

SAINT OR HARLOT?

FRANCE IN THE AMERICAN PRESS, 1918-1924.

BY

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**A Thesis/Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University of  
Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirement of the degree  
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## DEDICATION:

I dedicate this thesis to my paternal grandmother, Isabelle Shattuck, née Walker, a thwarted scholar. Like so many women of her generation and before, Izzy was excluded from higher learning by poverty and tradition. She could have been a profoundly influential diplomat because she saw past stereotypes, discounted prejudice as ignorance, was a fierce defender of the underdog, and welcomed cultural differences. Our world is poorer today for the past exclusion of such intelligent women from academia.

I also dedicate this to my maternal grandmother, Alma Marcella, née MacGregor. Like Izzy, she was also denied a formal education. In spite of this, she instilled in her daughter, Laurie, the importance of higher learning, and survived long enough to see her attend University. It was from my mother that I learned to thirst for knowledge, and was never told I could not succeed because of my gender.



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## ABSTRACT

Following the 1918 armistice, the world settled into a precarious peace. France sought security from future German aggression, while the United States sought the repayment of war debts and European economic stability. Suspicions, hard feelings, and misunderstandings aggravated already war-weary nations, resulting in innumerable misconceptions. Many books have been written regarding the political and social climates of the period between 1918 and 1924. However, the relationship between these countries on a popular level has largely been ignored. To address this historical gap, this thesis examines the images of France that appeared in American newspapers from the end of World War One to the 1924 Dawes Plan, focussing on perceptions of French society, culture, and politics. The popular American opinions at the time reflect much ambiguity—France was both saint and harlot, loved and hated, inviting and repulsive. This ambiguity was reflected in American foreign policy, which was neither strict nor lax with the French government. The link between the press, public opinion, and foreign policy is tenuous at best, and is discussed in the conclusion.

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## INTRODUCTION

As the war clouds that had hovered over Europe for four years finally began to lift in 1918, the world was left with an uneasy peace. Victorious nations looked upon the damage they had incurred and sought compensation or retribution. Defeated ones searched for ways to appease their conquerors without losing more ground, either figuratively or literally. The reprieve from war, as Jean-Paul Sartre called it, was in fact fraught with tension.<sup>1</sup> All involved countries mourned their losses and hoped desperately for extended political calm, which seemed unlikely. The tumultuous interwar period,<sup>2</sup> as it has come to be known, was characterized by suspicion, anxiety, and grief.

This suspicion was aggravated by long-standing false perceptions and misunderstandings, both on a popular level and a diplomatic one. Nations allied against common enemies in wartime could generally ignore their own dissimilarities; not so easily done when those dissimilarities irritated the peace process. Suppressed hard feelings between former partners surfaced soon after the armistice, particularly over the penalizing of Germany in the Treaty of Versailles. Great Britain and America hesitated to support the French tendency toward retribution, for the strength of their prewar economies had relied on a strong Germany. France, on the other hand, had suffered terrible losses from various conflicts with Germany, not just the Great War but also the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), and thus felt that only a permanently hobbled neighbour would assure her security. The public of both nations interpreted the other through a complex veil of stereotypes and insecurities; while

Americans viewed the French as frivolous, corrupt, and decadent, the French soon came to see the Americans in France as brawling drunkards and womanizers, and Americans at home as moralistic hypocrites. Such divergence in opinion was repeated in, editorialised on, and discussed by newspapers around the world, though none more so than in the United States, where debates raged over all aspects of the troubled peace.

Similarly, in today's historic scholarship, the early interwar period is one of the most written about, discussed, and evaluated eras of western history. Among scholars and laymen alike, disagreements over the lead-up to World War Two seem endless: the European recovery from the devastation of the Great War, the implication of the Allies in Hitler's rise to power, the foreign relations of various countries involved, the results of the Treaty of Versailles, and the ineffectiveness of reparation payments. Little work has been done, however, on popular American opinion of France from 1918 to 1924, and none has relied upon contemporary newspapers to investigate those opinions.

The objective of the present study is to explore popular American perceptions of post-war France. Specifically, how did the American newspaper press portray France during the early inter-war period, from 1918 to 1924? These dates represent a period of fluctuation in relations between the two countries, covering the transition from their *de facto* alliance, to the post-1919 dip in mutual popularity, to the beginning of improved relations with the completion of the Dawes Plan on reparations in 1924. The images in the American press from the same era, therefore, are accordingly mixed. It is the contention of this thesis that American newspapers were entirely ambiguous toward France, portraying that nation as both a saint and a harlot. As a

result, the newspaper-reading public was exposed to these disparate images, images which depended on the policy of the newspaper owners. Although it is impossible to know what readers believed, or indeed, what sections of the newspapers they actually read, some assumptions can be made and will be discussed at more length in the pages to follow. It is of importance to remember that this is a look into contemporary *perspectives* of France, rather than realities. As readers, we have always been influenced by media authorities, and that was especially true of the newspaper readership in the post-war period. The radio had yet to become a household item, and televisions were not yet invented, making written media the most important news source.

To attain the objective set out here—that is, to examine how France was presented to the public of the United States—a series of related investigations will be made into the character of the American press world: the degree of harmony and dissonance in French and United States policy; the people responsible for the printed press in the United States; the interplay of positive and negative press images of France; and finally the difficult field of appraising the possible impact this mixed imagery had on public and official opinion. The print media then, as now, helped form public opinion and both determined and mirrored popular concerns. The thesis will conclude with a brief discussion of the repercussions that press images may have had on American policy toward France, arguing that the ambiguity found in the newspapers was reflected not only in public opinion but also in American politics.

Chapter One is a discussion of the Franco-American relationship, from the turn of the twentieth century to the Peace Conference, and emphasises American reading of France and her people. Franco-American relations between 1918 and 1924 are then

explored in more detail, emphasising the mixed nature of those relations: they were at once cooperative and accommodating, combative and resentful. Chapter Two follows with an in-depth look into the nature of the contemporary American press world using the *New York Times*, the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, and the *San Francisco Examiner*, the primary sources for this thesis, as examples. Their publishers, editors and journalists, and their various approaches to France, are examined and evaluated. Then, Chapter Three describes France the Saint: the positive images of France, specifically, how the newspapers treated her people, her culture, and her politics from 1918 to 1924. Chapter Four discusses France the Harlot: the negative images of the same three components. The conclusion begins with a brief look at images from 1924, and the contrasting images of France will be reconciled as much as is possible. Finally, theories about the tenuous relationship between press opinion, public opinion, and official opinion will be presented as they relate to this thesis.

## METHODOLOGY

Using three prominent newspapers from 1918 to 1924, this thesis examines the ebb and flow of France's political and cultural popularity in America. The dailies scrutinized are the *New York Times*, the *Chicago Tribune*, and the *San Francisco Examiner*, selected for their significant circulations, their regional locations, and their diverging business styles and politics. The *Times*, for example, was circulating 323,000 dailies by 1921.<sup>3</sup> William Randolph Hearst, owner of the *San Francisco Examiner* and an impressive syndicate, oversaw a circulation of 5,100,000 dailies and 6,800,000 Sunday publications by the 1930s.<sup>4</sup> By World War Two, the *Chicago Tribune*'s circulation was well over one million.<sup>5</sup> Further, they represent the eastern,

mid-west and western parts of America, and as such provide a useful range of style (liberal versus sensationalistic or arch-conservative) while informing on the different political atmospheres across the country. The *New York Times*, of course, by virtue of its sheer quality, occupied a unique status, especially in its extensive coverage of international affairs. Finally, all three newspapers reported on France with varying degrees of sympathy or hostility, and even within each paper there was significant multiplicity of images.

The time period covered by this thesis, 1918 to 1924, allowed for a variety of perceptions. American newspapers were generally well-disposed toward France in the two or three years immediately following the armistice. However, as the United States reverted to its traditional isolationism, they grew increasingly critical toward the end of 1923, until the 1924 Dawes Plan inspired new hope. In reporting on these changes, there was great discrepancy in each paper's point of view; the *New York Times* was, overall, far more complimentary and moderate than were the *Tribune* or the *Examiner*. This discrepancy was largely due to the reactionary and nationalistic natures of the editors and publishers of the latter two. These papers were not exclusively supportive or critical of France; there was much discrepancy within each paper. While it is impossible to know exactly who read these three newspapers, and of those, who read what sections of them, it must be assumed that many readers looked to the papers as a source of local and world news, and not just for scandal or comic strips. However, due to the sheer volume of these papers, reading each in its entirety was impossible for the purpose of this thesis. Thus, the selection of portrayals of France is limited to three categories of articles: social/intellectual values, cultural performance, and policy behaviour. While this process of selection is specific enough



to afford structure, it is inclusive enough to allow for a diversity of images. The normally positive representations of France as a leader in the fashion industry (cultural performance) were counterbalanced by far less glowing portrayals of her in the turbulent political arena (policy behaviour). Such variations led to interesting questions, some of which are mentioned above. It is hoped that the examination of media perceptions of France will contribute to our knowledge of the general socio-political climate of the early inter-war years by specifically addressing how the American people viewed France and the relationship between their two countries. In doing so, it is possible to examine the delicate connection among press opinion, public opinion, and official policy.

In examining the cultural and political relationship between two nations, newspapers are an invaluable resource. As Bernard Cohen notes, the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling people what to think *about*.”<sup>6</sup> If this argument is true, then newspapers both determine and reflect the concerns of their readers by reporting on carefully selected contemporary issues widely considered important. The selection of what is “newsworthy” is done largely by editors and publishers who may believe they are printing what is of interest to readers, but who are, in fact, “powerfully determining what they [the readers] will be thinking about, and talking about...”<sup>7</sup> Further, the reportage of a foreign event passes through several lenses, refracting it into what Leonard Doob argues is propaganda; from the reporter’s own biases, to cuts made to a given story to make it fit its assigned spot on a page, articles are changed to reflect that paper’s policy. In his Public Opinion and Propaganda, Doob argues that

the impact of newspapers on the American public has historically been great, particularly prior to the advent of the radio.

Robert Young has recently used a method like the one utilised here, and indeed it is from his work that the present study stemmed. In his upcoming book he examines this era's propaganda and compares the American media's treatment of France with that of Germany in 1939 and 1940.<sup>8</sup> This thesis relies on similar methodology but focuses on the early inter-war period, and deals with the portrayal of France alone.

Ultimately, this is an examination of one country's views of another, and in this sense it is a cultural history. However, this thesis crosses the boundaries of that academic label by exploring American press perceptions of French foreign politics. In addition to the three newspapers, contemporary writings by journalists in the form of memoirs have also been important sources for the present study, thus adding an element of social history. For instance, journalists such as Walter Duranty and George Seldes provided an indication of their perceptions and prejudices in their memoirs about France. Memoirs such as these ensure the human element while reminding us of the subjectivity of reporters.

It is difficult to assess the influence of the press on public opinion, and even more so on the conduct of a nation's foreign policy, a thorny issue that will be addressed in the conclusion. To do so requires an inquiry into theories on the "impact" of mass media on readers. However tentative our suppositions are likely to be, it is important to demonstrate the role newspapers played in constructing France for the American public, and providing American policy makers with a prescribed set of stereotypes and cultural assumptions, since it is the contention of this author that

the press had a significant influence on popular opinion, which in turn influenced official policy.

## HISTORIOGRAPHY

There was a large body of literature required for this study, and for most of the areas covered here, there was a rich source base. Complexities of Franco-American relations in the post-war era were made clearer by works such as the following. Sally Marks explores the idea of overcoming differences in national perspectives in The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918-1933. Marks succinctly describes France's disappointment with the Treaty of Versailles, and attributes her aggressive stance on reparation payments to acute insecurity. Anthony Adamthwaite describes the tensions and conflict at the Paris Peace Conference in Grandeur and Misery: France's Bid for Power in Europe 1914-1940. Leaders of Great Britain and the United States, whose countries were separated from Germany by oceans, could not understand the degree of anxiety felt by the French who shared a border with, and had already suffered previous invasions from, that country. Similarly, Blumenthal's France and the United States: Their Diplomatic Relations, 1789-1914 points out another reason for such anxiety was that France's once prominent place in European economics had faltered by 1914, due in part to her largely agrarian economy and stagnant birth rate. However, most troubling for the French, according to "The Myths of Reparations", also by Marks, was that Germany's consistent avoidance of reparation payments went unpunished by leading world powers. In 1923, France's desperate need for resources culminated in her invasion of the Ruhr in an attempt to seize some of the payments owed her by Germany. France felt betrayed by her allies

as a result of their lax attitude toward Germany's default, and John Keiger and William Keylor provided valuable insights into her sense of betrayal.

There are several other seminal works on Franco-American relations, one of which is, again, by Henry Blumenthal. In Illusion and Reality in Franco-American Diplomacy 1914- 1945, he describes a number of misconceptions, and false assumptions shared, by both France and America. He argues that France looked to the United States for support in both world wars, presuming they would be her ally but not allowing for America's own plans. The French, according to Blumenthal, believed that Americans were as "Franco-phial" as they themselves were, but in reality the United States only joined the war because their own economy was threatened, and not out of a love for France.

In addition to the political connection, the social relationship between France and America must also be considered. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle's France and the United States, From the Beginnings to the Present provides an interesting description of the mutual cultural perceptions between the two nations. In the half-century prior to World War One, Americans were, he argues, only marginally interested in the French, although there was a lively interest in the opposite direction. Stereotypes at the time were mutually contemptuous. For example, both thought the other nation highly immoral due to women's behaviour; the French could not understand the freedom practised by American women in courtship, while Americans could not understand the tacitly tolerated rate of infidelity in French arranged marriages. This is but one example of perceptions and misunderstandings at a popular level. Also on French culture, The French in Love and War, by Charles Rearick, describes the atmosphere in France during *les années folles*: they were "a time of madcap living it

up for some people, but for a much greater number they were a sobering time of coming to terms with the war and its toll.”<sup>9</sup> It was as much a time for celebrating the end of the war as it was to grieve and express what is now called survivor’s guilt. The short hair and skirt styles, and women’s behaviour in general, so scandalous to conservatives both in France and America, represented a minority, according to Mary Louise Roberts. Another pivotal source that examines the period before the war is by Henry Blumenthal. Significantly, American and French Culture, 1800-1900: Intellectual Exchanges in Art, Science, Literature, and Society discusses the press as he compares the two countries and their cultural relationship prior to the First World War. The American press, Blumenthal argues, was an enormous industry compared to its foreign associates, and somewhat unique in its freedom. Blumenthal perhaps overstates this freedom, as we know that Alfred Ochs of the *Times* struggled from the beginning to keep his papers free of special interest groups and their demands.

The post-war hedonism which has come to be almost synonymous with French culture in the 1920s has been thoroughly examined by Mary Louise Roberts in Civilisation Without Sexes, in an article on women’s dress, and in her PhD thesis, The Great War, Cultural Crisis, and the Debate on Women in France, 1919-1924. Her argument is that the momentous changes in women’s behaviour and fashion were an expression of prevailing pessimism, an indication that the damage of the war extended beyond cultural artefacts and into the realm of “nature”, i.e.-traditional gender roles. Social and intellectual cultural values at the time were reflected in debates over women, debates which eased the impact of the war by identifying problems more readily understood—and more easily controlled—than that of the falling franc.

Such cultural dissonance and perceptual change is also explored by Charles Brooks in America in France's Hopes and Fears, 1890-1920 vol. 2. The love for America so prevalent in the war years, especially after 1917, faded quickly in peacetime, as was evident in the plays and popular entertainment of the day. Brooks argues that the relationship between the two countries "was far more assumed than actual"; in sharing a common enemy, distinctions were glossed over. However, this was not possible in the "harsher glare of peace."<sup>10</sup> Cultural relations of this period are marked by tension, and cultural differences aggravated by post-war trauma. The latter was described by Omer Bartov's article "Martyr's Vengeance: Memory, Trauma, and Fear of War in France, 1918-1940." The cultural legacy of the war was the subject of the three helpful and insightful works by Mary Louise Roberts mentioned above.

In addition to relations between France and the United States, the American media must also be considered. Unfortunately, the sources on the specific newspapers are limited and many are dated. Elmer Davies' History of the New York Times, 1851-1921 is one such book. Davies writes glowingly of the *Times*, with little attention to critical analysis, and cites few sources, giving his work the feel of a long advertisement (likely because the book was published by the paper itself). Meyer Berger's The Story of the New York Times; 1851-1951 provides more discussion of the paper, though it, too, lists virtually none of the sources used by the author.

A less direct route to an historical examination of these papers is through biographies of their editors and publishers. The most infamous was, of course, William Randolph Hearst (1863-1951), owner of the *San Francisco Examiner*. In addition to John Trebbel's The Life and Times of William Randolph Hearst, Ian Murgridge's The View from Xanadu is an in-depth and informative look into the life of

one of the most notorious newspapermen in American history. Mugridge's goal was to assess Hearst's views of United States foreign policy and the impact he had on the government through his franchise. Although he sometimes defended France, Hearst more often faulted her for being a militaristic country, and just for being European. On the same topic is Hugh Cudlipp's The Prerogative of the Harlot: Press Barons and Power. Hearst took primarily an isolationist stance, as did that of Robert McCormick, head of the *Chicago Tribune*. Two books inform on McCormick and his work: James Edwards' The Foreign Policy of Colonel McCormick's Tribune, 1929-1941, and Richard Norton Smith's The Colonel: The Life and Legend of Robert R. McCormick, 1880-1955. These are both insightful, if at times cumbersome, sources. On the owner of the *New York Times*, Alfred S. Ochs, there is an article entitled "All the News That's Fit to Print: Adolph Ochs and the New York Times", by Stephen Ostrander, in addition to the books about his paper mentioned above. There are also very extensive entries on each of these men in the Dictionary of Literary Biography, as well as on many of the journalists working under them, including Walter Duranty, Anne O' Hare McCormick, Charles Grasty, and Winifred Black. Although these papers were news organs, their respective tones were also set by the agendas of the owner/editors.

About the relationship between the press and the public, there are many seminal works. Walter Lippman's Public Opinion argues against the objectivity of reporters, and states that stereotypes play an important and undeniable role in journalism: "We are told about the world before we see it. We imagined most things before we experience them. And these preconceptions, unless education has made us acutely aware, govern deeply the whole process of perception...."<sup>11</sup> The stereotype offers an easy and convenient order to the world, and thus challenging them causes great

anxiety. There are a few books pertaining to national stereotyping in the early interwar period between America and France that are useful. Crane Brinton and W.C. Brownell's books are telling of mutual misconceptions held by the French and the Americans.<sup>12</sup>

Several theoretical works have been written on the interrelationship between the press, public, and official opinions, in addition to those mentioned above. Articles collected in Markel's Public Opinion and Foreign Policy discuss the important role the press plays in informing the public about international affairs. In his own chapter, Markel argues that of the three factors which shape public opinion—the government, the press, and citizen groups—it is usually the press that is most influential. William Chittick goes a step further by suggesting that the media historically have had a significant impact on the State Department itself, acting as an important channel of communications between various governmental departments otherwise isolated.<sup>13</sup> Prior to World War Two newspapers were virtually the sole channel of communication between the State Department and the public. This has not always been an efficient channel, as Martin Kriesberg argues. In his article "Dark Areas of Ignorance", he shows that the American public has been chronically uninformed on foreign affairs issues in times past, and outlines the groups most ignorant of them according to a 1940 census. From these and other works, a pattern of mutuality emerges: the press was owned by individuals with political agendas and the contents of newspapers reflected those agendas; thus those individuals helped shape public opinion, and the public, in turn, helped shape official policy. In relation to the study proposed here, images of France were projected throughout the American printed media to the public. These popular opinions were formed and manipulated by



newspapermen, and their work in turn influenced United States foreign policy. This relationship was also inverted; the press relied on the State Department for information on foreign policy, and that information was filtered through newspapers to the public.<sup>14</sup> This filtration process caused policy to be interpreted for readers by an often biased press, to be simplified by officials with their own agendas, interested in political success and determined to win public approval. This complicated topic will be explored more profoundly in the conclusion. However, it is not the tenuous correlation between popular beliefs and governmental action that is the primary focus of this work; that correlation merely indicates the importance of this study. Rather, the central topic is the way in which one group of people looks upon a “foreign” group, and what perceptions say about the observers themselves.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre, The Reprieve (London: Penguin Books, 1963).
- <sup>2</sup> Typically, the inter-war period extends from 1918 to the outbreak of World War Two, 1939. Although this thesis does not include the latter half that era, the period from 1918 to 1924 will nonetheless be referred to as "interwar" for the purpose of ease.
- <sup>3</sup> Meyer Berger, The Story of the New York Times, 1851-1951 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951), 240-241.
- <sup>4</sup> Ian Mugridge, The View From Xanadu: William Randolph Hearst and United States Foreign Policy (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 19.
- <sup>5</sup> Caryl H. Sewell, "Robert R. McCormick", in Dictionary of Literary Biography, (hereafter DLB) vol. 29, p. 205.
- <sup>6</sup> Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 13.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>8</sup> He has discussed this book and provides a brief look into its findings in "In the Eye of the Beholder: The Cultural Representation of France and Germany by the New York Times, 1939-1940" in The French Defeat of 1940, Joel Blatt, ed. (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1998).
- <sup>9</sup> Charles Rearick, The French in Love and War: Popular Culture in the Era of the World Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 43.
- <sup>10</sup> Charles Brooks, America in France's Hopes and Fears, 1890- 1920, vol. 2 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987), 567.
- <sup>11</sup> Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 59.
- <sup>12</sup> Crane Brinton, The Americans and the French, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). See also W.C. Brownell, French Traits: An Essay in Comparative Criticism, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919).
- <sup>13</sup> William Chittick, State Department, Press, and Pressure Groups: A Role Analysis, (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970).
- <sup>14</sup> For a more detailed discussion of this interrelationship see Ralph Levering, The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1978, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1978).

## CHAPTER 1: PAST AND PRESENT— THE FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP, 1918 TO 1924

It is difficult to summarize the historical relationship between the United States and France; it has been as full of ambiguity as intensity, dominated as much by mutual admiration as disdain. If the relationship could be seen as a string, it would be taut, the tension created by, on one end, a commonality and 'meeting of minds' on idealistic issues such as republicanism, democracy, and the freedom of speech. Pulling on the other end would be the divisiveness of politics and culture. In essence, the strain has been caused by opposition between idealism and reality. There have always been points of contention, often clouded by myths or stereotypes, which have evoked strong reactions from both governments and individuals. Many of today's cherished clichés about the French have roots in the period presently under study—1918 to 1924—and some date back even further.

This chapter will deal primarily with cultural and inter-governmental relations, from the Great War to the Dawes Plan, casting a brief but important look into the images and politics that predate the twentieth century. More exhaustive discussions have already been written, but the overview below will serve as an important and useful context in which to frame the images garnered from the newspaper articles examined in chapters three and four: specifically, those of the Saint/Harlot duality. These media images shaped the opinion of American readers about France; their opinions, it will be argued, in turn helped shape the country's foreign policy. However, before broaching the difficult issue of public opinion and foreign policy, the less complicated subject of

Franco-American relations must first be examined to discover contemporary American impressions of the French, and for the events that helped to form them.

Most historians agree that the Franco-American bond dates back to the American War of Independence (1775-1783). In desperate need of assistance against the powerful British, the Americans found an ally in the French. The French government was interested in ending British dominance in North America, while the French people were taken with the idea of this infant republic struggling for its sovereignty. French people recognised in the new United States a dream come true—"a simpler, healthier, more virtuous society, established in virgin land of limitless possibilities; a new nation constituting itself from first principles."<sup>1</sup> Although their means of attaining the goals of republicanism and democracy have been different, the French and Americans have always shared a strong belief in their importance. The perceptions of America bore little resemblance to the reality of life in the United States, but the hopes and dreams contributed to the beginnings of the French Revolution in 1789. Following both the American and subsequent French Revolutions, relations were haphazard and fragmented as the new governments focused on establishing themselves. However, the French people remained fervently interested in, and curious about, the new government across the Atlantic. They were even a little envious of the American opportunity for self-government, and the apparent freedoms many Americans enjoyed—of travel, thought, and assembly.<sup>2</sup>

While the nineteenth century witnessed a renewal of mutual interest on a societal and political level, diplomats on both sides attempted to gloss over substantial political tensions by perpetuating the myth of historic harmony and amity, a myth authenticated

by images drawn from their alliance during the American Revolution.<sup>3</sup> This blurring of political realities was greatly assisted by the late-nineteenth century trend among wealthy Americans to experience European culture first-hand. The trend quickly became a national obsession, with an increase of 65,000 transatlantic travellers between 1870 to 1885, and the numbers kept growing.<sup>4</sup> Some visitors stayed, resulting in a well-established resident population of American writers and poets in Paris by the turn of the twentieth century. At this time, European culture in general, and French culture in particular, was held up in America as the standard against which all was measured. Frenchmen and most Americans agreed upon the primacy of France's genius in the arts, gastronomy, science, and literature. Elizabeth B. White pointed out that this nineteenth century American admiration for France's culture spilled over into social institutions: "...French educational systems exercised a great influence upon our schools and French intellectual achievement was highly respected."<sup>5</sup> America also held at this time a profound respect and admiration for France as the fashion centre of the world, and women interested in the latest styles were included in the significant number of U.S. tourists in France.

This veneration did not go unqualified, however. Even in this period, almost a golden age for Francophilia, one can see a tension at the popular level as the downside of France's culture was also witnessed, and thus her brilliance marred. According to many American tourists and travel writers, French licentiousness was outrageous and shamefully widespread. Inevitably, comparisons were drawn between the two countries; and many American travellers were shocked at the perceived 'looseness of morals.' Moral decay was practically embodied in French women, and was certainly

glorified by writers such as George Sand. Because many arranged marriages were unhappy, French society turned a blind eye to infidelity.<sup>6</sup> Americans were further incensed at French divorce laws, laws that “permitted a miserable pittance for the wife and, significantly, made it possible for both partners to remarry.”<sup>7</sup> Adding to the impression of indecency and lax morality was the fact that the country was famous for its wines and brandies, beverages strongly believed by many Americans to be a source of sin, particularly by those involved with the Temperance movement. American perceptions of French writing further reinforced this notion of wickedness, as described by Elizabeth Brett White in 1927:

Appreciation for French literature in [America] has been retarded in no small degree because Americans have condemned its quality of extreme realism and its emphasis on sex. Many have believed that these characteristics reflected a fundamental corruption and degeneracy in the French people.<sup>8</sup>

When French hygiene was put under a microscope, American tourists saw their visits as an opportunity to uplift their hosts. One male writer in *Harper's Magazine* lauded American women in Paris for having “initiated her [the French woman] into the mysteries of hygiene.”<sup>9</sup> Such stereotypes of the French were detected in American newspapers from 1918 to 1924, and will be revisited in Chapter Four. The cliché of rampant French depravity and filth was not challenged by American demographics, as there was a dearth of politically active Francophiles in the United States.

The United States has always lacked a French population significant enough to promote or counter the stereotypes that developed over time. Although nineteenth-century America was shaped by many cohesive groups of European immigrants, there were only small and isolated groups of French people dispersed throughout the nation.

This also meant that there was no sizeable French community to carry political weight through bonds maintained with its homeland; whereas every other European country eventually developed such links with the United States through resident immigrant populations.<sup>10</sup> This was largely because so few French people were interested in living abroad. This helps to explain why stereotypes spread virtually unchecked, and misunderstandings sprang up frequently on both sides of the ocean.

However, it was the Great War that was the turning point in the Franco-American relationship. Just prior to the official beginning of World War One, France's military was one of the most formidable in the world, boasting 750,000 soldiers, while the United States claimed to have only 75,000 and a 120,000-person militia.<sup>11</sup> Despite its impressiveness, however, the French force was not potent enough to face that of its German army without assistance, despite Russia's aid. Thus, from the beginning of World War One, France and her ally Great Britain hoped for American support. Given that hope, President Woodrow Wilson's early declaration of his government's neutrality "of action and thought" caused immediate antagonism among the three powers. Despite America's official stance, however, France and England still presumed that the Allied cause would at least benefit from aid in the form of munitions and supplies. They were not entirely disappointed, since Wilson's was a neutrality "in Britain's favour." The American policy of neutrality was bent to benefit Great Britain by, for instance, demanding higher standards of conduct in naval warfare of Berlin than of Britain. Wilson justified this because, according to him, London was more "right" than Berlin.<sup>12</sup> In fact, Germany resented the extent to which its enemies were assisted by a "neutral" country while the Central Powers were provided with relatively little.

Hence, in 1915, Germany resolved to attack any ship suspected of carrying munitions, and 1917 unleashed its submarines. Henry Blumenthal argues that if the American government had been truly dedicated to the position and ideal of neutrality, aid to both sides would have stopped altogether. Clearly, that lack of dedication allowed political sympathies and profitable trade with France and Britain to shape Washington's immediate policies, with little foresight to the consequences.<sup>13</sup> Michael Hunt contradicts Blumenthal, saying that trading with belligerents was a right defended by the United States in a war with Britain in 1812, a right granted neutrals according to maritime law.<sup>14</sup> Nonetheless, their trade with Germany and reluctance to enter the war caused some friction between America and the Entente.

According to French historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, President Woodrow Wilson remained leery of the Allied cause in 1914 for a mixture of domestic and foreign reasons. One reason was that the countries involved in the Allied forces were linked by formal alliance to "the worst of all regimes": that of the czar.<sup>15</sup> Further, Wilson believed American interests were, in fact, threatened by this war; trade would be grievously interrupted, not to mention the havoc the war would play with currencies. Wilson was also afraid of the domestic effect of a European war when America's population had such a large number of immigrants. The 93 million residents of the United States included 13.3 million foreign-born people; and a further 12.9 million were the offspring of foreign-born citizens. Of the 26 million "foreign white stock", a full 6.4 million were German and 3.4 million were anti-British Irish.<sup>16</sup> These demographics proved consequential in the American debate over entering the League of Nations.<sup>17</sup> Clearly, there were many reasons for America to remain impartial; but



ironically, it was in defence of the right of nations to claim neutrality, threatened by the German submarine campaigns, that finally persuaded her to join the Allies on 6 April 1917.

Even then, Wilson made it clear that his country was not willing to commit to the responsibilities required of a formal alliance and that America was officially to be known as an "associate". The American public, before 1917, was strongly opposed to any involvement of their nation in the bloody European war, and was reticent to become deeply involved even in 1917.<sup>18</sup> Despite this American reserve, France breathed a sigh of relief, as her own war efforts had been seriously hampered by a lack of funds, staggering casualties, and by troops fatigued almost to the point of surrender. The nineteenth-century groundwork laid by diplomats was put to good use once the Americans joined the French in a common cause; the 150-year relationship between France and the United States was given a gloss of respectability and brought out front and centre. Both governments were active in supporting this diplomatic reinterpretation of history, epitomized in General John J. Pershing's famous phrase "Lafayette, we are here!" Regardless of these efforts, even now, all was not bliss in this cross-cultural marriage.

