

CANADIAN COMMUNISM: THE POST-STALINIST

PHASE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>CHAPTER</u>		<u>PAGE</u>
	ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
	TABLE OF CONTENTS	iii
	INTRODUCTION	vii
	SECTION I: HISTORY	1
CHAPTER I	HISTORY OF THE C.P.C.: 1919-1953	2
CHAPTER II	HISTORY OF THE C.P.C.: 1953-1962	15
	SECTION II : STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION	28
CHAPTER III	THE PARTY: NATIONAL ORGANIZATION	29
	Structural divisions p. 30; operating principles pp. 31-37; the general-secretary pp. 38-43; the National Executive Committee pp. 43-47; the National Committee pp. 47-50; the National Convention pp. 50-53; electoral organization pp. 53-54.	
CHAPTER IV	THE PARTY: ORGANIZATION BELOW THE NATIONAL LEVEL	55
	Provincial organization pp. 56-58; regional organization p. 58; city organization p. 58; ward constituency organization pp. 58-59; electoral organization pp. 59-60; party clubs pp. 60-65; paid functionaries pp. 65-66.	
CHAPTER V	THE PARTY: MEMBERSHIP	67
	Size pp. 68-69; geographical distribution pp. 69-70; qualifications pp. 70-72; disciplinary measures pp. 72-74; rights p. 76; duties and responsibilities pp. 76-81; party discipline pp. 81-83; role of leaders pp. 83-85; appeal of the party and character of the membership pp. 85-96.	

<u>CHAPTER</u>		<u>PAGE</u>
CHAPTER VI	THE PARTY: OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PUBLIC	97
	Legislators and elections pp. 98-104; media of mass-communications controlled by non-Communists pp. 104-108; satellite publications pp. 108-111; the party press pp. 111-120; demonstrations and individual contact p. 121.	
CHAPTER VII	THE MOVEMENT: UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PUBLIC	122
	The movement and its relationship to the party pp. 123-124; size pp. 124-127; unions pp. 127-141; ethnic organizations pp. 141-145; youth groups pp. 145-147; women's organiz- ations pp. 147-148; peace groups pp. 148-151; domestic reform groups pp. 151-152; groups concerned with foreign affairs pp. 152-154; the four major types of satellite organiz- ations pp. 155-159; the technique of "infiltration" pp. 159-161.	
CHAPTER VIII	PARTY FINANCES	162
	Expenditures p. 163; party dues p. 164; the U.S.S.R. as a source of funds p. 165; party businesses pp. 166-170; private donations pp. 170-173; the role of unions and satellite organizations pp. 173-174.	
	SECTION III : PROGRAMS AND POLICIES	175
CHAPTER IX	THE VISION: PARTY PROGRAMS	176
	Definition p. 177; the 1954 party program pp. 177-179; the 1960 party program p. 180; the C.P.C. interpretation of Canadian history pp. 181-182; economic factors leading to Communism pp. 182-184; Parliament as an instrument of the socialist revolution pp. 184-185; attitude towards other political parties pp. 185-187; the alliance of progressive forces pp. 187-189; the transition to socialism pp. 189-195; the Communist society p. 195.	

<u>CHAPTER</u>		<u>PAGE</u>
CHAPTER X	THE APPROACH: FOREIGN POLICY	196
	C.P.C. relations with other Communist parties pp. 197-220; basic premises of C.P.C. foreign policy pp. 220-224; objectives and tactics pp. 224-233.	
CHAPTER XI	THE APPROACH: DOMESTIC POLICY	234
	Emphasis on patriotism pp. 235-244; constitutional reform pp. 244-246; economic policies pp. 246-249; policy towards minority groups pp. 249-250; immigration policy pp. 250-251; defence policy pp. 251-252; women and youth p. 252; farm policy pp. 252-253; labour policy pp. 253-254; social welfare pp. 254-255; civil rights pp. 255-256; the 1956-57 debate on the character of the party pp. 256-260; methods employed in the attempt to gain political power pp. 260-264.	
	SECTION IV : CONCLUSIONS	265
CHAPTER XII	STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, FUTURE PROSPECTS	264
	The C.P.C. today pp. 267-269; discussion of strengths and weaknesses pp. 269-283; future prospects pp. 283-287.	
	SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	288
APPENDIX A	IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE RECENT HISTORY OF THE C.P.C.	xii
APPENDIX B	C.P.C. MEMBERSHIP 1939-1962	xvii
APPENDIX C	GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUNIST AND SATELLITE ORGANIZATIONS	xx
APPENDIX D	VOTES POLLED BY L.P.P. AND C.P.C. IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS 1953-1962	xliii

		<u>PAGE</u>
APPENDIX E	VOTES POLLED BY L.P.P. AND C.P.C. IN PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS 1953-1960	xlviii
APPENDIX F	ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE C.P.C.	lii
APPENDIX G	TIM BUCK'S HANDS BY: SONYA MORRIS	liv
APPENDIX H	ABBREVIATIONS USED	lvii

INTRODUCTION

An examination of a single Communist party in isolation can aspire to serve purposes beyond those pursued by studies of more nationally oriented parties. The long years of rigid, central control imposed by Moscow upon international Communism has created a situation in which each component part, to some extent, represents the total movement in microcosm. The quarrels and splits, policy shifts, successes and failures of international Communism are, by and large, reflected in each national Communist Party. The study of one, then, may be of value in understanding them all.

The Communist Party of Canada is no exception to the general rule just outlined. In its history and organization; in the tactics it employs; in the disadvantages and advantages it has suffered and enjoyed, the Canadian Communist party is particularly representative of Communist movements in highly developed, industrial societies.

Moreover, an examination of the Communist Party of Canada will shed some light on one of the darkest corners in the study of Canadian institutions. No extensive study of Canadian Communism has as yet been published. Admittedly, the party is numerically weak. However, because of its international connections, its organizational structure and the mentality of its members, it exerts a disproportionate influence on Canadian politics. For this reason it is deserving of more attention than it has been accorded by political scientists and historians.

The period from the death of Stalin to the federal election of June 18, 1962, is one of the most interesting in the history of Canadian Communism. It is also one of the most informative periods. The inner-



party crisis of 1956-57 tore aside the veil of secrecy which normally obscures party activities, making it possible for an interested observer to discover many of the most intimate and hitherto inaccessible details of party life.

In the treatment of the subject, much emphasis has been placed upon the party's organization, structure, and platform. The tactics it employs to attract members and voters and to secure the support and implementation of its ideas become apparent in relation to the broad areas mentioned. In the same manner, the party's purpose and place in Canadian politics and the world Communist movement become known. The study also attempts to demonstrate the means by which a political philosophy, essentially alien to most Canadians, can grasp Canadian minds and adapt itself to Canadian conditions. Unfortunately, this examination breaks little new ground in its treatment of alleged Communist espionage activities and connections between some party members and officials of the Soviet Embassy. Such intrigue, if it does exist, is surrounded, for obvious reasons, with the greatest secrecy.

The development of the topic is at times uneven and in places there are definite gaps due largely to the difficulty of obtaining information. As is the case with most Canadian political parties, the Communist Party is very circumspect about releasing information regarding its finances. The same is true, less understandably, of its membership figures. Often, for example, party organs and officials will claim an increase in membership but express the increase in percentage points without giving the base figure. Further, much material that is available is of a questionable

nature. This is especially true of membership figures, press circulation figures, estimates of the party's influence in the country and statements of the purposes which the party is designed to serve. In these areas both Communist and non-Communist sources often exaggerate for the sake of effect. In short, much of the material used revealed a strong bias and on that basis, where cross-checking was not possible, had to be discounted. Such difficulties have often led to the necessity of speculation where facts and figures would have been more properly employed. However, the reader is made aware of such situations when they arise.

Communist publications have provided the main source of information. The bulk of the material, approximately seventy-five percent, has been drawn from the Communist national weekly, The Canadian Tribune, and the party's theoretical journal known variously as National Affairs Monthly, The Marxist Review and Marxist Quarterly. The memoirs of Communists and ex-Communists have provided some information as have openly anti-Communist publications. Relatively objective accounts in the non-Communist press have been a great assistance in places, largely because of the interviews with Communists they have included. Such articles are, however, few and far between. Many, too, are subject to the usual objections about journalistic sources.

Except for the first section, which briefly outlines the history of Canadian Communism, a topical rather than chronological treatment of

the subject matter has been adopted in the interests of clarity. The approach has followed, as nearly as possible, that which would be taken in the examination of any Canadian political party. Exceptions occur because of the unique, to Canada, nature of the party's philosophy and structure and because of its international connections. References to the world Communist movement are necessary to place Canadian events in perspective and to make them understandable. However, some knowledge of the movement on the part of the reader is assumed and such references are brief.

SECTION I

HISTORY

CHAPTER I

HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA: 1919-1953

Canadian Communists are fond of attempting to demonstrate that the roots of their movement lie deep in Canadian history. Tim Buck, in his book Thirty Years, suggests a natural connection with a group of Toronto printers which, in 1824, met in an apple orchard to prepare a demand for shorter working hours and better pay.<sup>1</sup> The party press has on several occasions implied that the Communist Party of Canada (C.P.C.), is a natural successor to the radical political movements headed by Papineau, William Lyon MacKenzie, Louis Riel and other "great Canadian revolutionaries."<sup>2</sup>

Such connections are, to say the least, tenuous. The history of the Communist Party in Canada properly begins with the establishment in Canada, during the years 1919 and 1920, of branches of the Communist Party of America and the United Communist Party of America. It soon became apparent to the Canadian membership of the two organizations that they could better achieve their aims if they worked together. Accordingly, in June, 1921, a unity convention was held on the outskirts of Toronto.<sup>3</sup> It was there that the C.P.C. was born.

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<sup>1</sup>Tim Buck, Thirty Years 1922-1952: The Story Of The Communist Movement In Canada, p. 9.

<sup>2</sup>John Stewart made such a claim in "Where Louis Riel Fought," Canadian Tribune (C.T.), XVI:798 (Nov. 10, 1952), p. 7.

The third World Congress of the Comintern, meeting the same summer, advised Communist Parties everywhere to unite with the working class in "broad popular activities." Despite strictures of the War Measures Act, which had necessitated the unification taking place in secret, the C.P.C. immediately took steps to implement the directive.

In December, a convention was held in Toronto which recommended the launching of a legal working class party based upon the theses and statutes of the Comintern. The meeting also adopted a five point provisional program which advocated: the formation of a workers' republic; working class political action; trade union unity; the establishment of a party press; and the organization of the party "on the principles of democratic centralism." February, 1922 saw the above recommendations implemented when delegates from six provinces<sup>4</sup> formally established the Worker's Party of Canada. Jack MacDonald, Maurice Spector and Tim Buck were the three top ranking members. The first named was general-secretary.

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<sup>3</sup>Ralph Allen, in a Maclean's Magazine article, claimed that three Comintern agents were in attendance and that they brought three thousand dollars to be used by the C.P.C.. [Ralph Allen, "The Case History of Comrade Buck," Maclean's Magazine, LXIV:6 (Mar.15, 1951), p. 8.]

<sup>4</sup>British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec.

The party as formed possessed a dual nature. The legal organization, or Worker's Party, was known as "A" Party. There was also a "Z" Party, or Communist Party, which was to work underground. Those Communists who belonged to both organizations adopted dual identities. Tim Buck, for example, was known to "Z" Party as J. Page. The subterfuge of a different name for the legal party was necessitated by the continued operation of the War Measures Act.

The party immediately allied itself with the Trades and Labour Congress in attempts to build the Canadian Labour Party. At the same time efforts were made to secure a following within the unions. The scope of party activities was further broadened in 1923, with the formation of a youth group, the Young Worker's League of Canada.

At the Third National Convention of the Worker's Party held early in 1924, it was decided, in conformity with a Comintern directive, to come out into the open and begin organizing a mass political movement. It was also decided to revert to the old name, Communist Party of Canada. The practise of allowing organizations to affiliate en bloc was discontinued and individual payment of initiation fees and dues became the sole basis of membership. The Communist Party slowly abandoned the practise of working alongside other working class organizations and began to operate in direct, if descreet, competition with them.

The party's frantic efforts, between 1924 and 1929, to create a mass movement met with little success. Canada was enjoying a boom period. Considerable adverse publicity was being accorded to the Bolshevik regime



of the U.S.S.R.. Consequently, there was little support to be found for a revolutionary party among native Canadians. The party found its main source of members among the immigrants. Some immigrants had imbibed the philosophy of Marx in their homelands. Others turned to the party in frustration when general post-war prosperity passed them by. The representation of ethnic minorities in the party, as a result, was vastly disproportionate in relation to the percentage of Canada's total population which they comprised.<sup>5</sup> The vast majority of the party's most prominent members, such as Tim Buck, Leslie Morris, John Weir and Sam Carr, were foreign-born.

In the late 1920's, the party suffered a leadership crisis. Its number two man, Maurice Spector, was expelled for suspected Trotskyite sympathies. About the same time the career of the general-secretary, Jack MacDonald, passed under a shadow. Discouraged by the C.P.C.'s lack of success, he began to toy with the heresies of "right opportunism" and "American exceptionalism." He tentatively advanced the possibilities of employing more moderate techniques and co-operating with the embryonic labour parties then in existence. The executive of the C.P.C. referred MacDonald's case to the Anglo-American section of the Comintern. The Comintern's reply ordered MacDonald to recant or suffer expulsion.<sup>6</sup> It was Buck who received this cabled reply and who, in 1929, duly succeeded MacDonald as general-secretary when the latter failed to comply with the order.

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<sup>5</sup>Cf. Ch. V, pp. 86-88.

Buck immediately submitted a plan of action to the Comintern for approval. When his plan was returned, approved but with instructions to pay more attention to "poor" farmers, foreign labourers and French-Canadian labourers, he and his party hastened to comply. Two front groups, the Worker's Unity League and the Farmer's Unity League, plus a newspaper, L'Ouvrier Canadien, were immediately founded to exploit the areas indicated by the Comintern.

With the abrupt decline in Canada's economic fortunes after 1929, prospects for the C.P.C. slowly brightened. Membership began to increase as did Communist party influence within the trade unions.<sup>7</sup> In an effort to hasten the internal breakdown, which the economic crisis seemed to promise, the Communists increased agitation among the workers and placed increased emphasis upon strike action.

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<sup>6</sup>The telegram, sent November 22, 1929, read:

Place before MacDonald demand that he as member of the Party and C.C. must openly admit and immediately abandon right opportunistic position, unconditionally agree to carry on resolute struggle against all right elements in party, unconditionally accept C.I. party line and discipline informing him failure to accept these conditions of the tenth ECCI plenum means expulsion from the party.

(Quoted by Ralph Allen, Op. cit., p. 54.)

<sup>7</sup>There were approximately four thousand to four thousand-five hundred members in 1928 [Kommunisticheskii Internatsional pered shestyn vsemirnym kongressom (The Communist International before the sixth world congress) Moscow, 1928, p. 292] ; four thousand early in 1931 [XI Plenum

The obvious desire of the party to create complete chaos in Canada as a prelude to the proletarian revolution captured the attention of the Canadian government. On August 11, 1931, Buck and eight other prominent Communists were arrested for violation of Section Ninety-Eight of the Criminal Code. Eight of them, including the general-secretary, received sentences of five years each. A two year sentence was imposed upon the ninth member.

It is difficult to decide whether the arrests hindered or helped the Communist movement. On the one hand, the C.P.C. definitely missed the leadership of nine top members. On the other, it continued to function under cover of the Worker's Unity League (W.U.L.), and it remained, for a time, the only nationally organized alternative to the Conservative and Liberal parties with which significant segments of the population had become disenchanted. In addition, many Canadians were disturbed by the implications of Section Ninety-Eight. The Communists were able to play upon their sympathies to advantage. The Tim Buck Anti-Frame-up Committee and A.E. Smith's Labour Defence League were able to muster a large body of support for the release of the convicted leaders and the repeal of the culprit section of the Criminal Code. Thus, while it may be said that the

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IKKI Stenograficheskii Otchet (The XI Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. Stenographic Report) Moscow, 1931, p. 428]; six thousand in 1934 (World News and Views, London, April 6, 1939); and eighteen thousand in 1939 (Ibid, March 15, 1947).

arrest of Communist leaders and the restriction of party activities hampered the organization's full exploitation of the depression, the Government's action also helped the C.P.C. to expand.

In 1934, Buck and his colleagues received their parole. Approximately two years later MacKenzie King and the Liberals were elected on a platform which included a commitment to repeal Section Ninety-Eight. The promise was swiftly translated into legislation. The Communist party came into the open once again and began its united front, anti-facist campaign.

An outstanding feature of the pre-war united front period was the voluntary dissolution of W.U.L. and the assimilation of its revolutionary unions by the American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.). Another was the formation of a blood transfusion unit and the MacKenzie-Papineau Brigade for service in the Spanish Civil War. Communists and socialists co-operated in these endeavours, a fact which illustrates the relative rapport established between the normally rival left-wing factions during the united front period. This rapport did much to enhance Communist fortunes as did the good-will generated by the Canadian brigade in Spain and the dissolution of the W.U.L.. Other factors contributing to the general upsurge in C.P.C. fortunes during the immediate pre-war years were: the growth of Communist sympathies among intellectuals; the reaction to the increasing power of Facist Italy and Nazi Germany; and continuing unemployment.

The united front campaign slithered to a confused halt and then reversed itself upon the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939. Buck

at first remained silent on the subject and then appears to have decided that, whatever the Pact said, it didn't mean it. On September 9, he cabled MacKenzie King supporting Canada's War effort and pledging, in the name of the party; "full support for the Polish people in their resistance to Nazi aggression."<sup>8</sup> One week later, as Russia attacked Poland, Buck was underground and saying that "the MacKenzie King government and the bankers and the capitalists who were strangling national recovery in peace are now promoting an imperialist war."<sup>9</sup>

In direct contravention of the Defence of Canada Act, the party began to distribute anti-war pamphlets by the thousands. Some openly incited the armed forces to mutiny. Others appealed to "genuine socialists...to raise the class struggle to the highest pitch and to prepare to take advantage of the revolutionary situations which war inevitably brings about."<sup>10</sup>

Despite such provocation it was not until June 5, 1940, that the Canadian government declared the Communist Party illegal under the Defence of Canada regulations. At that time approximately one hundred leading Communists were interned. Buck and other key members, however, remained in hiding and were not captured.

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<sup>8</sup>Quoted by Ralph Allen, Op. cit., p. 56.

<sup>9</sup>Tim Buck, "The People Want Peace," quoted by Ralph Allen, Ibid...

<sup>10</sup>Quoted by Ralph Allen, Ibid...

A year later, June 22, 1941, the C.P.C. reversed its stand for the third time in twenty-two months:

...Canada is in mortal danger; The future of our democracy and the safety of our homes and families depend on the battle raging on the Eastern Front. At this critical hour the thoughts of all Canada are with our Soviet Allies. To defend Canada and save world civilization, to keep faith with our Soviet and British Allies, to press for immediate invasion of the continent--join the armed forces!<sup>11</sup>

After an interval of a few months, Buck and other leaders surrendered to the R.C.M.P.. Following a short stay in jail, they were released. Adopting the tactic of "united front from above," they immediately threw themselves wholeheartedly into the war effort. Communist labour organizers worked to obtain no strike guaranties from unions, and the party, working under the name of Dominion Communist-Labour Committee for Total War, agitated for the opening of a second front.

The whole-hearted participation of Canadian Communists, whatever their motives, in the war effort; the popularity of the Red Army, and the Teheran Conference rapidly dispersed any ill-feelings towards the Communists and recouped any loss of membership incurred by their earlier "double shuffle."

In August of 1943, the Labor-Progressive Party (L.P.P.) was formed and for two years maintained the facade of being a new party. In order to give cogency to Soviet propoganda, the party's primary task was to persuade Canadians that it had renounced all thoughts of class war. Buck's

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<sup>11</sup>Quoted by Ralph Allen, Ibid., p. 57.

politics were typified by his appearance, shortly after leaving jail, with Premier Hepburn of Ontario at a war-rally in Maple Leaf Gardens. During the 1945 federal election, the C.C.F. was attacked for pursuing socialist aims in a time of crisis, and Buck urged support of the Liberal government.

In terms of membership and influence over the public, the last two years of the war were high points in the history of Canadian Communism. No official membership figures for the period have been encountered. However, it is generally conceded that the L.P.P. reached its peak in numerical strength towards the end of the war. Influence in the labour unions also increased. Shortly after the war, for example, a Communist, Pat Sullivan, became a vice-president of the Trades and Labour Congress (T.L.C.). In addition, Communists were more successful at the polls having at the end of the war one M.P., two M.L.A.'s, four aldermen and four school trustees in office. In the 1945 general election, the Communists gained more votes (107,391), both absolutely and relatively, than they ever had before or have since.<sup>12</sup>

With the end of the war and the rapid deterioration in East-West relations, Labor-Progressive policies were hastily revised. Buck proclaimed that the L.P.P. had always been and always would be a party of Communists. Co-operation with bourgeois parties was no longer countenanced.

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<sup>12</sup>The figure quoted was compiled from; W.H. Scarrow, Canada Votes (table 36, p. 119). The conclusion reached is based upon comparison of other statistics published in the same work. Also cf. Appendix D p. xliii.

The end of the united front signified the beginning of a decline in Communist fortunes. A major blow to the party's cause was the exposure, late in 1945, of the Canadian operations of a Soviet spy ring. The testimony of Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk in the Russian embassy who had defected, led to the arrest and conviction of the lone Labor-Progressive M.P., Fred Rose, and the party organizer Sam Carr, for their complicity in the ring. Gouzenko's revelations alienated public opinion, facilitated public acceptance of, and to some extent inspired post-war anti-Soviet propaganda, and generally complicated Communist efforts to recruit new members.

It is difficult, in the absence of membership figures, to say what immediate effects the Gouzenko case had upon the L.P.P.. Many Communists found such means to be justified by the end, and their faith remained unshaken. Some of the newer members, recruited during the popular front period, probably had greater difficulty in rationalizing such behaviour. It would be safe to say that some left the party as a result and others became less ardent supporters.

During the succeeding six years Canadian Communists supported Moscow's rigid foreign policy without reservation. Their all too apparent links with the Soviet Union were constantly emphasized in the press. In Parliament the Conservatives and Social Crediters attempted to have the party banned. The adverse publicity Senator Macarthy and those of his ilk received in Canada was probably a factor in Parliament's decision to allow the L.P.P. to continue functioning--in addition, of course, to all the obvious and valid theoretical arguments.



Parliament may not have banned the Communists, but the trade union movement did. By 1949, both the Trades and Labour Congress (T.L.C.) and the Canadian Congress of Labour (C.C.L.) had begun to purge their respective organizations of Communists. Known party members were removed from all positions of influence and all Communist-dominated unions were expelled from the national and provincial trade union congresses. Communist influence within the unions rapidly declined.

As the L.P.P. grew increasingly more isolated from the main stream of Canadian political life, its influence and strength declined. The low point, however, had not yet been reached. The nadir came between mid-1957 and mid-1958 following a blow from unexpected quarters.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA: 1953-1962

Stalin's death, in March 1953 was followed by a prolonged struggle for power within the Kremlin. The rival factions avoided, to a large extent, any public display of their rivalry. They also, until the battle was decided, denied themselves any sweeping condemnation of opposing groups on ideological grounds. The factional strife was not, at that time, duplicated in the L.P.P.. However, the interregnum did have some effect on the Canadian party.

The period of flux in Moscow was a period of uncertainty for the Canadian Communists. They were in doubt about the eventual outcome of the struggle in the U.S.S.R. and understandably wished to avoid alienating the faction destined to emerge victorious. For these reasons, and because there was at the time a definite paucity of authoritative political statements forthcoming from Moscow, Canadian Communist periodicals accorded less space to the writings and speeches of Soviet authorities, including Stalin, than had formerly been the case. At the same time the L.P.P. seemed to feel a lack of the Soviet guidance to which it had become accustomed by long years of enforced subservience to Moscow. It was perhaps in a desire to discover alternative sources of authority that Eastern European and Chinese leaders and theoreticians began to be quoted more frequently.

The changes Khrushchev effected in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) while attempting to overcome his rivals were not duplicated in the L.P.P.. The changes were not widely known or understood. Nor were they immediately incorporated into party dogma. In any event, the L.P.P. retained its rigidly hierarchical, bureaucratic and

Stalinist character.

