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The European Security and Defence Identity Debate

A Thesis Submitted

To The Faculty of Graduate Studies
In Partial Fulfilment Of The Requirements
For A Masters Degree In Political Studies

By Christopher Young

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The European Security and Defence Identity Debate

by

Christopher Young

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of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree**

of

Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

The European Security and Defence Identity Debate (ESDI) came to the forefront in international security following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the thesis postulates that this debate has been ongoing and persistent since the formation of NATO in 1949. To demonstrate the historical relevance the thesis is broken down into three main periods. The first period was from the formation of NATO in 1949 to the end of the 1960s. This period was predicated on the realisation of dependence of the Europeans on the United States (and NATO) for their defence against the Soviet threat. The second period was from the start of détente in 1967 until the end of the Cold War in 1989 following the fall of the Berlin Wall. This period was predicated on a relationship of interdependence between the Europeans and the United States for the defence of Western Europe. Finally, the period following the end of the Cold War has been known as one of defence independence as the Europeans are no longer reliant on the United States and NATO for their own defence. Despite this independence, NATO has continued to be viable and, as the thesis postulates, will continue to be viable in the future as the main interlocutor of European defence.

The theoretical foundations of the thesis are based on international regime theory, in particular the concept of security regimes. The thesis divides the debates between Europeanists and Atlanticists and places both within the theoretical constructs of international regime theory. Europeanists believe that the European Union must eventually develop and implement its own defence capabilities outside of NATO. The Europeanist argument relies on a more functionalist approach to international regimes, whereby integration in one area will necessarily spillover into the security realm. Atlanticists, on the other hand, believe that NATO must remain as the key institution to supply the public good of defence for Europe. The Atlanticist argument rely on a the

premise of hegemonic stability and the need to have a hegemon, the United States, remain as the leader within the regime in order to sustain the regime.

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Introduction

THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY DEBATE

The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 linked the security of North America and Western Europe. The impetus for the formation of NATO was the perception of a Soviet threat from the East; a threat based on ideological dissimilarity and expansionist tendencies. Europe became the focal point of this East-West confrontation with the central front running along the inter-German border. Following WWII Western Europe was too weak to supply its own deterrent in the face of overwhelming Soviet conventional forces. An alliance with the US would assure a nuclear deterrent and supply economic aid to rebuild. For its part, the US needed a bastion of liberal democracy and a market for its economic productivity. Hence, the alliance was a signal to the Soviet Union of America's commitment to Western Europe and the ultimate example of the interdependence of like-minded states.

The end of the Cold War removed the political and strategic parameters for NATO's rationale. In addition, the developing integration of the EU (EU), the relative decline of American hegemony, and the transatlantic tensions over international trade and security undermined NATO's related functions in political and economic circles. The question is whether NATO has been able to adjust to the new strategic and political environment in Europe or whether other organizations have become better suited to these new exigencies.

The question is at the heart of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) debate. It is characterized by two competing archetypes: Europeanism and Atlanticism. Europeanism advocates that, in the long term, the EU must be in charge of common European security and defence policies and act independently on those policies. Atlanticism accepts a more significant European role but asserts that NATO must remain as the centre of security and defence policy and decision-making. The

outcome of the debate will determine the future of Western security and the transatlantic relationship.

EUROPEANISM

Most European governments considered the end of the Cold War as the beginning of a new phase in European political and economic integration. A significant step towards integration was the Maastricht Treaty on EU signed in December 1991 and in force since November 1, 1993. While the treaty was a step forward, it made little, if no, attempt to establish a defence structure, preferring to commit to a defence identity at some future date.

...to implement a common foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world...¹

Regardless, the Union's aspiration to include security and defence within its development process is clear. The Western EU's (WEU) 1987 Platform on European Security Interests proclaimed "that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence."² The statement is not lost on the advocates of Europeanism who believe that the Union would be moribund if it was nothing more than a single economic market backed by a few common policies in foreign and security affairs.

Maastricht's significance is its commitment. Until Maastricht, agreements were decidedly void of such commitments. For example, the Single European Act (SEA), signed at the end of 1985 and in force since mid-1987, was vital in creating the optimism for the 1992 process but had little impact on security and defence affairs. Europeans were sensitive to security and defence matters infringing upon the development of the

¹*Treaty on EU*, Maastricht, February 1992

²WEU, *Platform on European Security Interests*. (The Hague: October 27, 1987)

'economic' European Community. The only related section was Article 30(6) which promised to "consider ... closer co-operation on questions of European security." As a condition for such consideration, the article confirmed "nothing in this Title shall impede closer co-operation in the field of security between certain of the High Contracting Parties within the framework of the Western EU or the Atlantic Alliance."³ While making a diplomatic gesture to consider such matters, the preference was to leave them to other organizations such as NATO.

Although Maastricht established a Common Foreign and Security Policy, the next step is to establish a specific defence policy, based on a commitment to come to the aid of any member state whose integrity is threatened, with the requisite mechanisms for action. According to Jacques Delors, former President of the European Commission, this defence policy could be built on the WEU framework,⁴ in particular, Article V of the WEU Treaty:

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.⁵

The WEU would act as the Union's defence arm charged with coordinating multinational forces or intervention units, facilitated by a Union decision-making apparatus.

Yet, such views are not universal. France, for example, believes that defence issues should remain outside Union decision-making. The Union would still have a common policy and an organization to carry out that policy but decisions would be intergovernmental. Britain also does not believe in a single EU institutional framework and does not want to see the WEU integrated within the EU at all. Both the French and

³Bulletin of the European Communities, *The Single European Act*, Supplement 2/86 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1986), p 18f

⁴Jacques Delors, "European Integration and Security," *Survival*, (XXXIII, # 2, March/April, 1991) p. 107

⁵WEU, Western EU: History, Structures, Perspectives, (Brussels: WEU Press and Information Service, November 1993) p. 11

British attitudes, with their insistence on the state retaining control over defence, and reluctance for any institutional expression of that defence are fundamentally opposite to the integrationist thrust of Europeanism.

Europeanists are also unclear which issues a future defence policy should address. In a proposed draft Union treaty, the scope of that policy included armaments cooperation, control over technology transfers and arms exports, arms control and confidence building measures; and humanitarian intervention.⁶ Maastricht went no further, laying out only general objectives to safeguard common values; strengthen security; preserve peace; promote international cooperation; and consolidate democracy and the rule of law. Such a list is devoid of the more practical issues of command and control, burden sharing, decision-making, and military action in times of intense conflict.

Finally, the objective of the WEU as the European defence organization poses two problems. First, there is a question of membership. Denmark, Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Finland are all members of the EU but not the WEU, and attend only as observers. Iceland, Norway and Turkey are associate WEU members, members of NATO but not members of the EU. In addition, nine ex-communist countries are also WEU "associate partners".

Second, there is the question of the WEU's dual role: "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications;" and "to develop further the close working links between WEU and the Alliance and to strengthen the role, responsibilities and contributions of WEU Member States in the Alliance."⁷ The chances of maintaining this split personality effectively is dubious especially in light of the ESDI struggle.

⁶Europe / Documents n. 1709/1710, 3 May 1991. p.18

⁷*Declaration on the role of Western EU and its relations with the EU and with the Atlantic Alliance, Maastricht Summit (9-10 December 1991)*

ATLANTICISM

Compared to Europeanism, Atlanticism is better articulated. It has three principles: first, NATO is the only viable European defence organization and continues to have a vital role to play in European security; second, NATO is the essential forum for agreement on security and defence policies and is irreplaceable in providing leadership; finally, only NATO guarantees the security link between North America and Europe. Atlanticism does accept an assertive European defence identity within the alliance as long as these three principles are respected. Atlanticists argue that an European defence identity should not duplicate NATO's military organization, nor become a competing forum where an inner group of European states independently develop their security and defence policies, thereby reducing the North American members to the status of mercenaries.

Atlanticists also accept the WEU's increasing role as a legitimate bridge between the Alliance and the EU, such that the WEU would be a European caucus within the framework of NATO. In 1987, British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe referred to the WEU as "the arch between NATO's two pillars," that could "bring a clearer European thinking in the Alliance," and be "a necessary vehicle if the Europeans are to contribute more to their own defence."⁸

The Alliance has some advantages too. Instead of the Soviet threat, the West faces instability and regional conflict. NATO represents stability; it is the only instrument through which member states can plan for their common defence. Consider the role it played in German unification. Not only did German membership in NATO reassure its neighbours, it provided the institutional base for German obligations on questions of territory, and armed forces. Simply, NATO is "the only common defence organization adequately equipped to guarantee Europe's military security."⁹

⁸Sir Geoffrey Howe, speech delivered at the Institute Royal des Relations Internationales, Brussels, 16 March 1987. Reproduced as "The Atlantic Alliance and the Security of Europe," *NATO Review*, (April, 1987)

⁹Michel Fortmann, *In Search of an Identity: Europe, NATO, and the ESDI Debate*, Extra Mural Paper #58, (Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Department of National Defence, Canada, Nov. 1991) p. 4

The most comprehensive example of Atlanticism is the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, signed in 1991. The Declaration accepts that "the world has changed dramatically," but also asserts that the "alliance will continue to play a key role in building a new, lasting order of peace." It challenges that Europe's security cannot be "comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America."¹⁰

NATO's military predominance is unquestioned, but European security is less a military issue and more a regional and foreign policy issue, over which NATO has little claim. The Rome Declaration does recognise the change by pointing to the "broad approach to stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental aspects." Also, the inauguration of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as "a forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security related issues,"¹¹ in addition to joint military exercises with former Cold War adversaries as part of the Partnership for Peace have been significant steps.

Finally, the Alliance continues to be plagued by two issues that date back to its inception: extended nuclear deterrence and burden sharing. The first is European NATO member's dependence on the US extending a nuclear deterrent guarantee to Western Europe. Throughout its history, European members have feared the US would contain a nuclear conflict in Europe rather than putting its own population at risk. Despite the end of the Cold War, the root of the issue remains the "unequal levels of influence on nuclear decision-making and unequal levels of exposure to its consequences."¹²

¹⁰Article 2, *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th November 1991. (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1991)

¹¹"The North Atlantic Cooperation Council," NATO Basic Fact Sheet, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, May 1993)

¹²Ian Gambles, *Prospects for West European Security Cooperation*, Adelphi Papers #244, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1991/92) p. 8

The second problem is the defence burden. To improve the balance the US has been promoting pillar building whereby North America and Western Europe would share the burden on an equal basis. Pillar building is a significant component of Atlanticism. Yet it has also been used by Europeanists to claim that the Americans are not committed to European security and thus has to argue the need for an independent European defence identity.

DEVELOPMENT OF ESDI

ESDI's development has also been affected by the dominance of the superpowers. In shaping the political order in Europe, the decisive role of the US in the political and economic recovery of Western Europe, and the overarching superpower control of the instruments of global competition and deterrence during the Cold War "left a legacy of dependency in Europe."¹³ The result has been the inability of Western Europe to duplicate its success in economic integration in the defence arena despite calls by both American and European officials for a new transatlantic balance to alleviate this dependency.

Thus, ESDI's development is rooted in the drive for EU and the politics of the Atlantic Alliance. ESDI has developed along a continuum of three distinct phases: dependence, interdependence, and independence. The first phase, from the end of WWII until the beginnings of détente in the late sixties, was dependent on the development NATO. Attempts were made to develop an independent ESDI but none were successful. West Europeans were more concerned at the time with economic integration while still unsure of the future direction of European integration and the national aspirations of their fellow Europeans.

German and Italian Foreign Ministers Genscher and Colombo first used ESDI, as a concept, in 1981. In a proposal to the EC they suggested that political cooperation

¹³*ibid.*, p. 3

among the members should include security matters. Even though the agreement was watered down, it encouraged a more independent ESDI for two reasons: first, European integration had developed enough on the economic front to warrant considerations on the political front; and second, beginning with détente, there was a change in the relationship between the superpowers, and between the US and its allies. The vital factor that changed the superpower relationship was nuclear parity. Parity led the US to question extended deterrence. Thus, the period from détente until the end of the Cold War was one of interdependence: NATO remained supreme but required more negotiation to solve disagreements and relied on an increasing European role in providing its own defence.

The current phase since the end of the Cold War has removed the need of the Alliance as a guarantor, while defence has come to represent the final pillar in the development of the Union. Yet with instability still a factor, the EU hesitates to break away; the Alliance represents a source of stability that played a significant role in developing the Union in the first place. In turn, the debate is affected by numerous factors, including the attitudes and actions of Russia, the US, and Germany; the relationship within the French-German core; and institutional questions such as greater integration, decision-making and burden sharing.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

ESDI is based on common security interests existing among the members of North America and Western Europe. Relations between these states are characterized by expectations of peaceful change where force, or the threat of force, has no part. Furthermore, these states recognise that cooperation will result in a greater level of security than could be achieved individually. Such a convergence of expectations conforms to international regime theory. Regimes are sets "of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." Stephen Krasner

conceptualises regimes as "intervening variables standing between basic causal factors," such as power or influence, "and outcomes and behaviour."¹⁴

Throughout the Cold War, NATO personified the transatlantic security regime. The articulation of security interdependence, shared democratic values and an expectation of common security pursued through alliance participation and coordination confirmed the regime archetype. Collaboration in the alliance was codified and legitimised by formalised arrangements and mechanisms to monitor and control potential crises and insure compliance.

The institutional character of the alliance (*decision-making procedures*), the articulation of the ideology of security interdependence (*principles*), a high degree of shared democratic values amongst the membership (*norms*), and shared expectations that security will be pursued through alliance participation (*rules*), together conform to the formal notion of a security regime.¹⁵

Each perspective of the ESDI debate corresponds to a particular approach to regimes. Atlanticists believe the security of the North Atlantic is indivisible and can only be assured as part of a transatlantic security regime with NATO at its core. In turn, the regime needs a hegemon, a state with pre-eminent power, to exercise leadership and provide the essential public good of security. Europeanism, on the other hand, represents a devolved model of the transatlantic regime. The need for transatlantic cooperation is accepted, but not through NATO and without a hegemon. The provision of the public good would be shared among the members and the EU would supply the influential power of the regime.¹⁶

¹⁴Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," *International Organization*, (36, 2, Spring 1982), p. 185

¹⁵Paul Buteux, *Regimes, Incipient Regimes and the Future of NATO Strategy*, Occasional Paper #6, (Winnipeg: Programme in Strategic Studies, University of Manitoba, 1989) pp. 9-10. (*Italics Mine*)

¹⁶The application of regime theory to the debate between Atlanticists and Europeanists is introduced by Paul Buteux, in *The Role of European Institutions in the 'Europeanization of European Defence: The Case of Armaments Collaboration*, Occasional Paper #10, (Winnipeg: Programme in Strategic Studies, University of Manitoba, 1990) pp. 2-7

In the case of NATO, the US plays the role of hegemon by providing a security guarantee to Western Europe. It is in the interest of the hegemon to provide the public good, but also to get beneficiaries to share the burden. Thus, like any hegemon, the US has always been concerned with the problem of burden-sharing.¹⁷ According to hegemonic stability theory, the decline of the hegemon will lead to the disintegration of the regime; hence Atlanticists are adamant that NATO, and the US, remains as the main interlocutor of European security.

Europeanism uses game-theory to dispute the need for a hegemon while taking a functional approach to regime formation. Both approaches posit that a hegemon is not necessary because the cost of defecting is greater than the cost of membership. The very existence of the regime facilitates communication, enhances the importance of reputation, and increases the opportunity costs of future interactions. The devolved security regime encourages cooperation and an equal distribution of the burden because there is a positive return on investment. In turn, cooperation in one issue area may arise as an unintended consequence of cooperation in another issue area. This notion of 'spillover' is central to functionalism, and suggests that the integration of the EU benefits from the close proximity of economic, social, and political cooperation.

However, Europeanism has a conflict between sovereignty and integration. Those that advocate the pre-eminence of sovereignty point to the anarchic structure of the international system. This structure imposes a competitive condition on the international system that forces states to preserve their security through sovereignty. While the European states may rely on one another in the economic sphere, the essence sovereignty is the maintenance of its security through its own defence structures.

¹⁷Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, (XLVIII, 3, August 1966)

Those that promote integration posit that the increasing role of institutions, and not states, will supply security for Europe and negate the notion of anarchy in the system. "The key to the process is the enlightened self-interest of governments and their ability to transfer the lessons of cooperation from one sector to another."¹⁸ The more interdependence there is in non-military issues, then the more integrated they will become. The end result will be negation of independent state sovereignty for the promotion of 'European sovereignty'.

In the end, ESDI cannot be removed from the overall process of change in transatlantic relations and European security. The numerous variables affecting the debate will dictate the level and degree of change in the transatlantic security regime. According to regime theory, Atlanticism would lead only to a change in the original regime while Europeanism would transform the regime into a completely new one. Hence, depending upon which of the two, or combination of the two, is chosen, the ultimate question is whether NATO will remain as the personification of the transatlantic security regime or if there will be a new personification and/or a new regime.

¹⁸Charles Pentland, "Integration, Interdependence, and Institutions: Approaches to International Order," in David Haglund and Michael Hawes, eds. World Politics: Power, Interdependence, and Dependence, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990). p. 180

Chapter One

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ESDI

The international system is anarchic, by definition, because no central authority enforces rules of behaviour. Interacting within the system, states are assumed to act in their own self-interest, constrained only by their interaction with other states and the distribution of capabilities between them.¹ Relations among states are often marked by recurring controversies, competition and attempts to influence the system.²

Despite the absence of authority states do cooperate, binding together in mutual courses of action and restricting their options by accepting rules of the international community. Stable relationships may be carefully structured in one issue area, such as trade relations or the law of the sea, while others are subject to dispute.³ That is not to say that such cooperation represents harmony; but it is an adjustment of behaviour to the preferences of others, as the history of ESDI demonstrates. Anarchy remains as a constant with cooperation acting as a variable.

INTERNATIONAL REGIME THEORY

To explain and prescribe cooperation within the ESDI framework, the thesis applies the concepts of international regime theory. Regimes represent coordinated patterns of behaviour by which states seek to manage their co-existence. They reflect actors' understanding of their situations, yet are also affected by factors beyond the

¹Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: Random House, 1979) p. 118

²Kenneth Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," in Kenneth Oye, (ed.) Cooperation Under Anarchy, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985) p. 1

³Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in Oye, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-254

knowledge or perception of those same actors. Hence, Krasner's definition has a psychological and normative emphasis:

Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.⁴

These elements act as 'intervening variables' between factors such as interests on one hand and actions on the other. In essence, regimes are an agreement, based on common principles, to regulate an issue-area. Norms explain why states collaborate; rules denote what the collaboration is all about; and procedures explain how the collaboration is to be administered.

Insofar as agreed procedures are in place, individual decision-making is both constrained and predictable. It is constrained insofar as norms and rules are reflected in the collective procedures, and it is predictable insofar as governments are committed to known rules and procedures...⁵

Regimes should be considered on a privileged level: having the advantage of being functional and/or sector specific while allowing for regional limitations. For example, regimes are not limited to the security arena, but can be applied to say economic relations. They could be formalized and multifunctional, like the UN, or they could have specific rules like the Berlin regime. Also, a regime might have both formal and informal attributes, such as the CSCE.⁶

Stephen Haggard and Beth Simmons make three distinctions of regime theory.⁷ First, regimes are examples of cooperative behaviour but cooperation can take place in

⁴Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," *International Organization*, (36, 2, Spring 1982). p. 185

⁵Janice Gross Stein, "Detection and Defection: Security Regimes and the Management of International Conflict," *International Journal*, (XL Autumn 1985) p. 604

⁶Morten Kelstrup, "The Process of Europeanization: On the Theoretical Interpretation of Present Changes in the European Regional Political System," *Cooperation and Conflict*, (XXV, 1990) p. 32

⁷Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," *International Organization*, (41, 3, Summer 1987) pp. 495-496

the absence of established regimes. All cooperation in the international system does not automatically denote the existence of a regime. Second, regimes are distinct from institutions. Robert Keohane defines institutions as "connected sets of rules that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations,"⁸ governed by external events such as societal traditions. Regimes, on the other hand, outline implicit injunctions that endorse state actions and contain rules that explain change. Regimes do not shape but form around already established expectations. Yet, regimes are not actors. They simply establish the parameters of action; "regimes are inert, the embodiment of aspirations for cooperation."⁹ Thus, states do not interact with regimes, as they do with institutions, rather they act within the context established by the regime.

Finally, a distinction must be made between regimes and order. Regimes may facilitate order but are not bound by it. In fact, regimes may unintentionally contribute to disorder. According to Kenneth Waltz, the international system is determined by three factors: the ordering principle, the number and characteristics of the units involved, and the distribution of capabilities among those units.¹⁰ Regime theory, however, adds values that influence state actions.¹¹ Cooperation need not be the only pattern; a regime can exist if a mixture of confrontation and cooperation marks interactions. The benefits of regimes are their ability to increase predictability and apply guidelines to a variety of

⁸Robert Keohane, "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics," in Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) pp. 2-4

⁹James Rosenau, "Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-Driven Actors in World Politics," International Organization, (40, 4, Autumn 1986) p. 881

¹⁰Waltz, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-99

¹¹Oran Young, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," World Politics, (32:3, April 1980) pp. 108-109. Regimes are sometimes placed under the category of modified structuralism. Structural realism, as attributed to Waltz, refers to restrictions placed on policy options or actions caused by the structure of a particular international system determined by the three basic factors of ordering, functions and capabilities. Contrary to structural realism, modified structuralism implies that the international system may not reflect its actual structure because of the role of intersubjective values.

relationships; reduce transaction costs; create conditions for negotiations; legitimise state actions; facilitate issue linkage within and between regimes; improve the quality of information; and reduce the incentives to cheat by enhancing the value of reputation.¹²

There are five factors that postulate the existence of an international regime. First, regimes are issue-area oriented because they have analytical parameters.¹³ Second, regimes are consistent with the notion of an 'international society' where the grouping of states is separate from the general system.¹⁴ Third, regimes are formed only when all states see their creation to be of assistance in the realisation of their individual objectives.¹⁵ Fourth, there must be interdependence among the states such that the realisation of their own objectives is inextricably linked to the cooperative enterprise. Finally, regimes facilitate cooperation through 'reciprocity' and "continuing satisfactory results for the group of which one is a part."¹⁶ Not all states receive equal returns on their investment but regimes establish an experiences that offers relevant information.

SECURITY REGIMES

Security is about the ability of states to maintain the independence of their identity. A state's security goals are based on history, culture, geography, and

¹²Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) pp. 244-45

¹³ Issue-areas are "sets of issues that are in fact dealt with in common negotiations and by the same, or closely coordinated, bureaucracies, as opposed to issues that are dealt with separately." *ibid.*, p. 61

¹⁴ In other words, these states see themselves as exemplifying a cognitive homogeneity, usually derived from common experiences. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977) pp. 8-16

¹⁵This realization does not have to be based solely on rational choice but can also be explained by what Robert Keohane calls "constraint choice" analysis. In this sense, a regime is a type of international contract designed to "establish stable, mutual expectations about others' patterns of behaviour and to develop working relationships that will allow the parties to adapt their practices to new situations." Robert Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," International Organization, (36, 2, Spring 1982)

¹⁶Robert Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," International Organization, (Winter 1986) p. 20

perceptions of its role in international relations.¹⁷ One can distinguish two types of threats to a state's security: external threats from other states; or internal threats vis a vis a state's domestic political system.

... any lasting improvement in international relations presupposes full respect for the principles of the independence and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in their domestic affairs, the rights of each people to shape its own future, and the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force.¹⁸

The ESDI debate relates to the classic notion of the protection of sovereign states through military and diplomatic means. Within the transatlantic security regime these means require a consistent and unitary approach to strategy; a consideration for all interests during negotiations; and the maintenance of communication in decision-making. While the North Atlantic Treaty makes reference to other aspects of security, NATO's *raison d'être* has been to safeguard "the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples" by uniting "efforts for collective defense."¹⁹

Robert Jervis defines security regimes as "principles, rules, and norms that permit states to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate."²⁰ Security regimes create an environment conducive to a long-term appreciation of a states' interest in survival and is formed around the expectation that the actions of other states will be brought into conformity with one another through a process of policy coordination.

¹⁷Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elsbjerta Tromer, and Ole Waever, *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era*, (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990) p. 3. This includes military security; political security (the stability of states and systems of government); economic security (access to resources and finances); societal security (language, culture, religion, national identity and custom); and environmental security (maintaining the local and planetary biosphere).

¹⁸Paragraph 4, *Final Communiqué* issued after the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Washington, D.C., April 10, 1969., from *Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1954-1977*, General Affairs Committee, 23rd Ordinary Session, Western EU Assembly, Paris, 1978.

¹⁹North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty*, August 24, 1949. In fact, of the Treaty's fourteen articles, five deal specifically with collective defence and only one with other aspects of security, (the remaining eight are administrative).

²⁰Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization*, (36,2, Spring 1982) p. 357

The principles of a security regime incorporate both common interests and common aversions; members of a security regime desire to preserve their values, as well as see them furthered. In turn, the norms constitute order, stability, predictability and reassurance to offset insecure relations. If states share common values they likely will not pursue policies that challenge or undermine another state's values, for to do so would threaten their own security.²¹ Instead, states attempt to have their interpretation of those values adopted by the group.

According to Jervis, the obstacles to establish a security regime are especially great due to the security dilemma.²² Measuring security and knowing what others are doing is difficult and decision-makers tend to react unilaterally rather than seek cooperative solutions. Because the stakes are greater, predictability and trust are harder to establish; threats to a state's security are often imprecise making it difficult to gauge regime benefits. In addition, the distinction between offensive and defensive motives can be blurred so that actions by one state will automatically impinge on the other actors whether the threat is real or not.²³

While the argument above is compelling, some argue the analysis is overly pessimistic.²⁴ Janice Stein admits that there is greater competitiveness in security issues but that the difference may be exaggerated. Short of war, Stein postulates that there are ranges of scenarios in which actions by one state to improve its security may simultaneously improve the security of others. She argues that the potential of the

²¹Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," International Security, (Spring 1985) p. 20

²²In an anarchic international system, one state may sincerely increase its level of defence spending only for defensive purposes and self-preservation, but it is rational for other states to assume aggressive intentions on the part of that state. Therefore, these other states also increase their level of arms spending, leading the original state to feel insecure and contemplate a further increase in military spending. Hence, by initially trying to enhance its own security, the first state sets in motion a process that results in its feeling less secure.

²³Jervis, *op. cit.*, p. 359

²⁴Janice Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 611

regime concept has been underestimated, failing "to capture the nuances and subtleties of the benefits conferred by informal security regimes." Indeed, decision-makers look to cooperative behaviour to better judge the actions of others and because the risks are higher in security issues the incentives for cooperation may be that much greater.²⁵

What, then, are the conditions necessary for the formation of a security regime? First, it must be in the interest of the current great powers to form a security regime; more specifically, "they must prefer a more regulated environment to one in which all states behave individualistically."²⁶ Second, the actors must believe that others share the value of mutual security and cooperation; all states must believe that security is not provided for by expansion. Finally, there must be an ability to disaggregate an issue, such that, a complete security problem is divided into its component parts and dealt with separately in a cooperative manner.

Those factors which act as obstacles include the security dilemma; ideological differences, such as Marxist-Leninism versus liberal-democracy; asymmetries between states, such as different geographical locations and historical experiences; the existence of uncertainty, whether or not the adversary is violating an agreement; and domestic and alliance constraints, such as public opinion or responsibilities to uphold the trust of alliance partners.²⁷

Security regimes are easier to construct when states are egoists rather than competitors. Egoists try to maximize their utilities and "pay attention to the interests of others only insofar as the behaviour of others affects their own utilities."²⁸ Competitors,

²⁵This assertion was substantiated by the incipient East-West security regime. The 'hot-line' between the US and the Soviet Union after the Cuban missile crisis is a prime example of two enemies setting up a collaborative mechanism to facilitate better communication and hence lessen the chances of inadvertent annihilation.

²⁶Janice Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 630

²⁷Alexander George, "Factors Influencing Security Cooperation," in George, Farley, and Dallin (eds.) U.S. - Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988)

²⁸Janice Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 607

on the other hand, seek to maximize their utilities relative to others. For competitors, the absolute size is unimportant in comparison to the relative difference in wealth, status, or security between a groups of states. When states compete, conflict becomes a zero-sum game, whereby the possibility of mutual benefits evaporates and cooperation is short term or non-existent.²⁹

However, even when states are egoists, a key for sustaining the regime is reciprocity. Reciprocity requires states to support others without knowing when or from whom they will be repaid. It is expected that the other members of the regime will not take advantage of those with temporary problems, and vice-versa. In a purely competitive environment, reciprocity requires even, direct and immediate paybacks, limiting the chance for cooperation.

One might have the impression that a security regime is synonymous with an alliance. That impression, however, neglects a key difference between the two. To explain:

An alliance is a formal agreement that pledges states to cooperate in using their military resources against a specific state or states and usually obligates one or more of the signatories to use force, or to consider ... the use of force in specified circumstances.³⁰

Alliances only recognise common aversions, notably external threats, whereas security regimes, not only address common aversions, but also common interests. In essence,

²⁹This is not to say that the pursuit of egoistic self-interest is conducive to constructing security regimes. It is to say that there are at least two situations in which procedures to manage security relations will become rational for egoists: if individual choice leads to mutually undesirable outcomes or consequences less optimal than those achieved through coordination. As referred to above, these two situations can be classified as common aversions and common interests. Egoists can resolve the outcomes scenario through informal coordination but must actively coordinate to resolve the consequences scenario.

³⁰Robert Osgood, "The Nature of Alliances," in Robert Pfaltzgraff, (ed.) Politics and the International System, (New York: Lippincott, 1972) pp. 481-82. According to Osgood, an alliance is "a latent war community, based on general cooperation that goes beyond formal provisions and that the signatories must continually estimate in order to preserve mutual confidence in each other's fidelity to specified obligations." Robert Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968). p. 19. Although a sense of community may reinforce alliances, it rarely is a cause for their existence. A decision to join an alliance is based upon rewards outweighing cost for a particular objective. George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962). pp. 12, 61 and 175.

security regimes accept the simultaneous duality of external and internal threats, while at the same time, promote interests that are common to all regime members.

To demonstrate, consider NATO. For all intents and purposes, the 'Alliance' is just that: an alliance to confront the military threat of the Soviet Union. However, NATO is closer to the concept of a security regime because it is also based on common interests.

Common cultural traditions, free institutions and democratic concepts, ... bring the NATO nations closer together, ... There was, in short, a sense of Atlantic Community, alongside the realisation of an immediate common danger.³¹

The articulation of security interdependence, shared democratic values and an expectation that security will be pursued through alliance participation resembles a security regime.

The key feature of the NATO regime is the reflection of a pluralistic security community such that any defection by any one member does not increase the security vulnerability to other members.³² For a political community to assess its security needs it must appraise its core values in relation to the identification of threats. These values give rise to a framework for change without calling into question the identity of the political community itself.

THE ESDI SECURITY REGIME

Haggard and Simmons group regimes into four theoretical approaches: structural, strategic, functional, and cognitive.³³ The significance of these approaches to ESDI lies in their interpretations of regime continuity and proscriptions of change.

³¹Paragraph 12, Chapter One of the "Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO," Appendix 6, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Facts and Figures, (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1984) p. 271

³²Alliances facilitate policy goals by "introducing into the situation a specific commitment to pursue them." Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). p. 55.

³³Haggard and Simmons, *op. cit.*, pp. 498 - 513

Change, according to regime theory, is related to changes in expectations, principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. When changes in expectations occur, there will be associated changes in principles and norms, leading to the transformation of one regime into another or the dissolution of the original regime altogether. Changes in rules and decision-making procedures, on the other hand, only lead to changes within the original regime.

Hegemonic stability represents the structuralist approach. It postulates that a single powerful actor must establish and maintain a regime that, in turn, is based on the structure of power that is determined by the hegemon.³⁴ Two characteristics are required to be a hegemon: first, the willingness to lead and accept a disproportionate share of the burden of providing the collective goods of the regime; and second, the willingness of other states to follow. In order for a hegemon to preserve stability, its leadership must be accepted as legitimate.

In the context of ESDI, NATO resembles a hegemonic security regime. Following WWII, it was recognised that the international balance had to be maintained by the US outside UN auspices. The capabilities of the partners confirmed the alliance as an extension of US protection and not a mutual security pact familiar with more traditional alliances. Thus, the purpose of NATO was the delineation of a Pax Americana rather than a mutual commitment for a specific contingency within the well-understood rules of the balance of power.³⁵

Thus, the transatlantic security regime became a reflection of US hegemony. With its overwhelming military strength and economic influence, it was both willing to lead, and was accepted as legitimate to lead by the other partners, in providing the

³⁴Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp. 71-72

³⁵Friedrich Kratochwil, "The Challenge of Security in a Changing World," *Journal of International Affairs*, (Summer/Fall 1989), p. 124. In the same vein, Kratochwil warns that despite professions of an 'Atlantic community', the US never guaranteed security for some of the most important European policy concerns. "The geographically narrow definition of NATO's casus belli contrasts sharply with the idea of a community that sees eye to eye on all issues concerning the state of the world." p. 125.

collective good of a western security guarantee. If, as some authors have ruminated, the US has been a declining hegemon in the last decade, then the transatlantic security regime will be modified or abandoned all together. Fears that such changes will permanently damage the operation of the regime drive Atlanticists to maintain NATO in its present form. But it will be difficult for Atlanticists to maintain the US as its hegemon since the US will not be able to preserve its existing position.

It simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the others, because that would imply a freezing of the differentiated pattern of growth rates, technological advance, and military developments that has existed since time immemorial.³⁶

According to hegemonic stability theory collective goods are supplied by the willingness of the hegemon to assume a disproportionate share of the costs.³⁷ There are two views on the mechanics of how the hegemon provides such goods. The malign view posits a coercive leadership role by the hegemon, such that the rules of the regime are enforced through positive and negative sanctions. Because of its dominant status, the hegemon persuades other states to provide a share of the collective good. The hegemon "resolves the problem of provision by imposing itself as a centralised authority able to extract the equivalent of taxes."³⁸

The benign view suggests the benefits to the hegemon of a well-ordered system outweigh the costs of supplying the collective good. In this case, the hegemon is willing to take on the full burden, while other states have an incentive to 'free-ride'. However,

³⁶For an examination of US hegemonic decline see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000, (London: Fontana Press, 1988) p. 689.

³⁷Such a good "is one the consumption of which by an individual, household, or firm does not reduce the amount available for other potential consumers." Charles Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides," International Studies Quarterly, (25, 1981) p. 243. A sidewalk is an excellent example of a collective good. However, because an individual can 'consume' the good without paying for it directly, collective goods tend to be under-provided unless some actor assumes a disproportionate share of the costs or some agency can force consumers to pay.

³⁸Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," International Organization, (39, 4, Autumn, 1985); and Mancur Olson, "A Theory of the Incentives Facing Political Organizations," International Political Science Review, (April 1986) pp. 587-88

although each state is gaining from being a member there may be instances in which if it cheated or defected its relative gain would increase.³⁹ In this case, the hegemon can use its political influence to persuade states not to defect and its dominance to punish those that do.

Of the collective goods supplied by the US, the primary one is the security guarantee. Almost as important, though, has been the secondary good of leadership "expressed through the taking of initiatives with respect to alliance policy, the attempt to build alliance consensus through the practice of consultation, and the factoring of allied interests into American relations with the Soviet Union."⁴⁰ It has been in the US interest to supply these goods even though its partners gained a free ride; yet, it has also been in the US interest to get the beneficiaries to share the burden, hence the persistent argument over burden sharing in the alliance.⁴¹

According to the theory of collective action, a hegemon should be less willing to bear a disproportionate share of the burden if its preponderant position erodes.⁴² The relative economic decline of the US did result in a shift of its defence burden to other members of NATO; but the adjustment has been modest. The reason is NATO's position as a uniquely privileged group where one member is still significantly larger than the others.⁴³ As long as the alliance is uniquely privileged, the US will continue to bear a disproportionate burden.

³⁹John Conybeare, "Public Goods, Prisoner's Dilemmas and the International Political Economy," International Studies Quarterly, (Vol. 28, No. 3) p. 10

⁴⁰Paul Buteux, Regimes, Incipient Regimes and the Future of NATO Strategy, Occasional Paper #6, (Winnipeg: Programme in Strategic Studies, University of Manitoba, 1989), p. 19

⁴¹In an analysis of burden-sharing in NATO, and the subsequent role of the US hegemon, John Oneal postulates that there has been an increase in cooperation within the alliance and a modest decrease in the 'exploitation' of the US over the period 1950-84. John Oneal, "The Theory of Collective Action and Burden-Sharing in NATO," International Organization, (44, 3, Summer 1990).

⁴²Snidal, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-89.

⁴³Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) pp. 28-30 and 49-50. In 1984, after decades of supposed economic decline, the GDP of the US was still 4.5 times larger

Hegemony is based on legitimacy. Other states accept the rule of the hegemon because of its status in the international system.⁴⁴ A considerable degree of consensus is required if the hegemon is to have the support of other powerful states. If these states begin to regard the actions of the hegemon as contrary to their own interests then the hegemonic system, and the regimes it has established, will be greatly weakened.⁴⁵

The hegemon cannot force other states to comply but must elicit their deference. Some authors have related such deference to Gramsci's concept of ideological hegemony: "a unity between objective material forces and ethico-political ideas in which power based on dominance over production is rationalized through an ideology incorporating compromise or consensus between dominant and subordinate groups."⁴⁶ According to Gramsci, hegemony refers to order in which a common social, moral language is spoken; and a single concept of reality is dominant. In applying Gramsci's framework, the coercive use of power becomes less necessary and less obvious as consensus builds on the basis of shared values, ideas and material interests. These ideas and institutions come to be seen as legitimate. In this way a hegemonic structure of thought and action emerges and helps us understand why the hegemon's partners are willing to defer to its leadership.⁴⁷

than West Germany, the second largest ally. It is not surprising that the US devoted an average of 8.6% of its GDP to the military from 1950-84, while the defence burden of the other allies averaged 4.7%.

⁴⁴Norman Frohlich, Joe Oppenheimer and Oran Young, Political Leadership and Collective Goods, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971)

⁴⁵Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) p. 73

⁴⁶Robert Cox, "Labour and Hegemony," International Organization, (Vol. 31, # 3, Summer 1977) p. 387. Gramsci distinguishes among three levels of hegemony: integral, declining and minimal. Integral describes a regime characterized by a well-defined sense of common purpose and lack of antagonism amongst the partners. Declining hegemony refers to a regime in which contradictions between the interests of the partners have become acute, such that disintegrative tendencies become pronounced. Finally, minimal hegemony refers to a regime in which the leaders do not wish to lead, but dominate. Joseph Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) p. 24 and 47.

⁴⁷Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and Policies, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988) p.78.