Tensions arose on a popular level almost as soon as the United States Expeditionary Force troops arrived on the shores of France. On the surface was a grateful European country, enamoured with a generation of dashing and heroic Americans risking their lives to defend old friends. These fresh soldiers were hailed as saviours by the French public and became instantly popular. Doughboys were valiant and lovable figures to all but their military counterparts, the "*poilus*", who sat in their

muddy trenches and fumed with jealousy over the rash of Franco-American marriages and amorous relations that took place from 1917 on. Thus below the veneer of amity and adoration was a deep sense of dissatisfaction and disillusionment. Some American bitterness stemmed from the reality of occasional carnal activity; due to their sexual contacts, the American troops developed not only distressing diseases, but also an extremely unjust image of French females in general.<sup>19</sup> Further, everywhere U.S. soldiers turned, they seemed to get over-charged by businessmen covetous of American cash. The Americans came to believe that there were only two kinds of French civilians: usurious war profiteers and women who were, in varying degrees, whores. From their position, the French became disillusioned by the fact that, in addition to their munitions and equipment, U.S. soldiers also brought American money to France, and were blamed for years afterward for driving up prices and selfishly buying the eggs and butter common French people could not afford.<sup>20</sup> Further antagonism arose in military circles over the training, transportation, and use of the new troops. French strategists wanted an amalgamation of forces, so that American soldiers would bolster already existing but depleted sectors. Washington disagreed, countering that there was psychological value in having all-American divisions fighting the enemy alone.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, World War One only amplified the ambiguity so typical of the Franco-American relationship. They were two individual nations unified by the cause of defeating the Germans. However, cultural differences and wartime hardships caused misrepresentations and hard feelings among the general population. On a diplomatic level, the French government initially believed that America had joined the war purely

out of Francophilia, when in reality it had more to do with the threat war posed to America's interests. As Charles Brooks skilfully explained,

the Franco-American identity so sedulously and sycophantically promoted by the French press and government during the war was far more assumed than actual. In the lambent and hazy glow of wartime amity, with a common enemy on the field of battle, it was easy to miss the distinctions being glossed over. It [was] not so easy in the harsher glare of peace.<sup>22</sup>

By the end of the war, general perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic were distorted. The Americans arrogantly claimed that they had rescued and effectively replaced the French in the trenches, winning the war almost single-handedly. The Europeans countered with the argument that the United States had entered the war too late to be of much service before September 1918, and that it was Britain and France who were largely responsible for the allied victory and the war's termination. They merely had to cite casualties as proof of their efforts; France had lost 1,394,000 men to America's 50,000, not to mention the fact that the war had been waged on French and Belgian soil, rather than that of America.<sup>23</sup> However, despite some rumblings, Americans still rode a crest of popularity in France in late 1918, as most Frenchmen were greatly relieved just to have an end to the war.

Yet, there was a sense of anticlimax and disillusionment which disappointed many. According to one reporter in Paris in 1918, the feeling that the armistice was a frustration and not a relief ran higher among women than men: "Here they tell me that ten or at most fifteen days would have seen a complete and ignominious defeat upon which the French had set their hearts. An armistice seems to them [women] a contemptible compromise...[while] Germany is still mighty, boastful, venomous, and planning for the next war."<sup>24</sup> It is possible this bitterness was the result of enduring the

war, with all its shortages, painful losses, and depravation, as a civilian, without being able to take an active roll in it.<sup>25</sup> Further, humiliating Germany by marching Allied troops through the streets of Berlin would have been cathartic for the rather demoralized French; but this closure was denied them by the armistice and subsequent peace conference.<sup>26</sup> On a popular level in the United States in the same period, there was also a deeply ingrained opposition between the American love of, and disgust with, the French and France. Upon official involvement in the war, the American people idealistically expected to be able to defeat German “autocracy” and establish a safe and harmonious world, but by 1920, most Americans had concluded that little or nothing had been gained, that European nations were as militaristic as ever.<sup>27</sup> The result was a United States that wanted “their government to go to great lengths to avoid any future conflict.”<sup>28</sup>

Despite the country’s devastation, visiting American soldiers, tourists, and artists continued to agree with the French that their country was a marvel. Many remained as entranced by French culture, romanced by its art and architecture, and delighted with its cuisine as previous generations of visitors had been. This delight, however, was moderated by the aggravation of profiteers greedy for their currency, and *propriétaires* who barred US soldiers from entering drinking establishments and restaurants.<sup>29</sup> At home, bitter rumours spread that the army had been paying rent to occupy French trenches, a persistent myth which Ambassador Jules Jusserand fought hard to debunk. Likewise, the French were at once grateful to the Americans for their assistance at the front, and disgusted by their arrogance. The early image of the courageous and

cheerful soldiers from across the water had been transformed, at least in part, into stereotypes of brawling, drinking, obstinate, troublemakers.

Governments, too, betrayed different perspectives. Most were struggling to cope with the end of the war itself for, as Sally Marks points out, few had prepared for the actuality of victory because Allied energy had been more focussed on fighting and winning the war. Besides, German resistance had been expected to last at least until 1919.<sup>30</sup> The French were haunted by the knowledge that the human carnage, the destruction of land, and the massive debt had left them in a pitiful state compared to that of their enemy, whose country remained virtually untouched. France's birth rate had plummeted because of the war, and its export industries had been ravaged while those of Germany remained largely intact. To add to the difficulties, Bolshevism was perceived to be spreading malignantly across Europe from Russia, causing widespread political turmoil. Thus, France's primary concerns were with recovery and obtaining security guarantees from other nations. The American government, by the end of the war, was also interested in a treaty which would maintain peace in Europe, and agreed with the French that Bolshevism should not take hold of Germany. However, Washington opposed the French desire to reinstate the traditional European balance of power, a system of alliances they viewed as militaristic and the cause of countless wars in the past.

The opening of the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919 was a momentous occasion, one which did little to ease tensions between the major powers in attendance, and which, indeed, laid the groundwork for future hostilities.<sup>31</sup> The choice of Paris as a venue was a recognition by the victorious nations of the suffering endured by France, a

choice which provided Premier Georges Clemenceau the opportunity to chair the deliberations. When Wilson first arrived, he was at the apex of his short-lived popularity in France and was given a hero's welcome, the likes of which had rarely been seen. One *San Francisco Examiner* reporter remarked that "Paris has greeted the two Napoleons and General Boulanger, but these national figures evoked applause from groups of interested adherents, while to-day all Paris, and the representatives of all France, applauded Mr. Wilson in unison.... Paris exuded such enthusiasm, such vibrating joy and goodwill."<sup>32</sup> Wilson brought to the table his famous and idealistic Fourteen Points that had been central to the 1918 armistice, and which put Wilson on the moral high-ground. His proposed League of Nations,<sup>33</sup> was intended to encourage member-nations to practice a diplomacy based on morality, only possible, he argued, in the context of a world now made safe for democracy.<sup>34</sup> This morality included the equality of rights among nations in the League, regardless of their size, a proposition meant to eliminate the traditional European system of balance of power and traditional systems of alliances. His fourteen points were designed to "unshackle trade, bring the arms race to a halt, banish secret diplomacy with its alliances and terrible carnage, pull down empires, and most important of all promote self-determination."<sup>35</sup> Although the French had long been strong supporters of democracy, they found his proposal objectionable because the League on its own was not adequate protection against German aggression. Clemenceau was painfully aware that a mere treaty and its paper promises would not ensure his country's safety. Consequently, he sought guarantees, in part through the formation of alliances with France's neighbours, in part by developing a policy of economically crippling the enemy with a steep war bill, that it might not

pose a threat again. The stark contrast between Wilson's idealism and Clemenceau's realism continued the age-old tension of Franco-American relations.

For the Americans, along with other nations, the disarmament issue identified in the fourteen points was paramount for ensuring peace, and Wilson pushed for an arms reduction consistent with the internal security of each member nation. He suggested that the disarmament of Germany should precede world disarmament, although the French stated they could never disarm without adequate defence arrangements on their own terms, regardless of Germany's status.<sup>36</sup> In fact, some French representatives proposed that Germany should be dismantled altogether and that certain regions be amalgamated into other countries, a major sticking point for all attending the conference.<sup>37</sup> Thus, the rift widened between the two governments and Wilson's popularity quickly reversed into widespread animosity by spring of 1919.

Yet all was not strife and disagreement between America and France at the conference. Wilson and Clemenceau could agree that Germany was guilty of having started the war. They also both saw Bolshevism as a movement powered by a minority government put into power by a violent revolution, and therefore as a serious threat, particularly if it spread to Germany. Yet they did not agree on a solution to that movement's rise in popularity. Clemenceau wanted an armed intervention in Russia; Wilson did not.<sup>38</sup> As the conference progressed, the delegates settled some points and a treaty took shape: Germany was to relinquish and physically "restore" all territory it had occupied during the war (what this restoration entailed was never stipulated); France should regain Alsace-Lorraine without plebiscite; and Poland would be re-created, though its boundaries and borders were left ill-defined. Beyond these issues

there was little accord, partly because of complications brought about through secret pre-war treaties signed between Britain and France<sup>39</sup>, as well as by Russian political volatility.<sup>40</sup>

Deliberations in Paris were further troubled by the need for haste. With the onset of winter, millions were starving across Europe and an influenza epidemic was claiming lives world-wide at a ferocious rate. Shortages across the Continent of coal and food, an acute rise in the cost of living, and violent labour disputes, caused great concern for the heads of the governments attending the Conference. Conditions in Central Europe were worse than they had been in wartime, a plight illustrated by Sigmund Freud when he wrote an article for a Hungarian periodical and requested to be paid in potatoes.<sup>41</sup> The eight-month delay between armistice (November 11, 1918) and treaty (June 28, 1919) also produced bitterness, primarily due to hardships suffered by European populations. Germans protested the delay because of great food shortages, while the French denounced it as an effort on the part of vanquished countries to stall on or evade armistice terms.<sup>42</sup> Soldiers wanted to go home and the electorate wanted them there, desires which made any postponements politically costly for governments. As the pressure to come to an agreement mounted, tensions at the Peace Conference increased as well, and old petty rivalries surfaced. The ambitious French agenda for the Saar, Rhineland, and Central Europe created a spectre of French domination in the eyes of the English and Americans, and was predictably condemned. Clemenceau accused Lloyd George of being the enemy of France "from the very day after the armistice" and got the reply: "Was it not always our traditional policy?"<sup>43</sup> France was shocked again when she realised as early as February 1919 that Great Britain and America would not



maintain their wartime economic cooperation by supporting the flagging franc, and that French war debts would be neither eased nor erased.

In this atmosphere of frustration, rivalry, and self-preservation, it is a surprise that any agreement was made whatsoever. The international treaty finally signed in June, 1919 was a compromise for all and pleased none. Historian Sally Marks wonders that it was not more severe toward Germany, arguing that Anglo-American complacency moderated the pact. The bodies of water separating Germany from Great Britain and North America have always served as a physical and a psychological buffer against Continental military aggression. Further, neither had had the recent experience of their countries being invaded and occupied.<sup>44</sup> Conversely, French fear was only magnified by their shared borders with their enemy. These competing national perspectives resulted in Britain wanting a balance of power, France wanting security at almost any cost, and America wanting a democratic field ripe for investment and economic activity. The peace accord that was finally drafted was certainly not believed by the French to be the best deal; and thus public opinion as early as 1919 was one of resignation. By the end of that year many Europeans were already convinced that the peace was merely a pause, and that renewed conflict was inevitable.<sup>45</sup> On paper, the Treaty limited German military might, demilitarized the left bank of the Rhine, and required reparations be paid to the victors in the form of goods and capital. However, the exact reparations amount was not settled at the Conference, leaving the specifics to be worked out by the newly created Reparations Commission, effectively opening what Henry Blumenthal rightly referred to as a Pandora's box. As a result, the sum of reparations, their due date, reasons for their payment in the first place, and their

collection, quickly became the most significant and divisive issues of the inter-war period.<sup>46</sup>

Following the Peace Conference, Franco-American relations continued to crumble. The chief cause of this was the U.S. Senate's refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and its provision for a League of Nations, a bitter disappointment for the French. Ironically, Wilson's own administration was largely responsible for the rejection of the two agreements, according to historian William Keylor, who argues that at the time Wilson presented the Treaty to the Senate, the Republican leadership and American population in general, showed "an unmistakable record of support" for it, even though it codified a position of French primacy in Europe. Some even contended that it did not go far enough to prevent future German militarism, and it appeared in early 1919 that Wilson would secure ratification without having to compromise the pact.<sup>47</sup> Virtually all members of the Republican Party, excluding a sprinkling of 'irreconcilables,' were willing to support the Treaty so the United States could begin to participate in the enforcement of the peace settlement. The climate turned in the summer of 1919, when domestic problems complicated matters. The Republicans became hesitant to engage the United States in an open-ended and binding commitment to European stability as outlined in Article X of the League Covenant, although they were willing to agree to the limited involvement stipulated in the Treaty. Republican Senators such as Robert La Follette, Sr. argued that "the pursuit of greatness abroad killed reform and narrowed liberty at home."<sup>48</sup> Increasingly, politicians and citizens alike argued for a return to isolationism and a concentration on domestic issues. Even

the French representatives at the Peace Conference argued for the two issues to be presented and discussed separately.

Despite the opinions of his advisors and colleagues, Wilson made the mistake of presenting the League Covenant and the Treaty of Versailles as inseparable issues, dooming both to failure. Had they been argued independently, the Treaty would have passed without delay and the League could then have been debated without further impeding the peace process or damaging Franco-American relations.<sup>49</sup> Insult was added to injury when the American government also refused to back a French security agreement in 1919. This new source of French disappointment caused dealings between the two countries to deteriorate even further. The treaty was intended to be a trilateral agreement that assured France that the United States and Great Britain would defend her against future unprovoked German aggression. This new agreement was initially widely approved by both the American public and leading Republican statesmen.<sup>50</sup> Once again, the Wilson administration killed the deal by deciding that it was "incompatible with the spirit of collective security embodied in the League Covenant."<sup>51</sup> The main reason for the treaty's rejection was its similarity to those older and 'untrustworthy' systems of 'militant' bilateral alliances, and a strong reluctance on the part of the public to become involved in future European wars. In rejecting the guarantee, Wilson evidently was trying to replace the European tradition of security-alliances and balance of power with a more 'modern,' perhaps more American approach. That guarantee was particularly objectionable because it singled out France as the sole beneficiary of American commitment. The withdrawal of American support for French security, first through Washington's rejection of the League of Nations

Covenant, second through its rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, and third through the rejection of the military guarantee, illustrates their move from 'internationalism' to 'nationalism,' from global involvement to traditional political isolationism. It also reflects the prevalent feeling in 1920, after the defeat of Wilson by Republican Warren G. Harding in an election, that most Americans wanted nothing more than a "return to normalcy."<sup>52</sup> Each rejection dismayed the French, and instilled a sense of betrayal over the loss of their associate.

In the wake of American detachment, France scrambled to find security elsewhere. In 1920 she signed a military agreement with Belgium, thereby securing the traditional invasion route to France, and signed a full alliance and military convention with Poland. Clearly, the American government had not considered the long-term implications of U.S. detachment. Because Wilson was determined to dismantle traditional European alliances, and because he refused to financially assist in a settlement, France, Britain, Belgium, and Italy were left to fend for themselves. Further, American isolationism gave France and Belgium the power to outvote the more moderate proposals of Great Britain. As a result, French demands on Germany became more punitive in the hope that, if Germany was economically incapacitated by a steep war debt, its war machine would be disabled and some sense of safety would be attained. Anthony Adamthwaite argues that prior to this mounting American isolationism, France's demands had been relatively moderate, only insisting that Germany pay a modest portion of war costs.<sup>53</sup> With the loss of this Anglo-American support, insecurities grew and France became ever more strict and inflexible toward her enemy, partly out of a need for security, and partly out of economic necessity.

Prior to the American entry into World War One, war-time loans to France and Britain had been taken out from private banks, and were quickly repaid. After 1917, France and other Allies were given loans from America's public coffer, the State Treasury. By 1918, the Entente owed \$10 billion (21 billion francs) to the American government, \$4.2 billion of which was France's own debt. She also owed Britain 15 billion francs, making her total foreign debt colossal; her annual budget for all of 1913 was only 5 billion gold francs.<sup>54</sup> The reimbursement of these debts was next to impossible, but not according to her creditors. The payment of debts due America became a question of honour for many United States citizens; the suspicion that the Allies were attempting to side-step them reinforced the perception of French underhandedness and corruption.

To American diplomats and politicians, European disputes were not the responsibility of their nation, and in accordance with strong public sentiment, determined not to be involved except where American interests were threatened. In the years immediately following the Paris Peace Conference, United States foreign policy shifted from one of punishment of Germany to active assistance in expediting its economic recovery. American policy-makers argued that this change was essential to restoring European political and economic stability. At the same time, their priority seemed to be the collection of war debts rather than the finding of a solution to the tangled issue of war debts and reparations. The United States government refused throughout the interwar period to recognize any connection between Germany's reparations, and the Allies' war debts to America, a connection that the French were determined to make. President Harding, Wilson's successor, made this position clear to

Clemenceau on the latter's 1922 visit to America, adding that he hoped their two countries could maintain a good relationship nonetheless.<sup>55</sup> However, France already felt too abandoned by the American rejection of the Treaty and a lack of commitment to her security to overcome this new affront, particularly when Washington and Paris did eventually begin to discuss the problematic issue of war debts.

France's financial woes continued to be a major concern for her government throughout most of the 1920s. The financial cost of the war had been enormous, even without the cost of the material reconstruction of her northern departments. Public debt had increased tenfold between 1913 and 1920, one tenth of which was from British and American foreign loans.<sup>56</sup> Many French people believed that all allied debts should at least be eased if not erased altogether; and in late-1918 both the British and French quietly approached the United States Treasury to request some economic relief. They argued, primarily, that the debts should be forgiven on moral grounds. The U.S. had joined the war late, and throughout its years as a neutral power had grown wealthy while Britain and France had poured vast amounts of money and blood into the conflict. What France had paid in carnage and destruction, the United States had avoided by distance and a reluctance to join the Allies. In addition, France had suffered financially from promises made when the loans were originally granted. She had dutifully used those loans, in part, to purchase goods and arms exclusively from the U.S., though their prices were higher. Thus, by demanding payment for the loans, America was in fact asking France to further finance the vast war profits of American businessmen.<sup>57</sup> Secondly, France argued that she in fact *could* not pay the loans if Germany defaulted on her own payments. Again, French officials were stressing the link between missed

reparations and their own grievous debt. Their difficult situation was aggravated by a circumvention of trade with America due to restrictions placed on imports by the new Republican government in the name of nationalism. The American prohibition of alcohol also barred one of France's major exports and sources of income. For the general French public, the inflexibility of the creditor nation was highly offensive. As Jean Prévost noted in this time of fiscal stress: "the public considered our debt obligation toward America, not just with concern, but with a kind of fury."<sup>58</sup> The insistence of both the United States citizenry and its government on loan collection went far in establishing the popular image of "a selfish, materialistic America," not to mention a hypocritical one; while refusing to ease the debts of both France and England, Washington advocated a vast reduction of German reparation payments in the name of European economic revitalization.<sup>59</sup>

Of course, America's backing of German recovery was just as divisive as its approach to French foreign debt. America, as mentioned, supported a rapid German recovery for its own economic reasons, while France sought the economic crippling of Germany for security reasons. Right from the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had resisted the reparations demands placed on her. Almost every coal shipment to France and Belgium was below quota, in spite of incentives put in place by the victorious nations.<sup>60</sup> In addition to resisting treaty demands, Germany also inflated her currency incrementally, slowly so as not to alarm other nations until she was well on her way to a speedy recovery. Once her recovery was in progress, Germany cancelled out domestic debt and claimed to be unable to pay foreign ones with such a greatly weakened currency.<sup>61</sup> Such economic manipulations were a determining factor

in the 1921 and 1922 decisions to send French troops into the Ruhr valley, an area rich in natural resources, in an attempt to take by force what France could not get through diplomatic avenues. Indeed, France sent troops over the border several times to ensure reparations could be seized if they were not being paid voluntarily. The last incursion ordered by Prime Minister Aristide Briand was in March 1921, and was his final political act. Raymond Poincaré assumed his position soon after.<sup>62</sup>

1922 was, in many ways, a turning point in international relations. In this year the Germans signed a pact with the Russians at Rapallo. This pact further deepened France's concern, as it had traditionally looked to the Russians for protection from Germany. Also in 1922, the American Congress formed the World War Foreign Debt Commission (WWFDC), a political body whose *raison d'être* was to negotiate payments of war debts. Unfortunately, the Commission was not endowed with enough power to reduce the capital of debts, and could only make small reductions on interest payments.<sup>63</sup> Complicated negotiations ensued between the WWFDC and debtor nations, negotiations that led to the Genoa conference in April, 1922. However, because American representatives were not present, few decisions could be made regarding war debts; and because of Paris' veto power, reparations could not be tackled either. The impasse forced delegates to forward the issues to the newly formed Reparations Commission. The initial meeting of this new body was on 24 May 1922 and was attended by several prominent American bankers, including J.P. Morgan. The problem at hand was whether they should grant a loan to Germany to ensure it could meet its reparation payments; but by 10 June, the Commission was forced to suspend deliberations. France had refused categorically to support the proposal that Germany



not be given more loans until reparation demands were reduced, as she depended on this income to pay her own debts. Franco-American relations became more troubled, as France resented the forgiving of Germany's debt while French debt was not eased.<sup>64</sup> The consequences of the failure of the Commission were felt almost immediately as the franc faltered and France became further isolated. Finally, the Commission was forced to declare Germany in default of its required shipments of coal on 9 January 1923, and Prime Minister Poincaré led the political debate to invade the Ruhr. This was not to make money, he stated, but rather to gain control of the distribution of coal in Germany, to strengthen France diplomatically in the eyes of Britain, and to make the Americans rethink the issues of war debts and reparations.<sup>65</sup> French policy was to prevent German access to the Rhineland by either occupying it or causing its separation altogether.<sup>66</sup>

In January 1923, Poincaré was finally able to send troops into the Ruhr where they were to stay for an entire year, a legal operation once the Reparations Commission had declared Germany in default on its coal payments. Although Poincaré made it clear that France could justify the invasion of the Ruhr as temporary assurance of much needed reparation payments, the US government suspected France of attempting to pursue the objectives denied her at the Paris Peace Conference.<sup>67</sup> No support for the French position came from Britain, a response which only prolonged the crisis. However, Poincaré's political future relied on his ability to make Germany pay, and the best way to achieve this was through an invasion and an occupation of the Ruhr Valley.

This demonstration of France's strength was, to many Americans, ample evidence of her militarism, her imperialistic tendencies, and her punitive attitude toward

Germany. Former President Wilson's reaction to this bid, for what France saw as her dues, was far from supportive. In a 1923 interview he went so far as to call Poincaré a "bully" and to accuse Ferdinand Foch, *maréchal de France*, of being a "militarist," claiming that "I would like to see Germany clean up France, and I would like to meet [French Ambassador Jules] Jusserand and tell him that to his face."<sup>68</sup> Rather than aid their old ally, Washington and London effectively undermined her by providing the financial support to stabilize Berlin's faltering currency and assist with the introduction of its new *Rentenmark*. This was in line with the Anglo-American policy of improving Germany's economy, but it had the added effect of further devaluing the franc.<sup>69</sup> By December 1923 the tables had turned. The French military mission in the Ruhr was becoming economically unviable and increasingly unpopular at home; in January 1924 it had amassed less wealth from the Ruhr than it had done prior to the occupation in 1922. The steady post-1918 depreciation of the franc had reached an unprecedented level, destroying France's bargaining power with her creditors.<sup>70</sup>

Poincaré scrambled to stabilize his country's currency with a 20 percent tax hike that only succeeded in making his government even more unpopular. Once again the Americans stepped in, providing France with a 100 million dollar loan on 13 March 1924 to help raise the value of the franc. However, there were strings attached: an international settlement was to be arranged to put an end to the Ruhr crisis. Once more a commission was formed, and in 1924 the American-headed Dawes Committee submitted a five-year plan for the payment of reparations, to which Chancellor Gustav Stresemann of Germany grudgingly agreed, as it seemed the surest way to untangle the economic stranglehold of the Ruhr occupation. In addition to the payment schedule,

the committee called for a supervised reorganization of Germany's infrastructure and an immediate evacuation of the Ruhr. The American hope of a peaceful and economically stable Europe was rejuvenated with the Dawes Plan, though the ability of the United States to maintain traditional isolationist policy depended largely on the actions of France and Great Britain. Most countries involved "were uniformly unenthusiastic" but accepted the plan for lack of a better alternative; and despite initial reticence, it did greatly improve the international mood.<sup>71</sup> The new spirit of optimism felt across the western world over the Dawes Plan was perhaps too high, for it succeeded in creating what Duroselle has called "a financial merry-go-round" which in fact did not benefit any of the countries involved. America loaned money to Germany, who used some of it to pay reparations to France, who in turn paid some of her loans to the United States.<sup>72</sup> It did demonstrate, however, that there was—and had always been—at least one meeting point for America and France: that Germany should pay reparations. The Young Plan of 1929 fine-tuned the Dawes Plan, but in the end no financial plan or international conference could mend the many misunderstandings and hard feelings between America and France.

In sum, since its beginning in the War of Independence, the relationship between France and the United States has always been epitomized by both cultural admiration and shared idealistic principles, as well as by divisive political frustrations. The common nineteenth-century trend for American tourists to visit France is testament to the nearly universal respect she commanded. That a large group of people from a traditionally isolationist nation sought to experience French artistic, literary, and scientific genius speaks to the incomparability of France's cultural achievements. This

trend worked in conjunction with contemporary diplomatic efforts to renew ties between the United States and France, a link that proved an important one in the First World War. However, although the Americans eventually joined the war on the side of the French, great frustrations evolved for both nations.

Ironically, many of these frustrations were rooted in common ground, but both countries sought to arrive at the same ends through different means. After the Paris Peace Conference, France was left feeling that an associate had abandoned her, a feeling only exacerbated when the United States Senate refused to pass the Treaty of Versailles, and consequently the League of Nations, as well as a military guarantee for French security soon after. The single most contentious issues in the interwar period became that of war debts and reparation payments, issues especially irritating to the Americans. Both French and U.S. governments wanted Germany to pay, but their distinctive approaches were determined by wartime experiences and financial need. In keeping with its isolationism after 1920, the United States was willing to forgive some of Germany's debt and support its recovery to ensure a healthy trading partner, while France sought "political ambitions by economic means"<sup>73</sup> by invading the Ruhr valley. The occupation was undeniably unsuccessful, as France was weaker than she had been in 1919, and certainly had reached a low in international popularity.

It would be foolish to think that leaders of countries could live unaffected by dominant stereotypes and popular images. Moreover, many of the frustrations between American and French politics throughout the interwar period are explained by cultural and experiential differences. One of the channels most effective in spreading these perceptions of other nations and cultures was the contemporary press; American

perceptions of the French are no exception. Indeed, it is the contention of this thesis that press representations are formed not only by the media itself, but through the inter-relationship of political acts of heads of state and the public. As demonstrated in this chapter, American foreign policy for the early inter-war period was increasingly self-interested, an isolationism based on stereotypical views that France was a warring nation and America safer without involvement in her politics. This stereotype was presented in the media, and consumed by readers. Thus, it appears that foreign policy is determined by politicians, citizens, and the press. Critics of public involvement in foreign policy have tended to overlook the “strong influence that governmental officials can have on public opinion.”<sup>74</sup> Levering states that in seeking to persuade citizens to support a certain cause, the government has traditionally received invaluable help from the news media, which relies, in turn, upon officials for their information on foreign policy.<sup>75</sup> It is important to turn now to the news media itself for the period of 1918 to 1924 in order to understand its nature, and determine why the three newspapers reviewed here portrayed France in the ways they did.

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> William Doyle, Origins of the French Revolution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 94.
- <sup>2</sup> It is important to qualify Blumenthal's generalization that these freedoms were enjoyed by all Americans. There were vast segments of the population that were not afforded such emancipation, specifically Afro-Americans, women, native peoples, and some immigrant groups. Thus, the personal liberties perceived by the French to be nearly universal were, in fact, only enjoyed by a certain percentage of residents in the United States. See Henry Blumenthal, American and French Culture, 1800-1900: Interchanges in Art, Science, Literature, and Society (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975), 53.
- <sup>3</sup> Diplomats drew from the Franco-American alliance in 1778 and French participation in the War of Independence to create the impression that this relationship had not been disturbed at all by the passage of time. This idea of unchanged and mutual esteem was embodied in the image of the Marquis de Lafayette, French leader of the forces sent to fight in the War of Independence. Blumenthal states it best: "Whatever political differences divided their respective governments, allusion to this symbol psychologically conditioned Americans to remember, with fondness, only the crucial assistance France rendered at the time of the birth of the American Republic. The French gladly played up this friendly notion." See Blumenthal, Illusion and Reality in Franco-American Diplomacy, 1914-1945 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 6-7.
- <sup>4</sup> Christopher Endy, "Travel and World Power: Americans in Europe, 1890-1917," *Diplomatic History*, 22, no. 4 (Fall, 1998), 567.
- <sup>5</sup> Elizabeth Brett White, American Opinion of France, from Lafayette to Poincaré (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), 235.
- <sup>6</sup> Blumenthal, American, 37.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 38.
- <sup>8</sup> White, 239.
- <sup>9</sup> Endy, 583.
- <sup>10</sup> Duroselle, 47-48.
- <sup>11</sup> Duroselle, 46-47.
- <sup>12</sup> Hunt, Ideologies, 134.
- <sup>13</sup> Blumenthal, Illusion, 14-15.
- <sup>14</sup> Michael Hunt, Crisis in U.S. Foreign Policy. An International History Reader, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 9.
- <sup>15</sup> Czarist Russia was an institutionalized monarchy, a style of government which represented oppression, and was considered by Americans to be at the opposite end of the political spectrum from democracy, the ideal form of government. It was also a symbol of Old World decadence and luxury, enjoyed by autocratic rulers at the expense of powerless citizens.
- <sup>16</sup> Duroselle, 84.
- <sup>17</sup> Levering, 44.
- <sup>18</sup> The strong desire among Americans to remain neutral during the first years of the Great War was in keeping with the traditional isolationism of that nation. By first declaring neutrality, and then becoming involved in the war without the commitments (real or perceived) required of a formal alliance, President Wilson remained faithful to the convention of "staying aloof from European conflict. See Michael Hunt, Crisis, chapter 1.
- <sup>19</sup> Duroselle, 108.
- <sup>20</sup> Brooks, 565.
- <sup>21</sup> Duroselle, 97.
- <sup>22</sup> Brooks, 567.
- <sup>23</sup> Duroselle, 94.
- <sup>24</sup> Gertrude Atherton in *The Chicago Tribune*, 29 December 1918, p.3.
- <sup>25</sup> See Roberts for a more profound description of women's wartime and postwar experiences.
- <sup>26</sup> The armistice was finally agreed upon with the assistance of Wilson's Fourteen Points, an agenda intended to establish an everlasting peace in Europe. The idealism expressed in them was widely acclaimed and was central to his initial and universal popularity in France when he arrived at the Conference.