Similarly, the thaw which briefly characterized East-West relations after Stalin's death and the greater flexibility manifested by Soviet diplomacy and Soviet leaders found but little reflection in L.P.P. policies. The Canadian party did, for a brief period, make token references to "the Geneva spirit," but in the main it adhered to the tactics and strategy forged in the early years of the Cold War.

The L.P.P. maintained, as it had from 1941 to the end of the war, a strongly nationalistic posture. The title of the party's 1953 election platform, "Put Canada First!," typified the stand. The nationalism was based upon anti-American sentiments. Almost everything about Canada that the Communists declared to be wrong or undesirable was attributed to the insidious influence of "Yankee" monopolists and militarists. The Rosenberg case, the arrest and imprisonment of eleven leading American Communists, and like incidents inflamed the anti-U.S. prejudice of the L.P.P. until it bordered on paranoia.

L.P.P. pronouncements held all other Canadian political parties to be equally responsible for what was termed the "sell-out" to the United States. The rank and file of the C.C.F. were said to have been betrayed by their right-wing leadership. L.P.P. members were encouraged to cultivate the friendship and attempt the conversion of their C.C.F. counterparts who were, if misguided, sincerely progressive. This plan, which met with little or no success, was the only attempt made by the L.P.P. to form a working arrangement with another political party. Despite increasing evidences that its isolation was helping to decrease the party's popular

appeal, the "sectarian" attitude persisted.

In the 1953 federal election, with a great display of unwarranted optimism and unfounded strength, the L.P.P. nominated one hundred candidates. None were returned. Almost every federal by-election between 1953 and 1956 was contested and large slates of candidates were nominated in the Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec provincial elections.<sup>1</sup> In each case the party met with no success. It ceased to employ such tactics with the Saskatchewan general election of 1956 when all but two of the Communist candidates nominated were withdrawn in favour of the C.C.F.. The switch was a result of new policy statements from Moscow which not only urged collaboration with socialists but also sanctified the theory of separate roads to Socialism.

Late in 1955, the L.P.P. received an invitation to send observers to the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U.. The Congress, which met during February of 1956, ushered in a fateful period for the L.P.P. and, indeed, for Communist parties throughout the world.

The resolutions adopted by the Congress and the speeches of its chief rapporteurs had profound implications for inter-party relationships, party structure, strategy and tactics. They amounted, in effect, to a formal acceptance of the new flexibility, relative to the rigidity of the Stalinist period, which had been injected into the Soviet system after 1953. Most startling of all the changes was the criticism and downgrading of Stalin implied in an address to the public session by Mikoyan and made

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<sup>1</sup>See Appendix E.

explicit by Khrushchev in a speech to a secret session of the Twentieth Congress from which foreign Communists were excluded.

First reports of the Congress and its condemnation of "the cult of personality" reached the Canadian Communist press in March. Although they had no knowledge of the secret speech or its contents, the Canadian rank and file seemed vaguely disquieted by the implied criticisms of Stalin. A desultory debate on his merits and defects took place in the correspondence column of the Canadian Tribune.<sup>2</sup>

Disquiet became active discontent when the Canadian Tribune published, in April, the news that a Polish-Jewish newspaper, Folkstimme, had charged the Soviet Union with persecuting cultural leaders of the Russian-Jewish community. Alone, the Folkstimme revelations would probably have

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<sup>2</sup>The first letters appeared in Mid-March and by the end of April they dominated the space devoted to correspondence. The following statement, taken from the March 26, 1956 edition of the Canadian Tribune (p.4), indicates that some members had begun to re-assess their opinion of Stalin at that early date:

"It has become clear that for some time the C.P.S.U. has been closely appraising the role of Stalin - his contribution to the building of socialism in the Soviet Union as well as errors he committed.

"Naturally, some of the disclosures have come as a shock to many people to whom Stalin was, as we in Canada have always assumed, the embodiment of the collective leadership of the C.P.S.U.....

"...But lacking...authentic information and texts we deem it unwise to indulge in speculation of the drawing of hasty conclusions."

had little effect on the Canadian party. However, they were followed, in June, by the American State Department's publication of Khrushchev's secret speech. Chaos resulted.

For the most part, statements by the party leadership about the astounding accusations displayed puzzlement coupled with continued faith in the C.P.S.U.. The courage of the Soviet Union in publicly revealing its short-comings was emphasized, although annoyance, at the fact that Khrushchev had not informed them of the contents of his speech, was expressed.<sup>3</sup>

Most of the rank and file and some of the leaders were not to be so easily pacified. They wanted to know if the State Department's text was accurate and, if accurate, how Stalin had been allowed to make such errors. They wanted to know how the C.P.S.U. intended to prevent similar errors in the future. Some began to see evidences of a cult of personality and too little inner-party democracy in the L.P.P.. The National Executive Committee (N.E.C.) of the L.P.P. was criticized for failing to be more critical of the Soviet Union and for the lack of guidance it offered to the membership at the time of the State Department's expose.

The N.E.C. was in no position to take a stand. Its members were unable, although it held an abnormally large number of meetings from

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<sup>3</sup>An example of this attitude is provided by "Statement of the N.E.C. of the L.P.P." [N.A.M., XIII B : 5 (May, June, July, 1956), p.24].

mid-April to the end of July, to achieve a mutually acceptable interpretation of the events. A disorganized opposition to the policies of the party and Buck's leadership had begun to crystallize around J.B. Salsberg.<sup>4</sup> N.E.C. statements reflected the internal division. They were innocuous and indecisive.

On June 30, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. issued a resolution purporting to answer questions of which those of the Canadian Communists were typical. Anxious to end the dispute which threatened to destroy their party, the N.E.C. published, towards the end of July, a statement which implied acceptance of the Soviet explanations.

Much of the membership, however, was unwilling to accept the Soviet resolution as the last word. Their feelings must have found an echo in the N.E.C. for, in late summer, a small delegation, consisting of Buck, Salsberg, Leslie Morris and William Kardash visited Russia secretly. The delegates hoped to receive more adequate explanations first hand.

Salsberg was especially insistent upon receiving an explanation of

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<sup>4</sup>Salsberg, for thirteen years an L.P.P., M.L.A. in Ontario and a senior member of the party hierarchy with a large personal following, was quietly dropped from the N.E.C. in 1953 because he refused to withdraw demands for an investigation into alleged anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. In 1955 he travelled to the U.S.S.R. on a fact-finding mission and discovered evidence to support his charges. Buck and other high party officials had then prevailed upon him to keep his information from the public for the sake of the party. In May, 1956 he was vindicated and re-instated as a member of the N.E.C..



the treatment of Russian Jews and information about measures adopted to ensure that further persecution would not take place. Khrushchev's replies to Salsberg's questions for the most part closely paralleled earlier statements by the C.P.S.U., but they were spiced with personal anecdotes and observations. Far from being pacified by Khrushchev, Salsberg was actually antagonized and by one statement in particular. "Wherever a Jew sinks his anchor," said Khrushchev, "there grows a synagogue." Salsberg later observed: "I knew then that it was almost over for me."<sup>5</sup>

It was not until October 12, three weeks after its return, that the delegation was able to decide upon a report satisfactory to all its members and secure its adoption by the N.E.C.. Even then Salsberg voted in favour of the report "with certain reservations."

The delegation's deliberations had been interrupted by a demand from the Quebec organization that Buck and Salsberg address a special membership meeting in Montreal to clarify the existing situation. The disagreements of the two men, despite last minute attempts to patch them up, became apparent as soon as they spoke. The meeting was characterized by a complete breakdown of party discipline. Three days after it ended, Gui Caron, Quebec provincial leader, and five other prominent members of the National Committee (N.C.) from Quebec submitted their resignations. All attempts to secure a retraction failed.

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<sup>5</sup>Quoted by David Lewis Stein in "The Slow Comeback of Canada's Communists," MacLean's Magazine, LXXIV:15 (July 29, 1961), p.38.

The Quebec resignations brought the dispute in the N.E.C. to a head. On October 22, the N.E.C., by a narrow margin, supported Norman Penner's motion asking that Buck surrender his office and functions. The whole N.E.C. then resigned with only Salsberg opposing the move.<sup>6</sup> The next day the executive sent a telegram to Moscow chastizing Khrushchev for his attempt to intimidate the new Polish leadership and another to Warsaw "greeting" Gomulka. The extreme confusion of the faction opposing Buck was demonstrated when Norman Penner summoned a special meeting of the resigning N.E.C. to withdraw his motion to remove Buck. He did not, however, withdraw his criticisms of the general-secretary.<sup>7</sup>

In late October and early November, the National Committee met in plenary session. It attempted to elect a new N.E.C. of twelve members but only succeeded in securing nine. The new executive bristled with Buck's supporters. Salsberg's chief sympathizers were either not elected or resigned when he, tied with three others for the last position, withdrew from the run-off vote. He claimed that the Committee in voting for Buck's policies had voted for the denial of the right to freedom of speech within the party. The Committee also voted to rescind the cables to Warsaw and Moscow.

Unfortunately for the party, the crisis in leadership occurred at the time Suez was invaded and rebellion broke out in Hungary. The member-

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<sup>6</sup>Norman Penner, "Speech at Toronto L.P.P. Meeting," N.A.M. , XIII B:10 (December, 1956), p.6.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid..

ship was thus forced to face further problems without a clear indication of official policy. Further dissention was the result.

Between November, 1956, and April, 1957, debate within the party grew more heated. Lines of opposition began to be drawn. The party press was replete with articles advocating either reform or the status quo as each faction sought to secure support for its ideas.

April saw a National Convention consisting of one hundred and sixty-seven delegates representing the hard core of the party assembled in Toronto. The Convention's resolve to support Buck was enhanced by Buck's adroit political manouvering. He made speeches playing upon the sympathies of the delegates and accusing his opponents, in essence, of disloyalty to the party. Many of his remarks were subsequently officially withdrawn but their effect remained.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, the Convention was, to an extent, packed. The national sub-committees were seated with a voice but no vote and the six rebellious N.C. members from Quebec were replaced by delegates sympathetic to Buck. Perhaps the greatest factor contributing to the rebels' defeat was their own lack of unity except in the desire for reform. The Convention unanimously re-elected Buck, approved his platform, denounced Salsberg and defeated the latter's token bid for a place on the N.C.. Indeed, Buck was almost too successful. Some of his most faithful supporters were not elected to the N.C. because they had dared to demand that Salsberg be given a fair hearing. Shortly after the Convention Salsberg and six other former members of the N.E.C. quit the party for good.

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

A split serious enough to result in the resignation or dismissal of a significant number of top personnel had a predictable effect upon the rank and file. They left the L.P.P. in droves. Membership dropped in the period of a year to one-half, or less, than the figure existing prior to the Twentieth Congress. It may be safely assumed that the effect on associated groups not subject to the commitments and discipline of the party were at least as extreme. The United Jewish People's Order (U.J.P.O.), for example, briefly severed all connections with the party. The party press, too, had its activities severely curtailed through lack of funds and a sharp decline in circulation. The youth movement discharged its full time staff and fell apart. By 1958, the party's elected representatives had been reduced to two: an alderman and a school trustee both elected in North Winnipeg.

Early 1958 represented the low point in the recent history of Canadian Communism. However, almost immediately, the L.P.P. began to recoup its losses. Sufficient devoted party workers remained after the crisis to form a sizeable nucleus about which the party could be rebuilt. Several factors combined to assist the efforts at reconstruction. Firstly, the Anglo-French and Israeli invasions of Suez had helped to dispel some of the odium which attached itself to the Soviet actions in Hungary. Secondly, the Soviet sputniks added much to the prestige of the U.S.S.R. and, by association, to Canadian Communists. Thirdly, the Canadian political scene was characterized by unrest and realignment of political support. The Liberals had been twice defeated and the Conservatives had formed at first a minority government and then a majority government with

the largest percentage of Commons seats ever gained by a political party in Canada. The Social Credit party had failed to elect any members to the twenty-fifth Parliament and C.C.F. representation had been reduced to eight M.P.'s. Fourthly, unemployment had again become a national dilemma. The unemployed had often provided a fertile field for Communist agitation. Fifthly, a C.L.C. Convention had called for the formation of a new party of labour. Despite constant rebuffs, the L.P.P. actively sought alliance with the new group. Slight modifications in the presentation of Communist policies necessitated by the attempt, in all likelihood, somewhat broadened the appeal of the party thereby assisting in its reinvigoration.

At the Seventh National Convention of the L.P.P. (later referred to as the Sixteenth Congress C.P.C.) held in October 1959, Buck boasted, without giving exact figures, that since May of the same year party membership had increased fifteen per cent. The United Jewish Peoples Order was back in the fold although reduced in numbers. The Youth section (Y.C.L.) had a membership of approximately eight hundred and once again employed a paid organizer.<sup>9</sup> Circulation of both the Canadian Tribune and the Pacific Tribune had significantly increased. By 1961, the party had increased its elected representatives to four: two aldermen and two school trustees. Buck claimed even more progress at the Seventeenth National Convention. By June of 1962, it is safe to say the party had reached a level of four thousand to five thousand members.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>David Lewis Stein, Loc. cit..

<sup>10</sup>See Appendix B.

The L.P.P. was quick to acknowledge upon the belief expressed by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress C.P.S.U. that, through an alliance of progressive forces within the community, a parliamentary road to socialism was, in some countries, possible. This belief accounts for the change in policy, already noted, during the Saskatchewan elections in 1956. The new tactic of unilateral "co-operation" with democratic socialists was pursued by the L.P.P. in both the 1957 and 1958 federal elections. The same is true of the provincial elections which have taken place since mid-1956.

In early 1962, at the Seventeenth National Convention of the C.P.C., Tim Buck surrendered his long-held position as general-secretary to Leslie Morris. Buck's years of service were rewarded by his election to the chairmanship of the National Committee. The party he views from semi-retirement is small, slightly moribund and despised by the Canadian electorate. It has yet to realize the high hopes with which it was founded.

SECTION II  
STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

CHAPTER III

THE PARTY: NATIONAL ORGANIZATION



Together with associated groups the C.P.C. provides channels through which its members can involve themselves in almost every conceivable sphere of community life. Organized religion is the single important exception to this general rule. The party has established sub-committees and satellite organizations to deal with such diverse subjects as education and the consumer, culture and housing, civil liberties and Canadian-Soviet friendship, peace and unemployment. The very breadth of the C.P.C.'s activities distinguish it from other Canadian political parties. However, the interest the party exhibits in any single area of activity at any given time is dictated by the policies of the party's political organization.

Structurally, the party has three divisions.<sup>1</sup> Two, the electoral organization and the administrative and policy-making organization which constitute the party proper, are described in the constitution of the C.P.C.. The third structural division, the satellite organizations considered collectively and known as the movement, is extra-constitutional. It is with the party proper that this chapter deals.<sup>2</sup> As might be expected, there is some overlap in the functions of the three sections. Co-ordination and leadership is supplied by the administrative organization.

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<sup>1</sup>There is a possible fourth division -- the underground. Involvement of C.P.C. members in the Soviet spy ring revealed by Igor Gouzenko indicates that Z Party, or a corresponding organization, existed as late as 1945. However, if an underground organization functions today, no concrete evidence of its existence has come to the attention of this writer.

Although the C.P.C. has operated under four<sup>3</sup> different constitutions during the period 1953-62, its expressed aims and ideals are basically unchanged. The party describes itself as being "the political party of the working-class dedicated to the cause of socialism."<sup>4</sup> Its professed purpose is "the achievement of working-class state power and the building of a socialist Canada."<sup>5</sup> To achieve this goal the party attempts to "unite in its ranks the most political advanced and active members of the working class" and of other sections of society.<sup>6</sup> It claims to have "no interests separate and apart from those of the working class from which it springs."<sup>7</sup> As employed in the constitution of the C.P.C., the term 'socialism' refers to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>The movement is discussed in Chapter VII.

<sup>3</sup>They were adopted by the 3rd National Convention L.P.P., February, 1949; the 6th National Convention L.P.P., April, 1957; the 16th National Convention C.P.C., October, 1959; the 17th National Convention C.P.C., January, 1962.

<sup>4</sup>Constitution of the Communist Party of Canada (1962), Preamble, p. 4. Hereafter referred to as Const..

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 1-2.

<sup>8</sup>...In its consistent defense of the real interests of the nation, the Communist Party is guided by the world outlook of Marxism-Leninism. The Communist Party of Canada upholds the time-honoured and tested principle of working class internationalism. It develops fraternal ties with communist and worker's parties of other countries for the victory of the common aims of the working class. (Ibid., p. 4.)

Democratic centralism is the organizational principle of the C.P.C.. The principle is defined as combining:

...the maximum of democratic discussion and participation of the membership in Party life, with the self-imposed obligation to carry out majority decisions and executions of these decisions by an elected centralized leadership capable of directing the entire Party....<sup>9</sup>

Many of the trappings of democracy are present in procedures adopted by the party. All party committees are elected by majority vote. The elected committees are bound by party policies as decided by conventions. The conventions themselves, be they regional, provincial or national, are composed of delegates elected by majority vote and secret ballot. Several months prior to a meeting of the National Convention, the senior policy-making body, the pages of party periodicals and newspapers are open to policy suggestions from individual members and party clubs. The draft program, prepared by the N.W.C. and approved by the National Committee, is published well in advance of the Convention. Criticism and comment are invited. This process is known as pre-Convention discussion. Moreover, party organizations are encouraged to submit resolutions for the consideration of the Convention.

There are restrictions upon the functioning of the democratic process, however. The principle of democratic centralism allows discussion to take place only until a decision is reached. Once a measure is adopted by majority vote each subordinate body and member is expected

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

to suppress any misgivings and willingly follow directions. Article four, section one of the present constitution does concede the right of members and organizations to "reserve their opinion in the event of disagreement with a decision or submit it to a leading committee."<sup>10</sup> The effective functioning of this provision, however, is hampered both by the natural reluctance of an individual to question the decisions of an official body and by the fact that the same article and section requires a member to "unconditionally carry out" the disputed decision even while his objections are in the process of being judged.

In addition, the party has displayed a marked intolerance towards people advocating policies contrary to those espoused by the leadership. During the 1956-57 crisis, party members were repeatedly urged "to get into the pre-convention discussion which is now open; to discuss in the most critical fashion...all...questions having to do with the theory, policy, practise and leadership of the party."<sup>11</sup> It was emphasized that "all views must be brought forward for discussion in the spirit of the fullest party democracy."<sup>12</sup> Yet when members took advantage of the invitations many were denounced as "revisionists" or accused of anti-

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<sup>10</sup>Const., art. 4, sec. 1, p. 8.

<sup>11</sup>"Call to the Sixth National Convention L.P.P.," N.A.M., XIV:1 (Jan., 1957), p. 2.

<sup>12</sup>"Draft Policy Resolution, for the Sixth National Convention Labor Progressive Party," N.A.M. XIV:1 (Jan., 1957), p. 1.

party and "fractional" activities. Norman Fenner claimed that his motion to remove Buck from office was motivated by Buck's attempts to restrict discussion within the N.Y.C. through veiled references to revisionism.<sup>13</sup> Fenner has also cited several incidents which demonstrate that most members of the National Committee adopted attitudes similar to Buck's.<sup>14</sup> Nor were such charges of intolerance made solely by the principals in the dispute. A Toronto member charged, in a letter to National Affairs Monthly (N.A.M.), that "name-calling and slander" had characterized the dispute.<sup>15</sup> Another letter, from an Edmonton member, stated:

...Every critic is immediately suspect of revisionism and must go out of his way to deny such tendencies, thereby throwing a large red herring into the discussion before it even begins....

All critics are automatically classified as softies, weakened by the cold war and corrupted by prosperity;....<sup>16</sup>

Full and free discussion within the party is further hampered by the executive's habit of editing information made available to the membership. William Kashtan noted in a F.A.I. article that a decision by the N.Y.C. withheld information on the Twentieth Congress C.P.S.U. and

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<sup>13</sup>Norman Fenner, "Speech at Toronto L.P.P. Meeting," N.A.M., XIII(B):10 (Dec., 1956), p. 6.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid..

<sup>15</sup>Bess Maltin "Our Leadership Found Wanting," N.A.M., XIV:1 (Jan., 1957), p. 10.

<sup>16</sup>William Stilwell, "Opinion on Our Party Discussion," F.A.I., XIV:2 (Feb., 1957), p. 7.

and Khrushchev's secret speech from the P.C..<sup>17</sup> The N.P.C. also prevented the publication of Buck's main report to the October, 1956 N.C. meeting.<sup>18</sup>

In the C.P.C., decisions of superior institutions are binding on their subordinates. This is only normal and, since the democratically elected National Convention is the senior body within the party, such a requirement would seem to be in accord with democratic principles. However, the National Convention meets at infrequent intervals. As a result, many decisions binding upon the membership are made by the relatively small National Committee or its even smaller executive group, the N.E.C.. Within the N.E.C., the predominance of the general-secretary ensures that for all practical purposes many of the decisions which the membership must unconditionally carry out are, in fact, made by one man. Leslie Morris conceded the validity of this criticism when he stated:

...that our party leadership, as part of its sectarianism and extreme emphasis on centralism, is guilty of substituting central direction from the top is true....<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>William Kashtan, "Some Conceptions and Misconceptions -- and Changes Needed to Advance Party's Interests," N.A.M., XIV:4 (Apr., 1957), p. 22.

<sup>18</sup>Bess Maltin, loc. cit..

<sup>19</sup>Leslie Morris, "Three Basic Principles of the Heart of Debate," N.A.M., XIV:3 (March, 1957), p. 7.

The noted reservations about the C.P.C.'s claims of inner-party democracy apply, in greater or lesser degree, to all Canadian political parties. To some extent they are faults inherent in representative democracy. But other factors combine to make the Communist Party more rigidly hierarchical with a greater concentration of power at the top than would normally be the case in a democratic organization.

One such factor is the lack of a centre of authority within the party capable of limiting the power of the administration. In other parties the administrative organization is in fact subordinate to the parliamentary caucus or a corresponding group. At the same time the relative permanence of the administration, its accumulated knowledge and the authority it derives from party conventions allows it to exert considerable influence upon its legislators. The Communists' lack of success at the polls precludes such adjustments taking place within their party. In any event, it is highly doubtful that they consider rival centres of authority to be compatible with the proper functioning of a Communist party. The exceptional discipline required of a Communist also helps to produce and support undemocratic tendencies within the party.

One of the best illustrations of the hierarchical structure of the party as it existed prior to 1957 is a description by an ex-Communist of his feelings upon reading Khrushchev's speech.

...Everything I had suppressed for twenty years erupted like a sewer...we were the elect, the hierarchy were more elect, and the

leader was by definition, the truth....<sup>20</sup>

The party leadership claims that changes have taken place since 1957, that the party is more democratically organized, that discussion is freer. Certainly, the draft policy resolution presented to the Sixth National Convention of the L.P.P. expressed the need for "a reconstruction" of the character of the party organization and the "style of work" in order to make them more democratic. Moreover, the preamble of the new constitution adopted at the Convention was especially insistent upon the democratic rights of the members and the steps taken by the party to guarantee them. In the previous constitution the preamble had made no reference to the subject.

The 1959 and 1962 constitutions of the C.P.C. have preambles written in a vein similar to that of the 1957 L.P.P. constitution. However, less reticence is exhibited in asserting the binding nature of majority decisions and the obligation, albeit "self-imposed," of each member to carry out directives. Also there has been no significant alteration in the inner-workings of the party to correspond to its formal protestations of being democratic. Current insistence upon the democratic rights of members would seem to represent a modification in party cent necessitated by the events of 1956 within the Canadian party and the international movement, rather than being the reflection of a change in practise.

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<sup>20</sup>"Comrade George" quoted by David I. Stein in "The Slow Come-back of Canada's Communists," Op. cit., p. 38.



In structure, the administrative and policy-making section of the party resembles a pyramid with the general-secretary at the apex, the party clubs at the base and the various national, provincial and regional organizations in between. The general-secretary of the C.P.C. is elected by the National Committee from its own ranks. There is no specific reference in the constitution to the length of time for which a general-secretary is selected to serve. However, it would seem that it has been the practice for an election to be held at approximately two year intervals following the appointing of a new National Committee by the National Convention.