The main criticism of hegemonic stability theory is this necessity of a hegemon for the maintenance of the regime. Robert Keohane and Duncan Snidal criticise this categorical approach to change and dispute the imminent danger to established regimes. They point out that nothing in the theory of collective goods suggests that a single hegemon is required.⁴⁸ According to Keohane, once a regime is in place, it may remain stable if the hegemon accepts revisions to the rules. According to Snidal, hegemonic stability contains the 'hidden' assumption that collective action is impossible, "for if collective action is possible then states might cooperate to provide public goods in the absence of hegemonic power." Because collective action does take place, especially in nonsecurity issue areas, Snidal contends, "we need to amend the assumption that collective action is impossible and incorporate it into a fuller specification of the circumstances under which international cooperation can be preserved even as a hegemonic power declines."⁴⁹

It naturally follows that the decline in the hegemon's relative capabilities will lead to a waning of the regime. The costs of defending the system rise while the hegemon grows frustrated with its partners gaining more from the system than it is. In turn, competitive powers challenge the hegemon's leadership in the regime. As the regime grows, the burdens to maintain its stability disproportionately drain the resources from the hegemon. The larger the gap between the hegemon and the other members, and the faster the hegemon will decline.⁵⁰

⁴⁸Snidal, *op. cit.*, and Keohane, *After Hegemony*. The notion of collective goods has two characteristics significant to regimes and hegemons: jointness of supply and nonexcludability. Jointness of supply is the simultaneous provision of a collective good to all members. If a collective good is produced all actors can consume it whether they have contributed or not. In turn, nonexclusion is the inability to prevent other states from benefiting from the good.

⁴⁹Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp. 593 and 595

⁵⁰Jacek Kugler and A. F. K. Organski, "The End of Hegemony?," *International Interactions*, (Vol. 15, No. 2, 1989) p. 115

However, hegemonic stability theory is not deterministic but cautionary; it does not say the system will break down just that the "tendency toward breakdown or fragmentation of the system greatly increases with the relative decline of the hegemon."⁵¹ Obviously, continued cooperation is not precluded following the period of hegemony, provided that the interests of the current great powers are congruent.⁵² According to Kindleberger, states might "take on the task of providing leadership together, thus adding to legitimacy, sharing the burdens, and reducing the danger that leadership is regarded cynically as a cloak for domination and exploitation."⁵³ What the theory does say is that this scenario is unlikely and that the preservation of the regime will be much more difficult.

The possibility of a new cooperative agreement within the current regime is based on two pressures of contention inherent in the Alliance. The most intractable of these was the problem of extended deterrence that depends ultimately on US willingness to put its own population at risk. The crux of the problem is the level of influence in nuclear decision-making versus exposure to its consequences.⁵⁴ While the end of the Cold War has reduced the immediacy of the problem, it has increased the number of players and the potential for smaller, regional conflicts to spread to larger, international conflicts.

A second permanent condition is the US concern with burden sharing. According to Ian Gambles, there are two US intentions. The obvious one is to alleviate the 'free-riding' problem by getting the Europeans to pay for more of their own defence. This is

⁵¹Robert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment, (New York: Basic Books, 1975) p. 73

⁵²John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," International Organization, (36, Spring 1982) p. 384

⁵³Kindleberger, *op. cit.*, p. 252

⁵⁴Ian Gambles, Prospects for West European Security Cooperation, Adelphi Papers #244, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1991/1992 pp. 7-8

reinforced by US budgetary difficulties, trade disputes with the EU, and European opposition to US security policy. The less obvious intention, led by the US defence establishment, is to threaten troop withdrawals in order to strengthen the hand of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander (an American) and to raise the nuclear threshold.⁵⁵ The Europeans have responded by making discreet preparations for the withdrawal of US troops demonstrated by the revival of the WEU and Franco-German defence cooperation, notably the establishment of the Eurocorps. These organizations could form the nucleus of a European pillar or an independent defence identity.

So what are the chances of other cooperative agreements in light of the changes in European security and the development of the EU? According to Lipson:

They are possible, at least, if adversaries are confident about their monitoring and their ability to withstand a surprise defection. Similarly, agreements are more likely if both sides have a significant margin of security, a "surplus" allowing each to proffer cooperation with some protection in case the agreement fails. Finally, if defensive forces are considered pre-eminent, the risks of any breakdown are surely lessened and the opportunities for agreement significantly broadened.⁵⁶

In keeping with the criticism of hegemonic stability, the strategic approach to regimes, exemplified by game theory, explains how co-operation can evolve without a hegemon. This explanation is vital to the arguments of Europeanists to show that hegemonic stability is not the only approach to providing European security and defence. Game theory analyses the interaction between actors by exploring the realm of power, bargaining, co-operation and trust. Game theory tries to understand existing arrangements and what the alternatives might be.

According to game theory, the costs of a bad reputation, rather than the overarching influence of a hegemon, is a more viable reason for states to honour their

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 10-11

⁵⁶ C. Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," *World Politics*, (October 1984), p. 16

regime commitments.⁵⁷ A violator may find it harder to enter into any new agreements while its membership in other regimes is under scrutiny. Therefore, it may be in the interest of the state not to violate the principles, norms or rules of a regime to protect its interests in other regimes.

The most appropriate game theory model for regimes is that of the Prisoner's Dilemma in which states bargain to achieve objectives. In situations resembling a Prisoner's Dilemma an inhospitable political environment, and the absence of certain institutions, restrict communication and encourage self-interest.⁵⁸ Given the greater risks involved in security issues, and the greater competition between states, the application of the Prisoner's Dilemma is more apparent. But even in international security the dilemma can produce co-operative behaviour. Advocates of Prisoner's Dilemma refute the assumption that the typical actor will violate the provisions of a regime as long as the probability of being caught is low; an assumption that implies the need for effective enforcement procedures to achieve compliance. According to Young, there are circumstances in which self-interest will lead to compliance, "especially in conjunction with long-run perspectives on iterative behaviour."⁵⁹

International relations is more like a multiple-play Prisoner's Dilemma. If play is repeated, "the costs of defecting on any single move must be calculated not only with reference to the immediate payoff, but with reference to the opportunity costs

⁵⁷Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 105

⁵⁸Gilpin, *Political Economy of International Relations*, p. 87. The Prisoner's Dilemma involves two players. Each is assumed to be a self maximizer. Each can move only once per game, and each faces a simple choice: to cooperate or to defect. Under these conditions, each player can maximize his own reward by defecting, regardless of what the other does. However, if both defect, they receive a smaller reward than if they had cooperated. The inevitable result is that both attempt to maximize and no player has any incentive to cooperate.

⁵⁹Young, *op.cit.*, p. 339. Actors will often develop general compliance policies in conjunction with the expectation of a long term socialization. From the point of view of regime members, the actual development of compliance mechanisms requires significant investment while the return on that investment will almost always decline before perfect compliance is reached. Accordingly, it is safe to assume that the members of a regime will rarely attempt to develop compliance mechanisms capable of eliminating violations altogether.

associated with future interactions."⁶⁰ Such repetition suggests that stable co-operation can occur, even in the area of international security. The requirements include perceptions of interdependence; time to monitor and react to each other's decisions; a strong interest in long term relationships; and moderate differences between the payoffs for co-operation and defection.⁶¹ However, as far as insuring compliance, this measure of action-reaction is weak, because states decide whether or not to break the rules based on the benefits to themselves and not the total costs to others.

Objections to Prisoner's Dilemma question the oversimplification of actors' goals; the elements of strategic interactions; the failure to capture more interactions such as bargaining; and the inability to recognise several analytically distinct games being played simultaneously. Yet, as Charles Lipson suggests, despite the objections, gaming models can still be used to explore the pattern of structural constraints on players' choices; the inducements and punishments those choices represent; the role of variables in modifying the interactions of players; and the relationship between individual choices and the outcome for the whole group.⁶²

While Europeanism uses game theory to dispute the necessity for hegemonic stability it uses functional theories to demonstrate how regimes are constructed in the absence of a hegemon.⁶³ Functionalism is based on the belief that national loyalties can be diffused and redirected into a co-operative framework because of the growing complexity of governmental systems that has increased the importance of non-political, technical tasks.⁶⁴ According to functionalism, moving from a technical to a political

⁶⁰Haggard and Simmons, *op. cit.*, p. 505

⁶¹Lipson, *op. cit.*, p. 7

⁶²*ibid.*, p. 11

⁶³In fact, Keohane turns the relationship of hegemony and regimes on its head. "If hegemony can substitute for the operation of international regimes, it follows that a decline in hegemony may increase the demand for international regimes." Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp. 180-181

⁶⁴David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966)

framework limits the potential for conflict.⁶⁵ Thus, functionalism emphasises a restrictive role for political actors such that various pressures, especially interest groups and bureaucratic actors, influence decision-makers.

Central to functionalism is the notion of 'spillover', where collaboration in one technical field leads to collaboration in other technical fields. For spillover to occur the existing and proposed regimes must have a degree of interdependence. Functionalism questions "the assumption that the state is irreducible and that the interests of governments prevail, and proceeds to the active consideration of schemes for co-operation."⁶⁶

The functionalist model for such schemes of co-operation is integration. Functionalists equate integration with the co-ordination of agencies to which states transfer selected powers. As this network of institutions develops, the overbearing shadow of anarchy is eroded, revealing an "interest-based form of international governance."⁶⁷ According to Ernst Haas, these agencies "demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states,"⁶⁸ leading to the establishment of legitimate political structures through shared values and the emergence of new structures that may overlay, but not necessarily replace, existing structures. To take it to its ultimate conclusion, integration is identified with the "abolition of the sovereign power of modern nation-states,"⁶⁹ such that nations:

⁶⁵Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, 2nd. ed., (New York: Harper and Row, 1980) pp. 418-419

⁶⁶AJR Groom and Paul Taylor, "Functionalism and International Relations," in Groom and Taylor, (eds) Theory and Practice in International Relations, (New York: Crane Russak, 1975) p. 2

⁶⁷Charles Pentland, "Integration, Interdependence and Institutions: Approaches to International Order," in David Haglund and Michael Hawes, World Politics: Power, Interdependence, and Dependence, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990) p. 180

⁶⁸Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958) p. 16

⁶⁹Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, (London: Faber and Faber, 1973) p. 29

forego the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs: and the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new centre.⁷⁰

Examining European integration in the 1960s, Ernst Haas concluded that 'functional spillover' did occur in the Common Market's progress in achieving a external tariffs, uniform rules of competition, a free market for foreign labour, and a common agriculture policy and have "come close to voiding the power of the national state in all realms other than defence, education and foreign policy."⁷¹ However, Haas concluded that integration based upon such pragmatism, is temporary because it is not reinforced by an ideological commitment.

The functional logic which leads from national frustration to economic unity, and eventually to political unification, presupposes that national consciousness is weak ... but in Europe it (unity) had not gone far enough before the national situation improved once more, before self-confidence rose, thus making the political healing power of unions once more questionable.⁷²

The pattern of political spillover, on the other hand, is not as clear. Stanley Hoffman argued that there has been a failure of 'spill-over' in Europe because of the diversity of the member states and the overarching bipolar international system.⁷³ While the Benelux countries were willing to secede their defence leadership to the US, France attempted to push a multipolar international system allowing European integration to build an entity that would emancipate Europe from the US. Thus, no clear functional line can be drawn between the success of the EU and the creation of an independent European defence identity.

⁷⁰Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963) p. 6

⁷¹Ernst Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America," Journal of Common Market Studies, (V, June 1967) p. 324

⁷²*ibid.*, p. 331

⁷³Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968) pp. 400-401

Some distinctions should also be made between formal and informal integration and between political and socio-economic integration.⁷⁴ Formal integration embodies endeavours by policy-makers to institutionalise common policies, whereas, informal integration flows from the intense association of component parts without interference from policy-makers. Formal is a proactive, deliberate process of integration with specific aims; whereas informal is more responsive to changes in the economic and social environment.

Political integration denotes a community of shared values that fosters an identity among the members. Socio-economic integration, on the other hand, is the interaction between different groups that retain their own sense of identity. This interaction is based on transactions flowing from an interdependent economy. Political integration depends on socio-economic integration but "there is no simple or inexorable transition from contact through trade to the emergence of a political community."⁷⁵

Joseph Nye has refined a 'neo-functional' theory of integration, which combines a federalist purpose with a functional strategy. Neo-functionalism is based upon several 'process mechanisms' including the linkage and capacity to handle tasks; coalition formation based on political or ideological projections; the socialisation of elites towards the notion of integration; the formation of regional groups with the involvement of external actors; and the growth of an ideological-incentive appeal in support of

⁷⁴William Wallace, The Transformation of Western Europe, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990) p. 54

⁷⁵*ibid.*, p. 55. Applying the notion of 'spillover' to integration, Haas and Philippe Schmitter establish three variables which intervene between economic union and the possibility of a political union: background variables include member's sizes, the extent of social pluralism, complementarity of elites, and transaction rates among members; variables at the time of economic union such as delegated powers and the level of shared governmental purposes; and process variables, including decision-making style, transaction rates after integration, and the ability of governments to adapt to crisis. According to Haas and Schmitter the higher the scores of each variable, the more likely it is that economic union will spillover into political union. Ernst Haas and Philippe Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America," International Organization, (XVIII, Autumn 1964).

integration.⁷⁶ Nye has also delineated a number of conditions that influence the evolution of an integrative process. These include: the equality of the units; the complementarity of values; the existence of pluralism; and the capacity to adapt.

As the core of neofunctionalist theory, spillover is differentiated between functional and political. Functional spillover relates to technical pressures for further integration, whereas political spillover involves political pressures.⁷⁷ Neofunctionalism differs from its parent by embracing the political as part of its strategy. In this sense, spillover "is not taken to be automatic and technically driven, but is contrived and negotiated by political actors seeking to maximise advantage."⁷⁸ As integration develops it increasingly impinges on sectors at the core of national sovereignty, hence becoming more politicised.

Yet, neofunctionalism has little regard for the underlying power structure on which regimes are based. Keohane does admit that "relationships of power and dependence will ... be important determinants of international regimes," and that "actors choices will be constrained in such a way that the preference of the most powerful actors will be accorded the greatest weight."⁷⁹ Such a statement, however, does not address the issue

⁷⁶Joseph Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971) pp. 56-93. Although linkages may promote integration, they may have a negative effect if, for example, the political fortunes of a group supporting integration declines. The extent to which integration can be broadened is a function of the level of public support the coalition enjoys.

⁷⁷ The idea runs that "once one area of the economy was integrated, the interest groups operating in that sector would have to exert pressure at the regional level on the organization charged with running their sector." Because the main barrier to the benefits of integration in one sector would be the lack of integration in other sectors, these groups would advocate further integration. Stephen George, *Politics and Policy in the European Community*, 2nd. Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) p. 23

⁷⁸Pentland, "Integration, Interdependence, and Institutions," p. 182

⁷⁹Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp. 71-72. Keohane implies that regimes can become self-sustaining after the decline of the hegemon because of the convergence of interests among states, but he fails to explore the dynamics which foster this convergence. As the hegemon tires of supporting the system it increasingly detaches itself from its duties, becoming less benign and more predatory. Out of this discord cooperation arises in an attempt to maintain the system because, as Gramsci postulated, an ideological hegemony had been established. Even though this cooperation continues it is based on a less secure system.

that functional regimes "are only too easily upset when either the balance of bargaining power or the perception of national interest (or both) change among those states which negotiate them."⁸⁰

Research on integration has also been criticised for its lack of an appropriate theoretical framework and reliance on factor analysis in the development of inductive theory. In the absence of such a framework, empirical examinations lack the predictive ability to take into account the affect of intervening variables. In other words, there is little agreement about what catalysts initiate and sustain integration and, therefore, there is no model in which rules of transformation are established.

The central problem for functionalism is the underlying strength of the state. Functionalists are unable to demonstrate how governments will be persuaded to capitulate to international institutions. Integration is conceived as a process that progressively erodes the authority of the state, but to initiate the process central institutions are required to represent the interests of the member states. Hence, "there is a degree of circularity here, in which the consent of national governments is required to establish institutions which will then operate ... to undermine the authority of those same governments."⁸¹ Functional theories are not causal; they are better at specifying when a regime will be in demand and not how it will be created.

In the end, tensions have been a permanent feature of the alliance and NATO's ability to adjust has been a disincentive for the development of an independent European identity. To define a European value system different from the US would require promotion of minute differences at the expense of similarities in the fundamental philosophical beliefs of democracy, individual liberty and a market economy.

The pressures for change also do not address the underlying logic of common security interests. NATO has been associated with a predominant and manifest threat

⁸⁰Strange, *op.cit.*, p. 487

⁸¹Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 62

affecting the unity of NATO and any other existing or potential security pact. The decline of that threat has encouraged a re-nationalisation of all member states' security policy.

Over the past twenty years the American ideological hegemony has given way to a more European orientation. Western Europe has developed multiple loyalties with affiliation to the nation-state supplemented by 'European' values.⁸² This affiliation has not, however, led to an exclusive association with the EU, yet the claim of a community of shared values, culture and expectations has become an important factor in European politics since the beginning of the eighties. However, it is by no means clear that European sentiment has grown to the necessary extent to define an open-ended common European security interest against any external threat, or to subordinate national security interests to common European ones.

⁸²The pressures for European integration have been generated within European society as a result of indigenous political, economic and social factors and external factors. For example, all members have recognized that they are unable to individually deal with many of the problems they now face. In addition, powerful pressures, such as the need for a large and secure European economic market, have impelled them to cooperate. Those same interests have generated pressures for the development of common European policies to defend and promote European interests in an increasingly interdependent international community. Roy Pryce and Wolfgang Wessels, "The Search for an Ever Closer Union: A Framework for Analysis," in Roy Pryce, (ed.), *The Dynamics of EU*, (New York: Croom Helm, 1987) p. 5.

Chapter Two

DEFENCE DEPENDENCE: THE FIRST COLD WAR

The ESDI debate is not a product of recent changes in European security. Although the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union gave increased emphasis to the debate its origins date back to the Brussels Treaty of 1948. The main purpose of the treaty was to secure a major role for the US in the defence of Western Europe. Once this goal was achieved with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty a year later, the Brussels Treaty became moribund, and the initial character of ESDI was given an Atlanticist signature.

The establishment of NATO, however, was not viewed by the US, or its European allies, as the ultimate solution to Western Europe's security and defence problems. At the time, the crux of those problems was how to involve West Germany and Italy in the provision of West European defence. In 1950, an attempt was made to bring the former adversaries into an independent European defence identity, through the creation of a European Defence Community (EDC). The so-called Pleven Plan would have created a European Army and can be viewed as the beginnings of Europeanist sentiments for an independent ESDI. The EDC, however, was doomed to fail because of its supranational nature. Instead, the Europeans revamped the Brussels Treaty to allow West Germany and Italy to join NATO. The result was the creation of the WEU in 1955 and the consolidation of the Atlanticist character of ESDI.

Despite later attempts to initiate an Europeanist program, ESDI maintained its Atlanticism through the fifties and sixties. The rejection of the 1961 Fouchet Plans for a joint defence policy and the failure of the 1963 Elysee Treaty for defence co-operation between France and West Germany confirmed that ESDI would remain within the Atlantic framework. Thus, from the end of WWII until the beginnings of détente in the

late sixties, every attempt to develop ESDI independent of NATO failed primarily because of the need for US nuclear deterrence and leadership in the face of the Soviet threat.

ESTABLISHING THE TRANS-ATLANTIC SECURITY REGIME

Beginning in 1947, a number of West European countries began to address the need for defence co-operation. In March of that year, the Treaty of Dunkirk joined the British and French together to resist the military resurgence of Germany. A year later, the Brussels Treaty was signed by five nations, promising mutual assistance against armed aggression and co-ordinated efforts for economic recovery.¹ But the military body of Brussels, known as the Western Union Defence Organisation, would prove inadequate in the face of the Soviet threat. Yet this inadequacy was not a concern since both treaties were not meant to create a distinct European defence framework. Instead, they were a "signal to the United States that the Europeans were ready to do their share,... to insure the defence of Western Europe."²

From the beginning American involvement in West European economic recovery was indispensable.³ Yet the Marshall Plan for economic aid would prove useless in an environment threatened by political chaos.⁴ WWII had given proof that uninhibited

¹*Treaty Between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*, Signed at Brussels, on 17 March 1948. United Nations, *Treaties and International Agreements Registered, Filed and Recorded with the Secretariat of the United Nations*, (Vol. 19, 1948) pp. 53-63. In addition to mutual security (Articles 4 and 5) and the promotion of economic recovery (Article 1) the treaty also established specialised committees in the social (Article 2), and cultural (Article 3) fields. A Council of the five foreign ministers, which could be convened at the request of any signatory, was provided for consultation and advice (Article 7). Within this provision, special reference was made to the threat "of a renewal by Germany of an aggressive policy." To assist the Council, a permanent committee met in London every month while a standing military committee was established to work out defence plans and coordinate military machinery.

²Michel Fortmann, *In Search of an Identity: Europe, NATO, and the ESDI Debate*, Extra Mural Paper #58, (Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Department of National Defence, Canada, Nov. 1991) p. 8

³The US had been left relatively undisturbed by the war. By 1948 the US accounted for over one third of World GNP, half of the world's grain exports, and over half of the world's crude oil. William Wallace, *The Transformation of Western Europe*, (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990). p. 38

⁴The two key European foreign ministers at the time, Ernest Bevin of the UK and Georges Bidault of France, were fearful of the growing political power of domestic communist parties in the West and the

nationalism would lead to war. It had also fundamentally shifted the political map of Europe. Military security was now only possible with an American commitment to the defence of Europe.

European federalists had hoped to use Brussels as an argument that Western Europe, "threatened with attack from without, exhausted by its cycle of internal wars of 'all against all' (or France and Germany), its economy in ruins, must submit itself to a higher power that embodies its own collective will to survive."⁵ These early Europeanists advocated some form of federal union; but their dreams would fade with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Henceforth, European security would be dependent on the security relations between the two superpowers. Europe remained the central focus of international security but now as an object and not the centre of world power. In the words of Barry Buzan, the superpower relationship "overlay" previous relations within Europe.⁶ For countries such as Britain and France there could be no political confidence without an American security guarantee.

The problem that the European leaders had to deal with was the trend of isolationism in American history and the particular aversion to being involved in European affairs. For its part, the US was more interested in some form of institutionalised European co-operation within the confines of the United Nations. Such a

threatening gestures of the Soviet Union in the East. The Soviet Union had already refused to participate in the Marshall Plan recovery program and had intimidated its neighbours to do likewise. The foreign ministers doubted that the Soviet Union would watch while the US restored Western Europe and demonstrated capitalism's superiority over communism.

⁵Charles Pentland, "Integration, Interdependence, and Institutions: Approaches to International Order," in David Haglund and Michael Hawes, eds. World Politics: Power, Interdependence, and Dependence, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990) p. 179

⁶"Overlay meant the replacement, or sometimes the reinforcement, of the previous local patterns of antagonism and alignment by those stemming from the superpower rivalry. This realignment was always done with the support of local elites ... and was not therefore an imposed event wholly against local views. What it did mean, however, was a surrender of the autonomy of local security relations and a willingness to subordinate security policy to the imperatives of the superpower confrontation." Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elsbjerta Tromer, and Ole Waever, The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era, (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990) p. 37

united Europe would release the US from maintaining a permanent European protectorate.⁷ This united Europe could then be the second pillar of a liberal democratic world order allowing the US to participate more selectively in global affairs.⁸ However, crises such as the Berlin blockade in 1948, the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia, and the rise of the communist party in Italy, convinced the Americans that Europe could not stand-alone. With the advent of the policy of containment and the goals of the Truman doctrine "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure,"⁹ the Americans were committed to protecting the liberal democracies of Western Europe through an Atlantic security community.¹⁰

On April 4, 1949, the foreign ministers of Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the US, signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. Of the fourteen articles the key was Article Five:

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently

⁷For example, the Vandenberg Resolution encouraged the "progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual or collective self-defence." It placed a number of conditions on American involvement in Europe, the most paramount of which was the requirement of any arrangement to be compatible with the Charter of the United Nations. *Senate Resolution 239, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 11 June, 1948*

⁸David Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance*, (New York: Basic Books, 1987) p. 30

⁹*President Harry S. Truman, address before a joint Session of Congress*, March 12, 1947, reproduced in C.L. Mee, *The Marshall Plan*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. Appendix I, p. 268

¹⁰Despite the unity of perspective there was a difference of opinion about what kind of community this alliance would create. European federationists still hoped that it would be a European community "with sufficient constitutional authority, material power, and popular legitimacy to meet its constituents shared needs for both security and welfare," strengthened by an American association. Pentland, "Integration, Interdependence, and Institutions," *op. cit.* p. 178. A compromise was reached with the creation of the Council of Europe, signed as the Treaty of Westminster 5 May 1949. Its aim was to achieve "a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress," working towards "an economic and political union." In the end, however, the Council was restricted from deliberating on controversial topics such as defence. Derek Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*, (New York: Longman, 1991) pp. 34-35

agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them. ... will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.¹¹

In spite of the unprecedented commitment, the US clearly intended to retain complete freedom of manoeuvre within the NATO framework, as demonstrated by Article Five. This article allowed each nation to determine its course of action in a crisis, including the decision to use force. Yet the Europeans would accept these terms because NATO represented a breakthrough. The British were not keen to succumb to a European construction and did not want their influence with the Americans supplanted by a continental coalition. The French needed an American guarantee to contain the Soviets and the Germans, so that French forces could bolster their colonial empire. For West Germany, NATO's need for a German army, could be the lever needed to regain sovereignty and bolster its democratic and economic recovery.¹²

Despite references to an "integrated military force,"¹³ however, NATO remained a collection of national forces. Actual integration was ambiguous, being "understood and used to indicate a build-up into one whole of separate national contributions."¹⁴ Indeed, NATO member states have consistently sought to maintain control over their armed forces. They have equipped them, organised them, and paid for them, such that "each country maintains ultimate political and military control over its national forces." The

¹¹*The North Atlantic Treaty*, in Henry W. Degenhardt, *Treaties and Alliances of the World*, 3rd. Ed. (London: Longman, 1981) pp. 166-67.

¹²Calleo, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35

¹³North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqués*, September 18th and 26th, 1950 in *Texts of Final Communiqués: 1949-1974*, (Brussels: NATO Information Service). NATO's first order of business was to design a framework in which policy, military doctrine, strategy and force structure formed a coherent whole, without creating a supranational organization. The US favoured European integration in defence to reduce the need for an American commitment. The Europeans resisted US pressures and instead "sought a maximum US commitment for a minimum loss of sovereignty." Jan Willem Honig, *NATO: An Institution Under Threat?*, (Boulder: Westview Press for the Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1991) p. 20. The solution was to enlarge NATO's institutional framework, by creating numerous agencies and organizations, and develop both a civilian and a military structure to reflect its two main functions.

¹⁴Honig, *op. cit.* p. 24

structure NATO provided for was not the integration of forces; "rather, in the event of war, it enables them to 'link up' and operate under a unified command according to a common plan."¹⁵

The maintenance of national defence forces is the essence of state sovereignty. The formation of NATO was based on the desire to maintain that sovereignty hence any integration of armed forces would have defeated the purpose. While the European states accepted their own weaknesses they were not about to relinquish the very attributes that signified them as sovereign states. For its part, the US made sure it retained ultimate control over its own forces. NATO was able to guarantee European security without undermining state sovereignty. At the time, an independent ESDI, in whatever form, would not have been able to accomplish such a task; there simply was no European state capable of underwriting a European deterrent.

THE EDC AND WEU

The first challenge to Atlantic solidarity did not come from the Soviet Union but from Asia. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 would question America's commitment to Europe. In order for the US to combat communism in Korea the European allies feared the US would have to reduce its military aid to Europe. Instead, the war strengthened the resolve of NATO and the American commitment. To the Americans, the invasion of South Korea demonstrated Soviet willingness to risk military confrontation; hence the threat to Western Europe was real. The US immediately responded with a rearmament programme which included a considerable increase in defence expenditure in the US and Britain.¹⁶ President Truman announced substantial increases in American forces stationed in Europe while the North Atlantic Council

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 26

¹⁶In 1950 alone, Washington authorised an additional \$4 billion in defence funds. This established the base line of a standing US military capability, including a mobilizational base and active forces, which set a peacetime precedent. It was also used to accelerate the building of European military forces.

announced a 'forward strategy' such that "any aggression should be resisted as far to the East as possible."¹⁷

But Korea was also a signal to NATO that their combined forces were inadequate without a German military contribution; indeed the US was insisting that its own contribution was conditional upon German participation.¹⁸ The Germans could provide the needed manpower, space for manoeuvres, and military bases. Because German soil constituted the front line, it was illogical and unfair to omit them; if NATO was going to defend a Western Europe that included Germany, then Germany should participate. But while the Americans were able to persuade the British, the French found the idea to be completely unacceptable. The French made it clear that it would only accept German rearmament within the framework of an integrated European army.

There was a compromise. At the North Atlantic Council meeting in September 1950, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman seemed agreeable to the establishment of a European army, which would include a German contribution.¹⁹ The Plevan Plan, as it became known, called for a European Defence Community (EDC) consisting of European members of NATO acting collectively within the larger alliance.²⁰ The plan also assumed that not all-participating states would integrate all their forces;

¹⁷ Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949-1954, (Brussels: NATO, 1955) p. 32

¹⁸ Rita Cardozo, "The Project for a Political Community (1952-54)" in Roy Pryce, Ed. The Dynamics of EU, (New York: Croom Helm, 1987) p. 51. German soil would undoubtedly constitute the front line in any conflict, therefore it was illogical and unfair to omit the Germans from NATO. In turn, the Germans could provide the needed manpower, space for manoeuvres, and bases.

¹⁹ Lawrence Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance, (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), p. 46. Schuman, for one, realised that the French objection was jeopardising NATO defence preparations and the American commitment to Europe.

²⁰ Trevor Taylor, European Defence Cooperation, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984) pp. 15-16. The Plevan Plan was named after the French Prime Minister who came up with the idea. Political leadership would be provided by a European Assembly and a European Defence Council, operating on a majority voting basis. The EDC was not only a defence organization but also a political institution "to give an impetus to the achievement of a closer association between the member countries on a federal or confederal basis." US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, vol. 3, *Western European Security*, p. 246.

France, for example, would retain control over its forces deployed overseas. West Germany would also contribute but would neither control a national army nor become a full member of NATO.²¹

By May 1952, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the EDC treaty creating a union that some analysts have claimed to be "the most ambitious as regards European integration."²² The EDC represented an important diplomatic compromise between the US and France. The US gained French adherence to the idea of German rearmament while the French gained an immediate American military commitment and a delay in the rearming of Germany.²³

But diplomat compromise would not last. Over the next two years EDC stalled. While the Benelux countries and Germany ratified the treaty and Italy was expected to, it was in France where it ran aground. Ironically, while it had been a war in Asia that had highlighted the need for such an organisation, it was also a war in Asia that helped bring about its demise. By 1953, the war in Indochina had tied down 100,000 French troops and cost twice as much as France had received in Marshall aid. Although American support grew, the French complained they could not simultaneously fight the West's war in Indochina and meet their European defence responsibilities.²⁴ By 1954, the situation

²¹Christoph Bluth, "British-German Defence Relations, 1950-80: A Survey," in Karl Kaiser and John Roper, Eds., British-German Defence Cooperation: Partners Within the Alliance, (London: Jane's for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1988) pp. 4-5

²²Alfred Cahen, The Western EU and NATO: Building a European Defence Identity Within the Context of Atlantic Solidarity, Brasseys's Atlantic Commentary #2, (Toronto: Brasseys's, 1989). p. 2

²³Additional protocols reinforced the French desire for guarantees against West Germany. France persuaded the US and Britain to join with it in a joint declaration that a threat to the EDC would be treated as a challenge to their own security, symbolised by the two countries agreeing to station troops on the continent. A final protocol sought a commitment from Britain to provide military aid to any EDC state under attack. These protocols reinforced the impression that for France the EDC was designed as a guarantee for itself against possible German aggression as much as it was to be an anti-Soviet organization.

²⁴Roy Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe: 1945-1967, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968) p. 167. By 1954, the US was devoting one-third of its foreign aid budget to financing 78% of the French war effort in Indochina, yet it received no commensurate authority over its use. While France repeatedly requested assistance it refused to let the conflict be internationalised. See Elizabeth Sherwood, Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990) pp. 45-47

in Indochina worsened with the defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Yet the denouement of the war not only gave the French serious doubts about EDC, it also set in motion the progressive alienation of France from the US and NATO.

Following the humiliation in Indochina a new French government, feeling its allies had not supported it, attempted to adjust the EDC to soften its supranational approach but were unable to get the other treaty parties to agree.²⁵ Thus, the treaty was submitted to the French Assembly in its original 1952 form and defeated in a show of defiance on August 30, 1954.

It is commonly held that the EDC failed for three reasons. First, the Korean war had ended, Stalin had died, and the danger of a Soviet attack seemed to have receded. In turn, NATO had substantially increased its nuclear deterrence and the French felt a credible non-nuclear defence was no longer an imperative.²⁶ Second, Britain had refused to join because of the implied supranational authority. British participation would have counterbalanced Germany and reduced French fears of a renewed and resurgent German military. Finally, the Gaullists and Communists had increased their representation in the French Assembly and were hostile to the supranational idea of the EDC. General de Gaulle's vision of the Union Francais, in which France was still deemed a world power, was in sharp contrast to the subordination of the French Army under the rubric of some supranational authority.

Had the EDC survived, the transatlantic security regime might have evolved into a bilateral alliance built on two pillars: an American nuclear pillar and an integrated European conventional pillar. The failure of the EDC meant the regime would develop as a multilateral alliance completely under US leadership. The failure signalled the

²⁵The two month agony and defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 brought down the Laniel government and ushered in Pierre Mendes.

²⁶Jose Manuel da Costa Arsenio, The Western EU: Historic Synopsis and Evolving Perspectives, Occasional Paper #9, (Winnipeg: Programme in Strategic Studies, University of Manitoba, 1990) p. 5 and Stanley Sloan, NATO's Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain, (Washington: National Defence University Press, 1985) p. 23

continued predominance of state sovereignty in Europe. The death of the EDC held back the process of European integration and guaranteed that defence co-operation, especially between France and Germany, would be within the Atlantic Alliance framework, at least for the foreseeable future.

Rejection of the EDC still left the problem of German participation unresolved. This time it was Britain's turn to find the compromise. The central element of the proposal was to expand the Brussels Treaty Organisation to incorporate the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy in a new Western EU. The Brussels Treaty would be revamped to become a mutual security pact; to restore German sovereignty; and to rearm Germany within the WEU framework leading to membership in NATO.²⁷

Once again, the French were the least receptive. This time, the US and UK used a carrot and stick approach by threatening to withdraw their defence commitments, while offering to station four British divisions and a tactical air force permanently in Germany if they did. The offer placated the French.²⁸ The Treaty was expanded to include Germany and Italy while the article of faith remained defensive.

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.²⁹

²⁷ *Foreign Relations of the United States, op. cit.*, p. 1221

²⁸ With the main powers in agreement a conference was held with the ECSC members plus the UK, US and Canada in October 1954. By May 6 1955, the Agreements were ratified by the nine plus Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Greece and Turkey. Nine days later the Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact with Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.

²⁹ Article 5, *Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective self-defence* Signed at Brussels on March 17, 1948, As Amended by the *Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty*, Signed at Paris on October 23, 1954. The agreement changed the purpose of the organization from defence against "renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression" to "promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe." It ended the occupation regime, abrogated the Occupation Statute, and abolished the Allied High Commission. It committed the parties "to work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," and asserted that duplication of military staffs and authorities would not occur (Article III, Protocol 1). It undertook to restrict the production of certain types of weapons. In doing so, it set up an Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA - Protocols 3 and 4). Finally, each of the member states placed specific forces under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Article I, Protocol 2) while special reference was made to the British forces in Germany, (Article VI, Protocol 2).

The WEU was a series of compromises. The US gained their desire for the rearmament of Germany and its participation in NATO. The FRG regained sovereign control over its affairs and prestige through its membership in NATO. France acceded to German rearmament, but had gained the British troop commitment. Finally, Britain had avoided the supranationalism of the EDC while facilitating German rearmament through the transatlantic security regime.³⁰

However, the establishment of the WEU also set some disturbing precedents. First, American hopes for a European defence organisation would not be realised. Second, Soviet conventional force levels would not be matched by the allies, despite American insistence and German rearmament. As a result, the military strategy of the Alliance would increasingly rest on the use of American nuclear forces and concurrently lead to questions of burden sharing and decision-making. Finally, the WEU would clearly not achieve any significant results beyond its initial purpose. Simply put,

it was to ensure the closest possible co-operation within NATO, and although it did play a limited role in the Saar settlement, it remained essentially a paper organisation. With the handing over to the Council of Europe in 1960 of the social and cultural responsibilities it had inherited from the Treaty of Brussels, it seemed that to all intents and purposes WEU had become moribund.³¹

Despite the optimism, the WEU remain in obsolescence. Because it's main function had been to facilitate the participation of Germany and Italy in West European defence. Once this had been achieved, NATO was to receive the full attention of the defence establishment.

ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES AND FRENCH AMBITIONS

One would be hard-pressed to find in the rest of the 1950s and the 1960s any expression of European political will to create an independent ESDI. That is not to say there were no attempts; but these attempts would either fail or remain dormant.

³⁰ Carol Edler Baumann, (Ed.) *Europe in NATO*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987) p. 11

³¹ Urwin, *op. cit.*, p. 70

Throughout this period not even the concept of a European security and defence identity was clearly defined by Europeans. Ironically, it was President Kennedy in 1962 that coined the phrase "European Pillar" and called upon Europe to do its share in "defending a community of free nations."³² In doing so the President was not lending his support to a European defence entity but was raising the perennial question of burden-sharing, scolding the European members for not taking on more of the responsibility and cost of maintaining the transatlantic security regime.

There was to be success in the drive for European integration in the economic field. With NATO and the backing of Marshall Plan, Western Europe made its most venturesome step toward functional integration by establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 under the auspices of the Schuman Plan.³³ This plan was designed to contain the resurgent heavy industries of the Ruhr valley, Germany's traditional economic base for military power.³⁴ In 1957, the Treaties of Rome were signed establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom (European Atomic Energy Community). The institutional arrangements were adopted from the ECSC with a few changes in character and responsibilities. The only reference to defence was the disclosure of security information and the treatment of military equipment (Article 223); and the significance of defence in the maintenance of market operations (Article 224).³⁵

³² Alfred Cahen, Western Defence: The European Role in NATO, (Brussels: NATO, 1988) p. 4

³³The ECSC included France, W. Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and was named after Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister.

