FIGURE 9.

"external agency" (or agencies) and "in-group(s)" model varies and is not constant or fixed. The participants who are labeled "external" or "in", in the environmental contest depends upon the particular situation or task being performed. The only participant that does not change its label is the citizen user. This can be attributed to the fact that the citizen's information resources are the weakest and he is usually more concerned with his local "micro" environment as compared with the "macro" regional concerns of the other participants. Consequently the citizen user lacks any real power or influence in the environmental contest and has to rely on the "external" members for information.

It is interesting to note the position that the environmental professional assumes in the diagrams. In each case he relies upon the same parties for information and straddles the division between the "external" and "in" participants. He, therefore, relies on the individual participants for information and consequently there is no guarantee that at any one time he will have all the information required to adequately perform his professional role. The professional may be able to improve his information resource by the use of his political ability, informal contacts or acquaintances to acquire additional information. This, however, could prove to be an unworkable solution for two reasons. Firstly, his contacts may not release the information and secondly, he may not have the political skills or have developed the needed social contacts. As a consequence the

professional may be in the position where he may have to provide an inferior service because of a lack of information.

The professional is, therefore, placed in the dilemma of having to provide a needed service but not being able to positively guarantee a complete service.

It seems that no matter what the situation is, the professional assumes (not necessarily by choice) the role of servant. This situation may be better demonstrated by the following diagram (See Figure 10).




FIGURE 10.

Government's Control Over Information

This diagram shows that the government has control over the greater portion of the available information and can, therefore, regulate the release of it. The professional and the citizen user do have access to some information, but their portion is small in comparison to the government's share. Even if the citizen user were able to acquire the needed information, he would probably lack the necessary resources (e.g. financial, professional, etc.) to properly utilize it.

There appears to be two elements missing: one, a readily accessible information resource and two, an ability by the citizen to effectively use and understand this information..

In order to demonstrate how these two problems can be overcome, Figure 10 will be developed further.




FIGURE 11.

Restructured Information Resource

Figure 11 now shows the information resource enlarged to include the environmental professional and citizen user within its boundaries. The majority of the information is now available and accessible to the concerned parties and the government controls only the information that it regards as privileged or sensitive to itself.

The inclusion of the environmental professional within the information base enables him to operate with a complete information resource. He can now interact more fully with the citizen user and government, because he does not have to rely upon his political skills, economic or social contacts, nor to depend upon other parties to release to him the necessary information. He is now in the position to render judgements and rational decisions based upon substantive information rather than having to resort to subjective or educated guesses.

Also, by placing the professional within the shared information resources, he is no longer a servant but rather an active participant in the urban environmental process. With this newly acquired independence, he can now show allegiance to a particular participant in an urban environmental issue on the basis of public decisions taken. This access to urban environmental related information enables the professional to assume a creative and important role in the process of urban change. It also helps to provide a more complete and professional service to both governments and citizen users.

As the citizen user now has access to previously inaccessible information, he can participate on a more equal basis with his adversaries in the environmental contest. He can use this information and act independently (similar to a citizen who uses legal information and defends himself) or can hire a professional to interpret the information and act on his behalf in an urban environmental issue.

A citizen, however, may not be able to realize the full potential of this information resource if he is financially unable to retain professional assistance. This situation could be made less serious through a programme of financial assistance for the environmentally disenfranchised. Such a programme could be developed more fully into a potent social instrument with wide ranging effects for both the citizen and the professional.

Environmental issues are only satisfactorily resolved when the interests of all parties have had a thorough hearing and are integrated into the solution(s). The disenfranchisement of any involved party can easily lead to an inequitable solution which may be no solution at all. Thus, there is a need for access to information resources by all parties and professional assistance for the citizen user. By allowing the citizen user to become involved in the process of urban and environmental change, it would enable him to participate on a more equal basis with environmental professionals and the various levels of government.

It is therefore suggested that urban-environmental problems could be more effectively resolved by the creation of a Citizen User Resource Base, or "CURB", as shown in Figure 11, page 106.

The following conclusions will provide further explanation as regards the methods of implementation and the levels of government participation required. Suffice to state here that the "citizen user" must have more detailed and usable information on which to base his decisions.