The events, already described,<sup>21</sup> leading to the initial election of Tim Buck as general-secretary indicates that Moscow, through the Comintern, considerably influenced the party's choice. It is difficult to decide whether or not the Soviet Union's opinion carries equal weight today, because the office has changed hands only once in the intervening years. Leslie Morris replaced Tim Buck, in 1962, at the Seventeenth National Convention.

At the time, the Soviet Union was engaged in accelerating the process of de-Stalinization in answer, among other reasons, to the challenge presented by Peking to its continued leadership of international Communism. It may be that Buck's replacement, since he was closely associated with the Stalinist regime, was a token concession to Moscow.

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<sup>21</sup>Ch. 1, p. 6.

If such is the case, it may be concluded that the Soviet Union continues to have some direct influence in the choice of the Canadian Communist leadership. On the other hand, Leslie Morris had been Buck's chief lieutenant for a considerable period and one of his staunchest supporters during the party crisis of 1956-57. He would, therefore, seem to be almost equally tainted despite the fact he is rumoured to have been Buck's rival for the leadership in the early 1950's. Moreover, Buck was seventy-one at the time of the Seventeenth National Convention and probably felt it was time to play a less active role. This was, in fact, the reason Buck cited for the change.<sup>22</sup>

Although it is doubtful that Moscow participates directly in the selection of the Canadian general-secretary, there is reason to believe that an indirect influence exists. Since Moscow is, at times officially and at others unofficially, the co-ordinating body for international Communism, it is highly unlikely that the Canadian membership would select a leader displeasing to the C.P.S.U. hierarchy. That is, the conditions governing the election of the chief Canadian official are closely analogous to those governing the selection of party strategy and tactics, an area in which Soviet influence demonstrably applies.

The general-secretary is a full-time, paid administrative official. He is the leading member of the N.E.C. and must ensure that the body

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<sup>22</sup>John Leblanc, "Red Fox Won't Lie Low," W.F.P., Mar., 11, 1963.

carries out its assigned duties. His influence within the party far exceeds that implied in the constitution's almost cursory reference to the office. Several factors contribute to the phenomenon. Serving the party on a full-time basis, the general-secretary would naturally tend to be more knowledgeable than other members; to have at his finger tips the information necessary for making decisions. He is thus able to influence the formation of policy and tactics at all levels in the party. This situation is accentuated by the hierarchical nature of the party. All lines of responsibility are directed upwards.<sup>23</sup> Thus as chief member of the permanent executive of the highest national body, decisions of the general-secretary become binding upon the entire membership.

The general-secretary's relatively frequent trips to the U.S.S.R. and other nations of the Soviet bloc for business and pleasure also add to the weight of his opinions. At times, as in the case of Khrushchev's secret speech,<sup>24</sup> they resulted in his obtaining information regarding events within the bloc in advance of the rest of the party. Beyond such pragmatic considerations lies the almost mystical respect, akin to that accorded pilgrims in the Middle Ages, with which Canadian Communists regard those among them who have visited the world's first "socialist" state.

In the case of Tim Buck, sheer length of service, thirty-two years

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<sup>23</sup>...All...lower organizations must carry out decisions of higher organizations. (Const., Preamble, p. 3.)

<sup>24</sup>Cf. Ch. V, p. 76.

in the office, tended to increase his authority. His position was almost sacrosanct.<sup>25</sup> It took much courage to contradict or challenge the validity of Buck's pronouncements. The same is true, although to a lesser extent, of Leslie Morris who, for many years before becoming general-secretary, was number two man in the party. The general-secretary also has the opportunity, while touring the country on party business, to make contact with the membership and to build up a following based on personal loyalties. His ability to dispense patronage through the N.E.C. furthers the process.

There are various procedural means by which the general-secretary can exert an untoward influence on the deliberations of the National Committee and the National Convention. During the October, 1956 meeting of the N.C., for example, Buck and his supporters succeeded in having the members of all national sub-committees in attendance and in giving them a voice although no vote.<sup>26</sup> Most were Buck's supporters. The prestige which accrued to them through their offices undoubtedly added weight to their opinions and probably made them a factor in the defeat of the Salsberg faction. Norman Penner has described a number of the procedural tricks that Buck employed to influence the outcome of the same meeting:

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<sup>25</sup>...As we know, there are mostly good old comrades who are members of the club. They joined the party many, many years ago, worked hard for the party, the better parts of their lives, and are, only naturally, suspicious of anyone who questions comrade Tim Buck. They know that he led the party for many years; had been good at that, and could not wish any better....

[S. DeWolfe, "Supports N. Penner Amendment," N.A.M., XIV:5 (May, 1957), p. 4.]



...I withdrew my motion [to have Buck removed from office] in order to permit the most objective kind of discussion at the N.C. meeting; ...And though the N.C. unanimously accepted my withdrawal of the motion, the motion nevertheless became a central issue of the plenum.

I think the way comrade Buck placed it in the report and the whole tenor of the report made it inevitable....<sup>27</sup>

Fenner went on to discuss the unfavourable light in which the N.C. viewed the Salsberg group and attributed much of the responsibility for the situation to Buck:

...This atmosphere of suspicion and hostility was aggravated when on the ninth day of the meeting comrade Buck introduced a statement going far beyond his report in which the crisis in the party was laid at the door of opportunists, vacillators, petty-bourgeois elements, and supporters of people's capitalism. He withdrew the statement the next day while not refuting the ideas contained in it....<sup>28</sup>

Withdrawn or not such a statement, coming as it did from the party leader, was bound to influence National Committee members.

Prior to 1956 another factor contributed to the strengthening of the general-secretary's position. He was virtually deified by the party press and much of the membership:

...Right now [the good old comrades] only cry for comrade Stalin and cannot see that Canada could possibly produce a man that could

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<sup>26</sup>"Meeting of the National Committee I.P.F. Oct. 28-Nov. 9, 1956," N.A.P., XIII(B):9 (Ibv., 1956), p. 1.

<sup>27</sup>Norman Fenner, "Speech at Toronto I.P.F. Meeting," Op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

replace Comrade Buck. No, that is something they won't buy!

On the other hand Canadian people in general and the Canadian working class in particular won't buy their "Man-God" for their ruler either. But they don't mind...<sup>29</sup>

The most blatant example of the process is provided by a poem entitled "Tim Buck's Hands."<sup>30</sup> It was written by Sonya Morris and published in the Canadian Tribune on the occasion of Buck's sixty-third birthday.

The worshipful air and sloppy sentimentality of the poem are duplicated in prose references to Buck:

...Tim Buck is a man of the people, utterly devoted to the sacred struggle for people's happiness and progress.

He is one of the greatest living Marxists, honoured and respected by Communists of his own land and the world...<sup>31</sup>

In addition, party publications followed a policy of including Buck in their pantheon of Canadian heroes. Since the 1956-57 crisis and Moscow's insistence on the destruction of the "cult of personality," references to the general-secretary have become more prosaic. Hero worship is, officially, no longer a virtue.

The executive of the party, the N.E.C. is, like the general-secretary, selected from the ranks of the N.C. by majority vote and secret ballot. Similarly its term of office is not specifically mentioned in the constitu-

<sup>29</sup>S. DeWolfe, loc. cit..

<sup>30</sup>See Appendix G.

<sup>31</sup>Charles Sims, "Loved As No Other: A Prose Tribute," C.T., XVII:858 (Jan. 4, 1954), p. 5.

tion but in practise, there seems to be an interval of roughly two years between elections. All members of the N.E.C. may be "removed, released or changed by a majority vote of the National Committee, provided that all members involved are fully notified in written form and in good time."<sup>32</sup> Vacancies may be filled by a majority vote of the N.C. The size of the N.E.C., normally twelve members, is also determined by the N.C..

The bulk of the men and women elected to the N.E.C. have previously held responsible positions in city, regional or provincial organizations, in the party press, or in the ethnic, youth or women's movements. They have an established reputation and, often, some personal following. Being elected to public office may be of some indirect aid in securing a position in the N.E.C. in that it creates an opportunity to gain a personal following. However, public office does not make election to the N.E.C. a certainty, nor does it ensure continued membership on the executive. The popular J.B. Salsberg, for example, was quietly dropped from the N.E.C. in 1953 following his refusal to withdraw demands for an investigation into charges of anti-semitism in the Soviet Union. At the time he was a member of the Ontario Legislative Assembly. The fact that the move was not publicized may be attributed to the importance of a loyal public and to the leadership's desire to avoid a showdown on a very sensitive issue.

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<sup>32</sup>Const., art. 6, sec. 7, p. 27.

Most of the members given this high office have no professional status and limited formal education. This situation is slowly changing as a second generation of leaders moves into the executive. The change, however, is largely a result of a general rise in the level of education attained by Canadians, rather than the product of any specific intent on the part of the C.P.C..

For many years members of the N.E.C. were for the most part foreign born or members of racial minorities in Canada. This was a reflection of the make-up of the general membership. Again the situation is changing. The bulk of today's immigrants are fugitives from Communism or, at least, less kindly disposed to the ideology than their counterparts of the 1920's. Also, the numbers of minority groups within the party were somewhat depleted during the 1956-57 crisis. This is especially true of the party's Jewish element. There is a limited circulation of elite at the executive level.

Broadly speaking, the N.E.C. is charged with the responsibility of carrying out the decisions of the M.C. during the intervals between that body's regular sessions. At such times the constitution demands that the N.E.C. give "prompt and efficient leadership" to all party committees and the membership. It is also expected to "develop the public work of the party, initiate campaigns" and generally "advance party policy in accord with the general line of the party."<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Const., art. 6, sec. 7, p. 26.



More specifically, the N.E.C. has the power to appoint editors of the party press and other paid functionaries. The N.E.C. can also appoint sub-committees responsible to itself when it feels them to be necessary for the efficient and effective functioning of the party. It is empowered to elect from its own numbers officers, apart from the general-secretary, essential to the proper conducting of its duties. These officers normally include a treasurer, a labour secretary, a party organizer and someone responsible for work among youth, women and minority groups. The Executive Committee prepares draft policy and program resolutions for the consideration of the N.C. and, ultimately, the National Convention. Moreover, the agenda for meetings of both the latter bodies are largely the work of the N.E.C..

Constitutionally, the N.E.C. is subordinate to the N.C. and, therefore, to the National Convention. It is required to base its decisions upon policies laid down by the two superior bodies. In addition, it is directly responsible to the N.C. for all its actions and must regularly consult with the plenum on organizational and political questions. The ability of the N.E.C. to act on its own discretion would, thus, appear to be limited. However, policy resolutions adopted by the N.C. and the National Convention are worded vaguely enough to give the N.E.C. considerable scope for discretionary action although this factor alone does not present the N.E.C. with the same degree of freedom as most Canadian parties accord their parliamentarians. Control of the N.E.C. by the N.C. is further hampered by the fact that it is virtually impossible for the senior body to meet at frequent intervals in plenum, since its membership

scattered throughout the country.<sup>34</sup> Consultation of the N.C. by its executive between regular sessions when it does take place, is conducted through the mails. It is significant to note that even during the height of the 1956-57 crisis the N.C. held only one extraordinary session, and that the N.E.C. saw fit to withhold pertinent information regarding Khrushchev's secret speech from the regular session of its parent body in May, 1956.<sup>35</sup>

The tendency of the N.E.C. to dominate the party organization is accentuated by factors similar to those which enhance the power and prestige of the general-secretary. The reputation of executive members, together with the knowledge they accumulate while in office, leads the membership into a willingness to defer to executive opinions. The personal loyalties commanded by most executive members also extends the power of the N.E.C.. Its continued dominance seems certain barring an internal dispute which would likely, as in October 1956, throw the N.C. into unaccustomed prominence.

The National Convention elects the N.C., "the highest authority of the Party between Conventions,"<sup>36</sup> by secret ballot from a slate of nominees. A nominations committee of a size determined by the Convention is first elected to receive nominations from the floor. It must make proposals to the Convention "regarding the structure and size of the [N.C.]

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<sup>34</sup>The party's national headquarters are in Toronto. It is there that meetings of national bodies normally take place.

<sup>35</sup>W. Kardash, Loc. cit..

<sup>36</sup>Const., art. 6, sec. 6, p. 24.

having in mind geographic and other considerations."<sup>37</sup> The nominations committee is also responsible for verifying the eligibility and good standing of nominees. Besides having the right to make additional nominations, the committee may, when so directed by the Convention, suggest the composition of the N.C.. There is provision in the Constitution (Article 6, section 5) for clubs and regional or provincial organizations to submit nominations for elections to the Convention if they are accompanied by the written consent of the nominees. Normally the National Committee as finally elected is composed of roughly fifty members.

By a subsequent secret ballot alternate members, with voice but no vote, are selected in such numbers as determined by the Convention. Vacancies that occur in the N.C. are filled from the alternate membership in an order designated by the Convention. Both members and alternate members of the N.C. must have been members of the C.P.C. in continuous good standing for a minimum of five years. The 1957 constitution, written when the hierarchy was dedicated to demonstrating the party's inherent democracy and at a time when the membership had been rapidly and severely depleted, allowed a two year period to suffice. The present service qualification was imposed in 1959.

The N.C. is "responsible for assuring the execution of Convention policies and decisions and for enforcing the Constitution."<sup>38</sup> The

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<sup>37</sup>Const., art. 6, sec. 5, p. 24.

<sup>38</sup>Const., art. 6, sec. 6, p. 24.

national treasury is also under its care. Between conventions, the N.C. possesses wide discretionary powers. It is granted, for example, "the power to decide on new policy when events make that necessary."<sup>39</sup> In such an event the constitution requires that "whenever possible" the N.C. shall "consult Party organizations and initiate discussions throughout the party prior to such decisions being taken."<sup>40</sup> This clause, designed to act as a check on the N.C. has little value for it is the N.C. which decides when such consultation and discussion is in fact possible. Despite such provisions few open discussions have preceded policy decisions made between conventions. Of course, it may be claimed that few such decisions have been made. On the other hand, in 1956, the York Township section of the L.P.P. stated:

...in Lenin's time debate was encouraged and flourished but today the leading bodies do the real debating in closed session and present the finished product to the membership....<sup>41</sup>

No evidence has been discovered which would suggest that the statement is less valid today than it was when first made.

The requirement for "reports, summaries, decisions and other material adopted at National Committee meetings [to be] made available to all provincial and regional committees" and to be published in some party publication available to the membership does give the membership a

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid..

<sup>41</sup>York Township, Toronto, Ontario, section of the L.P.P., "How Can We Make the Labor-Progressive Party a More Democratic Organization?" N.A.E., XIII(B):7 (Sept., 1956), p. 4.

minimal control over N.C. actions. However, as has already been noted,<sup>42</sup> the N.C. is not above editing such material upon occasion -- a practise which compromises the usefulness of the provision.

Meetings of the N.C. are held in Toronto at least twice each year. Special meetings can be called at the request of one-third of the membership or, in exceptional circumstances, by decision of the N.E.C.. Meetings in addition to the two required by the Constitution are, however, rare.

In theory, the highest authority of the C.P.C. is the National Convention. The body is composed of delegates elected by secret ballot and majority vote at provincial or regional conventions<sup>43</sup> and by members of the outgoing N.C.. Delegates are elected on the basis of proportional representation as determined by the N.C. according to paid up convention assessments.<sup>44</sup> The provision for "special consideration to the need for adequate representation from French Canada"<sup>45</sup> included in the 1957 L.P.P. Constitution was dropped in 1959. The clause probably reflected

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<sup>42</sup>Cf. p. 34.

<sup>43</sup>Normally the provincial convention elects the delegates. However, the Constitution provides "that Provincial Committees may decide with the approval of the National Committee that delegates shall be elected by Regional Conventions. In this case, where there are clubs not attached to Regions, they shall have the right to elect National Convention delegates." (Const. art. 6, sec. 2, p. 21.)

<sup>44</sup>The formula employed for the Sixth National Convention, L.P.P.

the extreme decline in numbers of the Quebec membership during the crisis and the need for special concessions if Quebec's status within the L.P.P. was not to undergo an abrupt change. Provincial committees are informed of the number of delegates allowed and their allocation at least three months prior to a Convention.

Regular National Conventions must be held not less than once every two years and special Conventions may be called by a two-thirds vote of the N.C.. The N.C. decides upon the time and place, normally Toronto, for assembly of both regular and special National Conventions.

Formally, the National Convention's duties consist of amending the party program and constitution, electing the N.C. and making "political and organizational decisions which are binding upon the entire party membership."<sup>46</sup> Practically, a Convention serves as a rubber stamp for the actions of the N.C. and N.E.C.. It is too large, normally consisting of well over one hundred members, meets too infrequently and for too

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was outlined as follows in N.A.M.:

...Delegations shall be elected on the basis of one (1) delegate to the national convention for each twenty-five members or major fraction thereof, who have paid their national convention assessment for the year 1956 by March 1, 1957, as recorded by the national office. This shall also be the basis of representation for the province of Quebec with this addition, that: French Canadian representation shall not be less than the number of English-speaking delegates elected on the above-stated basis... "Call to Sixth National Convention of Labor-Progressive Party," N.A.M., XIV:1 (Jan., 1957), p. 2.

<sup>45</sup>Constitution of the L.P.P. (1957), art. 6, sec. 2, N.A.M., XIV:6 (June, 1957), p. 12.

<sup>46</sup>Const., art. 6, sec. 1, p. 21.

short a period, usually three or four days, to be an effective policy making body. The N.E.C. and N.C. must of necessity prepare, in advance and in detail, the material to be considered by a Convention. Such material is then presented to the body by a prominent member of the executive with the result that disagreements with policies and tactics proposed could take on the appearance of disapproval of, or lack of confidence in, the party's most prominent and influential members. Consequently, draft policy resolutions are seldom substantially altered by a Convention.

It may be argued that few changes take place in a draft resolution once it is presented to a Convention because most desired alterations have already been incorporated as a result of the required pre-Convention discussion. Such a claim has considerable validity but it does not alter the fact that the National Convention is not, except in the most restricted sense, a policy-making body. Nor does it enhance the National Convention's claim to represent the wishes and opinions of the membership at large. The omnipresence of the N.E.C. and N.C. mitigates against a Convention fulfilling the latter function. The N.C. decides upon the number of delegates, their geographical distribution and even selects some itself. The indirect method of electing delegates allows provincial and regional executives, some of whom also serve in the N.C., to exert a further influence over the choice. Moreover, the Convention's agenda is prepared by its executive bodies. Much of the limited time available for discussion is occupied by lengthy executive reports. All resolutions to be considered by a Convention "must reach the National Executive not

later than fifteen (15) days before the opening of the Convention."<sup>47</sup> While this provision is designed to allow proper distribution of the resolutions, it also, perhaps, prevents a Convention from taking full advantage of the discussion in which it engages.

The C.P.C.'s electoral organization at the national level is formally distinct from its administrative and policy-making section. "In accordance with Canadian Parliamentary procedure,"<sup>48</sup> the party must elect its leaders for election campaigns. "A similar procedure," the Constitution states,<sup>49</sup> will govern the work of the party's parliamentarians. Where two or more party clubs exist within the boundaries of a federal constituency they must, in effect, form a constituency association to select the party candidate.<sup>50</sup>

Although the two sections are separately organized, the party administration is provided with several formal means of controlling the electoral organization and there is some overlapping of personnel. The party's leader in the federal field is elected by the N.C.. Without exception, throughout the period under examination, the party leader and the general-secretary have been one and the same man. Candidates

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<sup>47</sup>Const., art. 6, sec. 4, p. 23.

<sup>48</sup>Const., art. 7, sec. 4, p. 28.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid..

<sup>50</sup>...Where more than one Party club exists in a given constituency, nomination conventions should be held to nominate candidates for the House of Commons. (Const., art. 7, sec. 3, p. 28.)



selected by nominating conventions must be approved by the N.C.. Parliamentary candidates and elected members are "subject to the discipline of the Party as determined by the ... [N.C.] ...and [are] bound by the Party's policies as laid down in its Conventions."<sup>51</sup> The meagre success Communists have achieved at the polls makes it difficult to determine how far the formal controls can be exercised in practise. The fact that the general-secretary of the C.P.C. is also party leader, coupled with the pattern set by established Communist regimes and strong Communist parties operating in the West, would, however, suggest the administrative supervision of the electoral organization is now very close and would continue to be so should Canadians decide to elect a substantial number of Communist Members of Parliament.

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<sup>51</sup>Const., art. 7, sec. 4, p. 28.

CHAPTER IV

THE PARTY: ORGANIZATION BELOW THE NATIONAL LEVEL

The administrative and policy-making organization of the C.F.C. has several strata below the national level. A definite order of precedence is established for the various levels with each being responsible to the level next above and all, ultimately, to the national organization. Each party organization is granted "full initiative"<sup>1</sup> to formulate policies and make decisions within its own area of competency always assuming, however, that they are "in conformity with the general policies of the party and its convention."<sup>2</sup> Although full initiative is in theory granted to each organizational level, practically initiative would seem, on occasion, to be limited by the decisions of higher bodies. This observation is suggested by the party constitution which states:

...Should a lower Party organization find that a decision made by a higher Party body does not, in its opinion, suit the actual conditions in its locality it should request the higher Party body to modify the decision. If the higher Party body still upholds its decision it must be carried out....<sup>3</sup>

Provincial organizations stand immediately below the national in the party's structural hierarchy.<sup>4</sup> They are constituted of all party organizations within their provincial boundaries. Structurally, provincial organizations almost exactly duplicate the national body.

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<sup>1</sup>Const., art. 5, sec. 7, p. 19.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>4</sup>There are six provincial party organizations. None exists in the Maritime provinces although some local party organizations have been established.

The highest authority within a provincial organization is, constitutionally, the provincial convention which is convened once every two years. Its delegates are elected by each party club on a basis determined by the provincial committee. Special provincial conventions may be called either by a majority vote of the provincial committee or upon the written request of clubs representing two-thirds of the party membership within a province. Practically, much of the provincial convention's authority has been usurped by the provincial committee and the provincial executive for reasons similar to those contributing to the pre-eminence of the N.C. and N.E.C. within the national organization.

The provincial committee, which meets a minimum of once every six months, is the highest provincial authority between conventions. Its members and alternates are elected by secret ballot and majority vote at the provincial convention. Its size is also determined by the convention. Nominating procedure is identical to that functioning on the national level. To be eligible for service on a provincial committee, a Communist must have been a party member in good standing for at least two years. This provision does not apply where a new provincial organization is being established.

"To lead the work of the party"<sup>5</sup> between its regular sessions the provincial committee elects, from its own ranks, a provincial executive composed of not less than seven members. A provincial party secretary is also elected by the committee. The duties and authority of the provincial secretary correspond, provincially, to those of the

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<sup>5</sup>Const., art. 5, sec. 7, p. 19.

general-secretary on the national level. Either the committee or its executive may appoint advisory sub-committees to "assist it in the guidance of the work in a particular field."<sup>6</sup> Such sub-committees are expected to "implement the policies and decisions of the respective responsible party bodies" and to "report regularly on their activities to the body which established them."<sup>7</sup>

The Constitution makes provision for regional organizations to be established by decision of a provincial committee. Regional organizations thus established are required to hold annual conventions composed of delegates from all clubs in the region. As in the case in the two superior organizational levels, the regional convention elects a regional leadership which is responsible for party work within the area. Prior to 1956, several regional organizations existed. Subsequent to the inner-party crisis of that year, only three, the Northern Ontario, North-Western Ontario and Niagara Penninsula regional committee continued to function.

In each city where two or more party clubs exist, a city organization is established. The machinery consists, typically, of a convention composed of delegates elected by the clubs and a city committee elected by the convention. City committees in turn elect, where numbers warrant, a city executive and executive secretary.

Next in seniority to the city organization within the structural hierarchy is the ward constituency or section. It is a committee composed of representatives from clubs within a given area (wards, provin-

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 19.      <sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

cial or federal constituencies). Clubs within a section elect whatever officers they deem necessary for its efficient operation. Section committees are expected, "under the jurisdiction of the city or regional committee," to "implement party policy, assist the clubs to strengthen their public work and administer the affairs of the [ward constituency] organization."<sup>8</sup> Unlike city organizations, the creation of sections is not mandatory but occurs only "where found necessary to advance electoral and general party activity."<sup>9</sup>

All party committees at whatever level must "abide by the principle of collective leadership coupled with individual responsibility."<sup>10</sup> All must report regularly to the body which elected them and all are subject to disciplinary action in the event they conduct themselves in a manner detrimental to party prestige or fail to carry out party decisions. In such cases disciplinary action might involve reprimand, removal or reorganization of the committee concerned by the next higher party body. An election would then be conducted without delay.<sup>11</sup>

Electoral organization below the national level duplicates, where possible, the national pattern. Nominating conventions are held when two or more clubs exist within a given provincial constituency. All

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<sup>8</sup>Const., art. 5, sec. 4, pp. 16-17.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>10</sup>Const., Preamble, pp. 3-4.