<sup>27</sup> Levering, 37.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>29</sup> This was a common complaint. The exclusion of the 'doughboys' from French pubs and hotels was justified by the owners after some establishments were wrecked by drunken and carousing United States Expeditionary Force soldiers. One reporter writing for the *Chicago Tribune* commented that such actions bred resentments: "certainly there are good reasons for the many things like this in France, but since they are not made plain to the average doughboy they turn his heart to stone." Sunday, February 16, 1919, part 8, p.6.

<sup>30</sup> Sally Marks, *The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918-1933* (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1976), 1-2.

<sup>31</sup> For several viewpoints of the 1940 fall of France to Germany and how the Paris Peace Conference and Treaty of Versailles are implicated, see Joel Blatt, ed., *The French Defeat of 1940: Reassessments* (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1998).

<sup>32</sup> Naboth Hedin in the *Examiner*, December 16, 1918, p.2, CC.

<sup>33</sup> The League of Nations was the outcome of Wilson's fourteenth point, and the one he considered most crucial to ensuring peace. It called for "the creation of a general association of nations under specific covenants to give mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity."

<sup>34</sup> Duroselle, 102.

<sup>35</sup> Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 134.

<sup>36</sup> David Strauss, *Menace in the West: The Rise of French anti-Americanism in Modern Times* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978), 112.

<sup>37</sup> Anthony Adamthwaite, *Grandeur and Misery: France's Bid for Power in Europe 1914-1940* (London: Arnold, 1995), 44.

<sup>38</sup> Duroselle, 118.

<sup>39</sup> For more on this see Marks, *Peace*.

<sup>40</sup> Russia's last Czar, Nicolas II and his family were murdered in 1917. The ensuing political turmoil resulted in the Bolshevik Revolution of late 1917. This was a radically new form of government, and as such was the source of much suspicion.

<sup>41</sup> Adamthwaite, 46.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>44</sup> Marks, *Peace*, 11.

<sup>45</sup> Robert J. Young, *France and the Origins of the Second World War*, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996), 9-11.

<sup>46</sup> The Treaty of Versailles did place the moral responsibility for the Great War upon the shoulders of Germany and its allies, and established the legal basis for the imposition of financial remuneration. The authors of the Treaty were obliged to restrict these reparation payments to cover only certain losses. For example, Germany was required to pay damages for all civilian injuries or deaths throughout the conflict, for the maltreatment of POWs, for all pensions of members of the Allied military, naval, air-forces or their dependants, and other civilian groups. The exact amount, and a schedule of payments, was to be decided on by the Reparations Commission by 1 May 1921, and Germany was to pay some reparations in the years leading to that deadline. See Frederick Schuman, *War and Diplomacy in the French Republic, an Inquiry into Political Motivations and the Control of Foreign Policy* (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1931).

<sup>47</sup> Levering, 44.

<sup>48</sup> Hunt, *Ideology*, 135.

<sup>49</sup> William R. Keylor, "'Lafayette, We Have Quit!' Wilsonian Policy and French Security after Versailles" in *Papers of the Bicentennial Colloquium of The Society for French Historical Studies in Newport, Rhode Island* (September 1978), Nancy Roelker and Charles Warner, eds., 44-75.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>52</sup> Levering, 46.

<sup>53</sup> Adamthwaite, 56.

<sup>54</sup> Duroselle, 122.

<sup>55</sup> Blumenthal, *Diplomatic*, 103.

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<sup>56</sup> John F.V. Keiger, "Raymond Poincaré and the Ruhr Crisis" in French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940: The decline and fall of a great power, Robert Boyce, ed. (London: Routledge, 1998), 50.

<sup>57</sup> Duroselle, 124-125.

<sup>58</sup> Strauss, 123.

<sup>59</sup> The justification for this was that the German debt was imposed by the victorious nations and by a treaty. "Political debts" were removable therefore by another treaty, whereas French and British debts were "commercial debts" and thus not to be erased. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle argues that this refusal was in line with the American ideal of a free-enterprise system which holds the notion that the commercial debt is something of a sacred cow, the very symbol of the law of property. See Duroselle, 122-124.

<sup>60</sup> These incentives included premiums paid for each ton of coal shipped on time, financial assistance for the cost of shipping, and even the provision for improved nutrition for miners. See Sally Marks: "The Myths of Reparations," *Central European History* 11 (1978), 235.

<sup>61</sup> Blumenthal, Diplomatic, 126.

<sup>62</sup> Young, Origins, 13.

<sup>63</sup> Denise Artaud, "Reparations and War Debts: The Restoration of French Financial Power, 1919-1929," in French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940, 93.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 94.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 96.

<sup>66</sup> Blumenthal, Diplomatic, 114.

<sup>67</sup> That is to say, to gain possession of the much-coveted Ruhr Valley. Blumenthal, Illusion, 112.

<sup>68</sup> William Keylor, "France and the Illusion of American Support, 1919-1940," in The French Defeat of 1940: Reassessments, Joel Blatt, ed., 215.

<sup>69</sup> Adamthwaite, 101.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup> Marks, "Myths" 245.

<sup>72</sup> Duroselle, 127.

<sup>73</sup> Adamthwaite, 107.

<sup>74</sup> Levering, 11.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*



## CHAPTER 2: THE AMERICAN PRESS AND EUROPE

The history of the printed press in America is long and intimately linked to the tumultuous political past of that country. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, the push by entrepreneurs for an increasingly liberated and independent news media was ceaseless, although it met much resistance. This battle continued right into the twentieth century. However, newspapers have always been only as strong, eloquent, or unprejudiced as the people who have written them. In the present chapter, the owners and reporters of the *New York Times*, the *Chicago Tribune*, and the *San Francisco Examiner*, will be discussed with the purpose of revealing their attitudes towards France. The owner/editors<sup>1</sup> of these papers varied in their opinions about American involvement in European events following the 1918 armistice. As a result, they tended to portray France with differing degrees of sympathy or hostility. Indeed, just as these newspapers diverged in their presentation of France, so too did individual journalists diverge in their reporting of that nation, in accordance with the tone of their respective papers. However, although each newspaper examined here had a certain tone and approach to reporting current events, there was also much disparity of images *within* the papers themselves. Where a trait or action of France was lauded one day, the same trait or action was often condemned the next. The result is a mixed treatment of France across the papers both individually and collectively; and the impressions that the *Times*, the *Tribune*, and the *Examiner*, despite biases, were not strictly homogenous in their approaches. It is interesting to compare the nature of the newspapers' tones and the politics they supported or condemned; however it is also important, particularly in the subsequent chapters, to contrast portrayals of France that appeared within the same newspapers. The reasons behind such

disparate images will prove to be important to the following chapters covering the dichotomous images of France.

The first fourteen years of the twentieth century, according to historian James Melvin Lee, were a time of “social readjustment” for the business of newsgathering. The movement mirrored the expansive philanthropic climate developing in many western countries at the time. In North America, it manifested itself as a push for society to be “modernized” by addressing the social ills of corruption, child poverty, and the squalid housing of the underclass. This period is also distinguished by new ethical standards for journalism, increased attention to women as both consumers and readers, and press campaigns for the improvement of living conditions.<sup>2</sup> Many newspapers went so far as to add new departments that specifically targeted civic reform. These included household sections in which readers, mostly female, were given tips on healthy meals and household cleaning, and which included advice columns designed to assist and comfort “lonely human beings with human problems.”<sup>3</sup> Moreover, most papers created complaints departments to demonstrate their accountability to their readers. With the onset of the Great War in 1914, even further change was wrought, and even more rapidly. The newspapers which survived this difficult period improved greatly; editors knew more than they had prior to 1914 about what news was, how to attain it, and how to clarify current events with editorials which informed the public but which did not influence the news department.<sup>4</sup>

Journalism itself was considered a romantic and exotic employment prior to 1914. A turn-of-the-century reporter found himself, first, to be an insider to news, someone whose press pass admitted him—and exceptionally her—behind the façade of respectability to witness “the sweaty, dirty realities of municipal politics and society.”<sup>5</sup> Yet, second, he was necessarily an outsider, as the rules of independent journalism forbade blatant party biases. Despite the trend

of objective reporting, however, many found avenues for personal expression as agents of civic improvement. So-called “Muckrackers” and “sob sisters” initiated campaigns of reform, writing stories with an emotional flair. Given some responses it could be dangerous work, certainly, and many reporters carried guns. Regardless of the risk, journalism at this time was often thrilling, an occupation described by one reporter as “the maddest, gladdest, damnest existence ever enjoyed by mortal youth”.<sup>6</sup>

This exciting employment was not reserved exclusively for men. In keeping with the new emphasis on female readers, there was a significant increase in the number of women involved in news production, particularly as journalists. Although their numbers had greatly increased by the 1920s, even late in the nineteenth century there had been talented female reporters. Already in 1899 there were four times as many dailies in the US as there had been just thirty years before.<sup>7</sup> The number of newspapers themselves had also increased greatly, opening further opportunities for rookie reporters, male and female, and creating more fierce competition for readers. Although the writing of “stunt-girls” and “sob sisters” initially only appeared in the women’s pages, they slowly began moving in on crime stories and feature articles as women became slightly more established in the industry. Female journalists often brought fresh perspective to the political events they reported on. Many of them focussed on the human aspect of international events, that is, how the public was affected, and what the popular opinion was of those events. Reporters like Annie Laurie, Anne O’Hare McCormick, and Gertrude Atherton gave unique insight into the events of their time.

The Great War, beginning in 1914, was an event that would change the face of the world, including journalism. The war sapped much of the excitement of correspondents’ work, as “its appalling, relentless slaughter did not lend itself to colourful prose, even though some of the

country's best...were on the scene."<sup>8</sup> What was once the maddest, gladdest profession was now an appalling glimpse into utter misery; journalism was not made any easier by wartime restrictions. Censors were both severe and often contradictory. What one would allow, another would block. For owners, compounding the shock of trench-warfare was the shock of the cost of newsgathering. Cable tolls skyrocketed and were necessarily paid by individual papers, forcing smaller outfits out of business altogether. The *New York Times*, by way of illustration, paid \$15,000 a week on cables and more than \$750,000 annually.<sup>9</sup> It also paid for special war dispatches at three times the price of pre-war ones. Some papers were able to pool resources with correspondents from European newspapers, thus reducing labour costs, but the money spent on newsgathering was nonetheless staggering.

Moreover, papers were forced to modernize the routine of handling news. Rather than being secretive about sources of information, articles now identified information sources in the opening sentences, as a disclaimer to protect the paper.<sup>10</sup> War correspondents themselves, as well as the nature of their reporting, "helped to create a paradox in which the American people had more information on world affairs at their disposal than ever before, yet seemed no more capable of understanding them than their relatively isolated ancestors had been." It was for that reason that another modification was ushered in—the editorial.<sup>11</sup> Because the public was so unfamiliar with European geography and politics, an interpretation was often necessary to accompany breaking news. The numerous modifications made over the forty-year period leading to 1924—new departments, imaginative features for previously ignored consumers, hiring more female employees, cost-cutting, and clever uses of editorials—were only possible with the experimentation and risk-taking of the men in charge of trend-setting papers such as the *New York Times*, the *Chicago Tribune* and the *San Francisco Examiner*.

The editor/owners behind the three papers examined in this thesis exemplified a new breed of heads-of-newspapers. Adolph Ochs of *The New York Times*, the *Chicago Tribune*'s Robert McCormick, and William Randolph Hearst of *San Francisco Examiner* fame, worked in an era in which newspapers ruled the mass communications world, and publishers were entrepreneurs. Strong-minded editors like those of the nineteenth century could still be found, but their power had been infringed upon greatly by more involved owners like the three examined here. Though they came into comparable positions as heads of nationally distributed, widely read newspapers, they approached their work from very different backgrounds. The latter may explain some of the qualities that made them loved or hated, and may well shed light on their treatment of France. To get a full grasp of each paper's perspective on Europe in general, and of France in particular, it is necessary to turn to some biographical information about the lives of three men.

Adolf Ochs was born in Cincinnati on 12 March 1858, and his was a classic rags-to-riches story. From humble origins, Ochs rose to be a giant in the field of news publishing. He was the eldest of the six surviving children of Bertha and Julius Ochs, German Jews who had escaped to America from nineteenth century European political turmoil. His father initially prospered with his young family; however Julius—"soldier, bookkeeper, merchant, public servant, and unpaid rabbi—was a wanderer of considerable intellect but little business acumen."<sup>12</sup> Only partly due to the latter, the post-Civil War financial panic that swept across the country in 1867 cast Ochs family's into poverty. Thus, it was out of dire economic necessity that the two eldest boys, Adolph and George, began working for the local newspaper as young delivery boys.

Adolph was eleven when he began his paper route of four square miles, a route which contributed \$1.50 to his family's income weekly.<sup>13</sup>

By 1875, after working his way up the ladder at the newspaper, Ochs felt he had learned all he could from the small paper and struck out on his own, moving west to find work as a journeyman printer with a strong letter of recommendation from his *Chronicle* foreman, and not much else. The year 1877 found him in a business partnership with Colonel MacGowan in the rough-and-tumble town of Chattanooga, Tennessee. Their initial venture soon failed but their second attempt with the *Chattanooga Times* was more successful. In the first issue of the paper under its new owner/editor, Ochs declared it "independent," beholden only to its readers and advertisers, a bold declaration considering that many newspapers represented special interests at this time.<sup>14</sup> His stringent policy of remaining politically, religiously, and socially impartial earned him the respect of his contemporaries and popularity with his readers.

In its independence, the *Chattanooga Times* was unlike other small town newspapers, and its autonomy made it easier for contributors to speak out in favour of civic reform. This unique approach was key to its eventual success, though life was not easy for the first few years under Ochs. The staff consisted of only ten, including reporters and press workers, but had soon grown enough that the *Times* became the leading voice in promoting the growth and progress of the burgeoning city.<sup>15</sup> Ochs successfully campaigned for non-partisan and honest city government, and he pushed for a sewer system and river clean-up. He also supported the building of a university and improvements to existing schools and theatres. In essence, he focussed on all that was "civilized," programmes that would prepare Chattanooga for future economic development. His was not a Midas touch, however, and he made several costly mistakes which were, in the end, good fortune.

It was bad luck and poor judgement which finally led Adolph Ochs to the *New York Times*. After several failed investments and poor real estate transactions, he found himself deeply in debt, with his beloved *Chattanooga Times* up as collateral security. To generate money, Ochs decided to buy another newspaper. In March 1896, he learned from a friend and reporter that the *New York Times*, once a respectable paper, was now reeling from years of mismanagement and was ripe for takeover. It was losing \$1000 per day and its circulation had sagged to 9,000 subscribers.<sup>16</sup> He made his move, using only his personality and reputation as a small-town publisher, as well as a number of respectable references, to back him in his attempt to take over the *Times*. Ochs somehow convinced the *Times*' owners that his plan to issue 10,000 shares of stock in the company, with enough shares placed in escrow to revert to his ownership at the end of three consecutive profitable years to make him majority stockholder, was a good one.<sup>17</sup>

From the outset, it was a difficult goal to achieve. New York was, of course, far more competitive than Chattanooga had been. To boost *Times* readership, Ochs would have to contend with the expensive circulation war being waged at the time between publishing giants William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer, compete with the *Herald's* foreign events coverage, and interrupt the popularity of the sensationalistic yellows, the *World* and the *Journal*, papers that cost only a penny and were widely read.<sup>18</sup> He decided to make subtle and simple changes to distinguish his paper, like having modest headlines advertising that the *Times* "Does Not Soil the Breakfast Cloth," an early jab at the excessive ink used by the more sensationalistic papers.<sup>19</sup> On a more ideological level, ever remaining true to his beliefs about honest and independent journalism, Ochs immediately publicized the fact that his new paper would adhere strictly to noble journalistic principles. In his words, he planned "to give the

news impartially, without fear or favour, regardless of any party, sect, or interest involved.” He promised his readers that his paper contained “all the news that’s fit to print,” and was aimed to please “thoughtful, pure-minded people.”<sup>20</sup> Competitors laughed and mocked his approach, and then gulped when circulation counts demonstrated how ready readers were for a fresh and honest paper.

In addition to his initial changes which, though subtle (and ethical), were significant, Ochs also carefully selected an impressive staff. Along with his business acumen, he had an eerie ability to sense people’s hidden talents.<sup>21</sup> In 1904, he wisely hired Carr Van Anda away from the *New York Sun* to be his managing editor, who according to Ochs, had a “genius for news-gathering and marvellous appreciation of news value and fidelity to fairness and thoroughness.”<sup>22</sup> His editor, Charles Miller, had worked for the paper before Ochs, and his business manager was Louis Wiley. With this reliable and inventive staff, the new owner developed novel additions to his paper. They printed real estate transactions and court cases, they downplayed entertainment, and gave impressive New York financial news. They replaced comics with the instantly popular Sunday Magazine containing book reviews and current events. Ochs was also careful to remain politically independent, making an exception only to support President Wilson’s battle for the League of Nations years later.

Long before the First World War, Adolph Ochs and his staff had succeeded in turning the *Times* around. Circulation soared from 9,000 at his takeover to 25, 000 in 1898, to 75,000 in 1899.<sup>23</sup> By 1900, the paper was profitable enough that Ochs became majority owner, a development that allowed him to pay the debts of the *Chattanooga Times*. That same year he had special editions of *The New York Times* printed for the Paris Exposition, indicating his openness to France and its culture. This move simultaneously bolstered the paper’s prestige



abroad and formed ties with European colleagues, ties which stood it in good stead when war broke out fourteen years later. His paper was able to contend with wartime challenges because most of the profits it earned were spent on improving equipment, enlarging facilities, and cultivating means of newsgathering.

The Ochs-Van Anda combination was a powerful one, explaining their paper's rapid recovery and stunning success. Indeed, it was their coverage of the Great War and the subsequent Paris Peace Conference in 1919 that firmly established the *Times* as an American institution. Not only did it employ the largest corps of foreign correspondents in the country, but its workers also had links with European news services. They were especially co-operative with the *London Times* via Marconi's wireless telegraph (built in 1907), a co-operation that allowed them to scoop their competitors regularly. Censors normally made transmitting stories nearly impossible, but their restrictions were side-stepped by Van Anda. Early on in the war he invented a code they could not crack, thus ensuring that *Times* journalists could relay stories before others could, and in much greater detail. Ochs and Van Anda were careful to carry stories from both the Allied and German sides of the conflict, so meticulously in fact, that representatives of both groups in America accused the paper of catering to the other. This became serious enough that in 1915, German sympathizers accused the paper of violating United States neutrality by printing pro-British articles, a charge which Van Anda and Miller were required to deny before a congressional committee.<sup>24</sup> Editorials, on the other hand, even prior to the United States' involvement in 1917, generally (but not exclusively) contended that Germany was in the wrong. That editorial position confirmed the paper's claim that opinion and straight news reporting were very different things. The quality of the paper's events

reportage was almost unparalleled at the time, and in fact was honoured with a Pulitzer Prize in 1918, in appreciation of the entire news staff.<sup>25</sup>

There were a number of talented reporters on the news staff at the *New York Times*, many of whom had visited Europe both for work and pleasure. Among the top foreign correspondents were Charles H. Grasty, Walter Duranty, and Anne O'Hare McCormick. These news workers were in Europe for extended periods dating from the early 1910s to well after the 1920s. They necessarily had a more intimate understanding of events surrounding the war than did reporters who had not been to Europe, or had stayed only for a short period. They at least had seen the places and met some of the political figures that were so conspicuous in wartime and 1920s headlines. It could be argued that with exposure to overseas countries comes greater empathy for the people of those nations. At the very least, the *Times* received reports from people very familiar with Europe.

One of these, Charles Grasty, born in 1863, embarked at seventeen on what quickly became a remarkable career. He was hired by the *Kansas City Star* and by 21 had become managing editor of that paper. In 1891, he managed to find the financial support to buy the *Baltimore Evening News* in which he published exposés about crime and political corruption, in accordance with his strong principles. Years later, after working with several other papers in other positions, his family vacation in Europe was cut short when World War I broke out. He returned to the scene in 1915 as a foreign correspondent for the *Kansas City Star*, the Associated Press (of which he had been a director from 1900 to 1910), and later for the *New York Times*. He reported from abroad for several years, a posting interrupted by a brief stint as treasurer at the *Times*. Grasty sent home commentary about the strategic and diplomatic facets of the war rather than about battlefield conditions. His honesty and trustworthiness had earned

him access to several of the Allied leaders, including French Marshals Ferdinand Foch and Joseph Joffre. The *Baltimore Sun* remarked on Grasty's death that "he was probably the best-informed journalist in Europe and none had higher standing or reputation."<sup>26</sup>

While Grasty was very talented and informed, the *Times* had other reporters equally talented. Walter Duranty and Anne O'Hare McCormick also witnessed events in Europe during and after the war. Duranty was born and raised in England, where he attended public school. His academic achievements earned him a seat at Cambridge, where he graduated in 1903. This education clearly left its painful mark on Duranty, who later spoke disparagingly about British public schools. In 1913, he moved to the Latin Quarter in Paris, where he wrote for the *New York Times*' Paris bureau. His reporting became especially important with the beginning of hostilities in 1914. George Seldes remarked that Duranty was one of the most erudite and educated of foreign correspondents in Europe, one with an uncanny ability to learn languages, including French.<sup>27</sup>

The final correspondent to be discussed here is a remarkable woman, whose insight and abilities brought her much renown. Like Duranty, Anne O'Hare McCormick had also been born in England, though she came to the United States as an infant. Shortly after McCormick graduated with her B.A. from a private academy in Columbus, her family was left in desperate straits when her father deserted them. This prompted McCormick's introduction to writing, as she worked as managing editor for the weekly *Catholic Universe Bulletin*. In 1910, she married an engineer whose job required extensive travelling in Europe. During her frequent visits to Europe throughout the prewar and interwar period, she came to appreciate the incredible political and social changes occurring in Europe. Her lengthy career with the *Times* was launched when, in 1920, she proposed to send the *New York Times* dispatches from

Europe, which Carr Van Anda accepted immediately. Europe in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s was portrayed by McCormick with a “broad knowledge and thoughtful insight about world affairs” and a strong rapport with world leaders, to many of whom she was a favourite. Eventually she became the first woman to serve on the editorial board of the *Times* (1936-1954), a position that required her to write unsigned editorials biweekly. Her knowledgeable and sensitive reporting earned her another first for women: the Pulitzer Prize for journalism in 1937. At her death, colleague Robert Duffus said of her life’s work; “She had a great compassion for those who suffered... War was the thing that wrecked houses in which real people lived, that left children hungry and mothers hopeless. She looked beneath the events of the day and saw the effect of those events on families, on the old, on the young, on the sick.”<sup>28</sup>

These foreign correspondents were important factors in the success of the *New York Times* and set the tone of the paper’s sensitive treatment of European countries. Its success is crudely measurable by its circulation increase. By 1921, it had risen from the original circulation of 9,000, to 323,000. At the end of 1924 the *Times* had a daily circulation of 351,000, and its gross income was \$20,000,000.<sup>29</sup> From the outset, New York readers welcomed Ochs’ honest paper with a sense of relief, a response that greatly benefited from the Hearst- Pulitzer rivalry. “All The News That’s Fit to Print,” though sold initially at the same price as the yellows, was clearly a cut above. Fifty years after his purchase, Ochs remarked that his paper was not merely the source of news for “intelligent, thoughtful people” but an institution that had effectively divorced news from opinion.

Ochs’ fellow owners discussed below were of completely different backgrounds, which may explain their opinions on issues of the day. Although there is a lack of biographical material thoroughly explaining Ochs’ opinions, it is clear from his actions that he harboured no

ill-will toward European nations. Perhaps his impoverished youth and German-Jewish ancestry had taught him more tolerance for other countries and cultures, like France. He seemed to harbour no ill-will toward France. Indeed, that country was likely the source of some excitement and interest, as he published a Paris edition during the Paris Exposition. Isolationists such as McCormick or Hearst did not make such efforts. We also know that Ochs was grievously aware of his lack of formal education, and “when educators and statesmen extolled him and his works he could not get over the feeling that he was an actor in a dream masquerade.”<sup>30</sup> Despite this source of shame, he was heaped with awards and bestowed with two Doctor of Letters prizes. Further, although he enjoyed mixing with celebrities, politicians, and intellectuals, he was also somewhat awed by them, and felt injured when they criticized his paper.<sup>31</sup> Adolph Ochs was evidently of different stock than his wealthy contemporaries discussed in this thesis.

Robert Rutherford McCormick, future editor/ owner of the *Chicago Tribune*, came from very different roots than those of Adolph Ochs. McCormick was born in Chicago in 1880 to an aristocratic family long involved with newspapers. His mother, Katherine Van Etta Medill, was the daughter of Joseph Medill, publisher of the *Chicago Tribune* from 1855 to 1899. She played favourites with her eldest son, Joseph Medill McCormick, and virtually ignored Robert.<sup>32</sup> His father, Robert Sanderson McCormick (1849-1919), Yale graduate and son of Theodore Roosevelt’s attorney, was a diplomat who served as ambassador to Austria, Hungary, Russia, and France through the course of his career. Robert senior was not the most focussed ambassador, and to him, “less weighty than the fate of Korea or czarist pretensions to Asian supremacy” were the issues of his “wardrobe, his rent, and the romantic escapades of a

rebellious niece."<sup>33</sup> It was after his transfer to Russia from the Austrian court of Francis Joseph that his life, and that of his son, changed drastically. Several biographers hold Sir Cecil Spring-Rice of the British Foreign Office, who was also posted in Russia, responsible for ruining McCormick's career in diplomacy. They claim that he encouraged Robert Sanderson's transfer from his prestigious Russian post to one less respectable in Paris.<sup>34</sup> France was considered less prestigious in diplomatic circles as it was not a political hot-spot in the early 1900s, and was given to McCormick so his blunders could not damage Franco-American relations. With his father's change in status and position, 24-year-old Robert developed a lifelong antipathy toward the English, as it was the beginning of the end of their social prominence, and possibly a resentment of France as a 'consolation prize' for his father. In dismissing "his father's blunders and indiscretions, young Robert McCormick came to see his parent as a victim of British snobbery and State Department treachery. For the rest of his days he worked at his grievances like a blacksmith at his bellows, with profound consequences for all who read or were influenced by the *Chicago Tribune*."<sup>35</sup>

Before their family arrived in Paris, the two brothers, Robert and Joseph (known as Medill), had attended various elite private schools, including several in England. These often harsh environments, for which English boarding institutions of the time are renowned, instilled in the youth a strong sense of patriotism, though for him it developed into a loyalty to America rather than to the British Empire.<sup>36</sup> Robert remembered years later that he and his brother were so afraid of becoming "Anglicized" they spent their spare time reading American classics such as Tom Sawyer.<sup>37</sup> At fourteen, when his parents returned to England from a year in Chicago, he was enrolled at Groton, a very exclusive and prestigious American prep-school, graduating two classes ahead of Franklin D. Roosevelt. When Robert contracted pneumonia he was put

under the ministrations of his grandfather, Joseph Medill, with whom he had previously spent several summers. His grandfather inculcated in him an interest in journalism and the news world. Following the path of both his older brother and his cousin, Joseph Patterson, Robert attended Yale, though it was a rather unsuccessful academic stint, earning him only a "gentleman's C average." From there, fortuitously, he went on to North Western Law School on his father's recommendation. Before graduating he was persuaded to run for city alderman, and was elected in 1904. Thus began his short-lived career in politics.<sup>38</sup>

In 1911, after being defeated in his second term as president of the sanitary district, he learned that his family was planning to sell the *Chicago Tribune* to publisher Victor Lawson. The family could not find an heir to occupy the position previously held by his uncle, the recently deceased Robert Patterson. Robert rushed to persuade the trustees to allow him and his cousin, Joseph Patterson, to take the paper over, to which the trustees grudgingly agreed. Thus began a long partnership based on their lifelong friendship, strong despite a vicious family feud between their mothers.<sup>39</sup>

*The Chicago Tribune* had always been a family paper, and with the installation of Robert and Joseph, the Medill empire was to remain that way for at least another generation. In fact, according to historian John Tebbel, the only time that it was in the hands of an outsider was during the sixteen years that James Keeley was managing editor and general manager. Keeley left in 1914 for the *Record-Herald* when it became known that he was not popular with his boss, Robert R. McCormick.<sup>40</sup> When he resigned, McCormick and Patterson assumed his duties by swapping the job of editor back and forth every month. In taking the reins, the McCormick-Patterson duo was able to both maintain the inheritance from their forbears and to

breathe new life into the business after a difficult era of family rivalries following the death of their grandfather.

The work and lifestyles of the young men reflect their elitist upbringing. Like many sons of the rich and powerful, they had benefited from an education in the country's leading seaboard colleges, as well as from schools abroad.<sup>41</sup> Often when young people are well travelled, they develop a respect, if not a liking, for foreign countries and cultures. In Robert's case, the opposite seems to have happened, for his strong aversion to British politics was reflected in his axe-grinding *Tribune* editorials. Regardless of his personal experiences overseas, "the more he traveled and the more cosmopolitan he became, the stronger his attachment was to the United States. His simple, uncritical patriotism never left him."<sup>42</sup> In fact, it was not just England that was the target of his mistrust. He was deeply suspicious of the whole "European cauldron" and its political tangles, including France, and thus was staunchly isolationist.<sup>43</sup>

On the other hand, and contrary to what some historians have said, as a youth he liked many of his English schools, a liking reflected in his good grades, his acquired English accent, and love of cricket. Even later in life, as a full-fledged proponent of American governmental seclusion, he chose British accoutrements: he rode in a Rolls-Royce, had a London tailor and shoemaker, claimed British authors as his favourites, and reflected fondly on his days as a school-boy in England.<sup>44</sup> However, though he was fond of European culture and fashion, European politics made him very uneasy; and his wariness was not reserved exclusively for Great Britain. France was undeniably included, perhaps partly because it was the place to which his father had been unceremoniously relegated. This distaste was only entrenched with the events of the post-war period.