³⁴J. Pinder, European Community: The Building of a Union, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) p. 3

³⁵The supranational executive known as the High Authority in the ECSC was now to be called the Commission. The bureaucratic Commission would prepare legislation to be presented to a Council of Ministers; a body of national representatives. There was also an elected European Parliamentary Assembly, to give democratic legitimacy to the new Community. It mainly existed as a consultative body to both the Commission and the Council. Finally, a European Court of Justice was established to be an arbitrator on the interpretation of the treaties. See George, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-5; Pinder, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-27; and Neil Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Community, (London: Macmillan Press, 1991).

(223): Any Member State may take the measures which it considers necessary for the protection of all the essential interests of its security, and which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, ammunition and war material;
(224): Member States shall consult one another for the purpose of enacting in common the necessary provisions to prevent the functioning of the Common Market from being affected by measures which a Member State may be called upon to take in case of serious internal disturbances affecting public order, in case of war or serious international tension constituting a threat of war or in order to carry out undertakings into which it has entered for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security.³⁶

Thus, while there is no formal exclusion of defence from the agenda, the purpose was the functioning of the Common Market. The result was that the common market would not infringe upon the sensitive issue of national security, whether it be internal or external. While a wide interpretation of the treaty can be found in the Preamble, denoting members' determination to "strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty," and while Article 235 provides for Community activity in areas not anticipated when the treaty was signed, the priority was to safeguard the principles of the common market and not to address security and defence issues.

Following the Rome Treaties, General Charles de Gaulle ascended to the Presidency in France in 1958. It was de Gaulle's intention to build Western Europe into a political, economic, and cultural unit organised for action and self-defence. This unit would be based on co-operation between states with the possibility of a confederation, rather than a federation. De Gaulle believed in the strength of the nation-state as the key element of the international system: states were "the only realities upon which one can build, the only entities invested with the right to order matters and the authority to act."³⁷ He hoped to lead the members away from the supranational hopes of the Rome Treaties "toward a Europe des patries, a European unity based on the sovereignty of nation-states and independent of the Superpower relationship.

³⁶ *Treaties of Rome Establishing the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community*, Signed March 1957. (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Community)

³⁷ Pierre Gerbet, "In Search of Political Union: The Fouchet Plan Negotiations," in Pryce, *op. cit.* p. 113

The Suez crisis had strengthened French resolve for independent status and fuelled their pursuit of an autonomous foreign and defence policy.³⁸ Following the French debacle in Indochina, Suez became another example of lack of American support for allied (read French) interests. De Gaulle would capitalise on these feelings of mistrust to pursue "a strategy of manoeuvre on the margins of the alliance."³⁹

In the same year that de Gaulle assumed the presidency, Khrushchev consolidated his power in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev would prove to be a steward of brinkmanship in East-West relations, by putting the solidarity of the Alliance continually to the test. Following the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, Khrushchev threatened to terminate the Four Power agreement on Germany, sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, and cut West Berlin links to Western Europe unless the western powers agreed to a new status for West Berlin.⁴⁰ While maintaining the western desire to assure freedom of access, President Kennedy was willing to negotiate. The British supported Kennedy. The Federal Republic was opposed to any concessions, but had to take the Anglo-American pressure into account. De Gaulle, however, refused to negotiate under duress and was unwilling to show weakness in the face of Soviet pressure. The crisis

³⁸Sloan, *op. cit.*, p. 36. The Suez crisis of 1956 demonstrated that the US would not allow European national interests to undermine East-West relations. The Anglo-French-Israeli attack on the Suez Canal in response to provocation from Egyptian leader Abdul Nasser violated the principles of the United Nations and "was characterised by deliberate deceit toward their American ally." Gordon Craig and Alexander George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Times*, 2nd Edition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) p. 123. The US took the unprecedented step of collaborating with the Soviet Union in condemning its own allies.

³⁹Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91. After initially taking office, de Gaulle attempted to reassert French great power status by advocating that France, Britain, and the US form a special entity within the alliance. "This organization would make joint decisions in all political questions affecting global security and would also draw up and, if necessary, implement strategic action plans." President Eisenhower responded that this was not possible because "we cannot afford to adopt any system which would give to our other allies,... the impression that basic decisions affecting their own vital interests are being made without their participation." Alfred Grosser *The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1980). pp. 187-88.

⁴⁰Khrushchev wanted the incorporation of W. Berlin into the DDR, but was willing to concede it as an independent political entity. However, the western powers were adamant that the Federal Republic was the only legitimate voice of the German state, of which Berlin was a part. See Grosser, *op. cit.*, 1980) pp. 190-198.

further deteriorated Franco-Anglo relations, while strengthening Franco-German relations. It also increased the Federal Republic's will to achieve a political union among EEC members.⁴¹

De Gaulle's first attempt to create a Europe independent from the superpowers would be the Fouchet Plan. Deliberations would depict the conflict between the belief in an Atlantic Europe, in which NATO members would seek to influence the US from within the alliance, and those who envisaged a European Europe emancipated from American predominance with the ability of independent manoeuvre.⁴² "The uncivil war between de Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons was about to enter its most bitter phase, the Battle of the Grand Designs."⁴³

There were actually two plans: the first (1961) proposed a loose union of the six with a common defence policy; the second (1962) proposed a unity of action in several policy areas, such as foreign policy, economics, culture, and defence.⁴⁴ The first plan was accepted by the Germans, Italians, and Luxembourgs as a basis for negotiation. These negotiations related to the link between the proposed union and NATO; the autonomy of the EEC; and inclusion of EEC elements, such as a Secretary General, a larger role for the proposed assembly, and more precise provisions on the future of a single union. The French delegation accepted these amendments as appropriate.

Unfortunately, the French committee neglected to confer with de Gaulle. He scrutinised the amendments and duly cancelled them. All reference to NATO was excluded. There was to be no secretariat, rather a committee of national diplomats, and

⁴¹ Gerbet, "In Search of Political Union," pp. 118-119

⁴² Stanley Hoffman, "Europe's Identity Crisis: Between the Past and America," *Daedalus*, 93, No. 4, (Spring 1964). p. 1291

⁴³ David Schoenbrun, *The Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle*, (New York: Atheneum, 1966). p. 317

⁴⁴ David Haglund, *Alliance Within an Alliance: Franco-German Military Cooperation and the European Pillar of Defence*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) p. 86

the Assembly was to remain consultative. Extra-national bodies would have some technical value but could not have political authority. Decisions would be strictly intergovernmental based on unanimity, removing any semblance of supranationality, and guaranteeing veto power for every member. De Gaulle now proposed that the scope of the union be extended to the economic field without any guarantee of respect for community treaties. Finally, any provision for future development was eliminated, replaced with a clause stating only the possibility of a Community system.⁴⁵ As can be expected, this second plan was unacceptable to the other European partners.

The stated reasons for its rejection were the exclusion of the United Kingdom and the contravention of supranationality, an ideal to which the Benelux countries and the Federal Republic adhered at the time. De Gaulle's vision was very coherent: a Europe of States, void of supranationality. The other members feared "a restored European Concert in which one country, France, would be more equal than the others."⁴⁶

From the ashes of the Fouchet Plans grew the 1963 Elysee Treaty between France and the FRG. West Germany had been the most receptive towards the Fouchet proposals and de Gaulle had formed a strong relationship with Adenauer following the Berlin crisis in 1961. De Gaulle sought out Adenauer as a privileged partner in a Fouchet Plan built for two intending to consolidate the relationship in a number of areas. In the area of defence, the respective Ministers would meet every three months to address the following objectives:

- 1.a) As regards strategy and tactics, the competent authorities of the two countries shall endeavour to align their theories with a view to achieving common approaches...
- 1.b) As regards armaments, the two Governments shall endeavour to organise joint teamwork as from the stage of formulation of appropriate armament projects and of preparation of the financing plans...
2. The Governments shall study the conditions in which Franco-German collaboration may be established in the field of civil defense.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 121

⁴⁶ Haglund, *op. cit.*, p. 86

⁴⁷ *Elysee Treaty*. (Section II). The Treaty was signed in Paris on the 22 January, 1963. Decision-making would be by directives issued by Heads of State and Government meeting whenever necessary, at a minimum

The signing of the treaty was resented by the other community partners as it confirmed their fears of a Franco-German bloc. However, when the Bundestag approved the Treaty it attached a preamble to reverse the anti-Atlanticist thrust intended by de Gaulle. In fact, the Bundestag interpreted the treaty as reinforcing not only NATO, but also the Common Market.

TO WIT the preservation and consolidation of ... collective defense within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance and the integration of the armed forces of the States bound together in that Alliance, the unification of Europe by following the course adopted by the establishment of the European Communities, with the inclusion of Great Britain and other states wishing to accede, and the further strengthening of those Communities.⁴⁸

As a result, the Treaty would fail to harmonise Franco-German defence co-operation the way it was intended. While it existed in theory, France could not swallow the implications of the Bundestag's interpretation. The treaty remained in limbo until the European security agenda could mature to allow a re-interpretation. Once again, French interests, this time manifested through de Gaulle, had been subsumed under the auspices of the Anglo-Saxon alliance.

THE EUROPEAN PILLAR: ADJUSTING THE DEFENCE-BURDEN

At the same time de Gaulle was promoting his Europeanism, President Kennedy launched his vision of Atlanticism. That vision viewed European integration as an essential element of the trans-Atlantic partnership, creating two pillars on either side of the Atlantic.

We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner... We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense... and developing co-ordinated policies in all other economic, diplomatic and political areas. We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we

of every two years. Foreign ministers would meet every three months to implement the programme as a whole. In addition, an interministerial commission would be appointed to monitor but would have no power.

⁴⁸*Preamble to the Act of the Federal German Government Ratifying the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation*. Approved by the Bundestag 16 May 1963, Federal Republic of Germany, The Bulletin, May 21, 1963 (Bonn: Press and Information Office, 1963)

could deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations.⁴⁹

In calling upon the West Europeans to become a partner Kennedy used the pillar concept as a way of alleviating the defence burden. With the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the arrival of Soviet ballistic missiles in the 1960s, mutual vulnerability became a reality. The pillar concept was a political tool to embrace the principle of a multilateral force (MLF), which would spread responsibility for nuclear deterrence to the Europeans and raise the nuclear threshold.⁵⁰ The principle of the MLF was "multilaterally manned, owned, and controlled" ships with nuclear missiles combined "into a NATO deterrent force under NATO command."⁵¹

In connection with the MLF, Kennedy and his Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, were exploring the proposed NATO strategy of flexible response. The strategy reflected a desire to be able to respond to a limited attack by conventional means, thereby raising the threshold at which nuclear weapons would be used. Even after crossing that threshold emphasis was on 'escalation control,' and the need for options beginning with limited counter-force strikes.

The Europeans quickly realised the implications of such a strategy. By raising the nuclear threshold, the price the Soviets would have to pay for aggression would be decreased, while the price the Europeans paid would increase. The intent was to limit not only the intensity of the war, but also its geographical scope. For Europe, a limited war was indistinguishable from a general war. Of course, the French took the greatest

⁴⁹John F. Kennedy, "The Doctrine of National Independence," 4 July 1962, in *The Burden and the Glory*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 111.

⁵⁰Prior US military strategy was based on American technological superiority in nuclear weapons. It allowed the US hegemony to provide the public good of extended nuclear deterrence 'on the cheap.' "Once large numbers of Soviet rockets could reach the US, a NATO strategy to defend Europe through American massive retaliation grew less credible and therefore more dangerous." Calleo, *op. cit.*, p. 41. In addition, the Kennedy administration was running into balance of payments problems and was looking at European conventional contributions as a way to alleviate them. see Simon Lunn, *Burden-sharing in NATO*, Chatham House Papers #18, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983) p. 13.

⁵¹Christian Herter, *Toward an Atlantic Community*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1963). p. 84

exception to the new strategy. They saw an implicit recognition of the weakness of the American strategic guarantee and a determination on the part of the US to prevent any conflict in Europe from threatening the American homeland. Furthermore, by abdicating the nuclear initiative to the enemy, NATO would be demonstrating a lack of resolve, damaging the regime's deterrent.⁵²

Despite European reservations, the basis for the MLF and flexible response were straightforward: there had been a shift in the strategic environment between the US and the Soviet Union; and a shift in the political environment within NATO. It was no longer possible for the US to maintain the status quo. The MLF was a way of solving the dilemma of the nuclear status of the FRG; offering an instrument for greater cohesion within the Alliance; of granting meaningful participation in nuclear defence matters to the Europeans without proliferation; and fostering the twin goals of European unity and the Atlantic partnership.⁵³

Ironically, it was the French desire for an independent nuclear deterrent of their own which was a major incentive for the MLF.⁵⁴ While Kennedy was promoting the 'Grand Design of European unity as one of two pillars in the transatlantic partnership, the MLF was a method to counteract de Gaulle's vision of European unity. De Gaulle's aspiration for a EU of states led by France was in opposition to Kennedy's view of a Europe "speaking with a common voice, (and) acting with a common will."⁵⁵

⁵²Pierre Gallois, "US Strategy and the Defence of Europe," *Orbis*, vol. 8 (Summer, 1963) pp. 232-247.

⁵³Robert Bowie, "Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance," *International Organization*, (Summer 1963) pp. 724-727. In October 1962, the MLF proposed a fleet of twenty-five surface vessels, jointly owned and operated. The fleet would be supervised by representatives of participating countries, with the US retaining a veto over launches, promising to devolve control at some future date.

⁵⁴In a July 1962 speech McNamara castigated these small forces (British and French) as being "dangerous, prone to obsolescence and lacking in credibility as a deterrent." The French saw deterrence now depending upon the sheer uncertainty of future war, such that extra centres of decision-making would contribute to this uncertainty and hence deterrence. Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," in Peter Paret, (ed.) *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 770.

⁵⁵John Kennedy, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-116.

Yet the MLF would prove to be a misnomer. "There was no way the MLF could square the circle of retaining and sharing centralised control."⁵⁶ If the MLF was not a deterrent of its own, it would still rely on the American nuclear deterrent. This would defeat the purpose as the US would now have a veto over both. In addition, the MLF was incapable of calming the anxieties over extended nuclear deterrence and the doctrinal shift towards flexible response. Indeed, the MLF only exacerbated the problems between nuclear and non-nuclear powers.

Throughout, only the Germans showed interest.⁵⁷ But the Germans were caught between Paris and Washington. France refused to participate and de Gaulle continued to emphasise the lack of credibility in the American nuclear guarantee. In turn, the US was openly using the MLF to pry the FRG from de Gaulle's grasp.⁵⁸ In order to lure German interest away from the MLF, France emphasised the role its incipient nuclear force would play in the defence of West Germany. French leaders stressed that, given geographical proximity, French nuclear forces were automatically a substantial deterrent for the FRG.⁵⁹

Yet the French grandstanding would not prove to be the deathblow. In October 1963, Adenauer was replaced by Ludwig Erhard, who was in favour of the MLF but

⁵⁶Joseph Joffe, The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of Alliance, (Cambridge: Balinger Publishing, 1987). p. 58. The control problem also raised significant military issues. How credible would the MLF be as a deterrent, if any participant could veto the use of force? In fact, the responsiveness of a force dependent on a voting mechanism of any kind could not be counted on for the pace necessary for efficient execution of military plans. Schwartz, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.

⁵⁷Alistair Buchan, The Multilateral Force: A Historical Perspective, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964)

⁵⁸Wolfram Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989) pp. 45-50

⁵⁹Robert Grant, "French Security Policy and the Franco-German Relationship," in Robbin Laird, (ed.), Strangers and Friends: The Franco-German Security Relationship, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989) pp. 13-14. From the French perspective, German participation in the MLF would have placed the FRG further under American tutelage, and would have detracted from the political and strategic value of France's nuclear force.

more concerned about public desire for close co-operation with France.⁶⁰ The following November, President Kennedy was assassinated, to be replaced by Lyndon Johnson who wanted to give the Europeans a chance to formulate a common position rather than force decisions on individual governments. Finally, by the fall of 1964, the British Labour Party came to power. Prime Minister Wilson had been critical of both Britain's independent nuclear deterrent and the MLF, preferring to put all his faith in the American nuclear deterrent. These developments had the effect of pushing the MLF to the sidelines, forcing Washington to begin working on a new forum for consultation on strategic planning within NATO.

Perhaps the most condemning analysis of why the MLF failed was put forward by Alistair Buchan. He argued that what was needed was not some new arrangement to give greater control to the Europeans but assurance that the American nuclear umbrella had some sort of guarantee, and that the US was willing to consider their interests as an essential part of the operational planning and disposition of American strategic forces.⁶¹

A preliminary reading might suggest that de Gaulle had won a partial victory in the 'battle of the Grand Designs.' However, an in depth analysis reveals that neither side won, but that de Gaulle definitely lost. De Gaulle's aspirations for a 'Europe des patries,' was rejected by the other West European states. Both de Gaulle and his European partners shared the goal of greater European unity and participation in international security; but they did not share the same methods for achieving that goal. While de Gaulle wished to pull his European partners away from the supranationality of the EC and the reliance on NATO; those partners wished to maintain the institutionalised co-operation of the EC and the link with the US through NATO.

⁶⁰Catherine Kelleher and Gale Mattox, (eds.), Evolving European Defence Policies, (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1987). pp. 248-250.

⁶¹Buchan, *op. cit.*, p. 637

The events, which culminated in the death of the MLF, solidified the French disaffection. In 1966, de Gaulle announced France was leaving NATO's integrated military command and asked NATO to remove its forces and facilities from French territory by 1 April 1967.

France is aware to what extent the defensive solidarity thus established between 15 free Western nations contributes to ensure their security... France therefore plans, as of now, to remain, when the time comes, a party to the Treaty signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington. This means that, ... she would, ... be determined, as today, to fight on the side of her Allies in the event that one of them should be the object of an unprovoked aggression.⁶²

Despite the decision, de Gaulle made it clear France would continue to participate in the political aspects of NATO and maintain its treaty obligations. De Gaulle could afford to consider nuclear politics as secondary because he could be confident that NATO's nuclear arrangements would deter the Soviet Union thus still enjoying the Alliance's protection.⁶³

However, while de Gaulle was gaining independence he was giving up a great deal of influence. The French withdrawal impressed upon the Germans that the American nuclear deterrent was absolutely vital to their security.⁶⁴ As long as France was a full member of NATO, it could block the adoption of flexible response; once it withdrew, the way was cleared for its adoption and, ironically, the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent was increased.

⁶²Letter sent by de Gaulle to President Johnson on March 7, 1966. Quoted in Grosser, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-214. For two different views regarding the impact of the French withdrawal on NATO military capabilities see David Calleo, The Atlantic Fantasy: The U.S., NATO and Europe, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 33-35 and 154-155; and Kenneth Hunt, NATO Without France: The Military Implications, Adelphi Papers, No. 32 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966).

⁶³Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p. 173.

⁶⁴With the French withdrawal conventional defence of West Germany became problematic, weakening NATO's lines of supply and communications. Some of these negative effects were mitigated by French concessions such as permission for overflights of NATO planes flying from Britain to southern Europe. There was also a temporary agreement on the stationing of French troops in the Federal Republic based on the October 23, 1954 convention of foreign forces in Germany.

Politically, the French withdrawal altered the balance of power within the alliance, placing greater dependency on American leadership. It also enhanced the importance of the German role.⁶⁵ In the end, not only did the Soviets have to contend with the new NATO strategy, but also an alternative nuclear decision-making centre in Paris. On balance, the withdrawal did not undermine NATO, instead it reiterated its importance and *modus vivendi*.

CHANGING DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES

There is no doubt the French rebellion was a detriment to NATO. The defection made it more difficult for the alliance to translate increased European strength into a more significant European role. Whether de Gaulle knew he would weaken the role of his European counterparts is one of contention. The MLF discussions had marked the highpoint of direct European co-operation in nuclear weapons strategy; the lack of support, however, did not lessen the need to devise a system in which the Europeans could acquire greater control over their own destiny in return for a greater contribution to the strength of the Alliance.

In 1965, before the French rebellion, McNamara had suggested from a 'select committee' of defence ministers who would discuss ways to improve consultation within the alliance about the use of nuclear weapons and the nuclear planning process.⁶⁶ This proposal proved to be the genesis of the Nuclear Planning Group, which led to a greater European role in Alliance strategy and addressed pressures for increased European participation.

⁶⁵Sloan, *op. cit.*, p. 38

⁶⁶*Communique*. Defence Ministers Meeting, Paris, 31 May - 1 June 1965 in Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO: 1965-1980, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) p. 39. At first McNamara's proposal received a mixed reception. Britain was enthusiastic but Germany was not sure it wanted to give up the MLF. France was uninterested, viewing the proposal as another method of alienation, while the smaller powers feared the larger powers would dominate the decision-making. However, by the time McNamara had made his proposal, it had become apparent that France was already isolated. With British support, McNamara conceded to the smaller allies concerns and allowed broad representation. This was followed by new German Chancellor Erhard's decision to renounce interest in the MLF, leaving the way clear for him to support the proposal.

Based on the recommendations of the Committee, the North Atlantic Council decided in December 1966 (after the French withdrawal) to establish a two-tier system for nuclear planning and policy making. The first tier, the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee (NDAC), was open to all members. Its mandate was to discuss any matter concerning the nuclear affairs of the Alliance and to propose general policies by involving all members in consultations on an informed basis. The second tier, the Nuclear Planning Group, was composed of four permanent and three rotational members, charged with the mandate to formulate policy proposals in the area of nuclear weapons.⁶⁷ In the past, nuclear issues had been mixed up with other disagreements within the alliance; hence, the significance of the NPG was its ability to provide a means through which issues of nuclear policy could be isolated from other issues.

This tendency for nuclear doctrine to symbolise the broader politics of inter-allied relations did not disappear, of course, with the functioning of the Nuclear Planning Group, but it did help the United States and its European critics to confront directly their differences over nuclear strategy without... talking at cross-purposes.⁶⁸

Compared to the MLF, the NPG succeeded because of a different approach. Whereas the MLF was a military force answer to the pressures for European participation, the NPG was a political, consultative, and information-sharing answer. The NPG represented a redefinition of the relationship between the superpower and its non-nuclear allies. Instead of searching for a formula by which control could be shared between the allies, the NPG mitigated the impact of the American veto by involving the European allies in the process of decision-making. Through this improved consultation non-nuclear members would be able to secure a better share in nuclear defence planning than they could through participation in a small joint nuclear force, subject to

⁶⁷The four permanent members were the US, UK, FRG, and Italy. The three rotational members would be drawn from the NDAC based on eighteen month terms. Initially, Portugal, Denmark, and Norway did not wish to be considered for rotation, but Norway changed its mind in 1969.

⁶⁸Buteux, *Politics of Nuclear Consultation*, p. 61

US veto. In turn, these members would participate in the development of weapons programmes, the determination of force structure, the strategy of that force structure, and the tactical and operational plans needed to facilitate that strategy effectively.

In addition to isolating issues of nuclear planning and sharing, the NPG fostered greater allied cohesion. By encouraging co-operation in nuclear policy, the NPG developed a spillover effect for co-operation on other issues. Furthermore, the NPG developed a standard method of dealing with issues, whether nuclear or not, leading to greater success in resolving those issues. The result was that the US successfully used the NPG to explain its nuclear policies and gain allied support. For more than a decade following the NPG's implementation the American nuclear guarantee was rarely questioned openly.

The NPG ended an important period in the origins of ESDI. For the first time, the role of NATO had been seriously questioned. In response, the US reiterated its commitment by redefining NATO strategy and revamping NATO's decision-making procedures. Its leadership was disputed by one regime member, but, in true form, that member's withdrawal did not undermine US leadership or the alliance. Thus, the transatlantic security regime was never in danger of dissolution, simply because there was never any political will to create an alternative. The most salient point of this period was that the concept of a European Security and Defence Identity, as opposed to the security and defence of Europe, lacked substance, purpose, and political acceptance. Any notion of an independent European identity would first have to cross this hurdle before any role could be determined.

Chapter Three

DEFENCE INTERDEPENDENCE: DETENTE AND THE SECOND COLD WAR

The first signs of economic problems for the hegemon came in 1960 when speculation against the dollar was fuelled by the American balance of payments deficit. By the end of the 1960s, the monetary system was collapsing, and the trading system was in jeopardy. The US was still the most dominant power, but the pressure against its economic strength was changing its political position. As the 1970s progressed European unwillingness to shoulder more of the defence burden and to follow American leadership in the international economy encouraged the US to be even more unilateral in its approach to transatlantic relations.

By the late 1960s, the immediacy of the Soviet threat had diminished in the eyes of the NATO allies. There was a growing consensus that the Soviet Union had achieved a state of normality in its relations with other states. Indeed, there appeared to be a *modus vivendi* between the Americans and Soviets, such that *détente* became the driving principle; a principle which accepted the Cold War as the defining element of their mutual understanding. Such a mutual understanding allowed both sides to recognise the debilitating affect of an unfettered arms race and the chance to increase the security of both camps through arms control talks and eventual disarmament treaties.

The Soviet troop movements into Afghanistan in 1979 brought *détente* to an end and initiated the so-called Second Cold War. US statements about the USSR became more bellicose; disarmament talks ended; and the US demanded that its allies fall in line behind a more confrontational NATO. However, Western Europe had grown accustomed to the growing trade with Eastern Europe, and had quietly developed a more independent foreign policy line during the relaxed era of *détente*.

US belligerence became pronounced with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, who drastically increased defence spending and attempted to enforce a high-technology embargo against the Soviet Union. The embargo was particularly troublesome and exacerbated the difference of foreign policies between the Americans and their European allies. Reagan's high-handedness came to a head at the Reykjavik summit in October 1986. Even though no agreements were signed it was the approach Reagan used that caused the problem. The European allies were furious that they were not consulted before commitments were offered on behalf of the alliance. This apprehension had also been exacerbated with the 1985 Strategic Defence Initiative that was seen as technological development cloaked in defence spending.

The belief in the need to manage relations with an ally no longer certain of its hegemonic position, pushed Western Europe into closer security co-operation beginning in the 1980s, demonstrated by the renewal of the Franco-German defence dialogue in 1982, and the revival of the WEU in 1984. By the late eighties, a clear path had been established leading the West Europeans away from their US ally. Despite these divergences, European identity in security and defence continued to be defined by the transatlantic security regime. For example, the establishment of the Eurogroup within the framework of NATO, and the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) of NATO's European countries were designed to foster greater co-operation on security issues and armaments procurement. The significance of these two groups, however, was to respond to American pressures of burden sharing. The result was little more than institutional proliferation and a reaffirmation of US hegemony. The justification remained that the US nuclear guarantee still represented the public good of a security regime that the West Europeans were unable to replace.

CHANGING EXPECTATIONS: DÉTENTE AND OSTPOLITIK

The process of détente began with the approval of the Harmel Report at the same December 1967 North Atlantic Council meeting that accepted flexible response as

official NATO strategy. The report suggested that NATO should proceed on a double track. While protecting the military balance, its members should seek better relations with the Soviet Union.

The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and ... to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence. In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved.¹

The most important contribution of the report was its insistence that "military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary;" reiterating the Alliance ability to pursue both its functions simultaneously. Détente recognised the need to reduce tensions while accepting the reality of competition. It provided room for political manoeuvring, promoting "negotiation rather than confrontation" on critically important issues.² Détente also indicated to the rest of the world that the two superpowers' relationship was the fulcrum of global power.

By adopting the Harmel Report, the allies fundamentally altered the objectives and the image of the Alliance. The result was that the Alliance could balance the divergent perspectives of the East-West politico-military situation rather than acting as a focus for polarisation. Acceptance of the Harmel Report also provided reassurance to the European allies that their interests would be protected in the increasing bilateral arms control discussions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In turn, the Report reassured the US that its allies would not become overly excited about détente and vulnerable to Soviet peace overtures.³

¹ *North Atlantic Council Communique, December 14, 1967: Annex to Communique (Harmel Report), "Future Tasks of the Alliance, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament," 1967, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967) pp. 679-681*

² Richard Nixon, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace," A report to Congress, 2/18/70, U.S. Department of State Bulletin 62, # 1602 (March 9, 1970) p. 323

³ Sloan, *op. cit.*, p. 46

For the superpowers, arms control was a way of codifying the new military understanding and the common will to avert annihilation. By far the most impressive achievements during this period were the two Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and II) signed in 1972 and 1979. Unfortunately, the U.S. failed to ratify the SALT II following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the same year. While SALT II would remain in obscurity during the resumption of Cold War politics in the 1980s, arms control had become a regular characteristic of East-West relations.⁴

Both sides in the arms control talks gained recognition of significant principles each upheld as vital to its strategic point of view. On the one hand, the Soviets, by agreeing to the mutual limitation of ABM deployments to two sites, were in effect endorsing the long held US belief in mutual assured destruction. On the other hand, the freeze on the existing numbers of land-based and submarine launched missiles constituted not only an acknowledgement of Soviet parity but actually a substantial superiority in ICBMs and a smaller one in SLBMs.⁵

Indeed, détente followed naturally from the premise of parity and recast an ancient dilemma of all alliances. Given that the weaker members of all alliances can never be completely assured of their patron's promises, they have an incentive to

⁴SALT I consisted of two parts: the first was a five year Interim Agreement which limited strategic offensive arms by placing ceilings on land-based and submarine based nuclear weapons; the second was the ABM (anti-ballistic missile) Treaty, of unlimited duration, which severely restricted deployment of antimissile systems. Following the success of SALT I, President Ford and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev reached a tentative agreement in 1974 at Vladivostock on ceilings for strategic delivery vehicles and to restrain qualitative developments that could threaten future stability. But follow-up negotiations in Geneva floundered on the inclusion of cruise missiles and heavy bombers. In 1976 Jimmy Carter came to power seeking lower limits than those negotiated in Vladivostock. Finally, on June 18, 1979, in Vienna, the two leaders signed SALT II, providing for parity and limitation on all aspects of delivery systems. For further information on these agreements and other arms control initiatives, see Fen Osler Hampson, "Arms Control: Achievements, Relevance, and Purpose," in Robert Mathews, Arthur Rubinoff, and Janice Gross Stein, (Eds.), International Conflict and Conflict Management: Readings in World Politics, (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1989) pp. 524-534; David Cox, "Arms Control," in Haglund and Hawes, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-128; and Morris McCain, Understanding Arms Control: the Options, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1989) chapter 6.

⁵U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Text and Histories of Negotiations*. (Washington: 1982).

balance insurance with risk by making propositions to the common adversary.⁶ In other words, to augment the public good of common security provided by the US in the hegemonic security, the West Europeans were keen to gain reinsurance through conciliation and co-operation with the Soviets. In this way, if the supply of security began to decline, the European members of NATO would have a choice of making up the security shortfall or reduce the demand for security through a policy of appeasement. The essence of détente opened a window of opportunity for these European members to pursue such reinsurance.

In addition to arms control, significant other negotiations took place during the period of détente that dramatically changed the European security environment forever. With the election of Willy Brandt and the Social Democrats in West Germany in 1969, three separate series of negotiations got underway with the Soviets: first, discussions between West Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union confirming existing boundaries in Eastern Europe; second, negotiations among the four powers occupying Berlin aimed at normalising the position of the city; and third, discussions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact which would eventually lead to talks on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR).⁷

The U.S. and the Soviet Union based their relationship on the territorial and political status quo in Europe, whereas intra-European détente, to a large degree, was trying to change it.⁸ The Europeans' sense of security was changing such that the preservation of territorial integrity was diminishing relative to political and economic issues. Détente in Europe meant, in actual policy terms, Ostpolitik - the West German

⁶Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, 1984, No. 4

⁷John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, The Soviet Union and The United States: An Interpretive History, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990). Pp. 278-279.

⁸Wolfram Hanrieder, "Transatlantic Security and the European Political Order," in Jackson, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

policy of patient accommodation that refuses to challenge the status quo in Eastern Europe precisely so it can change it.

Détente was particularly attractive to West Germany. It allowed the Federal Republic the same liberty within the American protectorate that Britain and France had always enjoyed. Détente would allow the FRG to adopt a new policy towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that would forever alter East-West relations. Ostpolitik, or eastern policy, sought to mute Soviet hostility by granting Moscow recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe. By satisfying Moscow the FRG simultaneously diminished its dependence on the West, and increased its manoeuvrability in the international system. In essence, the policy of Ostpolitik sought to restore West Germany's full sovereignty and to reunify on its own terms.⁹

At the heart of Ostpolitik was the question of inner-German relations, or Deutschlandpolitik; and central to Deutschlandpolitik was the maintenance of unity of the German state. The two most important achievements for both policies occurred in 1970 and 1972. The first was the treaty between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union in August of 1970, which "recognised the current realities of life" in Eastern Europe, provided for the pacific resolution of all disputes between the signatories, and set the stage for a modus vivendi between the two Germanys. Then in December 1972, the two Germanys signed the Basic Treaty, mutually recognising each other's sovereignty.¹⁰

⁹Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, for example, declined Josef Stalin's 1952 offer to reunite Germany provided it became neutral.

¹⁰Both treaties were accompanied by a 'letter concerning German unity' in which the Federal Republic insisted on its right "to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will regain its unity through free self-determination." Michael Sturmer, "Deutschlandpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Western Alliance: German Perspectives on Détente," in Kenneth Dyson, (Ed.), European Détente: Case Studies of the Politics of East-West Relations, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986) pp. 134-135. In this way, Bonn was able to accommodate East Berlin by accepting the reality of the GDR as a state and dealing with it on the basis of full equality, but at the same time, reiterating its position that there was only one German nation, that East and West German relations could not be the same as those between other countries, and that a treaty between them would have to reflect a kind of coexistence in which the divergence of social and political structures could be arrested.

Ostpolitik became a complementary part of West Germany's security policies, not by restricting or lessening the linkage with NATO and the US, but by accepting the territorial status quo. "The new German Ostpolitik ... filled the policy of détente with German substance in a pan-European perspective."¹¹ By linking the territorial and political realities, the FRG was able to link its security policy with its Eastern policy and therefore develop a more constructive attitude toward arms control and adjust its foreign policy to fit with the dynamics of détente.¹² Quite simply, détente allowed the FRG to reconcile its relationship with the US, its membership of NATO and integration into Western Europe with improved relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

This linkage was an important development to the stability of NATO because there was less of an incentive for the Germans to question the US commitment to Europe. It demonstrated that the extended deterrent aspect of US national security policy could be sustained "precisely because that reassurance depended more and more on political rather than purely military-strategic assessments by the Germans of Soviet intentions and US diplomacy."¹³ Given the Germans realistic assessment of the risks imposed on Western security policy by the nuclear stalemate they ceased pressing the US for reassurance. As a consequence, the Germans supported the SALT 1 agreement; they became active participants in the mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR); and they welcomed the checking of offensive strategic capabilities at the core of SALT II.

The announcement of the NATO dual-track decision on 12 December 1979 foreshadowed the failure of détente. This finally occurred with the invasion of

¹¹Quoted from Angelika Volle, "The Political Debate on Security Policy in the Federal Republic," in Karl Kaiser and John Roper, (eds.) British-German Defence Cooperation: Partners Within the Alliance, (London: Jane's for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1988). p. 41

¹²Wolfram Hanrieder, "Transatlantic Security," in Robert Jackson (ed.), Continuity of Discord: Crises and Responses in the Atlantic Community, (Toronto: Praeger Publishers, 1985). p.34

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 35

Afghanistan by the Soviet Army fifteen days later. The Federal Republic in particular did not want to accept the end of détente and had the most to lose from its abandonment: namely the *modus vivendi* of Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik.¹⁴

For the United States the decade of détente and Ostpolitik accomplished little. For the Europeans it accomplished a great deal. The key benefit gained by the Europeans was the Soviet's shift of focus away from the European theatre to the strategic arms arena and the Third World.¹⁵ Having little to lose the US reacted to the breakdown of détente with sanctions and rearmament. On the other hand, the West Europeans stressed the validity of détente and stressed the need for more of it in times of tension. As the US began to question arms control as a process to stabilise east-west tension, the Europeans continued to view the process as an imperative goal in its own right. If the US was concerned about the deterioration of the global military balance, the Europeans were concerned about the threat to regional peace.

According to Josef Joffe, "the very process of détente was destined to drive the Allies apart because it would offer rewards to the West Europeans that the United States could not possibly share."¹⁶ For the US, Détente and the Cold War were merely variations on the enduring rivalry with the Soviet Union. For the Europeans, the regional conflict in Europe was more limited and therefore less resistant to a partial resolution. For the Europeans there was a trade-off based on the issues of access and acceptance. The Soviets wanted legitimacy for their territorial gains in Europe and for the partition of Europe. The West Europeans wanted access, whether it be social, economic, or diplomatic, to Eastern Europe.

¹⁴ Some Federal politicians attempted to portray Afghanistan as an East-South problem, in order to save European détente. However, the FRG was unable to slow the gradual freezing of East-West relations. The final straw was the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, announced while Chancellor Schmidt was meeting Erich Honecker in the GDR.

¹⁵ Josef Joffe, *The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of the Alliance*, (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1987) p. 7

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 12

By shifting the global East-West competition from Europe, its ancient locus, to the Third World, the Soviet Union lifted the threat and thus the discipline from the European members of the Alliance. By offering them diplomatic access to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union gained peaceful access to Western Europe's prolific resource base - credits, subsidies, technology transfers - which was after all one of the great stakes of the Cold War contest. And by extending co-operative coexistence to the Europeans while denying similar self-restraint to the United States in other areas, the Soviets achieved a separate truce in the world's foremost strategic arena.¹⁷

Despite the return to Cold War rhetoric and the end to reconciliation between the superpowers, the environment within which the ESDI debate was taking place had now changed demonstrably. The crucial difference as compared to the forties, fifties and sixties was that Europe was now the stable and sheltered zone of peace between and amidst the violence beyond its shores. With conflicts over Berlin and Germany safely put to rest through the formal agreements of the 1970s, the West Europeans no longer viewed the Soviet Union as a looming threat but an indispensable partner in détente, balanced against the military dependence on the United States.

THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN PILLAR

While tensions were easing within the European theatre during the period of détente, the US was increasing its rhetoric over burden sharing which led, in part, to the creation of two organisations, the Eurogroup in 1968 and the Independent European Programme Group in 1976. Both these organisations were dedicated to increasing the role of the European allies in providing their own security, particularly within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance security regime. At the same time, outside the Alliance framework, the EC members were forging stronger political ties through the process of European Political Co-operation, a process that began in 1970 and increased in importance throughout the 1970s with the development of the Conference on Security

¹⁷*Ibid.* p. 15. A sub-set of the resulting difference in rewards offered the allies was the different expectations of the outcome of the process of détente. Aware that détente would not change the underlying cause of superpower rivalry, the US essentially pursued a policy of containment / balance of power. For the US détente meant hegemony could be maintained at much less cost.

and Co-operation in Europe. The goal of EPC was to forge a more unified voice on the world stage and to co-ordinate the foreign policies of EC members, independent of the US.