<sup>11</sup>Const., art. 8, sec. 2, p. 30.

nominees of such conventions are subject to the approval of the provincial executive. All candidates for public office are subject to party discipline as determined by the provincial committee and are bound by party policies as set out by the various conventions. Even the policy of electing the administrative head to lead the party in elections is similarly patterned upon the practises of the national organization.<sup>12</sup>

The party club is the primary organization of the C.P.C.. Minimum allowable membership in a club is three. They may be established in communities, in places of employment or on "any other basis determined by the responsible Party committee in the area."<sup>13</sup> The Constitution reflects the party's working-class bias in specifically demanding that party members be organized into shop clubs "wherever possible."<sup>14</sup> Each club is named by its own membership. Normally, the name is selected from one of three categories: Canadian historical figures; leaders, past and present, of the C.P.C. and the Canadian

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<sup>12</sup>The C.P.C. differs markedly from the practise of other Canadian political parties in requiring that a provincial leader, duly elected by a provincial committee, be subject to the approval of the N.C.. Article 7, section 4 of the Constitution states (p. 28): "The provincial leaders shall be approved by the National Committee."

<sup>13</sup>Const., art. 5, sec. 1, p. 14.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid..

labour movement; the community or establishment in which the club functions.<sup>15</sup>

Party clubs are required to meet at least once a month. They elect their own officers, which normally include a president, a treasurer, a secretary, an education director and a discussion leader, for one year terms. Nominations are held a minimum of two weeks before the elections. If an officer proves to be unsatisfactory he may be replaced before the expiration of his term by a majority vote of the membership. Results of regular elections and replacement of club officials must be reported to the next superior party body be it ward, city, regional or provincial.

Clubs are designed to fulfil several functions all of which evolve from a single basic purpose described in the C.P.C. Constitution:

...It shall be the aim and duty of the Party club to bring about the closest relationship between the Party and the working people in the area in which it works....<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>The following examples of each category have been chosen at random. Canadian historical figures: Louis Riel Club, Papineau Club. Party leaders: Beckie Bukay Club, Tim Buck Club. Community: Point Douglas Club, Kapuskasing Club, Val D'or Club. Clubs in several different centres have been named after Norman Bethune, a Canadian doctor who died serving China's Red Army. Appendix C provides an indication of the number and geographical distribution of party clubs in the years 1953 to 1962 inclusive.

<sup>16</sup>Const., art. 5, sec. 3, p. 15.



The Constitution goes on to state, in grandeloquent terms, that the clubs are to accomplish their purpose by:

...joining in the struggle of the people for their political, economic and cultural needs; by conducting propoganda, agitational and organizational work among the working people in order to convince them to support the Party's program and policy; by helping each member to become an active fighter for Party policy and a builder of the Party.<sup>17</sup>

More prosaically, the club is intended to provide each party member with his basic political education. Each club appoints an educational director and a discussion leader whose duty it is to keep the membership informed of the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of current events and past history, a task in which they are assisted, to some extent, by party publications. In so educating its members the club is expected to make them more articulate and persuasive advocates of Communism. Although the educational program meets with some success, its full potential has not been realized because of demands made upon the membership's time by other activities and because, in all likelihood, many clubs lack instructors of sufficient qualifications.

The club is also designed to serve as the basic recruiting unit, to provide a place in which prospective members can, in relatively informal surroundings, become acquainted with party dogma and persuaded of its validity by their peers in terms they can understand. As admirable as the scheme seems in theory, one is left in considerable

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid...

doubt, in the absence of any definitive study of the plan's operation, about its practical efficiency. One could argue, for example, that if the clubs functioned as intended they would provide the party with a slow but relatively constant rate of growth even during periods in which it meets with public disapproval. However, the violent fluctuations in the membership figures of the C.P.C. coupled with the relatively constant mean figure and the party's employment of professional organizers suggests that the club provides little advantage over the recruiting methods employed by other Canadian political parties. Indeed, these factors suggest that the C.P.C., despite the existence of party clubs, is, like other parties, largely dependent upon its publicly proclaimed policies and the "image" projected by its leaders for recruiting new members.<sup>18</sup>

Letters to N.A.M. have noted additional functions and expressed considerable doubt about the club's ability to fulfil them. Two members from British Columbia wrote:

...The political life of the clubs has been reduced to raising money, making it impossible for them to play a leading role in the community, and to maintain membership. Not only is it becoming more difficult to maintain this style of work, but it is also politically incorrect.

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<sup>18</sup>This statement assumes the close connection of the C.P.C. and the Soviet Union which exists in the minds of most Canadians.

To permit our clubs to function as political bodies, to make it easier for workers to join and remain members of our party, to have club meetings more educational and enjoyable, ...we must free [the members] from the far too heavy financial obligations. Therefore, a drastic reduction of money-raising by the clubs is of political importance....<sup>19</sup>

Another member, also from B.C., suggested that:

...Our party clubs...fail...to be in line with Canadian experience ...They should be larger and function more publicly. Also the emphasis for party work should be on the conscious development of the club members; there is a strong equalitarian discipline that is not conducive to growth even in a favourable political setting....<sup>20</sup>

He went on to state:

...In British Columbia...we have industrial clubs which do not operate effectively. These club members are not from one shop, but on a number of shops, widely scattered through the industry. Because of this they are not able to concentrate on the job or in the community because of distance.

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Our political work suffers seriously because of low ideological development. We are, in some cases, fearful of study because we may, in the process, neglect some of our practical work....<sup>21</sup>

Many of these statements, if they applied in 1957, will be valid today because the party club remains substantially unaltered.

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<sup>19</sup>Tobie and Andy Hogarth, "Correct Our Mistakes by Collective Efforts," N.A.M., XIV:3 (Mar., 1957), p. 5.

<sup>20</sup>C. Caron, "Analyze in Calm, Careful, Objective Way Present Position and Problems of Our Party," N.A.M., XIV:2 (Feb., 1957), p. 6.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid..

Despite the possible shortcomings of the party club previously noted, the organization does provide the party with two excellent services. The clubs supply a dependable source of manpower for such endeavours as the distribution of party literature and the conducting of public demonstrations. The clubs serve these purposes well because their relatively small size allows the C.P.C. to keep its members under almost constant surveillance. In other words, as the Constitution states:

...The Party club checks up regularly on the carrying out of its decisions and on the activities of its members and works to strengthen party discipline and party unity...<sup>22</sup>

A good percentage of the executive positions in the upper echelons of the C.P.C. and its official press are filled by paid party functionaries. The party also employs organizers. Information about paid functionaries' activities, influence, pay scale, distribution and numbers is extremely sketchy; indeed almost non-existent. Sidney Katz has quoted David Kashtan as claiming that the C.P.C. employs sixteen full-time organizers.<sup>23</sup> This figure probably includes most of the paid party executives. During the discussion of the draft policy resolution for the Sixth National Convention of L.P.P., a letter to N.A.H. noted:

...in the province of British Columbia...the activities of the clubs have been geared to maintaining a bureaucratic apparatus of at least eleven paid functionaries (including the Pacific Tribune staff)...<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Const., art. 5, sec. 3, p. 16.

<sup>23</sup>Sidney Katz, "Inside Canada's Secret Policy," Kochan's Magazine, LXXVI:8 (Apr. 20, 1963), p. 32.

<sup>24</sup>Tobie and Andy Hogarth, Op. cit., p. 5.

On the basis of such statements and other less explicit comments, it is possible to say, with a rough degree of accuracy, that there are between twenty-five and thirty full-time, paid officials in the C.P.C.. Such an estimate takes into consideration that financial problems have likely dictated a decline in the numbers of functionaries employed since 1957 and that a few paid party members fill two or more offices. In addition, the Communists may perhaps, like the N.D.P., be assisted from time to time by union organizers.

The influence of paid party members must be considerable both because remuneration only comes with a responsible office and because they are able to devote full time to party affairs. This situation coupled with the fact that most paid offices were appointive, caused some of the membership concern during the 1956-57 crisis,<sup>25</sup> but most such positions in the hierarchy remain non-elective today.

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<sup>25</sup>Annie S. Buller, "Our Party Will Face the Challenge and Make the Needed Changes," N.A.M., XIV:2 (Feb., 1957), p. 15.

CHAPTER V

THE PARTY: MEMBERSHIP

In the absence of any regularly published official statements, it is difficult to give completely accurate membership figures for the C.P.C. and its predecessor, the L.P.P.. It is generally agreed, however, that the high point was reached between 1939 and 1947. Estimates of the number of card-carrying members during that period vary between 17,000 and 23,000.<sup>1</sup> With the Cold War, the Korean conflict and the rapid rise in Canada's economic fortunes, membership in the L.P.P. declined. Membership rose again during 1953-55 thaw in East-West relations only to decline once more towards the end of 1955. Subsequently, some degree of stability seems to have been achieved with the number of members in a given period varying between 5,000 and 7,000.<sup>2</sup> These figures are of course, not accurate from late 1956 to early 1958 when the party's internal divisions led to expulsions and mass resignations.

Once again, official figures are not available but David Stein's estimate of 2,000 members<sup>3</sup> when party fortunes had reached their nexus would not seem to be far from the mark. Letters to N.A.M. written during the crisis spoke of the virtual destruction of the Quebec organization. Party leaders desperately appealed for unity:

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Appendix B.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Appendix B.

<sup>3</sup>David Lewis Stein, Op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>4</sup>...It is the leaders of the L.P.P. who are directly responsible for the resignations in Montreal, and the smashing of what was our

In this difficult moment for our party, subjected to attacks from without and differences within, perhaps the most difficult moment since 1921 when the party of Canadian communists was first organized, it is important that our members close ranks and rally to the cause for which we are working - peace, democracy and socialism.

.....

The N.E.C. regrets that some comrades have resigned from the N.E.C. and that some resignations even from the party have taken place....<sup>5</sup>

Financial difficulties, reflected in an abrupt reduction in the number and size of newspapers and periodicals published under the party's auspices and the employment of fewer paid functionaries, together with the obvious disaffection of such associated groups as the U.J.F.C. also tend to support Stein's contention.

The geographical distribution of C.F.C. members in Canada is by no means even. Rather there are pockets of party strength concentrated around most of Canada's major urban centres and mining communities. No official figures are available but, on the basis of quotas established

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best party organization in the country.... [Carol Lyne, Searching For the Canadian Path," N.A.E., XIV:2 (Feb., 1957), p. 14.]

...The fact is that soon after the resignation of the six (Quebec leaders), a great number of members left....The Montreal membership was never given any official figure, although J. Switzman stated that the amount was 400.... [E.E. of Montreal, "The Montreal Crisis and Our Discussion," N.A.E., XIV:4 (Apr., 1957), p. 17.]

<sup>5</sup>"A Call to The Members and Supporters of the I.P.P.," N.A.E., XIII (B):9 (Nov., 1956), pp. 1-2.



for subscriptions and donations to its sustaining fund by the Canadian Tribune, it would appear that the greatest number of party members reside in the Toronto-Hamilton area. The urban districts of the South-West B.C. coast have the next largest concentration followed by Montreal, North Western Ontario, Winnipeg and, probably, Edmonton.<sup>6</sup> Few Canadian cities do not have a representation of Communists although the party has made virtually no inroads on traditional political loyalties in the Maritimes and there seem to be few Communist organizations in Ottawa, Victoria and Quebec City.

Any resident of Canada eighteen years of age or over "regardless of race, sex, national origin, color, or religious belief"<sup>7</sup> is eligible

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<sup>6</sup>The following chart, reproduced from the Canadian Tribune provides an example of the relative concentration of party members in various Canadian centres revealed by sustaining fund quotas:

Toronto	\$7,200	N. Ontario	\$1,000
Montreal	\$4,500	Windsor	\$1,350
Alberta	\$1,650	London	\$ 400
Sask.	\$1,450	Peninsula	\$1,000
Manitoba	\$2,100	Hamilton	\$2,150
N.W. Ont.	\$1,375	Ottawa	\$ 350
Sudbury	\$ 500	Oshawa	\$ 300
Miscellaneous		\$ 300	

\$25,500 Is Our Sustaining Fund Target in April-May for Canadian Tribune," C.T., XVII:871 (Apr. 5, 1954), p. 1. Also cf. Appendix C.

<sup>7</sup>Const., art. 3, sec. 1, p. 5.

for membership in the C.P.C. provided he or she will subscribe to the duties and responsibilities of members outlined in article three, section two of the Constitution.<sup>8</sup> Applications for membership are subject to "discussion and decision by a majority vote of the club."<sup>9</sup> If a club should reject an applicant its decision is subject to review by the next higher body. In areas where no party organization exists, memberships-at-large may be granted by the provincial committee or executive of the party.

Special conditions also apply in the case of former members "where the applicant was expelled from the Party or left because of basic disagreement with Party policy."<sup>10</sup> Such applications must be forwarded, by the club or local party committee together with a recommendation, to the appropriate provincial committee and, "where circumstances warrant" to the N.E.C. for final decision.<sup>11</sup> A corresponding section is not to be found in the 1957 L.P.F. Constitution but the same clause is included in the 1959 Constitution of the C.P.C.. The section was

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<sup>8</sup>A Party member is one who accepts and works to carry out the program and policies of the Party as determined by this constitution and by Convention, carries out Party decisions, belongs to a club and pays dues regularly. A party member attends club meetings, reads, supports and spreads the Party's press and literature to the best of his or her ability. (Const., art. 3, sec. 2, pp. 5-6.)

<sup>9</sup>Const., art. 3, sec. 3, p. 6.

<sup>10</sup>Const., art. 3, sec. 5, p. 7.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

probably necessitated by the return, or anticipated return, of a number of those members who withdrew during the mass exodus of 1956 and 1957.

A party member three months in arrears in payment of dues ceases to be in good standing. Once six months in arrears a member's name is "stricken from the rolls" after all attempts have failed to bring him back into good standing. In such cases the information is forwarded by the club to the next highest body of the party. Should one whose membership has been terminated for this reason apply for readmission within six months he may, upon approval of the club or local committee, be permitted to pay up back dues and maintain standing as an "old member."<sup>12</sup>

If the conduct or action of any member is considered to be "detrimental to the Party and the best interests of the working class"<sup>13</sup> he is subject to censure, removal from all responsible posts and even expulsion from the party. This loosely worded section functions as an elastic clause capable of covering a multitude of sins. It is designed to provide the discipline necessary to maintain the party's "unity and militancy" and to forestall "impermissible" factional or splitting activities.<sup>14</sup> Other sections under the general heading "Disciplinary Procedure" are more specific. "The practise or advocacy of any form of racial, national or religious discrimination"<sup>15</sup> is subject to

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<sup>12</sup>Const., art. 3, sec. 4, p. 6.

<sup>13</sup>Const., art. 8, sec. 2, p. 29.

<sup>14</sup>Const., Preamble, p. 3.

<sup>15</sup>Const., art. 8, sec. 7, p. 32.

disciplinary action including expulsion from the party. Expulsion from the party is mandatory in the case of a member found to be "a strike-breaker, provocateur or traitor to the working class."<sup>16</sup> In accord with the party's present belief that a "parliamentary road" to socialism is both possible and desirable, members advocating "force and violence or terrorism" must also be expelled.<sup>17</sup> However, the provision does seem unusual when measured against the inflammatory language of the Communist Manifesto and the Canadian party's professed adherence to the "world outlook of Marxism-Leninism."<sup>18</sup>

Charges against a party member must be made in writing to the party club concerned or to a leading party committee. The disciplinary action to be taken, if any, as the result of such a charge is determined by a majority vote in the club concerned. Proper notice of motion must be given to all members of a club prior to a proposal for disciplinary action being brought before a meeting. If expulsion is considered to be necessary, the member or members concerned retain membership until the club's decision is ratified by the regional or provincial executive of the party.<sup>19</sup> All actions of discipline are immediately reported to the provincial and national executives of the party. They then take the steps necessary to inform the membership.

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<sup>16</sup>Const., art. 8, sec. 6, p. 33.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>18</sup>Const., Preamble, p. 4.

<sup>19</sup>The responsible executive must act within fourteen days. (Const., art. 8, sec. 3, p. 31.)

Members charged with an offense have the constitutional right to "appear, bring witnesses and freely testify before the given party organization."<sup>20</sup> They also have the right to appeal to the next higher body up to and including the National Convention. A decision of the National Convention is final. Such appeals must be dealt with within thirty days or the person involved may submit his case to the next higher body. All disciplinary measures are binding pending the outcome of an appeal. The Constitution warns that "expulsion from the party is the most severe of all Party disciplinary measures."<sup>21</sup> It charges all party organizations to "exercise the utmost care, thoroughly investigate and study the facts and material evidence of the case and listen carefully to the statement made in his or her defense by the Party member concerned"<sup>22</sup> when dealing with expulsion.

The formal rights of the C.P.C. members, with one exception, are enumerated in article four, section one of the Constitution.<sup>23</sup> They include the right to "participate in formulating and carrying out the policies of the Party;" the right "to discuss any and all policies and tactics within the Party organization and in designated party publications, the right to reserve their opinion in the event of disagreement with a decision or submit it to a leading committee at the same time unconditionally carrying it out." Party members in good standing have

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<sup>20</sup>Const., art. 8, sec. 5, pp. 31-32.

<sup>21</sup>Const., art. 8, sec. 8, p. 32.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp. 32-32.

<sup>23</sup>Const., p. 8.

the right to elect leading committees and to criticize their work and composition. Subject to any special qualifications which may be contained in the Constitution, every party member has the right to be elected to all offices and committees. A party member has the right to be present "whenever decisions are taken regarding his activity or conduct and the right to address any question or statement to any Party body, including the National Committee and receive full information pertaining to the question." If a member should disagree with the decision of any party organization, up to and including the provincial, he "has the right to appeal that decision to the next highest body and may carry the appeal to... [the] National Committee and National Convention."<sup>24</sup>

The practical operation of these rights is circumscribed by the same qualities of the party's hierarchical structure which tend to limit the effective functioning of inner-party democracy. The constitutional rights of members are not, however, mere window dressing. Several examples of their exercise in practise might be cited. Perhaps the most dramatic was the reversal, upon the demand of the membership, of an N.E.C. decision to withhold from the membership as a whole a statement which Tim Buck read to the November 1956 N.C. plenum.<sup>25</sup> But the letter

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<sup>24</sup>The Constitution continues:

...While such an appeal is pending the individual member, club or committee appealing such a decision must abide by the decision already rendered. All appeals shall be heard by the respective committees within sixty days....

(Const., art. 4, sec. 3, p. 10.)

by J.B. Salsberg, Harry Binder and Stewart Smith, from which the preceding example was drawn, indicated further on that such demands from the members were neither a normal occurrence nor quickly met. The correspondents, all past members of the N.E.C., after noting that Buck had contrived to prevent the membership from learning that he had heard the contents of Khrushchev's secret speech prior to his return to Canada, stated:

...This is a policy of a leadership cult in which only the elite are to know the facts and to decide for the membership what is good for them to know, and to give way only where resistance is no longer possible....<sup>26</sup>

The duties and responsibilities of a C.P.C. member as listed in the Constitution are so heavy in all their ramifications as to stagger the imagination of card carrying members in other Canadian political parties. The general statement of duties already cited<sup>27</sup> is supplemented throughout the Constitution by more specific statements. In addition to being the right, it is also the duty of party members to participate in the formulation and execution of party policies and to discuss and evaluate policies and tactics within the party organiz-

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<sup>25</sup>...It is reported in [the N.E.C.] minutes of November 15th that they decided not to make available to the membership as a whole the statement which comrade Buck read to the N.C. meeting....

Then a week later Nov. 22 they were forced by demand of the membership to reverse their stand....

[J.B. Salsberg, Harry Binder, Stewart Smith, "Letter Of Comrades J.B. Salsberg, Harry Binder, and Stewart Smith," N.A.I., XIV:1 (Jan., 1957), p. 6.]

<sup>26</sup>Ibid...      <sup>27</sup>Cf. Ch. V., p. 71.

ation.<sup>28</sup> Here the implication is that members must attend all party club meetings, and devote considerable time to study. Moreover, some members are required to serve on the many party committees and to attend the numerous conventions as delegates.

Party members are required to:

...implement the decisions of the party, observe party discipline and oppose everything detrimental to the working class and the Party....<sup>29</sup>

They must:

...Combat every effort, whether it comes from abroad or from within the country, to injure the rights of labor and the people or any section thereof, or to impose upon Canada the arbitrary will of any group, party, clique or conspiracy, thereby violating the unqualified right of the majority of the people to direct the destinies of our country....<sup>30</sup>

The Constitution further states that:

...It shall be the obligation of every member to oppose all forms of national discrimination, oppression and all ideological influences and practises of racial intolerance and discrimination or special privileges based on nationality....<sup>31</sup>

These duties may seem to be platitudinous generalizations imposing little real burden on the individual member. However, whether out of genuine conviction, simply for political gain, or a combination of the two motivations, the formal duties are often translated into action in the form of demonstrations, petitions and fund raising campaigns, all of which activities are time-consuming.

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<sup>28</sup>Const., art. 4, sec. 1, p. 8.

<sup>29</sup>Const., art. 4, sec. 2, p. 9.

<sup>30</sup>Const., art. 4, sec. 10, p. 12.

<sup>31</sup>Const., art. 4, sec. 11, pp. 12-13.



As might be expected "all Party members eligible to do so must make certain they are on the voters' lists."<sup>32</sup> Each member is expected to take an active part in election campaigns. In addition, the party and the party press are continually in need of financial assistance. Each of these requirements necessitate organizational meetings. More time must be spent in the distribution of literature and in the soliciting of votes, subscriptions and donations. Nor is this the end of a Canadian Communist's catalogue of duties.

The members, according to section twelve of article four, "should belong to the respective trade union to which they are eligible," and:

...When eligible to do so...join farm, co-operative, fraternal, professional and other peoples organizations which defend the interests of the working people and work to advance the interests of the membership, promote and strengthen the given organization....<sup>33</sup>

Further, they are expected to "constantly endeavour to deepen their political knowledge and understanding through systematic study of Marxism-Leninism...."<sup>34</sup> Members should also "study and explain to Canadians the program and policies of the Party in order to win them for these aims."<sup>35</sup> Finally:

...It is the duty of every Party member to refrain from activities in conflict with established Party policy as expressed through decisions arrived at in Conventions and by higher Party committees. A Party member defends and strengthens Party unity....<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>Const., art. 7, sec. 1, p. 27.

<sup>33</sup>Const., p. 13.

<sup>34</sup>Const., art. 4, sec. 2, p. 9.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.      <sup>36</sup>Ibid.

This catalogue of duties, with all its implications, has led some members to question the amount of time required of them by the party and the priorities assigned in practise to the various tasks. A Toronto member, writing in the May, 1957 issue of N.A.N. demanded:

...Less inner party meetings and more time for community work-meeting with people, working in different peoples organizations....<sup>37</sup>

He went on to suggest that the party:

...Do away with much of the double burden now carried by those party members who are working in various people's organizations and are also called upon to do the same work and make the same sacrifices in the party as other members....<sup>38</sup>

The Toronto writer's complaint about too many meetings was supported by other correspondents.

...Another problem is too many meetings -- club meetings, executive meetings -- place an impossible burden on members who must work for a living. By the time a party member has attended all the required meetings he is fortunate to have the time, or energy left, to carry out their decisions. We need meetings for help in giving leadership, not meetings for their own sake....<sup>39</sup>

Other party members, while not actually complaining of the time occupied by party duties, have made statements which, through oblique reference, underscore the heavy workload. There is, for example, the following comment made by an unidentified woman in an article entitled "The Problems of a Wife in a Progressive Home":

...Let's handle carefully the problem of whose political activity

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<sup>37</sup>John Boyd, "On The Two Danders In Our Party," N.A.N., XIV:5 (May, 1957), p. 8.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid..