1. Stafford Beer, Designing Freedom, CBC Massey Lectures 1973, (CBC Publications 1974), p.21.
2. Geoffrey Broadbent, Design in Architecture, (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), p.214.
3. Ibid., p.207.
4. Ibid., p.207.
5. Ibid., p.209.

CONCLUSIONS

It follows therefore, that one of the premier requirements needed in a healthy environment must be the free exchange of urban information. Man himself, not mere technology, is the weak link in the chain leading to a healthy organized urban environment.

This thesis has pointed out many examples of how difficult it is to change opinions and methods; to make interested parties see the advantages; to disentangle political and related civil service procedures (at all levels of government) and to clear up misunderstandings.

Until very recently, government's main urban priority was the number of dwellings produced: housing, in their opinion, was a technical and financial problem. The quality of the urban and living environment was a minor concern to government, as only a few were interested in it and there was absolutely no question of public participation. Public participation is only now becoming a popular and fashionable term in Canada and the self-assurance of specialists and the bureaucratic machine is no longer accepted without question. The citizen users or future users of the "built environment" are making it clear that they want to be heard.*

*It should be pointed out that the term "citizen user" applies to an individual consumer of the "built-environment", be he a professional, politician, technocrat, or simply the average "citizen".

The provincial government of Manitoba recognized this situation by stressing the importance of public participation in local government by the establishment of 'Community Committees' and 'Resident Advisory Groups' in the recent City of Winnipeg Act or 'Unicity'. Unfortunately, despite the good intentions of the government, the result has been frustration and minimum involvement by the citizens as they cannot affect decisions in any effective manner. Because the user lacks any real information or the ability to act upon it, he remains (except for the occasional outburst such as the Safeway problem in Fort Rouge), an anonymous, passive, unknown recipient of a pre-built, pre-determined urban environment.

The politicians, civil servants, lawyers, clients, economists, architects, contractors and all those who play a role in the provision of human habitation will have to establish more effective means of communicating and working together. This will not happen at once, but it will result only from a slow process. This process will be dependent not only on technical innovations but on the growth of new insights. For the creation of the built environment is a collective activity which demands that all the participants be conversing about the same problems, or at least know when this is not so. Only in this way can technical and practical solutions emerge which will factually change the process of urbanism. The collection, storage and dissemination of urban information is not just a technical problem, but as the following quotation from 'Geoffrey Vickers' book, "Value System and Social Process", states it is dependent upon

the cooperation of all parties involved.

"Since we depend absolutely on communications, within societies, between societies, and between the generations, developments which threaten these communications with failure are a lethal form of trap. By failure of communication I do not mean the failure in the means to transmit, store, and process information. Of that we have already more than we can use. I mean failure to maintain, within and between political societies, appropriate shared ways of distinguishing the situations in which we act, the relations we want to regulate, the standards we need to apply, and the repertory of actions which are available to us. This fabric, on which communication depends, is itself largely the product of communication. Demands on it are rising. We need to consider what chance there is of meeting them and at what cost; especially at a time when new techniques for handling information are finding their way into the regulative process at all levels, based on assumptions about how that process works which are not, I think, well validated and at the same time changing the process more deeply than we realize.²

What will be the role of the architect in this situation?

Architects do not occupy a position of power in the overall framework of urban growth. Yet, it is they who occupy the closest relationship between man and the built-environment. Why? Because they are trained and educated to make practical connections between human problems and technical solutions. How can architects therefore change the prevailing situation? Let us examine this in depth.

In order to effect change in the urban environment, we do not wait for circumstances to change before anything can be done; something has to be done to change the circumstances. In short, there must be more participation by all parties and a more equitable sharing of information relating to urban problems. This participation, however, must be recognized so it will manifest itself in action

over a long period. The architects and the educators of architects must direct themselves towards developing techniques of relating more to the actual needs of the users, and in the process use the feedback from these users in assisting the actual decision making process.