Much changed with the outbreak of the First World War. Every day allowed for exciting, though often brutal, headlines, and circulation rose. The *Tribune* was strongly opposed to American involvement until mere months before the nation's official entry into the fray in 1917. When it became obvious that his country would join forces with the Allies, McCormick switched his paper's tone to being militaristic as well as ultra-patriotic. Before this, in search of adventure, Robert had made a trip in 1915 to England with the First Cavalry of the Illinois National Guard. Later that same year he had observed events unfolding from the Eastern Front in Russia. In 1917, he was promoted to colonel through family connections, and participated in the battle of Cantigny, though to what extent remains unclear. When the war ended and they returned, a schism had opened between McCormick and Patterson, and Patterson left to start the *New York Daily Tribune*. They remained of one mind, however, on German efficiency, on their mistrust of England, and most of all, on the necessity of American exclusion from future European warfare and the proposed League of Nations. Although McCormick was attracted to some aspects of European culture, he was repelled by its politics, and this ambiguity was reflected in his newspaper. Although it had isolationist leanings, there were also regular columns on French fashions, travel advice, and positive descriptions of France.

McCormick's recipe for news was successful, and within the first eight years of running the paper he and his cousin had succeeded in doubling *Tribune* circulation from 261,278 in 1914 to 499,725 in 1921.<sup>45</sup> The Sunday edition, the biggest seller, went from 406,556 to 827,028 in the same period.<sup>46</sup> After the Great War's end, the paper finally broke William Randolph Hearst's dominance in Illinois, an accomplishment certainly worthy of mention. Behind the significant circulation increase were Patterson's comics and his original idea of

printing a listing of the local motion pictures. The success of the *Tribune* also had to do with McCormick's foresight years before when he had begun buying Canadian wood for newsprint.

Without a doubt, however, the foreign correspondents working for the *Tribune* were an important part of its success. There were several talented and daring reporters on staff who did almost anything for a story, including George Seldes and Floyd Gibbons. According to his book Witness to a Century, Seldes simply chanced upon key reporting positions, though it likely had more to do with his competence. He went to France in 1917 to write for and edit the Paris edition of the *Tribune*; he was also a member of Pershing's army press corps, a very sought-after position. In the 1920s, he was the paper's Berlin correspondent, but returned to Paris as much as he could in that decade. He seems to have been somewhat more tolerant of European political events and society than was his boss, whom he called xenophobic.<sup>47</sup> As a foreign correspondent for the *Tribune*, Seldes had travelled to many countries in Europe until he left the paper in order to write his first book, and had experienced France and French culture first-hand.

Floyd Gibbons, one of the most renowned foreign correspondents in Europe, also wrote for the *Chicago Tribune*. His stunts began on his 1917 passage to Europe. Rather than crossing the ocean on a ship assured a safe crossing, he instead chose the *Laconia*, a ship he believed in danger of being attacked by a German U-boat. His recounting of being the victim of an attack on a passenger liner may have played a role in the American entry into the war, or so Gibbons claimed. It made print in every major American newspaper, and was read before both houses of Congress. Gibbons' arrival in London was a journalistic event, "more exciting now than a Zeppelin raid," according to Seldes.<sup>48</sup> Another attempt to out-scoop his rivals led

him to the front line, where a German sniper shot out his eye. His recklessness, as well as his ability to find breaking news made Gibbons a treasure to the *Chicago Tribune*.

Reporters were as important to the *Tribune* as they were to the *Times* in the post-war era. Given his involvement in the paper's content, very little went to print that McCormick did not first approve. However isolationist and leery of Europe his publication was, it certainly appealed to many readers in the Chicago area. In 1945, *Harper's Magazine* stated that "...the colonel's huge power in the Midwest is largely based on the fact that millions of mid-westerners are hospitable to his ideas..."<sup>49</sup> So, for this combination of reasons, the rise of the *Tribune* to a place of prominence, not only in Chicago but nationally, made the 1920s prosperous years for its owner, despite its reputation for being among the most argumentative papers in the United States at the time.<sup>50</sup> Yet, however argumentative, even chauvinistic, the *Tribune* was, it never reached the level of the overbearing and outrageous reporting that was attained by Hearst's publications.

William Randolph Hearst's empire was virtually unparalleled by other contemporary American publishers, for in addition to newspapers, his empire included at its peak radio stations, magazines, news syndicates, mines, ranches, castles, and hotels. By the mid-1930s he owned papers in almost every major American city, and boasted an estimated circulation of 5,100,000 dailies and 6,800,000 Sundays.<sup>51</sup> The only child of George and Phoebe Hearst, he was born in San Francisco, California, on 29 April 1863 to an even wealthier family than was McCormick, and was exceptionally sheltered.<sup>52</sup> As a youth he was described as "petulant, selfish, arrogant and occasionally callous, and in later life his associates and victims were to suffer from his tantrums." This personality was partially formed by an absentee father and an

over-indulgent mother whose unhappy marriage directed her attention and devotion to her son.<sup>53</sup>

Never an academic, Hearst attended various schools in San Francisco, and then was sent to St Paul's in New Hampshire. Between world tours and other distractions, he had some sort of formal education at private grammar schools; but these spasmodic periods were interrupted by his endless rebellion against discipline.<sup>54</sup> When he was ten years old, his mother decided he should see the world, partly for educational purposes and partly to make evident their family's status. To ensure he did some studying, she hired a classics graduate to tutor William during the 18-month trip from Edinburgh to Florence. It was at seventeen, during his second excursion to the Continent, that he displayed a distinctive interest in newspapers, analyzing critically the differences between those in London and the rest of Europe. However, he was not sufficiently educated for his parents' tastes; and at nineteen Hearst began three intemperate years at Harvard, showing more aptitude for childish practical jokes than for academics. It was a particularly tasteless joke that got him expelled from the prestigious school, which he left happily.<sup>55</sup>

Once expelled, Hearst went to work as a cub reporter at the *New York World*, studying Pulitzer's style of sensationalism and methods of boosting circulation. Hearst wrote a long letter to his father suggesting how he would improve the *Examiner*. Although George was not excited about his son's interest in a career in the news industry, he was beginning his first full Senate term in Washington and the paper was losing money rapidly. He conceded, and handed the *Examiner* over to his twenty-four year old son in 1887. In his new position, William Randolph Hearst was nothing if not industrious. Almost immediately he began several social crusades and paper campaigns for civic improvement in San Francisco; he revelled in his role

as defender of the underdog and spokesman for the under-classes, and dedicated his paper to public service on issues deemed significant or worthy. As a result, he contended with a backlash from his peers for being a “capitalist who hated capitalists.”<sup>56</sup> Soon after he acquired the *Examiner*, he bought the *New York Journal* and founded a modest syndicate.

Hearst put great effort into improving the *Examiner's* faltering circulation. Like almost all contemporary newspapers of this ilk, he covered news in a grandiose way, with bold headlines and questionable methods of getting stories.<sup>57</sup> His business was not based on the strict rules of professionalism, as was that of Adolph Ochs. Hearst was not even above fabricating news if there was little else to report; and when he could not create it, his staff would falsify or instigate it.<sup>58</sup> In fact, Allen Kelley, who had moved from New York to San Francisco to take the position of city editor, soon requested to be transferred to a position as a columnist, so aghast was he at the slanting of news and Hearst's “unwarranted insinuations.”<sup>59</sup> Despite all this, the paper became increasingly popular, and within two years of Hearst's takeover, the *Examiner* was selling to 60,000 readers daily and growing, though it was still losing money—nearly \$300,000 during the first several years.<sup>60</sup> However, his pockets were deep, and when they were empty his father's were deeper still. Hearst's infamously unprofessional methods of newsgathering were not without their critics. Neither was the paper's owner. In the Dictionary of Literary Biography, Stephen Vaughn has assembled several unflattering, albeit bemusing, descriptions of Hearst's work:

His was “a childlike dream world,” writes one of his biographers, “imagining wonderful stories and then going out and creating them.” Other observers were less kind. The *North American Review* referred to Hearst's work as “a blazing disgrace to his craft.” Will Irwin remarked that in the Hearst press “the music of the spheres became a screech.” Oswald Garrison Villard likened the coverage found in Hearst papers to “gathering garbage from the gutters of life.” Hearst writer Arthur James Pegler said that “a Hearst newspaper is like a screaming woman running down the street with her throat cut.”<sup>61</sup>

Critics contend that he had strong political ambitions, with the ultimate goal of becoming president.<sup>62</sup> Perhaps, as Ian Mugridge contends, this explains his strict control over editing and the paper's content. Mugridge further argues that he used his paper to play political favourites and to support causes with which he agreed. Reams of paper could be used to describe his successes and failures as an editor, his policies and beliefs, but perhaps it is wise to let him speak for himself. In 1898 he published an editorial in the *New York Journal* which argued that newspapers were the "greatest force in civilization, and could "form and express public opinion," "suggest and control legislation," "declare wars," "punish criminals" and, as a representative of the people, "control the nation."<sup>63</sup> Indeed, not only was the reading population at large malleable, but so too was the media itself. In letters found in the Hearst papers, he stated "the modern editor of the popular journal does not care for facts. The editor has no objections to facts if they are also novel. But he would prefer novelty that is not fact, to a fact that is not novel."<sup>64</sup> These values contrast sharply with those more conscientious and principled ones of Ochs, and to a lesser degree, with those of McCormick.

That Hearst used the *Examiner*, and his entire chain, as a means of supporting his favourite causes became especially clear by his coverage of the Great War, of President Woodrow Wilson, and of the events of the interwar period. His antipathy toward Wilson began as soon as the President took office in 1913. The source of this criticism was connected to Hearst's unwavering belief that the U.S. was still not free of England, despite the War of Independence, and that Wilson was an Anglophile. According to Hearst, Britain continued to carry its influence, ideas and attitudes into the affairs of the United States.<sup>65</sup> His chief complaint, particularly after the outbreak of the 1914 war, was that the British government, in its expectation that America would be on-side, had neglected to allow for that country's own

position, needs, or concerns. Hearst accused Wilson of being pro-British, an accusation based initially on the weak argument that the President chose to address Congress in person. Hearst objected to this because it seemed more reminiscent of the British parliamentary tradition than of the American governmental tradition.<sup>66</sup> His indictment of Wilson for allegedly being sympathetic toward England was further strengthened by the American entry into the "European war."

After the outbreak of war in 1914, Hearst became even more staunchly in favour of American isolationism. Indeed, his paper adopted such a degree of xenophobia that some readers began to question his motives.<sup>67</sup> He argued that it was a European battle over domination of the world market, and that Japan and Britain were more serious threats to America than was Germany. He also contended that the Germans were going to win, and tried to counter the substantial allied propaganda in the United States. He went too far in 1916, however, when he argued that the sinking of the British ship *The Lusitania* in 1915 which killed 128 Americans, had been justified. With this outrageous assertion, his popularity reached new lows. Hearst's political stance prior to 1917 led to accusations that he was pro-German, and "as support for the Allies grew into hysteria, Hearst's popularity declined."<sup>68</sup> The anti-Hearst backlash cut into profits as readership waned. More fuel for the fires of criticism came from his belief that German interests were the same as American ones. After the armistice in 1918 the Hearst papers launched a campaign to redeem themselves by proving what they had done for domestic war efforts. It is also worth noting that although he was increasingly unpopular during the Great War, his disgrace was short lived and his empire resumed its expansion in the years following 1918.

Hearst's opinion of France was not altogether negative, although he was prejudiced by his aversion to British influence. Because the French had assisted in the War of Independence, he believed that they did deserve special regard. Hearst was nonetheless critical of them, and his opinion grew increasingly disparaging as he aged. Early in his career he declared that French money and military power under Lafayette had helped America beat back the English in the eighteenth century, and he lauded the lack of classism he perceived in their society. He also defended the French in 1901 against the indictment of decadence: "The French nation is about as far from being decadent as anything on top of the earth..." and anyone who so described it "would simply expose his own pitiful ignorance."<sup>69</sup> France was not above reproach, however, and despite her Republic status, she was nonetheless a European nation. To him, simply being a European power meant having militaristic tendencies, and Hearst fingered France as the most militaristic country in Europe, and the cause of numerous wars.<sup>70</sup> Further, like some European neighbours, she was underhanded and untrustworthy in her politics, a trait that had dominated Europe for so long, and which still threatened American interests. For these reasons, Hearst was a passionate, post-war isolationist, arguing for a full repayment of French and British war debts as penance for the war. Like McCormick, but unlike Ochs, he was strongly opposed to the League of Nations and thought America should have nothing to do with the Treaty of Versailles, or Europe itself except on the level of trade.

There is a dearth of information about Hearst's reporters for the early 1920s. Fortunately, however, one of the most outrageous examples of his loyal staff is fairly well-known. Winifred Black, known as Annie Laurie, has a place in the annals of history as the first American "sob-sister."<sup>71</sup> When America joined the Allies in World War One, she was off to Europe for a second stint as an unofficial foreign correspondent, her first having been to England in 1910 to



report on the British suffragettes. Wartime censors, however, prevented most of her stories from crossing the Atlantic; and upon her return to the United States they fell victim to her acidic pen. Black fit into Hearst's sensationalist mould nicely, and like him, she became more staunchly conservative with age. While there is little written about other reporters who worked for Hearst's *Examiner*, it is important to note that his journalists were obliged to write stories within his sensationalist and xenophobic guidelines if they wanted their work to be printed. Hearst, like his two colleagues discussed earlier, was a very involved editor/owner, personally setting the tone and style for his publication.

In sum, Adolph Ochs, with his reliable and brilliant editor Carr Van Anda, brought his paper back from the verge of bankruptcy to a position of international acclaim using novel ideas and adhering to a high level of professionalism and integrity. Ochs' humble background instilled in him a strong sense of honour and accountability. His lack of first-hand childhood experience with France was compensated for by his European background, which likely contributed to his openness to cooperate with French newspapers, and his tolerance of foreign politics. Although the *Times* was far more positive in its portrayal of French society, culture, and politics than were many other papers, it could also be critical, even in its editorials. This is important to remember, and demonstrates the ambiguity of American opinion of France was detectable in the *Times*. However, it was McCormick and Hearst whose agendas and motives were more perceptible in the tones and policies of their newspapers' treatment of Europe in general, and of France in particular.

Robert Rutherford McCormick, of wealthy and aristocratic heritage, was devoutly patriotic and a strong detractor of European politics. When he inherited the *Chicago Tribune*

he proved himself to be a talented, if somewhat prejudiced, editor. Memories of his father's fall from diplomatic grace haunted his adult life, coloured his paper's editorial policy regarding treatment of France, and determined the causes he supported in its articles. Because his father had been relegated to a less crucial post in France, McCormick was resentful of both French and British diplomacy, and its influence in the United States. His isolationism became increasingly unyielding as he aged, despite his childhood exposure to Europe. And yet, despite his isolationism, his newspaper carried positive images of France, and was known to praise many aspects of French culture.

William Randolph Hearst was the most staunchly isolationist of the three, and arguably of the entire American press. In his childhood, his mother had taken him to see Europe in the hopes that he would develop into a cultured and well-rounded adult. In reality, he became a spoiled and impetuous adult, immoderately and unapologetically disdainful of Europeans. He used his paper, not only to argue against the Allies in a public forum, but also to further his cherished goal of being president. It was perhaps because of this intense desire to run the country that Hearst, like McCormick, became increasingly opposed to American involvement in European disputes as time passed. His failure at politics was made up for by his astonishing success in the news business, and the circulation of his syndicate was testament to the popularity of his politics.

As previously mentioned, Hearst argued that newspapers were the "greatest force in civilization, and could "form and express public opinion," "suggest and control legislation," "declare wars," "punish criminals" and, as a representative of the people, "control the nation."<sup>72</sup> This power has been the subject of an impressive body of literature which explores the impact of the media on public opinion, and through the actions and beliefs of voters, on official

opinion and the foreign policy of governments. The power of the press is worth delving into briefly, as it serves as useful background to the upcoming discussion on the press, public opinion, and foreign policy in the conclusion of this thesis.

The press has long been an instrument of communication to the electorate for politicians. Although officials want to be presented in a fashion that promotes their careers, the press wants to present news in a way that sells newspapers, and to determine what that news is independently, a tension that leads some people to see the two camps as “natural enemies.”<sup>73</sup>

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> The newspaper owners of the papers used in this thesis also played a significant part in the editing process of their businesses. Their involvement was so pervasive that they are usually referred to as both titles, as seen here.

<sup>2</sup> James Melvin Lee, History of American Journalism (Garden City: The Garden City Publishing Co., Inc., 1917), 388.

<sup>3</sup> So said James Keeley, general manager of the *Chicago Tribune* about Miss Libbey's column. He claimed that she had received 50,000 letters in just two years, leading him to believe that she was "filling a long-felt want". He went on to say that "over two hundred girls and young women have written and acknowledged that her words of warning saved them from taking the irretreivable false step which often confronts the friendless girl in a large city..." Quoted from Lee, 393.

<sup>3</sup> Elmer Davies, History of the New York Times, 1851-1921 (St. Clair Shores: Scholarly Press, Inc., 1971), 331.

<sup>5</sup> Bernard A. Weisberger, The American Newspaperman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 159.

<sup>6</sup> Weisberger, 156.

<sup>7</sup> Marion Marzolf, Up From the Footnote: A History of Women Journalists (New York: Hastings House, Publishers, 1977), 32.

<sup>8</sup> Weisberger, 163.

<sup>9</sup> Meyer Berger, The History of the New York Times, 1851-1951 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951), 219.

<sup>10</sup> Lee, 421.

<sup>11</sup> Weisberger, 168.

<sup>12</sup> Susan Barnes, Dictionary of Literary Biography, vol. 25, 224.

<sup>13</sup> The boys rose at three in the morning to hand-fold papers as they came off the press and deliver them, after which they had to be at the local public school for seven a.m. According to Susan Barnes, Julius Ochs appears to have felt remorse that his two sons worked while he was unemployed, and he rose early to accompany them on their walk to the *Knoxville Chronicle* office in silent apology, and a way of letting them know that he shared the discomforts that resulted from his misfortunes. See *ibid*, 226.

<sup>14</sup> Stephen Ostrander, "All the News That's Fit to Print': Adolph Ochs and the New York Times," *Timeline* 10, no. 1 (1993), 40.

<sup>15</sup> Barnes, 228.

<sup>16</sup> Ostrander, 42.

<sup>17</sup> Barnes, 230.

<sup>18</sup> "Yellow journalism," was named after Hearst's colour comic strips that included "The Yellow Kid." This type of newspaper was known for its sensationalistic reporting, bold headlines and heavy ink. 'Yellows' were part of the penny press, and at this time the *New York Times* cost 3 cents.

<sup>19</sup> Ostrander, 42-43.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, 43.

<sup>21</sup> Barnes, 231.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, 231.

<sup>23</sup> Ostrander, 45.

<sup>24</sup> This charge wounded Ochs deeply, particularly as it coincided with anti-Semitic hate mail he had received. As a precaution, he had security guards posted at his building. Ochs, a Reform Jew, opposed the formation of a separate Zionist state, and advocated assimilation despite his loss of popularity with some members of the Jewish community. Further uproar came toward the end of the war when, with the Germans clearly losing, Miller wrote an editorial which supported the Austrian proposal for non-

binding peace talks. Immediately there were accusations that the Times was "running up the white flag" early. Competitors seized the opportunity to demand the public "read an American paper." The furor crushed Ochs' pride and he sank even further into the depression which had begun the year before, and from which he would suffer the rest of his life. See Barnes, 233, and Ostrander, 48.

<sup>25</sup>Barnes, 233.

<sup>26</sup>Daniel Pfaff, "Charles H. Grasty" in DLB, vol. 25, p. 97.

<sup>27</sup>Sally Taylor, "Walter Duranty" in DLB, vol. 29, p. 98.

<sup>28</sup>J. Douglas Tarpley, "Anne O'Hare McCormick" in DLB, vol. 29, p. 198.

<sup>29</sup>Berger, 240-241.

<sup>30</sup>Berger, 272.

<sup>31</sup>Ostrander, 46.

<sup>32</sup>That he was not especially close to his mother was verified by the fact that in his memoirs Robert paid little attention to her. See James Edwards, The Foreign Policy of Colonel McCormick's Tribune, 1929-1941 (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1971), 5.

<sup>33</sup>Smith, The Colonel, 91.

<sup>34</sup>Robert Sanderson McCormick, when transferred to the court of the Russian czar, was greatly disliked by Spring-Rice, for reasons unclear. Spring-Rice happened to be a close personal friend of President Roosevelt's. According to Frank Waldrop, former editor of the Washington Times-Herald, it was Spring-Rice's campaign of subtle hints to the President which finished McCormick's diplomatic stint in Petersburg. Waldrop wrote: "Step by delicate step, Spring-Rice built an understanding through letters, first to the President, and then to the President's wife, to show that the McCormicks, who saw themselves securely in favour because they were effusively pro-Russian, were thought at court some sort of a joke in poor taste on Roosevelt's part." Spring-Rice suggested that unless he was stopped, Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany, who was in league with the czar, would manipulate a peace for the Russo-Japanese War that would be costly to every nation but Germany. The Englishman was in close enough stead with Roosevelt that when he intimated longingly "How I wish you had a really good ambassador here...", the President got it, and McCormick was relieved of his Russian post. See Sewell, 204.

<sup>35</sup>Smith, The Colonel, 94.

<sup>36</sup>Evidently this was a very good period of his life, as McCormick was in touch for the rest of his life with those schoolmates who survived World War I and also with the schoolmaster's widow. See Sewell, 202.

<sup>37</sup>Edwards, 5.

<sup>38</sup>Two years after becoming alderman, with aspirations of being Governor of Illinois, he ran for the important municipal position of president of the sanitary district. This was a station with extensive responsibility and patronage at which he proved very competent. McCormick was responsible for several large construction projects, most significantly, a sanitary canal linking the Chicago sewage system with the Mississippi River. He approached his position with a typically efficient, business-like attitude. He routed the corruption which had slowed the project's completion, and established a laboratory for the study of bacterial purification of sewage, putting his city at the cutting edge of sewage disposal at the time. Despite his achievements, he was ousted from his post in 1910 by a social movement against Republicanism, and never returned to politics. See Sewell, 203.

<sup>39</sup>Historian Lloyd Wendt claims that "superficially [Joe Patterson] appeared to be the exact opposite of Robert Rutherford McCormick. Joe was affable, democratic, a free-thinker, and he seemed to enjoy the company of common people more than the social and club life into which he had been born." Both cousins shared their grandfather's tough stubbornness, "his flair for new ideas of a pragmatic nature, and his idealism," though they differed almost completely over issues like economics, politics, and the

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social system. Like his cousins, "Joe" had attended Groton and Yale, had traveled frequently during vacations, and entered politics young, and had also worked as a cowboy in Wyoming and Mexico. See Lloyd Wendt, Chicago Tribune: The Rise of a Great American Newspaper (Chicago, Rand McNally & Company, 1979), 375.

<sup>40</sup> John Tebbel, An American Dynasty (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 90-91.

<sup>41</sup> Wendt, 373.

<sup>42</sup> Edwards, 5.

<sup>43</sup> Robert Young, "Forgotten Words and Faded Images: American Journalists before the Fall of France, 1940," *Historical Reflections/ Reflexions Historiques* 24, no. 2 (1998), 211.

<sup>44</sup> See Sewell, 204, and Wendt, 373.

<sup>45</sup> Tebbel, 92.

<sup>46</sup> Tebbel, 92.

<sup>47</sup> George Seldes, Witness to a Century: Encounters with the Noted, the Notorious, and the Three SOB's (New York: Ballantine Books, 1987), 117.

<sup>48</sup> Seldes, 57.

<sup>49</sup> Sewell, 212.

<sup>50</sup> Edwards, 14.

<sup>51</sup> Mugridge, 19.

<sup>52</sup> His father was a successful prospector who owned shares in two of the richest mines in the country. Interestingly, despite their affluence, his mother taught at a local school. This was definitely not the norm at this time for women of high-income families. Teaching attracted predominantly single women desperate for a wage and some sort of security. However, Phoebe was strong-willed and a determined philanthropist. Her gifts to educational institutions and poor students earned her national attention. There is a rich literature on North American teachers toward the end of the nineteenth century which indicates that the abysmal working conditions and paltry salary attracted the needy, making it all the more puzzling that such a well-to-do woman would choose it as a field. See, for example Marta Danylewycz, Taking the Veil: An Alternative to Marriage, Motherhood and Spinsterhood in Quebec, 1840-1920 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987) and P. Rooke and R.L. Schnell, Discarding the Asylum: From Child Rescue to the Welfare State in English-Canada (1800-1950) (Lanham: University Press of America, 1983).

<sup>53</sup> Hugh Cudlipp, The Prerogative of the Harlot: Press Barons and Power (London: The Bodley Head, 1980), 15.

<sup>54</sup> Cudlipp, 19.

<sup>55</sup> One prank consisted of herding a jackass, to which was a sign attached saying "now there are two of you", into a professor's home. The prank for which Hearst was expelled was especially crass. He had chamber pots delivered to all his instructors. Inside of each pot was the name of each recipient, ornately inscribed at the target point. See Cudlipp, 21 and Stephen Vaughn, "William Randolph Hearst" in DLB, vol. 25, 100.

<sup>56</sup> Cudlipp, 25.

<sup>57</sup> A fine example of his flamboyant methods of newsgathering is the time he dispatched a chartered train to send reporters to investigate a terrible fire at the Hotel Del Monte in Monterey. See Vaughn, 101.

<sup>58</sup> For example, in 1890 Hearst had rookie reporter Annie Laurie (nee Winifred Black) "faint" so she could witness first hand, undercover, the infamous, squalid conditions of the City Receiving Hospital where staff was allegedly negligent in providing its care. She wrote an exposé entitled "A City's Disgrace" on the Sunday feature's front page. Her actions caused city officials to call for improvements to the healthcare services and personnel. This is an example of both "yellow journalism" (sensationalistic reporting) and a "sob sister" (female reporters who were self-appointed champions of the poor, children, and women.) See Faye Zuckerman, "Winifred Black", DLB vol. 25, 12-19.

<sup>59</sup> Cudlipp, 27.

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<sup>60</sup> Vaughn, 101.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, 101.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid*, 105.

<sup>63</sup> Roy Hoopes, "The Forty Year Run," American Heritage (November 1992), 48.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid*, 48.

<sup>65</sup> Ironically, he firmly believed that the Western Hemisphere was an ideal place for American expansionism and that it was perfectly within their rights to invade Central and South America, both militarily and economically. This was clear by his ceaseless campaign for American control of the Panama Canal. See Mugridge, 144.

<sup>66</sup> Cudlipp, 73.

<sup>67</sup> Not only readers but politicians were concerned. A big confrontation between Hearst and the Allies erupted in 1916 when, printing news and photos, his papers blatantly disobeyed censorship regulations. The British refused him the use of cables and mail unless he obeyed, and when he refused to concede, both the British and the French denied him access to communication lines. Canada took the drastic step of banning his publications altogether. See Cudlipp, 73.

<sup>68</sup> Vaughn states that in Oregon, citizens burned Hearst papers while singing "Keep the Home Fires Burning." In addition to this were the boo's heard so loudly in movie theatres that Hearst-Pathé News was abbreviated to just Pathé News. See Vaughn, 109.

<sup>69</sup> Mugridge. 38.

<sup>70</sup> In 1930, Hearst was asked to leave France because, according to him, he had published the secret Anglo-French naval treaty two years previous, because of his paper's opposition to the American entry into the League of Nations, and because he advocated collection of French war debts. He affected to be entirely amused by the whole incident, and surprisingly this occurrence did not adversely effect his view of France. Mugridge, 38-39.

<sup>71</sup> It is worth mentioning that this nickname came into use in 1907 from a snide remark by New York reporter Irvin Cobb because of what he called their "emotional and maudlin writing." Black hated the label, writing that "I am not a 'Sob Sister' or a special writer. I'm just a plain, practical, all-around newspaper woman. That is my profession and that is my pride. I'd rather smell the printers' ink and hear the presses go round than go to any grand opera in the world." See the Zuckerman, p.17.

<sup>72</sup> Hoopes, 50.

<sup>73</sup> Cohen, 266.

### CHAPTER 3: THE SAINT

Thus far, this thesis has examined Franco-American relations as they were immediately following the First World War. It then scrutinized the nature of the contemporary news media in America, focussing on the approach taken by three newspapers regarding France: the generally sympathetic *New York Times*, the often critical *Chicago Tribune*, and the ardently isolationist *San Francisco Examiner*. The present chapter, and the one following it, will present the ways in which those papers portrayed France and various events in Franco-American relations. Interpretations of the French people and their government between 1918 and 1923 were almost as diverse as the individuals who reported them. Indeed, there was almost an overabundance of representations from which to select for this thesis. 'France the Saint' was the set of depictions showing her to be the country whose people and politics were largely blameless. France was the victim of events beyond her control, the darling of the world's nations, and as such warranted much empathy and support from her associate across the Atlantic. It spoke well of France that an isolationist country such as the United States was willing to reach out to another nation and embrace its people, support its economy, and admire its culture with the fervour articulated by the *Times*, the *Tribune*, and even, to a lesser degree, the *Examiner*.

The depictions of the French national character published in those three newspapers immediately following the war were largely positive. This chapter will explore those images, and outline exactly what aspects of the "the French" were so magnetic, beginning with the Saint metaphors. The saintly image was an abstract reading of *la France*, a reading by American newspapers that was a sympathetic appreciation for the nation's suffering. The American newspaper excerpts to follow illustrate positive perceptions of French men, of French women, and



of the French people collectively. They also describe the revered art, literary works, and fashion of French culture. The chapter concludes with a glimpse into the complex representations of French foreign politics. American newspapers, and not just the *New York Times*, celebrated French political leaders and honoured the victimization of their state. Underlining these positive portrayals of politics was the American understanding of French fear of Germany and need for debt relief, and American support for French invasion of the Ruhr. In combination, the three newspapers provide us with the impression that America was swept away by the romanticism of France the Saint.

The abstract notion of the Saint was discussed on a symbolic level. According to American newspaper depictions, the spirit of the French people was saintly in its fortitude and martyrdom. Annie Laurie of the *Examiner* described the widespread impression held by Americans: "we have been taught here in America to look upon the French people as a nation of saints and martyrs and noble disinterested patriots willing to die with a smile in order that the world might live..."<sup>1</sup> Like most saints, the French nation had endured, and transcended, its persecution. As though to illustrate this courage, shortly after the war ended came timely and numerous descriptions of Joan of Arc, the most famous French saint. She had been beatified in 1909, and a decade afterward, an editor of the *New York Times* wrote a tribute to her. This editorial presented Joan as the very embodiment of France herself, linking the events of Joan's life with recent events in French history. The editorial concluded strongly:

When Rheims of the sacred vial and the sacring of so many kings is become a monument of German savagery as well as of Christian and of French civilization, when Jeanne's passionate love of and martyrdom for France have made her more than ever the symbol of France, have fused and identified this martyr of France with martyred France after these years in which French cleric and French freethinkers have died in the trenches together for the same noble and imperishable ideal, this heroine of France becomes a saint of the Church, as she has long been a

beloved figure to all who love France or heroic courage, unselfishness, and achievement.<sup>2</sup>

Significantly, it was in 1921, only two years after the war, that France honoured her for the first time with a national fête, 490 years after her death. After decades of fractional and minor demonstrations in her honour, the government designated May 8 as a nationally recognized date to commemorate her life.<sup>3</sup> In this first year of festivity, the streets of Paris and Orleans, her birthplace, were decorated with French flags and Jeanne's own banner. Statues across the country were decorated with wreaths and flowers to celebrate her place in French history. Joan of Arc had come to symbolize France's noble struggle against foreign oppressors, and in fact her name became synonymous with that of France. Official recognition of Joan's struggle was simultaneous with the national struggle for indemnity for the suffering and needs of her people.