<sup>39</sup>C. Caron, loc. cit..

is most important. When life gives the husband the job steadiness, the union leadership, the voice that commands attention and the experience to reach conclusions quickly, that does not mean the baby-sitting or household division should revolve around his "important" meetings....<sup>40</sup>

Not only are party activities demanding of the memberships' time and energy, but also they effectively restrict the social contacts available to the members. Members become so involved in party work that they have little opportunity to cultivate friendships and interests outside the party confines. It is possible that the party believed this situation to be desirable. It both limits the possibility of a member being wooed away from the bosom of the C.P.C. and enhances the party's ability to "keep tabs" on the activities of individual members.<sup>41</sup> It may also be that the duties are conceived to be a necessary step in the

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<sup>40</sup>"The Problems of a Wife in a Progressive Home," C.P., XIX:1004 (Oct. 22, 1956), p. 8.

<sup>41</sup>Pat Sullivan, one time party member and ex-president of the Communist-dominated and now defunct Canadian Seamen's Union (C.S.U.), ascribes just this motivation to the heavy obligations imposed upon the membership. He concluded one section of his book, Red Sails on the Great Lakes, by stating:

...When I look back on this period of my membership in the party [1937-39] I recognize it as the time when the Communist party began the procedure of weaning me from everyone not connected with the party. They carried this even into my social life, so that eventually I became identified with them to such an extent that my friends dropped me and I had to depend for companionship on other Communists. I soon realized, of course, that everything I said and did eventually found its way to the local party leaders, and, when I was elevated into the leadership circle, to the Centre in Toronto.... (Pat Sullivan, Red Sails on the Great Lakes, p. 53)

creation of a dedicated, disciplined and knowledgeable political elite. The fact remains, however, that the party does encourage its members to find their recreation and social life within the C.P.C. and its satellite organizations. The party and its front groups sponsor and encourage Communists to attend movies from the Communist bloc, plays with a left-wing political message and 'cultural' activities including folk programs by representatives of Canada's many racial minority groups. Communist halls were once the scene of social evenings and even athletic events. These last activities seem to occupy less prominence in party life today than they did in the 'thirties.' but the halls are still employed for educational projects and other more 'purposeful' endeavours. The attitude of other Canadians also effectively limits the Communists' social horizons. For example, Don Currie, Manitoba C.P.C. organizer, has claimed, with little exaggeration, that "to say one is a Communist is like admitting you are a social leper."<sup>42</sup>

It is apparent that a high degree of discipline must be maintained within the C.P.C. for the membership to sustain its obligations to the party. That the C.P.C. is aware of this fact is demonstrated by the frequent references to discipline in the Constitution. Such references could be dismissed as being theoretical concessions to the teachings of Lenin were it not for the considerable evidence of their

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<sup>42</sup>Quoted by Charles Thompson, "The Paradox of Winnipeg's Ward 3 Communists," Canada Month, I:2 (Nov., 1961), p. 20.

practical application. A discipline of almost military rigidity exists within the party. It is implied in the hierarchical nature of the C.P.C.. Some of the measures employed to sustain inner-party discipline, including censure and expulsion, have already been cited. Other, less acceptable, methods also exist, if an ex-party member, Pat Sullivan, is to be believed, to ensure that party members do not act against what are conceived to be the best interests of the party. He has charged that "character assassination"<sup>43</sup> is regularly employed to discredit unmanageable members and that this knowledge is highly effective in bringing dissident elements into line.<sup>44</sup> In his book, Sullivan devoted considerable space to describing the "blind obedience"<sup>45</sup> required of Communists. The following statement is representative:

...I was in for a shock. For the first time the party whip was cracked over me, and I began to realize what Communist party discipline meant.....From this time on [the successful establishment of the C.S.U.] - it was orders.... I was told sharply that I was a member

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<sup>43</sup>Pat Sullivan, Op. cit., p. 174.

<sup>44</sup>It is realized that Sullivan's book did not deal specifically with the period being considered in this thesis. However he did deal with the precise issues raised in this chapter. His comments have been selected as illustrations because of their lucidity and dramatic quality. In each instance corroborative evidence from the period 1953-62 has been discovered. In this instance his contention is supported by statements of J. B. Salsberg, Harry Binder and Stewart Smith, (Letter from Comrades J. B. Salsberg, Harry Binder and Stewart Smith, "Loc. cit.") and Norman Penner ("Speech at Toronto L.P.P. Meeting," "Loc. cit.").

<sup>45</sup>Pat Sullivan, Op. cit., p. 183.

of the Communist party and that the party forces in Quebec were limited and it was up to every member of the party to submerge everything else in the interests of developing and strengthening the Communist party in that province....<sup>46</sup>

A clear indication of the type of discipline exacted by the party, together with a further proof of the party's hierarchical structure and some insight into the mental make-up of C.P.C. members, is supplied by the members' attitude towards their leaders. The creative process seems to be stultified. There is a total, and what would be considered in most organizations outside the military, an unhealthy, reliance upon the leadership. Annie S. Buller, for many years a prominent party member, inadvertently revealed the extent of the membership's dependence upon the party leaders in a statement to N.A.M.:

...We [the leaders] must take responsibility for [the 1956-57 inner-party crisis]. The long drawn out meetings of the N.E.C. did not help us in bringing the necessary clarity at the time when it was most needed. The membership then would have felt we were beginning to tackle these questions and by doing it together with the membership, we could have resolved many problems....<sup>47</sup>

Similarly revealing statements were numerous during the party dispute of 1956-57. The Vancouver, B.C. Waterfront Club wrote:

...We submit that our leading committees can and must always find a majority report; that within our party there is no room for a minority report. To our club a minority report is simply democracy in reverse, for it gives every Tom, Dick and Harry an opportunity to expound theories that do not help our work one

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<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>47</sup>Annie S. Buller, "Our Party Will Face The Challenge and Make the Needed Changes," I.A.M., XIV:2 (Feb., 1957), p. 15.

bit and can only cause disruption. A minority opinion is essential to a democratic debate but a majority report is entirely another different matter....<sup>48</sup>

A letter by E.B. of Montreal explicitly stated that:

...the past weaknesses and incorrect approach of the party towards leaning on the leadership in place of doing independent thinking, was aggravated by the N.A.K. [4] in its slowness and even reluctance to react [in the crisis]....<sup>49</sup>

Besides revealing an intemperate degree of reliance on the leadership, letters to party publications also revealed that a definite gulf between the leaders and the membership exists in the minds of many Communists and, most probably, in fact.

...It is characteristic, I think, that our leaders find it impossible to approach the members without a line which they can attempt to sell. It is characteristic of lack of confidence in the membership....<sup>50</sup>

Another member, Bess Maltin, referred to the party's "ivory tower leadership."<sup>51</sup> In a speech at a general party membership meeting in Toronto, a member stated:

...Let's face it, it's a long time since any of our leaders worked in factories. What a lot of good it would do if they could all go back for a year and find out what the workers' problems are, but if they can't do this, at least they should go among the workers' in as many other ways as possible, instead of talking down to workers' from their office chairs. They will think much better and

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<sup>48</sup>"Opinions of the Vancouver, B.C. L.F.P. Waterfront Club," N.A.K., XIV:4 (Apr., 1957), p. 4.

<sup>49</sup>E.B., Op. cit., p. 15.

<sup>50</sup>E.W. Kemp, "For an Independent Marxist Labor-Progressive Party," N.A.K., XIV:2 (Feb., 1957), p. 9.

<sup>51</sup>Bess Maltin, Op. cit., p. 10.

clearer if they listen for a change instead of always telling....<sup>52</sup>

One wonders what would motivate a person raised in a society which supposedly admires and values independence of spirit and mind, personal initiative; encourages the acceptance of Christian or, at least, religious values, and virtually deifies private property, to join the C.P.C.. The organization and the doctrine it espouses represent, on the surface at least, the negation of most Western democratic traditions. What prompts a man trained to value personal liberty to submit to rigid discipline; to place service to the party before the demands of his family; to promote a system of government which is demonstrably productive, without exception in practise, of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes? Why would a man or woman living in a highly developed and affluent industrial society seek to establish a system that, practically, has demonstrated few virtues other than the ability to offer rapid material advancement to an underdeveloped society? These questions are as difficult to answer as they are obvious to ask. Some of the answers will be found in a subsequent section dealing with the party's relationship with the C.P.S.U.<sup>53</sup> Others will be found in obviously appealing passages from Marx and Engels. What follows, however, is not meant to be an analysis of the attraction of Communism qua doctrine, but rather its appeal as a movement.

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<sup>52</sup>Olive Olynk, "Let Us Close Books To Go Forward for Socialism," N.A.N., XIV:4 (Apr., 1957), p. 21.

<sup>53</sup>Cf. Ch. X, pp. 197-220.



Part of the answer to the foregoing questions lies in the fact that many of the values to which Canadian society pays lip service are not always the basis for its actions. This element of hypocrisy in the society might turn a person seeking a righting of wrongs and a more equitable ordering of the state towards a radical philosophy.<sup>54</sup> Comparisons of Communism and Christianity, to the detriment of present day Christians, for example, are not uncommon in the "progressive press."

That most members of the C.P.C. are not truly products of modern Canadian society is another partial explanation. The bulk of the original members were immigrants largely drawn from Eastern Europe and the lower stratas of British society. It has been estimated that between one-third and one-half of the early party members were Finns - refugees from the abortive Communist revolution in their homeland. Yugoslavs too, in relation to the racial composition of Canada, formed a disproportionately large element as late as 1939.<sup>55</sup> An anecdote related in a letter to N.A.M. illustrates the largely "foreign"

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<sup>54</sup>...I joined because I despised hypocrisy and parasitism. The Party spoke of the same principles in terms of socialism - a new word for me - in terms of carrying the banner of the working class. ...[James Beaver, "Ten Years In The Party," N.A.M., XIV:2 (Feb., 1957), p. 15.]

<sup>55</sup>Finns provided two-thirds of the total party membership in 1926. (Kalendar Komunista na 1927 god., Moscow, 1927, p. 647.) P. Moraca (ed.), Cetrdeset Godina. Zbornik Secanja Aktivista Jugoslovenskog Revolucionarog Radnickog Pokreta, Vol. I (Belgrade, 1960) mentions 1,800 out of a total C.P.C. membership of 18,000 in 1939, were Yugoslavs.

composition of the party during the thirties:

...During May Day demonstrations the majority of those parading sang songs in the languages of the countries of their origin... quite a few of the bystanders advised the paraders to "go back to Russia"....<sup>56</sup>

Watson Kirkconnell, in his book Seven Pillars of Freedom maintains, in highly coloured language, that the I.P.F. retained its largely immigrant composition during the forties:

...The Communist Party of Canada thus appears to be comprised of revolutionary minorities from three large and otherwise loyal Canadian groups, the Ukrainians, the Finns and the Jews. They are reinforced by a number of still smaller recreant minorities from other loyal groups from Central Europe, and by a few Anglo-Saxon accomplices, chiefly immigrant.<sup>57</sup>

Despite the dubious nature of some of the claims he makes in his book, Dr. Kirkconnell would seem to be on fairly solid ground here. His section on the party's racial composition is reasonably well documented. A high percentage of the party's membership is still composed of the original immigrant adherents.

...As we know, there are mostly good old comrades who are the members of the club. They joined the party many, many years ago....<sup>58</sup>

David Lewis Stein, without revealing his source, claims that the racial composition of the party has recently been substantially altered.

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<sup>56</sup>I. Sharinsky, "From Extreme to Extreme," N.A.M., XIV:2 (Feb., 1957), p. 12.

<sup>57</sup>Watson Kirkconnell, Seven Pillars of Freedom, p. 49.

<sup>58</sup>S. DeWolfe, "Supports N. Penner Amendment," N.A.M., XIV:5 (May, 1957), p. 4.

He says that in 1956 sixty-five per cent of the membership was Slavic or Jewish. By 1961, these groups comprised less than fifty per cent of the party members.<sup>59</sup> The change, if his figures are accurate, can be explained largely in terms of the mass departure of the party's sizeable Jewish community following the Folkstimme revelations in 1956. The Slavs, as a group, were less intimately concerned in the crisis. For example, John Weir, reporting to a national conference of party workers' "on the Ukrainian-Canadian field" in February, 1957, was able to say:

...We are proud that in this period there have been no resignations from membership or positions among our comrades, that our members and supporters have not succumbed to pressures of hysteria and liquidationism....<sup>60</sup>

Stein's figures lead one to believe that native-born Canadians have stepped forward to fill the party's depleted ranks. Even if this is the case, the argument that most C.F.C. members are not typical products of Canadian society still has merit.

Firstly, many of the younger party members seem to be children of the C.F.C.'s first generation or party sympathizers. At least this is the pattern among the party's more prominent families. Jacob Penner, for many years active and successful in Winnipeg's politics had two sons follow him into the party.<sup>61</sup> Leslie Norris and the

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<sup>59</sup>D.L. Stein, Op. cit., p. 39.

<sup>60</sup>John Weir, "Build Our Party In Public Work In The Ukrainian-Canadian Community," I.A.K., XIV:3 (March, 1957), p. 14.

<sup>61</sup>One son, Herman, left as a result of the inner-party crisis of 1956-57.

Reverend J. Edlicott (one-time president of the C.P.C.-sponsored Canadian Peace Congress) both have had sons in the party. Such new members have usually been raised in "progressive homes" where both husband and wife were active party members. They imbibed the Marxist-Leninist philosophy from an early age. Moreover, they have, most probably, adopted many of the old-world attitudes of their parents. One party member in attempting to explain the appeal of Communism to post-World War One immigrants also noted a number of factors that inhibited the assimilation of many early C.P.C. members into Canadian society:

...During the crisis of the thirties immigrants from East European countries felt the pinch of adversity even more than native Canadians. They joined the ranks of the party that fought for their needs. Our leadership did little to help them get integrated into the mainstream of Canadian life, its culture and customs. These immigrants were active in cultural, fraternal and unemployed organizations, organized on the basis of their nationalities...<sup>62</sup>

The writer went on to say that in 1934 even the party clubs were re-organized "on a language basis." Children raised in this atmosphere could hardly be expected to adopt "typically Canadian" attitudes.

The process was probably accentuated because the parents' social contacts were limited in the manner already discussed and by their natural desire to associate with people of similar views. A letter to M.A.H. noted the Communists' "fear of 'the man on the street' and

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<sup>62</sup>J. Sharinsky, Op. cit., p. 12.

the neighbour next door, which prevents so many of [them] from talking to and influencing more people."<sup>63</sup> The children would be similarly affected although to a lesser extent. They were further set apart from the normal Canadian milieu, in some cases, by Communist schools which, in Winnipeg, operated as late as 1952.

A second reason for believing that much of the 'Canadian' membership of the C.P.C. is made up of the children of older immigrant adherents and people whose attitude could not be termed North American lies in the party's confessed inability to reach the "normal" Canadian:

...Our political and ideological immaturity...has made us unable to find ways of making the idea of socialism understandable and more acceptable to the average Canadian...<sup>64</sup>

This flaw was granted official recognition in the policy resolution of the Seventeenth National Convention, C.P.C.:

...We also suffer from the influences and practices of sectarianism which means to passively wait upon events, to indulge in leftist phrases instead of working out practical and concrete policies, to hide the party from the people by taking refuge in inner-party activities as a substitute for working among the masses - the prime reason for the existence of a Communist party...<sup>65</sup>

Another partial explanation for the phenomenon of people so far departing from the traditional political attitudes of this country as to join the C.P.C. is indicated by the areas in which the Communists have

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<sup>63</sup>John Boyd, Op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid... Also cf. Ch. VI, pp. 103-104.

<sup>65</sup>"Policy Resolution of the 17th National Convention of the Communist Party of Canada," Documents of the 17th National Convention, Communist Party of Canada, Sec. IV, sub-sec. 4, p. 22.

demonstrated some success at the polls. The Spadina area in Toronto and Ward Three in Winnipeg are examples. They are populated, by and large, by people on the fringes of the affluent society. They are not indigent men and women who have renounced all hope and ambition.

Rather, they are fully aware of the material benefits obtainable in this country but which they themselves have been unable to grasp. This is not to say that there are no professional people in the party -- there are, but they are in a definite minority. In addition, many of them spent their early lives in areas such as those just described. Biographies of C.F.C. members, almost without exception, claim humble origins for their subjects. Tim Buck worked in a factory when he was twelve, Leslie Morris worked in a railroad yard at twelve; Paul Phillips fought in the Ukrainian revolutionary movement, came to Canada in his teens and worked as a presser in the garment trade. Numerous similar examples might be cited.

A corollary of the above explanation is that the party's program represents an ultimate solution to the member's problems:

...As a railroader I saw that the L.P.P. was the first to expose the seven cent strike settlement last year. It was the first to raise the demand for a twenty-five cent boost in wages. And it was the first to spike the will-o-the-wisp cost-of-living bonus nonsense....<sup>66</sup>

In addition, the party often offers an immediate outlet for frustrated

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<sup>66</sup>"Why I Joined The L.P.P.," from Railroader's Voice, N.A.R., IX:6 (June, 1952), p. 56.

ambition through its committees, conventions and through activities in the party and its satellite organizations. There is also the possibility of being selected to run for public office, to become a paid functionary, or to find an outlet for creative energies in the party press. The party may also supply a sense of purpose and a feeling of being able to influence the course of history to people who otherwise might feel themselves condemned to a meaningless existence on the edge of society.

The latter observation is occasioned by the assiduous attempts made by the leadership and the party press to convince the membership that the party is actively and decisively influencing Canadian history. It is also prompted by the frequent references in official statements by party members to the cause and to services performed by the party. Further, the observation was suggested by the reasons Communists themselves give for joining the party.

...I joined with a strong feeling of Canadian patriotism and with a vision of a wonderful future for Canada, if the many economic and social injustices could be removed. I found that the views of the Communists' party coincided most closely with my own.

I joined the party because I believed in the equality of rights for all people, men and women, all races and nationalities....

...I joined because I stood for a community of all countries which could live together without war or oppression.

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...I joined because I was convinced that it is worthwhile to fight for what my conscience tells me is right....<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>67</sup>James Beaver, *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

...As a railroader and a Canadian I have been deeply impressed by the L.P.P.'s efforts to save our country from being gobbled up by Wall street, and to keep Canada at peace in a world at peace...<sup>68</sup>

Finally, the claim seems to be supported by the fact that many ex-members upon leaving the party almost immediately adopt another cause. Some, for example have joined the C.C.F. or N.D.P., others preach the dangers of Communism. One ex-member of the C.P.C. is now an official with Moral Re-Armament.<sup>69</sup>

Some members, and it would seem with great accuracy, have characterized the party's image of itself as a vital and positive force in Canadian politics as being largely illusory. They have claimed that the party is isolated. Significantly, however, many of the members who fully grasped this truth have since left the party. J.B. Salsberg and Norman Fenner are representatives.

The belief that joining the C.P.C. involves, or is preceded by, a renunciation of Canadian society's values may also, in many cases, be an illusion. If such is the case, and it appears that it is, the existence of a Canadian Communist party becomes more understandable if the previously discussed factors are also taken into consideration. The most telling evidence in support of this idea is the fact that C.P.C. membership figures have been greatest when the party's distinctive features were most blurred. The reference is to the popular front

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<sup>68</sup>"Why I Joined the L.P.P.," Op. cit., p. 56.

<sup>69</sup>He is Gerald Holman, one time (prior to 1950) member of the N.S.C. [Ken Lefolis, "A Private Citizen's Check on the Hysterious Organization That Claims To Be Fighting Communism," Nuclear Magazine, LXXVI:9 (May 4, 1962), p. 23.]



period of World War Two. The events that produced the inner-party crisis of 1956-57 seem to indicate that many party members had thoroughly orthodox ideas about utopia. When their self-created false image of Russia was shattered beyond repair they left the party. They were horrified by reports of racial discrimination. They were appalled to think that reports portraying the U.S.S.R. as a police state, which they had for years dismissed as capitalistic propaganda, might be true. They were hurt and disappointed to see Russia act, in Poland and Hungary, in a manner they had long considered to be exclusively characteristic of "imperialist" nations. J. B. Salsberg must have spoken for many disillusioned party members when he said:

...I saw it happen in Russia and spread to every country where Communists were in power. Good people, sincere, idealistic people joined the party and became the hangmen of their friends. Maybe this was the only way to build Communism. Maybe any other way it would take one hundred years. But I began to think it was better to wait a hundred years than to build Communism on more mountains of dead bodies.<sup>70</sup>

Salsberg, his associates, and others like them began to worry about the party's isolated position in the community. They began to advocate the reorganization of the party on lines more in keeping with Canadian political traditions. During the 1956-57 party crisis some party members remarked on what they termed the increasingly "bourgeois" nature of the party:

...There is no doubt that some sections of our party, particularly in the larger centres have been strongly tainted with middle class

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<sup>70</sup>Quoted by D. L. Stein, Op. cit., p. 38.

ideology. The way of life of many comrades has changed in the post-war years and with it their ideology has changed...For quite a few years now our party has not done much recruiting from the ranks of the workers, particularly the lower paid and most exploited sections. Very few of our younger cadres come from the ranks of the workers....<sup>71</sup>

Finally, the factors which would motivate a person to subject himself to the rigid discipline and heavy workload imposed by the party and to the disapproval of the community-at-large, must be analysed. Some of the members, undoubtedly, are prepared to make such sacrifices for the sake of serving what they conceive to be a noble cause. The fact that both duties and discipline are imposed in degrees also helps to explain the phenomenon. It is also true to say that many members don't accept these conditions. When forced to choose in effect, between their family and the party, many chose the former. They either leave or shirk their duties:

...I added that the same thing was true of a lot of comrades, the younger ones, who were now active in Canadian Seaman's Union. Some of them were having domestic trouble over the situation [excessive demands made on their time by the party]...I warned the Committee that if something wasn't done to remedy this condition, I was afraid that some of the newer comrades would desert the Communist party.<sup>72</sup>

...the fear of job victimization...is a real fear. All talk of "developing democratic processes, public debate, etc." to the contrary, our members have this problem in relation to both the bosses and most trade unions. At best they can advocate issues

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<sup>71</sup>John Boyd, Log. cit..

<sup>72</sup>Pat Sullivan, Op. cit., p. 54.

and limited actions as an individual only but never as a communist, in the name of the party without risk to their livelihood. They dare not run as I.P.F. candidates, they dare not speak as I.P.F.ers at public meetings, or go on I.P.F. delegations....<sup>73</sup>

The members would seem to be unequal to meeting the challenge presented by their party's ambitions. They are insular in outlook, associating with few people other than those of their own persuasion. They are aging and seem able to attract few new members from outside their own limited circle of acquaintances. To quote John Boyd:

...More and more...comrades want to "take life easy," fewer are prepared to make some of the sacrifices of the past....<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>73</sup>Peter Boychuck, "Draft Resolution Is a Welcome Document," N.A.M., XIV:3 (March, 1957), p. 21.

<sup>74</sup>John Boyd, loc. cit..

THE PARTY: OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PUBLIC

CHAPTER VI

Like all Canadian political parties, the C.P.C. attempts to persuade the general public that its platform, and the political philosophy from which the platform is derived, are worthy of support. The methods employed by the C.P.C., in what might loosely be termed its "program of public education," are for the most part orthodox. The party relies, for the dissemination of its message, upon speeches by its leaders and elected representatives, vigorous touting of the party line by the party press together with sympathetic newspapers and periodicals and upon reports of its activities in the media of mass-communication controlled by the non-Communists. To the same end, the C.P.C. publishes and distributes its program in pamphlet form and, from time to time, brief tracts outlining in some detail the party's position on specific matters of concern. Occasionally, the party departs from Canadian political orthodoxy by employing the public demonstration in its endeavours to gain attention and acceptance.

The party has had little success at the polls. As a result, it has had little opportunity to employ the legislative bodies of the nation as sounding boards for Communist doctrine. The electorate viewed the Communists with most favour in the years between 1941 and 1947. It was in a 1943 federal by-election that the notorious Fred Rose, Canada's first and only Communist M.P., was elected to the House of Commons to represent Montreal's Cartier riding. His usefulness as an exponent of Communism was ended when he and other members of a Soviet spy ring were sentenced to prison. Indeed, Fred Rose must be considered to be a liability rather than an asset to the party.