To understand the scope of the problem, it must be remembered that in less than three generations Canada has gone out of the primarily agricultural into the industrial age, out of a basically rural into a largely urban way of life, and out of a natural into a man-made environment. This rapid transformation "was supplied by exploding technology and the novel institutions with which we exploded it and used its energy."² But, neither the technology nor the institutions which achieved the explosion are capable of dealing with its results. "The main problems of a technological age are not technological but political and cultural."³

This gradual transformation from a natural to a man-made environment has resulted in an increasingly complex world, which is so unpredictable, that it demands regulation by political decisions of increasing scope. Government is our major instrument of adaptation and correspondingly, in recent years there has been a massive and accelerating increase in the scope and volume of deliberate regulation of the national life. Government regulation now extends to the distribution of incomes, services, jobs, homes to education,

health and welfare, to economic, physical and social planning. It grows larger, yet our political institutions are repeatedly accused of failing to keep up with its (our) problems. This should not come as a complete surprise however, as political change is limited by the speed at which people can change their ideas of the world in which they live. New technology, however apparently beneficial to all, can not unify the world. Unification and integration are supposedly the fruits of political action; and the limits of political action are in part determined by the political system which governs us. This system will be explored in more detail in a more appropriate context.

It is readily apparent that this rural to urban switch, mentioned earlier, took place because of technological development; two of which are very important. Personal transportation (e.g., the automobile) and greatly improved highway systems. Larger towns grew larger and more congested at the expense of smaller centres. The problems related to the development of roads and traffic in urban areas and their influence on the urban environment may be best explained by the following quotation from the Buchanan Committee report, "Traffic in Towns".

"Apart from through traffic, which forms a surprisingly small and tractable part of the problem, urban traffic consists of journeys, which begin or end at urban buildings and which are generated by activities in those buildings. Thus the traffic is a function, of buildings.

Even more clearly, urban roads are a function of the way urban buildings are arranged. Buildings in towns need the accessibility which is required by the activities which they generate. If these activities clog the roads with traffic, the resultant mess is a symptom of a deeper problem, the problem of providing urban buildings with accessibility. This includes accessibility on foot, which conflicts with accessibility for vehicles. But even this is far too simple; for urban buildings need more than accessibility. They need services, light, clean air, quiet, perhaps a pleasant outlook and other amenities. These demands (summarized as environment) are not fully compatible with each other or with accessibility. The problem is to design towns that their buildings may enjoy that combination of accessibility and good environment which is deemed to be the best; and to enjoy it as fully as can be achieved with the resources available. What resources shall be made available and what priority shall be given to these conflicting demands—these are for the policy-maker, not the planner. But until the policy-maker has thus restructured his problem, he cannot make these decisions and until he does so, he cannot instruct his planners."⁴

Therefore, and notwithstanding the foregoing, it becomes increasingly apparent that the elected politician at whatever level of government, is the person in the government system directly accountable and responsible for policy decisions that affect the urban milieu. He reflects the voters preference and, imperfect as our democratic system might seem, it appears in the final analysis to work. The appointed civil servant, even senior officials, whose positions would seem to be most easily threatened, can withstand the winds of political change from party in power to party in power, philosophy to philosophy, while the elected representatives stands or falls at the whim of the electorate.

In Canada, our parliamentary system of government is based on two principles: responsible government and representative government.* More simply, the House of Commons represents the majority of the electors. The government is responsible to the House of Commons which in turn is responsible to the people. In effect, theoretically the people govern. I say theoretically because a political party in Canada may be elected to power with a large majority although it polled less than one half of the national vote. Further, a government with a well organized party majority behind it, need have little fear of defeat in the Canadian House of Commons. It can be defeated only if its own followers rebel, which is not the usual course of events in a "party" government.

In our parliamentary form of government the constitution provides for the fusion of executive and legislative powers by requiring overlapping membership in the Cabinet and Parliament. The cabinet consists of the highest executive members of state; the Prime Minister and the members of cabinet who direct federal departments such as : External Affairs, Justice, and so forth. "They are, in constitutional theory, collectively responsible to an elected Parliament for both new policy and, via legislative approval of annual expenditure appropriations, for on going policies and programs as well".⁵

In effect we have a cabinet system of government in Canada. This cabinet system centralizes governmental authority in the hands of any

*The following describes only the Federal level of government, however the legislative process is identical in form at the provincial level; e.g., the House of Commons becomes the Provincial legislature, the Cabinet remains the Cabinet and so on.

individual group who can maintain the loyalty or consent of a majority of Canada's elected representatives.