Given the reduced tensions during the period of détente there was less public support in the US to maintain the level of defence forces in Europe. The question of burden sharing had become a key catalyst in the ESDI debate. The Eurogroup was a grouping of ten European governments¹⁸ within the framework of NATO. Its aim was to help strengthen the whole Alliance by seeking "to ensure that the European contribution to the common defence was as strong, cohesive and effective as possible."¹⁹ It provided a forum in which European Defence Ministers could exchange views on major political and security issues and foster practical co-operation through the work of specialist sub-groups.²⁰ It also provided a mechanism through which its members could co-ordinate their defence efforts and rationalise their defence resources, while articulating with one voice their support for the continuing presence of US and Canadian troops in Europe. That voice was also used to advertise Europe's contribution to European defence as a direct response to questions of burden sharing.

The Eurogroup initially formed the European Defence Improvement Program (EDIP) in December 1970 to demonstrate Europe's intention to do more in its own defence. Despite the fact that the EDIP "amounted to little more than the packaging and presentation of nationally planned defence expenditures as part of an increased

¹⁸Initial members were Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and the UK; Portugal and Spain were later members.

¹⁹Eurogroup, Western Defense: The European Role in NATO, (Eurogroup Secretariat, British Delegation to NATO), p. 1

²⁰Subgroups included tactical communications (EUROCOM), logistics (EUROLOG), long-term concepts of operation (EUROLONGTERM), military medicine (EUROMED), defence procurement cooperation by national armaments directors (EURONAD), and joint training (EUROTRAINING). These subgroups provide reports to the Eurogroup defence ministers who meet twice a year, prior to the NATO Defence Planning Committee.

collective European contribution to the alliance's defence effort,"²¹ it proved to be a successful collective challenge by the Europeans to the charges of American politicians bent on wresting US forces out of Europe.

The Eurogroup also provided for a more cost-effective use of defence resources through standardisation. In 1972, the Eurogroup adopted "Principles of Equipment Collaboration," in design and production to harmonise tactical doctrines and develop joint procurement plans. Despite a lack of progress, subgroups continued to work on such matters as operational concepts, training, communications, logistics and military medicine.²²

Some European leaders at the time the Eurogroup was formed tied it to the growing European consciousness in ESDI and the beginning of a "defence establishment of a politically united Western Europe."²³ Yet most members avoided any mention of a distinct group and permanent institutional arrangements. In fact, the Eurogroup's activities confirmed that it was a reflection of Atlanticism. Its success in fostering armaments collaboration has been marginal.

Quite simply, "the Eurogroup suffered from the political handicap of the non-participation of France, which found the Atlanticist premises on which it had been based unacceptable."²⁴ In order to bring France into the fold, the Europeans created another group, the Independent European Programme Group, outside the alliance framework. The IEPG, formed in 1976, was the forum through which all European members of

²¹Buteux, The Role of European Institutions, p. 8

²²*ibid.*, p. 8. It can be argued that the lack of success on joint procurement was the desire by Europeans to reject that an attempt was being made to create a distinct European procurement program at the expense of suppliers from the US because, for all its complaining about burden-sharing, the economic benefits to the US armaments industry under the existing pattern of trade helped strengthen the American commitment and reflected the US hegemonic position.

²³Helmut Schmidt, "Germany in the Era of Negotiations," Foreign Affairs, October 1970, p. 42.

²⁴Buteux, The Role of European Institutions, p. 11

NATO (except Iceland) could discuss and formulate policies designed to achieve greater co-operation in armaments procurement. It was designed to associate France with the Eurogroup but to be independent of both the Eurogroup and NATO. The IEPG reflected a Europeanist approach to burden sharing and was concerned with supported an independent European armaments industry.²⁵

The objectives of the IEPG were to permit efficiency in research, development and procurement; to increase standardisation and interoperability; to support a European defence industrial and technological base; and to encourage a balanced two-way street in armaments co-operation across the Atlantic. Under French insistence the IEPG emphasised inter-operability over standardisation, and favoured procedural methods rather than structural ones. This insistence, coupled with the Carter administration's call for a 'two-way street' in defence trade, marginalized the IEPG.²⁶ NATO remained the primary forum for dialogue on armaments and the mechanism to record the flow of defence trade. The IEPG became simply a reflection of the Eurogroup, while the Carter initiative demonstrated "the continuing strength of the Atlanticist framework and provided an example of the way in which the United States was still able to exercise hegemonic influence."²⁷

The failure of the IEPG to advance very far in its early years is partly attributable to the reluctance of the bigger countries to enter into co-operative ventures, fearing the export of jobs. It was also due to a fear on the part of the Europeans that European co-operation in defence would encourage the US to abandon NATO. As an example, in

²⁵The Group meets at the Defence Ministerial and National Armaments Directors level and works through three panels: harmonization of operational requirements and identification of opportunities for collaboration; research and technology cooperation; and defence equipment market matters including the liberalisation of defence trade. It also has a staff group of national officials based at NATO.

²⁶Carter called for NATO to incorporate a Long Term Defence Programme (LTDP) in the development, production and procurement of defence equipment which created 'families of weapons' which would be co-produced and co-procured on both sides of the Atlantic.

²⁷Buteux, *The Role of European Institutions*, p. 15

June 1984, Senator Sam Nunn introduced a resolution calling for US troop withdrawals if the allies continued to delay the goals of the Long Term Defence Programme. In response, the Europeans commissioned a report to examine how to improve the competitiveness of the European Defence industry. The result was the document Towards a Stronger Europe, published in December 1986 that called for Europeans to co-ordinate research and development and encourage joint ventures. To facilitate this co-operation, the study called for the revival of the idea of a European Arms Procurement Agency in the long run, and an IEPG Secretariat in the short run.

At the Luxembourg meeting of the IEPG in November 1988, Ministers agreed to establish a permanent secretariat in Lisbon and approved an "Action Plan" intended to create an open European armaments market.²⁸ The Plan had few new ideas but the Luxembourg meeting did rejuvenate the IEPG and increasingly tied it to the political agenda of the EC. Both the Eurogroup and IEPG continued the pursuit of a European Pillar as part of the Atlantic partnership model. The appeal of the model was its attraction to both Europeanists and Atlanticists alike. But the model had inherent problems, most notably that European security depended ultimately on the US nuclear deterrent, effectively creating a partnership of unequals.

Increased European co-operation was viewed as contributing to the European's capacity to influence the US, reassure their own publics about defence and to ease economic difficulties. Such co-operation was seen as a way to strengthen and adapt NATO to the political and economic environment of the 1980s, rather than as a means of rendering Europe independent of the need for a US alliance.²⁹ The only security co-operation occurring among the members of the European Community was in name only.

²⁸ Ministerial Communique, Independent European Programme Group, Luxembourg, November 9, 1988. The first stage was completed with the establishment of national 'focal points' whereby countries register as potential suppliers. The second stage was completed by a French led panel which developed a proposal for a jointly funded European Technology Programme leading to the establishment of the European Cooperative Long Term Initiative in Defence (EUCLID) in June 1989.

²⁹ Taylor, European Defence Cooperation, p. 13

In response to calls by Heads of State and Government for possible ways of moving forward on consultation among the Member States on foreign policy issues, the "Davignon report" was presented in 1970 at the Luxembourg Summit. This report was the starting point for European Political Cooperation (EPC), informally launched in 1970 before being enshrined in the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. The establishment of the European Council in 1974 contributed to the coordination of EPC because it gave Heads of State and Government a role in defining the general orientation of Community policy. By 1981, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran brought home to the Member States the growing impotence of the European Community on the international scene. Determined to strengthen EPC, that same year they adopted the London Report that required prior consultation by Member States of each other and the European Commission on all foreign policy matters affecting all Member States.

EPC was a result of two problems of concern to Europe: East-West relations, in particular the process begun by the CSCE, and the increasing tension in the Middle East. These concerns were shared by the UK and used as grounds for its membership in 1973. The British application for membership also demonstrated a linkage between enlargement and political union; political co-operation was seen as a logical step toward political unification. "It appeared to the Ministers that it was in the field of concertation of foreign policies that the first concrete efforts should be made to show the world that Europe has a political vocation."³⁰ For the British and other members, this insistence on an international role would give them a new leadership role in the world and allow them to rise above the failures the Fouchet Plans of the early sixties.

EPC was not a supranational structure but an intergovernmental one, without centralised bodies or coercive implementation. Its aim was not to merge national

³⁰"Report of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Members States on the Problems of Political Unification," *Davignon Report*, 27 October, 1970, Part 1, point 10. *EC Bulletin*, 11/1970. Besides foreign policy cooperation, Political Cooperation was extended to the fight against terrorism (1975) and a European Judicial area (1977).

priorities but to co-ordinate them, as well as to develop common positions and joint action. Thus, policies were implemented in co-existence with national policies. Further, the consensus rule, made the process long and complex, and involved a great deal of compromise, which limited the ability of the twelve to act promptly.

Processes of harmonisation were slow and essentially reactive, decision-making remained in the control of national governments, and there was no consensus on any overall strategy for European foreign policy. It was a case of reaching common positions when it appeared 'possible or desirable'.³¹

The fact remained that the Europeans still lacked any collective political will to seriously explore security and defence options outside the alliance. The EPC was set up as a forum for consultation on foreign policy and while it did have some modest success in achieving a consensus on a wide range of issues, including security in Europe, 'European Identity' in security and defence only acquired a measure of political visibility without gaining any substance. Common positions did emerge on topics such as southern Africa, Cyprus, the Middle East and the CSCE. However, defence matters were excluded and the military aspects of the CSCE Helsinki Final Act were organised through NATO.

Despite these reservations, the process of EPC did push forward the concept of EU as it related to political co-operation. The London Report of December 1981 acknowledged that EPC was entitled to address the "political aspects of security". The report also addressed the EPC's ability to act by agreeing that national staff serving one president would continue to serve his successor so that expertise could be retained.

The EPC also continued to derive significance by operating in areas that had previously been the subject of multilateral European consultation within NATO. One area which the EPC had immediate success was in co-ordinating the EC member's approach to the CSCE.³² The CSCE introduced a number of qualitative changes in the

³¹Taylor, *European Defence Co-operation*, pp. 22-23

³² Structurally, the CSCE is a product of the Cold War. It was a mechanism for European states to conduct relations with each other and with their respective superpowers that would be insulated from the

security situation in Europe. First, the CSCE multilateralized East-West relations. Second, it transcended the bloc-to-bloc mentality of the superpower relationship enabling neutral and non-aligned countries to become full participants in international security. Third, it expanded the pan-European dialogue from the sphere of economics to political, military, environmental and human rights issues. Fourth, it established a continuous dialogue without institutionalised structures. Fifth, it removed some of the drama of East-West relations allowing settlement of more practical issues of human rights. Finally, it allowed two ideological worlds to formulate some common objectives, such as transparency of military activities, and to give a more human dimension to the superpower relationship.³³

In the 1980s the CSCE was a symbol "of the commitment of all participating states to the goal of lowering tension and promoting co-operation across ideological and political barriers."³⁴ During that time it not only survived a renewed confrontation between the superpowers, but also was an instrument for both East and West European states to insulate their relations from that confrontation and to impress upon the superpowers the need for restraint.³⁵

superpower conflict. A key factor in its formation is that it was formed outside of the purview of either superpower; in other words, neither superpower were required or necessarily desired it to be formed. Yet, at the same time, the CSCE is reliant on both superpowers for its maintenance; in other words, it requires the cooperation of both.

³³Victor-Yves Ghebali, "The CSCE in the Post Cold-War Europe," *NATO Review*, (April, 1991) p. 8. There are four 'baskets' associated with the CSCE related to security; economics, science and technology, and the environment; humanitarian issues; and the follow-up process. In the preamble to Basket one, all participating states express their will to improve relations among each other and to overcome "the confrontation stemming from the character of their past relations." They refer to the history of the European states, to their common traditions and values, but also note "the individuality and diversity of their positions and views." Lastly, they call for joint efforts to increase confidence to solve problems and to improve cooperation.

³⁴Karl Birnbaum and Ingo Peters, "The CSCE: A Reassessment of its Role in the 1980s," *Review of International Studies*, 1990, p. 311

³⁵The general rule of procedure was that all participating states would take part in the Conference as sovereign, states under condition of full equality. Specific rules regarding security, developed in the 1984 Stockholm Document, were based on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs). The provisions required the notification of certain military activities at least 42 days in advance; that there be invitations of

The advantages of the CSCE, now referred to as the OSCE (Organisation), as compared to other European institutions, was that it was multilateral, that both superpowers were members, and that the European non-aligned countries participated. No other European forum could boast that it simultaneously encompasses all the member countries of NATO, the EU, the Council of Europe, and the ex-Warsaw Pact countries. This composition reflected the notion of Greater Europe as well as the continent's transatlantic dimension.

The OSCE was also unique in terms of its comprehensive mandate, which embraced the political, military, economic, scientific, technological, ecological, social, humanitarian, cultural, and educational fields. It was a process that converged around the common code of human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule of law, security and economic liberty.

Motivated by the political will, in the interest of peoples, to improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to peace, security, justice and co-operation as well as to rapprochement among themselves and with the other states of the world.³⁶ For most of its life, the CSCE has owned no property, occupied no headquarters, employed no staff, or even possessed a mailing address. As the name implies, it was intended to be a rolling series of meetings bringing senior levels of governments together to discuss and, it was hoped, agree on principles for increasing the security and well being of its member states.³⁷

As a result of the Paris Summit, the OSCE programme in the security field now comprises three elements: confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), the peaceful settlement of disputes, and disarmament. Yet the OSCE's security programme

observers to certain military activities involving 17,000 troops or more; annual calendars of military activities were to be exchanged; and provisions for verification were introduced whereby each state had the right to carry out inspections on the territory of any other state but no state could be forced to allow more than three inspections per year, and not more than one by any single other state.

³⁶*Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act*, Helsinki, 1975, p. 7

³⁷Michael Bryans, "The CSCE and the Future Security in Europe," Working Paper #40, (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, March 1992), p. 2

is still at a rudimentary stage.³⁸ CSBMs continue to provide a tool to partake in security deliberations but they can only be auxiliary to a disarmament programme that is presently beyond the purview of the OSCE. The mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes is an incredible achievement, but it is limited in its field of application and its non-mandatory status.

It was never the aim of the Helsinki process to ensure, let alone guarantee, security in Europe, and the Charter of Paris has done nothing to alter this fundamental fact. Its concern is not collective security, but global security, that is to say, security considered in terms of the interdependence of its economic, ecological and humanitarian, as well as its political and military dimensions... it is by no means qualified to supersede the Atlantic Alliance.³⁹

Recently, the OSCE procedures were revamped to allow it to respond to emergencies. It provides a mechanism in which force levels, and even military doctrines, might be discussed. But its decision-making depends largely on unanimity and therefore it cannot impose its will on one recalcitrant member. It may provide a forum in which agreements cobbled together elsewhere can be endorsed, as well as facilities for private conciliation, but it is unlikely to have much impact on the management of crises.

EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Due to its history and strategic culture particular US views of the world can be criticized in spite of its relative success after the end of the Cold War.⁴⁰ American society is deeply convinced that the world should be governed by the ideals of American liberal democracy. Victory in 1945 and the Soviet collapse in 1989-1991 has given further impetus to this sense of superiority.⁴¹ However, it is impossible for the US to

³⁸From the outset, decision-making in the CSCE has been by consensus. Detractors of the CSCE process have claimed that this consensus or unitary vote paralyses the CSCE in times of crisis and that even if a consensus is reached the CSCE possesses no resources to carry it through.

³⁹Ghebali, *op. cit.*, p. 10

⁴⁰Colin S Gray, *Strategy in the Nuclear Age: The United States, 1945-1991.*, in Murray, W., MacGregor, K., and Berstein, A. The Making of Strategy, (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1994.)

⁴¹Francis Fukuyama, "The End of the History?" (The National Interest , Summer 1989). p. 3-18.

undertake a conflict without the support of the American society as Vietnam War showed. This support has typically demanded short, no-casualties and victorious operations, and has urged the US to use massive force, with a tendency to air power.⁴² Without the clear and present threat of the Soviet Union these tendencies were brought to the forefront.

Through the years, the tendencies exhibited the three central pillars of deterrence, limited war and arms control. However, the elaborations of these pillars have been apolitical due to the trend toward administration rather than to politics.⁴³ The US defense community entered the last decade of the 20th century with the belief in the declining utility of nuclear weapons and the creation of a regionalism strategy with the aim of containing regional disputes as a first priority. But regional containment is not easy to translate into identifiable requirements for strategic utility. Moreover, US policymakers have the notion that conventional deterrence lacks full strategic integrity in an age of nuclear proliferation.⁴⁴

The debate over the political utility of force in the nuclear age has raged in strategic theory ever since the advent of nuclear weapons. Could a nuclear war be fought and won? Since the US and its allies were unwilling to match Soviet strength in conventional weapons in Europe, the security of Western Europe had to be preserved through nuclear deterrence.

⁴²This conception would have his outcome in the World Wars, the SAC conceptions in the 1950s and the air campaign against Iraq. See Bradley Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order. The Global Politics of Deterrence*. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1994). p. 106-112.

⁴³ Gray, *op cit.* p. 596-598.

⁴⁴ Davis, Z. and Reiss, M. U.S. Counterproliferation Doctrine: Issues for the Congress. Congressional Research Service Report 94-734 ENR, September 21, 1994. The tendency to strategic limitation in the role of the US exists in some political, military and social sectors which defend a selective engagement focused on US vital strategic areas, apparent in US military planning such as JSCP (*Joint Strategy Contingencies Planning 1992- 95*). DPGSS (*Defense Planning Guidance Scenario Set 1992-1999*), selecting MRCs (*Major Regional Conflicts*) in Europe, Middle East and Korea, and LRCs (*Lower Regional Conflicts*) in Panama and Phillipines.as models, and counterinsurgency and counternarcotrafic operation. Barry Buzan, Charles Jones., and Richard Little. *The Logic of Anarchy*, (Columbia University Press. N.Y. 1993.) p. 13.

The political reality at the root of the strategic posture of NATO is that basically, as far as military means are concerned, the European allies have sought to provide for their security through deterrence rather than their ability to successfully fight a war on their territory. Credible deterrence, rather than credible defence, has always been the major strategic objective of the European members of the alliance.⁴⁵

The American commitment to extend deterrence, however, had been made when the military superiority of the US was obvious. The problem was how to maintain this commitment once nuclear parity had been established by 1970.⁴⁶

The fact the US no longer had strategic nuclear superiority undermined its capability to support extended deterrence. Nuclear parity had been officially consecrated by the 1972 SALT 1 agreement. The Soviet Union gained the capability to offer a counter-force first strike against American ICBMs, leaving the American President with a choice between surrender or suicidal retaliation. This led the US to think about deterrence by threat of war fighting and limited nuclear war strategies.

The strategy of flexible response remained the cornerstone of NATO strategy, a conventional-minded doctrine that sought to postpone nuclear options as long as possible. Flexible response was desirable to the US because it allowed it to continue its hegemonic position within the alliance. Of course, the Europeans were quick to grasp the implications of this new strategy, with the most pessimistic of them suspecting the intent of the US to limit the geographical scope of the conflict. For the Europeans, however, this was acceptable as long as they received US nuclear protection, guaranteed by the presence of US ground forces. The question remained whether the US would actually

⁴⁵Paul Buteux, *Strategy, Doctrine, and the Politics of Alliance*, (Denver: Westview Press, 1983) pp. 51-52. Deterrence is much more difficult to achieve once it seeks to cover a third country as opposed to concentrating on prevention of attack on one's own soil. Distance will also exacerbate the difficulty of extended deterrence, such that if the country to which deterrence is being extended is adjacent to the country being deterred but is remote from the country providing the deterrence, then the credibility of that deterrence can be questioned.

⁴⁶Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987) pp. 151-52. When the US had nuclear weapons dominance in the fifties and the sixties the Soviets applied a warfighting doctrine in order to have a credible deterrent. The US believed in assured destruction because they felt they could control the strategic environment through fear. When parity arrived it was unclear whether the Soviets dropped warfighting, meanwhile the US had the problem of Soviet predominance in conventional forces. Thus, the US adopted a warfighting doctrine to add to their credibility.

carry out a nuclear retaliation due to fear of escalation. For the Europeans, however, the stationing of US troops in Europe ensured that the US would use nuclear weapons to defend them and provided much needed credibility. These ground forces were described as a 'trip wire' to trigger US nuclear forces.⁴⁷As such, the allies were reluctant to increase drastically their own conventional strength for fear of giving the US the option of pulling out its ground forces. Yet, it was very clear that American strategic doctrine from the mid 1970s onwards would search for ways to break out of the debilitating effects of nuclear parity and gain control of the escalation process towards the nuclear option.

The development of US strategic doctrine during the Reagan Administration was accused of "radical departures from the traditional objectives of U.S. nuclear strategy."⁴⁸ In fact, the US had been gradually shifting away from deterrence since the 1960s, moving towards an emphasis on response options equivalent to the level of Soviet aggression. Hence, the doctrine during this transition phase emphasised limited strategic options, counter-military and counter-political control targeting, post-attack continuity of government, and the potential for waging a prolonged nuclear conflict.⁴⁹ Indeed, the Reagan administration was demonstrating continued adherence to the Countervailing Strategy of Presidential Directive 59 established in 1980.⁵⁰

⁴⁷Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983) p. 290

⁴⁸Leon Sloss and Marc Millot, "U.S. Nuclear Strategy in Evolution," Strategic Review, (Winter, 1984) p. 19

⁴⁹Keith Payne, "Does the United States Need a Nuclear Warfighting Doctrine and Strategy," in Keith Dunn and William Staudenmaier, Military Strategy in Transition: Defense and Deterrence in the 1980s, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984) pp. 166-67

⁵⁰The Countervailing Strategy encompassed three specific changes designed to reinforce to the Soviets that victory was not possible. The first was to increase the emphasis on counter-leadership targeting. The second change was in counter-military targeting. By the end of the 1970s the total nuclear warhead count still favoured the U.S. but the number of Soviet launchers far surpassed the U.S. The third change was the reduced emphasis and new objectives in industrial targeting. Instead of targeting to impede recovery, economic targeting concentrated on destroying logistics and industries providing immediate support to the enemy war effort. For further information see Scott Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) pp. 50-53

By the end of the 1970s, NATO chose to link deployment of new weapons systems with arms control, in order to overcome its security dilemmas. The SU had deployed intermediate range, land-based missiles (SS-20s). Within the context of the strategic review that culminated in PD 59, NATO decided in 1979 to respond by deploying land-based cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in Europe unless an agreement could be reached.

The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF (theatre nuclear forces) build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defence and thus maintain the security of its member states.⁵¹

This became known as the dual-track approach that caused an uproar in media and public circles in Europe, leading to a serious examination of the American guarantee. The US viewed this as ironic given that the decision to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles was a way of reassuring the Europeans of the strength of extended deterrence. In addition, the arms control approach, if successful, promised to alleviate key problems of credibility with flexible response by ensuring strategic parity.

Intermediate nuclear forces were seen as an important link between the defence of Europe and the US strategic forces. The Europeans were afraid that a conventional war could escalate to the tactical nuclear level without escalating to the strategic level, thus not affecting the territories of the two superpowers. Yet, INF levels had a great deal to do with Soviet perceptions of deterrence and the unity of the alliance. The deployment figures had to be high enough to create doubts for Soviet planners about the possible success of a pre-emptive strike while being low enough that they would not decouple the US strategic guarantee.⁵²

⁵¹NATO, *Communique of the Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers*, December 12, 1979). In order not to provoke an escalatory response from the Warsaw Pact, NATO paralleled the modernisation decision with a willingness to establish a mutually acceptable balance of theatre nuclear forces through arms control talks.

⁵²Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984). p. 35

The silent nuclear battle in the Alliance is about influence and insulation. The deadly logic of nuclear weapons bids the United States to tacitly distinguish between its own territory and that of its allies. If deterrence does fail, war must be limited in time, intensity, and space. If there has to be war, it must come to an end before it crosses the nuclear threshold. If war does become nuclear, it must be terminated before it crosses the Atlantic Ocean. The same logic, however, bids the Europeans to deny their patron such freedom of choice. To buttress deterrence, the gulf of geography and sovereignty must be closed. To avoid victimisation in a limited war, there must be no exit for the United States. If American strategy has relentlessly searched for additional options, the Europeans have just as obsessively looked for additional chains to keep their protector's fate tied to their own.⁵³

In the end, public opinion did not prove to be a decisive barrier to NATO modernisation, as the vocal opposition remained a minority. The Soviet Union also miscalculated when it thought that it could prevent the modernisation by exploiting Western nuclear anxieties. Soviet intransigence at the bargaining table only served to strengthen NATO's hand because the Western European leadership believed that the Soviet Union was attempting to stop the modernisation by suspending arms control. The result was a test of alliance solidarity in which Soviet intimidation united rather than divided NATO.⁵⁴

The proponents of war-fighting options contended that to maintain a credible deterrent it was beneficial to possess the capability to meet military threats with a range of overlapping nuclear and non-nuclear responses. This flexible strategy would serve to increase uncertainty in the minds of Soviet planners while reassuring the Europeans of

⁵³Josef Joffe, *op.cit.*, p. 50. There were three fundamental reasons why NATO needed to pursue arms control as part of its modernisation approach. First, parliamentary, hence public, acceptance of modernisation would have been difficult without a willingness to pursue arms control. Second, many Alliance members felt it was in their interest to preserve the 'twin-pillar intent of the Harmel report: defence and détente. Third, many NATO planners were aware that modernisation would prove ineffective if it generated Soviet force structure improvements.⁵³ Despite professions to the contrary, many commentators at the time suspected NATO of having adopted the dual-track approach only to ensure that domestic opposition would not undermine the modernisation program. While formally expressing a desire for negotiated limitations with the Soviet Union, the US was increasingly seen as wanting to use the process only as a means of achieving the new deployments in the face of European wavering. For the US, the necessity was to ensure that the deployments went ahead; if negotiations were to have any chance of promoting security, they would only be successful after the deployments had begun in 1983.

⁵⁴*Ibid.* p. 161

the American commitment. But European detractors argued that the US might sacrifice Europe by containing the conflict there through the use of limited nuclear options to prevent hostilities involving North America.⁵⁵

One can see the evolution of war fighting as a natural progression on the part of the U.S. and not one of radical departures. With the development of technology to the point where nuclear war could be waged and won; the perceived Soviet belief in war fighting; and the advent of parity, the U.S. had no choice but to adopt a war-fighting strategy. Whether war fighting solved the problem of extended deterrence is beside the point. The U.S. needed a credible strategy to use nuclear weapons with success otherwise they would prove ineffective.

Whatever the response, one thing was always in the back of Western European minds:

If Western Europe provided its own nuclear deterrence, then the intractable credibility problems of extended deterrence would be replaced by the considerably less demanding problems of adjacency. In any system, the need for extended deterrence will decline as more centres of power provide their own deterrence.⁵⁶

Thus, the problems caused by extended deterrence were a result of bipolarity; an end to bipolarity would logically lead to an end of the problems. While there was no evidence that the US would cease to use nuclear threats to deter nuclear attacks, there was reason to believe that the commitment to deter conventional attacks with nuclear threats was on the decline.⁵⁷ In addition to the INF and dual-track approach, other events in the 1980s raised more doubts about the US commitment to Western Europe. On 23 March

⁵⁵Richard Burt, "New Weapons Technologies: Debate and Directions" in *Adephi Paper 126*, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976) p. 23

⁵⁶Buzan, *Introduction to Strategic Studies*, p. 190

⁵⁷In 1982, four former U.S. senior policy-makers advocated a policy of no-first-use regarding nuclear weapons. See McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara and Gerald Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, (Spring, 1982). Two years previous to that, a senior member of the Administration had written an article sympathetic to no-first-use just prior to Reagan taking office. See Fred Ikle, "NATO's First Nuclear Use: a Deepening Trap?" *Strategic Review*, (Winter 1980).

1983 Reagan announced the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) that was inherently contrary to European security interests. The principle of shared risk and extended nuclear deterrence were inimical to the SDI's rhetorical objective of "rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete" through strategic defences.⁵⁸ The announcement signalled the apparent intention of the US to switch from a military posture based on offence to one based on defence. Instead of relying only on its strategic nuclear forces to deter war, the US wanted to adopt a defensive posture whereby the cities and especially the strategic forces on the continental US would be effectively defended. The US Secretary of Defence argued, "strategic defence represents a change of strategy, for a more secure deterrent. It offers a far safer way to keep the peace."⁵⁹

The emphasis placed on the defence of the continental US implied the security of Western Europe was becoming less important. In the words of Louis Deschamps, "SDI has, for the first time, made the European question peripheral to the Americans' perception of their territorial security interests."⁶⁰ The presence of US troops in Europe was still an obvious incentive to remain committed but growing domestic pressure for US troop withdrawal, in addition to complaints about burden-sharing, suggested the potential of drastic reductions in the number of troops stationed in Europe. Even if US troops did remain, there was no guarantee of escalation; the US could simply decide to fight a conventional war in Europe. In short, SDI threatened to alter the basis on which the security of Western Europe had been ensured since the end of WWII.

The Reykjavik summit of 1986 added to the impetus for European co-operation. The attempted deal between Reagan and Gorbachev, without consultation with the European allies, to abolish ballistic nuclear weapons, would have suspended the

⁵⁸Speech by Ronald Reagan, 23 March 1983, in Louis Deschamps, The SDI and European Security Interests, (London: Croom Helm for the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1987), pp. 31ff.

⁵⁹Caspar Weinberger, "US Defense Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 4, (Spring 1986). p. 679

⁶⁰Louis Deschamps, The SDI and European Security Interests, Atlantic Paper No. 62, (London: Croom Helm, 1987). p. 50

operation of extended nuclear deterrence. With SDI, European leaders could draw comfort from the fact that US nuclear weapons would continue to ensure their security. They were, therefore, flabbergasted that President Reagan almost agreed to eliminate nuclear weapons completely.

The following year arms control negotiations reached their fruition with the signing of the INF Treaty.

The INF Treaty challenges the 'seamless web' of deterrence that is supposed to operate through the links in the NATO triad between conventional forces, theatre forces and strategic nuclear weapons. The perception that there has been a weakening of the link between US strategic weapons and the alliance's forces in Europe is widespread. Finally, not only has the military credibility of flexible response been weakened, but so has its political credibility as well. The INF Treaty was a watershed in a process of strategic change that has altered the balance of security risks and political commitments within the alliance.⁶¹

The problem of extended deterrence related to a serious examination of the viability of the transatlantic security regime. Expectations about the use of nuclear weapons had changed and with it the principle of shared risks and responsibilities. The volume of US defence spending, greatly increased under Reagan, induced European suspicions that Washington was not interested in arms control but preferred to defeat Moscow through an unbearable arms race. Reagan's lack of interest in SALT II, reluctance to initiate START and INF negotiations, and his enthusiasm for military programmes in space, all supported these suspicions.

The crisis of the 1980s was over the terms of the alliance. The US wanted to recentralize the alliance in the service of neo-containment while insisting that the Europeans remain, at a minimum, benevolently neutral; in other words, to abstain "from policies that would act as an impediment to the restoration of America's power and position, whether in Europe or in the world beyond."⁶² The West Europeans wanted to

⁶¹Buteux, *Regimes, Incipient Regimes*, p. 20

⁶²Joffe, *op.cit.*, p. 31

be left out of America's battles and preferred to recentralize the Americans under the service of East-West co-operation; in other words, a return to détente.

GENSCHER-COLUMBO, THE WEU, AND THE SEA

All these developments regarding extended deterrence, the resumption of Cold War politics, and burden sharing impressed upon the European allies the need for their own security co-operation. The 1981 Genscher-Columbo initiative expressed the desire to take steps, within the framework of EPC, to co-ordinate the positions of the member states on the political and economic aspects of security. Genscher and Columbo (the German and Italian Foreign Ministers) suggested extending the present pattern of political co-operation among the then ten members of the Community into the security sphere, with the direct involvement of defence ministers.⁶³

The assumption behind these arguments was that the USSR was an enemy to be destroyed by economic means if possible, whereas the West Europeans, with the exception of Margaret Thatcher, worked on the assumption that the best way of dealing with the USSR was to enmesh it in a web of interdependence.⁶⁴

Discussions were difficult and often acrimonious. When they concluded with the adoption of a *Solemn Declaration on EU* in Stuttgart on 18 June 1983, Political Co-operation had been relegated to discussing only the political and economic aspects of security with defence policy questions remaining a NATO preserve. The reason for the failure was that three of the then ten members, Ireland, Denmark and Greece, could not agree to move forward on the issue.

⁶³ John Roper, "European Defence Cooperation," in Catherine Kelleher and Gale Mattox, (eds.), *Evolving European Defence Policies*, (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1987) p.40

⁶⁴ George, *op. cit.*, p. 56. In particular, Reagan was unhappy about the proposed Siberian gas pipeline to Western Europe, which was a joint effort between the USSR and a number West European governments. It produced a serious conflict when Poland declared martial law in 1981. The US announced economic sanctions including a ban on natural gas technology. When US companies claimed they were in an unfair position, Reagan extended the ban to all US subsidiaries and foreign companies producing US products under licence. Because most of the technology for the pipeline was US in origin, it essentially blocked its construction, and lead to a united outcry from the EC. The US eventually backed down with the agreement from the West Europeans that they would not enter into any new agreements.

Yet Genscher-Columbo was not the only aspect of European co-operation in the early eighties. In 1984, the French led the effort to reactivate the WEU with the intent that what the members of the EC could not do, the seven members of the WEU could.⁶⁵ Yet, the reactivation was also a recognition by all seven WEU members that there could be no credible defence of the West without the Atlantic Alliance. The reactivation was also in response to French concerns of an increasingly pacifist German policy following the INF debate and desire for a forum in which they could consult with their European allies outside the alliance. France had sustained its interest in the WEU throughout the years from de Gaulle to the Socialist governments. In turn, the Germans required a demonstration of 'European will' to deflect US criticism and to prompt France to modify its special role in the Alliance and Europe.⁶⁶

A dual aspect emerged from the start of the process to relaunch the WEU. In the WEU's Rome Declaration of October 27 1984 the foreign and defence ministers re-affirmed their commitment to the progressive integration of Europe and to the "continuing necessity to strengthen Western Security." Referring to the later, they pointed to the Atlantic Alliance as the foundation of Western security that had:

permitted the construction of Europe; [thus], a better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and to the greater solidarity among its members.⁶⁷

This statement made clear that the leaders did not want to relaunch the organisation outside the framework of NATO. In particular, the foreign and defence ministers highlighted the irreplaceable role of US conventional and nuclear forces in the defence

⁶⁵Belgium, France, FRG, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK. The WEU was organised in the form of a council which would meet regularly at the ministerial and ambassadorial level; a staff and working groups would assist the council; and a parliamentary assembly would gather four times a year.

⁶⁶Arsenio, *The Western EU*, p. 19

⁶⁷Western EU, *Rome Declaration*, October 27, 1984

of Europe, while the Europeans had a major responsibility in the conventional and nuclear defence of the Alliance.

The Declaration also gave the Council the right to consider the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world; and pointed out that the WEU was the only 'parliamentary' body mandated to discuss defence matters. The WEU was successful in co-ordinating its members' naval activities in response to events in the Gulf region from 1987-88. This success demonstrated that the WEU could act as effective European forum for co-operation in crisis situations where members' security interests were affected.⁶⁸ However, individual countries would still carry out any operation.

Since France was not a full member of the Atlantic Alliance it felt a growing need to concert with her European partners within a different forum. The six other members were seeking a rapprochement with France at a time when important decisions regarding Europe's security had to be taken. Since the consultation process could not take place either within the Alliance or the Community, the only viable alternative at the time was the WEU.⁶⁹ Sir Geoffrey Howe, the UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs put the WEU role into perspective.

We don't want WEU unnecessarily to duplicate work that is done just as well or better elsewhere. We don't want it to upset our other partners in the Alliance. We don't want it to become obsessed with institutional problems at the expense of the practical contribution, which is the vital one. The NATO Alliance itself must remain the decision-making forum for defence matters. A more effective WEU must bring more, not less, strength to the Alliance.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Alfred Cahen, The Western EU and NATO: Building a European Defence Identity Within the Context of Atlantic Solidarity, (London: Brassey's, 1989), p. 6

⁶⁹ Jacques Poos, "Prospects for the WEU," NATO Review, (August 1987) p. 16. One of the key issues at the time of reactivation was collocation of all agencies and personnel. Most governments proposed that the collocation be in Brussels, so that it could associate with the Alliance. But this proposal was rejected by the French for the very reason that they did not want the WEU to be seen as being too closely identified with NATO.

⁷⁰ Howe, "The Atlantic Alliance," p. 9

In 1987, the members decided to create a single agency under the WEU's Secretary General to study problems of arms control, security, and armaments co-operation. This objective was detailed in "The Platform on European Security Interests," and, once again, was largely the result of French insistence.⁷¹ It was also a consequence of the recent diplomatic developments between the two superpowers, specifically the Reykjavik summit.

The most significant statement in the 'Platform' was that European integration would remain incomplete as long as it did not include defence. Such a statement addressed the Europeanist agenda and could be seen as a way of broadcasting a Europeanist programme. However, some have viewed the revitalised WEU as an expression of a much stronger and more independent European pillar within the Atlantic security regime. Differences between the members over the balance between the pillar and the Alliance, coupled with disagreement over the future political agenda of the Union, limited the WEU's ability to express European security and defence in a unified manner. As was the case with the Eurogroup and the IEPG and all previous expressions of a distinctly independent ESDI, the majority of its members' resistance to undermine the transatlantic security regime hampered the effectiveness of the WEU.