At the provincial level the party has been more fortunate in its representatives. Three Communists have been elected to legislative assemblies since World War Two: two in Ontario and one in Manitoba. J.B. Salsberg in Ontario and William Kardash in Manitoba continued in office well into the fifties, the first mentioned losing his seat in 1955 and the other in 1958.<sup>1</sup> Both were competent legislators although Kardash did not possess the brilliance of Salsberg. Both probably succeeded in impressing much of the public with their undoubted ability. Moreover, the party received a great deal more publicity in the non-Communist media of mass-communications because of the activities of its two legislators than it would otherwise have been accorded. However, their efforts did not result in any appreciable increase of support for the party at the polls nor did they stem the tide of withdrawals from the L.P.P. following the war. It is also significant that J.B. Salsberg was not returned on the first occasion that the other parties made a concerted effort to gain his seat. He attributed his loss to three factors: his lack of campaign funds in relation to those available to the Liberal and Conservative candidates; political chicanery on the part of the victorious Conservative, and the "labor-splitting role" of the C.C.F. candidate.<sup>2</sup> Kardash met his defeat when he was forced to contest a single seat constituency. The multiple member constituency

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<sup>1</sup>A.A. MacLeod the other L.P.P., M.L.A. in Ontario served only a single term.

<sup>2</sup>"J.B. Salsberg Comes Out Fighting," C.T., XVIII: 1943 (June 20, 1955), p. 3.

The multiple member constituency in which he had always run was abolished prior to the 1958 Manitoba election.

The issues of municipal politics only rarely offer opportunities for a definitive application of Communist doctrine. They do, however, allow Communist aldermen and trustees to influence, to some extent, the management of Canadian cities and schools. Municipal politics also provide a showcase in which elected Communists can display their administrative and legislative talents and, by espousing popular causes such as slum clearance or anti-discrimination laws, their concern for the welfare of their fellow citizens. Moreover, city council meetings provide an opportunity, albeit infrequently employed, for Communists to place elements of their national policy before the public. For such reasons Communists contest municipal elections. This is not meant to imply that a sense of civic duty and pride in public service are necessarily lacking in Communist representatives at the municipal level. Rather, the party, in all probability, views the election of its candidates to city councils and school boards as being stepping stones to success at higher levels of government.

This strategy has achieved very little, if any, success. On one hand, areas in Toronto, Winnipeg and Montreal which had, on occasion or at regular intervals, returned Communists to municipal office eventually elected Communists contesting provincial or federal seats. On the other hand, the same is not true of Vancouver, Hamilton, the Lakehead and other Canadian centres which have elected Communists to civic office. Of greater significance is the fact that all Communists who have held

federal or provincial seats were first elected during the popular front period or while its dying embers still lighted the Canadian political scene.

Moreover, it is an extremely doubtful proposition that a significant number of a Communist alderman's or school trustee's following can be claimed by the party as converts. Much of its voting strength is drawn from card-carrying members and members of satellite organizations settled in a relatively confined area. The party's discipline ensures that they will turn out in sufficient force to have a telling effect on the final returns. The effect is heightened when the non-Communist vote is split. This is especially true of municipal elections and more especially in wards employing some form of preferential ballot. In provincial and federal elections the wider constituency boundaries and greater interest on the part of the electorate results in the Communist vote being diluted. Further, it can be argued that many people other than party members who might support a Communist for some particular office cannot be expected to support all Communist candidates running in their area. Their vote is motivated by the personal appeal of the candidate. For example, a Winnipeg newsman attempting to explain Jacob Fenner's three decades of service as a Winnipeg alderman said, "Fenner has become an institution."<sup>3</sup>

The election campaigns mounted by the C.P.C. and its predecessor the L.P.P., have been ill-calculated to secure converts among Canada's

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<sup>3</sup>Quoted by Charles Thompson, Op. cit., p. 19.



voting populace. Although, as it is argued in a subsequent chapter,<sup>4</sup> the party's probable expenditures seem to exceed the revenue it might expect from all obvious sources, its election fund must be considerably smaller than those of Canada's other political parties. Paul Phillips, then party national treasurer of the L.P.P., stated, with regard to the financing of the party's massive effort in the 1953 federal election:

...Reports from various constituencies indicate that according to plan the average spending per candidate of the L.P.P. will be between \$500 and \$600. Thus an amount of \$40 - \$50,000 is the total indicated in the 1953 election spending....<sup>5</sup>

Even after allowances have been made for understatement and for the fact that Mr. Phillip's estimates were based upon eighty, rather than the actual one hundred candidates, it remains highly unlikely that the L.P.P.'s expenditures in any way approached those of Canada's more established parties.

Limited revenue results in the party being forced to make a choice between running a large number of candidates each with a low budget, and concentrating expenditures upon a relatively few constituencies. Running a small number of candidates has the advantage of increasing the possibility of having one elected since the party does not scatter its limited human and financial resources. On the other hand, a large

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<sup>4</sup>Cf. Ch. VIII., p. 163.

<sup>5</sup>Paul Phillips, "That Million Dollar Election Fund Mystery," C.T., XVI:807 (Jan. 12, 1953), p. 3.

number of candidates might result in more people coming into direct contact with the party. Thus, in theory, the number of potential converts to scientific socialism would be enlarged. In either case, however, there is limited access to the press, radio and T.V.. Low-key campaigns incapable of attracting the serious attention of most of the electorate have resulted.

Much of the printed material employed by Communists in election campaigns does not seem to be of a type calculated to attract the "average" voter. At least, the bulk of it is far different from the terse, colourful brochures commonly distributed by other parties. The party program and newspapers often used as handouts are unattractive in layout, lengthy, and, too often, turgid in style. Of the programs especially, it might be said that either exceptional interest or exceptional devotion is required to inspire a complete reading.

...The IPP is so far separated from the Canadian people that it speaks a different language from that which the people speak. This would be more accurate, perhaps, if formulated the other way around: the IPP is isolated from the Canadians at least partly because it does not speak their language.... I must say that the language in which [the 1954 program] is expressed is abominable. No other word will do. The program consists largely of statements which for sheer deadliness cannot be approximated anywhere. This is true in spite of the fact that the writers have used the most horrifying descriptive terms they can find to describe imperialism and imperialists, and the most glowing terms to depict ourselves. In fact, the deadliness of this document is proportional to the amount such terms have been used....<sup>6</sup>

Even when the program is somewhat condensed and distributed in the form

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<sup>6</sup>E.W. Kemp, "For An Independent Marxist Labor-Progressive Party," N.A.N., XIV:2 (Feb., 1957), p. 10.

of an election platform the above criticisms substantially apply.

The post-1956 attempts by the C.P.C. to associate itself with the C.C.F. and later the N.D.P. do not seem likely to benefit either party, in the short run at least. Certainly the N.D.P. can only be harmed, given the current temper of the electorate, by Communist advertisements urging support of the N.D.P. where no C.P.C. candidate is in the running. Nor is it likely that the ads will cause voters to associate the C.P.C. with the more moderate position of the N.D.P. thus making the first-mentioned party more palatable. Rather, the policy likely lends support to the claims of those who tar both parties with the same brush.

Finally, the Communists make ineffective use of election campaigns as a means of educating the public to an acceptance of their doctrine, because their strategy is only tenuously based upon an objective examination of Canadian conditions. The major factor in deciding both policy and strategy is the current "line" adopted by Moscow. Understandably, plans formulated on this basis are often inappropriate, at times grossly so.<sup>7</sup>

The media of mass-communications controlled by non-Communists provide the C.P.C. with opportunities to be placed in the public eye. Once again, whether or not the party derives notable advantage from such official contacts is highly problematical. Generally speaking, the communications media provide the C.P.C. with publicity in four different ways: paid advertisements, news items, editorial comment and, at times during election campaigns, free-time broadcasts.

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<sup>7</sup>Cf. Ch. X, pp. 200-201.

The advertisements are commonly purchased during election campaigns and in the May Day, Labour Day and July first editions of daily newspapers. At irregular intervals the party also runs newspaper advertisements which outline its position on a particular political issue. More often, however, this latter technique is employed by thinly disguised front groups for the purpose of mustering public support behind the party's stand. The ads published in the name of the C.P.C. usually take the form of a message from the N.E.C. on behalf of the party. As is so often the case with material written by the C.P.C., the messages are extravagantly worded and laced with jargon. Usually they end in a peroration. The advertisements are so divorced from the styles normally encountered by Canadians in their reading as to appear alien. In some cases they seem better designed to provoke laughter than to promote thought.

Our country is young and vigorous, our people have shown time and again that they can defeat profit-mad men who are willing to sell out our country for their own selfish interests.

UNITE TO PUT CANADA FIRST!<sup>8</sup>

Rejoice this Canada Day! "A new day for mankind is dawning -- Labor is on the march -- in Canada and all over the world -- to guarantee Peace, Democracy and Friendship among all the nations."<sup>9</sup>

Fellow Canadians!

Make your views known to the government of Canada!

On to Total Disarmament!

On to a Summit Meeting,

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<sup>8</sup>N.E.C., "Put Canada First," W.F.P., Jun. 25, 1954.

<sup>9</sup>N.E.C., "Canada Day," W.F.P., June 29, 1956.

On to a new era of Peace and friendship between peoples!  
ACT NOW -- FOR PEACE!<sup>10</sup>

The party's use of radio and T.V. for advertising purposes has been sparing, partly for financial reasons and partly because some outlets have refused to handle a Communist account.

The coverage the party receives from press, radio and television in the normal course of reporting the news would seem to be the most beneficial service performed for the C.P.C. by the non-Communist communications media. Even these benefits are, however, qualified by several factors. In its role as a Canadian political party, the C.P.C. is too weak on the hustings to warrant extensive reporting of its normal political activities. Comments by its leaders on Canadian politics, for example, if reported at all tend to be buried in the back pages of newspapers or to receive only cursory attention on the airwaves. In its role as an element of the world Communist movement, the party is newsworthy. Disputes within the party also capture the attention of the news media. Thus the C.P.C. seems to achieve greatest coverage when it is involved in or associated with events least likely to capture the public's sympathy. It is not suggested that association with the U.S.S.R. or other bloc nations is always a disadvantage to the C.P.C., but that this has most often been the situation during the past decade and a half.

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<sup>10</sup>Sixteenth National Convention C.P.C., "An Appeal to the People of Canada," W.F.P., Oct. 24, 1959.

One would be hard-pressed to discover any advantage to be derived by the C.P.C. from the general tone of non-Communist editorial comment in recent years. It has been, if not openly antagonistic, barely tolerant:

...The Labor Progressive Party which in this country is the open political arm of communism differs sharply from all our other political groups and movements. It uses constitutional practice not with sincerity but in a wholly fraudulent way....<sup>11</sup>

...What is astonishing is that Mr. Zuken, an avowed Communist should have the nerve to address the electors of the city at all...To any stranger to Winnipeg the one fact about us that would be unbelievable is that the electors of this city in times like the present would allow a Communist to hold a seat - of all places - on the school board....<sup>12</sup>

The feeling is mutual. Party members have little respect for "bourgeois" news media especially newspapers:

...Even the Financial Post (Feb. 9, 1957) the organ of Big Business in Canada, adds its mite of praise for the Salsberg effort by quoting from his article in the Post's premature LPP funeral dirge.

...When such journals begin complimenting "outspoken communists" engaged in "criticism" of their party, it is an unfailing sign that such criticism has gone far beyond the limits of the Leninist concept and aim of criticism. The bourgeois press only compliments those (in instances like the present) who regard criticism as a license for slander or worse....<sup>13</sup>

The paucity of Communist candidates in Canada's election campaigns has led the C.B.C. to be extremely sparing in its grants of free-time political broadcasts to the L.P.P. and C.P.C.. Even during the 1953

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<sup>11</sup>An editorial, Ottawa Journal, Mar. 2, 1953.

<sup>12</sup>An editorial, W.F.P., quoted by Charles Thompson, Op. cit., pp. 19-20.

<sup>13</sup>Tom McEwen, "The Existence of Party; Key Point at Issue," N.A.M., XIV:4 (Apr., 1957), p. 4.

federal election the N.E.C. had to make several representations to the C.B.C. before being accorded the service.<sup>14</sup> In this way the audience available to the party is further restricted.

Publications sympathetic towards Communism provide the party with another source of publicity. On March 10, 1954, E.G. Hansell, a Social Credit M.P. from Alberta, filed an order for return in the House which asked for the number, names and cities of origin of Canadian publications which followed the Communist line.<sup>15</sup> Subsequent newspaper reports of the answer that Mr. Hansell received stated that there were nineteen such publications. Sixteen were published in Toronto, one in Sudbury, one in Winnipeg and one in Vancouver.<sup>16</sup> The bulk of these papers and periodicals, "A dozen or so," according to John Stewart,<sup>17</sup> are products of the "independent progressive press." Most of the independent progressive publications are foreign language newspapers associated with one or another of the party's satellite ethnic organizations.

The Alert Service, an avowedly anti-Communist organization based in Toronto and headed by Marjorie Lamb, at regular intervals publishes listings of periodicals and newspapers which follow the Communist line. Its most recent bulletin lists nineteen such publications aimed

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<sup>14</sup>"Communists To Get Air Time," Winnipeg Tribune, July 16, 1953.

<sup>15</sup>Debates, House of Commons of Canada, session 1953-54, III, p. 2846.

<sup>16</sup>"Government Lists Red Publications," W.F.F., Apr. 15, 1954.

<sup>17</sup>John Stewart, "Reshape Party Thinking on Concept of Press," N.A.M., XIV:3 (Mar., 1957), p. 10.

specifically at minority cultural groups. They include: A No (The Woman) and Kanadai Magyar Munkas (Canadian Hungarian Worker) written in the Hungarian language; Kronika Tygodniowa (Weekly Chronicle) a Polish language newspaper; Jedinstvo (Unity) aimed at Yugoslavian Canadians; II Lavoratore (The Worker) published in Italian, a Lithuanian weekly, Liaudies Balsas (Peoples Voice); Liekki (The Flame) and Vaunpus (Liberty) for Finnish Canadians; and a Slovak weekly Iudove Zvesti (Peoples News). There are also, according to the same bulletin, three publications for Ukrainian-Canadians one, Ukranian Canadian, written in English and two, Ukrainski Slovo (Ukranian Word) and Ukrainski Zhitya (Ukranian Life) written in Ukrainian. Week End News, The Chinese Tribune and a youth bulletin are aimed at the Chinese community; Karpatska Rus (Carpatho-Russian) serves that linguistic group and Makedonian Glas (Macedonian Voice) the Macedonians in Canada. Vestnik (Herald) is a Russian language weekly which supports the C.P.C.. Canader Yiddische Vochenblatt (Canadian Jewish Weekly) is published by the U.J.P.O.<sup>18</sup> Newspapers were also published in the German and Bulgarian language at one time, but no reference to them has been encountered since 1955.

While these publications do provide the party with another channel for presenting its program to the public and with favourable publicity, it is difficult to assess their efficacy in extending support for the party. Circulation figures are not available, nor are the political philosophies of the people who purchase the magazines known with certainty. However, it is reasonable to assume that many readers of the 'progressive'

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<sup>18</sup>Marjorie Lamb, Alert, Jan. 5, 1961.



press had prior connection with either the party or a satellite organization. John Stewart, one-time editor of the Canadian Tribune estimated that sixty per cent of the readers of that newspaper also read and supported "other progressive papers." In the same article he also suggested that "there [were] few readers [of the Canadian Tribune] remaining who [were] not members or close supporters of the L.P.P."<sup>19</sup> If such is the case the "progressive" ethnic press can be expected to do little for the party other than maintain the interest of existing supporters - not that this is a service to be treated lightly. The conclusion would seem to be supported by the party's admitted failure to attract significant numbers of recent immigrants to its ranks:

...While there has been a change both in the general approach to the postwar immigrants and in the thinking of those immigrants themselves...there is as yet no situation where they are ready to come to labor halls or read the workers' press in any large numbers....<sup>20</sup>

Several of the party's satellite organizations not directly connected with ethnic groups also publish or distribute bulletins and newsletters. Examples are: Northern Neighbours, organ of the Canadian-Soviet Friendship Society; the C.C.W. Newsletter of the Canadian Congress of Women, and Peace Review distributed by the Canadian Peace Congress. The exact member and circulation figures of such publications are unknown. Outside the organizations they are specifically designed to serve, the publications probably have a limited distribution. Thus the people who read them most likely know that the Communist party is in sympathy with the

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<sup>19</sup>John Stewart, Op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>20</sup>John Weir, Op. cit., p. 14.

stand taken by their organization, indeed many of them will be Communists. If these suppositions are correct, the publications might have some success in popularizing various aspects of the C.P.C. program, but it would be quite limited.

Progress Books, the publishing and distribution house for party literature in Canada, provides a ready source from which Canadians may obtain the most prominent international Communist journals,<sup>21</sup> current left wing literature, and the classics of Communism. This is especially true in the six Canadian cities in which there are Communist-run book stores, such as the Co-op Book Store in Winnipeg, to act as retail outlets for the firm. Once again it is not known how many Canadians avail themselves of the opportunity to become acquainted with Communism, but it is assumed they are few and far between and that many of them have a prior connection with the party.

Several newspapers and a monthly periodical are published under the direct auspices of the C.P.C. and its youth organization. The official organ of the youth group from 1951 to 1957 was Champion. In 1957 the paper ceased to be published due to the disruption of the youth movement resulting from the party crisis of that year. Since 1957, the youth publication has been variously known as Orbit, Y.C.L'er and Advance. Circulation figures are not readily obtainable. However, in 1952, a Canadian Tribune article claimed 3,500 subscriptions and a total cir-

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<sup>21</sup>Progress Books publishes one of the two English language editions of The World Marxist Review, a monthly edited in Prague.

ulation of 7,000 for Champion.<sup>22</sup> The next year Champion's subscription objective was 3,000.<sup>23</sup>

Le Combat a French language, semi-monthly newspaper, with the slogan "For the emancipation of the Working class and the nation" is published by the C.P.C.. The paper has had quite an eventful history. It was "padlocked" under Quebec law in February, 1948. Publication ceased only briefly. Combat soon reappeared on a monthly basis in multilith form. By the autumn of 1953 it was once again published in printed form every fortnight. Sales rose fairly steadily between 1953 and 1956. Its editor, Pierre Gelinas, reported in March, 1954 that circulation had quadrupled since the previous year, but no figures were contained in the article.<sup>24</sup> In June of the following year, circulation was reported to be seven hundred<sup>25</sup> and, at the conclusion of a fund drive that August, Combat had 1,157 subscribers.<sup>26</sup> The party crisis of 1956-57 so reduced support for the paper that it was forced to suspend publication for approximately one year, appearing again in late 1958.

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<sup>22</sup>Mark Frank, "Champion Has A Birthday," C.T., XV:758 (Feb. 4, 1952), p. 10.

<sup>23</sup>"Champ Drive Rolling," C.T., XVI:806 (Jan. 5, 1953), p. 9.

<sup>24</sup>Pierre Gelinas, "French Canada's 'Combat' Quadruples Circulation," C.T., XVII:869 (Mar. 22, 1954), p. 8.

<sup>25</sup>Harry Gulkin, "French Canada's 'Combat' Growing by Leaps and Bounds," C.T., XVIII:933 (Jun. 13, 1955), p. 9.

<sup>26</sup>Misha Cohen, "Combat - Trib. Drive Nets \$22,000," C.T., XVIII:1940 (Aug. 1, 1955), p. 11.

Circulation figures for the succeeding years have not been discovered. However, since the paper is most widely read in Quebec, and since the Quebec organization was severely disrupted by the party split of 1956-57, it is unlikely that circulation has exceeded the one thousand mark if, indeed, it has reached that figure.

The Pacific Tribune, a party newspaper published under the auspices of the British Columbia organization's provincial committee, finds, like Combat, the bulk of its readers in a single province. While the British Columbia C.P.C. is strong enough to support the weekly, it does so at the expense of the Canadian Tribune, the party's national English language newspaper. The B.C. organization is never assigned financial or subscription quotas during the annual drives to sustain the national paper.

The Canadian Tribune is published by the National Committee of the C.P.C.. Normally, the party's general-secretary is a member of its editorial board. It is a weekly newspaper usually twelve pages in length. Prior to 1957 the paper was often up to twice that size on special occasions. From 1957 to mid-1960 each issue was only eight pages in length. The reduced bulk was necessitated by the marked decline in subscriptions and the financial difficulties encountered by the paper following the inner-party crisis of 1956-57.

Details of its operation are not often published by the paper, probably for the excellent reason that they are not particularly newsworthy. However, in 1955, the Tribune's fifteenth year of publication,

an article entitled "Here's How the Trib. Goes to Press" was printed.<sup>27</sup> The article revealed, among other things, that the paper employed a staff of seven at the time, that its correspondents were all volunteers and that the Tribune staff held conferences on Thursdays and Fridays to decide what was to be included in the next issue. Once the decision was made, correspondents were notified accordingly. It is likely that the operation is very much the same today with the possible exception that the staff has been reduced. Fifty per cent of the Tribune's income is supplied by subscriptions, bundle sales and advertisements. Advertising, however, provides "only a relatively small part"<sup>28</sup> of the budget. The remaining half of the required revenue is supplied by donations to a sustaining fund.

John Stewart, in a letter to N.A.M. explaining his reasons for submitting his resignation as editor of the Canadian Tribune stated:

...When it [the Tribune] came into being in January 1940 under the editorship of A.A. MacLeod, it was not a successor to the Clarion, the party paper.... It was far broader in concept than the present Tribune and numbered among its founders and contributors a number of non-communist, socialist and liberal-minded people who accepted its proclaimed aim as "A Journal of Democratic Opinion"....<sup>29</sup>

He went on to note that:

...Later the editor was replaced and the non-communist associates

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<sup>27</sup>C.T., XVIII:913 (Jan. 24, 1955), p. 11.

<sup>28</sup>John Stewart, Op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>29</sup>John Stewart, Op. cit., p. 10.

of the paper were summarily ousted - and this long before the onset of the cold war. The Tribune then became, in fact, changed by executive decision from a broad paper of "democratic opinion" to a narrow party organ....<sup>30</sup>

Mr. Stewart then cited several occurrences to support his claim that the paper was a house organ and to demonstrate the deleterious effect rigid party control had on the content of the Tribune. The following is an example:

...There were long and bitter debates over Hungary...the Tribune could not take any position at all until the NEC had made up its mind. (One editorial written by the editor simply stated that there were several opinions about the events in Hungary...There were also charges that because the Tribune carried eye-witness reports which did not exactly tally with official opinion...the editor was "biassed" and using the paper to assert his own point of view.)...<sup>31</sup>

Mr. Stewart's contention that the Tribune is a party paper would seem to be supported by many factors. Some are: the frequent inclusion of the full text of speeches made by Communist leaders and editorials from Pravda; the disproportionate amount of space devoted to the reporting of party and front group activities and the use of the letters to the editor column, in most Convention years, for pre-Convention discussion. Further, as the Greenwood L.P.P. Club noted, the paper editorializes news items.<sup>32</sup> Statements on the Tribune contained in policy resolutions made by the National Convention also tend to support Stewart's opinion. The following is a statement taken from the Draft Policy Resolution for the Sixth National Convention of the L.P.P.:

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 10.    <sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>32</sup>Greenwood Club, L.P.P., "How the Trib. Can Help Unity," C.T., XIX:993 (Aug. 6, 1956), p. 11.

...[the press] must be looked upon as the main avenue for reaching the Canadian people, carrying explanations of the issues of the day, enlightening its readers upon the causes of events and proposing a course of action in the interests of the people and progressive advance....<sup>33</sup>

Stewart also noted in his letter that, although the Tribune was de facto a party organ, that the party did not honestly admit the fact. As a result the paper was not as effective in its role of voice of the party as it might be and it was certainly not an "independent Canadian newspaper in its own right." A statement made in an article describing the operation of the Tribune lends support to his claim. The article claimed that, as a weekly, the Tribune could not be expected:

...[to] be a chronicle of events. It seeks to centre its attention on the main issues of the week. It sets out not only to bring the truth, so twisted and distorted by the big dailies, but to call for action on the issues that concern the lives and welfare of the Canadian people....<sup>34</sup>

Circulation figures are not published as a matter of policy, but it has been possible to compile the following table from the odd statistic dropped in various articles on the press.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Subscriptions</u>	<u>Source</u>
Jan. 14, 1952	2,081	<u>C.T.</u> , XV:755 (Jan. 14, 1952), p. 6.
Feb. 18, 1952	3,536	<u>C.T.</u> , XV:760 (Feb. 18, 1952), p. 7.
Jan. 5, 1953	approx. 3,000	<u>C.T.</u> , XVI:506 (Jan. 5, 1953), p. 6.
Mar. 13, 1954	1,013	<u>C.T.</u> , XVII:870 (Mar. 29, 1954), p. 12.
Jan. 17, 1955	1,790	<u>C.T.</u> , XVIII:912 (Jan. 17, 1955), p. 6.
Oct. 22, 1956	Max. of 1,000	<u>C.T.</u> , XIX:1004 (Oct. 22, 1956), p. 1.