"Buttressed by the mass party organizations and a permanent public service, the Prime Minister, his cabinet, and senior officials have acquired the responsibility for authoritative decision-making and the power to behave as an inner circle in the Canadian legislative system."⁶

Thus in Canada we have elected representatives who serve at the behest of the public, an ideal democratic system. Why then such problems? The three levels of government, federal, provincial and municipal operate in different time frames, and as a consequence, elections in the various jurisdictions take place at the pleasure of the elected officials.

Therefore, only by the wildest freak of a chance could a voter effectively exercise his franchise without, at one and at the same time, supporting one, two, or even three political parties. In Canada, we have individuals who profess in all seriousness, to vote New Democratic provincially, Progressive Conservative federally, and to support the local ex-mayor, a former member of parliament who professes to be a Liberal, but ran as an Independent because of the French-English question. This ex-mayor, it should be pointed out, might be a man with an Irish name who speaks Ukrainian.

Further, M.H. Sproule-Jones in his monograph, "Public Choice and Federalism in Australia and Canada", draws our attention to the dilemma of the politician. This may be illustrated by the following

points from the above monograph.

- (a) Over one-half of the electorate holds a different party identification at one level of government from that which it holds at another level of government.
- (b) Only one-fifth of the electorate consists of members who would call themselves strong party identifiers and hence likely to support a party in all circumstances, are opposed to those members of the electorate who would call themselves independents, not very strong party identifiers or only fairly strong identifiers.
- (c) A large proportion of the electorate-sometimes one-half-will switch from voting for one party at the other level of government.
- (d) Of the 65 Federal and Provincial elections between 1900 and 1969, third parties received 10 per cent or more of the votes on 32 occasions, despite the difficulties of electing third parties under the single member plurality vote electoral system.
- (e) At least four parties are alive and well and represented in the Federal House of Commons, while at least three parties currently are represented in six Provincial Legislative Assemblies.
- (f) Although large proportions of the electorate do not engage in many forms of political participation other than voting, such as joining and exerting influence through interest groups concerned with public issues, or making direct contracts with elected and appointed officials, evidence suggests that most individuals attempt to maintain by attentiveness to the media and by, especially, discussions with friends, neighbours and co-workers.
- (g) Some 7 per cent of the population of each Canadian Province turns over because of interprovincial migration every five years. This financially costly option (given the size of Canadian Provinces) is exercised especially by the higher educated English-speaking demographic groups, and may be partly accounted for by the differing mixes of private and government goods from one Province to the next.⁷

These problems are real in the sense that they create or perhaps illuminate the real human problems regarding the priorities and concerns of the elected official. With the diffuse support they receive and the very diversity of this support, I feel these government bodies in many cases resemble Stephen Leacock's 'Lord Ronald', who "mounted his horse and rode madly off in all directions." The policy-maker's role is further complicated by the fact that the making of policy, especially in times of rapid change, involves continuing dialogue, and the dialogue between government and governed has become an immensely difficult exercise in communication; for all a government's actions are themselves communications, demanding explanation.

Thus the politician becomes involved in an endless exercise of explanation of his government's policies, hoping to instill trust in himself and the government he represents. It is critical that these explanations generate trust, for if the converse happens, the loyal opposition (an alternative government) would be more than willing to replace the existing government.

As it has been previously noted, policy-making is a collective enterprise, and the politician policy-maker is becoming even more dependent on the continuous processing and appraisal of information by the specialist-bureaucrat. This fact is reinforced by referring to "The Structures of Policy-Making in Canada,"⁸ a collection of

essays on the structures of policy-making in Canada. The editors of this book put forward the thesis that policy-making in Canada can be seen as a continuous contest between the new policy structure, operating in and around the cabinet, and the on-going structure, which operates mainly within the domain of the bureaucracy.