Despite these intentions the WEU has had difficulty in staking certain claims. Those European NATO members not part of the WEU have difficulty with the WEU's stated claim to be the European pillar; fearing a WEU decision might be taken that will affect them as well. Within the WEU itself, some members viewed reactivation to be

⁷¹Western EU, *Platform on European Security Interests*, (The Hague: October 27, 1987). The Platform described the intention of the member states to assume full responsibilities in Western defence by strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance; in arms control and disarmament, in accordance with the Alliance's declaration of 12 June 1987 on the elimination of INF missiles; and in East-West relations by exploiting the possibilities for dialogue and cooperation as contained in the Helsinki Final Act. To assist in organizing and pursuing the Platform's objectives, the Brussels' meeting of November 1989 set up a "WEU Institute for Security Studies". Its tasks included research on European security; promoting an awareness of European security issues through courses and seminars; organizing meetings with institutes in countries outside of Western Europe; establishing a database on defence efforts of WEU members; and to contribute to academic work on European security.

desirable only if it was closely linked to NATO, while others viewed it as acceptable only if it remained independent of NATO. Another issue was the overlapping responsibilities between the WEU and other organisations. Since all members of WEU were also members of the EC, the risk of duplication was high. The amended Brussels Treaty made special reference to avoiding such duplication:

In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any organs by them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with NATO. Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice.⁷²

During this same period of time, on the more general political front, the Single European Act (SEA) was taking shape in the confines of the EC. The SEA was of particular importance to political co-operation because it gave the EPC a full legal basis and a status comparable to that of the European Community. Indeed, for the first time in the history of European integration, co-operation in foreign policy was given the same emphasis as economic integration. Although the two aspects were kept distinct, "they are both considered as foundations on which to build the EU that the twelve member countries set out as their objective in the preamble to the Act."⁷³

Article 30(1) of the SEA describes the objective of the EPC as being to jointly formulate and implement European foreign policy. This commitment was important because it was the first time that the notion of a 'European foreign policy' was recognised. Article 30(6a) states that "closer co-operation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters." In qualifying this statement article 30(6c) confirmed that this

⁷²Article IV of the amended Brussels Treaty. The Rome Declaration attempted to provide for a division of labour: the WEU would primarily impart "political impulses" to cooperation in the armaments sector while the Eurogroup and IEPG would be in charge of implementation of projects. However, this division proved artificial as the work by the IEPG was moved to a high level because of the participation of defence ministers. Therefore, the IEPG retained similar opportunities for "political impulses".

⁷³Italian Ambassador Giovanni Jannuzzi, "European Political Cooperation: Moving Towards Closer Integration," NATO Review, (August, 1988) p.12

closer co-operation shall not impede closer co-operation in the field of security between certain of the High Contracting Parties within the framework of the Western EU or of the Atlantic Alliance.

Article 30 intensified bilateral collaboration, demonstrated by the French-German Joint Defence Council, as well as broader discussions through the EPC and WEU. The SEA struck a blow for federalism with a force that many of its signatories did not foresee. In place of the parliament's previous right to be at best "consulted" by the Council of Ministers, the Single European Act gave Euro-MPs the right to a second reading of some important categories of draft legislation. It gave them a particularly strong hand when they could muster an absolute majority, and the commission's support, behind an amendment. Then, the Council of Ministers could overrule the parliament only by a unanimous vote of all 12 member-countries.

The SEA also gave the Commission the right to be represented at meetings of the EPC that Jacques Delors, used to enter into the defence debate.

It is noteworthy that Title III of the Single European Act, which deals with European Political Co-operation, contains specific reference to the co-ordination of political and economic aspects of security and a commitment to the maintenance of the technological and industrial conditions necessary for it. When this is coupled with references in the Preamble to international peace and security, and when Title II can be read as expanding the basis for Community-wide arms procurement programmes within the framework of Community industrial policy, then it can be seen that a legal and, indeed, political base for an expanded Community role in defence collaboration has been established.⁷⁴

However, the fact remained that all members would continue to resist Community constraints on policies which were seen as vital to national interests or which limited defence interests outside of Europe. As long as NATO existed there was no need to extend powers to the Community that would compromise the alliance.

⁷⁴Buteux, The Role of European Institutions, p. 27.

Chapter Four

DEFENCE INDEPENDENCE: EUROPEAN SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR

Posturing began after the democratic revolutions in 1989 when all parties could see the inevitable end of the Cold War. The re-emergence of historical frames of reference from beneath the Cold War overlay has been the most significant European political development of the 1980s, causing awkward issues of definition for policy-makers in the 1990s. Western Europe had been defined by institutional structures provided by an American hegemon with the division of Europe defined by Soviet intransigence. This stable framework allowed for the gradual institutionalisation of economic and social interaction within Western Europe. By the 1980s, however, these institutional adjustments became the impetus for further integration, rather than the security objectives that had started the process.

At Maastricht - and repeated in NATO's 1991 New Strategic Concept - it was agreed that the WEU would act as both the defence arm of the EU and the tool through which the European Pillar of NATO would be strengthened. This dual role, however, papered over the question of whether ESDI was going to be built inside or outside the framework of the Alliance. Underlying the discussions over institutional relationships was a more fundamental discussion about whether the US could be counted on to support European interests if they were threatened, or whether Europe needed to be able to act on its own.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, and throughout the last decade of the 20th century, a number of key developments and agreements occurred that responded to the 'new world order' envisioned followed the fall of the Berlin Wall. These developments and agreements have formed the cornerstone of what is today, the new ESDI, as opposed to the old ESDI that existed during the Cold War. At the beginning of the decade were two seminal agreements: the Rome Declaration (NATO) and the

Maastricht Treaty on EU, which set the agenda for the new European security environment. Next, toward the end of the decade were three key agreements: the Amsterdam Treaty, the Madrid Declaration, and the Washington Declaration. Throughout the entire period, the development of three potential European defence organizations: the WEU and the EuroCorps, representing a more Europeanist approach; and the Combined Joint Task Forces, representing a more Atlanticist approach were all affected by the five major agreements. The following section examines these five agreements and three organizations to bring to date the current status of ESDI.

THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The end of the Cold War saw a fundamental rethinking of the nature of security, with less emphasis being placed on military aspects of security, and more being given to non-military or 'soft' aspects of security. This marked a logical progression from the collapse of the bloc system marked by its vying nuclear-armed alliances to a more complex multipolar, and perhaps less secure, international system. Not unnaturally, the immediate post-Cold War years were also accompanied by speculation about the role of the U.S. which had survived the Cold War with its superpower status largely intact. The ushering in however of a more general definition of security appeared to diminish the compelling need for expensive U.S. military commitments to Europe and elsewhere and gave rise to concerns of a latter day Wilsonian-type neo-isolationism.

It is now clear that the conditions for the new security environment began with the ascendancy to power of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985. With his subsequent position as President of the USSR in 1990 he was able to push forward with his policies of Perestroika and glasnost that introduced "new thinking" in both domestic and foreign policies.¹ In foreign affairs this new thinking included superpower military equality; collective security and a shared

¹Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, (New York: Harper and Row, 1988)

destiny in the future of the world; arms control and the reduction of weapons to reasonable sufficiency; a strengthened role for the UN in settling Third World conflicts; and the need to dispel fears of Soviet aggression.²

By the end of 1990, as this new thinking spread, democratic change swept communists from power throughout Eastern Europe. The fall of the Berlin Wall and unification of Germany symbolised the end of the Cold War. By March 1991, the Warsaw Treaty Organization was abolished and its former members no longer classified as adversaries.³ By December 1991 the demise and break-up of the Soviet Union was unalterable as the Soviet Flag was replaced with the Russian Flag atop the Kremlin.

After Bill Clinton took office in 1993 there was a change in attitude in the American psyche. The new President embraced the idea of a stronger ESDI, seeing it as a means of addressing concerns about burdensharing on the part of the European members of the Alliance. For ESDI to work, Clinton argued it would need to be based on the concept of "separable but not separate" European capabilities in order to avoid a wasteful duplication of defense structures. Implicit in Clinton's approach was a reaffirmation that U.S. and European security interests remained linked, even in the more benign post-Cold War environment. Therefore, it was essential to both dispute the impression that the US would not "be there" when major threats emerged and the belief that NATO was a barrier to the assumption of greater responsibility by its European members.

The most fundamental challenge facing European security was the collapse of the Soviet Union. It created a void into which dangerous forces such as nationalistic tendencies have crept. The situation in the former Yugoslavia is a prime example of nationalistic tendencies in the emerging European states system and the need for the

²Vadim Medish, *The Soviet Union*, 4th Ed., (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1991) p. 336

³*The London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance*, issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 6 July 1990.

present security institutions to adjust their mandates. Some writers have argued that the end of the Cold War will lead to more 'hot' wars in Europe. John Meirsheimer argues that the absence of war in Europe since 1945 has been a consequence of three factors: bipolarity; military equality between the superpowers; and the fact that each of those superpowers was armed with large nuclear arsenals. Bipolarity meant only one point of friction had to be managed, that between the superpowers, leaving less room for miscalculation.⁴ In a multipolar world, on the other hand, shifting coalitions would repeatedly force adversaries to re-learn how their opponents define their interests, re-negotiate new accords, and re-establish new rules of competitive conduct. A multi-power world is always more liable to go wrong than a two-power one, because it means that any big foreign-policy decision has to take into account the possible reaction not just of the other power but of several, and the risk that all these reactions may collide with each other.

Yugoslavia represented the realization that the EU was unable even to articulate a common policy. To advocates of EU this failure underlined the urgency to set about building a single foreign and defence policy. More realistically, it underlined the difficulty of achieving one. The big EU states did not think their interests were synonymous with a pan-European interest. Thus, two fundamental tenets of the EU, the ability to act as a coherent force in world affairs and its desirability, were stopped in their tracks.⁵ Yugoslavia also highlighted a structural problem for the EU: the difficulty of managing a foreign policy that has to be discharged through a bevy of foreign ministers, the composition of which changes each six months.⁶ The hard fact for the EU to accept was that its role diminished as the war continued. Its mechanisms for political cooperation kept the twelve aligned but did not persuade proactive joint policies.

⁴ John Meirsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, Summer, 1990 (Vol. 15, No. 1) pp. 6-7

⁵ John Parker, "Reinventing Europe," *The World in 1994*, pp. 16-17

⁶ "Bosnia: A Text Book Written in Blood," *The Economist*, February 26th, 1994, p. 20

For NATO, Bosnia raised acute questions about military purpose and collective political will. It demonstrated that no state drops its sovereign will to decide when and where to go to war. Part of NATO's success was the development of military arrangements binding together allied forces in Europe against the clear and present threat of the FSU. For Bosnia, no similar mechanism existed to bring members to agree whether such a war merited common action.

Bosnia also demonstrated the significance of individual players in providing European security. Germany was powerless, while Britain and France could not mount wider operations without the US. Yet, America's initial hesitation over Bosnia demonstrated a change in US attitudes: first, that America simply took a pragmatic view of their interests; and second, that America is starting to feel it is high time Europeans learned to look after themselves.

Meanwhile, policy-makers in Russia are now united in rebuilding Russia's influence, not only in the former Soviet Union, but also in the wider world. In President Yeltsin's state-of-the union address on February 24th 1994, Russia's new pride was evident: "Russia has not yet taken its proper place in the world ... Only a strong Russia can guarantee stability in the former Soviet Union. The World also needs a strong Russia."⁷ As such Russia continues to seek "a special agreement with NATO corresponding to the position and role of Russia in world and European affairs," and to their "military might and nuclear status."⁸

The West has a difficult line to draw between discouraging the rebuilding of an empire and accepting some traditional big-power assertiveness. Russia remains a huge regional power, with legitimate interests and a potentially powerful role to play in the world. The West needs a Russia secure inside its current borders.

⁷Quoted in "Russia Reaches Out," *The Economist*, February 26th, 1994, p. 49

⁸Statement by Mr. Yeltsin on April 9th, in "Russian Foreign Policy: A Tantrum Postponed," *The Economist*, April 16th, 1994, p. 54

From 1989 onwards it was apparent that the US saw NATO as the central security organization in Europe, in part as a counterweight to the British and French concerns about German reunification, but also as a means of maintaining influence within Europe. The U.S. conception of post-Cold War security 'architecture' preceded any European versions of ESDI. In the US Secretary of State's 1989 description of the 'new security architecture' he stressed:

“hopes for a Europe whole and free are tinged with concern by some that a Europe undivided may not necessarily be a Europe peaceful and prosperous. Many of the guideposts that brought us securely through four sometimes tense and threatening decades are now coming down. Some of the divisive issues that once brought conflict to Europe are reemerging.”⁹

For regional powers, the end of the struggle between the superpowers has dramatically changed their strategic landscape. Superpowers had provided almost total protection and their disappearance has thus reduced the security of these regional powers, increasing the incentive for them to resort to individualistic policies.¹⁰ Regional powers are now less constrained in seeking their own alignments and to develop their own foreign policy, as the cases of Iraq and Serbia have shown. This development is reflected in NATO's post-Cold War policy in which the 1999 Strategic concept envisions the possibility of multiple threats from a variety of regions requiring power projection outside of the alliance's traditional area.

Europe's primary value to the United States in this new world order is to provide moral and practical support to U.S. global policy. Europe is now a partner with a strategic value for the flexibility and adaptability of the US forces in addressing American national interests.¹¹ European maintenance of its own force levels was vital to sustain

⁹ Address by James A. Baker III, U.S. Secretary of State, to the Berlin Press Club, 12 Dec. 1989, quoted

¹⁰ See, for example, Desmond Ball: “Arms and Affluence, Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region”, *International Security*, V. 18, N. 3, Winter 1993/94; Richard Betts: “The New Threat of Mass Destruction”, *Foreign Affairs*, V. 77, N. 1, 1998, pp. 26-41

¹¹ At the end of the Cold War, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Colin Powell created the Atlantic Force under the Base Force Plan. This Atlantic Force placed forces on the European side of the ocean but not exclusively for use in Europe but also for the Middle East and South-West Asia.

the American will to deploy across the Atlantic. This meant the US, with its European allies would endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would be sufficient to generate global power. This posture was repeated in the 1998 NSSD: "The United States will not allow a hostile power to dominate any region of critical importance to our interests"¹²

With the end of the Cold War, the former opposition between East and West transformed into a broader, inclusive concept of security in the interests of the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole. This concept has involved the participation of Central and Eastern European countries and of former neutral or non-aligned countries, as well as NATO member countries. Another major factor as part of this context has been the growing importance of crisis management, peacekeeping and peacesupport operations. Finally, further developments to exert a major influence on the restructuring of security was the wish expressed by a significant number of Central and Eastern European countries to become members of the Alliance, followed by the decision by NATO countries to open the Alliance to new members.

TALE OF TWO CITIES: ROME AND MAASTRICHT

The 1991 Maastricht Treaty was a significant development towards ESDI and officially launched the EU.¹³ However, Maastricht did not embody the dreams of the

Powell thought that European acceptance of this role for US forces and the European tolerance of the training required for it, was crucial to US Congress and public opinion acceptance of the maintaining of a rather high defense.

¹² President William Clinton. National Security Strategy for a New Century. The White House. Washington D.C. October 1998. p. 5.

¹³The political ambition contained in Title V (Articles J.1 to J.11) of the Treaty on EU is to establish an active common foreign and security policy which must enable the Union, speaking with a single voice, to fulfil the hopes which were created by the end of the Cold War and to face the new challenges presented by the upheavals in the international arena... This comprehensive approach has a single institutional framework, with the Council and the Commission both taking responsibility for coordination. The effectiveness of the decision-making process will be increased by applying the Council's working methods to the common foreign and security policy and be allowing a qualified majority for joint actions; in the case of common foreign and security policy decisions requiring unanimity, the Member States will, as far as possible, avoid standing in the way of a unanimous decision where there is a qualified majority in favour of that decision. Commission of the

Euro-federalists because it did not even represent a shift of sovereign powers to Brussels. Rather, Maastricht represented a joint exercise of pooled sovereignty where members ultimately retained the right of veto. A re-centralization of power seemed to have taken place within the states at the expense of representative institutions that have found it more difficult to control ministers and civil servants in their dealings with Brussels.

For example, the Union's "federal goal" was deleted, in favour of "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, where decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens." In addition, the clause declaring that the two intergovernmental 'pillars' - for foreign and internal security - would merge with the Community, were deleted. Still another example was the support for subsidiarity, such that the EU should act only if "the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member-states and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community."¹⁴

The section of the Treaty related specifically to defence is Article J.4:

- 1) The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.
- 2) The Union requests the Western EU (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union that have defence implications...
- 4) The policy of the Union in accordance with this article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

New rules will encourage common policies. In the end, Governments will find it harder to pursue policies at odds with the EU. Yet, rather than further integration, the EU seems to be becoming a coalition of sovereign entities, offering members an additional

European Communities, XXVIIth General Report of the Activities of the European Communities. 1993, (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1994) Chapter IV, Section 1, #921, pp. 327-328

¹⁴"The Deal is Done," The Economist, December 14th, 1991, p. 52

context for enhancing their position in the international system. Both levels find themselves bound in an inter-dependent arrangement; EU competencies have not detracted from national sovereignty. The treaty embodied a view of Europe that had little to do with what its citizens wanted and which even the treaty's own architects would not defend as a practical possibility.

As part of Maastricht, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are to be implemented on two different levels. First, there are the common positions. The Member States must ensure that their national positions tie in with these. Second, there are joint actions, which 'commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity' and are adopted in areas in which the Member States have important interests in common. On the basis of the guidelines laid down in October,¹⁵ the European Council adopted the first two joint actions: one concerning the conveying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia, and the second concerning the dispatch of observers for the parliamentary elections in the Russian Federation.

The CFSP was introduced to equip the Union better for the many challenges it faced at the international level, by providing it with new means of taking action in areas of foreign relations other than the traditional Community ones. Title V constitutes a separate pillar of the EU. The difference is most striking in the decision-making procedures, which require Member consensus, whereas in traditional Community areas a majority vote suffices.¹⁶

¹⁵Bulletin of European Communities, 10-1993, point I.4. CFSP is governed by the provisions of Title V of the Treaty on EU. The CFSP is also addressed in Article 2 (ex Article B) of the Common Provisions, which states that one of the objectives of the Union is to "assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence".

¹⁶To achieve harmony and avoid contradictions between these two types of activity (Community and inter-Governmental), Article 3 (ex Article C) provides that: "The Union shall ensure (...) the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency. They shall assure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers."

A number of decisions were taken by the European Council at Maastricht that directly affected the development of ESDI in the context of relations between NATO and the WEU. These included: extending invitations to members of the EU to accede to the WEU or to seek observer status, as well as invitations to European member states of NATO to become associate members; agreement on the objective of the WEU of building up the organization in stages, as the defence component of the EU, and on elaborating and implementing decisions and actions of the Union with defence implications; agreement on the objective of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and the role, responsibilities and contributions of WEU member states in the Alliance; affirmation of the intention of the WEU to act in conformity with positions adopted in the Alliance; and the strengthening of the WEU's operational role.

On 19 June 1992, WEU members issued the "Petersberg Declaration" which set out, on the basis of the Maastricht decisions, the guidelines for the organisation's future development. Member states declared that their military units would be made available for military tasks under the authority of the WEU. These tasks, known as the "Petersberg missions", consisted of humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking.¹⁷

The Treaty on EU, signed at Maastricht, continued to reflect compromises between the key players but highlighted the need for the 'union and its Member States [to] define and implement a common foreign and security policy'. Moreover, the EU requested the WEU to 'elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.'¹⁸ The treaty added that the CFSP 'shall respect the

¹⁷The first application of provisions set out in the Maastricht Treaty with regard to the WEU (Article J.4.2 of the Treaty of EU) occurred in November 1996. At that time the Council of the EU adopted a decision requesting the WEU to examine urgently how it could contribute to the EU's humanitarian efforts in support of the refugees and displaced persons in the Great Lakes region in Africa. WEU-EU cooperation was also undertaken in relation to the planning of evacuation operations, supporting African peacekeeping efforts, and mine clearance.

¹⁸*The Treaty on EU*, Title V 'Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy,' Article J.1. 7 Feb. 1992.

obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.¹⁹

NATO recognized the changes in the security environment and began to adjust to those changes in a uniform and productive manner. In November 1990, the US signed the Transatlantic Declaration, which lay the foundations for a revived partnership based on increased transatlantic solidarity, acknowledged the existence of a European security identity and pointed the way to equitable sharing of responsibilities and burdens. In the follow-up to the Rome Summit in 1991, Manfred Wornier, NATO Secretary General, identified the transformed alliance's role to help build a new European security architecture:

The Alliance, however, has stated that this is not a goal that one institution acting alone can achieve, no matter how successful its record. Instead, security, stability and prosperity in the new Europe can come only from a framework of interlocking institutions in which NATO, a European Political Union and the institutionalised CSCE process will be the principle actors.²⁰

NATO's *Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance* in July 1990 set out to define the shape of Europe's security. The declaration set forth the ambition to 'enhance the political component of our Alliance;' and within the European Community pursue, 'the development of a European identity in the domain of security' which would contribute to 'Atlantic solidarity.'²¹ The London declaration set the agenda for NATO's role at the heart of European security, built around an American design.

In explicit recognition of ESDI the 1991 Rome Declaration called for the "further strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance," which "will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance." The declaration goes on to recognize

¹⁹Ibid. Article J.4.

²⁰Manfred Wornier, "NATO Transformed: the Significance of the Rome Summit," *NATO Review*, (December 1991) p. 4

²¹ *London Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance*, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Alliance, 5-6 July 1990 (Brussels: NATO)

that it is for the European allies to decide what arrangements are needed for the expression of a common European foreign and security policy and defence role and that as these two processes develop NATO will ensure transparency and complementarity between ESDI as it emerges in the EU and WEU, and the Alliance. NATO welcomed the perspective of a reinforced WEU role, both as a defence component of the process of European unification and as a strengthened European pillar of the Alliance, "bearing in mind the different nature of its relations with the Alliance and with the European Political Union."²²

Consequently, from the Rome Summit onwards, there have been two broad thrusts to Atlanticism: to establish closer ties among NATO, the EU and the OSCE; and to optimise NATO's political role in defining Europe's security architecture. Transformation took a number of different forms. First, NATO's relationship with the new democratic republics of Central and Eastern Europe was one of a "security anchor in Western Europe that helps the new democracies to develop their potential with the least instability and disorder and free from threat and intimidation."²³ For example, in the aftermath of the attempted coup in Moscow, NATO stated that the security of Central and Eastern Europe is "inseparably linked" to ours.²⁴

Second, the Rome declaration supported and encouraged a specific European role in foreign policy and defence. Rome recognized that the two processes of EU and the transformation of the Alliance were decisive to the future of European security, and needed to reinforce each other.²⁵ Rome went a step further by welcoming a reinforced

²²*Rome Declaration on Peace and Security*, all quotes from p. 3.

²³Worner, "NATO Transformed," p. 4

²⁴Statement on The Situation in the Soviet Union issued by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial session on 21 August 1991.

²⁵Communiqué issued by foreign ministers of the Atlantic Alliance in Copenhagen, June 1991. See text in NATO Review, (June 1991) p. 31-33

role for the WEU, both as the defence component of European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance.

Yet, regardless of these changes NATO remained primarily a means of common defence through collective arrangements. "Of all the world's security organizations, only NATO has the binding treaty commitments among its members and common military assets to act as well as consult. It is thus unique in its ability to guarantee its members' security."²⁶

On 20 December 1991, the foreign ministers of NATO, Eastern Europe, and the republics of former Soviet Union met to establish the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. The expressed purpose was to work towards a lasting order of peace in Europe through the promotion of stability and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent states with the help of NATO and the CSCE. In addition, NACC would help oversee the implementation of the CFE and START treaties.²⁷

All these changes to NATO did not end the continual jockeying between the EC and the Alliance. The EC summit in Dublin in April 1990 had agreed that NATO would be maintained as the main security framework for its members. As a result of the Gulf crisis, however, Italy expressed the opinion that it was time for an EC take-over of the WEU. The following Autumn, a confidential paper sent to EC governments indicated a growing consensus to give the Community a clear defence role suggesting that the EC, not the WEU, should coordinate military initiatives, taking over the role of the WEU when the Brussels Treaty expires in 1998.

In order to enable NATO to cope with the post-Cold War security challenges, the Alliance's new Strategic Concept stated that a broad approach to security was required. It was agreed, "to maintain...an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces

²⁶Womer, "NATO Transformed," p. 7

²⁷Alex Morrison and Susan McNish, (Eds.) NATO and Europe: How Relevant to Canadian Security, (Toronto: CISS, 1994). p. 12

based in Europe...although at a significantly reduced level” and “to move away, where appropriate, from the concept of forward defence towards a reduced forward presence, and to modify the principle of flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons”.²⁸ The Rome Declaration also acknowledged that “the challenges...cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America”.²⁹

TALE OF THREE CITIES: AMSTERDAM, MADRID AND WASHINGTON

The Amsterdam Treaty added a new foreign policy instrument to The European Council, the body that defines the principles and general guidelines of the CFSP. The European Council now has the right to define, common strategies in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. The general rule remains that CFSP decisions always require a unanimous vote in their favour. However, Member States can exercise "constructive abstention", in which they do not block the adoption of the decision but they agree to abstain from any action that might conflict with the Union's action.³⁰ The new Article 26 of the EU Treaty introduced a new post: High Representative, intended to give the CFSP a higher profile and more coherent. The High Representative acts on behalf of the Council in conducting political dialogue with third parties.³¹

²⁸Paragraphs 39 and 40, Rome Declaration

²⁹Paragraph 3, Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, *NATO Review*, December 1991.

³⁰This mechanism does not apply if the Member States abstaining in this way account for more than one third of Council votes weighted in accordance with the Treaty. The amended Title V of the EU Treaty does, however, allow for adoption by a qualified majority in two cases: for decisions applying a common strategy defined by the European Council; and for any decisions implementing a joint action or common position already adopted by the Council. There is a safeguard clause enabling member states to block majority voting for important reasons of national policy. In such cases, when the Member State concerned has stated its reasons, the Council may decide by a qualified majority to refer the matter to the European Council for a unanimous decision by heads of state and government.

³¹It was also agreed in a declaration annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam to set up a policy planning and early warning unit in the General Secretariat of the Council under the authority of the High Representative for the CFSP. Its tasks include: monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant to

On the security front, the new Article 17 (ex Article J.7) of the EU Treaty also opened up prospects for two new developments: common defence and the integration of the WEU into the EU. Specifically, the new text states that the CFSP covers all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence. Similarly, provision is made for the Union fostering closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possible integration of the WEU into the EU.

The Amsterdam Treaty also reinforces the Union's commitment to strengthen its security by incorporating the WEU's Petersberg tasks in the Treaty and by strengthening the relationship between the EU and the WEU. Finally, the Amsterdam Treaty acknowledged that the progressive framing of a common defence policy might lead to a common defence, but that this would require a separate decision by the European Council and adoption by member states in accordance with their constitutional requirements. The Treaty also confirms that the Union's policy shall respect the obligations of certain member states that see their common defence embodied in NATO.

In Madrid the member states affirmed their "full support for the development of the European Security and Defence Identity by making available NATO assets and capabilities for WEU operations".³² In this context the North Atlantic Council endorsed:

the decisions taken with regard to European command arrangements within NATO to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities ... the arrangements for the identification of NATO assets and capabilities that could support WEU-led operations, and arrangements for NATO-WEU consultation in the context of such operations.³³

the CFSP; providing assessments of the Union's foreign and security policy interests and identifying areas on which the CFSP could focus in future; providing timely assessments and early warning of events, potential political crises and situations that might have significant repercussions on the CFSP; producing, at the request of either the Council or the Presidency, or on its own initiative, reasoned policy option papers for the Council.

³² Paragraph 18, Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid on 8th July 1997.

³³ *Ibid* p. 46

There was also considerable progress made in developing arrangements both for the release, monitoring and return of Alliance assets and for the exchange of information between NATO and WEU for the conduct of WEU-led operations. Moreover, Madrid reaffirmed the Alliance's commitment to full transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis management and welcomed the fact that the WEU undertook:

to improve its capacity to plan and conduct crisis management and peacekeeping operations (the Petersberg tasks), including through setting the groundwork for possible WEU-led operations with the support of NATO assets and capabilities, and accepted the Alliance's invitation to contribute to NATO's Ministerial Guidance for defence planning.³⁴

As Lluís Maria de Puig, President of the WEU Assembly, wrote:

NATO has not only strengthened WEU but is also bringing a new dimension to European defence; it can even be argued that is resolving WEU's dilemma, at least for the time being: since there is not going to be a merger between the EU and WEU or even an integration process over the medium term, WEU today stands as the only reference point in terms of a European defence, and can now draw on NATO assets for certain operations. Its prospects are better now than they have ever been.³⁵

At the same time as the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed, the WEU issued a "Declaration of Western EU on the role of the Western EU and its relations with the EU and with the Atlantic Alliance" which contains instructions for the further development of WEU's cooperation with the EU and NATO and for the continued development of WEU's operational role. According to the Declaration the WEU "is an essential element of the development of the European security and defence identity within the Atlantic Alliance and will accordingly continue its efforts to strengthen institutional and practical cooperation with NATO".³⁶

³⁴Paragraph 20, Madrid Declaration, op. cit.

³⁵Lluís Maria de Puig, "NATO takes the plunge on Europe", *Letter from the Assembly*, No 26, September 1997, p.2.

³⁶Paragraph 9, *Declaration of Western EU on the role of the Western EU and its relations with the EU and with the Atlantic Alliance*, WEU Assembly, Document 1582, 28 November 1997. To this end, WEU will develop its cooperation with NATO in the following fields: mechanisms for consultation between WEU and NATO in the context of a crisis; WEU's active involvement in the NATO defence planning process; and operational links between WEU and NATO for the planning, preparation and conduct of operations

At Madrid, the North Atlantic Council reaffirmed "the vitality of the transatlantic link will benefit from the development of a true, balanced partnership in which Europe is taking on greater responsibility. In this spirit, we are building a European Security and Defence Identity_within NATO" (article 2). To support this, the NAC established a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Sintra. "The EAPC will be an essential element in our common endeavor to enhance security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region" (article 9).³⁷

Since Amsterdam and Madrid considerable progress has been made in the cooperation between WEU and NATO in accordance with the principles of complementarity and transparency. For example, NATO and the WEU have gone a long way together in closing the military planning gap. According to General Sir Jeremy MacKenzie, Deputy SACEUR:

the robust Terms of Reference for the DSACEUR together with an effective planning staff, both of which have a responsibility for planning and force generation in NATO and the WEU can only mean that there is less duplication of effort and planning, and the data bank of plans and forces which may be used in those operations resides in a single planning staff, which can only speed up the process and produce a more efficient result.³⁸

On 13 June 1996, in Brussels, the NATO defence ministers, tasked their Permanent Representatives in cooperation with NATO Military Authorities, "to review the defence planning process to ensure that it continues to develop the forces and capabilities needed to conduct the full range of Alliance missions and in addition is able

using NATO assets and capabilities under the political control and strategic direction of WEU, including: military planning, conducted by NATO in coordination with WEU, and exercises; a framework agreement on the transfer, monitoring and return of NATO assets and capabilities; liaison between WEU and NATO in the context of European command arrangements". Paragraph 12.

³⁷NATO: Madrid declaration on Euro-Atlantic security and cooperation. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid on 8th July 1997.

³⁸General Sir Jeremy MacKenzie, "ESDI in NATO", NATO's Sixteen Nations, Special Supplement 1998, p.54.

to support within the Alliance all European Allies in planning for the conduct of WEU-led operations."³⁹

A number of leading officials and scholars have recommended new roles for NATO, including the transformation into a "globalised" Alliance, abandoning Article V guarantees.⁴⁰ Malcolm Rifkind, for example, suggested developing an Atlantic Community resting on four pillars. These pillars include the shared belief in parliamentary democracy; free trade; common cultural heritage; and the fourth must be defence and security represented by NATO.⁴¹

The logic behind these ideas is sound, but similar aspirations for the enhancement of the Atlantic Community failed to gain support when circumstances were more propitious twenty or thirty years ago.⁴² Instead, Washington must come to accept that "NATO's ability to support the emergence of a genuine European security structure is a measure of its successful reform and a precondition for its own survival as an effective and relevant institution in the future".⁴³

For example, Richard Holbrooke noted:

It would be self-defeating for the WEU to create military structures to duplicate the successful European integration already achieved in NATO. But a stronger European pillar of the alliance can be an important contribution to European

³⁹Paragraph 11, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in defence ministers session, 13 June 1996, NATO Review, September 1996.

⁴⁰For the "globalisation" proposal, see Ronald D. Asmus, Robert D. Blackwill and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Can NATO Survive?", The Washington Quarterly, Vol 19, No 2, pp.79-101. For the idea of dropping Article V guarantees, see Charles A. Kupchan, "Reviving the West", Foreign Affairs, Vol 75, No 3, May/June 1996, pp.92-104, and for the proposal for a EuroNATO, see Edward Whalen, "EuroNATO: An Alliance for the Future", European Security, Vol 3, No 3, Autumn 1994, pp.441-462.

⁴¹Malcolm Rifkind, "Need for an Atlantic Community to better reflect US-European relations", NATO Review, March 1995, p.12. See also Gunther Hellmann, Christoph Bertram and Klaus Kinkel – have made similar proposals. Gunther Hellman, "EU and USA Need Broader Foundation: The Case for a "Transatlantic Treaty", Aussenpolitik, Vol 45, No 3, 1994, pp.236-245, Christoph Bertram, "NATO on Track for the 21st Century", Security Dialogue, Vol 26, No 1, 1995, pp.65-71, and "Perils of a transatlantic alliance", Financial Times, 14 October 1996.

⁴²Philip H. Gordon, "Recasting the Atlantic Alliance", Survival, Vol 38, No 1, Spring 1996, p.46.

⁴³Karl Kaiser, "Reforming NATO", Foreign Policy, No 103, Summer 1996, p.141.

stability and transatlantic burden sharing, provided it does not dilute NATO. The WEU establishes a new premise of collective defence: the United States should not be the only NATO member that can protect vital common interests outside Europe.⁴⁴

However, in a powerful dissenting opinion, Colin Gray, argued that a "European pillar" within NATO cannot work to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. In weighing the evidence Gray pointed out that "a new Europeanized NATO will work neither in its European dimension nor with reference to a practicable new transatlantic bargain".⁴⁵ Gray later concluded:

Lest I be misunderstood, my argument has three explicit prongs. First, a cohesive European pillar in NATO is not practicable. Second, even if practicable such a European pillar would be incompatible with NATO functioning as a collective defence organization. Third, even if a cohesive European pillar of security could function well, albeit at the expense of the NATO that we have known, it would offer an inferior quality of security to that which could have been sustainable through traditional-NATO.⁴⁶

Gray is entirely correct in stating that NATO-Europeans...cannot function as part-time allies of the United States. The answer, though, is not to duplicate or replace NATO capabilities. Rather the answer lies in defining a European political and military structure within NATO while at the same time adhering "to the need for transatlantic reassurance so as not to throw Atlantic security out with the European bath-water".⁴⁷ As Jürgen Schwarz observed:

It is only within the framework of NATO that adequate political and organizational prerequisites exist for facilitating an "out-of-area" employment of Western European armed forces or their employment within the framework of the UN. When organizing such employments within the framework of the WEU, however apart from NATO, another separate military organization would

⁴⁴Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 74, No 2, March/April 1995, p.47.

⁴⁵Colin S. Gray, "NATO and the Evolving Structure of Order in Europe: Changing Terms of the TransAtlantic Bargain?", *Hull Strategy Papers*, No 1, January 1997, p.54 and p.81.

⁴⁶*Ibid*, p.82.

⁴⁷Johan Jørgen Holst, "European and Atlantic security in a period of ambiguity", *The World Today*, December 1992, p.220.

emerge, which would possibly compete with the Alliance...In the long run, this would not promote the European identity in the Alliance (in the sense of a "European pillar"), but it would accelerate the dissolution of NATO, starting with the gradual dissociation of the United States.⁴⁸

The US vision of ESDI was endorsed at the 1994 NATO Summit with the allies also adopting the concept of combined joint task forces as the mechanism for organizing operations more effectively, whether led by NATO or the WEU. While the issue was resolved in theory at the 1994 Summit, it was not until the 1996 Berlin NAC Ministerial that the Alliance managed to translate the theory into practice. From then on, all 16 allies agreed that ESDI would be built within the Alliance. Ministers also agreed that a series of institutional steps should be taken to create the necessary links between NATO and the WEU so that the WEU could draw on NATO planning and organizational structures when there was political agreement on WEU leadership for a particular mission. The key decision at Berlin, of course, was that the North Atlantic Council could make NATO assets available to WEU-led operations on the basis of a decision. This put to rest concerns that the United States, when push came to shove, would deny WEU the NATO support that it would need to be effective.

Finally, at the Washington meeting of the North Atlantic Council in April 1999, the Heads of State and Government agreed that "the EU has taken important decisions and given a further impetus ... the progressive framing of a common defence policy. Such a policy, as called for in the Amsterdam Treaty, would be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the Washington Treaty" (article 17). Such a framing of a common defence policy did not, however, deter the importance of the US to European security. "The presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America ... As the process of developing the ESDI within the Alliance progresses, the European Allies will further enhance their

⁴⁸ 145 Jürgen Schwarz, "The institutionalization of the European security policy", Peace and the Sciences, March 1993, p.52.

contribution to the common defence" (Article 22). In addition, the NAC confirmed the continued use of nuclear weapons in Europe as part of its strategy.

To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe...Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. (Article 46).⁴⁹

Much of the discussion by scholars around expectations from the US and what would be in store for NATO were thus made clear in Washington. The statements that flowed from Washington clearly established how NATO perceived the shaping of ESDI.

ORGANIZING EUROPEAN DEFENCE

Strengthening ESDI became an integral part of the adaptation of NATO's political and military structures while at the same time, it was an important element in the development of both the EU and the WEU. Both of these processes have been carried forward on the basis of the EU's Treaties of Maastricht in 1991 and Amsterdam in 1997 and the declarations of the WEU and the Alliance at successive Summit meetings held in London in 1990, Brussels in 1994 and Madrid in 1997, and Washington in 1999.

In January 1994, NATO welcomed the close and growing cooperation between NATO and the WEU, achieved on the basis of agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. They further announced that they would make collective assets of the Alliance available for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. NATO directed the North Atlantic Council to determine how the Alliance's political and military structures might be adapted in order to achieve three objectives: to conduct the Alliance's missions, including peacekeeping; to improve cooperation with the WEU; and to reflect the emerging ESDI.

⁴⁹ Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999.

As part of this process, the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) was developed. The CJTF provided improved operational flexibility and permitted the more flexible and mobile deployment of forces needed to respond to the new demands of all Alliance missions. It was also designed to provide separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU. The CJTF would permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU.⁵⁰

In October 1982, a Franco-German Commission on security and defence was established to work on arms and military co-operation, and political strategic affairs. Eventually, the dialogue between the French and the Germans produced three notable results in 1987: an agreement to create a Franco-German brigade; the organisation of an intergovernmental defence and security council; and the holding of bilateral field exercises called "Bold Sparrow".

Both France and W. Germany has wanted to expand the scope of European co-operation to incorporate security policy. France has favoured expanding the European capability to make independent decisions commensurate with the French concept of security independence. W. Germany has viewed enhanced Europeanization as a desirable way to get out of the constraints of the superpower-dominated East-West system.⁵¹

Yet the immediate objectives of the above were less building of a European Pillar, as they were to use the French-German dyad to reduce the superpower dominance over the alliance.⁵² As the eighties progressed the dyad increasingly

⁵⁰ In practice, if a crisis arose in which the WEU decided to intervene it would request the use of Alliance assets and capabilities, for conducting an operation under its own control and direction. The assets requested would be made available on a case-by-case basis by the North Atlantic Council. Conditions for their transfer, use and for their return or recall, would be determined in a specific agreement between the two organisations. During the operation, NATO would continue to monitor the use of its assets. European commanders from the NATO command structure would be nominated to act under WEU political control.