<sup>33</sup>Quoted by John Stewart, Loc. cit..

<sup>34</sup>"Here's How The Trib. Goes To Press," Loc. cit..

Total circulation at a given time is unknown. However, John Stewart, writing in March, 1957 noted that "bundle and news stand sales have diminished even more rapidly than subscriptions."<sup>35</sup>

The party also publishes a theoretical journal. In 1953 it was called National Affairs Monthly and was published in quarto form on slick paper. Late in 1956, probably to accomodate the large amount of correspondence received as a result of the dispute then taking place within the party together with the normal pre-Convention discussion, N.A.M. switched to a tabloid form in which guise it continued to appear until the end of June, 1957. Publication was then suspended for six months, all available funds being required to sustain the Canadian Tribune. In January, 1958, the journal resumed publication in the old format but on a bi-monthly basis and with a new title, Marxist Review. The name and frequency of appearance again changed in 1962, when the journal became the Marxist Quarterly.

The Marxist Quarterly differs noticeably from its predecessors in content. Under the editorship of Stanley Ryerson, it has concentrated heavily on historical and 'cultural' articles. Moreover, the Marxist Quarterly has very little material written by foreign Communists - material

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 10. Circulation figures for the years 1957-62 have not been discovered. It is believed the lack of such material can be explained by the fact that since 1957 appeals for funds have not been made on a quota basis. In the past circulation figures were most often discovered in the reports on fund raising campaigns.



that made up a significant portion of the offerings of N.A.M. and the Marxist Review. The latter two journals were more obtrusively the theoretical publications of a Communist party than is the Marxist Quarterly. Major articles written expressly for them centred around fine points of Marxist economics or the party's stand on domestic issues and foreign affairs. What amounted to editorials on the significant political events of the month, were also a regular feature of N.A.M. and the Marxist Review. The two earlier journals also devoted considerably more space to the speeches of prominent members of the Canadian party; to statements issued by the party's governing committees, and to policy discussion in the form of letters from the membership, than has their successor. N.A.M. regularly included suggestions to aid the membership in advancing its political education both through self-study and group discussions in the clubs. Book reviews have been a feature of all three journals.

It is not known with certainty what sort of circulation the journals have enjoyed. The nature of their content, however, would suggest that they have been less widely read than the party's newspapers. In 1959, an article in the Marxist Review noted that "Going on to a thousand people either subscribe to Marxist Review or buy it in single copies."<sup>36</sup> References to circulation have never been more explicit, usually less so, merely mentioning that subscriptions have increased or decreased without giving the exact figure.

The theoretical journals, described, in the case of the Marxist

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<sup>36</sup>M.R., XVII:165 (Feb.-Mar. 1959), p. 2.

Review, as a "non-profit making party journal published by the N.C. of the L.P.F.,"<sup>37</sup> are financed in much the same manner as the Canadian Tribune. That is, they rely on subscriptions, individual sales, donations and advertisements for revenue. Much less advertising is carried in the journal than the newspaper. Progress Books is undoubtedly the journal's largest account.

A policy resolution of the Seventeenth National Convention of the C.P.C. stated that the party publications:

...are the main lines of communication between our movement and the working class and the people generally. They are collective educators, agitators and organizers for the party. They give the party's views on events and call to action....

...For these reasons the strength and influence of the party can best be measured by the strength and influence of the press...We must act on the truth that many people come to the party by reading our papers and literature....<sup>38</sup>

If the last two sentences quoted are accurate, the party is in trouble; for the same resolution also stated:

...At present only a handful of members take copies of our papers to sell to other people or to introduce them to workmates, friends and neighbours....<sup>39</sup>

John Stewart has also referred to the problems involved in maintaining circulation:

...In its 17 years of existence, the Tribune has been read at one

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<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>38</sup>Documents of the 17th National Convention, "Policy Resolutions of the 17th National Convention C.P.C.," Resolution IV, sec. 5, sub.-sec. "b", p. 23.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid..

time or another by an estimated 75,000 subscribers (as distinct from hundreds of thousands who received or bought copies of the paper on plant gates, parades, demonstrations, etc.). Yet we have been able to retain scarcely 5 percent of these subscribers... one would assume that there are few readers remaining who are not members or close supporters of the LFP - [yet] 80% of these subscribers must be "resold" every six months or a year when their sub runs out.... They must be called upon personally.

.....

...And there is abundant evidence that many subscribers either do not read the paper at all, or at best very sketchily....<sup>40</sup>

In an attempt to explain these phenomena, Stewart went on to repeat the charges, and to give credence to many, that had been levelled against the Tribune. It had been called, he claimed, a Russian paper, an L.P.P. organ, deadly dull, pontifical, out of touch with reality, too political. It had been criticised for containing too many long, unreadable articles.<sup>41</sup> Letters containing these self-same criticisms have been published in the Canadian Tribune.<sup>42</sup> Similar charges have been levelled against N.A.M. and could, with justice, be applied to the Marxist Review. Marxist Quarterly, however, is a vast improvement over its predecessors. Thus the party press, whose reading public is largely restricted to party members and supporters, and which is only given a cursory glance by many of them, fails, like the party's other official contacts with the public, to appreciably extend the party's influence.

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<sup>40</sup>John Stewart, Loc. cit...      <sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>42</sup>For example that of the Greenwood Club, L.P.P. (Op. cit., p. 11.).

Public demonstrations, such as the Parliament Hill demonstration against German re-armament in 1955 and the "All-Canadian Seaway" car cavalcades of 1954, occasionally mounted in the name of the party undoubtedly attract some public attention. Whether they also attract support for the particular policy advocated cannot be determined. In any case, it appears that the party usually resorts to public demonstrations in order to associate itself with a policy for which a considerable body of public support already exists, rather than in an attempt to create public opinion. Again, the success of the maneuver cannot be ascertained.

The final official contact the party has with the public is through its individual members. However, as was demonstrated in the chapter on the membership, few party members are equipped with the talents and most are little inclined mentally to advance the party's cause on a person to person basis. In sum, if the party's policies are, to use its own terms, "isolated and sectarian" its formal contacts with the public can do little to hide the fact and will foster little support.

CHAPTER VII

THE MOVEMENT: UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PUBLIC

As previously noted,<sup>1</sup> Communists distinguish between the party proper and the movement. The distinction is, by no means, specious. Broadly speaking, the movement consists of those organizations and individuals, which, although they may have no formal affiliation with the C.P.C. and, indeed, may deny any substantial connection, lend support to the party. Their support may take the form of the advocacy of policies espoused by the party, financial contributions or both. In most cases, these organizations, known as front groups or satellite organizations; and individuals, often termed "fellow travellers" ( a phrase which the Communist press has denounced as meaningless), are not subject to the same degree of discipline and control as the party organizations and their membership. Nor, generally speaking, are their interests so broad, their activities so all-encompassing as are those of the party.

Despite the genuine differences just noted, it remains valid to consider the movement to be an integral and essential element in the structure of the C.P.C.. There is some overlapping of membership in the party and the movement, with party members of front groups becoming inspired to join the party. Several factors, which individually might be explained away, together serve to indicate that the party exercises considerable influence over the satellite organizations. Some are: the prominence of known Communists in most satellite organizations; the timing of front group campaigns to coincide with similar

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<sup>1</sup>Chapter III, p. 1.

campaigns conducted by the party;<sup>2</sup> revelations of the use of Communist literature in schools sponsored by such groups as the A.U.U.C. and the U.J.P.O.; the running of top officials in labour unions as L.P.P. candidates in 1953;<sup>3</sup> and the virtually complete unanimity of satellite and party pronouncements on issues of mutual concern.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, there is reason to believe, although no conclusive proof has been discovered, that many satellite organizations are, and have been, established at the behest of party leaders. On the other hand, some organizations which were originally independent of the C.P.C. have come to be incorporated into the movement after being successfully infiltrated by Communists.

It is impossible to assess the numerical size of the movement, because of the party members' habit of joining satellite organizations, and because it is extremely difficult to distinguish, in many cases, between genuine front groups and organizations which have for the moment espoused a cause sympathetic to the party line. Such assessments are further complicated by the fact that few individual sympathizers are so outspoken as Britain's Red Dean. Moreover, the close connections maintained by organizations within the movement involving, in most cases,

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<sup>2</sup>For example Dr. Endicott, president of the Canadian Peace Congress, charged that germ warfare was being employed by the U.N. in Korea during the time the L.P.P. was advocating an end to the "unjust war."

<sup>3</sup>Harvey Murphy, of the International Brotherhood of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, is an example.

<sup>4</sup>The truth of these statements will become evident as the chapter develops.

overlapping membership, add to the obstacles encountered. The following account, taken from the Financial Post, serves as an illustration. The author, after noting that Stephen Edicott was, at the time of writing, president of the L.P.P.'s youth group, the National Federation of Labor Youth, said:

...[Stephen Edicott's] presence at no less than three different types of rallies (a "peace rally," a Labor Youth "no conscription" rally and an L.P.P. public meeting) is significant hint of the interlocking nature of [the] fronts....<sup>5</sup>

Pat Walsh, who left the L.P.P. early in 1953 after a disagreement over policy,<sup>6</sup> simultaneously withdrew from all satellite organizations to which he belonged. They included the Canadian Peace Congress, the Canadian Woodworkers' Union, The World Labor Federation, the Woodworkers' Peace Committee, the Labor Rights Committee, the Civil Liberties League, the Canadian Seamen's Committee, the League of Democratic Rights and the Editors' Committee of the newspapers Le Combat, Action and Canadian

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<sup>5</sup>John Harrison, "The Red Threat To Our Pacific Gateway" Fin. Post, Dec. 12, 1953.

<sup>6</sup>...Walsh says he left the party because of orders to save United States atom spies Julius and Ethel Rosenberg "at all costs."

"Neither myself nor my friends objected to seeking the clemency of the courts but orders were to save them at all costs to protect Communist espionage."

Walsh said party officials in Moscow took the view that if the "blunderers" were executed "it would henceforth be much more difficult to keep and recruit spies."...

("Red Quits Party over Rosenbergs," W.F.P., Feb. 27, 1953.)



Tribune.<sup>7</sup> Walsh's case may be extreme but it does substantiate the preceding quotation. Finally it is difficult, if not impossible to discover any official statement of membership for the bulk of the satellite organizations.

Despite these difficulties, several public figures have, in the course of the last decade, been moved to make estimates. On January 3, 1954, the Honourable Stuart Carson, then Minister of Justice, said in the House of Commons:

...With regard to the number of fellow travellers, the figure that the honourable member from MacLeod [Rev. B.G. Hansell] mentioned was 50,000. That figure cannot be far wrong....<sup>8</sup>

The Reverend Hansell had obtained his figures from statements made by John Leopold, one-time member of the R.C.M.P. security force and undercover agent. About six months before Mr. Carson made his statement in the Commons a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Canadian Army Reserve, H.W.J. Peck, received considerable attention from the press after claiming that Communists and their sympathizers represented a force three times as large as the Canadian Army.<sup>9</sup> In 1958, a Canadian, Milan Jakubec, testifying before the United States House of Representatives' Committee on un-American activities claimed that there were 100,000 Communists and Communist sympathizers in Canada, most of whom belonged to various front

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid..

<sup>8</sup>Debates of the House of Commons of Canada, Session 1953-54, Vol. V (June 3, 1954), p. 5467.

<sup>9</sup>"Canadian Army A Useless Force," M.P.P., Jan. 12, 1954. At the time of Colonel Peck's comment the Canadian Army consisted of fewer than 18,000 officers and men.

organizations. The most recent estimate encountered, 30,000, was made by Sidney Katz in a Maclean's magazine article.<sup>10</sup> These figures cannot be verified, nor is it known whether allowances for overlapping memberships have been made in deriving them. Such estimates are, however, consistent in indicating that membership in the movement considerably exceeds that of the party. The multiplicity of satellite organizations that exist or have existed would seem to bear out the indications.

All members of satellite organizations are not card-carrying Communists. Moreover, many members of front groups could not, with justice, be called Communist sympathizers. Such people join, one suspects, because they sympathize with the aims of their particular organization. They are either unaware, or dismiss as unimportant, the body's connection with the C.P.C.. In other cases de facto affiliation with the C.P.C. may occur after the organization has become firmly established because Communists have worked their way into key positions. This latter process has been most common in the trade union movement.

Communist dominated unions and union locals constitute one group of satellite organizations. They contribute both vocal and financial support to the activities of the party and its other satellite groups, notably the Labor Defense League, the Canadian Peace Congress and its affiliates. Unions contribute financial support to the party by several methods. Some locals pay for congratulatory messages in the May Day and Labour Day editions of party periodicals. It has also been suggested from time to time that Communist union executives have con-

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<sup>10</sup>Sidney Katz, Op. cit., p. 32.

tributed to C.P.C. coffers without proper reference to their membership and that lump sums are transferred directly to the party by Communist-dominated unions.<sup>11</sup>

The Communist Party, since its founding in 1921, has made continuous efforts to associate itself with the union movement. With the possible exceptions of the brief period (1929-1934) in which the Worker's Unity League was highly active and during the Popular Front days (1934-39), the Communists' most significant successes came between the years 1941 and 1946. During the war years membership in Canadian trade and labour unions doubled. The increase was made possible, in large part, by the rapid expansion of industry and the government's passage, on a temporary war-time basis, of Order-in-Council P.C. 1003. In essence, the Order-in-Council was designed to foster collective bargaining.<sup>12</sup> The rapid rise in union membership resulted in an acute shortage of competent union executives and organizers, and a willingness, on the part of the unions, to accept the services of the many able Communists who stepped forward. Moreover, the same conditions favoured the unchecked expansion of Communist dominated unions, such as the Canadian

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<sup>11</sup>Union financial contributions to the party are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

<sup>12</sup>The terms of P.C. 1003 may be summarized as follows:

- It: (i) ensured to workers the right to join unions of their choosing.  
(ii) forbade employers to discriminate against workers who belonged to unions.  
(iii) forced employers to bargain with unions in "good faith."  
(iv) created a War Labour Relations Board with equal representation for employers and labour, to enforce regulations.

Seamen's Union, which existed prior to the war. The Communists' active support of the war effort following Germany's attack on the U.S.S.R. coupled with the magnificent showing of the Red Army, aided the Communists in their union activities by making them respectable even though their creed remained illegal.

Following the war the Communists continued for several reasons, as a significant element within the trades and labour unions even following attempts by the national trade union congresses to remove them from positions of influence. Not least among the factors tending to sustain C.P.C. influence has been the apathy of union members. Another major factor has been the undoubted ability of many of the Communists associated with the unions. The talents and insight displayed by men such as Harvey Murphy, J.B. Salsberg and Pat Sullivan have commanded almost universal, if at times grudging respect, from Canada's unionists. Indeed, Sullivan was twice elected to the vice-presidency of the U.L.C.. Further, the Communists were among the first to organize on the basis of industries, a practice begun during the W.U.L. period. The technique promoted success in consolidating their gains. Finally, the bad conditions which often existed in industries before they were unionized led the membership to display great loyalty to the union which secured improvements. The Communists were as successful as any other union leaders, if not more so, in achieving the alleviation of poor working conditions. Hence statements such as the following made by a miner at

Kirkland lake:

"I am with them [the Communists] one hundred per cent, and the bosses can argue and offer bribes 'till Domesday without changing my mind. They're the same bosses who let my brothers and sisters go begging after my father lost his life digging in their gold mines for them, and believe me, I won't shed any tears when the revolution puts them in their places."<sup>13</sup>

With the Gouzenko Trial and the advent of the Cold War, the presence of Communists within trades and labour unions became a distinct embarrassment to the national congresses. Anti-union activities were aided by the opportunities afforded for linking Communism and unionism in the public mind. Thus the union movement was prompted to examine the disadvantages as well as the advantages of Communist participation. Unionists began to accuse Communists of several different types of irregular practices. It was alleged that Communist leaders were concerned to achieve certain political goals divorced from the trade union movement. The validity of this claim depends upon ones point of view. A Communist's first loyalty is to his party. Thus it is conceivable that a man's duty to the party and his duty to the union might, conceivably, conflict at times.<sup>14</sup> A Communist would argue, on the other hand, that the interests of the party and the interests of labour are indetical by definition and that, therefore, no such conflict is possible.

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<sup>13</sup>Fin. Post, Mar. 24, 1953.

<sup>14</sup>Pat Sullivan cites such a conflict as being a major contributing factor in his decision to leave the party. (Pat Sullivan Op. cit. p. 164.)

Another, and related worry, although more prominent among business men and journalists than among unionists, was the hold Communists had obtained over unions engaged in resource production (Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, U.M.M.S.W., several locals of the International Woodworkers of America, I.W.A.) and strategic industries (United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, U.E.).<sup>15</sup> It was charged that the Communists concentrated upon these industries so as to be in a position to compromise the country's ability to respond to a crisis. Communists replied that they had secured prominence in such

<sup>15</sup> HERE'S HOW RED-LED UNION WEB LOOKS

Red Led Union	% of Union Members in Industry	No. of Locals		Membership
		1949	1952	
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers' of America .....	50%	32	27	26,200
International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers' .....	30%	38	37	30,000
United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union .....	35%	32	31	8,373
International Fur and Leather Workers' Union .....	50%	25	21	6,000
Maritime Marine Workers' Federation .....	15%	6	9	2,000
Shipyard General Workers' Federation of B.C. ....	12%	8	7	1,700
Canadian Textile Council ...	1%	nil	1	644
Canadian Garment Workers' Union .....	1%	nil	1	400

-(Trevor Lloyd, "How Red-Led Unions Gnaw at Heart of Industry,"  
Fin. Post, Jan. 3, 1953).

industries simply because they had been the first to organize them, in many cases because Communists had been the only people willing to serve in the out-of-the-way places in which many of the industries were located. Critics of Communism dismissed the possibility of altruistic motivation and asked why the Communists were so eager to serve in the unappealing spots.

Communist unions have been charged with instituting dramatic shifts in policy without consulting the rank and file. They have been accused of unauthorized expenditure of union funds. The activities of the C.S.U., which in one year called sixty-six work stoppages on the Great Lakes, most of them illegal, also produced displeasure.

In the early phase of the Cold War, the policies adopted towards the Communists by the two major Canadian labour bodies, T.L.C. and C.C.L., differed. In the C.C.L. there was continuous and bitter conflict between the executive and pro-Communist elements. The most contentious point proved to be the question of political affiliation. The majority of the delegates at the C.C.L. conventions from 1943 on supported the C.C.F.. The Communists, however, favoured the L.P.P.. In January, 1949, an open break with the Communists occurred within the C.C.L.. The Executive Board of the C.C.L. voted to expel the Canadian branches of the U.M.M.S.W.. At the same time a drive to reorganize the workers served by the U.M.M.S.W. under the non-Communist leadership of the United Steelworkers of America was begun. In March, the C.C.L. suspended the Communist officers of the U.E.. Two months later, a new

union, the International Union of Electrical Workers (I.U.E.) began attempts to woo U.E. workers into its fold.

In neither of the above cases was Communist-domination the ostensible reason for the action of the C.C.I.. It was not until 1950 that hindrances to Communist activity were incorporated into the C.C.I. constitution. The first union to be expelled from the C.C.I. for following the Communist line was the International Fur and Leather Workers Union (I.F.L.W.U.) in 1951.

In contrast to the C.C.I., the T.L.C. followed a policy of tolerance towards the Communists immediately after the war. T.L.C. president, Percy Bengough, believed that race, creed, colour or political beliefs should not be the factors determining the acceptability of a union to the organization. On this basis, Bengough and other Congress officers resisted for some time pressures from within the T.L.C. and from its American affiliate the A.F.L. to expel the C.S.U.. The pressure grew so great as to force their capitulation in June, 1949. By 1950, the T.L.C. had passed constitutional amendments prohibiting Communists from sitting as delegates to its conventions.

Since 1950, both major governing bodies have made considerable use of their anti-Communist legislation to expel Communists from the leadership of unions and locals under their jurisdiction and to suspend locals which refused to dismiss their Communist executives. The Communist leadership of district one (B.C.) of the I.W.A. were among those to go in the early 1950's.

The efforts to remove Communist influence from Canadian unions,



which have been continued by the C.L.C., have not been an unqualified success. Some B.C. locals of the I.W.A. retain Communist leadership as, until recently, did a local of the United Auto Workers. Local one (Vancouver) of the Marine Workers and Boiler Makers Industrial Union retains Communist executives. Relatively insignificant are Communist cells among railway, needlework, hotel and restaurant, and automobile workers although some of them manage to publish the odd four page, mimeographed newsletter.<sup>16</sup>

Of the large unions expelled from what is now the C.L.C., only two have disappeared, the C.S.U., which has been replaced, for better or worse, by the Seafairer's International Union, and the I.P.L.W.U. which has become a department of the accredited Amalgamated Meat Cutters. In British Columbia, two unions, the United Fishermen and Allied Workers and the Vancouver Civic Outside Workers, remain suspect of Communist connections. At the national level, as the following chart demonstrates, U.M.M.S.W. did not suffer any immediate decline in its membership as a result of its expulsion from the C.C.I.. Rather, its membership increased due to the normal expansion of the industries it had already organized. The U.S. still surpasses its rival the I.U.E. in numbers. Together the U.M.M.S.W. and the U.S. comprised four per cent of Canada's total union membership in 1962.<sup>17</sup>

The unions' purge of Communists has forced many of them as the

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<sup>16</sup>David Stein Op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>17</sup>Based on statistics from following chart.

Year	U.E. Branches	Members	I.U.E.	U.M.M.S.W.	U.S.A.	Total Union Membership
1949	32	22,857	not reported	38 25,000	50,000	1,002,188
1950 - 51	30	24,826	6 no report	29 25,000	55,000	931,771
1952	27	26,200	11 2,000	37 30,000	60,350	1,057,451
1953	24	25,700	18 4,500	36 30,000	70,000	1,133,079
1954	22	24,600	26 10,000	41 30,000	70,000	1,092,000
1955	23	22,500	30 50,000	41 32,000	60,000	1,153,800
1956	23	23,000	34 16,000	38 32,000	70,000	1,351,682
1957	24	24,800	35 16,000	42 33,000	75,000	1,386,185
1958	24	24,000	41 16,000	49 34,000	80,000	1,454,000
1959	27	19,900	41 16,000	48 34,000	80,000	1,459,000
1960	28	18,500	45 16,500	46 34,000	82,000	1,459,000
1961	29	18,650	49 11,000*	45 33,000	82,000	1,447,000
1962	28	18,900	51 7,961*	45 33,000**	82,000	1,423,000

\* Locals reporting

\*\* Since these figures were published large locals in Manitoba and Ontario have broken away from the U.M.M.S.W. reducing its membership by approximately one-half. The locals of significant size remaining within the organization are, for the most part, to be found within B.C..

Chart based on statistics published in the Annual Report on Labour Organizations In Canada 1949 through 1962 editions (Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch).

following statement by Tim Buck indicates, to hide their political affiliation.

...We don't have to apologize for the fact that so many of the Communists in the trade unions cannot divulge their membership in our party. Apologies for this should come from the American leadership of the trade unions, which would prevent Communists from holding jobs in Canadian industry....<sup>18</sup>

However, although the Communists are now less obtrusive there are indications that they still exert considerable influence in some unions. On the same occasion that he made the above statement, Mr. Buck also said:

...Some of the oldest and highly-respected trade unionists in Winnipeg are active members of the Communist party....<sup>19</sup>

Moreover, a 1961 edition of the Western Construction Tradesman, the quarterly published by the Inter-Provincial Building and Construction Trades Conference of Western Canada, contained an article by Ed Kennedy, the A.F.L. representative in B.C., which warned of Communist activities. He indicated that some members of Communist cells within the unions ("Everywhere there is a Communist cell...There is probably such a cell in your local union") are "expendable." Their job is, allegedly, to take the "brunt of the attack (from anti-Communists) while their underground associates make the progress."<sup>20</sup> Jay Lovestone, director of publications

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<sup>18</sup>"Reds in Unions - Buck," W.F.P., Sept. 17, 1960.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid...