This contest is further complicated by the mammoth and complex task of the continuous planning required for the ever increasing and expanding urban-environment. Consider the previously mentioned Buchanan report; it elucidates the myriad of options offered to the policy-maker and how difficult it is for him to know which of the plans offered to him best combine the priorities implicit in his sense of values. As a result, the policy-maker may be no longer aware of all the terms in which his problems might be solved and is forced to turn to the specialist for advice.

With the introduction of new sophisticated methods of problem solving, (i.e., cybernetics, information theory, system analysis, and so on) by the specialist - bureaucrat, the policy-maker may find that his traditional method of valuation may have become outdated without his knowledge.

The solution of political problems is unique in the sense that "political problems, even more than industrial or military ones, do not lend themselves to solution by trial and error, since such errors, apart from being too costly and too slow in showing their effects, change the situation in which they are tried and leave new

problems in their place".⁹

Considering the above, it follows that the policy-maker in his traditional role is called upon to innovate in a way which makes him dependent upon the expert. It also suggests that the policy-maker must have more than a passing acquaintance with these new techniques, "or our systems analysts may become our most sophisticated politicians".¹⁰

However, even with the assistance of these techniques and experts, the policy-maker will still on occasion have to make decisions in conditions of complete uncertainty. Instances will arise, where different but equally probable assumptions put into the computer will yield opposite results. The elected official must then consider the social benefits and social costs of any policy, and its ultimate effect on the citizens.

It has been the basic assumption of our political life that policy is made by elected policy-makers. There is presently a growing debate about the distribution of power between elected government and its permanent staff. Just recently, the former Conservative Leader Robert Stanfield warned that "more and more, what Ottawa does is decided by and implemented by the bureaucracy. We are losing control by democratically elected people, both at the parliamentary and ministerial level".¹¹

He also called for freedom of information legislation and

for extensive staffing of parliamentary committees. However his call for a return to simpler times may evoke nostalgia but it hardly seems like a realistic solution. Big government cannot be made to go away any more than the horse and buggy era can be made to return.

In short, what Mr. Stanfield was asking, is how can government be more effectively and responsively managed. While not dealing with this problem in general terms but as limited by the scope of the thesis, the following suggestions should be considered.

The creation of a Federal-Provincial Bi-level Committee to deal with common urban and housing problems was suggested (see p.59). It was felt that this committee would create an improved dialogue between the federal-provincial governments.

The City of Winnipeg Act, 'Unicity', was faulted for its poor performance in regards to citizen participation even though the act stressed this particular point. It was also assumed that the councillors understood policy formulation and had a policy background (see p.75). The provincial government can be criticized for being overly optimistic in assuming the councillors would fall into this type of role. However, the Act is currently under review and as it may be restructured, further criticism would seem ill-founded at this time.

Part Two of the thesis suggests that because of government's control, an accessible information resource and professional-citizen participation are lacking (see p.88). It should be noted here that "all" levels of government are grossly deficient in making information sufficiently accessible. Conversely, we are at the same time captive to a voluminous flow of government statistics and information. We have though, no way to verify its accuracy or authenticity. The crux of the problem therefore is the government's total control over the majority of information.

There have been many suggestions recently made in regards to this issue. Canadian Labor Congress president, Joe Morris, has suggested the establishment of 'counterweights' to the present bureaucratic pulls. Such a body would include representatives of labor and business and perhaps be chaired by a government representative. It would be mainly advisory and consultative, but would have its own research staff to ensure it not becoming "captive to the massive flow of government statistics and information only".¹² This hard information thereby learned would be made available to 'CURB' (goud vide).

Gerald Baldwin, MP for Peace River, Alberta, Canada's foremost fighter for freedom of government information, has been attacking the federal government for the past decade. Baldwin and other members of Parliament have advocated a freedom of informa-

tion act similar to those in the United States and Sweden. Such an act would require legislation at the federal level, but if passed this type of legislation would be hopefully duplicated at the provincial levels. Such action would immediately release a flood of similar hard facts which could also be assimilated into 'CURB'.