⁵¹ Robbin Laird, "France, Germany, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, (Vol. 38, #1, 1991) p.51

⁵² Laird, "France, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance," *op. cit.*, p. 53. The force structure approach to the French effort included a de facto extended deterrent through the expansion of 'pre-strategic weapons'.

diverged on the mechanics of reducing this dominance. While the French pressed the Germans to transform the alliance in a more European direction, the Germans were more interested in either maintaining the traditional alliance or in transforming East-West relations. With the ascendancy to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, and his desire "to build a more political and less military confrontational security system,"⁵³ the Germans found European military integration extraneous.

Franco-German security integration made cautious steps since 1983 at least, but it was not until a joint letter issued on 14 October 1991, proposing that a European 'force' be built out of the 4,200 man Franco-German brigade that a distinctly European contribution to security was made.⁵⁴ The US reaction was to reiterate a statement made at the North Atlantic Council's June meeting in Copenhagen, that 'NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies' and the Alliance provides 'one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe.'⁵⁵ It was also stressed that 'NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe.'⁵⁶

The Maastricht Treaty was an intergovernmental compromise. The French remained as determined as ever to promote an independent ESDI that only served to compound the awkwardness of the German position which was torn between supporting the development of the EU while maintaining the need for the Alliance. The German position was thus to support the Euro corps as being 'complementary to NATO' as well as 'part of the way to a European defence identity.' It was not until December that a solution was engineered between France and the U.S., stating that in any 'warlike

⁵³ *ibid.*, p. 53

⁵⁴ On Franco-German defence integration see, Simon Duke, *The New European Security Disorder*, (London: Macmillan/St Antony's, 1996), pp.215-254.

⁵⁵ See NATO Press Communiqué M-1 (91)44, 7 June 1991.

⁵⁶ *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, agreed upon by Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome 7-8 November 1991, Part II, Paras. 17,21,22,

situation' control of the Eurocorps would go to NATO while, in peacetime, the corps would be free-standing that the German position became less awkward.

The solution to the Eurocorps identity opened the way for clarification of the role of ESDI in relation to NATO and the U.S. itself. The underlying theme, that the Alliance supported ESDI as a means of strengthening the European pillar along with the understanding that NATO was still the 'essential forum' for consultation among the allies, became the Alliance mantra – espoused most enthusiastically by Britain and the U.S. American support for a ESDI within NATO may also have been motivated by the 'inability of the EU to speak with one clear voice on foreign policy' as well as serving notice that there may be occasions when the Europeans will have security interests that are not of direct concern to the U.S.⁵⁷ The compromise between NATO and the ESDI and Eurocorps, appeared in a statement of the North Atlantic Council's Brussels meeting on 11 January 1994:

NATO members confirm the enduring validity and indispensability of our Alliance. It is based on a strong transatlantic link, the expression of shared destiny. It reflects a European Security and Defence Identity gradually emerging as the expression of a mature Europe. It is reaching out to establish new patterns of cooperation throughout Europe.⁵⁸

Already, the Eurocorps has grown beyond its Franco-German embryo. Belgians, French and Germans now work side by side, under a single command. Spain's formal participation happened in 1995. Not all, however, are impressed. Britain regards Eurocorps as mere Franco- German hot air, and instead, sells the idea of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), under British command and within existing NATO structure. One difference between the two bodies is that the US plays an important role in ARRC, but not in Eurocorps. The Eurocorps can react when the Americans don't want to be involved.

⁵⁷ Lionel Barber, 'Reinvigorating the Transatlantic Alliance,' *Europe*, Feb. 1996, pp.21-2.

⁵⁸ NATO Press Communiqué M-1 (94)3, *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, Brussels, 11 Jan. 1994.

Yet, Eurocorps has a political dimension. It is answerable to the WEU. There are still arguments over how the corps might be used. The British argue that the Eurocorps uses up money that would be better spent elsewhere in NATO. Defenders of Eurocorps insist, however, that its time will yet come. General Willmann says: 'We're creating an instrument of joint European security and defence policy... I'm absolutely confident that we will achieve our goal.'⁵⁹

While the West European allies complained about their relatively large measure of abdication, they were also unable or unwilling to generate an independent defensive potential equal to their economic strength. Even though they continued to resent the fact that they had entrusted their own security to the responsibility of a distant protector, as the missile debates of the 1980s demonstrated, they preferred the extra burden of housing missiles on their territory to the uncertain benefits of autonomy.

According to Josef Joffe, the reasons for this European sobriety through the eighties were threefold. First, détente did not deliver on its lofty promises, as the Soviet Union did not make the military concessions that the West Europeans had hoped would be gained. Second, there were limits to Western Europe's internal order, exemplified particularly by West Germany and the unwillingness on the part of France to underwrite its security; in other words, the lack of a 'European hegemon'.⁶⁰ Even though France was always willing to pronounce European values and desires as a way to counteract the demands of the superpowers, it was never willing to allow West Germany the same level of freedom it accorded itself. Third, while the West Europeans, particularly France, complained about the overbearing influence of the US, the fact was that by the mid-1980s the US had accepted certain limits. The second Reagan administration began to combine "neo-containment" with arms control negotiations.

⁵⁹ Steve Crawshaw, Euro-army set to advance from words to deeds: Franco-German, , *Independent*, 01-14-1994.

⁶⁰ The leaning of Mitterand toward the US, Euromissiles, and rearmament were a subtle but clear reminder of this unwillingness. See Joffe, *op.cit.*, p. 40.

The largest change came with the reorganization of NATO's forces into "combined joint task-forces", enabling national contingents to serve under mobile commands for specific operations like peacekeeping; to help to integrate the East Europeans; and to give a boost to a stronger European defence role within NATO. This reorganization, with groups of forces assembled for particular military operations, will create a more flexible NATO; foster a European defence identity inside NATO; enable France to draw closer to the alliance, without fully rejoining it; and allows East Europeans and Russians to join in NATO peacekeeping.

The CJTF are ad hoc headquarters to run peacekeeping operations or other out-of-area interventions. They will answer either to NATO, or if American troops do not take part, to the WEU. These task forces will become NATO's means for running a mission outside of territorial defence.⁶¹

The Brussels summit solved many of the Euro-Atlanticist tensions and for the U.S. the summit served its national interests by, in the words of President Clinton, promoting 'greater European responsibility and burdensharing.'⁶² Brussels marked the launching of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) as an American initiative and, marked not only an important development for European security but also for U.S. relations with Europe. The unveiling of PfP, which coincided with Clinton's first visit to Europe as President, was portrayed as an attempt to 'build a new comprehensive Euro-Atlantic architecture of security with, and not without or against Russia.'⁶³

⁶¹ What became clear from the IFOR operations in Bosnia, was that the European members of NATO rely on the Americans for such essentials as transport planes, communications systems, and satellites. However, while the arguments continue over the need for NATO to become more European, more than half its combat aircraft and its active military personnel, as well as three-quarters of its four-star generals, are European.

⁶² *Statement of the President*, (Washington D.C.: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary), 6 Sept. 1996.

⁶³ Opening Statement, Special Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 10 Jan. 1994 (Brussels: NATO Information Service).

The Brussels summit also saw the unveiling of the CJTF concept. The Brussels communiqué stated in paragraph 6 that the Alliance would adjust so as to:

stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, *on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council*, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. We support the development of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security ... (Emphasis added).⁶⁴

By the beginning of 1994 the shape of European security had been established in what amounted to a compromise between the Europeanist and Atlanticist positions. The European allies recognized the primacy of NATO in European security as a price to be paid for the continuing involvement of the U.S. The U.S. interest in accepting this enhanced European role was based on two factors: first, the need to maintain more 'selective and effective' options where action could be taken by the European allies and; second, the realization that, 'for any major threat, including nuclear threats, the Europeans will continue to look to the United States and to NATO as the principal guarantors of their security.'⁶⁵

Of special interest is the way in which the CJTF has redefined the U.S. role in European security. Since none of the EU members can guarantee the capacity and wherewithal for independent action, the U.S. has succeeded in both reducing its burdens in Europe and, at the same time, it has enhanced its influence vis-à-vis its European allies. The US *de facto* veto power over WEU/CJTF operations makes the formation of a truly independent European security identity a long-term project at best.

The best indicator of U.S. influence over European security is demonstrated by the fact that although the CJTF could theoretically operate in the WEU context, it nevertheless in practice is reliant upon the willingness of the U.S. to contribute vital

⁶⁴ *North Atlantic Council, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 Jan. 1994*, (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Press Communiqué, M-1 (94(3)), Para.6.

⁶⁵ *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, (1996), p. 35.

command, control and logistical assistance.⁶⁶ The WEU, even when operating in its Petersberg Task⁶⁷ guise, has been operationally inefficient because 'the organisation lacks a permanent command structure and other standing military capabilities' and the organisation also remains divided on the role it should play in crisis situations and on 'substantive issues of policy.'⁶⁸

Furthermore the CJTF concept confirms NATO's role as *primus inter pares*, since the North Atlantic Council effectively has veto power over any missions employing NATO assets. This veto means that the US, as a non-European and non-WEU power, will have a great deal of influence in establishing initial missions but, thereafter, any mission is supposed to be under the political and military control of the Europeans, with NAC only monitoring. Within the CJTF context alone, the command, control and intelligence (C2I) question has been partially addressed but it remains to be seen how the agreed structures will fare in practice.⁶⁹

The U.S. would appear to have little to be concerned about European insistence for more responsibility, because there is ultimate question of whether there is the will to

⁶⁶ The U.S. declared itself willing to release NATO assets to its European allies if it does not wish to participate but only under three conditions: that the mission must have the support and approval of the mission; that the overall commander of any mission employing NATO personnel or assets remains SACEUR; and, lastly, that any forces involved in a mission must be NATO approved and NATO operational procedures should be observed.

⁶⁷ The tasks are defined in the *Petersberg Declaration*, Western EU, Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992, as 'humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces incrisis management, including peacemaking,' (Section II: On Strengthening WEU's Operational Role, Para. 4).

⁶⁸ David S. Huntington, 'A Peacekeeping Role for the Western EU,' in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (eds.), Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996), p.437.

⁶⁹ An obvious problem arises if the European members of NATO wish to act independently through the NATO C2 structures: how do non-US personnel learn U.S. command positions at short notice? Under an agreement for the U.S. to leave its senior command posts intact, the immediate problem has been resolved but the impression is that the U.S. wishes to exert influence or maybe even control over European-directed CJTF operations by remaining in senior command posts. Other scenarios may arise that could lead to destabilising results. For instance, would the French participate in a CJTF operation when they are not proportionately represented in the command structures and when they may be outnumbered by (non-participant) U.S. officers?

commit resources. This question was raised by an official DoD publication when it was observed that, 'some European states will push hard to develop a European Security and Defense Identity, but few will increase their capabilities for independent military action.'⁷⁰

CJTF perfectly exemplifies the dependency of institutional innovation, its co-determination by past decisions and also the multiple causation of institutional change. Altogether, in addition to its strict military-operational functions, CJTF can fulfill five tasks.⁷¹ First, it can guarantee, by developing clear-cut criteria, that multinational force units really become effectively integrated and operative. CJTF should help to counteract the tendency by some NATO countries to contribute to multinational units in order to ease their own defence budget and therefore not ensuring that the respective forces are trained and equipped in a way that actually allows for multinational interoperability. Second, CJTF can provide a common framework for joint exercises of NATO and PfP nations' military forces, helping to smooth the way to enduring cooperation in military and security affairs. Third, CJTF allows for linking NATO countries not (yet) integrated into the Alliance's military structure. Fourth, CJTF HQs may serve as coordinating agencies between NATO and WEU or a future European defense organization in the framework of the envisaged European security and defense identity. Moreover, the CJTF HQs have the strategic function of providing WEU on a case-by-case basis with the necessary military and command-and-control infrastructure for their own operations. Fifth, CJTF HQs could act as connection authorities to the U.N. Confirming these trends, the final communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting at Sintra in May 1997 stated:

"We welcome agreement reached recently in the WEU on the participation of all European Allies, if they were so to choose, in WEU operations using NATO

⁷⁰ *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, (1996), p. 35.

⁷¹ "After the NATO Summit: New structures and modalities for military cooperation," explanatory memorandum by Rafael Estrella for the North Atlantic Assembly, NAA, AL 205/DSC (94) , 8 November 1994, pp. 16-7.

assets and capabilities, as well as in planning and preparing of such operations; and on involvement, to the fullest extent possible and in accordance with their status, of Observers in the follow-up, within the WEU, of our meetings of Berlin and Brussels. We note that the basis has therefore been established for the implementation of Ministerial decisions, for the strengthening of NATO-WEU working relations and, in this framework, for the development of the ESDI with the full participation of all European Allies. This will ... contribute to setting the groundwork for possible WEU-led operations with the support of Alliance assets and capabilities."⁷²

The British reaction to the French-German Eurocorps initiative, was to underline the importance of not only NATO, but of the military role of the U.S. as well. This was accomplished through the WEU, which was promoted as a 'bridge' between NATO and the EC and a 'means of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.'⁷³ The WEU also had the inherent advantage, from the British view, of relying on NATO 'for information and advice on military matters' and since the Eurocorps was seen as a means of enhancing collaboration between WEU member states, it was not unreasonable to believe that it would tether the emerging 'Euro' defence entities to the Alliance's European pillar.

The WEU provides a framework for European concerted actions in the case of direct threat, or when the security interests of members are at stake in any part of the world. A significant benefit to the WEU is its ability to act outside the European security area without encountering the difficulties of the NATO framework. The WEU Assembly is the only European assembly with responsibility for defence sanctioned by treaty and is the focal point of parliamentary discussion on the future of European security.⁷⁴

In December 1990, at a meeting of the European Council, all EC members saw the WEU as the main defence bridge-building organization between the Community and

⁷²Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Sintra, Portugal. Final Communiqué, 29 May 1997 (NATO press release M-NAC-1[97]65).

⁷³*Defending Our Future*, Statement on Defence Estimates 1993, (London: HMSO, July 1993),

⁷⁴Willem Van Eekelen, "Building a New European Security Order: WEU's Contribution," *NATO Review*, (August 1990) p. 23

NATO. But France, Germany and Italy considered it a transitional stage to a genuine European security and defence policy; while Britain regarded it as an extension of NATO. The divergences of opinion continued into March 1991 at an EC Foreign ministers meeting in Luxembourg. There, a majority of EC countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg) agreed on the need to bring the WEU under the control of the EC. Britain and the Netherlands disagreed, stating that ESDI must remain compatible with NATO.⁷⁵

The WEU is currently being spoken of as a bridge between NATO and the EU or the basis of the Union's military arm. This, however, raises the central problem of any European defence identity it is unlikely in the foreseeable future for Europe to cope with anything more than the most minor military operations without the support of American military logistics and intelligence.⁷⁶ Unlike NATO, the WEU has no integrated military command; no electronic command and communication system to match that of the Americans, and no half decent airlift for moving soldiers rapidly to major battlefields.

The Brussels 1994, the Berlin 1996 and the Madrid 1997 NATO Summits paved the way for close cooperation between WEU and NATO by fully appreciating the development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance; making collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance available to the WEU; and by developing the concept of CJTF as a means of facilitating operations under the political control and strategic direction of WEU.

The WEU Planning Cell, which was set up on 1 October 1992 and became operational in May 1993, is composed of civilian and military staff and has the following

⁷⁵Hans Binnedijk, "The Emerging European Security Order," *Washington Quarterly*, (Vol. 14, #4, Autumn 1991) pp. 73-76. The WEU was enlarged in November 1992 with the Greek accession (although it is not a full member); Denmark and Ireland were also admitted as observers. Iceland, Norway and Turkey are associate members. In May 1994, the WEU admitted nine East European countries, including the three Baltic states, as "associate partners". The IEPG was absorbed into the WEU and the various Eurogroup groups were transferred in 1993. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1993-1994*, (London: Brassey's, 1994) p. 115

⁷⁶Freeman, "Waking up to Reality", p. 5

main tasks:⁷⁷ “to prepare contingency plans for the deployment of forces under WEU auspices; to prepare recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected; to keep an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be allocated to WEU for specific operations”.⁷⁸ The tasks of the Cell were enlarged to include, in addition to the objectives defined in 1992, the following: “the compilation of an inventory of rules of engagement; the preparation of standard operating procedures for the selected headquarters; the monitoring of the situation in potential trouble spots; the preparation of exercise plans and evaluation of their results for future planning; and finally, a wider reflection on the development of a military capability for WEU. In time of crisis the planning cell would be expected to provide advice to the WEU authorities on the practicability and nature of any WEU involvement; and to co-ordinate the preparation of deployment of forces under WEU auspices until this function is assumed by a designated joint headquarters”.⁷⁹

At the WEU Council of Ministers in Rome, on 19 May 1993, ministers from France, Germany and Belgium declared the European Corps as Forces Answerable to WEU. The principal document for the European Corps is the Report of La Rochelle of May 1992, in which France and Germany laid down the outline principles for a

⁷⁷ As the Deputy Director and Chief of Staff of the WEU’s Planning Cell, pointed out: “The Cell is now 55 strong, some 40 of whom are navy, army, airforce and civilian officers. mostly of lieutenant colonel or equivalent rank and above...The Planning Cell can also be reinforced by experts from nations, when necessary for a specific task”, Brigadier G. G. Messervy-Whiting, “The refinement of WEU’s operational capability”, NATO’s Sixteen Nations, Special Supplement 1998, p.9.

⁷⁸ *Europe Documents*, No 1787, op. cit.

⁷⁹ Willem van Eekelen, “Giving Europe Its Own Teeth”, *European Brief*, October/November 1994, pp.66-67. Finally, in WEU’s Ministerial Council in Rhodes, on 12 May 1998, ministers “approved the document on the Terms of Reference of the WEU Planning Cell, which has been elaborated on the basis of the developments in WEU’s operational capabilities, including the decisions taken in Paris and Erfurt on the implementation of the military committee and on the WEU Military Staff. Ministers looked forward to the elaboration of Terms of Reference for a dedicated Planning Cell unit, as part of the implementation of decisions taken at Erfurt on the participation of WEU nations concerned in planning for operations to which they contribute”. Paragraph 30, Rhodos Declaration, WEU Council of Ministers, 12 May 1998.

multinational major formation.⁸⁰ On 21 January 1993, the *Report of La Rochelle* was supplemented by the *SACEUR Agreement* signed by the French Admiral Jacques Lanxade, the German General Klaus Naumann and SACEUR General John M. Shalikashvili.⁸¹

In Rome, the countries participating in the Multinational Division Central MND(C) – the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany – confirmed that they were prepared to make the Division available for military tasks under WEU auspices. The Division has its headquarters in Monchengladbach in Germany.

At the WEU Ministerial meeting in Lisbon on 15 May 1995, France, Italy and Spain declared that the Rapid Deployment Euroforce (EUROFOR) and the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) would be Forces Answerable to WEU and would be used as a priority in this framework. At the same time Portugal formally asked to participate in these forces. In November 1995 the “Joint Declaration by Spain, France, Italy and Portugal on the conditions of employment of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR in the framework of WEU” was approved.⁸²

⁸⁰ Lieutenant General Helmut Willman, “The European Corps – Political Dimension and Military Aims”, *RUSI Journal*, August 1994, p.29. According to the Report the mission of the European Corps is: collective defence of the allies within the framework of WEU/NATO; maintaining and restoring peace; humanitarian missions, *ibid.* On the Corps’ genesis in the Kohl-Mitterrand proposal of October 1991 – Franco-German military cooperation will be strengthened beyond the existing brigade. The strengthened Franco-German units could thus become the nucleus of a European Corps capable of including the forces of other member states of the WEU. This new structure could equally become the model of a closer military cooperation among the member states of the WEU – see Daniel Vernet, “The dilemma of French foreign policy”, *International Affairs*, Vol 68, No 4, 1992, pp.655- 664.

⁸¹ Beatrice Heuser, “Advance Of The Eurocorps”, *European Brief*, June 1993, p.38. See also Edward Foster, “NATO, France, and the Eurocorps”, *European Brief*, August/September 1993, pp.48-49. “Belgium signed the SACEUR agreements on 12 October 1993. According to this agreement, the corps may be used by NATO either as a main defence force in Central Europe or as a rapid reaction peacekeeping or peacemaking force in the European theatre, covered by NATO”, De Decker, *op. cit.*

⁸² According to the Joint Declaration the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR initiatives are meant to contribute to the creation of a military capability for Europe, notably in the field of force projection; create a multinational base structure for member states of WEU that wish to participate in its operations; contribute, while respecting the content of the Petersberg declaration, to initiatives of international organisations, to promote and maintain peace and security. The force will provide a rapid-reaction land capability, equipped with easily deployable light forces with a level of availability adapted to the mission it is to carry out. The size of the force to be used may vary from a small formation to a light division, using a modular system depending on the mission. On EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR see also “EUROFOR and

At its meeting in Paris on 13 May 1997, the WEU Council of Ministers approved the proposal of the Chiefs of Defence Staff to clarify and strengthen their role within WEU and to improve the functioning of the Military Delegates Group (MDG). In accordance with this proposal, the ministers decided to establish, under the Council's authority, "a military committee consisting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff represented, in permanent session, by the Military Delegates Group under a permanent Chairman". At their meeting in Erfurt on 18 November 1997, the WEU approved "the recommendation of the Permanent Council on the implementation of the military committee and the reorganization of the military structure at WEU headquarters to coincide with the rotation of the Director of the Planning Cell in 1998".⁸³

The main responsibilities of the Military Committee⁸⁴ included: to recommend to the WEU Council the military measures necessary for the implementation of Petersberg tasks; to discuss and develop consolidated views on WEU military issues and advise the WEU Council accordingly; to provide military advice as necessary on all matters relating to Forces Answerable to WEU and to NATO assets and capabilities to be transferred to

EUROMARFOR: WEU's New Latin twins', RUSI Newsbrief, Vol 15, No 7, July 1995, pp.49-51, and Eric Grove, "A European navy: new horizon or false dawn?", Jane's Navy International, November 1995, pp.12-19.

⁸³Paragraph 30, Erfurt Declaration, WEU Ministerial Council, 18 November 1997. The Military Committee, which is the senior military authority in WEU, consists of the CHODs of the full member, associate member and observerstates, supported by the WEU military staff, but it may meet in other configurations, including associate partners, on a case-by-case basis and may also invite other participants to take part in relevant work. The CHODs will be represented in permanent session by the Military Delegates Committee (MDC) under a permanent chairman (the three-star general/flag officer), *The WEU Military Committee*, paragraph 68.

⁸⁴As a logical consequence of the Council's decision to establish a Military Committee the military structure at WEU headquarters had to be reorganised. Decisions to that effect were taken at the WEU Council's Ministerial meeting at Erfurt with the proviso that this reorganization should coincide with the rotation of the Director of the Planning Cell in 1998 – effective from 14 May 1998. Thus, it was decided to set up, under the authority of the WEU Council, a military staff under a three-star general/flag officer in order to ensure greater cohesion and strengthen internal relations between the military components in WEU headquarters. As regards relations with NATO and the EU, the three-star general/flag officer is responsible for: ensuring interfaces and coordination with NATO's Military Committee and military command structure, at the appropriate levels; drawing on NATO support as agreed between WEU and NATO; ensuring the exchange of military information and documents as agreed between WEU and NATO; and ensuring the exchange of military information and documents as agreed between WEU and the EU.

WEU; to evaluate contingency and operation plans; to assist in the provision of military intelligence to WEU's relevant bodies to participate in WEU's contribution to NATO's defence planning process and provide military advice to the WEU Council in accordance with modalities to be determined; and to contribute to strengthening the military cooperation and consultation processes between WEU and NATO.

The WEU, in its "Declaration on the Role of Western EU and its Relations with the EU and with the Atlantic Alliance", adopted by WEU Ministers on 22 July 1997, set out the role and relations with the EU as well as with the Atlantic Alliance. It states that the WEU is an integral part of the development of the EU, providing it with access to operational capability, notably in the context of the Petersberg missions, and is an essential element of the development of the ESDI within the Alliance, in accordance with the Paris Declaration and with the decisions taken by NATO Ministers in June 1996 in Berlin. Since Amsterdam and the WEU Declaration of 22 July 1997, further steps have been taken in developing WEU-EU relations. In September 1997 the WEU Council introduced measures to harmonize as much as possible the six-monthly presidencies that rotate between members countries in both the WEU and the EU. At their meeting in Erfurt in November 1997, EU Ministers endorsed a decision enhancing the operational role of WEU observer countries, in line with the provisions contained in Article 17.3 of the Amsterdam Treaty. These arrangements, aimed at facilitating EU-WEU cooperation in crisis management, will come into effect upon entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty.

Chapter Five

REGIME CHANGE: ALLIANCE POLITICS AND THE DRIVE FOR EU

With the 50th anniversary NATO summit in April 1999, and with the recent events in the Balkans as a backdrop, it is a prime time to take into account the events over the last 10 years since the end of the Cold War to evaluate the entire ESDI debate. Many writers went to great lengths in the early to mid 1990s to put their views forward on the future of NATO and whether the EU would develop an independent defence identity which would supplant it in Europe. For the last few years the discussion seemed to have become tired, as it was no longer fashionable to have this discussion. However, the recent events in the Balkans have raised the whole question of NATO's role, especially in light of its 50th anniversary celebration, and have provided an excellent chance to evaluate what has developed and what has not developed. Such an evaluation provides a more practical view forward, based on actual actions by the parties concerned.

For obvious reasons, theorizing about the shape of the international system focused a great deal of attention on the role of the U.S. with the two ends of the theoretical spectrum being marked by Paul Kennedy and Joseph Nye. Kennedy considered whether the U.S. would fall prey to modern variants of imperial overstretch, in which great powers in relative decline would instinctively respond by spending more on "security", thereby diverting potential resources from "investment" and compounding their long-term dilemma.¹ In the same year that Kennedy's book appeared, David Calleo's equally provocatively tome² appeared and, together, they fuelled much of what

¹ Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, (New York: Random House, 1987), p.xxiii.

² David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance, (New York: Basic Books, 1987). For a more recent argument in the 'declinist' tradition, see Donald W. White, The American Century: The Rise and Decline of the United States as a World Power, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).

became known as the declinist debate. In turn, Joseph Nye argues that in the absence of firm hegemonic leadership, instability or even chaos could ensue.³ To Nye the:

twin dangers that Americans face are complacency about the domestic agenda and the unwillingness to invest in order to maintain confidence in their capacity for international leadership. Neither is warranted. The United States remains the largest and richest world power with the greatest capacity to shape the future.⁴

The extent to which NATO was in a position to foster an ESDI has often been couched in terms of the Europeanist versus Atlanticist debate with, until the present, little middle ground. What has arisen since the end of the Cold War is a *modus vivendi* between these two approaches recognizing that it is necessary to have both an active European and transatlantic component to Europe's defence while maintaining the perception for national consumption in many European countries, most notably France, to preserve the idea of an independent ESDI.

Contrary to the most pessimistic predictions that the Atlantic Alliance would cease to serve a purpose following the end of the Cold War, NATO has not disappeared and it appears adaptable to the new international system.⁵ This adaptability is no doubt partly due to the common cultural, economic and political heritage of the allies, which bind them even beyond common strategic interests.⁶ It is also partly due to the

³ It should be noted that a debate had already been established on declinism amongst economists, IPE scholars, and economic historians and Kennedy's work acted as a catalyst for the most general debate. For earlier work in the 'declinist' genre see, Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-39* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Stephen Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade,' *World Politics*, 28 (3) (April 1976), pp.317-47; George Modelski, 'The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 20 (2) (April 1978), pp. 214-35; and Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

⁴ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Change in the Nature of American Power*, (New York: Basic Books, 1990) p.261.

⁵ See Kenneth Waltz: "The Emerging Structure of International Politics" *International Security*, V. 18, N. 2, 1993, pp. 44-79; and Michael Brown: "Minimalist NATO", *Foreign Affairs*, V. 78, N. 3, 1999, pp. 204-218

⁶ See, for example, John Ikenberry: "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos", *Foreign Affairs* V. 75, N. 3, 1996

emergence of new threats and instabilities,⁷ and the continuing utility of the alliance. The EU, despite a more efficient integration, is still unable to operate independently outside its immediate proximity while the US cannot without any outside support or the legitimacy it entails.⁸ Rather than constructing a new security regime to serve these purposes, NATO allies can spare themselves the sunk costs that a new alliance would involve and can rather adapt the existing structures.⁹

Adaptation requires a more balanced relationship within the alliance, as all the members have already recognized, through a higher European profile. The fact that there is a strong incentive to develop European defence capabilities does not mean that either a united Europe will emerge or that NATO should not continue with its reform.¹⁰

Much of the debate between Atlanticists and Europeanists still boils down to the overall structuralist approach to international security and the debate between neorealists and neoliberalists. For instance, neorealism of the Waltzian style,¹¹ still asserts the uniform reaction of the "units", or nations, to changes in the international power matrix to be the essence of all international politics and security.¹² For Waltzian neorealism, the anarchical organizing principle cannot accept forms of institutionalized regional cooperation as permanent but only as temporary "amalgamations", which come

⁷ See, for example, Samuel Huntington: "The Clash of Civilizations?". *Foreign Affairs*, (V. 72, N. 3, 1993)

⁸ John Peterson: *Europe and America: The Prospects for Partnership*, (London, Routledge, 1996), p. 7

⁹ Robert McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War", *International Organization*, (V. 50, N. 3, 1996), pp. 445-476

¹⁰ Philip Gordon: "Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy", *International Security*, (V. 22, N. 3, 1997/8), pp. 74-100

¹¹ For other important neorealist trends and branches, cf. Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy. Neorealism to Structural Realism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and Benjamin Frankel, ed., *Realism. Restatement and Renewal* (London: Cass, 1996). These however are beyond the progressively myopic scope of the neorealist-neoliberal debate in its current appearance.

¹² See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 118-22 and 126. For a recent reformulation of this axiom see e.g. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19 (1994/95), No. 3, pp. 5-49 (pp. 9-14) .

and go with the respective structural shape of global conditions.¹³ These amalgamation do not possess any intrinsic potential but owe their existence to the "most powerful states in the system", which use them as arenas for settling their power relations. Consequently, structural realism, encounters difficulty in coming to analytical terms with international cooperation that does not take place 'directly' between single states but, instead, within institutionalized contexts.¹⁴ Neorealist alliance theory attempted to address this inconsistency by asserting Waltzian structural effects within those institutionalized contexts.¹⁵

Neoliberalism's challenge to neorealism typically exacerbates rather than alleviates these inconsistencies in neorealism's analysis. Its focus was to take insights from new institutional economics and apply them to international relations analysis but stopped far short of developing a truly institutional approach to international relations.¹⁶ However, in contrast to neorealism, neoliberalism does assume that international cooperation stems from - at least on a regional scale - "institutionalized" arrangements;¹⁷ for example, guided by common norms, rules, reciprocal expectations and the structuring effects of international organizations. These institutionalized forms of international cooperation then help states to save on transaction costs and to avoid sub-optimal outcomes of cooperation."¹⁸

¹³ See Waltz, Theory of International Politics , pp. 91-2.

¹⁴ See Grieco, "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation," p. 335.

¹⁵ See Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36 (1984), pp. 461-95; Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," Journal of International Affairs 44 (1990), pp. 103-23.

¹⁶ Founding works are Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) and Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power. Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989).

¹⁷ Keohane, International Institutions , pp. 1-2.

¹⁸ Keohane, After Hegemony , p. 85.

The debate between neorealism and neoliberalism is thus the context within which the determination of ESDI, on a theoretical level, exists. The neorealist approach to regime theory is hegemonic stability, promoted by Atlanticism. The neoliberal approach to regime theory is functional integration, promoted by Europeanism.

THE DRIVE FOR EU: FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION

When considering Robert O. Keohane's and Joseph S. Nye's institutionalist perspective as the context for examining efforts "to turn the potential for mutual institutional reinforcement in the security realm into actual functioning operation",¹⁹ the principle focus is not on the structure of the international system, or on the interactions between domestic politics and international relations; rather it is on international political processes.²⁰

A central assumption of the institutionalist approach is that sustained cooperation is possible under well defined conditions including the existence of mutual interests that make joint gains from cooperation possible; long-term relationships among a relatively small number of actors; and the practice of reciprocity according to agreed-upon standards of behavior. Such cooperation constitutes a process for the management of conflict. International institutions can facilitate cooperation by providing opportunities for negotiations, reducing uncertainty about others' policies, and by affecting leaders' expectations about the future.²¹

Keohane's and Nye's approach is considerably different from the realist approach of the kind articulated by John J. Mearsheimer, who predicted that West

¹⁹Anne-Else Højberg, "The European security structure. A plethora of organizations?", *NATO Review*, (November 1995), p.30.

²⁰Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Introduction: The End of the Cold War in Europe" in Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffmann (eds), *After the Cold War. International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London 1993), p.4.

²¹ *Ibid*, pp.4-5.

European states will begin “viewing each other with greater fear and suspicion, as they did for centuries before the onset of the Cold War”, and to worry “about the imbalances in gains as well as the loss of autonomy that results from cooperation”.²² Keohane and Nye, on the other hand, note that “international institutions facilitate policy coordination among powerful states and reduce the likelihood of mutually harmful competition among them for spheres of influence; they therefore serve these states’ interests”.²³ Keohane and Nye’s argument that institutions can help promote cooperation is important to understanding the ways in which states can affect change in the European context. As Christoph Bertram stated: “In times of certainty, institutions mirror the realities of power. In times of uncertainty, they can shape the realities of power. If no institutions to channel change existed, they would have to be invented. European stability is to a very great degree defined by the stability of European institutions.”²⁴

According to the institutionalist view institutions have worked in Europe. As Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann pointed out:

how governments reacted to the end of the Cold War was profoundly conditioned by the existence of international institutions. Europe was an institutionally dense environment in which the expectations of states’ leaders were shaped by the rules and practices of institutions, and in which they routinely responded to initiatives from international organizations, as well as using those organizations for their own purposes”.²⁵

The theoretical claim is that a web of multilateral organizations or “interlocking” institutions,²⁶ are more effective for preserving the transatlantic link: by providing rapid

²² John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War”, *International Security*, (Vol 15, No 1, Summer 1990), p.47.

²³ Keohane and Nye, *op. cit.*, p.7.

²⁴ Bertram, *op. cit.*, p.14.

²⁵ Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, “Conclusion: Structure, Strategy, and Institutional Roles” in Keohane, Nye and Hoffmann (eds), *op. cit.*, p.381.

²⁶ See North Atlantic Council Communiqué, Oslo, 4 June 1992: “stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area will increasingly be built on a framework of interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions”, *NATO Review*, (June 1992).

and effective consultation on issues of common concern; allowing freedom for prompt political action; and by developing the most effective combinations of national military forces; and for ensuring constant development in the institutions themselves.²⁷ As Stefan Fröhlich underlined:

despite all its current shortcomings, a model of overlapping institutions, in which the emerging European structures are strengthened within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, is for the time being the only conceivable avenue to the evolution of a functioning European security system.²⁸

The EU's creation of the new post of High Representative for foreign and security policy is a key step toward forging a common, European approach to military matters. At the two-day summit in Cologne, Germany, EU heads of state gave the Union authority to order military action in crisis spots. "What has been missing between America and Europe is political consultation early on. What needs to happen now that we have a 'Mr. Common Foreign and Security Policy' is consultations on the makings of a crisis, not just last-minute discussions for operational purposes."²⁹

The countries of the EU have come very close to the line that separates the pooling of their economies from the merging of their politics. To cross it, they need to be reasonably sure that the new Europe passes the first-person-plural test. They would have to be confident that its people now think of themselves in some serious way not chiefly as Germans or French, but as Europeans.³⁰

²⁷See Philip Zelikow, "The Masque of Institutions", *Survival*, (Vol 38, No 1, Spring 1996), p.8, and Alyson J. K. Bailes, "European Defence and Security. The Role of NATO, WEU and EU", *Security Dialogue*, (Vol 27, No 1, 1996), p.56.

²⁸ Stefan Fröhlich, "Needed: A framework for European security", *SAIS Review*, Winter-Spring 1994, pp.51-52. According to a RAND note the advantages to the US of the overlapping institutions model are the following: "[This model] preserves a political and military role for the United States; creates alternative links for US involvement in Europe beyond NATO; demonstrates US willingness to adapt to a stronger European role in security arrangements; and maintains flexibility to move to a number of different security models", see Nanette Gantz, James B. Steinberg, *Five Models for European Security: Implications for the United States*, RAND NOTE N-3446-A, 1992.

²⁹ See John Newhouse, *Europe Adrift*, (New York: Pantheon, 1997)

³⁰Twice in history, Europe, or a large part of it, has there been solid ground for such a sense of identity. The first time was the Roman Empire - clearly showing deference to Roman Law, the Latin language, and the

In September 1994, Edouard Balladur, the French Prime Minister raised the idea of a Europe of concentric circles, with France, Germany and one or two others at the centre.³¹ This core would itself have a core: Germany and France, whose relations "must be raised to a new level if the historic process of European unification is not to peter out before it reaches its political goal."³² The British argue that countries should be free to pick and choose the areas in which they are to cooperate more closely, aiming for closer integration in some, such as foreign policy, but not in others, such as currency. Mr. Balladur's vision was that the core should cooperate more closely on everything. In effect, Balladur wanted Europe to be a single club with different classes of members, whereas the British want Europe to be several different clubs.

The difference is fundamental and brings the history of European integration full circle. At the beginning it was an attempt to bind France and Germany together; politics and security were paramount, while economics was a means towards that end, rather than an end in itself. As the community grew its priorities were reordered, to the point where the argument is now about how much integration do the citizens of the EU want. The EU is based on treaties and institutions that now find it hard to cope. Big countries, for example, have worries about a stream of new small members, both because qualified majority decides the Union's budget and because two big countries foot a disproportionate amount of that budget.³³

peace of the legions. The second time began when Charlemagne was crowned as "Emperor of the Catholic Church of Europe. While the political unity of Europe did not last long after Charlemagne's death, for another six centuries Europeans went on believing that there ought to be no distinction between God's business and man's business, and that politics should come under God's guidance.

³¹ Shortly afterwards, the German Christian Democratic party made a similar proposal where the Union's existing hard core" of five countries (Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland) should coordinate monetary, fiscal, industrial and social policies.