On a less symbolic level, interwar observers were complimentary to French men, primarily those belonging to the armed forces. French men were portrayed as being an exceptionally cultured, intellectual, educated, and masculine group, a depiction that grew out of the Great War. Soon after the war began in 1914, descriptions abounded of the celebrated and idealized French soldiers, nicknamed the '*poilus*.' Their own local press had popularized this nickname in early 1915. The title—and the archetype it accompanied—stuck.<sup>4</sup> The moniker itself revealed the sort of men these soldiers were: hairy, tough, and ultra-masculine, an ideal not unlike the 1970s 'Marlboro Man.' French civilians in the early war years were convinced of the happiness and cheerfulness of these heroes, though such optimism was greatly dampened when the realities of trench warfare set in.<sup>5</sup> Images in America of French soldiers were comparable. The *poilu* quickly came to embody the ideal man, the hope of his people, a warrior battling to protect his (feminine) homeland of France. Despite the best efforts of American francophobes, he remained a cherished

idol on both sides of the Atlantic, and the most prevalent and enduring example of French manhood to come from this era.

There are many adulatory descriptions and accounts of the *poilus*, particularly in the last years of the Great War and those immediately following the armistice of November 1918. The typical *poilu* was bearded and battle-stained. He was a willing combatant, like the sergeant interviewed by Walter Duranty, “who has been attached by his own request to the most active regiment since the battle of Verdun and who has been decorated with the military medal and war cross...”<sup>6</sup> Upon entering Alsace-Lorraine, French soldiers were emotional, standing with “faded khaki, faded blue, stained with war and beautiful with triumph. Heads high, eyes shining through tears, faces gentle and kind and childlike. The famous soldiers of France.”<sup>7</sup> To American foreign correspondents they had the calm and poise of seasoned fighters, which they were. At the moment of the armistice, when other soldiers of the allied army trumpeted their joy over the end of the war, the *poilus* were controlled: “No greater proof of the splendid discipline and wholehearted patriotism of the French armies ever was given in the whole course of the war than by the way in which the end was received. Undismayed by disaster, the *poilus* are not unbalanced by victory.” In fact, they were unbalanced by peace. Another reporter described them as being “like castaways rescued after years on a desert island, ... still unable to realize the conclusion of the long agony.”<sup>8</sup> What was a warrior without a war?

After the fighting ceased, French veterans could “well be styled a legion of heroes,” the spirit of whom was so cheery as to be likened to “the typical Jacques Bonhomme.” Polite and charming, they were also modest about their skill and bravery.<sup>9</sup> For American soldiers, they were easier than the British ‘Tommies’ to get along with, largely because the *poilus* were more conciliatory than were their English counterparts.<sup>10</sup> High praise came even from Germany’s

former Crown Prince, Friedrich Wilhelm Von Hohenzollern, who was impressed by the nature of the *poilus*. He remarked that their élan, tenacity, and independence were superior to those of his own German privates.<sup>11</sup>

The *poilus*, though the epitome of masculine energy, were also indelibly French. An extensive 1919 *Times* article compared their nature to that of the American doughboys. According to the article, when on leave, a French soldier sought an aesthetically pleasing place to rest, a place where he could “sit around and talk and sing...[H]e wished that place to be beautiful—as far different from the life and scenes of the trenches as it could be. He didn’t want to see a war trophy hung on the wall; he wanted to see a dash of colour harmony...” The men described by this particular article even went so far as to paint scenes of Brittany and Normandy on large pieces of muslin, hung to replace windows lost to shelling in the former chair-maker’s shop where they were being housed. The French soldiers also appeared to be more communicative than their American brethren, as the quixotic fellows wrote more letters home. There was a marked cultural difference; “the Frenchman is not like the American. He has the idealism of a child and the individuality of an artist, which, essentially, he is.”<sup>12</sup> If *les poilus* were macho-men, they were also artists and men of letters, qualities that made them ever-so French to the attentive American observer.

A contemporary highlighted the essential ideals that the *poilu* had come to embody. At the interring of the Unknown Soldier in Paris in October of 1921, General Pershing of the United States Expeditionary Force saluted him, saying that:

In your noble life and in your tragic death you have become to the world an immortal symbol of devotion to the highest ideals of mankind. Your valour on many fields will ever remain an inspiration to living mothers who weep over your grave...<sup>13</sup>

Ambassador Herrick went further, saying that “France has been the bastion of civilization,” a statement that turned the *poilus* into the very guardians of that civilization.

Enlisted French men were not only protecting their homeland from the threat of German barbarity, but were also fighting to keep their women safe. French women, however, posed a much greater series of challenges for American newspapers and foreign correspondents. To the foreign eye during the war, French women were divided into two categories: either the (good) patriotic wife or mother, or the (bad) pleasure-seeking, selfish wanton, an image to be further explored in the next chapter.<sup>14</sup> From the wartime figure of the patriot emerged a new woman after the war, a character respectfully dubbed ‘*la femme moderne*’ by contemporary writers. Here was the fashion trend-setter, the free, new, liberated woman, who smoked freely in the streets, and drove her automobile un-chaperoned. It is both interesting and significant that many of the American journalists writing about French women were women themselves. Their reports generally represented their French sisters in very sensitive and sympathetic ways, despite obvious cultural differences.

Like French men, French women, too, were idealized. Some of the ways in which they were presented after 1918 were merely carried over from prewar conventions. Henry Blumenthal has written that, to tourists at the turn of the twentieth century, French women appeared to be more feminine than their American contemporaries. They were also more sophisticated, as women in France were permitted to earn more senior university degrees than were their American sisters. Such images survived the war and were preserved by the press long after it had ended. French women were accorded their own special places in American newspapers. Sometimes coy, obedient, and adoring, other times resourceful, competent, and determined, French women were

always fashionable. Above all else, they were patriots, they were mothers, sisters, wives, and daughters of men killed by German barbarism.

After an uncertain peace was established with the 1918 armistice, American soldiers were slowly returned to their places of origin. Some had met women and decided to stay abroad, while others took their war brides home with them. For newspapers, the issue of American soldiers marrying French women was an engrossing one. An informal survey by the *Tribune* found that, much to that paper's surprise, a great number of doughboys stationed in France preferred French women as partners to Americans. This survey, which made the front page, described the attractive features of French femininity, saying a Gallic woman "is more likely [than an American] to look up to and coddle the men in the family. She is more of a listener than a talker; she is pleased with small attentions, and never fails to show appreciation to them." She was also more passive, "more thoughtful and agreeable, and less exacting than the American..."<sup>15</sup> Not only were they great partners, but "French girls stand the test of beauty every time. Their keen humor doesn't take the form of the verbal sparring and the cheap banter of the American debutante." They made good conversationalists, but "what is more, they can listen."<sup>16</sup> Because French women were much more the partners of their husbands—both in the relationship and in business—they were considered valuable mates. Several *Examiner* articles expounded on French women's business abilities, saying that they made better use of their natural talents than did their American sisters.<sup>17</sup>

Such glowing descriptions of women from another country led to a flurry of articles, editorials, and letters to the editor in all three newspapers agreeing with the soldiers' assertion of the superiority of French women because of their sense of duty to family and their thriftiness,

beauty, style, and culture.<sup>18</sup> They were said to pose a significant threat to the popularity of American women, for reasons listed by Annie Laurie in November 1918. French women were remarkable in their “manner in dress, hair, eyes, dainty fascination,” and because they were “practical, hardworking, economical, affectionate, devoted—a dangerous rival, Miss America...”.<sup>19</sup> Some editorials discussed the benefits of a French female immigrant population.

One *Tribune* editorial went so far as to say that America would be lucky to have them:

The French are tenacious in family, home and country....They will improve our domestic situation....The United States would be better for an infusion of French cooking, manners, tenacity, thrift, family partnership, etc. A million French girls of the home-making type might temper our extravagance, modify our exuberance, improve our tables and polish up our manners. How about knocking off a billion of the debt for a million French girls?<sup>20</sup>

Indeed, comparisons between the two groups occurred frequently in the early interwar years. The *Times* claimed that French women were always chic while American girls, particularly those working with the Red Cross in France, were “devoid of charm and style” and “could not be called good-looking.”<sup>21</sup>

The women who were considered especially chic fell under the classification of the *femme moderne*, the ‘new woman.’ This figure burst onto the social scene around 1919, and was a commonly discussed icon. Although Western society was rather uncertain of what to say about this striking and novel creature, there was no end to the images being relayed across the Pacific. This woman was the archetype of change. According to Mary Louise Roberts, she provided a medium for postwar society to discuss and examine the transformation of their world wrought by World War One.<sup>22</sup> Unlike her forbears, in the eyes of contemporaries the new woman was independent and ‘sexually free’, flirting with boyishness by bobbing her hair and smoking in public. Such behaviour was rather shocking to the old expectations of social decorum, and thus

Figure #1, from the 17 August 1919 edition of the *Tribune*, is a startling photograph of a French war bride of an American sergeant en route to her new home. Upon closer scrutiny, the apparent halo is revealed to be a porthole of the passenger ship on which they were travelling, but the Madonna image is reinforced by the caption.





subject to criticism. However, she was also accorded a level of respect for her extraordinary style. She set trends that were mirrored by young women right across the Western world; and elite, wealthy visitors were sure to bring home the latest outfits from any trips to Paris.

Alongside the *femme moderne* was another depiction of French women: the victim. Not long after the armistice, Gertrude Atherton wrote a poignant description for the *Tribune* of common French women and their opinions of world events, a description that exudes empathy for their plight. The bitterness and resentment of traumatized civilians were clearly expressed by those she interviewed and observed. Atherton admitted that she had expected to find a people elated in the afterglow of the long-awaited peace:


I found nothing of the sort...I found the French people restless, dissatisfied, anxious...[T]heir faces were grim or sullen. Nowhere did I see the joy of the light irresponsibility of the [Christmas] season....Their sorrow by no means is the secret of deep [female] discontent....The women bitterly resent the armistice....When one considers that the fate of the world will be in the hands of a few fallible men, all of whom have made mistakes, one ceases to marvel that the French women, who have so bravely struggled with the bitterness of death these four years in the hope of ultimate recompense, should be too full of resentment and anxiety, too disgusted to rejoice with a whole heart over an armistice that leaves the enemy crippled, but patting himself on the back.<sup>23</sup>

French women, who had endured unimaginable pain at the loss of loved partners and sons, not to mention the destruction of their homes and workplaces, left an indelible impression on American press imagery well into the interwar period.

Among the representations of French women as victims of German cruelty, a victimization that was aggrandized by the American press, there were equally sympathetic representations of them as enduring, hardworking, and selfless, in a word, martyrs. The martyr image was an extension of the victim icon. *New York Times* reporter Anne O'Hare McCormick wrote an extensive article about French women in 1921, remarking on their intellectualism and "amazing

Figure #2-

That French women were "always chic" was almost a truism during the interwar period, as in this cartoon from the *Tribune*, 29 July 1923, p. 1, vii. The French woman is clearly the most beautiful and the best dressed of all tourists in this sketch.



competence, character and stoicism” in their painful lot as “fighters of the harder battle of peace.” She extolled their traits, depicting them as having an almost inhuman patience; “They were born with energy, poise, and practical intelligence. Old or young, high or low, they seem to take what comes to them with as good grace as if they had ordered it.” Indeed, several of the women she met went on with their lives, feeding their children dismal meals of beans, and living in hovels, caves, or the ruins of their former towns. They did all this without grumbling, for, as one woman chirped, “We are nearly all in the same boat, so one doesn’t complain.”<sup>24</sup> This sympathetic treatment of women as martyred victims was not uncommon. Indeed, it was found regularly in articles written in the years immediately following the devastation of the war.

The people of France were the subjects of numerous and equally empathetic articles by the American press in this era. Women were not alone in their depiction as noble martyred victims. Prevailing images of the French national character told of a hardworking people, a group that had endured both slaughter on the front lines and the devastation of their home-front with fortitude. Newspapers reported that the French people were determined to work until the countryside was returned to its former glory. In this aspect of France the Saint, the image of the martyred victim dominated once again. The French had been traumatised by the war and were still suffering greatly in the recovery from that devastating period. According to a *Times* editorial about French society, “heroic as it was in war, it has equal vigour and tenacity in the arts of peace.”<sup>25</sup> To American audiences, this impression was both familiar and endearing. For the United States, itself the site of two devastating wars, and a nation that advocated self-determination and the pursuit of personal comfort, the victim of German barbarity was an iconic symbol.<sup>26</sup> The French nation was idealized as the birth-place of republicanism, a nation that represented civilization,

order, culture, and racial equality. Such nobility made Germany's wartime assault all the more heinous; it was an assault on the very heart of civilization.

American newspapers following 1918 overflowed with first-hand accounts of the physical damage done to the martyred French landscape, most of which explained how civilians still struggled to carry on. Reports from American war workers detailed the devastation for readers back home. They described, for example, the Argonne region "which baffles description...The shell-torn land was like nothing so much as an arid desert where one could look over acres and acres of country with not a vestige of a town left....[I]t seemed as if it was nothing but one shell-hole blown into another..."<sup>27</sup> Many of the country's railroads, bridges, and roads had been destroyed, and unexploded shells made walking off the road deadly. Churches, houses, and entire towns had been wiped out, making the transportation of much needed supplies virtually impossible. People were forced to carry goods over miles of land, without the assistance of so much as a wheelbarrow.<sup>28</sup> The liberated areas of France were worse than early post-war civilian observers could have imagined: "the earth has been torn up from its bed; waters and the rains and the remains of mangled humanity have been allowed to gather there..."<sup>29</sup> Although their homeland had been martyred, the rugged population created a new one. All across the devastated regions, towns were slowly rising once more from the ashes of their former incarnation.<sup>30</sup>

Through all this ruination, people bravely returned to their bombed out homes to literally pick up the pieces of their previous lives, and to begin the painfully slow process of rebuilding them. Their situations were amply illustrated by a *Times* article, published in 1919: "The suffering of the people in this region [that of Northern France] is acute... They are doing their best to come back to a normal state of things, but with the ground in no condition to be tilled and the industries at a standstill it is difficult. Yet they do not despair."<sup>31</sup> Not only did the French

suffer and struggle without despair, but they did so without complaint, as a woman working for the American Committee for Devastated France found in 1920. Of all the families she had visited, living in caves and dugouts, surviving on paltry meals of beans, she was moved that not one “complained of their misfortune; they have the most marvellous courage... One of the hovels [I visited contained a family of seven... The mother was contented and did not complain, for did she not have her family back with her on their own soil, such as it was?”<sup>32</sup> The experience of another visitor to the devastated areas was comparable:

Disregarding the new law which “protected” the Zone Rouge,<sup>33</sup> a peasant had returned to the site of his old home, had himself removed the unexploded shells from his soil—twenty-four of them were lined up by the road—and so had established himself as a producer once more, if only on a tiny strip... [Later, in the same trip], in what was once the village of Nanteuil La Fosse, M. Rivière found an old woman who was somehow managing to live alone in the dismal wreck of her home, though she had to walk ten miles to buy food. She said simply... “*Je veux mourir dans ma maison.*”<sup>34</sup>

And yet the people rebuilt their country, slowly. Many other articles in all three newspapers detailed the process of rebuilding and celebrated the speed and determination with which this happened.<sup>35</sup> The noble *poilus*, the stoic women, and the enduring people of the French nation made poignant subjects for American newspapers. Articles also extolled idealistic elements of French society such as its racial equity.

France in general, and Paris in particular, had long been considered the bastions of racial harmony and civilization. This idea was firmly entrenched by the interwar period, particularly when France was compared to Germany. It was to protect these ideals that America had gone to war in the first place. The *Examiner* stated that “it seemed a dark hour for civilization when Germany...struck through Belgium at the heart of France.”<sup>36</sup> The latter’s culture and principles of liberty represented to Americans the very essence of enlightenment. Indeed, many articles printed shortly after the end of the war lauded the tolerance and diversity of France. That nation was “the

paradise of the black man” because “social distinctions are not based at all on color lines.”<sup>37</sup> The French were considered strong supporters of “the immortal principles of the rights of man,” and condemned all “prejudices of religion, cast or race, [and] solemnly affirms all men without distinctions of race or color.”<sup>38</sup>

When France moved into the Ruhr in 1923, the government used colonial troops from Senegal, Morocco, and other North African nations to support depleted white divisions. It is telling of French dedication to racial equality that the army was comfortable giving Africans responsibilities in the region. Sally Marks noted that some British consular officials declared that indigenous troops were actually preferable in the Ruhr than were Frenchmen, largely because of the intense hatred French soldiers felt for Germans, which was reflected in their behaviour. On the other hand, African troops were indifferent toward the Rhenish population and, overall, were better behaved than Frenchmen because of the “draconian punishments” meted out by the army to non-white offenders.<sup>39</sup> In return, Germans had “much less prejudice against the blacks” than they had against French soldiers.<sup>40</sup> In this vein, there were articles honouring the Africans and attesting to their exemplary manners. The *Tribune* reported that in 1923 the German police did not know of “a single serious case of an attack on women by Senegalese or Moroccan troops”, and that they were “well disciplined and well behaved.”<sup>41</sup> One article described the popularity of African soldiers with French civilians, a friendliness also extended to black American troops; “The children of France love them... I have seen scores of white children holding the hands of colored boys and trudging along on the march with them or romping into their tents and sitting on their knees...”<sup>42</sup>

If France was praised by some American writers for her open-mindedness in racial issues, so too was she acclaimed for artistic and intellectual achievement. For American interwar

newspaper audiences, artistic talent more than any other trait, defined what it was to be French. French artists had long dominated their field by producing countless internationally recognized masterpieces. Indeed, art was identified as the vital spark in the national character of France. Monet, Renoir, and Chagall, Cézanne, and Rodin were all compatriots. Like Holland's Vincent Van Gogh and the Spanish-born Picasso, even artists and students from neighbouring countries had been drawn to France's bustling cities, intellectual salons, celebrated *ateliers*, and charming countryside. Articles about France's art and artists were fairly common in the early years of the interwar era, as were references to the inherent artistic nature of the Frenchman. Creativity, flair, and emotional sensitivity seemed to permeate every aspect of the French character, particularly those at the heart of France's genius, her artists.

Articles reporting on current trends in modern painting, and reviews of French art exhibits visiting American galleries were almost always positive. Contemporary trends, of course, reflected qualities that were essentially French. The *New York Times* on 11 May 1919 described the latest imported exhibit in New York that sampled the evolution of paintings from the "ritualistic expressions of antiquity" to the latest modern works. The review suggests the emotional element of the paintings and the brooding nature of their artists; "there is a movement, passion, an emotion almost of agony suggested..." Honoré Daumier, an artist whose work was included in the exhibit, was equally fiery: "Daumier also was torn by violent emotions, but he had for them an expression that was curative, a blessed and relieving irony that allows him to clear his mind of the poison of resentment and anger." These artists, in fact, all shared a passion and depth of emotion expressed in their works. The collection demonstrated "the thoroughness of French workman-ship that makes even a slight sketch notable for its technical quality."<sup>43</sup> The passion and intensity of these painters were said to reflect the temperamental nature of the true genius.

Their eccentricities were quaint, as though eccentricity was the stamp of legitimacy for any true French master.

Beyond the temperamental artist, the actual pieces they produced were celebrated. The works of more familiar artists were reported in utterly glowing terms. In 1921, an exhibit in New York opened which included a popular piece by Paul Cézanne. His talent was:

...already a familiar of the American galleries, but nowhere so great as in this series of bathers, the product of such fever of desire and such heroism of patience, their colour as pure as sky and water, their light both enveloping and penetrating, their form profoundly supple; a wall of drawings to stir the stubbornest heart in the potency of this master...<sup>44</sup>

This was not a subtle review, clearly, but it typifies American reactions to the works of French masters, modern and traditional. Another reviewer found it “a chastening experience to have the companionship of such noble expressions of French genius.” The same reviewer wrote that Paul Gauguin’s portraits brought a “European intelligence,” while Renoir’s were “beautifully sound and genuine.” Odillon Redon, “too definitely a Frenchman for any hint of vagueness,” was represented by an oil painting and pastel sketch; “how little the medium counts with him...one [work] hardly more fragile, less unctuous and substantial than the other.”<sup>45</sup>

Clearly, the works of French art commanded the respect of American critics. Only a sophisticated audience could appreciate their subtlety; “...the fundamental traits upon which French achievement has been founded, traits dull to superficial minds as the shuttered and thrifty streets of Paris are dull for eyes hardened to the lights of Broadway.”<sup>46</sup> Some exhibits were even accompanied by a political message. A newly erected gallery exclusively for French art, built in San Francisco in honour of American soldiers and of Franco-American friendship, was opened in 1920. Two tapestries depicting Joan of Arc’s call to save France were seen as recognition of America’s contribution to the First World War, confirming that it had been worthy, appreciated,



and perhaps even divinely preordained.<sup>47</sup> Also included in the collection was a series of French war medals sent by government officials who were, not surprisingly, “especially enthusiastic” about the idea of the gallery.

The fact that American galleries held both permanent and temporary exhibits of French art is significant and telling of its prestige. A *Times* article indicated just how widespread such exhibitions were when celebrated French architect, Charles Plumet, sailed across the Atlantic to set up another permanent, but entirely modern, collection in New York. He remarked that “America is saturated with French work of the eighteenth century and other great *époques*,” but made no attempt to mask his goal of proving that French modern art was not only relevant, but better than, German art.<sup>48</sup> He declared that France was beginning a new era of fine, innovative works. France was not only producing new and exciting art work, but literature as well, another area of intellectual achievement that she had traditionally dominated.

During the interwar period, Americans knew France not only for the brilliance of her artists, but also for her vibrant literature. Paris was both the home of, and host to, scores of writers, journalists, and poets. Among them lived a rather large community of Americans who were permanent or semi-permanent residents of France. This era witnessed a great increase in this artistic and erudite community. Salons hosted by Americans such as Natalie Barney were frequented by such internationally celebrated writers as Paul Valéry, Colette, T.S. Elliot, Ezra Pound, and James Joyce, not to mention Ernest Hemingway and F. Scott Fitzgerald. In Europe, this *époque* was one of recovery, a time for rejuvenation and rebuilding. For France, it was also time to reassert her dominance in the fields of art, literature, and fashion. American writer Janet Flanner wrote that “in 1920 France began invisibly to recover from the habit of remembered hostilities. In 1921 the surface of French life suddenly began to look normal, that is to say France

began reliving as if peace were natural, indigenous, and permanent to European man...”<sup>49</sup> American ex-patriot Sylvia Beach’s famous Parisian bookshop, ‘Shakespeare and Company,’ was not only a promoter of new literature, but a meeting place for intelligentsia. It was Beach who was the first publisher brave enough to promote James Joyce’s controversial *Ulysses*. This community of writers made France in general, and Paris in particular, seem all the more enticing, more glamorous. These visiting writers were trying to access the rich culture that was home to indigenous wordsmiths like Colette, Gustave Flaubert, Henri Barbusse, and Marcel Proust.

There were certain French writers, contemporary and traditional, who were so spellbinding that American reviewers lost their composure to awe. Marcel Proust was one such greatly celebrated writer in the 1920s. He was considered by many to be “the most significant and individual new writer in France.”<sup>50</sup> The nineteenth century novelist Honoré de Balzac was another inspiring writer. A 1919 *Chicago Tribune* article remarked on his mythical abilities, saying that “Balzac is not a novelist but a magician. What sets him apart from other novelists, even from his technical superior, Gustave Flaubert, is his faculty of vision.” He was “a seer,” and any motif the Frenchman touched, “he vivified with his prophetic imaginations.”<sup>51</sup> Even authors little known to the American reading public were considered inherently talented. A 1920 publication by Ernest Vizetelly, entitled Paris and her People, was utterly magnificent; “you cannot turn a page without finding on it something that cries to be read aloud, to be transcribed...”<sup>52</sup>

The many talented modern writers of this nation contributed to the perception that France was an incredibly literate society, a perception dating back to the reign of Louis IX.<sup>53</sup> However, in the area of aesthetics, it was fashion that truly defined what it was to be French. The popularity of French styles predated the First World War by centuries, but in inter-war America, attention to

fashions from across the Atlantic reached new heights. The main reason for the interest was that women were dressing in more revealing, alluring ways. Despite some negative commentary on this trend, there remained much admiration of the styles, of the designers, and even of the women who wore the clothing. The 'flapper' movement was born in France, and the *nouvelle femme* was the subject of much discussion in American newspapers.

In 1919, a *Times* column announced that France was reasserting dominance in the fashion world by wowing the public with her styles; "more gorgeous and more beautiful than for many seasons past...[the new line] is stunning past imagination."<sup>54</sup> It goes on to say that, despite the controversy, for the last year or so Parisiennes had begun to wear their skirts "short, shorter, shortest." The government had reopened the horseracing tracks, closed during wartime, in 1919. This was a positive move for the fashion industry, as the races, particularly Longchamps and Auteuil, were traditionally the most popular venues for women to sport their newest styles.<sup>55</sup> By 1921, the short skirt, a trend which had raged through the western world, had begun to lengthen once again in France. Ironically, Americans were now celebrating short styles, and refused to wear long dresses.<sup>56</sup>

One reason for French dominance in the fashion world was the attention and care the designers paid their work. According to one *Times* review, "Paris has been, Paris will probably remain, supreme in the art of putting the right clothes on the right woman, of turning a feminine person into a personage..." This was due to a difference in approach: the American designer thought first of money and big business, while the French designer thought first of perfecting his dresses. The Frenchman thought "not 'how many dresses can I sell?', but 'how perfect can I make this dress?'"<sup>57</sup> Such workmanship explains why Parisian salons were always busy catering to American buyers.<sup>58</sup>

Figure #3-

This is a typical fashion column. Both the *Times* and the *Tribune* carried such fashion spreads on a weekly basis. This particular one is from the *Times*, 11 April 1920, p. 4, vii.

# DAY OF THE SHORT SKIRT

## Gay Hat and Abbreviated Cape Are Other Popular Fashions

**S**HORT skirts, long waists, short sleeves—these are the latest fashions of the Spring made as it became manifest, by usage from day to day. In one of the windows on Fifth Avenue during the past gala week there were exhibited two gowns broadcast for the street, but they were abbreviated and distinguished in the design so that one uninitiated in the change in fashion could not have been expected to recognize them as street garments.

Two women stood before them, regarding their shortness and thinness with awe.

"Don't you suppose they've made a mistake," said one, "surely those gowns are meant for evening wear. Why look at the sleeves and the low cut necks?"

"Not the sleeves or which they were draped were wearing hats and gloves."

economy of material, will welcome the shorter length.

A French designer has announced emphatically that the long waist is the line especially adapted to the American figure. Some one is heard to murmur: "What is this American figure that the French love so to grieve about?" Well, it is not so fat the French figure, which is allowed to be as plump as it pleases, wherever it pleases. We still lean to straight lines in this country, and the figure which is not built along those lines may be treated in the same manner it seems to be. It is for such a figure that the French artist of renewed delicacy the long-waisted models. And you have only to observe them on a straight, more or less flat figure to see how really beautifully they are adapted to the contour. Call it daring the long-waisted dress is perfection. She has met over many lovely models. The skirts are full or pleated, and while often they are made with lighter under-skirts, many of them leave the fullness of the skirt to be the only line below the draped waist.

### A Long-Waist Model.

For instance, there is one model from this renowned house made of gray satin, with a full skirt falling over a lighter skirt of black satin. The straight, long, flat bodice is considered in gray as an all-over pattern of large designs, and wide cuffs of black satin on the very



Embellished Evening Gown, Tulle and Tulle, Madeleine of Madras



Evening Gown of Tulle and Tulle, Lenoir.

It wasn't a mistake at any moment, and the observer was forced to meet more and more of the same sort in her journey about the city. For they are appearing in greater numbers every day. There is a decided acceptance of all of the short skirts which had long ago seemed not retained in the favorite of American women.

There is no denying the fact that the short skirts are nearly and, in most cases, hemming. They give a proportion in the figure of the body that would not be nearly so good were the skirts allowed to be very long. Every once in a while, along the thoroughfares where well-dressed women are wont to make their appearance, one sees astonishingly beautiful street clothes with skirts so short that they are nearer the knees than the ankles. The short skirt, without doubt, bids fair to become the most distinguished feature of the coming season.

Long sleeves, however, the shorter they are, and the smaller they are, the more women generally through the streets are the shorter they

tulle is found to be the foundation material, for the particular standing-out quality is the thing that is absolutely necessary to the modernist of evening adornment. Tulle has that lovely texture which makes it stand out, but at the same time it falls in pleasant folds. Especially the newer tulle has been refined to waving until they are perfect.

In Paris the rage for tulle goes on. Even after the openings were over, the designers kept on and on making new things from the lovely material. Two models, one for afternoon and one for evening, each made with tulle for the foundation material, are worth noting. One is draped almost entirely in tulle, and the other is unadorned thereby; either serve as a model for American imitations or American artists' copies. The afternoon frock is embellished with embroidery, and this strange combination of materials (tulle and satin) has taken a fast hold on the designers hereabout. One sees it in combinations of black tulle and cream organza, of blue tulle and white organza, of gray tulle and apricot organza, and so on, in varieties unlimited. Lace is often chosen and along with the organza as delicate and delicate and intricate. It has even been used to match the color of the organza, though more frequently it is seen in its natural state of cream or white.

Hats are even built to carry out this combination of materials, and some perfect specimens can be seen about town.

### Capes and Hats.

Capes have by no means disappeared off the face of the earth. In fact, their numbers have increased astonishingly. The shorter capes are the favorite, and a wide-cuffed or long-cuffed hat reaches the waistline or just a little below, and then are so constructed that they pull about the figure, forming a tight little space in the middle of the back, from which lines of draping emerge. These shorter capes are particularly smart for the younger people. One would never suspect a case of being suspiciously youthful, and yet these abbreviated affairs are certainly that. They are made, too, in such loose enough to be thrown back so that they will not become burdensome on warmer days. The cape, indeed, outsets of the little animal neckpiece, is the fur idea of the moment. Many are the variations in style that have sprung into the popular market during the last few weeks.