This thesis does not suggest that a Nixon like "Stonewalling" is taking place in government; but merely individuals, sometimes highly placed in government, simply do not realize that the esoteric information they possess is needed by the users of the urban-environment. This information presently is simply not readily available in usable form. In short, a mechanism such as 'CURB' is desperately needed, and soon.

FOOTNOTES

1. Vickers Geoffrey, Value Systems and Social Process, Penguin Books Ltd., 1970, p.98.
2. Ibid., p.69.
3. Ibid., p.69.
4. Ibid., p.110.
5. Doern Bruce G. and Aucoin Peter, The Structures of Policy-Making In Canada, MacMillan of Canada, 1971, p.40.
6. Jackson Robert J. and Atkinson Michael M., The Canadian Legislative System, MacMillan of Canada, 1974, p.51.
7. Sproule-Jones, M.H., Public Choice and Federalism in Australia and Canada, Research Monograph No.11, Centre for Research on Federal Relations, The Australian National University: Canberra, 1975, p.75.
8. Doern, Policy-Making In Canada.
9. Vickers, Social Process, p.114.
10. Ibid., p.118.
11. Victoria Times, 18 March, 1977, p.5.
12. Ibid., October, 1976.

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APPENDIX I.

Legislative Intent Model:*
Institutions and Expected Performance

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Prescribed Performance: Act</u>	<u>Implied Performance</u>
1. Council	Exercise powers of City (sec. 7, 99-137) Use community communities (sec.22) May delegate powers or duties to standing committees (sec.37) May delegate administrative duties to board of commissioners (sec.47)	Deliberate, approve general policies and principal elements of programmes. Delegate authority to make implementation decisions (Plunkett, 1972.p.37).
2. Executive Policy Committee	Formulate policies for recommendation to Council and co-ordinate (implementation of policies (sec.30) Receive and consider reports and recommendations of board of commissioners (sec.32) Co-ordinate work by standing committees (sec.33) Report environmental impact, etc. of public works "which may significantly affect the quality of the human environment (sec.653)	"Cabinet" of council (Plunkett,1972 p.22). Exercise overall review of policy impacts.
3. Standing Committees	"Preparation of plans and programmes" respecting functional area, recommendation of policies for area (secs.38,39,40). Ensure implementation of policies and programmes (ibid.) Carry out oversight of specific tasks and services in functional area (Ibid.)	Take on powers and duties delegated by Council. (Plunkett 1972,p.24)

* Source: From Prof. P.H. Wichern's paper - Winnipeg's Unicity After Two Years:Evaluation of an Experiment in Urban Government.

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Prescribed Performance:Act</u>	<u>Implied Performance</u>
4. Board of Commissioners	<p>Administrative duties delegated by Council (sec.97). Supervision of all employees and operation of all departments and services "subject to general directions given by a standing committee or by a community committee (sec.49). Implementation of policies and programmes (<u>Ibid</u>) Designated responsibilities (sec.52,53,54 00 see diagram) Provide information to public (sec.78) Information system (sec.74).</p>	<p>Unified and cohesive management-- effective co-ordination and supervision of policy implementation delegated by council, through committees (Plunkett, 1972, pp.25-29). Rapid flow of information both internally and to public (Plunkett, p. 395).</p>
5. Community Committees	<p>"Develop and implement techniques to maintain closest possible communication" (sec.23) Hold yearly, quarterly, and monthly meetings on city policies and programmes (sec.24) Formulate budgets and service programmes (sec.27) Review, hold public hearings on plans, zoning, etc.(sec.575,583,586) Supervise delivery of services in community, but <u>not</u> exercise "ultimate administrative control over employees".(sec.22)</p>	<p>Effective information flow, maximum participation and involvement of citizens in budgeting, policy formulation, programme evaluation (Plunkett, 1972, pp.31-34). Monitoring and evaluation of services in community, feedback from citizens on them.</p>
6. Resident" Advisory Groups.	<p>"Advise and assist members of community committee as to the performance of their functions under the Act" (sec.27).</p>	<p>Assist in above by assessment, self-education, "creative tension" (pressure on councillors), "hubs for information", "core of constant participation" (Task Force on Community Committees 1971, pp.7-8).</p>