³² "Europe a la Carte," *The Economist*, September 10th, 1994. p. 14

³³ The present arithmetic meant that the big five with 48 votes between them and representing four-fifths of the union's population, can muster a qualified majority by gaining the support of at least two small countries. Similarly, to get their way, the small states need the backing of three big states. Conversely, two big countries can form a blocking majority - of 23 votes - if they can get the support of any small country other than Luxembourg. Britain, Spain and Italy agreed that before the IGC in 1996 the Union should not set a precedent

France, Germany, the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain and Greece want to absorb the WEU into the Union, but Portugal, Denmark (which has an opt out from EU defence matters) and the traditional neutrals - Ireland, Austria, Finland, Sweden - are either sitting on the fence or downright opposed. However, the other fourteen members, despite their differences, fundamentally believe they can strike a bargain acceptable to all of them. For example, while the arch-federalists would like to "communitarise" foreign and security policy under the tutelage of the commission and Court of Justice, they will likely consider the Franco-German fudge of "constructive abstention", whereby majority voting would replace unanimity.³⁴

Enlargement not only adds more difficult issues to the agenda, it creates conditions in which their resolution is more difficult by adding to the numbers in particular institutions such as the Council of Ministers and disturbing the balance of power within them.³⁵ Hence, while enlargement extends the geographical scope of the Union, it has proved, and will continue to prove, a hindrance in the development of a higher level of integration.

Provisionally, the EU has decided to fix its future eastward bounds to exclude all the former Soviet republics, except the three Baltic states. Fifteen countries are in line as actual or potential candidates for membership; but before any new members can be accepted the Union needs time. Maastricht and the strife over voting rules, the EMS,

which, as more and more small countries join, would see the big countries held hostage by the tyranny of qualified majority. The compromise was to set the blocking majority in an enlarged Council of Ministers legally at 27, but with the understanding that if countries with 23 votes object to a decision the majority will delay implementation in the hope of finding a compromise.

³⁴ "A Convoy in Distress," *The Economist*, March 16th, 1996. p. 50

³⁵ The past examples of enlargement give credence to these observations. When Britain entered the Community it upset the balance established by the Franco-German partnership: the virtual duo-poly was converted into an uncertain triangle, weakening the original driving force for European integration. The entry of Spain created further difficulties because it was unwilling to accept a subordinate role to Paris, Bonn and London. In turn, the three power centres did not necessarily view Spanish ambitions with any favour. The new members were also quite firmly opposed to the greater use of majority voting and the abolition of the veto causing great consternation over the next step in developing the Union.

and negotiations with the Austrians and Nordic countries have drained the stamina of euro-philes. Any attempt to bring newcomers in before that could block European integration for a long time. Britain, ever in favour of a loose Union and fearful of federalist integration, imagines that a "wider" Europe by definition cannot also be a "deeper" Europe.³⁶

The emergence of potential members to the East of Germany is bound to change Germany's view of Europe, and of its own interests. Many people fear that the expansion of the EU to these countries, coupled with the effect of German unification, would create a German-dominated block that might eventually come to control the Union. Some feel such a development is happening anyway because of the structure of the old Union model, with its conclusion in EMU, because Germany's demands for political union and iron fiscal discipline under a common currency are making a new Europe in Germany's image.³⁷

In order to understand which direction Europe is going the member countries can be arranged into five constituencies.³⁸ The first is the hard core formed by France and Germany with the Benelux countries as an appendage. Despite different approaches, they all favour deeper integration as a way of guaranteeing peace and stability. In particular, France sees an institutionalised political alliance as a way of exerting influence on its bigger neighbour; while Germany sees integration as a way of dissipating its destructive nationalist tradition and allowing it a free hand in Central and Eastern Europe. The second constituency is made up of free traders: essentially the UK

³⁶Presently, a Darwinian selection process, separating economically fit countries from the laggards, is under way. Europe's money markets are prompting the sorting out by punishing governments that do not have their houses in order. These pressures are forcing the Germans and French to publicly back a strong inner core of EU countries able and willing to form a tight monetary union. That means a multi-tiered Europe is almost certain to emerge. Yet despite protestations from the Italians and British, the French and Germans see no other choice, promoting the core group as the only source of cohesion.

³⁷"A Union Blessed but not yet Consummated," *The Economist*, January 13th, 1996. pp. 47-48

³⁸"EU: Back to the Drawing Board," *The Economist*, September 10th, 1994. pp. 22-23

and Denmark. The third is made up of poorer, newly democratic countries: Spain, Portugal and Greece. These countries see the Union as a way of guaranteeing their new found democracy and modernising their economies. Europe's fourth constituency consists of those post-communist aspirants, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, who also see the EU as a way to cement democracy and modernise their economies. Finally, the fifth constituency consist of the new members: Sweden, Finland, and Austria. These countries have differing opinions For example, Austria, which has always tied its monetary policy to Germany, may hope to jump straight into the inner circle; while Sweden, which would have difficulty with the Maastricht criteria, may wish to opt out.

The introduction of the post-communist and former EFTA members should advance of the cause of Britain's model, which is designed to reconcile conflicting demands.

An enlarged Europe comprising a greater number of states could not be federal. That would mean extending considerably the domain of those decisions taken by majority voting. Therefore, the five big states representing four-fifths of the population and wealth could be put in a minority - which they will not allow.³⁹

Britain's former Prime Minister John Major could hardly have put it better. But the words are those of Edouard Balladur, France's former prime minister. Mr Balladur's argument suggest a widening reluctance to embrace the Germanic design for the EU and its enlargement. Germany gives priority to the Union's eastward expansion. It foresees negotiations starting as soon as the IGC is over. France does not relish the influence Germany would gain from expansion to the east and instead wants the EU to pay much more attention to the Mediterranean.

Enlargement will involve some less palatable changes, simply because a club of 25 cannot operate with rules designed for a club of 9 or 10. All countries, large and small, will have to limit the use of veto. This last point will be especially hard to accept

³⁹France and Germany: Essence of Essen," *The Economist*, December 3rd, 1994. p. 62

when it comes to security and defence policy and action. The solution, however, may lie in abstention - "not necessarily the kind favoured by France and Germany, whereby abstainers would have to support in all but name policies of which they disapproved, but rather the total abstention that would still let the Union intervene abroad despite the reservations of its neutral members."⁴⁰ Such a solution is based on the supposition that Europe is still more of a geographical term than a political one; and that the nation-state within Europe is still viable and prevalent. Inter-governmentalism will stay in defence because countries such as France and Britain will not risk their troops' lives through a 'qualified majority vote' decided by neutrals and/or small countries.

France represents a curious paradox. It is the leading proponent of a European foreign policy; yet it is also the most individualistic on the world stage. The French argue that it is not in Europe's interest to abandon the world to a single superpower, namely the US. Therefore, France must act for Europe, in the hopes that its partners will follow.⁴¹

For all its potential, Germany is still a handicapped giant, burdened by unification and the politico-military inhibitions of its history. On July 12th 1994, Germany ended its self-imposed ban on sending troops to fight abroad. Its constitutional court ruled that German troops may join foreign military ventures under the aegis of the UN and other worthy international groups.⁴² However, the constitution still bars them from acting alone.

Jacques Delors said shortly after the end of the Cold War, "before we consider the possible shape of a common defence policy we need to place it within the much

⁴⁰ "Europe tries again," *The Economist*, March 30th, 1996. p. 18

⁴¹ "Europe's Foreign Policy: A Facade of Unity," *The Economist*, (November 2nd, 1996). p. 50

⁴² "Germany Unbound," *The Economist*, July 16th 1994. p. 45 In regards to German defence, a white paper was published on April 6th, 1994; spelled out the country's vital interests: a stable and peaceful neighbourhood; strong European and Atlantic links; and the promotion of open economies and democracy. The thrust was clear: Germany should concentrate less on territorial defence and more on crisis reaction. The armed forces would be split into expeditionary forces; territorial forces; and a military organization backing up both.

wider notion of security, which encompasses a conception of a world order and the solidarity of social systems."⁴³ Delors claims the only option compatible with completing the vision of the EU is to insert a common security, and hence defence, policy into the framework.

This would not be the case if, as some propose, a series of communities - one for economic integration, a second for political co-operation and a third for security - were to be envisaged for the final stage of European integration...we must make it clear that what we are proposing is a single community as a logical extension of the ambitions of EU heralded by the Single European Act. And this, as we never tire of pointing out, is a community based on the union of peoples and the association of nation states pursuing common objectives and developing a European identity.⁴⁴

Delors goes on to say that a common defence policy would be meaningless unless it reflects a unity of action in foreign policy and a reciprocal commitment to come to the aid of any EU member whose integrity is threatened. In typical neo-functionalist fashion, Delors sees the dynamic of common interests gathering momentum to the point where "people will come to see the need for this missing ingredient - the means of defence, for the sake of national integrity, the values which nourish us, the solidarity which unites us and our responsibilities towards the rest of the world."⁴⁵ He qualifies, and confuses; such a development by calling for unanimity in the implementation of the defence policy; yet to encourage this evolution, a member state would, "at its request," be released from the obligations of such decisions.

France and Germany would both like to see Britain take more of a leadership role, yet British reluctance to consider further integration has only cemented Franco-German leadership.⁴⁶ While Gaullists in the French Parliament remain divided on

⁴³ Jacques Delors, "European Integration and Security," *Survival*, (Vol. 33, no. 2, March/April 1991). p. 100.

⁴⁴ *ibid.* p. 105

⁴⁵ *ib.* pp. 106-107.

⁴⁶ At a Franco-British summit in November 1994, there was a significant convergence on the issue of defence. Born of their military co-operation in Bosnia, the two announced the creation of a Franco-British

political union, their Gaullist President, Jacques Chirac, seems convinced that more integration is desirable. Only on one big issue are France and Germany not wholly in tune: defence. The Germans realise that the French still desire independence from the Americans, which continues to bother them. Yet, with Chirac's recent plan to overhaul the French army, the French President appears to be moving closer to NATO, while hoping that the European pillar within NATO might evolve into something detachable from the alliance. The Germans welcome this movement but they are still wary about being drawn into anything that distances them from the US.

At a December 9, 1996 summit in Nurembourg, Germany, the French and Germans agreed to "jointly support the development of a European security and defence identity with the Atlantic Alliance and commit to working together in favour of a common European defence policy within the Western EU."⁴⁷ The Nurembourg document stated that the two countries agreed on four objectives: to define common goals for their security and defence policies; to pursue common analysis of their security environment; to pursue a joint approach to military strategy; and to increase military and armaments cooperation. The document goes on to note that French and German security interests are increasingly similar. It also commits both countries to "actively contribute to the preservation of peace and international security," which further implies "the possession of military forces that are rapidly available and rapidly deployable within Europe as well as without."⁴⁸

European Air Group, based at High Wycombe, to help run joint peacekeeping and humanitarian operations within and outside the NATO area. The French think that the group, the first permanent joint military set-up between the two countries, means a genuine British acceptance of the need for a separate "European defence identity". The British, at pains to stress the group would in no way weaken their commitment to NATO, say the proposal could not have been made without France's recent rapprochement with NATO.

⁴⁷ "Franco-German Defence Concept Lacks Substance," *Defense News*, (Vol. 12, No. 5) February 3-9, 1997. p. 26.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* p. 26

For the Americans, the idea that the EU speaks for Europe promises convenience of dealing with only one body. In July 1995, Sir Leon Brittan launched a commission paper on relations between the EU and the US in order to provide European leaders a road-map for future transatlantic ties. The paper proposes a transatlantic economic space; the systematic discussion of NATO and European security; co-operation on humanitarian aid; and joint action to combat drug trafficking and international crime.⁴⁹

Britain and France have quietly agreed that European defence without a nuclear understanding makes little sense. The French have insisted that nuclear deterrence remains essential and that this cooperation is the very foundation of a future European defence. This French-British rapprochement is a new twist; yet one large difference still seems to separate them. While Britain has agreed to several measures of cooperation, they still do not accept the French assumption that these steps promote the political goal of EU. Both France and Britain are increasingly reluctant to abandon the notion of national sovereignty. At their summit meeting on October 30th-31st, 1995 the two said that they would be willing to use nuclear weapons on each other's behalf and that "the vital interests of one country cannot be threatened without the vital interests of the other being at risk."⁵⁰

But Germany does not want a centralised Europe. In rediscovering its nationhood, Germany now believes in de-centralisation except in foreign policy, defence, money, commerce, immigration and crime, since these are areas where Europe is bound to be stronger united rather than acting separately. Germany now envisages a Europe of nations, not a nation of Europe, likely quite similar to the current federal system in Germany proper.⁵¹

⁴⁹"The EU and America: Who ya gonna call?" *The Economist*, August 5th, 1995. p. 49

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 56

⁵¹ Two things have coloured Germany's supranational vision: its rediscovery of its national identity and the growing recognition that this identity may not be a burden after all. Since unification, Germany has

Great Britain will not countenance a "two-tier Europe with a hard core either of countries or of policies". The UK is loath to relinquish any more veto rights, "at a time when there is serious public concern about the centralization of decision-making. As for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the UK White Paper recalls, "the CFSP can never become an exclusive policy which would replace national foreign policy". The UK is keen on developing the Western EU as a pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, but does not want a merger between the WEU and the EU, as urged by the Franco-German alliance. The UK Government believes that "the WEU should be maintained as an autonomous organization with its own Treaty base, and that its operational capabilities should be developed to enable it to operate effectively in peace-keeping, humanitarian and other limited crisis management tasks".⁵²

According to John Newhouse, however, the fundamental battle about European political integration is over. The centralized bureaucratic political structure that has been created in recent years will not be overturned. This is even truer, Newhouse suggests, for the effort to develop the so-called Common Foreign and Security Policy. There is simply no chance, he believes, that the Europeans can truly constrain their national ambitions and interests within a unified policy.

Given the bipolar nature of the cold-war system, European integration could not have substituted NATO in importance with respect to security affairs because the special role of the United States was irreplaceable. However, although NATO was partly responsible for the limitations of European integration, it was also a necessary component for its beginning. On the one hand, the static nature of alignments in the Cold War encouraged the United States to sponsor economic unification in the name of

toned down the rhetoric regarding a 'United States of Europe' or even a 'federal Europe.' Instead, Germany's view of Europe now is a confederation of states joined by a single market, a single currency and open frontiers, within which supranationally minded members would operate: a joint foreign policy, an army, and a police force. "Germany and the Union: One Europe, up to a Point," *The Economist*, (September 14th, 1996). p. 48

⁵² IGC '96: UK and European Parliament Produce Shopping List, *European Report*, 01-05-1996.

the common cause against the Soviets. The Marshall Plan, for example, put a premium on trans-national projects.⁵³ Every improvement in European power allowed the United States to reduce its concern for the weakness of its allies and it proportionally augmented the Kremlin's preoccupation. Facilitating European economic cooperation could thus produce a welcome security externality.⁵⁴

The 1999 Cologne EU Summit called for a EU "capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces" which, as a first step, involves the absorption of the Western EU's procedures for cooperation into the EU proper. The possibility of a higher European profile has also been duly acknowledged by NATO first at the Brussels 1994 Ministerial which allowed the development of "separable" European forces if they were not "separate" from the alliance, and then at the Washington's 1999 Summit in which there is the first direct reference to a defence role for the EU.

A higher European profile in the defence field will generate problems of coordination within NATO, but the failure to rebalance the transatlantic relationship will imply even bigger problems. Security has lost some of its purity as a public good, and it is now closer to a "common pool resource", which requires a different production mechanism because it is more difficult to produce it in adequate quantities.⁵⁵ NATO's security during the Cold War approximated a public good because security was non-excludable.⁵⁶

⁵³ See, for example, Michael Hogan: The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987)

⁵⁴ Joanne Gowa: "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and Free Trade", American Political Science Review, (V. 83, 1989). Europeans are today, at least in theory, more able to produce the levels of defence needed to face the threats in the new security environment. These threats are less intense than the Soviet threat during the Cold War; meanwhile, Europeans are much closer today to reaching a common defence platform. A stronger Europe, by itself, necessitates closer integration, because a fragmented decision making process and the duplication implied by separate defence budgets would otherwise disperse most of the energies.

⁵⁵ Joseph Lepgold: "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem", International Security, (V. 23, N. 1, 1998), pp. 78-106

⁵⁶ Security is non-excludable, but it is a rival good because its consumption reduces the amounts available for other uses. It is non-excludable because none of the contemporary threats is exercised against the territory of a member state, and thus no ally can be forced to pay the costs of containment or to

A more symmetric distribution of power among allies may provide a partial solution, as already recognized by Olson and Zeckhauser, who called for “a greater ratio of private to collective benefits”.⁵⁷ Europeans and Americans would thus define respective areas that would be treated as private goods; in which over-consumption is curbed because those who have not been charged can be excluded. If the alliance remained asymmetric, as it now is, the European allies would be too weak to deal with any area outside their own territory, and would thus free ride and over-consume American involvement, which would in turn increasingly become scarcer, causing greater and greater friction. Hence, to remain viable, the alliance has an ingrained interest to see its European members increase their defence and security cooperation outside of the mantra of US control.

Continued US prominence could in fact generate a process of moral hazard by reducing the costs of irresponsible European behavior.⁵⁸ Part of the reason why it is difficult to organize an effective European defence is precisely because of the presence of an effective American power projection capability that offers a cheaper alternative for the European allies. If such a capability were absent, Europeans would raise their profile more urgently. Olson and Zeckhauser argued that:

a union of smaller members of NATO, for example, could be helpful, and be in the interest of the United States. Such a union would give the people involved an incentive to contribute more toward the goals they shared with their then more nearly equal partners. Whatever the disadvantages on other grounds of these policy possibilities, they at least have the merit that they help to make the

renounce sharing the benefits. Once a regional conflict, such as the invasion of Kuwait, has been solved, it has been solved for all nations, including those which have not participated to the war or have restricted themselves to “checkbook diplomacy”.

⁵⁷ Olson and Zeckhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 272

⁵⁸ Moral hazard is an incentive to behave in an undesired manner which originates from the very attempt to limit the damage of undesirable behaviour. The classic example is that of safety belts in cars, which may have actually increased the rate of traffic incidents by lulling drivers into a false sense of security and into driving more recklessly.

national interest of individual nations more nearly compatible with the efficient attainment of the goals that groups of nations hold in common.⁵⁹

European security initiatives, such as the revived WEU, the Eurocorps, the Franco-German understanding, and the development of national rapid reaction forces as forces answerable to the WEU appear to have posed an 'either' 'or' question for European security – either the transatlantic security framework adjusts to reflect a larger European role, or European security capabilities will be developed as an alternative, to the Atlantic Alliance. However, even though the US encourages the European allies to assume a greater share of the defence responsibility it is made with the knowledge that there is little chance in the foreseeable future of the allies actually being able to function independently from the transatlantic context. Meanwhile, with the European allies the illusion of there being European alternatives is essential for reasons of national sovereignty, pride and to give credence to the second pillar of the EU (the CFSP).⁶⁰

Although the U.S. supported a stronger role for Western Europe within the Alliance, such support was also potentially damaging to NATO and US hegemonic leadership. Eventually, the US would have to come out in the open as the extent of its support for ESDI: in other words, what it could and could not support. The US did so in a memorandum of 22 February 1991, attributed to the US Under Secretary of State, Reginald Bartholomew. The memorandum which was sent to all EC governments as well as to the WEU secretary-general, and criticized developments within the EC and specifically the Genscher-Dumas proposals, as posing a challenge to the integrity of NATO and to the future of US military involvement in Europe.⁶¹ The memorandum also outlined the US criteria for the establishment of a European Security and Defence Identity and threatened 'unintended consequences' if the European allies persist with

⁵⁹ Olson and Zeckhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 279

⁶⁰ Mark M. Nelson, 'Joint Foreign Policy Remains Distant Dream for EU,' *The Wall Street Journal*, 26 Sept. 1996.

⁶¹ Exactly who wrote the memorandum remains unclear and speculation has involved not only Bartholomew but also European Bureau Deputy Assistant Secretary, James Dobbins; National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft and State Department Counselor, Robert Zoellick.

the development of a joint CFSP. While some US officials considered the memorandum as a justified defence of US interests, others were embarrassed by the premature foray in a debate that was still taking shape.⁶²

The Amsterdam Summit of June 1997 was designed in part to improve the security mechanism created in Maastricht. France and Germany, with the support from Spain, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg and Greece, proposed a timetable for the gradual merger of the EU and WEU. The proposal was blocked by Great Britain and the neutral states. All that could be agreed instead was an unspecified commitment: to enhance cooperation between the two organizations, EU members that are not members of the WEU could participate in some WEU activities, and that an EU-WEU merger could take place "should the European Council so decide". The essentially civilian character of the EU is preserved. This situation put European efforts to enhance military cooperation and leverage around WEU and a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO.⁶³

The lack of global projection and the capacity to back diplomacy with force lies in the unwillingness of European governments to support its costs. The weight of Europe and what Europe is will be very important in a long-term: Europe is in a situation analogous to that of the United States in the late 1800s.⁶⁴ With the end of the Cold War, European states will have to reflect anew on their goals, their internal organization, and the role they see for themselves in a world increasingly concerned with global problems.

⁶² For details see Simon Duke, *The New European Security Disorder*, (London: Macmillan, 1994),

⁶³ The reduction of troops and professionalization are very important, but these efforts lack a set of policies in order to build necessary capacities as air/sealift, and a continuing improvement of intelligence means: a European military capacity to conduct medium-scale out of area operations means a cost of \$18-49 billions besides the creation of a satellite intelligence systems (\$9-25 billions). Berman, MB and Carter, GM, *The Independent European Force: Costs of Independence*. (RAND. Santa Monica. 1993).

⁶⁴ van Oudenaren, John. Europe as partner, in Gompert, David C. and Larrabee, F. Stephen.(ed) *America and Europe. A Partnership for a New Era*. (RAND. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1997). p. 115.

Yet the outcome of the IGC and the Amsterdam treaty seems extremely limited, plagued by the same divisions among the members states present at Maastricht and before.⁶⁵

The Treaty of Amsterdam has specifically incorporated the "Petersberg tasks" in the new Article 17 of the EU Treaty.⁶⁶ The Petersberg Declaration also states that WEU is prepared to support, the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis management measures, including peacekeeping activities of the OSCE or the United Nations Security Council. At the same time, the Declaration supports a solid transatlantic partnership and stresses the importance of implementing the Declaration on WEU (No 30) annexed to the Maastricht Treaty.

At the Cologne Summit in June 1999, France outlined ambitious plans to place the rapid reaction corps it dominates at the center of the EU's new military strategy, putting pressure on Britain to join an embryo pan-European armed force. Prime Minister Blair has been keen to boost Britain's role in European defence and reached a new understanding with the French in St Malo last December. That marked a departure from the previous government that resisted any European moves to increase defence. Britain

⁶⁵The EU Commission assessment was that the aim of a substantial improvement had not been achieved in spite of the establishment of 25 common positions and joint actions: From Libya to Yugoslavia in economic relations; common policies toward Ukraine, Rwanda, Angola and East Timor; and joint actions on South African and Russian elections, aid plan for Palestinian Authority, Bosnia and the administration of Mostar; supporting a indefinite extension of NPT, the biological and chemical weapons convention, and negotiating and implementing the Balladur Plan or Stability Pact in Eastern Europe. European Commission. List of Joint Actions adopted by the Council since the Entry into Force of the Treaty on EU. November 1993-September 1996; European Commission. List of Common Positions adopted by the Council since the Entry into Force of the Treaty on EU. November 1993-September 1996. The European Commission. Brussels, 1997.

⁶⁶The Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992 is a pivotal element in the determination to develop the Western EU (WEU) as the defence arm of the EU and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO). The three parts of the declaration define the guidelines for the future development of the WEU. WEU Member States declare their readiness to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU. The different types of military tasks which WEU might undertake were defined: apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, military units of WEU Member States could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

has repeatedly stated that the new initiative is a collaborative one, and that there will be no role for the European Commission. In an outspoken performance, President Chirac called for a permanent political and security committee to be installed in Brussels, presided over by Europe's new High Representative for foreign affairs. France also called for the military and defence planning capabilities of the WEU to be incorporated into the EU, and for regular meetings of defence ministers.⁶⁷

Most importantly, we have made clear that ESDP is not about collective defence. NATO will remain the foundation of the collective defence of its members. We are in no way attempting to duplicate the work of NATO. In fact the improvements in European military capabilities will be a significant gain for the Alliance. Nor does ESDP attempt to undermine the right of Member States to retain their own specific security and defence policy. The fact that all Member States, including the neutral countries, have been able to endorse the Helsinki decision, should provide sufficient reassurance on this point. So much for what ESDP is not.

Firstly at Helsinki we have committed ourselves to being able to deploy a corps level military operation within 60 days, and to sustain it for at least a year... Secondly, we have endorsed the establishment of new permanent political and military bodies within the Council to ensure both adequate political accountability, and rapid and effective decision-making procedures for the day-to-day management of operations... Thirdly, we have taken steps to ensure that appropriate measures are put in place for the consultation and cooperation with non-EU European allies, and with NATO.⁶⁸

The European member of the Alliance have made significant progress in creating additional capabilities for mobility and force projection over the past decade - but there is still some way to go. Fortunately, Berlin means that NATO planning, command and control, and other support - including logistics, lift and intelligence - can be used by WEU nations to make operations possible. Thus, the challenge of building a European defense capability within NATO should be a good deal less daunting and costly than it would be to do so outside the Alliance.

⁶⁷ Stephen Castle in Cologne and Paul Waugh, Cologne Summit: France presses for new defence force, Independent, 06-04-1999, pp 10.

⁶⁸ EU-Commission/ Institut für Europäische Politik Conference "The Development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy - The Integration Project of the Next Decade" Berlin, 17 December 1999 . Remarks by Dr. Javier Solana High Representative of the EU for Common Foreign and Security Policy.

THE POLITICS OF THE ALLIANCE: HEGEMONIC STABILITY

The NATO allies wound up a 50th anniversary Summit on April 25 with a new strategic concept for the 21st century. The democracies of the alliance see a variety of major risks confronting them in the new millennium, but Russia still ranks close to number one. The horizons of future action to protect NATO states now extend well beyond their borders, stretching somewhat vaguely to the East and South. And their justification for intervention will be based on a mixture of self-defence and humanitarian need.

The final statement at the outcome of the meeting in Washington D.C. refers to the European aspects of the enlargement of NATO and European defence identity: "We welcome the boost which has been given to the idea of a EU Common Foreign and Defence Policy by virtue of the Amsterdam Treaty, and the considerations given to this matter within the Western EU (WEU)". In general, analysts believe that creating a "European capacity" within NATO, which would be capable of taking action in an operation in which, for whatever reason, the United States would not be prepared to get involved directly, remains no more than a fanciful idea at present. "We have no example in the history of mankind of a group of people who have been able to exist without an autonomous defence capacity. Europe will have to face up to this inescapable reality", said Jacques Chirac, President of France. For his part, President Clinton stressed that, if Europe is to have a viable defence force, the Europeans will first have to agree amongst each other. He also warned that such a defence force must not try to usurp the role of NATO. Rather, President Clinton said he was persuaded that, irrespective of the form such European defence alliance takes, it will inevitably strengthen the capacity of NATO, and boost the commitment of the United States to NATO.⁶⁹

What does the recent war with Serbia mean in light of NATO's 50th anniversary? Its declared aims and its future? Failure in Kosovo would have had serious implications

⁶⁹"NATO Unveils a New Strategy For Europe," *European Report*, 04-28-1999.

for the alliance, as it would have obliged NATO to rethink its post-Cold War aims of intervention. On the other hand, if NATO had done nothing in Kosovo it would have looked irrelevant to the new security dimension in Europe. Yet the intervention in Kosovo also opened the door to cynical opinion in the rest of the world “deploring the alliance as an international scofflaw and bully.”⁷⁰ NATO now has to reassure a suspicious world that NATO has not given itself the right to attack other sovereign nations on a whim.

NATO’s campaign in Kosovo was also launched at a key time in the history of the alliance when the long-debated notion of Europe boosting its ability to take military action on its own and become a counterweight to NATO. But the Kosovo campaign has brought actual real life experiences to a previously academic discussion. These experiences provide an excellent demonstration of ESDI’s development from both an Europeanist and an Atlanticist perspective and a superb window of opportunity to gauge the success of each point of view.

When the conflict is looked at in terms of military ability the US points out that although thirteen countries took part, at least 70% of the firepower was American. Advocates of European self-sufficiency have brought home some hard truths about Europe’s defence. First, Europe’s real weakness in security matters lies not in shortage of military equipment or troops, but in a deep reluctance to think strategically. Second, developing the European pillar of NATO should not be seen as a loss of influence or interest by the US, but as a necessity of whatever the US needs to accomplish in the international security arena.

Unsurprisingly, mainly American academics rejected the declinist approaches and saw stability still resting largely upon the continued ability of the United States to

⁷⁰ “Defining NATO’s aims,” *The Economist*, (April 24th, 1999) p. 15. The development of NATO’s smart weapons (concern about taking and inflicting casualties) is also its Achilles heel. NATO’s leaders have signaled to their adversaries that they are not prepared to sacrifice many lives in pursuit of their own goals. “If your willingness to take casualties is limited, then someone else with a different calculation is likely to take advantage,” former US Ambassador to NATO: Robert Hunter. *The Economist*, (April 24th, 1999) p. S4

lead.⁷¹ In order to support their arguments about America's continuing importance, the U.S. role in European security and NATO, has been pointed to as the prime multilateral expression of this leadership.⁷² However some see the hegemonic role that the U.S. assumed in NATO during the Cold War as a dangerous measure of its post-Cold War position. For instance, David Calleo has argued that NATO is 'essentially an American protectorate for Europe. As such, it is increasingly unviable.' Calleo argues that global changes have introduced altered distributions of resources and power and that, 'even if the fundamental common interests of the United States and Western Europe dictate a continuation of the Atlantic Alliance the old hegemonic arrangements cannot continue without becoming self-destructive.'⁷³

The leadership role of the U.S. in European security is a policy goal of the Clinton administration. For instance, the Department of Defense publication *Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, states that 'preserving and enhancing the effectiveness of European security organizations, especially NATO,' is the 'principal vehicle for continued United States leadership and influence on European security issues.'⁷⁴ The question about whether the Atlantic Alliance is primarily about securing Western Europe, or whether it is about power relationships, would seem irrelevant. It is assumed that it is not only about defending U.S. and allied interests in Europe but also about 'strengthening the U.S. leadership role in European affairs.'⁷⁵

⁷¹See, for instance, Henry R. Nau, *The Myth of America's Decline* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Samuel P. Huntington, 'The U.S. – Decline or Renewal?', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.67 (2) (Winter 1988/89), pp.76-96.

⁷² For example, President Clinton stated that, 'The United States will continue to take the lead in NATO's' Address by President Clinton to the people of Detroit, *The Legacy of America's Leadership as We Enter the 21st Century*, 22 Oct. 1996 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1996).

⁷³ Calleo, *Beyond Hegemony*, p.3-4.

⁷⁴ *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, 1996) p.5.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.18.

Underpinning the debate about hegemonic stability in the current European context, as elsewhere, is the question of motivation; more specifically, what incentives does the U.S. have to continue to provide a public good (security) that may be of benefit to less powerful actors and, just as significantly, what incentives are there for less powerful actors to accept a hegemon in the absence of a compelling reason (or threat) to do so? The Cold War in western Europe was marked not only by the provision of U.S. leadership and resources, but by the assumption that the defence of the U.S. began in Europe and the awareness that, the entire area of Western Europe is in first place an area of strategic importance to the United States.

The neo-functionalist observation that integration occurs in functional increments, from those areas of least significance to state sovereignty, to those of most importance, would tend to suggest that sound economic relations should be established prior to security integration. In counterpoint, a neo-realist perspective would tend to place security at the center of any efforts at further integration. In the absence of security structures to inhibit or contain security competitions between the west Europeans, the chances of integration in other areas, according to the neo-realist perspective, would appear remote.

The acceptance of either of these two approaches depends heavily upon whether Western Europe is thought to be stable and, if so, the extent to which Western Europe could contribute more generally to the security of the region. Three arguments may be forwarded pointing to a neo-realist interpretation. First, the crisis in former Yugoslavia illustrated that there is a fundamental lack of common policy amongst the EU countries. In the absence of any common conception of security and responses, it is reasonable to question how common positions on other aspects of European relations could emerge, let alone lead to Union. Second, the reunification of Germany has fundamentally altered European security. Moreover the French and British reactions to reunification indicate that the traditional concerns regarding German power have not vanished. Third, the integration process in Europe took place because there were

external security assurances and, as a matter of speculation, integration may well not have taken place if the task of designing security assurances fell solely to the west Europeans.

Europe is the main, if not only, anchor tying the United States to an extra-hemispheric international order. The anchor may not hold. America may become tired of a Europe absorbed with its own identity but continuing to need the involvement and perhaps the deterrent of the United States to prosper in peace. If this link were to break it would amount to the abdication of any sustained, predictable, and reliable U.S. commitment to international order.⁷⁶

Christoph Bertram raises the issue of how committed the U.S. is to creating a new international order and, as a critical component of it, to enhancing and preserving European stability. In spite of the isolationists, there is ample evidence to suggest that not only does the U.S. take European security seriously but there is also a strong desire to build upon its security relations with Europe in other areas as a means of enhancing American influence. Other means of protecting and solidifying the U.S. role in European affairs in a permanent manner have been suggested, such as the idea of an Atlantic Union, involving some form of linkage between trade and security issues, as well as closer ties between the US, Russia, NATO and the EU.⁷⁷

Such schemes however run the danger of overstating the commonalities between the different sides of the Atlantic and underestimating the general problems with economic union. The reinforcement of America's security role in Europe may well act as a valuable adjunct to strengthening links in other areas but it is important that progression in security affairs is not held ransom to economic relations or vice versa.

⁷⁶ Christoph Bertram, Europe in the Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the Cold War, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995) p.3.

⁷⁷ See, for instance, Charles Kupchan, 'Reviving the West,' Foreign Affairs, Vol.75 (3), pp.92-105; and Simon Serfaty, 'America and Europe Beyond Bosnia,' Washington Quarterly, Vol.19 (3), Summer 1996, pp.31-44..

On the other hand, diverse factors have indisputably amounted to cause NATO a general loss of relevance.⁷⁸ The radically decreased common public perception of clear-cut threats has posed increased compulsion to justify provisions for continued collective-defense ability in the U.S. and Western Europe. NATO has developed new legitimating potentials and moreover a remarkable institutional attractiveness - obviously reaching far beyond its mere self-preservation. This has not only become clear in the case of Middle East European states' wishes for accession but also in the French "rapprochement"⁷⁹ towards the Alliance's integrated military structure.⁸⁰ NATO is on the way to developing a considerable notion of independent, corporate identity (or, at least, the governments of its member states are prepared to concede it a considerable notion of institutional action potential).⁸¹

⁷⁸ Peter Schmidt, Germany, France and NATO (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), p p. 12-3.

⁷⁹See Robert P. Grant, "France's new relationship with NATO," Survival 38 (1996), No. 1, pp. 58-80; Anand Menon, "From independence to cooperation: France, NATO and European security," International Affairs 71 (1995), pp. 19-34.

⁸⁰For general strategic accounts on the role, the changing shape and new roles of NATO after the Cold War, see Ted G. Carpenter, ed., The Future of NATO (London: Cass, 1995); Walter Goldstein, ed., Security in Europe: The Role of NATO after the Cold War (London: Brassey's, 1994); Philip H. Gordon, ed., NATO's Transformation. The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); Robert A. Levine, ed., Transition and Turmoil in the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Crane Russak, 1992); S. Victor Papacosma and Mary Ann Heiss, eds., NATO in the post-Cold War Era: Does it Have a Future? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).

⁸¹Among the factors leading to the Alliance gaining apparent corporate identity was the specific semantic character in which the enlargement discussion was conducted right from its inception. Typically, the political debates on the side of the proponents of an enlargement as well as on the side of its opponents did not so much center around the objective fact in question (that is, the increase in the signatory nations of the North Atlantic Treaty and a corresponding increase in membership of NATO's military and political bodies and organizational structures) as they evolved along metaphorical paths. Those "security metaphors" strongly conveyed the connotation of an autonomous NATO as a coherent security institution and self-reliant international actor: the Alliance as an 'stability anchor', as a 'projector' and naturally evolving 'community of Western values' etc. see Paul A. Chilton, Security Metaphors. Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House (New York: Peter Lang, 1996). Together with the overarching "architecture metaphor" as it became the characteristic frame of the discussion about a post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic security order, this alone already caused an increase in NATO's institutional autonomy: Not longer did national-power based geostrategic considerations or calculations in terms of the national interest of its member states furnish the chief points of reference, but whole institutional "pillars", "bridges" and "cornerstones", with the Atlantic Alliance often regarded as the leading and integrating institution (ibid., pp. 357-402).

Europe needs America as much as it did during the Cold War but the reasons why are harder to explain. New security concerns make the European allies keen to keep their American umbrella intact. Some of the allies like the American presence because it eases their fears of potential German might. Most acutely, the Yugoslavian disaster neither demonstrated that much of post-communist Europe is fragile at the best of times, and that Europeans cannot nor will not undertake a serious military operation without American involvement.

The problem for the Europeans in light of the threats from the East and the South is that the protective American umbrella can no longer be counted on so automatically. The realisation is that ESDI now represents an insurance policy rather than an element of European integration and power. The US is looking to France and Germany as key European interlocutors. America will increasingly pressure Britain to stand alongside France and Germany and be committed to the notion that Europe must generate the willpower to address global issues collectively. The value of the Anglo-American relationship to UK security is indisputable and it is most unlikely that the UK would ever support a diminished US role. The German-American relationship is also very close given that the Federal Republic's sovereignty was built on a West European political identity and an American security guarantee. Even France has strong interests in maintaining the US commitment to European security preferring to promote an "l'Europe de la defense within the broader heading of building the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance."⁸²

The other European members have accepted that their security is dependent upon a greater power; that they have a subordinate role to play in the alliance; and that they cannot aspire to autonomy in military decision-making.

There is arguably no good reason why any of these nations should prefer to take their lead from London, Paris or Bonn rather than from Washington. Indeed, it is

⁸²Gambles, *op. cit.*, pp.16-17

only by keeping close to the latter that they are able to fend off the bogey of the three-power directorate that frequently haunts European co-operation.⁸³

The US would not profit from an independent ESDI, or even from the development of an equal 'European Pillar'. Either development might oblige the US to negotiate, on equal or even inferior terms, with its European 'partners' on key Alliance decisions, effectively removing a degree of autonomy in US strategic decision-making. US criticism of burden sharing must be properly defined: reducing the cost of the burden while maintaining leadership and autonomy.