The hats that are most numerous along the Avenue are bright and Springlike in their colorings. There seems to be a decided leaning toward very bright and sparkling hats even with caps of dress or suits that are low and decidedly demure in tone. There is an happier combination. It is no wonder that, especially in the Springtime, women lean to bright colored hats. The more power to them! They make the streets less as though there were some reason for gayety and happiness. Of course, the green hat is the one made to the thing of the moment for those with one word that color. And it is a color that is not really adapted to those whose coloring does not sparkle out it. But then there are red hats, navy and pink hats and henna hats—various and every type of combination—and the woman who has not at least one of them bright greens is out of fashion's command. The veil worn with these gay hats are as fascinating as they are themselves. They are lacy and dotted and decidedly feminine, and, as the advertisement says when it shows a lovely face look more lovely, mean a lovely face look more lovely, or words to that effect.

The hats, as never before, tend toward a tilt off the head. For many years we had the hats with slightly turned down brims. Now we have coming to attention in the other direction, and nothing seems right in the head unless it turns directly away from the face. The tilted and three-cornered hats turning away

with abbreviated sleeves. Another design from the same house is made for dinner wear. It has even with draped over black tulle, making a sort of capelet which is edged with white beading of gold and perforated embroidery. A long-sleeved model for afternoon wear has a Tulle-bronze waist and lower panel of the skirt made

Positive representations of France were not confined exclusively to her people and her culture. There was also favourable treatment of her political side. Specifically, American newspapers published positive readings of French political leaders and their foreign policies. Such affirmation indicates that American observers understood that it was in fact fear and necessity, not vengeance, which shaped her foreign policy. These observers also considered the collection of French war debts unfair unless she were guaranteed that Germany would pay its own reparations. The Germans had resisted the Treaty of Versailles since its inception, a resistance that, according to American newspapers, further victimised France. In essence, the sympathetic reading of French politics came from the American media's appreciation of their position.

It was emblematic of France that such accomplished political leaders represented her during the interwar period. The men in power were not only talented and interesting, but many of them were respectable war heroes as well. There were articles describing wartime champions such as Georges Clemenceau, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Marshal Joseph Joffre, in addition to interwar leaders, Aristide Briand and Raymond Poincaré. For the limited purposes of this thesis, only the portrayals of two, Clemenceau and Foch, shall be examined.

On the day before the armistice, the *San Francisco Examiner* ran a story entitled "Premier Clemenceau, Most Amazing of Men" which describes him as a mystical, supernatural being:

Who is this person that goes about incessantly, bounding from point to point like something without nerves or the capacity for weariness, shouting encouragement to battling troops, giving heart to the fainting, strength to the weak, smiting the enemy, devising new plans for his undoing, foreseeing success, retrieving disaster, and apparently neither sleeping nor resting? Georges Benjamin Clemenceau, aged only seventy-seven, if you please; the youngest man in France and the most amazing, most breath-taking and inspiring figure...<sup>59</sup>

At the table of the Paris Peace Conference, President Woodrow Wilson saluted Clemenceau by saying he was the "grand young man of France," that no one was so qualified as he to chair the

event because of “his unfailing courage, his untiring energy, [and] his inspiration...”<sup>60</sup> It was his vitality that Americans found so inspirational, and several articles outlined the exercise regime he followed religiously despite his age.<sup>61</sup> The *Chicago Tribune* called him an asset to France because he was “an intelligent, rationalistic French patriot, full of common sense, [and] full of fight.”<sup>62</sup> The respect America held for this man never really diminished, although Clemenceau fell out of view when he left politics in 1920. Even when France was at a low in popularity, Clemenceau himself was always considered to be an insightful and rousing political figure.<sup>63</sup>

Marshal Foch, General of the French army and “imperturbable strategist,” was credited with winning the war.<sup>64</sup> He was admirably calm under fire. Foch said of himself that he did not get upset: he simplified complex situations, avoided “useless emotions” like fear, and remained focussed on the tasks at hand.<sup>65</sup> Foch was praised for his intelligence and his ability to appreciate “a military situation like lightening, with marvellous accuracy, [he] evinces wonderful skill and versatility in dealing with it... Of all the generals in this great struggle, he most resembled in audacious strategy his great master, Napoleon.”<sup>66</sup> On his tour of America in 1921, he was also likened to Lafayette, that much loved French ally in America’s fight for independence from British colonial rule.<sup>67</sup> Foch was the hero of France, and known to the Western world for his brilliant strategy and composure in grave situations. His actions were inspired by the desperate situation his country had found itself in under German occupation. These two political figures were respected and applauded, as were the policies of their government.

The foreign policy of “France the Saint” was the subject of many positive editorials and solicitous articles in America’s leading newspapers. Newspapers published during the Paris Peace Conference claimed that French politics were determined by that nation’s recent victimisation, a claim that was repeated, though with decreasing frequency, throughout the 1920s.

France was, as were her people, an enduring and suffering casualty of war, a land martyred by German militarism. Her fear of another invasion was “a natural product of a generation of Prussian menace culminating in a ghastly sacrifice of French manhood. To France’s suffering anything, almost, may be forgiven.”<sup>68</sup> According to the *New York Times*, her dire economic situation in 1919 was directly attributable to the war, in which France had paid the biggest price both in material and—with the loss of 2 million people—human destruction. Now she was totally crippled, both financially and socially. The article went on to describe how “silent factories and darkened streets and stilled tramways and shivering thousands mark the fuel shortage. Mounting prices that never cease climbing strain the economic situation day by day.”<sup>69</sup> Her people were forced to pay extremely high prices for basic necessities like eggs, and the cost of living had skyrocketed; they were suffering still, though the war was long over. All the French wanted was security, “they will be wholly satisfied... if the peace conference gives them complete insurance against war...”<sup>70</sup> It was therefore understandable, in light of her grievous suffering, that she was determined to pursue what Germany owed her. For these reasons, as well as others, France was justified in pursuing the occupation of the Ruhr. At the very least, even if the French “fail to bring out cash, it has taught the rest of the world to realize that the French people have known for a long time that they must fight Germany again at some future day...”<sup>71</sup> A letter to the editor of the *Tribune* indicates that the American public was, at least in some cases, supportive of the French move. The writer reminded the newspaper that “France by the treaty and by all the laws of the universe has restitution coming to her from Germany” because of “the unwarranted and barbaric invasion of a helpless and blameless people.”<sup>72</sup>

Fear of future German aggression was a recurring theme in the articles that defended French political actions against American critics. Especially during the post-war years, when

France was not paying her debts at a rate that satisfied Washington, there was much dissension over the reasons for the delay. Pro-French articles reasoned that a policy requiring the economic crippling of her enemy was simply essential for national security. To these observers, French policy was based on fear, rather than on bitterness or revenge. France's sense of vulnerability was pressing: "there are no 3,000 miles of Atlantic, nor even a sea narrows guarded by a tremendous fleet, between France and Germany," said a French officer to Walter Duranty in 1919. What separated the two age-old enemies, he continued, was merely "a thick black line on the map, but in fact it is just a step forward of one man," a common sentiment in the French army according to foreign correspondents.<sup>73</sup> Another aspect of this fear stemmed from the disparity between populations. The 40 million French were greatly outnumbered by 70 million 'boches'.<sup>74</sup> France had had reason to be afraid, and ever "since the Franco-Prussian war she has rightly regarded Germany as an enemy, and a very powerful enemy. The wanton attack on her in 1914 showed that her apprehension was justified."<sup>75</sup> Because of this fear, her policy toward Germany had become understandably rigid.<sup>76</sup>

As the years of the post-war period passed, this image of France as a legitimately fearful, rather than a vengeful, nation was sustained. In October 1922, not long before Poincaré received the legal approval necessary for his country to occupy the Ruhr, the *Times* was still telling its readers of the intensity of French fear. A recent visit to Europe had demonstrated to Rabbi Wise of New York that this state of terror was indeed the source of French rigidity; "Europe is obsessed by fear. Not hate, but fear, rules the world. The disappointment and sense of fear in France are deeper today than before the war. The entire policy of France is ill formed by fear rather than bitterness. France dreads the rise of Germany again to power and Germany's indubitable will to vengeance."<sup>77</sup> Accordingly, she felt that it was up to the United States, as one of the greatest of



the world powers, to ensure her security. This was a common opinion as early as 1919. In a *Tribune* article, French newspaperman Stéphane Lauzanne was quoted as having said that America was "morally obligated to give us an absolute guarantee of immediate assistance in case the Germans attack us. Unless this assurance is forthcoming we cannot do other than stay on the Rhine permanently... The United States must help Europe or peace cannot be restored."<sup>78</sup> To ensure that Germany could not afford future military conquests of France, and to collect long overdue reparations, the French army had occupied the industrial valley of the Ruhr in January 1923.<sup>79</sup>

Although that move did much to damage French popularity in America, many observers still expressed great sympathy for the French, who were again allegedly being victimized by German recalcitrance. They were owed the reparations according to the Treaty, which Germany had signed, and the German default was hitting the French hard. They needed the payments desperately, and were suffering many hardships because of German reticence, according to sympathetic reports. Further, France was quite simply unable to pay the war debts she owed the United States. She would certainly pay if she could, but her ability to do so depended on Germany living up to the terms of peace. There were even some suggestions about the feasibility of cancelling all allied war debts owed to America, including those of France.<sup>80</sup>

From this perspective, it was natural that France should try to take what was rightfully hers by occupying the rich valley of the Ruhr. Several American senators supported this action, saying that Germany was evading its duty. Senator Reed stated that France needed money "to bolster her almost bankrupt finances," and to pay "for the reconstruction of her devastated areas," but primarily the invasion was about her protection: "so long as she holds the Ruhr and Rhineland, and is in a position to control Germany or fight a war on German soil she feels that she has this

security.”<sup>81</sup> Such compassionate opinion was more commonly found in the *New York Times* than in the more isolationist newspapers like the *Tribune* or *Examiner*, though in the early months of the occupation the latter two were certainly in favour of the collection of German reparations, more so than they were toward the end of the occupation.

Despite criticism, there were always many champions of France who appreciated that the occupations of the Ruhr were not acts of imperialism, but rather of necessity. This defence became especially vehement when, in 1920, President Wilson wrote in a letter to Senator Hitchcock that “France is now actuated by a spirit of militarism controlling its government.”<sup>82</sup> The French and their defenders rebutted that she was only acting to protect her own interests, “since the guarantees, of which Mr. Wilson was largely the author, namely, the League of Nations and the Anglo–American–French military alliance do not now promise material results.” Further, it was said, had America signed the Treaty of Versailles in the first place, France would not feel so desperately vulnerable.<sup>83</sup>

In brief, from the American press perceptions of France between 1918 and 1924, one can identify a series of images which spoke positively about that country and its people. The Saint was represented by the strong yet sensitive *poilus*, the stoic women, and the enduring peasants, all of whom who were now rebuilding their homes. French art, literature, and fashion attracted buyers and admirers from around the world. Sympathetic treatment of her political choices abounded in all three newspapers, and many articles, editorials, and letters to the editor favoured the relief of French war debts and even supported the country’s move into the Ruhr. France the Saint, martyred on the altar of war by German barbarians, was indeed an enduring and poignant image. However, there are two sides to every coin. France the Harlot was the other.

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> This statement, which explains how America perceived France after her ruination, became widely publicized. See the *Examiner*, 24 February 1919, p.3.
- <sup>2</sup> The *Times*, 7 April 1919, p. 1, iii.
- <sup>3</sup> See, for example, the *Times*, 8 May 1921, p.15.
- <sup>4</sup> Charles Rearick, *The French in Love and War: Popular Culture in the Era of the World Wars* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 6.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.
- <sup>6</sup> The *Tribune*, 1 November 1918, p.3.
- <sup>7</sup> The *Times*, 9 February 1919, p. 4-5, v.
- <sup>8</sup> The *Times*, 14 November 1918, p.4. See also the *Examiner*, 14 November 1918, p.5 which commented on the same eerie reserve: "They made no demonstration, they just ceased firing. There was no cheering, no excitement..."
- <sup>9</sup> The *Examiner*, 1 December 1918, p.2.
- <sup>10</sup> The *Examiner*, 23 February 1919, p.2.
- <sup>11</sup> The *Examiner*, 18 February 1920, p.3.
- <sup>12</sup> The *Times*, 9 February 1919, p.8-9, TBR&M.
- <sup>13</sup> The *Tribune*, Monday 3 October 1921, p.3.
- <sup>14</sup> Mary Louise Roberts, *Civilization Without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917- 1927* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994), see forward, xi.
- <sup>15</sup> The *Tribune*, 18 November 1918, p.1.
- <sup>16</sup> The *Tribune*, 18 November 1918, p.1.
- <sup>17</sup> The *Examiner*, 1 December 1918, p. 6,ii, for example.
- <sup>18</sup> See, for example, the *Tribune* articles of 5 January 1920, p.8; 13 February 1920 p.8; and 23 February 1920, p.8.
- <sup>19</sup> The *Examiner*, 21 November 1918, p.11.
- <sup>20</sup> The *Tribune*, 13 February 1920, p.8.
- <sup>21</sup> The *Times*, 11 May 1919, p. 7 vii.
- <sup>22</sup> Roberts, *Civilization*, forward.
- <sup>23</sup> The *Tribune*, 29 December 1918, p.3.
- <sup>24</sup> 3 April 1921, p. 3, *Times Book Review and Magazine*.
- <sup>25</sup> The *Times*, 9 August 1920, p. 8.
- <sup>26</sup> American war workers were an important source for the dissemination of this image to newspapers. Two wars fought on American land were the American War of Independence (1775-1789), and the Civil War (1861-1865).
- <sup>27</sup> The *Times*, 9 February 1919, p. 8.
- <sup>28</sup> See The *Times*, 7 September 7 1919, p.6. vii.
- <sup>29</sup> The *Times*, July, 1919, p. 7, iv.
- <sup>30</sup> See, for example, the *Times*, 5 March 1922, p. 14 TBR&M; and 1 May 1921, p. 1 and 2, section 1.
- <sup>31</sup> The *Times*, 13 July 1919, p. 7, iv.
- <sup>32</sup> The *Times*, 5 September 1920, p. 2, i.
- <sup>33</sup> The *Zone Rouge*, or Red Zone, was an area in the northern departments that was set aside by the government to be preserved in its wartime state. This area was meant to remind the world, as well as locals, of the devastation of German barbarism.
- <sup>34</sup> The *Times*, 9 August 1920, p. 8.
- <sup>35</sup> See, for example, the *Examiner*, 24 June 1923, p. 5.
- <sup>36</sup> The *Examiner*, 10 November 1918, p. 1 T.
- <sup>37</sup> The *Tribune*, 15 November 1918, p. 3.
- <sup>38</sup> The *Examiner*, 26 July 1919, p.2.
- <sup>39</sup> Sally Marks, "Black Watch on the Rhine: A Study in Propaganda, Prejudice and Prurience," *European Studies Review* 13 (1983), 301.
- <sup>40</sup> The *Tribune*, 16 September 1923, p. 6. 1.

- <sup>41</sup> *The Tribune*, 16 September 1923, p. 6, 1. See also the *Times*, 2 August 1923, p. 1, which describes the insults made by American tourists to black soldiers. Such situations spoke volumes of not only French tolerance, but American prejudice at the time.
- <sup>42</sup> *The Tribune*, 15 November 1918, p. 8.
- <sup>43</sup> *The Times*, 11 May 1919, p.12, iv.
- <sup>44</sup> *The Times*, 12 June 1921, p. 20-21, TBR&M.
- <sup>45</sup> *The Times*, 6 June 1920, p. 5, vi.
- <sup>46</sup> *The Times*, 14 December 1919, p.10, vii.
- <sup>47</sup> *The Examiner*, 10 August 1920, p6. The second of the two tapestries carried the image of Joan departing for battle with an angel delivering the message that "Your way is prepared."
- <sup>48</sup> *The Times*, 9 April 1920, p. 12.
- <sup>49</sup> *DLB*, vol. 4, p 152. For newspaper articles about the return of Paris to its prewar gaiety, see the *Times*, 4 March 1921, p. 17; and the *Examiner*, 1 December 1918, p. 5, ii.
- <sup>50</sup> *The Tribune*, 1 May 1920, p. 13.
- <sup>51</sup> *The Tribune*, 23 March 1919, p. 7, vii.
- <sup>52</sup> *The Times*, 1 February 1920, p.58, iv.
- <sup>53</sup> He was responsible for the Bibliothèque Nationale's acquisition of precious manuscripts. See a detailed history of the French National Library in the *Times*, 4 March 1923, p.8 TBR&M.
- <sup>54</sup> *The Times*, 5 October 1919, p.1 x.
- <sup>55</sup> *The Tribune*, 6 March 1919, p.4.
- <sup>56</sup> *The Times*, 14 August 1921, p. 1, TBR&M.
- <sup>57</sup> *The Times*, 14 August 1921, p. 1, TBR&M.
- <sup>58</sup> See the *Times*, 10 March 1923, p. 16.
- <sup>59</sup> *The Examiner*, 10 November 1918, p. 11 of the *American Weekly* section (hereafter AW).
- <sup>60</sup> *The Tribune*, 20 February 1919, p.3. Also see the *Examiner*, 19 January 1919, p.1, i.
- <sup>61</sup> He was nearly 80 years old at the time. See the *Examiner*, 11 January 1920, p. 13 N.
- <sup>62</sup> *The Examiner* in 1919 wrote that Georges Clemenceau, more than any living man, represented the heroism and genius of the "indomitable people of his land." See 19 January 1919, p.1, i.
- <sup>63</sup> For example, when he visited President Harding in 1922, he was lauded by papers in America, and his purposes for the trip defended as being selflessly for the benefit of Franco-American relations. He called on Wilson for a cordial meeting; see the *Times* for 7 December 1922, p.1.
- <sup>64</sup> *The Times*, 13 April 1919, p.1. iii.
- <sup>65</sup> *The Times*, 4 January 1920, p. 1, iii.
- <sup>66</sup> *The Tribune*, 3 August 1919, p. 3, viii.
- <sup>67</sup> *The Times*, 13 November 1921, p.4.
- <sup>68</sup> *The Tribune*, 2 January 1921, p. 6, ii. See also the *Times*, 4 December 1919, p. 16.
- <sup>69</sup> *The Times*, 12 November 1919, p.3.
- <sup>70</sup> *The Tribune*, 28 November 1918, p. 1.
- <sup>71</sup> *The Tribune*, 28 January 1923, p. 1&2.
- <sup>72</sup> *The Tribune*, 30 January 1923, p.8.
- <sup>73</sup> *The Times*, 12 February 1919, p.2.
- <sup>74</sup> *The Times*, 12 February 1919, p.2
- <sup>75</sup> *The Times*, 9 April 1919, p.10.
- <sup>76</sup> *The Times*, 8 February 1919, p.1
- <sup>77</sup> *The Times*, 9 October 1922, p. 6.
- <sup>78</sup> *The Tribune*, 4 August 1919, p. 7.
- <sup>79</sup> For Poincaré's version of events and the reasons behind France's move into the Ruhr, see the *Examiner*, 4 February 1923, p. 2k.
- <sup>80</sup> See an excellent editorial arguing in favour of the cancellation of French war debts that appeared in the *Times*, 10 August 1920, p. 12. This editorial summarizes the issues complicating her ability to pay, which included a faltering currency, and loss of a vast segment of her population of taxpayers. It concludes by stating that the "countrymen of Lafayette" should be excused their debts to so rich a country as the U.S. The image of France the saint is found in this argument for debt relief in the words of a French senator.

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who said: "Shall a people that has been invaded and martyred be made to pay?" See the *Times*, 11 April 1919, p.1.

<sup>31</sup> The *Tribune*, 28 January 1923, p. 1 and 2.

<sup>32</sup> The *Times*, 11 March 1920, p. 1 & 2.

<sup>33</sup> The *Times*, 12 March 1920, p. 1 & 2.

## CHAPTER FOUR: THE HARLOT

Just as the American press created the image of 'France the Saint,' that noble victim of German barbarism, so too did it create her antithesis, 'France the Harlot.' This negative portrayal of France described men who were greedy profiteers and women whose behaviour and clothing styles were excessive and risqué, women who embodied France the Harlot. The French were unhygienic to the point of immorality, a people so cavalier with the lives of Germans as to be ruthless. The grace of French art and literature was overshadowed by the luridness and danger in the epicentre of popular culture, Paris. Further, the French government was characterized by political duplicity, by unpaid war debts, by its militarism and imperialistic goals, and by being overly dependent on the United States. Thus, France's national character, her aesthetic productions, and her politics, were all subject to severe scrutiny by American newspapers, especially by the *Chicago Tribune* and the *San Francisco Examiner*. Thus, negative images coexisted with positive images throughout the era, with the former becoming more pronounced in late 1922 and throughout 1923, because of the lengthy Ruhr occupation.

In the previous chapter, we saw that in the idealistic portrayals of the French soldier, the *poilu* epitomized both masculinity and sophistication. The morality of the *poilu*, however, was equalled by the depravity of his foil, the war profiteer. This shady character was a greedy civilian, living very comfortably indeed off the money he had virtually stolen from unsuspecting Americans, visitors and soldiers alike. He was unscrupulous and uncaring, someone whose *raison d'être* was simply to get rich quickly. Just as the *poilu* was the embodiment of French virtue, the war profiteer came to represent the avarice, the selfishness,

and the lack of morality that epitomized French society for her detractors. He was particularly unsavoury because he had not even fought in the Great War; he had been a civilian at a time when civilian men were often the targets of public contempt for having been “slackers.” The profiteer had become prosperous while soldiers had been enduring the horrors of trench life.

Throughout the interwar period, Americans were appalled by stories of greedy French *restaurateurs* and store-owners hungrily filching dollars from naïve American visitors. Accusations of French money-grubbing began long before the signing of the armistice in 1918, but were especially prevalent during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and early 1920. Headlines often read like the one in the *Examiner* in March 1919: “All France Profits as Peace Host.”<sup>1</sup> An article claimed that:

American money has poured and is pouring into France like rain upon a parched and thirsty ground, and as far as I could see and hear, France is no longer in need of American help. Much destitution and misery there are in France, of course, but France can take care of herself if she will compel the people of France who have enriched themselves amazingly during the war to look after their own countrymen.<sup>2</sup>

French tradesmen and *restaurateurs* were accused in other reports of doubling their prices on sight of an American uniform. Reporter Annie Laurie, in one of her regular columns for the *Examiner*, described such shocking treatment of doughboys in France: “the American uniform is a signpost, and every French tradesman who sees it doubles his price.” Should the gullible soldier look as though he were definitely interested in making a purchase, prices were allegedly tripled or even quadrupled. Laurie went on to tell of her experience in a restaurant, dining with a native Frenchman whose presence ensured them a reasonably priced meal. She saw “clear-eyed, honest looking American boys” paying four times what French people were paying for the same meal.<sup>3</sup> The doughboys, “disinterested crusaders, embarked on an unselfish sacrifice

found the French civilians greedy... They had suspected themselves to be the hero in the melodrama arriving just in time, and they could not, for instance, translate as an appropriate welcome the thrifty French habit of separating the Americans so completely from their funds." Greed caused "misunderstandings and disregard" on the part of the doughboys. There was even a popular expeditionary force song called "Take it From Me, They'll Take it From You."<sup>4</sup>

War profiteers were not found solely in restaurants or markets. They were overcharging for every service requested by American tourists. One account told of a woman who went to France to locate her son's body for re-interment in the United States. She declared that her success "in getting past the French regulations was due to an 'unstinted use of American dollars' among the *employés* of French bureaus."<sup>5</sup> Chauffeurs were charging a disgraceful 150 francs to drive visiting Americans to the gravesites of their fallen relatives. The peace was said to have been as lucrative to the profiteers as the war that preceded it. As host to the Paris Peace Conference, France "collected no small amount," of both British and American money, according to one article.<sup>6</sup> It was alleged that taxi drivers in Paris were so prosperous that they only worked when the mood struck, not out of necessity; and thus they were totally unwilling to go out of their way to help a foreigner.<sup>7</sup> Unscrupulous farmers would even sell the hallowed ground upon which Americans had fought for the freedom of France. An *Examiner* article briefly told of "the most flagrant instance of deliberate battlefield profiteering" in which a farmer advertised his land for sale. This piece of property had been a site of intense fighting by the USEF in the Argonne region, and the owner wanted to "capitalize [on] the graves of fallen heroes." The idea of making money from tourism in the area, every yard of which had been "bathed with the blood" of "splendid American troops,"



was so offensive that the American Legion was taking donations to buy the land in order that it might rather serve as a monument to the fallen.<sup>8</sup>

Such ingratitude was truly shocking for American readers, and entirely puzzling for their soldiers still abroad. Annie Laurie, née Winifred Black, was on a personal crusade to ensure that the American public was made aware of the heinous behaviour of the French. The avarice she had encountered overseas infuriated her, and she berated the French for their lack of gratitude; “they don’t like us any better than before the war. You are pillaged and robbed by the French, if you are an American in France. Everybody is over charged.”<sup>9</sup> She accused the French of having held back mail for USEF soldiers, for not having paid them, and for treating them poorly in still other ways.<sup>10</sup> Her allegations of unjust treatment were corroborated by an article in the *New York Times*, which described allegations of violence suffered by doughboys in Paris:

... [O]ur soldiers, who went to France imbued with patriotism—the best blood of our land—who sailed across the sea to fight despotism, found a species of despotism worse than that for which we are going to punish the Kaiser...[O]ur own loved ones were beaten, clubbed, starved...[O]ur soldiers, some of them wearing wound stripes, some returning to duty after weeks and months of suffering in hospitals, were thrown into prison without trial and without charges ever being preferred against them... Evidence is produced showing that men were hit and clubbed until they bled and fainted, and that one man even preferred death to the treatment to which he was subjected...<sup>11</sup>

These accusations were printed amid indictments of severe censorship, both during and after the war, in France. Annie Laurie fought against the censorship she claimed prevented stories of war profiteering from making it to American news: “the newspaper censor is the busiest man in France today and one of the most competent... Whatever drifts through to the press of the outside world gets through in spite of a highly organized system of espionage and censorship that would make the intrigues of an Oriental court look like child’s play.”<sup>12</sup> This

journalist's allegations were confirmed by the doughboys, according to the article entitled "Annie Laurie is Verified by Soldiers."<sup>13</sup>

The image of the war profiteer as heartless, immoral, and greedy was long-lived. There were still references to this character in late-1923, a full four and a half years after the war had ended.<sup>14</sup> Such flagrant profiteering was apparently a message to visiting American tourists and soldiers that they were unwelcome strangers in an unwelcoming land. To American audiences, such poor treatment of the "dear, simple-hearted, kindly, trusting, open-minded American doughboy," was shocking and disillusioning.<sup>15</sup> Equally disturbing were the rumours circulating through the press.

Stories about the overcharging of USEF troops, stories wired by journalists to American newspapers, were soon followed by even more alarming rumours of French greed and depravity. The final and ultimate insult to American wartime generosity came with allegations of trench rent. According to this new accusation, which became widely accepted in the early 1920s, the French government had charged the American military rent for the use of every trench occupied by the USEF, as well as rent for the use of water wells, and duty on any war-related goods exported from the United States to France.<sup>16</sup> Such accusations were, of course, untrue, and France quickly and accurately attributed them to German propaganda. But the stories made for bitter and resentful editorials in the *Examiner*: "I don't think that Americans would have made such charges against a people who had come to help save them, but we cannot always understand the French point of view."<sup>17</sup> These rumours were so persistent that France's top leaders came out to publicly deny their verity.<sup>18</sup>

To compound matters, the enormous sum of money that Americans were obliged to hand over to alleged heartless and greedy profiteers was quickly spent by an infamous *nouveau*

*riche*. The war had made some French people millionaires, and with the armistice they were out to show off their fabulous prosperity. In 1919 there was an apparent “mania for luxuries” among the wealthy who crowded smart establishments along the Rue de la Paix in Paris.<sup>19</sup> France’s capital city was “indulging in an orgy of money spending such as has never been witnessed in Europe before.” It was perceived by Americans as being a kind of collective madness. The “skyrocketing of prices has done nothing to check the wild extravagances of all classes of people” who enjoyed “excessive meals, fine clothes and jewels and costly amusements.” The wealth flaunted by Parisiens was the stuff of fairy tales: “fashionable women...may be seen in plenty on the street, with dogs wearing gold collars, with diamonds flashing in the heels of their shoes and with gem-studded bangles around their ankles.”<sup>20</sup> It was not only urbanites that had become prosperous. A letter to the *Tribune* editor remarked that post-war prices for crops in European markets brought good returns, and as a result “the thrifty French country people [had] profited largely...and are now a good deal richer than American farmers.”<sup>21</sup> Though the majority of war profiteers described by American foreign correspondents were male, the spendthrifts were usually female.

As with male profiteering, the behaviour of French females made them the targets of strong criticism from the American interwar media. Perceptions of their clothing styles and social behaviour contributed greatly to the ‘harlot’ image of their nation. They benefited materially from the profiteering activities of their men, and did not hesitate to flaunt risqué and expensive fashions. Historian Mary-Louise Roberts argues that the First World War effectively polarized ideals of womanhood. Positive descriptions about the first category, that of patriotic mother or wife, were discussed in the previous chapter, though she had the shortcomings discussed below. The second group, to be examined in the present chapter, was the

harlot, a pleasure-seeking wanton, and an unpatriotic and immoral woman. This cynical interpretation described the “bad” side of the *femme moderne*, whom we met earlier, and who, according to negative stereotyping, was a representation of a new and problematic category of womanhood. This character was personified by the flapper or, in French, *la garçonne*, the personage whom Roberts declared embodied the social changes wrought by the Great War. Gender issues offered a medium through which people could discuss the war’s impact on society.<sup>22</sup> According to Roberts, it was easier for many men to discuss the changes in their wives’ behaviour and garments than more abstract and intangible events like the falling franc. In Chapter Three, the *femme moderne* was respected for being chic, for setting trends. This positive discussion of women, however, was qualified by many negative depictions. The flirtatious, short-haired, corset-less flapper was a new creature, birthed in Paris in the 1920s, and she created an uproar with her relatively openly sexual, liberated behaviour. *La femme moderne*, negatively interpreted, was a prevalent image in newspapers such as the *Tribune* and the *Examiner*.

Damning stereotypes about French women abounded in the interwar period. They were said to be more promiscuous than their American sisters. They smoked by day on the streets, indicating their wild natures and lax morality. Yet in France, it was not only the flappers who drank alcoholic beverages, attended all night parties, and behaved provocatively. One account in 1921 claims that all the women, young and old, in attendance at an all night reverie—“Paris’s Wildest Orgy”—stripped and joined a mixed procession of unclad models and student painters, doctors, and architects, who were parading around the hall.<sup>23</sup>

The portrayal of French women as valuable and desirable wives was challenged by the champions of American women, who took issue with this perspective. Detractors of French

women argued they could not rival Americans for men's attention and for social respect. In the intense 1920 discussions over who made better mates, American women had many advocates.<sup>24</sup> According to the negative representations of French women, even their best maternal qualities were flawed, as suggested by the *Examiner* article of 1920:

The French woman's love for her home grows almost to the point of becoming a defect. Her excessive fondness for her children, her devotion to the quite humdrum existence around her household often leads to narrow-mindedness, and makes her hostile to change, to anything that can alter the life she has become accustomed to. But it is bad for her, as an individual, too....She is unable to get along in life without him [her husband].<sup>25</sup>

The patriotic mother so adored by some was disregarded as an obsessive lunatic by others. However, it was her counterpart who was most harshly criticized, primarily for her looseness of morals. Just as Joan of Arc was the model for France the Saint, the *femme moderne* became the embodiment of France the Harlot.

In America, it was a commonly held belief that French women were promiscuous, and, like the city of Paris itself, could easily tempt naïve American boys into behaving immorally. The licentiousness of French females was wreaking havoc on gender roles, according to the *Examiner*. Even the most innocent French girl could "give the most experienced man points in the art of flirting." As a result, the social convention of 'Don Juanism', in which men were the sexual "hunters," was rapidly changing: "man is no longer the pursuer but a hunted deer." The clothes French women wore were "obviously designed to attract," and had "never been so daring," transforming them into the hunter. With their brazen, open, and frank flirtation, French women were single-handedly changing society.<sup>26</sup> Not only were they changing the rules of courtship, but they were also graduating "at the head of the [co-educational] class", and taking up previously inaccessible positions in society, like judges. What was more worrisome for this particular observer was that there were more female

births—a scientific impossibility—and “the boys born are two pounds less in weight than formerly” while girls “weigh, each of them, in the average nearly a pound more than before” the war. A professor from the French Academy claimed that “the woman is gradually growing more like the man, even to the mustache and beard” and that “in years to come all women will be bearded and have the muscle like the man.”<sup>27</sup> Conversely, men were being feminized with the reversal of roles in post-war courtship and by fashions for men, reflected in the cartoon in a 1920 edition of the *Tribune*, Figure 4.

Paradoxically, although French women were commonly accused of promiscuity, they were also blamed for the worrisome decline in the French birth rate. Births in France had been dropping since the mid-eighteenth century, a trend that was a persistent topic of the French national press. However, with the end of the war, and the remarkable changes it had wrought on the social fabric of France, the responsibility was placed on women for the decrease in births. This decrease was presented as proof-positive of the social deterioration and moral decline of that once great nation. American newspapers in the interwar period began reporting on the “race suicide” underway in France. One *Tribune* article quoted a French committee’s report to the effect that the decline was “ascribed to comfort, selfishness, lack of morals and a sense of failure to understand the superior interests of the community.” It was also proof that French women were unpatriotic, since having babies, particularly in a greatly depopulated country, was argued to be a civic duty.<sup>28</sup> It was both strange and telling that men “do not hesitate to give up their lives” for France, while women would “not breed and bring up children for her sake.”<sup>29</sup> A timely *Examiner* article of 11 November 1923, claimed that “the baby is becoming rare in France,” a rarity attributable to the fact that “fewer and fewer... women [are] willing to bear the cross of motherhood.”<sup>30</sup> The article went on with a doomsday

Figure #4-

This cartoon clearly illustrates the fear of men becoming more feminine. Note the fashion designer in the second last sketch, who looks stereotypically French.



prediction that because of this widespread feminine selfishness, “within a hundred years the population of France will be less than seven million souls...[It will become], like Egypt of Tut-Ankh-Amen, a memory.”<sup>31</sup> Therefore, through these conflicting perceptions, women were simultaneously to blame for the rapid depopulation of France, and shockingly promiscuous in an era of limited access to birth control.

Likewise, there were contradictions and stereotypes that developed about the French ‘national character.’ The most significant and long-lived stereotype was that the French were a filthy people. The stereotype of the dirty Frenchman was a very long-lived one, and during the interwar it was linked to the basest qualities of human kind—from greed to immorality. During the Paris Peace Conference, hotel rooms with baths were extortionate, the price being “limited only by the ... imagination of the room clerk.”<sup>32</sup> Their expense reflected the rarity of bathing facilities in hotels. Barbers in Paris between the wars were “a keen disappointment to all American visitors. The barber shaves the customer but will not wash his face and the customer must grope around with soap in his eyes and find the wash bowl, and then comb his own hair...”<sup>33</sup> Being clean was linked with morality and non-violence, according to one article of 1923:

Will France soon cease to be a country in which one doesn't bathe? It has long been a jest on the French that perfume and powder are used as substitutes for bathing. Even now, bathing facilities are luxuries largely restricted to the hotels patronized by English and American tourists... [L]atest municipal laws prescribe bathrooms and showers in every newly erected apartment house in Paris... Godliness, cleanliness, peaceableness may yet become the order of things in France...<sup>34</sup>

Because they neglected to bathe, the French were alleged to have been responsible for the spreading of filth and contagion. In a *Tribune* article about their activity in Alsace-Lorraine, there were complaints that as a result of the occupation, the “health and sanitary conditions of



the country are declining rapidly...diseases which before the war were rife in French villages just across the border but had been unknown for a generation in Alsace Lorraine are creeping back."<sup>35</sup> Some of this contagion was due to circumstance; the war had resulted in a "process of social decay" and a "train of social diseases," according to the *Times*, a situation that would take years to reverse.<sup>36</sup> Nowhere was the threat of disease more dreaded than in the Ruhr, and no Frenchman was as dangerous as the colonial troops the government had imported to occupy the area.

According to the French, their ranks had been so depleted by the Great War that the army had no choice but to look to African colonies to replenish them. As we saw in the previous chapter, this was not a surprising move, given that the French were apparently more colour-blind than were other countries. Placing blacks in positions of authority over white civilians, therefore, was not untoward. However, that decision became the target of strong American condemnation. Lord Derby, British ambassador to Paris, remarked that he could not think "of anything more calculated to irritate the Germans," echoing the belief of many politicians that France's goal in the Ruhr was not seizing reparations, but rather humiliating Germany.<sup>37</sup> The *Examiner* claimed "it shows that the insanity of the French government is a little more complete even than most of us have come to believe."<sup>38</sup> The use of African troops was troublesome on many levels for contemporary American newspaper readers.

The "Black Horror" was a hot topic in the 1920s. As Sally Marks put it, "the very idea of imposing non-western troops on 'civilized Europeans' aroused intense indignation, which fed a stream of allegations. The German race was being polluted, both by miscegenation and by disease.... According to German propaganda, 100 per cent of the native troops were afflicted with syphilis, skin disease, and parasitic worms."<sup>39</sup> Marks goes on to

suggest that the soldiers, “whose vitality and free time were apparently inexhaustible, were also accused of numerous acts of violence, especially rape and murder.” Because German women were said to be too cultured to associate with the black troops, any liaisons between the two groups were immediately assumed to have been acts of rape. That German women and girls were being “subjected to black troops” was “an outrage,” and indicative of French immorality and brutality. According to the *San Francisco Examiner*, the soldiers were accused of “unchecked assaults” against “German women and girls in the occupied zone.”<sup>40</sup>

In the Saar region, accusations were even more severe against the lusty troops, where there were “an increasing number of murders and suicides as a result of ravishment of scores of young German working girls.”<sup>41</sup> Newspapers pondered the justice of having “black and yellow troops quartered upon the German people in ways offensive to women and girls”.<sup>42</sup> The *Examiner* wanted “to put things straight” on the issue of the black horror: “the French army of occupation on the Rhine comprises numerous negroes from Central Africa, who but yesterday were cannibals.” These soldiers were considered to be far from “superior exponents of civilization.”<sup>43</sup>

There is an interesting contradiction in American opinions of France. In the previous chapter we saw images of French society as inspirational in its tolerance, “the paradise of the black man.” And yet the use of African troops in the Ruhr brought France international political condemnation, with particularly virulent criticism coming from Hearst’s paper, a paper ironically loaded with references to the importance of personal freedoms and the democratic rights ‘exemplified’ in the United States. Further, there were accounts of Americans visiting France and abusing French people of colour. One such story described a group of tourists, all Americans except one black French veteran, driving to a war cemetery.

The Americans objected to the gentleman's presence, announced they would not ride with him, and threw him out of the car to leave him on the roadside. The *Temps* pointedly reminded visiting Americans that they were not at home, and that France was not a land of discrimination like the United States.<sup>44</sup> The derision over the "Black Horror" almost equalled the fear inspired by the dangers of the artistic capital of France.

Although there was not as much criticism as there was praise for her art, fashion, and literature, the heart of France's popular culture, Paris, did attract much censure.<sup>45</sup> The number of articles praising French art dwindled toward the latter part of 1922, indicating perhaps a lack of enthusiasm on the part of editors to portray this area of French society with unqualified praise. Conversely, there were an increasing number of articles describing the luridness and danger of Paris. Newspaper articles about that city portrayed rampant immorality in her literature, theatre, opera, and other artistic venues. Most problematic was the fact that Paris was the cultural hub of Europe and a popular destination for American tourists and artists. Thus, if it truly was the lurid place of sin it was depicted as being, then the steady flow of American visitors to the city would surely result in immoral behaviour, a loss of innocence, and even the importation of contagion like syphilis to the United States.

Parents of soldiers stationed in France were particularly apprehensive about having their naïve sons overseas. In 1919, the *Tribune* explained that "parents are uneasy... for fear their soldier boys in Paris may stumble, if not fall, among the city's scarlet snares... poor innocents, exposed to all the hazards of this metropolis of wine and women, pitifully imperilled by the crimson lip and the siren smile."<sup>46</sup> Such concerns were only confirmed by articles like the one in 1920, which appeared on the front page of the *Tribune*. The touring French opera, "Zaza," featured a scandalous scene with the star "entirely disrobed from the waist upward

with her back to the audience."<sup>47</sup> In 1921, the French government began an initiative to "remove nude women from the stages of Paris and to wipe out that epidemic of pornography and public immorality which in the eyes of tourists has begun to overshadow the lofty culture of France." The "hawking of moral filth" and "lewd extravaganzas" were easily found.<sup>48</sup>

Concern was also raised in other articles over the question of dancing halls. Paris was coming alive again after its wartime hibernation, and that meant indigenous debauchery was resurfacing. Police responded by imposing a ten o'clock lights-out order, a change which was "a shock...[because] for more than a century Paris has been regarded as the place where a man could enjoy himself day and night—and especially night—without restraint." The article went on to describe the "cosmopolitan crowds [that] thronged the Parisian resorts, listened to the gypsy orchestras and drank in the details of bizarre and sensual entertainments."<sup>49</sup> Dance halls were especially lurid, being home to sensual dances and even illicit drugs. Police closed one bar, the "Flirting Club," for remaining open to dancers after hours. Inside, they found "fifty couples drinking champagne at 100 francs the bottle...[T]he police allege the waiters sold cocaine, morphine and also claim they seized three opium layouts."<sup>50</sup>

Thus, as we saw in Chapter Three, while the *New York Times* was describing Paris as a cultural Mecca for the world, the *Chicago Tribune* and the *San Francisco Examiner* were often portraying it as a denizen of debauchery. Spanish writer Vicente Blasco Ibanez was quoted by the *Tribune* as having said that "the Paris of the present [1921] is as different from the Paris of 1914 as wicked is from naughty."<sup>51</sup> The "lofty culture of France" was giving way to "moral filth." In 1921, one French beauty icon claimed that, as a result, New York had replaced Paris as the centre of the cultural world. This transition was due, in part, to the American pursuit of beauty while the French pursued "the grossly material." She continued by

stating, “French people have abandoned art as their guiding star. Look at our literature—nine out of every ten new books morbidly concern sexual topics, showing where the taste of the public lies.”<sup>52</sup> This licentiousness only reinforced stereotypes of the immoral French national character, and the belief that French women were loose and fast. Interwar fashion reflected this transition from sophistication to the lurid as well.

Immediately after the war ended, the styles of women’s skirts on the Champs Elysées were shorter than they had ever been in living memory. Garments had become so revealing that “American buyers, the dress makers say, are ridiculing the shortness of the gown.” The low backs of dresses were also too risqué for American buyers, who insisted on having them filled in with lace.<sup>53</sup> These ensembles led one American man to believe that “part of the dresses surely must be omitted,” that “there must be some mistake.”<sup>54</sup> The new style also made the wearing of corsets impossible. This was a new cause for criticism for both American and French observers. To many, including those in clerical circles, “a woman’s body needs corseting.” The *Tribune* agreed, remarking that women were leaving the traditional boundaries of femininity by wearing such clothing.<sup>55</sup>

Styles became increasingly revealing, and increasingly decadent. In 1920, fashionable women were sporting bizarre accessories: “A stylishly attired woman taking tea at Claridge’s yesterday afternoon suddenly opened her handbag and carelessly unloosed a slender green and gold snake about two feet long, which wiggled to the floor and disappeared up the trouser leg of a terrified waiter. Afterward she complained to the manager that her favourite reptile was indisposed as a result of having bitten a plebeian waiter.”<sup>56</sup> Two years later, a “bedroom tea” fad was sweeping across Paris. Guests arrived with their “intimate boudoir apparel” into which they changed “before being ushered into the presence of the hostess.” This trend went so far

that some hostesses set up “elaborate beds and divans in their salons” and lingerie makers were “vieing [*sic*] with each other to create new styles for intimate wear” to accommodate the demand.<sup>57</sup>

French fashion was risqué and even bizarre at times, but it was also excessive and shamelessly indulgent. The “outstanding feature of the [1919] season in Paris is the mania for luxuries,” as thousands rushed “to acquire the costliest articles of winter attire and adornment,” much of which were “gaudy non-essentials.”<sup>58</sup> By 1921, in keeping with the postwar “mania for luxuries,” what was outrageously priced was *à la mode*: “nothing but the richest and most expensive adornments are admitted for fashionable women according to this season’s dictates.” “Diamond tiaras worth an incalculable amount,” and arms “literally covered with diamond bracelets alternating with colored stones of unsurpassed magnificence” adorned women at a society ball. No accessory was so impressive, however, as the “immense tiara made up of innumerable large diamonds in the center with the biggest and most perfect white stone ever seen in Paris” seen at one soirée.<sup>59</sup> Such extravagance seemed inappropriate to newspapers which often reminded their readers that the government of this wealthy populace was claiming to be unable to pay its debts to America.

Perhaps more than any other side of France, it was her politics that drew the harshest criticism and cynicism from American newspapers. The turmoil of post-war European foreign politics created ample opportunity for misunderstandings; and images of France reflect such differences of opinion. There were four elements of French politics that attracted the press’s negative attention: their apparent political duplicity; the debts and reparations issue; militancy and imperialism, which included several occupations of the Ruhr; and finally, French dependence on the United States. Although these are listed here as separate elements for the

purpose of simplicity, in reality they were intimately related. The vehemence with which these four components were frequently condemned by American newspapers is surprising. These were perceptions one country held about the foreign policy of another country, perceptions that did not involve profound introspection, nor take into account cultural and geographical differences. These images certainly did, however, complete the concept of France the Harlot.

European diplomacy in general, and French diplomacy in particular, was portrayed as being duplicitous and deceitful, an image that predated the interwar period by many decades. However, criticism of France on this level became especially vitriolic after 1918. The central reason for condemnation was that France had signed secret treaties with other European nations in the years immediately following the armistice. Secret treaties were considered by the American press to be proof of political duplicity as well as a danger to American interests.<sup>60</sup> The *Examiner* paid special attention to these pacts which, to the paper, represented all that was rotten in European politics: "the secret treaties and other documents and the confessions and boastings of the participants have made it perfectly clear that one government was as deep in the mire of crooked diplomacy as any one of the others."<sup>61</sup> In 1922, France quickly and quietly signed an agreement with Russia after six weeks of "flirting", which ostensibly meant further economic instability for Europe and an end to English world power.<sup>62</sup> American newspapers were concerned by any European pacts because their secret nature went against the League of Nations, and broke promises to America: "the United States was informed that no secret agreements would be considered in the peace conference." By the Genoa conference in mid-1922, American observers were outraged by the number of treaties that had been signed:

Europe is being covered by a network of alliances, all of which, of course, oblige the parties to them to maintain big armies. There is the Franco-

Belgian military convention, which obliges Belgium to keep up a larger army than before the war. There is the military treaty between France and Poland, by which Poland is compelled to keep up an army of a certain strength and France pays so much for every Polish soldier in arms... These are known to exist, but it is not at all certain that there are no others... All these treaties are secret, nobody knows what are the exact obligations of the Governments that have made them—not even the inhabitants of the countries concerned.<sup>63</sup>

Such political gaming caught Americans off guard; “intrigue is ingrained in European diplomacy and the United States even now is ...not only involved but it is inexperienced... We not only do not know the game, but we do not know what the others have up their sleeves.”<sup>64</sup> Headlines stated that French secret diplomacy indicated that France was clearly the enemy of a democratic peace, and moreover that Europe was “Preparing for the Next War.”<sup>65</sup> Although treaties had traditionally allowed European countries to build alliances and thus maintain peace, to the United States, secrecy was the enemy of modern diplomacy. According to several articles, traditional Continental diplomacy sabotaged the United States. The *Examiner* accused the French government in 1922 of “diplomacies which have been caught red-handed in a mean and treacherous conspiracy to cheat us, to take advantage of our faith in their words, [and] to undermine and destroy our trade relations... Diplomacy as practiced by these governments makes ordinary swindlers and ingrates look like innocent cherubs.”<sup>66</sup>

The image of France as duplicitous was enough to convince much of the American interwar press that isolationism was the only way to ensure the safety their nation’s interests. Isolationism was a policy strongly supported by McCormick’s *Chicago Tribune* and by Hearst’s *San Francisco Examiner*. The latter even accused the *New York Times* and several other eastern papers of being vehicles for European propaganda, alleging that they were overly sympathetic to the European perspective.<sup>67</sup> In an editorial, the *Tribune* argued that the United



States had never engaged in isolationism, but rather in independence from European influence. Had not “the American people lent seven billion dollars to European nations during the late war,” and “seventy-five thousand lives to the winning of that war”? Further, “while Europe has been waging or preparing to wage new wars, the United States has entered into engagements to limit its vast potential power on the seas and to keep the peace in the Pacific.”<sup>68</sup>

According to many articles, one clandestine motivation for French diplomatic secrecy was the annihilation of her age-old enemy, Germany. Through a system of alliances, France would have the financial support necessary to invade Germany. The *Examiner* claimed the Ruhr occupations were linked to French *revanchism*, in keeping with France’s dream of “the dismemberment of Germany.”<sup>69</sup> France was working toward this end by demanding impossibly high reparation payments of Germany, “three or four times the sum” that the United States felt she was entitled to, out of “a spirit of revenge instead of as a result of an expert appraisal of the capacity of their beaten foe [to pay].”<sup>70</sup> British economist John Maynard Keynes went so far as to claim in the *Tribune* that “the honest and intelligible purpose of French policy, to limit the population of Germany and weaken her economic system, is clothed... in the august language of freedom and international equality.”<sup>71</sup> France’s deceitfulness and secrecy were in bad taste, to say the least, particularly in light of the fact that she was not focussing her resources on peacetime rebuilding.

The debt issue was another hot point of contention for the American press. Pursuing such a belligerent policy of destruction required funding, despite assistance from secret treaties. The natural place to seek out aid was from the affluent United States, and for the newspapers this was problematic. As early as 1920, segments of the American press were

arguing that France was responsible for her own spending, and should not be relieved of her debts. If France "can lend millions to Roumania, Poland, and other countries besides spending untold amounts on airplanes, submarines, and other forms of militarism, why can she not pay her honest debt?"<sup>72</sup> French military spending, particularly in 1923, was condemned as being hypocritical and a waste of what was, in truth, American money. Headlines repeatedly complained that "France spends its Money on Finer Warships."<sup>73</sup> This diversion of funds, from rebuilding the northern regions of France to rebuilding her military, was typical of her "abominable diplomacy which has soaked Europe in blood and made its soil foul with the bones and carrion of millions upon millions of poor human beings." Such a diplomacy was a fitting penance for a people who "had not the sense and courage to overthrow their evilly disposed governments."<sup>74</sup> America should no longer be willing to assist such a country. Given the wealth that France had amassed from war-booty, she was certainly capable of paying the money she owed America.

American bitterness over French war debts increased when France begged relief from the crushing dues. The French government asked for what they called "a square deal", a period of respite "to breathe and to recover our strength," to wait at least until currency fluctuations were normalized.<sup>75</sup> The United States was unmoved, and newspapers reflected a widespread loss of respect for France. Articles commented on the speciousness of her actions: "can the peoples of Europe pay their debts to the United States? The answer is a certain and vigorous affirmative."<sup>76</sup> France owed a debt of honour, thus her request for remission indicated her shameless lack of principles.

William Randolph Hearst took an especially harsh stance on the debt issue for several reasons. He argued that with debt relief, "nobody stood to lose anything except the United

States.” Any “sentimentality” over the suffering of liberated nations like France and Belgium would result in them “unloading THE PAYMENT of the indemnity imposed on bankrupt Germany UPON THE AMERICAN PEOPLE” [emphasis his]. America had already done enough for the French by turning “their sure defeat into the victory they could never have won.”<sup>77</sup> According to one editorial, if France repudiated her debt, “on the average, every man, woman and child in the United States must contribute \$30, every family... must contribute \$150, in order that the men, women and children of France pay no part of this cost of the war.”<sup>78</sup> Moreover, Hearst was utterly convinced that France was arming herself to start another war against her traditional enemy, and using American money to foot the bill: “surely no nation in the financial distress in which France is alleged to be would be contemplating such an armament program” as she was planning. On the disarmament issue, France was firm that she would only disarm when Germany had already done so.<sup>79</sup> The McCormick and Hearst newspapers were predictably critical of this policy: “with France standing unmoved before the prayers and pleading of mankind for a tranquil world and asserting the intention of vastly increasing the most barbarous and inhuman implement of war, viz: the submarine, I think it is time to wipe the tears of sympathy from our eyes and try to see the clearer vision, what the present situation portends.”<sup>80</sup>

Ultimately, both the *Examiner* and the *Tribune* saw the relief of French war debts as another “scheme to entangle us once again in Europe’s rotten and rascally politics, and to jimmy again the doors of our treasury and then laugh at us for being simpletons and suckers.”<sup>81</sup> France’s financial wriggling reinforced the harlot image. Americans saw the French, who claimed to be poor, footing the cost of an expensive invasion of the Ruhr and of maintaining a large army.<sup>82</sup> Such militarism was repugnant to American newspaper reporters, and “these

Figure #5



French madmen” would “pull down the pillars of society and government” with their actions. “...The France of M. Poincaré, of the most corrupt plutocracy, of the most useless militarism, which now storms through Europe” was a world threat.<sup>83</sup>

The third component of French politics that drew criticism was what the American press called French militaristic imperialism, epitomized by their involvement in the Ruhr. France’s invasions drew intense criticism from American newspapers, leaving readers with the prevailing impression of a greedy, warring nation. Articles continually reminded readers of the long tradition of imperialism exemplified by Napoleon, and accused interwar France of despotism and greed.<sup>84</sup> In the eyes of her detractors, France had ulterior motives besides destroying Germany in her bid for the Ruhr: she wanted to “dominate central Europe or keep it in a hopeless ferment... French policy is based on French interest and not on a utopian passion for universal justice and perpetual peace.”<sup>85</sup> Headlines were strongly worded: “Dream of Continental Rule Seen Behind Long Battle Against Helpless Germany”<sup>86</sup> and “French Rejoice at Invasion Order.”<sup>87</sup> Even President Wilson joined in the criticism when he commented in a letter to Senator Hitchcock that “a militaristic party was in control of France.”<sup>88</sup> The ideals that had purportedly sent France to war—those of peace and liberty— were “tommyrot, without any justification at all in the historical relations of France with the rest of the world.”<sup>89</sup> In fact, by 1923, the Hearst papers were convinced that American intervention in the Great War had been a mistake. According to this perspective, the original and exalted reasons for which it had been fought; for “liberty, for democracy, for the rights of the weak, for the salvation of civilization...” were being defiled by the Allies, who were “still scrambling and snarling at one another as they gulp what they can grab from the garbage heap of the war, and actually growl over bones so bare they are not worth picking.”<sup>90</sup>

Figure #6

These cartoons are representative of others from this era. The perception of French militarism as a world threat, a force that even surpassed the British Empire, made it seem fearsome indeed.



Figure#7



Figure #8





When Raymond Poincaré sent troops over the Rhine in 1923, the accusation of imperialism and militarism from the *Examiner* and the *Tribune* reached new heights. Though smaller military units had been sent across the border in previous years, Poincaré's plan involved a larger force and a longer-term stay, signalling an unforgivable renewal of European in-fighting and ancient rivalries. French militarism was not novel; "France has been the constant disturber of Europe's peace for four hundred years; she has always been imperialistic and militaristic," and what was more, "she has been unfriendly to the United States at every opportunity..."<sup>91</sup>. The occupation demonstrated incontrovertibly that France was out for Continental control; "the victory of the Ruhr is a considerable victory, a great, hungry victory, but it is only one in a sustained campaign in the realization of a policy centuries old, the policy of French predominance in the European world..." French foreign policy "has been the same under Bourbon, Bonaparte, or republic," that is, imperialistic and deceitful.<sup>92</sup>

American newspapers strongly objected to the latest invasion of the Ruhr, claiming that France was not being forthcoming about her motives. One reason for the invasion was said to be that France needed to collect overdue reparation payments from Germany. The other reasons were subject to much criticism by the American press. For instance, the argument that France needed the rich resources of the Ruhr to assist her failing economy was misleading; France was "Strong Financially,"<sup>93</sup> wealthy and prosperous, and did not need the resources of the Rhineland as much as Germany did. Because there appeared to be much wealth in France, the reasons behind the invasion of the Ruhr seemed flawed:

Vast loans are being effected for the purpose of reconstruction and the future will demand a repayment with interest. While these loans are negotiated there is such evidence of prosperity as outrivals anything in the economic history of the country...there are not 1,000 men unemployed in France. The dole system is unknown... The cost of living in France is comfortably low. Nothing impresses the traveller,

fresh from London, as he walks the streets of Paris more than the foods. Fruit and vegetables in abundance, all dairy products in profuseness, testifying to the richness of the farms...Beggars are almost unknown, ... children are well dressed and well cared for...<sup>94</sup>

Large centres and small towns in France showed evidence of easy living where; “people are making fortunes”. In the south there was much “money in circulation among all classes of people”, but was there “Food in France? Plenty of it.”<sup>95</sup> Part of the reason for domestic wealth was that, while England was being severely overtaxed, France was being “absurdly undertaxed”, meaning she was less able than Britain to pay her debts to the United States. The other reason put forth by Paris for the invasion was security, but newspapers in the United States were critical of that purpose as well. Newspapers like the *Tribune* and *Examiner* reported that damaging Germany to ensure French security was no longer necessary. Because of its recent military defeat and the unreasonable reparations placed on it, Germany was depleted and unable to fight back, let alone invade France again.<sup>96</sup> Thus, in the eyes of the American media, France’s unnecessary activity in the Ruhr merely demonstrated that nation’s greed and ambition. Despite its wealth and security, the French government did not hesitate to take more loans from the U.S. to fund invasions of the Rhineland. France clearly intended to control the region out of a cruel and imperialistic spirit typically French, or so it was alleged by papers like the *Tribune* and *Examiner*.

Cruelty reigned throughout the restored territory of Alsace-Lorraine, and treatment of locals in the Ruhr was merciless, reported some newspapers.. There was “a constant ‘sabotage’ of the German language in the schools,” countless German residents “were cleared out on forty-eight hours notice,” and double standards abounded in the treatment of German citizens versus that of French people in the area.<sup>97</sup> Even the titles of articles contributed to this

image: “French Policy on Rhine Fans Hatred of Germans,” “Occupation of Rhine ‘Brutal,’” and “Saar Industry Shrinking Under French Control.” The *Times* joined in the criticism with an article called “Uneasiness of Redeemed Provinces,” an article that listed the grievances of a ‘Lorrainer’ as including “increased taxes, poorer schools, inferior transportation, narrowness and rapacity on the part of French officials.”<sup>98</sup> It was not enough that France had taken these territories, but they were now mistreating locals. These depictions of a brutal, demanding, and unforgiving nation contrasted starkly to the portrayal of Germany as a victim. Now it was Germany that was being raped and oppressed by France.