Paul Buteux has posited three possible evolutionary paths for NATO: a continuation of hegemony; devolution of hegemony; and complete disengagement.⁸⁴ For the hegemonic model of NATO to endure, the US must continue to supply the public goods of leadership and security. The key for the hegemonic model is whether flexible response can be sustained or an alternative strategy can be devised which justifies the continuation of American hegemony. The solution must take into account one of the resolutions at the 1990 London Summit:

NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means, or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence will significantly improve. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore even more remote. They (the allies) can therefore significantly reduce their sub-strategic nuclear forces.⁸⁵

For anyone who might have viewed this change in nuclear posture as representing the declining importance of extended deterrence, the strategic concept confirms that the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States. However, the changing security structure will continue to force a redistribution of power. The key question is

⁸³ *ibid.*, p. 17

⁸⁴ Paul Buteux, *Regimes. Incipient Regimes and the Future of NATO Strategy*, Occasional Paper #6, (Winnipeg: Programme in Strategic Studies, University of Manitoba). pp. 18-40.

⁸⁵ *ibid.* p. 57

whether this redistribution will alter the hegemonic role of the US within the regime. Thus, the second possible outcome according to Buteux, is a devolution of power and responsibilities to the European allies.

The argument for devolution has come from both Americans and European allies. On the American side there are three arguments. First, is the ever-present burden-sharing complaint, manifested in domestic pressures for troop withdrawal and greater European purchases of US defence goods. So far, the US has committed to keeping a physical presence in Europe; the question is how much.⁸⁶ In the area of defence trade, however, there is little hope of fruitful progress as national governments in all NATO countries jealously guard and support their defence industries as defence spending declines. Studies repeatedly decry the negative impact of protectionist policies on defence goods, but all national defence industrial sectors are deemed to be intimately linked to national sovereignty.⁸⁷

The second American argument calls for a redefinition of US strategic interests. For example, the report on Discriminate Deterrence can be interpreted as a trend towards regionalisation of US security interests.⁸⁸ It is also indicative of US strategic interests when one considers recent conflicts in Yugoslavia, Somalia, and the Gulf.

⁸⁶In a recent study on future US force levels in Europe, Richard Kugler lays out four options: a forward presence of 150,000 troops in Europe; a dual-based presence of 100,000 troops in Europe and the States; a limited presence of 70,000 troops in Europe; and a symbolic presence of 40,000 troops in Europe. Richard Kugler, The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Forces and Requirements for the Post-Cold War Era, (RAND Corporation, R-4194-EUCOM/NA, 1992)

⁸⁷The NATO Industrial Advisory Group conducted a full scale study on improving defence trade within the alliance. The end result was a Code of Conduct on Defence Trade which called upon the members of the Alliance "to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies" and set out "a moral and political," but "not a legally binding, commitment by members of the Alliance to fundamentally improve the conditions of defence trade." Conference of National Armaments Directors, Report on Improving the Conditions of Defence Trade Among the Allies, (NATO: Document AC/259-D/1509, 1 February 1993)

⁸⁸Fred Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter, Co-Chairmen, Discriminate Deterrence, Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, January 1988.

The third American argument for devolution is based on the problems of extended nuclear deterrence versus conventional defence. David Calleo, for instance, posits that the traditional NATO strategy of a U.S. nuclear umbrella supported by limited conventional defence has been undermined.⁸⁹ The new balance requires a shift of responsibilities to the Europeans and an end to the American protectorate.⁹⁰

The European argument for devolution involves the construction of a European pillar. One of the reasons for the lack of success has been the continuation of traditional politics of Europe's major powers. According to Josef Joffe, the end of the hegemonic regime could re-awaken traditional rivalries which would eventually become incompatible with the alliance.

A devolved alliance would have a significant affect on NATO as a security regime. The questions surrounding extended deterrence relate to the delivery of the 'public good' that could alter expectations and, in turn, affect the regime's principles and norms. But as Buteux admits, "the key structural assumption of the devolved regime is that the international system remains essentially bipolar."⁹¹ With the collapse of the Soviet Union, bipolarity has ended, and a distinctly multipolar Europe has developed. The ramifications of such a multipolar Europe on the desires for a devolved alliance on both sides of the Atlantic are not clear.

The disengagement path would essentially be a unilateral policy response on the part of the US because of the costs of hegemony and the lack of a burden-sharing solution. The argument for disengagement rests on three points: first, devolution would

⁸⁹Calleo, *op. cit.* p. 163

⁹⁰Ironically, the end of the Soviet threat has also lead to an end of the disagreements on how to handle that Soviet threat, which had continuously rocked the foundations of the alliance. The divisive debates regarding nuclear strategy will no longer play the central role in Alliance deliberations as they did in the past. Furthermore, the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT talks has paved the way for a much more harmonious relationship on the economic front allowing the Alliance to fully concentrate on significantly less divisive issues of peacekeeping, proliferation, and CSBMs.

⁹¹Buteux, *op. cit.*, p. 32-33

represent risk without control; second, the US cannot extend deterrence and redefine its global strategy in a "strategically and economically feasible manner;"⁹² and third, disengagement entails a more restrained view of the US global role which fits with the present state of American 'internationalism'. The rationale for disengagement is that there is no further need for a commitment to Europe and, as an added benefit, Western security would be strengthened because European governments would have to exploit more of their defence potential.⁹³

Ultimately, disengagement would spell the end of NATO, given a US rejection of the principles and norms that support the alliance. Yet, it would not necessarily be the end of the transatlantic security regime as expectations about Atlantic security would remain similar enough to sustain a degree of cooperation on the part of some of the present allies.

If the West Europeans were to respond by reinforcing their own defence efforts and by strengthening their own defence cooperation, there could emerge a Western European security regime that paralleled that of the Atlantic one. Truly, two pillars would emerge, but they would be independent ones linked, if at all, by joint participation in an Atlantic security regime.⁹⁴

Expectations of peaceful change and the absence of the security dilemma would remain the same as before. The key difference would be whether a new acceptable and capable European hegemon would emerge to anchor the European pillar of the transformed regime.

The ultimate question for NATO in considering these three evolutionary paths is what the "minimum quality and quantity of public goods that the US must provide to sustain a security regime."⁹⁵ Buteux feels that minimum is a form of extended

⁹²*ibid.*, p. 36

⁹³Melvyn Krauss, How NATO Weakens the West, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986) pp. 233-238

⁹⁴Buteux, *op. cit.*, p. 38

⁹⁵*ibid.*, p. 40

deterrence, even if only the existential variety, retaining a formal security commitment and a means of implementation.

The irony of enlargement for NATO, which suggests NATO would remain viable, is the implicit connection with the enlargement of the EU. Quite simply, the slowness of EU expansion will make harder a modest and sensible expansion of NATO. The slower the EU has gone, the more it has seemed as if NATO is forcing the pace. The fact is, full NATO membership, backed by the solemn territorial guarantee that goes with it, will be open to only a handful of those who might eventually join the EU - the Czechs, Poles and Hungarians and maybe the Slovaks.

Yet the stability of Europe depends not only on reassuring Russia of the West's good intentions, but also on reassuring those in the lands between Russia and the West that their security interests are not being neglected. Alongside a better-organised relationship between the West and Russia, therefore, there will be an enduring role for NATO's Partnership for Peace, which allows countries to determine how closely they want to co-operate politically and militarily with NATO. Such partnerships can help overcome lingering suspicions and prevent the drawing of new military lines through Europe. Yet the organization that could do the most to promote stability across Europe, without raising hackles with Russia, is the EU.⁹⁶

Though much of the debate in the West has revolved around Russia's reaction to a bigger NATO, there are more fundamental questions. Is NATO willing to extend its territorial guarantee and mean it? Unlike a collective security body, whose members make woolly promises to be good neighbours, NATO is a defence alliance, whose core task remains safeguarding its members. The most corrosive argument for expansion is that NATO can take in a country because it is unlikely to be directly threatened. A promise given in this way would cheapen the NATO guarantee for all and, in time, cause the alliance to unravel.

⁹⁶"The making of modern Europe," *The Economist*, May 13th, 1995. p. 14

Two arguments about NATO's relations with its neighbours have taken a clearer shape. The long search for a 'special relationship' with Russia produced an agreement.⁹⁷ The Western alliance has also been trying to get closer, through PfP, to many of the smaller ex-communist countries that would like to join it. The fact that thirteen of these partners agreed to send troops to Bosnia did more to tighten east-west ties than years of abstract negotiations.

Even more important, Bosnia helped France to sort out its relations with the rest of the alliance. President Chirac has now decided that France cannot be a semi-detached ally. His foreign and defence ministers announced that the French will rejoin NATO's military committee and attend meetings of defence ministers, and French officers will work more closely with SHAPE, the alliance's European military headquarters.⁹⁸ The war in ex-Yugoslavia helped the French to realise that, in military matters, Europe cannot do much without American help; that making NATO strong is the best way of keeping America engaged in Europe; and that it is neither feasible nor economic to try to duplicate NATO's military structure with some vague new "European defence identity". The French foreign minister explained that France was rejoining parts of NATO "because it wants to take part actively in the alliance's renovation and reconstruction and the development of its European pillar."⁹⁹ Indeed, France's rapprochement with NATO could go further. Some of its diplomats say that, if the first steps prove successful, it could in time fully rejoin the alliance's military structure.

French policy on Bosnia indicates of how far the French have come in shedding their Gaullist inhibitions on NATO.¹⁰⁰ They argued for NATO air strikes on Sarajevo.

⁹⁷The Russians agreed to put 2,500 troops under American command. To keep them happy, a joint committee of NATO ambassadors and Russia will deal with any mutual differences.

⁹⁸"The Atlantic Alliance: A New NATO," *The Economist*, December 9th, 1995. p. 51

⁹⁹*ibid.*, p. 51

¹⁰⁰The 1994 French white paper accepted the need for modernization, but insisted that nuclear deterrence remained at the heart of the defence doctrine. The paper called for an extension of deterrence to include the use

They were openly keen on American military involvement in Europe and are less worried about closer co-operation in NATO. It is true that they would like NATO to exhibit a more balanced power structure and for the United States to pay greater diplomatic attention to the EU. Such an attitude, however, does not suggest a replacement of NATO, rather it is reminiscent of the European pillar viewpoint.

Today, as yesterday, the world needs the United States...(Your) political commitment to Europe and military presence on European soil remain as essential factor in the stability and security of the continent...France is ready to take part fully in this process of renovation (of NATO) as witnessed by the announcement a few weeks ago of its rapprochement with the military structures of the organization.¹⁰¹

Where does this leave the WEU. Roughly where the British and Americans have always wanted it to be - not in rivalry to NATO, but as a vehicle for modest military operations in which the Americans do not wish to take part.

Ironically, it is taking a neo-Gaullist to convince the French that their security, and that of Europe's, depends on NATO. The fact is, circumstances have left the French with little choice. Defence budgets throughout Europe have been declining since the early 1990s the idea that the WEU could duplicate NATO's military capabilities and organization is now clearly untenable. The need for the French armed forces to save money has forced them to share overheads with their allies. In rejoining the Alliance's integrated command structure, the French insist that the rhetoric surrounding ESDI must

of 'surgical' strikes against small nuclear powers or terrorist states. Vital interests that could trigger a nuclear riposte were extended to most of Germany while suggesting that France may have "common vital interests" with Britain.

¹⁰¹ Speech by Jacques Chirac to the American Congress on February 1st. Rapprochement with NATO began in 1992, with the acceptance of the alliance's peacekeeping role and agreement that the "Euro-corps" should be under NATO command when on peacekeeping missions. By December 1995 France resumed its seat on NATO's military committee and allowed its defence minister to take part regularly in NATO meetings. France has also agreed to discuss nuclear deterrence with the Alliance as a follow-up to its offer last year to extend its nuclear umbrella to EU partners. "France's Changing View of the World," The Economist, February 10th, 1996. p. 47. As a practical example of France's changing approach was the recent announcement of military reforms. The armed forces will shrink by a third; its nuclear land-based force will be scrapped; and its old ideal of self-sufficiency is all weapons abandoned. Far from signalling a retreat from the world, President Chirac claims that such reforms will allow France to play the global role it has always aspired to, helping to build a European defence system and let France play a fuller role in NATO. "A French Projection," The Economist, March 2nd, 1996. p. 46

become a reality. To achieve this, they propose that Europeans in NATO commands should have a dominant responsibility. In the event of a WEU-led mission, these officers would no longer resemble a NATO command but would detach themselves as a solely European command.¹⁰² The fact is that everyone agrees that the existing structure is no longer applicable and incapable of accommodating NATO's enlargement. In a twist, it is the Germans who are the most reluctant to tamper with NATO's proven machinery.

Some members of the alliance worry about the costs of enlargement, the difficulties of integrating new armies, the plausibility of defence guarantees, and the possibility of new lines being drawn in Europe between those that had full membership and those that did not. These members feel these costs might weaken NATO, not strengthen it. However, if NATO is resolutely tied to its current membership, it will have difficulty fulfilling its new roles dictated by the end of the Cold War. "Looking backwards, it will wither and die in irrelevance."¹⁰³

Yet, few mainstream politicians in Europe and North America question NATO's utility. That utility used to be described as keeping the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. In some ways the alliance still performs these tasks. But now NATO has acquired two new tasks: one is to put out fires in places like Bosnia; and the second is to help assure stability in Central and Eastern Europe. One suggestion is that the Europeans would share the burden by focusing on global threats that affect their security, such as in the Middle East or North Africa. In return the Americans would support European efforts to stabilise their continent by, for example, supplying peacekeepers on request.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² *Ibid.* p. 39

¹⁰³ "Democrats at NATO's Door," *The Economist*, (June 1st, 1996) p. 15

¹⁰⁴ Robert Blackwill, who once advised President Bush, proposed a pact between NATO's European members and America along this basis. However, Mr. Blackwill wants new institutions to manage this pact, yet few governments would want another formal commitment. "The Future of NATO: A New Kind of Alliance?" *The Economist*, (June 1st, 1996). p. 20

The Americans play down the theme of Europeanisation, arguing that they will always want to take part in security operations, downplaying the need for WEU-led forces. The French, not surprisingly, expect that the Europeans will be left to their own devices sometimes. Still, some key mechanisms need to be worked out: how will the WEU pay for leased NATO assets? What would happen if the Americans suddenly decided to 'call back' certain of their loaned equipment? Regardless, there is strong belief that the new found unity and change of course within NATO will survive. The Americans have long advocated a European pillar within the alliance yet were concerned that such a pillar not rival or weaken NATO. The French always felt that the Americans would resist the emergence of a European defence identity. Now both sides have managed to assure each other: the French have accepted that Europe neither has the money nor the political will to create a truly independent and serious defence body within the EU; and the Americans have warmed to the idea of the WEU, especially as it looks to become a subsidiary of NATO's.¹⁰⁵

America now seems at ease with the idea of a "European defence identity." It has no problem with the French-German initiated Eurocorps, now that its relationship with NATO has been clarified.

We therefore confirm the enduring validity and indispensability of our Alliance. It is based on a strong transatlantic link, the expression of a shared destiny. It reflects a European Security and Defence Identity gradually emerging as the expression of a mature Europe. It is reaching out to establish new patterns of cooperation in Europe.¹⁰⁶

In June 1996, NATO's ministerial meeting in Berlin endorsed the establishment within the alliance of a European Security and Defence Identity. This endorsement meant that dual-hatted European officers within the NATO military structure could plan

¹⁰⁵ "NATO Acquires a European Identity," *The Economist*, (June 8th, 1996) pp. 51-52

¹⁰⁶ *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10-11 January 1994.*

and command low-intensity, out-of-area military operations conducted under the auspices of the WEU.

Robert Hunter, President Clinton's ambassador to NATO, takes a more relaxed view of the relationship between the WEU, EU, and NATO:

The Cold War argument that the alliance needed centralised military direction, and that a robust WEU could interfere, no longer applies. We support the WEU as a means of preventing the renationalisation of defence. The WEU will help to focus minds on security, and thus aid the EU's attempts at common foreign and security policies; and it will, like NATO, provide a home for the Germans. Furthermore, the more the European allies help themselves, the more Congress is likely to pay for transatlantic defence.¹⁰⁷

Whatever rows it may have had in the past, in the Cold War years the massive Soviet threat provided the cover for thrashing out difficult decisions and the incentive for sticking to them. Bosnia may have been a particularly awkward first test of NATO's post-Cold War reflexes, but as the alliance takes on more such 'out of area' responsibilities, there are bound to be more tests, and more rows. In an attempt to adapt to a changed world, NATO has been re-jigging its military workings. The idea is for it to continue to respond as an alliance politically, while letting 'coalitions of the willing' do the military jobs that need to be done. But Bosnia shows that an arrangement where everyone has a say, but not everyone shares the same risks, will need even stronger political binding and more effective consultation if it is to work.

It is now generally agreed by America as well as by all the big countries of the EU, that Europe should have its own way in organizing a military operation in which America does not want or does not need to be involved. The organization through which this identity will be expressed is the WEU. It remains unlikely that the WEU could organize a purely European force, for any purpose, even a fraction of the size of the alliance that won the gulf war. The reality is that in present circumstances most WEU military operations will need some sort of American support.

¹⁰⁷"The Defence of Europe: It can't be done alone," *The Economist*, February 25th, 1995. p. 19

The US ability to prevail in most alliance debates, and to force its allies to broaden their strategic horizons, has been highlighted by the recent diplomatic history of NATO enlargement. Besides Germany, no European member of NATO was enthusiastic about expanding the alliance. But the US, once it had decided that expansion was worthwhile, told its European allies that the old NATO was no longer on offer and the only way to continue the security guarantee was to extend it.

I have heard a great deal of concern about American hegemony and unilateralism, as well as about American tendencies toward isolationism and protectionism. These are understandable, but exaggerated, concerns. A strong sentiment exists in America for the idea that "shared leadership" with a strong, stable and democratic Europe, is in the greater interest of the US...Even though the cooperation among NATO members in the Kosovo crisis is outstanding, some military specialists warn that these signs may be misleading. German General Klaus Neumann, who heads NATO's Military Committee, warned in a recent interview that "the day may soon be coming" when Europeans and Americans may no longer be able to fight alongside each other on the same battlefield because of the rapidly expanding gap in their combat capabilities.¹⁰⁸

A less obvious lesson from Kosovo is that in times of crisis, multinational institutions are only the tools of the governments they serve. Ultimately, it is those governments that bear the responsibility, for making war or peace. Institutions like NATO, with well-established machinery for taking and implementing military decisions, can help their members react to a crisis in a more co-ordinated way. The means are of little value without the will to use them. Not even NATO can force its members to go to war or contribute peacekeeping troops against their will. Unless the EU becomes a sovereign state, no amount of institutional rebuilding can take responsibility for Europe's defence away from its 15 national capitals either.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸Felix Rohatyn, Podium: The future of the Atlantic alliance, *Independent*, 05-14-1999, pp 4. Defending the Union

¹⁰⁹ Simply giving the EU more military tools will not finish the job Author not available, Defending the Union. Vol. 351, *The Economist*, 06-05-1999.

American predominance erased all problems of role allocation within the alliance, it provided clear leadership and, consequently, an unmistakable focal point around which expectations and policies could converge. In other words, despite the fact that NATO comprised sixteen nations, it acted almost as coherently as it had been under a single decision-maker, dramatically reducing the conflicts and transaction costs associated with decentralized groups.¹¹⁰

The disproportionate distribution of power within the alliance led to an obvious disproportionate sharing of the burden of common defence.¹¹¹ According to Olson's theory, if there is such a skewed distribution of power, there may exist a "uniquely privileged group", in this case the United States, which may enjoy such a proportion of the benefits of the public good so as to justify its single-handed provision. Unlike its smaller partners, the United States was so important to the common effort that it could not defect from its commitment without irreparably damaging the alliance. According to Olson and Zeckhauser's original paper: "There will be a tendency for the 'larger' members those that place a higher absolute value on the public good to bear a disproportionate share of the burden".¹¹² On the one hand, if size had been more even, neither party would have been as crucial and might have been encourage to let others pay. On the other hand, the share of the total benefits might not have been large

¹¹⁰ The transatlantic issue on which the United States had the least leverage within NATO was the policy "out of area", that is outside Europe, even though Europeans exercised more a right to "opt out" than a real influence over American decisions, which remained mostly unilateral. See Michael Howard: "An Unhappy Successful Marriage", *Foreign Affairs*, V. 78, N. 3, 1999, pp. 164-175

¹¹¹ Bruce Russett and John D. Sullivan: "Collective Goods and International Organizations", *International Organization*, V. 25, Fall 1971, pp. 845-65; Klaus Knorr: "Burden Sharing in NATO", *Orbis*, V. 29, Fall 1985, pp. 517-36; Todd Sandler and John F. Farber: "Burden Sharing, Strategy and the Design of NATO", *Economic Inquiry*, V. 18, July 1980, John R. Oneal: "The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO", *International Organization*, V. 44, N. 3, Summer 1990, pp. 379-402

¹¹² Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser: "An Economic Theory of Alliances", *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, V. 48, 1966, p. 268

enough to justify provision, as neither power would have perceived sufficient incentive to provide most of the public good in exchange for its relatively smaller slice of the cake.

The United States has lost the incentive to use all of its resources and to remain disproportionately engaged in the international system. As the United States is no longer entrapped in each and every regional balance, its intervention can be both more reflective and more selective. For European states, on the other hand, there may be a mirror effect. On the one hand, the weaker American incentive, may lead to a proportionally higher propensity on the part of European states to raise their profile. This natural and pendular process is compounded by Europe's geopolitical position, which is much closer to crisis areas such as North Africa, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. The new less intense but more local threats have enhanced the importance of geography, thereby forcing the European states to concern themselves more because of their proximity to potential crises. Moreover, while during the Cold War American hegemony was easily tolerated because of its importance to European defence, today the Europeans may feel more reluctant to follow American leadership blindly. According to Huntington: "most of the world does not want America to be its policeman".¹¹³

The CFSP and ESDI are the institutional embodiments of the cooperation between the U.S. and its European allies: on the one hand they allow France and Germany to pursue the general goal of European integration with a security element; on the other hand, these 'Euro' structures are in fact highly dependent upon U.S. good will, leadership and resources. This fact has helped to retain U.S. interest in European security as well as securing support for an enhanced European security role. In addition, a number of flexible arrangements have served to keep NATO at the center of European security organizations. These arrangements have focused on enhancing the political role of the Alliance, such as task-sharing arrangements with the Western EU (WEU). Central to both the national and institutional adjustments is the Combined Joint

¹¹³ Samuel Huntington: "The Lonely Superpower", *Foreign Affairs*, V. 78, N. 2, 1999, p. 47

Task Force (CJTF) concept which serves as the critical link between the 'Euro' options and the Atlantic pillar and which facilitates the accommodation of a variety of diverse approaches to European security, while avoiding the disruption and maybe dissolution of Europe's security institutions.

The Alliance's potential for continued legitimization and increased institutional attractiveness is exemplified not only by the enlargement project but also by France's new behavior of approach and integration. This shows that the Alliance's political and military-operational goals have been flexible enough to maintain its integrity until far beyond the turning point of 1989/90.¹¹⁴ What appears to be the critical point for NATO's future is the question of its prospective character as a Euro-Atlantic security institution with the related informal rules, expectations, common interests, routinized political and military-operational procedures and a world-public image.¹¹⁵ This leads to the general proposition that with the defined common (military) threat fading, will the alliance show the typical appearance and problems of a security community.¹¹⁶ Then the question becomes one of internal, mainly genuinely political mechanisms for both continued intra-Alliance cooperation and external.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Its clearest marks are the return into NATO's Military Committee in December 1995 and its considering a full return into the Alliance's integrated military structure as announced during the Berlin Ministerial Meeting of June 1996.

¹¹⁵Michael Brenner, "The Multilateral Moment," in Michael Brenner, ed., Multilateralism and Western Strategy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 1-41 (p. 8); Duffield, "NATO's Functions," p. 777; David G. Haglund, "Must NATO fail? Theories, myths, and policy dilemmas," International Journal 50 (1995), pp. 651-74 (p. 662).

¹¹⁶Haglund, "Must NATO fail?", pp. 663-4 and 673-4; Steve Weber, "Does NATO have a future?" in Beverly Crawford, ed., The Future of European Security (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 360-95 (p. 362-68).

¹¹⁷Weber, "Does NATO have a future?", pp. 363-4; but cf. equivalent long-standing assumptions held by neorealist alliance theory as promoted by Synder, "The Security Dilemma." pp. 485 and 494-5 and Snyder, "Alliance Theory," p. 196.

However, the idea that international institutions condition national adaptive behavior and the shape of common interests¹¹⁸ tempts one to overlook the question how these institutions themselves adapt to changed conditions, or if they are capable of such an adaptation at all.¹¹⁹ In the case of NATO, the bipolar overlay exposed the alliance to adaptive pressure in the structural-realist sense, meaning that changes in the international-political "structure" forced NATO towards certain courses of action to maintain its 'position' in the international system.¹²⁰

This adaptation found its consequence in "The Alliance's new Strategic Concept" as agreed upon during the Rome Summit of November 1991. Accordingly three new roles for NATO were envisaged: the "dialogue with other nations", an "active search for a cooperative approach to European security" and complementing as well as reinforcing "political actions within a broad approach to security", thereby contributing with the "Alliance's military forces" to the management of such crises and their peaceful resolution" that "might lead to a military threat to the security of Alliance members".¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Following Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 63; Keohane, *International Institutions*, pp. 8 and 11.

¹¹⁹ Cf. William Wallace, "European-Atlantic Security Institutions: Current State and Future Prospects," *International Spectator* 29 (1994), No. 3, pp. 37-51 (p. 45).

¹²⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 322-45 (p. 336). This adaptive pressure firstly resulted from the 'trivial' necessity for military re-orientation after the strategic enemy's disappearance and growing national interests in reduced defense expenditures, secondly of course from the emerging much-invoked 'new security tasks' (cf. for example the out-of-area debate) and finally from the fact that NATO, because of the political-military double function it has possessed from its foundation, had sneaked into a sort of "self-proclaimed collective security organization", together with the according political principles and behavioral norms. See Simon Duke, *The New European Security Disorder* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 311. This last-named implicit dimension alone would have given enough reason for a sincere self-revision of the Alliance along with the beginning decomposition of world politics' traditional bipolar texture, as has been pointed out by Wallace, "European-Atlantic Security Institutions," pp. 45-6, with the underlying aim being precisely to keep NATO's international-political "position" in the Waltzian sense.

¹²¹ The Alliance's new Strategic Concept. Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th November 1991, para. 20 and 43. One further component of this plan for institutional adaptation was to establish a concrete "diplomatic liaison" with the former Warsaw Pact countries, which subsequently found its institutional formation in the set-up of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in December 1991 and the Partnership for Peace program in January 1994.

The Strategic Concept precisely did not give up the traditional core functions of the Alliance but reaffirmed them while at the same time recognized the need for far-reaching institutional changes. One particular paradox in NATO's institutional adaptation, which makes it clear that any perspective on contemporary Euro-Atlantic security must at least combine neorealist and neoliberal assumptions, instead of either trying to play them off against each other. The paradox is a structural-functional paradox: neoliberalism predicted NATO's continued existence in the pure sense of resistance against dissolution and with the alleged striving of states for keeping the transaction costs involved in international cooperation low.¹²² What neoliberalism did not predict were qualitative institutional changes. According to its assumption it had to expect a functional reorientation of NATO under retention of its structure - which Keohane explicitly predicted.¹²³ What NATO however has is, on the other hand, a structural reorientation under retention of its essential founding function. As the Strategic Concept continued:

Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the strategic context. The first is that the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity. The second, on the other hand, is that the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security. ... NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged.¹²⁴

¹²² This follows for example from the general assumptions about inter-state cooperative behavior made in Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp. 89-109.

¹²³ See Keohane, "Institutional Theory," p. 287.

¹²⁴ The Alliance's new Strategic Concept, para. 15-6.

The Brussels Summit of 1994 made a significant step towards the Alliance's institutional adaptation from a diffuse catchall approach to a more promising strategy of functional restraint:

In pursuit of our common transatlantic security requirements, NATO increasingly will be called upon to undertake missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defense of its members, which remains a core function. We reaffirm our offer to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the CSCE. ... Against this background, NATO must continue the adaptation of its command and force structure in line with requirements for flexible and timely responses contained in the Alliance's Strategic Concept. ... As part of this process, we endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance. We have directed the North Atlantic Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, to develop this concept and establish the necessary capabilities. The Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, and in coordination with the WEU, will work on implementation in a manner that provides separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU.¹²⁵

France, however, anticipating political isolation, replied with a counter-balancing strategy in the form of institutional duplication. It sought to decrease the perceived increased political importance of NATO and its new institutional ramifications such as NACC. This counter-balancing was realized with the help of WEU, which was supplemented by a consultative forum of selected East European countries. French behavior was in perfect accordance with the power-principle of classical realism and the structural logic of Waltzian neorealism. Yet in November 1991 the North Atlantic Council came up with the formula of "interlocking institutions"¹²⁶, which obviously believed the Alliance to be able to play a leading role in devising future European security structures

¹²⁵ Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10-11 January 1994 (NATO press release M-1[94]3, 11 January 1994), para. 7-9.

¹²⁶ Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th November 1991 (NATO press release S-1[91]86, November 8, 1991), para. 3.

and accordingly declared: "The Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty."¹²⁷

This vision however found itself in competition with other European security institutions promoting their own, concepts for future European defense and security. To a large part, the history of European security politics after 1989/90 can be written as a history of "institutional rivalry".¹²⁸ Given this institutional competition, it is problematic that after the end of bipolarity NATO has repeatedly striven for a general involvement in the European broad political agenda, for example the formation of the NACC. So, the concept of interlocking institutions may become in practice a functionally unspecified, reciprocally inhibiting rather than reinforcing juxtaposition of interlocking institutions.¹²⁹

The Berlin Ministerial Meeting of June 1996 marked a decisive turning point: NATO gave up its claim to a leading role in the interplay of European security institutions, thus relinquishing the organizing principle of interlocking institutions and turning to a new principle that could be termed one of interacting institutions - namely a coordinated interplay of the different post-strategic security strategies and institutions in Europe that does not rest upon one lead-institution but rather on the idea of general common regulations for a well-defined functional sharing. That became most obvious in the NATO Council when the WEU was charged with developing its own military operability,¹³⁰ to be "separable but not separate" from NATO.¹³¹

¹²⁷ Ibid., para. 6.

¹²⁸ See Andrew M. Dorman and Adrian Treacher, European Security. An Introduction to Security Issues in Post-Cold War Europe (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995), pp. 43-73.

¹²⁹ On the following, see Hugh De Santis, "Romancing NATO: Partnership for Peace and East European Stability," in Carpenter, ed., Future of NATO, pp. 61-81 (p. 63).

¹³⁰ See Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, 3 June 1996. Final Communiqué (NATO press release M-NAC-1[96]63, 3 June 1996), para. 5-6.

¹³¹ See Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, para. 6.

An active U.S. security role in Europe is necessary not only for the future of European integration, but also for the security of the region as a whole. This active role is also a matter of compelling self-interest for the U.S. since this is the core of its relations with Western Europe and a defining factor in its superpower status. From an institutional perspective, it has placed NATO at the center of European security no matter what future modifications are undertaken. Even if the EU does develop a coherent 'second pillar' it will remain hollow from the military standpoint unless there is a genuine willingness to operationalise the CFSP and ESDI. The temptation will be to continue to rely heavily upon NATO, or U.S., assets – all under a 'European' banner. The future of European security remains very much in American hands since it remains the dominant player.

Conclusion

THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

NATO's victory in the Cold War has earned it the prestigious title of "the most successful military alliance in history". The main aim of the coalition, to avoid a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, has not only been achieved but it has receded beyond imagination. Furthermore, relations among the allies, and in particular between the United States and the main European countries have been kept within reasonable levels of disagreement throughout.

One of the reasons for this success has been the asymmetric distribution of power among allies in favor of the US. Despite the rhetoric of the "Grand Design" resting on two equal pillars, the idea of an integrated Europe on par with the US has not been accepted as a viable approach. Indeed, some analysts have argued that, "if the European movement ultimately embraces a military component, it could be the final act in NATO's history."¹

The American security interest in Europe is to maintain a security core around which other relations can be built and expanded. In the absence of a strong NATO there may not be a core with which to build any other transatlantic structures like the New Transatlantic Agenda. Second, the role that the U.S. assumed during the Cold War was obscured by the debates about CFSP and ESDI which clearly showed that there was little European consensus about security 'architecture' or the role that the U.S. or NATO should play. The eventual compromise between different European positions was reached largely because of U.S. initiatives launched through NATO. In the absence of active U.S. involvement in the post-Cold War period, Western Europe may slip back into

¹ Lawrence Kaplan: "NATO After the Cold War", in Jarrod Wiener (Ed): *The Transatlantic Relationship*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1996, pp. 29; see also Beatrice Heuser: *Transatlantic Relations: Sharing Ideals and Costs*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996, chap. 6.

concert-based structures reminiscent of nineteenth century Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, the major European powers have been unable to address the problems of post-Cold War security in a collective manner. Instead, this task has fallen to the U.S. It is true that, given the difference of opinions between the major European powers, the U.S. was the only actor in a position to balance the conflicting interests.

The Europeans need to be clear that in pursuit of closer integration they should not put at risk the political and military co-operation with the United States on which their real security depends. Similarly, the United States needs to be more actively engaged in managing the new balance of power in an unstable world. Europe now often appears to be looking for a balance of institutions to replace a balance of power, with institutions prospering to the extent that they can persuade countries to surrender national sovereignty. In practice, it is much more complex. The institutional framework can be reworked in a variety of ways depending on the nature of the crisis. Though policy outputs increasingly come through trans-national institutions the main inputs still come from governments.

Perhaps the apparent tidiness of the European security structure during the past forty years has misled us into thinking that a security system must, in order to function, be equally tidy and thoroughly organized. Yet in the past this was the consequence of a threat assumed to be precise in a world assumed to be bipolar. Now that the threats have become more amorphous and the world pluralistic, a less formalized and comprehensive security system would seem to be quite appropriate.

As Western Europe strives to build its own security and defence identity, it would prove meaningless if it were not linked to North America. The North American military commitment is being and will continue to be reduced, as long as the situation maintains itself, but it will still be militarily meaningful. Without this commitment, Europe would lack the key element of reassurance that has allowed them to integrate and overcome historical animosities. Regardless of the incredible development that has taken place so far in Europe "Europe is not a nation; it is an aggregate of nations. Europe is not a

State; it is a grouping of States. To create Europe, this reality must be taken into account.² Hence, the Atlantic Alliance will remain the core security organization of a revamped Euro-Atlantic security regime.

The primary function of this incipient regime, is to ensure overall military and political security in Europe. Another main function is to provide the possibilities for change, primarily change in Central and Eastern Europe. This revamped regime is, in its very nature, a compromise, and each of the main actors has different priorities and engagement in the different parts of the regime. Some are more intimately tied to every facet and operation, such as the members of the Eurocorps, who are also members of the WEU, EU, NATO, and OSCE; while others are tied to specific activities, like the US. Regardless of the engagement, they all share a common interest in reform and in securing the present and potential conflicts in Europe and on its fringes.

The most vital aspect of maintaining NATO will not be ensuring the development of a European Pillar but making sure the US stays engaged in European security. The Europeans have already established a 'pseudo-pillar' with the WEU-Eurocorps twin. The EU will also continue to develop its CFSP. Hence, if the US engagement can be maintained, we are going to end up with a dual hegemonic regime led by the US and the EU. There will be changes in rules and procedures but not in principles and norms therefore change within, not change of, the transatlantic security regime.

It is likely that the EU will continue to develop and draw in the rest of Europe. However, the core seems unlikely to develop into a superstate for a long time, if ever.

The emergent European entity will probably be composed of ever denser layers of overlapping organizations and institutions, binding still sovereign, or at least

²Michel Debre, *Debats parlementaires, Conseil de la Republique, France*, (Oct. 27, 1953) as recorded in Willis, *op. cit.*, p. 168. Some have argued that the division of Europe into nation states was the fundamental reason for the repeated crises which rocked the region. According to this view, what was needed was a new political framework with a powerful common authority and a diminished role for nation states. Others, however, viewed the development of the Community as an instrument to help its member states recover their economic and political strength and to take collective action without undermining their sovereignty. It is obvious that it is the second view that has prevailed over the history of the Community as the nation-states have acquired a far greater range of responsibilities and obligations than ever before.

part sovereign, states into a closely woven network of standardization, consultation and cooperation... Among other things, this core will institutionalise, perpetuate and extend the European security community.³

What the EU has most conspicuously lost is a sense of purpose. What is Europe for? That simple question is a vital one for an entity so liable to disunity among the nation-states that compose it. Should Europe have a single currency, admit new but poorer members, narrow its democratic deficit, increase its fiscal transfers, or forge a common security policy? And it is on that question that there is the most disagreement and disillusion.

In the words of Vaclav Klaus, Prime Minister of the Czech Republic:

Nor should we be surprised if the form and pace of Europe's integration prove to be determined by the real interests of the countries concerned and of their citizens, rather than by artificial blueprints approved at various inter-governmental summits. Successful integration will have to be dictated more by human action than by human design... Integration means eliminating barriers to the movement of people, ideas, goods, services, labour and capital. It does not imply the remaking of Europeans into a new breed of "homo europeus". And I believe that whereas integration enjoys widespread support in Europe, "unification" (which I use here to mean a vision that extends beyond integration to cover the structure and organisation of human society) is an ideal that Europeans find more difficult to share. It represents a different and more ambitious goal.⁴

If North America and Europe can maintain the dynamism of their shared identity, they can continue to shape the world for the better. To do so they need not just good commercial relations but something like a shared foreign and security policy. At a minimum there will be threats to their shared interests. What these threats will be no one can say, but some of the candidates - resurgent Russia, intolerant Islam, nuclear-armed desperado states - are closer to Europe than to America. NATO is the organization to deal with such threats, though not the NATO of yesterday, but the NATO of tomorrow.

³Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elsbjeta Tromer, and Ole Waever, The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era, (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990). p. 42

⁴Vaclav Klaus, "So Far, So Good," The Economist, September 10th 1994. p. 58

The European members of NATO, caught up in the deliberations of the EU and surrounded by 'interlocking institutions'... all continue to look to NATO as not only the best organized and most successful collective security alliance ever to exist, but as a means of ensuring that Canada and the US maintain their foreign and defence ties with the European continent. They realise all too well that it has been the presence of North American troops on European soil coupled with the willingness of Canada and the US to reinforce their military strength in Europe that has prevented the outbreak of a general war on the continent.⁵

The EU is the hope of the future and as long as common sense prevails it will become an actuality. But that same common sense suggests that patience must command the desires of a few over the concerns and fears of many. Other more base problems such as socio-political fears and German renewal must be taken care of first. In this NATO can play a constructive role and the debate over its existence is premature. NATO must change, it is true, but so must any organization that was founded under the auspices of the Cold War; that includes the WEU, OSCE and the EU. NATO is still in a league of its own and it will remain so for some time to come.

⁵Alex Morrison and Susan McNish, Eds. NATO and Europe: How Relevant to Canadian Security? (Toronto: CISS, 1994). pp. 10-11

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