The previous three components of American criticism have shed light on the final topic, that of French dependence on the United States. This reliance was distressful for America, a nation that was attempting to reinforce its traditionally isolationist position in the political arena. Even during the war, it had not wanted to engage in a formal alliance, and had instead referred to the European nations with whom it fought as its “associates.” Now, with the beginning of a mangled peace, Washington was attempting to resume its relationship with Europe strictly on the level of trade by terminating any military association, and removing itself from international conferences. By removing itself from the political arena, the United States hoped to disentangle itself from the ‘hypocritical’ demands for more money—presumably to spend on French military ventures. As we saw in Chapter One, American detachment was both hurtful and frightening to France, though according to the *Tribune*, she only shed “crocodile tears.” With American withdrawal from European negotiations, France could easily blame the United States for European dysfunction.<sup>99</sup>

It is interesting to look at the ways in which France the Harlot was portrayed in this era. The tone of many articles is remarkably similar to the tone in which the newspapers

presented Germany immediately after the war. In a very real sense, the two nations had reversed places, a reversal that did not go unobserved by American newspapers: “the peace of Europe, once disturbed by the imperialistic aggression of Germany, is now threatened by the imperialistic aggression of France.”<sup>100</sup> France was taking advantage of her devastated enemy, according to the *Tribune*: “the French politicians and militarists have had their way and have invaded Germany with a great army. They can do this, of course, because the German soldiers have been demobilized and disarmed and the German people are helpless against the French military array.” As we have seen, these aggressive acts were said to have been done for more than financial gain. Occupations had been inspired by spite, by a bitter desire for revenge not only for the 1914 war, but also for the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871.<sup>101</sup> Germany had generously offered France “as war indemnity seven times the sum demanded by Germany from France in 1871,” but France had refused the offer. This was “not just treatment, even of a fallen foe...The greed of the Gaul seems not to have changed in Europe in 2,000 years...”<sup>102</sup> France was working to “ruin and break down the national spirit of Germany” by demanding “three or four times what [it] is entitled to” out of a “spirit of revenge instead of as a result of an expert appraisal of the capacity of their beaten foe.”<sup>103</sup> “Europe has not learned lesson of World War”, said David Lloyd George, ex-Prime Minister of England. The “economic recovery of Europe is seriously retarded by the cost of the new militarism,” but “where is the enemy?”<sup>104</sup> Simply put, “France at peace is more ruthless than France at war.”<sup>105</sup>

In sum, the newspapers of the early 1920s carried much condemnation and outrage about France and her people. The French were said to be greedy war profiteers, readily parting naïve visiting Americans from their money. French women were either prostitutes or the

nearest incarnation to them, but, conversely, were to blame for the nation's falling birthrate. The national character of the French was said to be unhygienic and immoral. The army was callous and reckless with German lives. French popular cultural was centred in Paris, a dangerous and lurid place with its provocative theatre and social contagion. But French politics were especially problematic. French diplomacy was duplicitous, the French constantly attempted to avoid their war debts, they were militantly imperialistic, and overly reliant on the United States. In essence, the nation, as a people and as a political body, could not be trusted. France was a harlot.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> The *Examiner*, 30 March 1919, p. 1 & 2 N.
- <sup>2</sup> The *Examiner*, 17 February 1919, p.3.
- <sup>3</sup> The *Examiner*, 24 February 1919, p.3.
- <sup>4</sup> The *Tribune*, 16 February 1919, p.6, viii.
- <sup>5</sup> The *Tribune*, 22 February 1920, p. 4.
- <sup>6</sup> The *Examiner*, 30 March 1919, p. 1&2 N.
- <sup>7</sup> The *Examiner*, 28 February 1919, p.3.
- <sup>8</sup> The *Examiner*, 2 May 1920, p. 3.
- <sup>9</sup> The *Examiner*, 21 March 1919, p. 5.
- <sup>10</sup> In this accusation, Annie Laurie was rather unclear about what she meant. The French government was not responsible for the pay of the American forces, but she said only that "I know of men who had not been paid in eleven months." See 21 March 1919, p. 5.
- <sup>11</sup> The *Times*, 13 July 1919, p. 6, i.
- <sup>12</sup> The *Examiner*, 24 February 1919, p.3.
- <sup>13</sup> The *Examiner*, 2 March 1919, p. 5N.
- <sup>14</sup> See the *Examiner*, 4 November 1923, p. 5 K.
- <sup>15</sup> The *Examiner*, 28 February 1919, p.3.
- <sup>16</sup> See the *Tribune*, 2 January 1919, p.2
- <sup>17</sup> The *Examiner*, 21 March 1919, p.5.
- <sup>18</sup> See Andre Tardieu's denial in the *Tribune* on 2 January 1919, p.2, and Clemenceau's in the *Examiner*, 18 January 1919, p.1.
- <sup>19</sup> The *Examiner*, 24 November 1919, p. 3.
- <sup>20</sup> The *Examiner*, 6 July 1919, p.8N.
- <sup>21</sup> The *Tribune*, 4 January 1922, p. 8.
- <sup>22</sup> Roberts, *Civilization*, 1-10.
- <sup>23</sup> The *Tribune*, 12 June 1921, p. 3, i.
- <sup>24</sup> See the *Tribune*, 12 January, 1919, p.5, i. According to the *Tribune* of 18 November 1919, p. 1, French girls were less independent than were their American counterparts. Some of the descriptions of the French seem almost patronizing- they state that the French girls would do anything for their men, making for doting and coddling spouses rather than the "true blue and real comrade through life" that American wives were.
- <sup>25</sup> The *Examiner*, 17 October 1920, p. 2N.
- <sup>26</sup> The *Examiner*, 31 October 1920, p. 3N.
- <sup>27</sup> The *Examiner*, 1 September 1921, p.12.
- <sup>28</sup> The *Tribune* said of "Dying France" that "no doubt the primary cause of this race suicide is to be found in certain cultural dispositions and peculiarly contagious notions. The invincible, unselfish spirit embodied in the slogans, 'Pour la Patrie' and 'Ils ne passeront pas', command the admiration of the world, but they are a hollow mockery in the face of a declining population due to a low birth rate..." 23 October 1921, p. 8.
- <sup>29</sup> The *Tribune*, 20 November 1920, p.4. For a much more detailed explanation of the pro-natalist movement in post-war France, see Roberts, *Civilization*, 95-124.
- <sup>30</sup> The *Examiner*, 11 November 1923, p. 1N.
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>32</sup> The *Examiner*, 10 November 1919, p.2.
- <sup>33</sup> The *Examiner*, 12 January 1919, p.2.
- <sup>34</sup> The *Examiner*, 29 September 1923, p. 28.
- <sup>35</sup> The *Tribune*, 21 February 1921, p.2.
- <sup>36</sup> The *Times*, 7 September 1919, p.4, iii.
- <sup>37</sup> Marks, "Black Watch", 297.
- <sup>38</sup> The *Examiner*, 4 May 1921, p. 2.
- <sup>39</sup> Marks, "Black Watch", 301.
- <sup>40</sup> The *Examiner*, 9 May 1920, p.1.
- <sup>41</sup> The *Tribune*, 9 May 1920, p. 1.

- <sup>42</sup> The *Examiner*, 9 February 1923, p. 23.
- <sup>43</sup> The *Examiner*, 11 February 1923, p. 1 & 2.
- <sup>44</sup> The *Times*, 2 August 1923, p.1.
- <sup>45</sup> The *Times* reported that in 1921 there was nothing worthy of mention being staged in Parisian theatres. French drama appeared "to be still feeling the effects of the war" since "there has been little new or noteworthy produced in Paris during the last three years." 10 April 1921, p. 1, vi.
- <sup>46</sup> The *Tribune*, 9 February 1919, p.3.
- <sup>47</sup> The *Tribune*, 17 January 1920, p.1.
- <sup>48</sup> The *Tribune*, 17 April 1921, p. 15.
- <sup>49</sup> The *Examiner*, 6 June 1920, A.W., p. 3.
- <sup>50</sup> The *Tribune*, 9 February 1920, p.5.
- <sup>51</sup> The *Tribune*, 30 January 1921, p. 1, iii.
- <sup>52</sup> The *Examiner*, 29 May 1921, p. 3R.
- <sup>53</sup> The *Tribune*, 17 August 1919, p. 7, i.
- <sup>54</sup> The *Tribune*, 18 January 1920, p. 5, vi.
- <sup>55</sup> The *Tribune*, 8 June 1921, p.8.
- <sup>56</sup> The *Examiner*, 22 April 1920, p.4.
- <sup>57</sup> The *Examiner*, 23 January 1922, p. 5.
- <sup>58</sup> The *Examiner*, 24 November 1919, p. 3.
- <sup>59</sup> The *Examiner*, 23 May 1921, p.1.
- <sup>60</sup> See Chapter One for a discussion of these treaties.
- <sup>61</sup> The *Examiner*, 3 June 1920, p.22.
- <sup>62</sup> The *Examiner*, 16 February 1922, p.1. This agreement was a trade-off, with the Soviet Union assuming the debts of the former Soviet Russian government, and in turn France would recognise the new government "de jure and grant long-term credits for Russia's reconstruction."
- <sup>63</sup> The *Examiner*, 9 July 1922, p.6N.
- <sup>64</sup> The *Tribune*, 17 August 1919, p. 6, vii.
- <sup>65</sup> The *Examiner*, 9 July 1922, p. 6N.
- <sup>66</sup> The *Examiner*, 18 January 1922, p.22.
- <sup>67</sup> The *Examiner*, 4 January 1919, p. 18 R.
- <sup>68</sup> The *Tribune*, 4 July 1923, p. 8.
- <sup>69</sup> The *Tribune*, 28 September 1923, p. 8.
- <sup>70</sup> The *Examiner*, 13 August 1923, p. 1.
- <sup>71</sup> The *Tribune*, 14 February 1920, p.1.
- <sup>72</sup> The *Tribune*, 3 July 1923, p.6.
- <sup>73</sup> The *Tribune*, 20 May 1923, p.17,i.
- <sup>74</sup> The *Examiner*, 3 June 1920, p. 22.
- <sup>75</sup> The *Examiner*, 16 March 1920, p.2.
- <sup>76</sup> The *Tribune*, 2 May 1922, p. 1. See also the *Examiner*, 28 February 1922, p. 19.
- <sup>77</sup> The *Examiner*, 24 May 1921, p. 28.
- <sup>78</sup> The *Examiner*, 23 February 1922, p. 16.
- <sup>79</sup> The *Times*, 12 July 1921, p. 2.
- <sup>80</sup> The *Examiner*, 4 January, 1920.
- <sup>81</sup> The *Examiner*, 20 January 1923, p. 28.
- <sup>82</sup> The *Tribune*, 20 May 1923, p. 17, 1.
- <sup>83</sup> The *Examiner*, 11 November 1923, p. 2k.
- <sup>84</sup> The *Tribune*, 10 April 1920, p.6, and the *Examiner*, 7 October 1923, p. 1 and 2..
- <sup>85</sup> The *Tribune*, 13 October 1920, p.9.
- <sup>86</sup> The *Examiner*, 7 October 1923, p. 1 & 2.
- <sup>87</sup> The *Times*, 8 March 1921, p. 1.
- <sup>88</sup> The *Examiner*, 13 March 1920, p.2.
- <sup>89</sup> The *Examiner*, 5 February 1923, p.22.
- <sup>90</sup> The *Examiner*, 20 January 1923, p. 28.
- <sup>91</sup> The *Examiner*, 5 February 1923, p.22.
- <sup>92</sup> The *Examiner*, 7 October 1923, p. 1 & 2.

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- <sup>93</sup> *The Times*, 7 November 1919, p.5.
- <sup>94</sup> *The Examiner*, 4 November 1923, p. 5K. For an earlier account of the wealth in France see the *New York Times*, 9 February 1919, p. 3, v.
- <sup>95</sup> *The Examiner*, 28 February 1919, p. 3.
- <sup>96</sup> *The Examiner*, 7 January 1923, p. 1 & 2.
- <sup>97</sup> *The Tribune*, 21 February 1921, p. 2.
- <sup>98</sup> *The Times*, 2 July 1922, p. 1, iii.
- <sup>99</sup> *The Tribune*, 11 November 1923, p.15,i.
- <sup>100</sup> *The Examiner*, 8 January 1923, p.22.
- <sup>101</sup> *The Examiner*, 21 January 1923, p. 1&2.
- <sup>102</sup> *The Examiner*, 21 June 1923, p. 28.
- <sup>103</sup> *The Examiner*, 13 August 1923, p. 1.
- <sup>104</sup> *The Examiner*, 7 January 1923, p.1 & 2.
- <sup>105</sup> *The Examiner*, 19 August 1923, p.2k.



## CONCLUSION

By the end of 1923, and the earliest months of 1924, the French were generally perceived to be the epitome of evil by the three newspapers. Their policy in the Ruhr, headed by Raymond Poincaré, was represented as an unforgivable affront to the defeated Germans. Not only was it still considered imperialistic of the French to occupy the region in the first place, but the use of colonial troops was frequently revisited by newspapers. The *Examiner* continued its diatribe against the “unnecessary” presence of Africans: “France has sent into Germany representatives of inferior races which until yesterday practiced cannibalism; and this is not only an absolutely new and unjustifiable fact, but a most grave and unnecessary insult to human dignity.” The author of this particular editorial distinguished between unacceptable African blacks, and the tolerable American blacks who, luckily, had been “educated according to the standards of civilization”. To him, the objectionable aspect of using Africans was “not a question of race” but rather one of safety. These foreign blacks had “committed an infinite number of crimes and [unpunished] acts of violence” against the poor local Ruhr population.<sup>1</sup> Poincaré’s government had pursued an “aggressive policy” that was “as cowardly” as it was “foolish”. The “reckless policy” behind the occupation was a “danger to civilization”.<sup>2</sup> In addition to the uproar over colonial troops was scandal over the secret diplomacy discussed in Chapter Four, compounded by documents made public in 1924. These documents led Senator Copeland to conclude that, given France’s secret treaties, “neither the Kaiser nor the military party in Germany caused the war or wanted it.”<sup>3</sup>

In the spring of 1924, however, the Dawes Plan renewed hope. The Reparations Committee, headed by American Charles Dawes, made a series of recommendations to which

the key nations agreed: “The English have chosen to be good; the French to be reasonable; the Germans to be resigned.”<sup>4</sup> The United States agreed to support the new  *Rentenmark*  with massive loans to stabilize the German economy, thus enabling the Weimar Government to pay reparations to France and Britain. Adding to the relief of the United States was the change in French government as Edouard Herriot replaced Poincaré. Newspapers, at least, portrayed Herriot as far more moderate than his predecessor had been.  *Times*  reporter Sisley Huddleston declared, “Of all the French statesmen that I have known, M. Edouard Herriot is perhaps the most charming, the most genial and the least like a fighter. He is like a great overgrown schoolboy—though a very cultured schoolboy.” Herriot was not a personality “to arouse passion ... He is comfortably fat and easy-going. He cannot rouse himself to a white heat of hatred of his opponents, and in France, the chief virtue of radicalism is the absolute hatred of the enemy...”<sup>5</sup> Although lacking in political experience, Herriot appealed to the United States. In his own words, “The Ruhr has only made us lose a lot of time and a vast amount of money. We should never have undertaken that adventure, it was a mistake from the beginning... If there is a Frenchman who believes that the Ruhr is a productive [engagement], he must be a lunatic.”<sup>6</sup> His election was “the final announcement that the political stampede of an abnormal decade is at an end... [A]s far as the people of Europe are concerned the war is over.” Even French militarism and imperialism were presented by the press as being less extreme. Anne O’Hare McCormick reported that “the French soldier is the unhappiest in Europe; he hates soldiering. The French boys in the Ruhr were that saddest lot of immature invaders I have ever beheld... No observers of that joyless militarism can think of France as a military oligarchy any more...”<sup>7</sup> Another  *Times*  feature described French imperialism in a more complimentary language than had been expressed in newspapers for years: “When France is accused of being

imperialistic, the suggestion apparently is that she wishes to extend her dominions in Europe. In that sense, the accusation is untrue. But if by spreading imperialism one means the spreading abroad of French influence in dark places... then France is undoubtedly imperialistic, precisely as England and, in her own way, America are."<sup>8</sup> The French presence in Africa was considered civilizing and beneficial, but in western European nations, it was brutal.

The Dawes Plan began to restore France's popularity in America. Attentive readers of this time must have been left wondering how to reconcile the complex and often conflicting images of the past six years. Within the three newspapers issued following the war, France had been both the darling of the world's nations, saintly in its fortitude, and an immoral harlot, leaching wealth from the United States. French men were at once heroic guardians of civilization, and avaricious war profiteers. French women were ideal mates and enduring victims, as well as whores. As a nation, the French were stoic and true to the Rights of Man, while being oppressive and immoral. The splendour of French culture was qualified by the dangers and luridness of Paris. Finally, while France's security concerns and desperate need for German reparations justified her invasions of the Ruhr, these occupations were also unforgivable acts of imperialism. These disparate images magnified the ambiguous attitudes of Americans towards the French, and are blatantly illustrated by the following divergent quotes: "heroic as [France] was in war, it has equal vigour and tenacity in the arts of peace"; and "France at peace is more ruthless than France at war."<sup>9</sup> Herriot's new government and the Dawes Plan, however, renewed some American confidence in the French and improved the balance of positive versus negative imagery in the course of 1924.

The foregoing epilogue provides an opportunity to reflect on the implications of the data which have been assembled for this study. Clearly, Americans felt a strong sense of ambivalence toward the French. Both the newspapers scrutinized here and the American reading public celebrated the ideals of liberty that French society appeared to espouse. On the other hand, the papers and public opinion of the United States were horrified by some of those liberties, as seen in their reactions to the use of black troops in positions of authority over whites, particularly over white women. To the majority of Americans in the 1920s, whose own nation was heavily entrenched in a system of violent oppression and segregation of blacks, racial mixing was both repugnant and immoral. Conversely, while the intellectualism of the French inspired American scholars, who happily aligned themselves with French thinkers, there was widespread aversion to the apparent debauchery of Paris. Americans were at once enamoured by some French women, and condemned others for their promiscuity. The strong reactions in newspapers to many aspects of French life and politics, positive or negative, reveal something of the American people. Although Americans celebrated some aspects of French society, they believed themselves to be morally superior to the French. The perceived immorality of the French was the underlying theme of almost all criticism levelled at them. This finding is supported by Mark Kriesberg, who writes that because of traditional isolationism, many Americans were chauvinistic, convinced they were "the most righteous and mightiest of all peoples."<sup>10</sup> As Chapter Four has documented, this attitude of superiority was evident in many of the newspaper articles that appeared in three of America's prominent papers.

But just how influential were newspapers in this era? Who read them? No official literacy rates exist for this period, though some inferences can be made from the level of

education of the American public and how informed they were about governmental issues. The 1940 census documented that most Americans, aged 25 or older, were not schooled beyond the eighth grade, and that more people had not completed one year of school than had completed four years of university.<sup>11</sup> Clearly, the American population in 1940 was not highly educated, and illiteracy was probably fairly widespread. It was likely very similar during the early interwar period. The theoretical literature on this topic connects the level of education to public awareness of important foreign policy issues. Thus, low-income groups in the 1940s were both poorly educated and poorly informed, conditions which can be ascribed to the stresses of poverty.<sup>12</sup> In addition, Kriesberg claims that urbanites are traditionally better informed than rural people; geography also determined American attentiveness to official affairs. In the early twentieth century, the literate American public relied almost exclusively on newspapers for information on current events. Studies from the 1930s and 1940s indicated that the more educated people supplemented their newspaper reading with printed periodicals, while the less educated used the radio.<sup>13</sup> This is significant because newspapers, which tend to specialize in foreign affairs, should have influenced the public more than other media did. News in paper form is tangible, says Bernard Cohen, and can be collected and studied, unlike radio news.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, in the early 1920s, since radio was not yet a news medium, the American public had few options to the printed press. Newspapers, which tended to be thorough, could be read at one's leisure and shared among many people, thus were an influential means of purveying information and opinion. This fact is attested to by the press's traditional relationship with government.

Since 1914, the State Department has used the press both to disseminate its policy on foreign affairs to the public, and to keep itself informed on the public's perception of foreign

affairs. Moreover, prior to the Second World War, the press was virtually the sole channel of communication between the State Department and the public.<sup>15</sup> The State Department also relied on the press to communicate information to otherwise isolated governmental departments. In return, the press has relied heavily on the State Department for foreign policy information. Despite this close relationship between the state and the press, most Americans remained abysmally uninformed of foreign affairs. Their focus, instead, was on domestic issues. Bailey remarks that Americans have traditionally been most concerned with themselves, then with near neighbours, and then—both last and least—with foreigners overseas.<sup>16</sup> He continues by saying that the American public in the 1920s was isolationist “almost beyond belief,”<sup>17</sup> a sentiment that this thesis argues was only encouraged by the contemporary press.

Indeed, at least part of the blame for the lack of public awareness of foreign affairs lies with the press itself. Levering argues that because of their biases and limited space, newspapers carried simplified stories about violence or the threat of it, emphasizing “the exceptional rather than the significant.”<sup>18</sup> As a result, readers were left with a false sense of what the important foreign policy issues were. The public was exposed to diluted interpretations of American foreign policy toward France through the media, which resulted in a widespread ignorance of—and intolerance for—other nations.

Kriesberg states that widespread ignorance in the American public was compounded by deep-seated prejudice. He distinguishes between an informed electorate—those eligible to vote and who stay up-to-date on foreign affairs—and an electorate that is merely aware. The former take an active interest in political issues while the latter, “although they may follow discussions of the issues of foreign policy... cannot frame intelligent arguments about them.”<sup>19</sup>

In 1947, more than 80 per cent of voters were reached by both radio and newspapers, and fully 80 per cent of voters read a daily or weekly newspaper regularly. It must be noted that there is a difference between 'voters', and the electorate. A study of voting patterns since 1912 revealed that, generally, only fifty percent of the eligible American population voted in Presidential elections.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, if the voting public in the interwar period read newspapers as regularly as it did in 1947, it was perhaps an aware group, but a poorly informed one.

It appears that the press could only have had a limited effect on public opinion given the general ignorance of the American public, and the associated problems of illiteracy and voter turn-out. However, the research for this thesis has indicated that such an appearance is misleading. Although there were illiterate segments of society, there were significant numbers of newspaper readers, as attested to by the impressive circulations of the three newspapers scrutinized here, and by the fact that cities such as New York, San Francisco, and Chicago had several large newspapers each. The American reading public, without extensive knowledge of foreign affairs, was less likely to criticize press perceptions, and tended to believe and adopt the simplifications and stereotypes commonly found in the popular press. This is supported by the general tendency to pay less attention to events overseas than to domestic issues. These simplifications, as previously mentioned, were made by the press itself and by officials eager to sway public opinion in their favour. The circular nature of this issue is as follows: government officials informed the press of the aspects of foreign policy they considered to be expedient; the press interpreted these topics into short, more easily understood, articles before printing them in the newspapers that the public consumed and then adopted as "truths." Although reporters tend to try to focus on stories they consider to be important, their

challenging of government's news releases is limited by their dependence on Washington for information.

Transplanting such broad observations into the real world of time and place requires a return to the overriding topic of this thesis. The papers used here were selected on the basis of their geographical location, and their large circulations indicate they were widely accepted. As mentioned in the Introduction, there were some 323,000 *New York Times* issued daily in 1921, a circulation that reached 351,000 by the end of 1924.<sup>21</sup> The circulation of Robert McCormick's *Tribune* doubled between 1914 and 1921, from 261,278 to 500,000, reaching over 800,000 on Sundays in the same period. William Randolph Hearst's media empire was enormous, an empire consisting of 5,100,000 dailies. These were prominent newspapers, and clearly reached a number of people.

The perspectives and tones of newspapers have long been heavily influenced by their administrators. This was true of the three editor/owners discussed here and their personal perceptions of France, a moralistic perception that reflected a widely held belief in American superiority. In addition, this representation reflected, to a large degree, the personalities and experiences of the three men. Adolph Ochs of the *Times* was raised in a desperately poor immigrant family, a heritage that encouraged a belief in the importance of independent and objective reporting, and that gave him a cosmopolitan attitude toward Europe. Robert Rutherford McCormick was an aristocrat who had benefited from an expensive and prestigious education, and whose strong nationalism was reflected in his newspaper. His paper appealed to the population of the mid-west, an area known for its isolationist perspective. His contemporary, William Randolph Hearst, was the wealthiest of all, remembered by biographers



as a spoiled and impetuous man determined to secure a place in the White House. The *Examiner* reflected his fervent dislike of European politics. Yet despite their biases, all three of these newspapers contained both positive and negative images of France, an ambiguity that was duplicated in popular culture and foreign policy.

The connection between newspapers, Americans of the 1920s, and the foreign policy of that period is a contentious and tenuous link to make, particularly in the absence of modern public opinion polling. According to Melvin Small, while no study proves incontestably that the public plays a role in policy-making, this connection is seldom disputed.<sup>22</sup> Yet a reminder of the policy of post-war America toward France is important to this discussion.

As explored in Chapter One, Washington in the 1920s was determined to extricate itself from French, and indeed European, politics. In the wake of wartime hardships, and following the bickering of the Paris Peace Conference, Americans were anxious for a return to “normalcy.” Aggravating this national sentiment was the Russian-bred Bolshevism that seemed to be infecting parts of Europe with ideas that were contrary to those espoused in the United States and thus reminding Americans of that continent’s political volatility. The American general public, traditionally isolationist, was especially fearful of future involvement in European conflict after World War One. In submitting the peace settlement, Wilson ruined his chances of having it accepted; he inflexibly held onto the original terms of the Treaty. When he turned to the public in the form of an election, he lost to a Republican in a 1920 landslide (61 percent of the vote was against him).<sup>23</sup> The election was correctly interpreted as a mandate for the Republicans.<sup>24</sup> Harding’s government adopted a foreign policy based on the concept of leading the world by example, rather than being directly involved in it. In this election, the public clearly demonstrated its ability to accept or reject a foreign policy, and

sided with critics of the League of Nations and Europe's apparent "return to its old degenerate ways."<sup>25</sup> The images from contemporary newspapers went far in promoting this image.

Throughout the early interwar period, there were many contentious policies adopted toward France by Washington. The United States was a key player in the issue of world disarmament discussed at the Washington Arms Limitation Conference of 1922, the goal of which was to slow or end the race for naval supremacy being staged by Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. However, in relegating France to the same level as Italy rather than including her among the 'Big Three,' despite her long coasts and recent invasion, was deeply offensive to France. This offence was compounded by American determination to collect French war debt, while providing Germany loans to meet its reparation deadlines. The bitterness caused by American policy in France only caused American attitudes, already sensitive to Continental criticism, to become even more nationalistic and isolationist.<sup>26</sup>

Ralph Levering states "opinions on foreign affairs, as on other subjects, are rooted deeply in an individual's personality and values."<sup>27</sup> The values of the American public were, to a large extent, skewed by illiteracy, a lack of education, and deep-seated prejudice. Americans who were strongly isolationist, and who believed their nation to be the most generous in the world, were convinced in the 1920s of their righteousness.<sup>28</sup> This attitude was noticeable in the treatment of France by the *Chicago Tribune* and the *San Francisco Examiner*, as explored in Chapter Four. France was described somewhat differently in the *New York Times*, but the latter did not reflect the attitude of the majority of American readers. Leaders who believed in American involvement abroad, and who supported the League of Nations, were concentrated in the northeast, almost entirely around the area of New York City.<sup>29</sup> In the late 1950s no more than one percent of adult Americans "read regularly or frequently about world issues in the

better analytical, relatively profound, semi-popular periodicals like the *New York Times*...”<sup>30</sup> A poorly-informed public is not a good influence on any democratic government’s foreign policy.

Although it appears that the printed press of this era was as uncertain about France as were the government and the public, its effect is extremely difficult to measure. Likewise, establishing the effect of public opinion on official policy is difficult. Ralph Levering calls the roll of the public “constructive and indispensable”.<sup>31</sup> Melvin Small claims there is a general agreement over the role public opinion likely plays, which is that it sets certain limits and goals for policy makers. Public opinion affects policy making, if not by initiating programs, then at least by limiting options.<sup>32</sup> In the context of this thesis, Small’s point is illustrated by Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations. As discussed in Chapter One, the President brought his fourteen points to the Paris Peace Conference, an agenda he thought would lead to international peace. Although these points were a key element of the peace settlement, to the American public Article X of the League Covenant was unacceptable—that article which committed all members of the League of Nations to protect other members from the aggression of belligerent states. The American public strongly opposed such an undefined obligation to European nations that, like France, were being portrayed by the press as militant and duplicitous. As a result of strong opposition to Wilson and the issue of the League from the public and from the American Congress, the Treaty of Versailles was never ratified, thus excluding the possibility of American involvement in the League of Nations. It appears the public, and arguably the press, had an effect on official foreign policy in this situation.

In the period of embittered Franco-American relations, from late 1922 to early 1924, however, their effect is somewhat more ambiguous. Presumably, had the saintly newspaper images of France successfully made public opinion more sympathetic, American official policy

would have allowed for her relief from war debts and would have supported the Ruhr occupations. Conversely, had the harlot portrayal of France successfully convinced the American public of her negative aspects, then official policy would have been more strict than it was, perhaps resulting in diplomatic ties being cut completely. In reality, the ambiguity of the images of France in the American media was mirrored by ambiguity in the foreign policies of the United States. Washington supported France to a degree, but shied away from any substantial assistance.

As the horrors of war receded, the American press, for reasons stated in this thesis, idealized and vilified their former associate. Ambiguity was a central theme to the early interwar period; France was seen as both saint and harlot, as she had long been viewed. However, ambiguity can be a treacherous path for people, media, and governments to follow. A public relying on stereotypical and one-sided arguments from biased newspapers about a nation, which like any other, is complex and diverse, remains doomed to support a dangerous and chauvinistic foreign policy. James Madison, in speaking to Thomas Jefferson, said:

The management of foreign relations appears to be the most susceptible of abuse of all the trusts committed to a government, because they can be concealed or disclosed, or disclosed in such parts and at such times as will best suit particular views; and because the body of the people are less capable of judging, and are more under the influence of prejudices, on that branch of their affairs, than of any other. Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad.<sup>33</sup>

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> The *Examiner*, 6 January 1924, 2K.
- <sup>2</sup> The *Examiner*, 20 January 1924, p. 1-2.
- <sup>3</sup> The *Examiner*, 27 January 1924, p.2K.
- <sup>4</sup> The *Times*, 1 June 1924, p. 1, TBR&M.
- <sup>5</sup> The *Times*, 8 June 1924, p. 5.
- <sup>6</sup> The *Examiner*, 18 May 1924, p. 1&2N.
- <sup>7</sup> The *Times*, 1 June 1924, p. 1, TBR&M.
- <sup>8</sup> The *Times*, 1 June 1924, p. 7, TBR&M.
- <sup>9</sup> The *Times*, 9 August, 1920, p.8, and the *Examiner*, 19 August 1923, p. 2K respectively.
- <sup>10</sup> Mark Kriesberg, "Dark Areas of Ignorance" in Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, Lester Markel, ed. (New York: Harper & Bros. 1949), 57.
- <sup>11</sup> Kriesberg, 50. It is important to note that there would have been some difference in the numbers, as by 1940 society had endured the Great Depression and witnessed the outbreak of World War Two in Europe.
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 54-56.
- <sup>13</sup> Ralph Levering, The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1978 (New York: William Morrow & Company), 23-24.
- <sup>14</sup> Cohen, 7.
- <sup>15</sup> William Chitrick, State Department, Press and Pressure Groups: A Role Analysis (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970), 179.
- <sup>16</sup> Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in the Street, The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy, (Gloucester: Peter Amith, 1964), 118.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 121.
- <sup>18</sup> Levering, 35.
- <sup>19</sup> Kriesberg, 51.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.
- <sup>21</sup> Ostrander, 53.
- <sup>22</sup> Melvin Small, Public Opinion and Historians: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Detroit: Wayne State University Press), 14-15.
- <sup>23</sup> Hunt, Ideologies, 136.
- <sup>24</sup> Charles Lerche, Foreign Policy of the American People, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), 90.
- <sup>25</sup> Hunt, Ideologies, 136.
- <sup>26</sup> Lerche, 93.
- <sup>27</sup> Levering, 21.
- <sup>28</sup> Kriesberg, 57-59.
- <sup>29</sup> Levering, 52-53.
- <sup>30</sup> Alfred Hero Jr., in *Ibid.*, 32.
- <sup>31</sup> Levering, 20.
- <sup>32</sup> Small, 14-15.
- <sup>33</sup> Saul Padover. "U.S. Foreign Policy and Public Opinion," Headline Series, no. 127, (January-February, 1958), 3.

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