<sup>20</sup>Quoted by Dudley Magnus, "Construction Unions Warn of Red Threat," W.F.P., Mar. 18, 1961.

for the A.F.L. - C.I.O. department of internal affairs, claimed, about the same time, that:

...The Communists have launched an intensive campaign aimed at penetration and subversion of the free world's trade unions....

Under Moscow's direction, Lovestone continued, Communists will try to increase their influence in North American unions seeking to "exploit such issues as unemployment, automation problems, tax and armament burdens in order to subvert our social fabric and strengthen the Soviet world position."<sup>21</sup> Union leaders would, thus, seem to be not at all sure that their anti-Communist campaign has been successful.

From the end of World War Two until 1956, the I.P.P. union policy combined hostility towards the "right wing" leadership of the national bodies, including the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour (C.C.C.L.);<sup>22</sup> with whole hearted approval of the rank and file and unreserved support of any strike called. The Canadian Tribune gave elaborate coverage to any strike capturing the national attention and was regularly distributed among picketers. At times the Tribune asked for financial support for the party's efforts to assist striker's families. On one occasion, when a strike extended over Christmas, the paper urged its readers to put a striker on their Christmas gift list.<sup>23</sup> The party

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid..

<sup>22</sup>...Although not a single cause that prompted the Catholic Syndicates to call for a province-wide stoppage has been removed, the leadership, under threats from the Duplessis regime, has revoked the decisions in favour of such a demonstration....

[Harry Binder, "Capitulation Of C.C.C.L. leadership," C.T. XVI:810 (Feb. 2, 1953), p. 3.]

also pressed for a national trade union movement independent of the U.S.A. because, as J.B. Salsberg said:

... [the U.S.] through its State Department uses the U.S. stranglehold on Canadian Unions to transform the Canadian trade union movement into a major instrument for the enforcement of its military, economic and political policies on the Canadian people....<sup>24</sup>

In short, the party attributed the expulsion of its unions and unionists from the T.L.C. and C.C.L. largely to pressure placed upon those bodies by the C.I.O. and A.F.L..

The party was also quick to support the efforts of the C.C.L. and T.L.C. to unite. However, as William Kashtan, then labour secretary of the L.P.P. pointed out in an article entitled "Regarding Some Unfinished Business,"<sup>25</sup> the party objected to the C.C.C.L. and "independent unions like United Electrical and Mine Mill" being left out of the merger.

The party's official attitude towards the union leadership mellowed somewhat after Khrushchev's enunciation of the possibility of a parliamentary road to socialism and the definite endorsement of attempts at merger by the C.C.L. Covention in 1956. The following statement written in 1962, and criticising the C.L.C.'s union policy undoubtedly would have contained, before late-1956, some disparaging reference to the leadership:

...There is nothing that big business monopoly could consider

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<sup>23</sup>"Let's Help Make It A Wonderful Christmas for Ford Kiddies," C.T., XVIII:907 (Dec. 13, 1954), p. 3.

<sup>24</sup>J.B. Salsberg, "The Trade Unions and Canadian Independence," N.A.M., IX:8 (Aug., 1952), p. 22.

<sup>25</sup>C.T., XIX:981 (May 14, 1956), p. 4.

disagreeable in this statement. At most it might object to the suggestion of its responsibility for workers laid off. But other than that, the aims outlined coincide with its own.

This is not the sort of statement the trade union movement of Canada ought to have adopted....<sup>26</sup>

Aside from illustrating the new attitude towards Canada's union leadership, the statement also demonstrates Mr. Kashtan's belief in the class war. This change in the party's union policy may be attributed almost wholly to its current attempts to pursue the parliamentary road to socialism by uniting all progressive elements within the community in the cause. No doubt the C.P.C. believes that a more deferential attitude toward the C.I.C. leadership will enhance its chances of becoming part of the C.I.C.'s political arm and also lead to the readmission of Communist-led unions to the national body. The party very much desires to have Communist-led unions return to the bosom of the Canadian trade union movement.

In virtually every other respect, however, the Communist attitude towards unions has remained unchanged since 1956. The party sides with the unions in their every dispute with business and government from compulsory arbitration<sup>27</sup> to legislation inhibiting union financial support

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<sup>26</sup>W. Kashtan, "The Trade Unions' Statement of Economic Policy," M.Q., Spring 1962, p. 49.

<sup>27</sup>Parliament meets on June 8, and if a strike is on by that date, [C.P.R. Firemen] it is believed the government will again resort to big-stick compulsory arbitration legislation....

["All Labor Behind C.P.R. Firemen - See Automation As Threat To Jobs," C.T., XX:1014 (Jan. 7, 1957), p. 1]

of political parties.

Most non-Communist trade unionists are convinced that their Communist counterparts are entirely under the thumb of the party.

...These people [the N.C. Provincial Executive of the C.P.C.] issue directives which are obeyed without question by more than fifty Communist labor leaders in the province of B.C.....<sup>28</sup>

The discipline required of party members in key posts, together with claims made by Pat Sullivan, Pat Walsh and other disaffected Communist Union leaders, do much to substantiate such charges.

It might be expected that party control would normally not result in any marked difference between the policies of Communist unions and non-Communist unions. The desire to attract more workers into their unions would force Communist leaders to act in an orthodox fashion. However, such is not always the case. The C.P.C., under all its various names, has always duplicated, as closely as possible, C.P.S.U. policies. Union leaders have followed their party's line, often with adverse results for their unions. For example, the Communist-dominated unions' opposition, between 1939 and 1941, to Canada's participation in World War Two resulted in some disaffection among the rank and file. In addition, the faithful mimicking, by the L.P.P. and unions under its influence, of the C.P.S.U.'s post-war, "hard line" seems not to have been in the best interests of continued Communist influence in the labour movement. The Communists' constant opposition to T.L.C. and C.C.L. leadership, at a

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<sup>28</sup>Ed Kennedy quoted by Dudley Magnus, loc. cit..

time when the Gouzenko spy trials and Soviet actions in Eastern Europe were doing much to make Communism unpopular with North Americans, probably helped to foster and strengthen the resolve of unionists to remove Communist influence from their organizations.

Ethnic organizations constitute another major element, perhaps the largest, in the movement. The January, 1961 issue of Alert commits, as nearly as can be determined, no errors of commission and few, if any, of omission in its listing of ethnic organizations with Communist sympathies. The publication claims that the United Jewish People's Order (U.J.P.O.), the Association of United Ukrainian-Canadians (A.U.U.C.), the Bulgarian-Canadian Slav Committee and the Carpatho-Russian Society are all satellite organizations. So too, are the Federation of Russian-Canadians, the Federation Yugoslav-Canadians, the Finnish-Canadian Amateur Sports Federation, the Finnish Organization of Canada, the German-Canadian Cultural Federation and the Polish Democratic Association.<sup>29</sup> These organizations may be broadly characterized as cultural and recreational societies serving as links with the homeland. They sponsor such activities as folk singing and dancing, tours of Soviet and other Communist bloc artists, films and lectures presented in their native language. Some have also, in the past at least, run leftist oriented schools. In addition, many of these societies provide halls for social and education functions.

Closely related to the cultural and recreational societies are the various mutual aid organizations with Communist leanings. The latter

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<sup>29</sup>Alert, loc. cit..



organizations, which normally offer either low interest loans; relatively inexpensive insurance or both, probably filled a very real need for early immigrants. Alert, again as nearly as can be determined, without error lists the following mutual benefit societies as being front groups: the Workers' Benevolent Association, the Chinese-Canadian Welfare Association of Toronto, the Kossuth Sick Benefit Society, the Polish-Canadian Mutual Benefit Society, and the Slovak Benefit Society.<sup>30</sup>

Although the ethnic associations are not an organic element of the party, they do have indirect representation in party councils. A fraction of their members, usually among the most active, are C.P.C. members who discuss their organizations affairs in the party's various ethnic committees. David Stein claims that the following national groups are represented by N.E.C. sub-committees: Ukranian, Russian, Finnish, Slovak, Carpatho-Russian and Polish. He also claims that Macedonians, Bulgarians and Jews are indirectly represented by individual members of the N.C.<sup>31</sup> Stein's representations are borne out by casual references made to the sub-committees in party periodicals. The type of connection maintained between the organizations and the party, together with the party's interest in the ethnic groups is implied in a statement made by John Weir on behalf of the Ukranian Canadian National Sub-Committee of the I.P.P.:

...the question is once again being raised by responsible comrades ... (Bruce Magnuson) whether...work in national group organizations is not a waste of energy, etc.

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid...      <sup>31</sup>David Stein, Op. cit., p. 38.

This questioning is not new, it has a long history. There have long been comrades who have held the view that specific "Ukrainian work" was not "party work," that comrades engaged in mass work in the national groups were doing "second-rate" work. This nihilistic attitude was never accepted by the party.

.....

What do we mean by Ukrainian work?

In the first place this means the work of building, defending and helping to promote the many-sided community activities of the progressive, democratic, cultural and fraternal organizations of the Ukrainian people....<sup>32</sup>

If it is granted that many members of Communist-led unions belong out of necessity rather than choice, the ethnic organizations still probably constitute the largest single section of the movement. They are, however, in decline. The organizations were formed during the twenties and thirties. The original members, most of whom brought their radical tendencies with them from Europe, are now growing old. Many have died. The attrition of membership has not been stemmed by new recruits because, as has been frequently noted, recent immigrants and native Canadians have demonstrated little tendency towards supporting radical left-wing organizations. Many newcomers who might in ignorance join ethnic satellite organizations are warned away by non-Communist ethnic organizations and publications and by occasional references to the Communist sympathies of the groups in Canada's English and French language publications. Word of mouth also, undoubtedly, plays a part in the process. Prosperity,

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<sup>32</sup>John Weir, Op. cit., p. 14.

white collar jobs and the all-pervading influence of "bourgeois" culture probably removes some of the incentive for children of original members to join. More important is the immigrant's desire to become "Canadianized." John Weir, in the statement referred to a short time ago, suggested another possible reason for the decline:

...up to and including the 5th national convention, the view prevalent in the national executive committee and other leading circles of the party was that the national groups were confined to the immigrant generation, necessitating special cultural activity among them, but that assimilation removed that necessity in so far as the Canadian-born children of immigrants were concerned....Although all comrades recognized the role of the immigrant workers in the history of the party and the value of sections of the Canadian people having direct links of kinship and cultural exchange with their now socialist countries of origin, nevertheless there was an underestimation of the importance of that field of activity....<sup>33</sup>

In short, Weir implies that some of the losses were due to simple lack of attention, an improper utilization of available workers by the party. The disillusionment with Communism within the U.J.P.O., occasioned by the 1956 Folkstimme revelations of anti-semitism within the U.S.S.R., must also have contributed to the movement's decline. Party sympathizers lost control of the U.J.P.O. in 1957 and only regained dominance two years later. In the interim many of the disillusioned members had quit.

David Stein has attempted to document the decline. He claims, without revealing his source, that by 1961 membership in the Polish Democratic Association had decreased to five hundred from an immediate post-war level of one thousand. In the same period the Federation of

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

Yugoslav-Canadians had declined from five thousand to six hundred while the Bulgarian Canadian Peoples League had only forty-six members.<sup>34</sup>

The party's youth group is, in several ways, not typical of the organizations which compose the movement. For example, its connection with the C.P.C. is officially acknowledged by both the youth organization and the party, its membership is more directly subject to party discipline and controls than are other front groups and its members are all avowed Communists.<sup>35</sup> The youth group has operated under three different names during the past decade. Until August, 1957, it was known as the National Federation of Labor Youth (N.F.L.Y.). The name was then changed to the Socialist Youth League of Canada (S.Y.L.). The Second National Convention of the S.Y.L., held in May, 1960, decided to "revert to the former name of the Marxist Youth Movement, the Young Communist League"<sup>36</sup> (Y.C.L.). In thus altering its name, the youth movement was following the lead of the L.F.P. which had reverted to the name C.P.C. a year previously.

The Y.C.L. and its predecessors have occasionally established committees to present the group's stand on various issues to the public

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<sup>34</sup>David Stein, Op. cit., pp. 38-39.

<sup>35</sup>They refer to themselves as "young Communists."

[<sup>36</sup>Extracts From The Report Of The N.E.C. Of The Socialish Youth League Of Canada To Its Second National Convention, " M.R., XVII:174 (July-Aug., 1960), p. 23.]

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 22.

and to solicit public support for its policies. The Labor Youth anti-conscription committees established in some Canadian centres during the Korean War are an example.

Aside from the Y.C.L., several other Communist-dominated and inspired organizations designed to appeal to the nation's youth exist. The Youth Friendship League, whose purpose is to foster world peace through world brotherhood, is one. Others include the Chinese Youth Association of Vancouver, the Cultural Recreational Association of Chinese Canadian Youth in Edmonton, the Russian-Canadian Youth Organization and the Sons and Daughters of the Canadian-Lithuanian Mutual Benefit Society. Such organizations do not have the same formal connections with the C.P.C. as does the Y.C.L.. However, those with a national organization receive considerable coverage in the party press including active support for their projects. Communists occupy influential positions within the organizations. In addition, the ethnically-oriented groups normally have some connection with the corresponding adult satellite organizations.

Most, if not all, of the organizations just named maintain an informal association with the World Federation of Democratic Youth, a satellite organization of the international Communist movement. The Canadian youth organizations send delegates to international youth festivals and congresses organized by the international body. The Youth Friendship League seems to be the Canadian sponsor of the international gatherings. Not all Canadian groups which send delegations to such meets are Communist-dominated, however. Similarly, non-Communist groups from other nations are also attracted. In Canada, the satellite youth

groups engage in such activities as youth camps and athletic events.

Official statements of membership in the youth organizations have not been discovered. However, David Stein<sup>37</sup> estimated membership in the Y.C.L. to be approximately 800 in 1961. If it may be assumed that the pattern of membership within the youth organization roughly parallels that of the parent body, Y.C.L. membership was probably slightly higher in early 1956 and suffered a sharp drop between late 1956 and early 1958, gradually increasing to its 1961 level in the intervening three years. Moreover, an article by Bill Willmott in a 1955 edition of H.A.M. attempted to analyse the failure of the N.F.L.Y. to grow during the previous four year period. During most of that time the L.P.F. was suffering a decline in membership. On this basis it is unlikely that membership has exceeded 1200 since 1953. The conclusion is supported by the available sketchy circulation figures of the youth papers.<sup>38</sup> But one should not insist upon the analogy just drawn. As has been noted the party has experienced considerable difficulty in recruiting native-born Canadians and recent immigrants. These factors may have produced a considerable variance in growth and decline of membership within the Y.C.L. and the C.P.C.. The latter body may still draw heavily upon pre-World War Two immigrants for recruits.

A satellite organization which was very active between 1948 and 1951 and which has since lost prominence is the Congress of Canadian Women (C.C.W.). It has concerned itself, in the main, with problems

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<sup>37</sup>David Stein, Op. cit., p. 38.

<sup>38</sup>See Chapter VI, p.

relating to family security. Over the past decade it has demanded such action as the raising of family allowances by fifty per cent, equal pay for women, universal pre-paid health insurance, and the banning from Canadian newsstands of American horror and war "comics." The organization maintains connections with the World Congress of Women and the Women's International Democratic Federation.

The Canadian Peace Congress and its affiliates such as the Manitoba Peace Council, the Edmonton Peace Council, The Toronto Association for Peace and similar organizations set up in some unions, constitute still another element of the movement. The Reverend James G. Endicott, long-time chairman of the Canadian Peace Congress, has, on occasion, denied charges that the organization is a satellite of the Communist party:

I believe that our movement fulfills the righteous purposes of God in history and that God uses the communists for the establishment of peace whether they know it or not....<sup>39</sup>

At an earlier date, he termed Lester B. Pearson's charge that the organization was an agent of "foreign aggressive imperialism" to be "irresponsible slander." The Peace Congress, Endicott claimed is "the agent of Canada's people."<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>From a Feb. 7 rally at Massey Hall, Toronto. Quoted by F.C. Stinson July 15, 1960 in The House of Commons. (Debates of House of Commons of Canada, Session 1960, VI, p. 6354.)

<sup>40</sup>"We Are The Agent of Canada's People' Endicott to Pearson," C.T., XIV:718 (April 30, 1951), p. 2.

However, several factors, which by themselves might have no great significance, combine to suggest that Endicott was either misled as to the influence of the Communists within his organization or was deliberately misleading the public. Endicott was awarded the Stalin Peace Prize,<sup>41</sup> his son Stephen became president of the N.F.L.Y., known Communists such as Don Currie, now provincial organizer for the Manitoba C.P.C., have held prominent positions within the Peace Council and its affiliates.<sup>42</sup> Party publications have given the organization their whole-hearted support. The Tribune has referred to Endicott as the "most famous Canadian" and as one "whose name is honored by hundreds of millions."<sup>43</sup> Peace Congress policy has never contradicted the current Soviet line. Moreover, Endicott and other members of the Organization were considered to be sufficiently trustworthy to be escorted on a tour of Korea's battlefields, during the war, by Chinese and North Korean representatives. They demonstrated to him evidence of U.N. use of germ warfare which he considered to be conclusive.

The organization, which is associated with the World Peace

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<sup>41</sup>"Throng Station, Greet Missionary of Peace." C.T., XVI:807 (Jan. 12, 1953), p. 12.

<sup>42</sup>Currie, for example, was secretary of the Manitoba Peace Council, an affiliate of the Canadian Peace Congress.

<sup>43</sup>"Most Famous Canadian Off on 14th Mission of Peace," C.T., XVIII:932 (June 6, 1955), p. 2.



Congress, was formed in 1948. In the following five year period it gained considerable strength and, if not prestige, notoriety. Its activities were faithfully reported in daily newspapers, articles on the Canadian Peace Congress appeared in magazines, thousands were persuaded to sign its "peace petitions," repeated references of it were made on the floor of the House of Commons. The climax of its career came in September, 1953, when several thousand Canadians were persuaded to participate in a "nationwide referendum by ballot" which attempted to ascertain whether or not Canadians were in favour of the big powers undertaking peace negotiations. Predictably, the results were nine to one in favour of a big power meeting.<sup>44</sup> When in the following year the hoped for meeting took place in Geneva, the Canadian Tribune was quick to assign much of the credit to Canada's peace petition and referendum together with similar undertakings sponsored by the World Peace Congress in other countries.

Since that time the organization has lost strength, almost dropping completely out of sight after 1957. The same events which split the party in 1956 and the hardening anti-Communist sentiment in Canada undoubtedly hastened its decline. So too, did unfavourable editorial comment in non-Communist newspapers and the interest the R.C.M.P. displayed in some of those who signed the peace petition. Although now moribund, the Peace Congress casts a lingering shadow over Canada. The organization's meteoric career has contributed in no small way to the

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<sup>44</sup>"Canadian Referendum 9 to 1 in Favor of Big Power Meet," C.T., XVII:849 (Nov. 2, 1953), p. 3.

present general suspicion of any Canadian peace group whether it be Voice of Women, the Peace Research Institute or the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

Domestic reform groups occupy the attentions of a significant portion of the movement. Such organizations have been established to accomplish widely varying tasks from promoting the appreciation of Canadian art in Toronto, to halting racial discrimination in Montreal's boarding houses and to protecting Canada's civil liberties. Of the various groups that fall within the category of "domestic reform," the League of Democratic Rights (L.D.R.) is probably best known. It purports to be interested in preventing the circumscription of civil rights and liberties in this country. The L.D.R. was most active in the early 1950's when it sought to align public opinion in opposition to the Garson amendments to the criminal code and Duplessis' 'Padlock Law,' both of which hampered or threatened to hamper the activities of the L.P.P.. The distaste with which most Canadians viewed the Padlock Law resulted in support for the L.D.R.. However, since the disallowance of that particular piece of Quebec legislation by the Supreme Court of Canada, the L.D.R. has displayed a distinct lack of vitality. Its demands for a Canadian Bill of Rights and, subsequent to the incorporation of such a bill into statute law, for a meaningful Bill of Rights have failed to arouse much interest among Canadians.

The activities of the domestic reform fronts are hampered to some

extent, as are those of all satellite organizations, by the daily newspapers' insistence upon exposing groups with Communist sympathies:

...the I.D.R.'s real purpose is to attack the revised Criminal Code now before Parliament. The revised code affects Communists because, among other things it strengthens provisions against treason and sedition which, of course, are the stock in trade of Communism  
 ....<sup>45</sup>

The Toronto Arts Council, formed in 1953 through the efforts of Communists, was dissolved because of a campaign by the Toronto press which revealed the organization's Communist connections. Reputable non-Communists in the Arts Council resigned to avoid the stigma of associating themselves with it.

Closely related to the domestic reform groups are satellite organizations which seek to influence Canada's attitude toward other nations and toward specific incidents in other nations. The Canadian-Soviet Friendship Society, established in 1952, is the oldest and best established of such groups. President of the Society is Dyson Carter, an author whose works are virtually unknown in Canada but who has had more copies of the Russian translation of his books printed than any other Canadian with the exceptions of Ernest Thompson Seton and Stephen Leacock.<sup>46</sup> A Russian

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<sup>45</sup>Editorial in W.F.P., Jan. 23, 1954.

<sup>46</sup>Professor A. Dennisov, president of the Soviet section of the Canadian-Soviet Friendship Society, included the following interesting facts in an article for N.A.M.. [A. Dennisov, "Canadian Authors in the U.S.S.R.," N.A.M., XI:10 (Oct., 1954), pp. 14-19.]. He stated that Ernest Thompson Seton was the most popular Canadian author in the U.S.S.R.. His works have been published in twenty-one of the Soviet Union's

philosopher heads the Soviet section of the Society.

As the organization's title suggests, it is dedicated to bettering relations between the U.S.S.R. and Canada. To this end the society advocates more trade with the Soviet Union and more cultural exchanges. It has helped to sponsor the Canadian tours of some Soviet artists and has publicized Soviet films. In an article welcoming a new Soviet ambassador to Canada, the Canadian Tribune noted:

Thirty-six roses—one for every year of the Soviet State—were sent to Ambassador D.S. Chuvakhin of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, by the National Council of the Canadian-Soviet Friendship Society....<sup>47</sup>

The Society also sponsors an annual Canadian-Soviet Friendship month which is celebrated concurrently in both countries. Special events, such as exhibitions of Soviet children's art in Canada and radio programs about Canada in the U.S.S.R., commonly mark the celebration. The Canadian-Chinese Friendship Society is closely patterned on the Canadian-Soviet model. It is, however, more recent in origin and has not, as yet, displayed the same degree of activity.

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languages and twenty-seven of his books have had combined sales of 2,267,000 copies. Stephen Leacock has had thirteen books published in Russian with combined sales of 271,000 copies. Dyson Carter's book Tomorrow Is With Us sold 72,000 copies in its Russian translation. Professor Dennisov also noted that the works of Thomas Chandler Haliburton, Isabella Crawford, E. Pauline Johnson, Gremazi, Jean-Jules Richard, Wilson MacDonald and E.J. Pratt, although not translated are "widely read" in English and French.

<sup>47</sup>"36 Roses For New Soviet Ambassador," C.T., XVII:850 (Nov.9,1953), p. 10.

Occasionally, special committees are formed in an attempt to rally public opinion in support of the party line on specific events taking place within other countries. Examples are: the Montreal Committee for Democracy in Kenya which protested the techniques employed by the British in suppressing the Mau-mau ( "Colonial oppression...is as potentially dangerous for Canada as is American McCarthyism"),<sup>48</sup> and the Committee for the Defence of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, which sought to raise funds for the defence of the two American spies, to force the Canadian government to protest the American action in prosecuting them and, after the Rosenbergs' death, to campaign for their vindication. The "Fair Play for Cuba" demonstrations conducted after the Bay of Pigs invasion and the 1962 crisis generated by the presence of Russian Missiles in Cuba were supported and, perhaps, inspired by the C.P.C.. More frequently, however, special agencies are not established to deal with specific policy matters. Rather, established satellite organizations are employed. Hence the U.J.P.O. issued "a Call" to the leaders of the Canadian Jewish Congress and to all Canadian Jewish organizations

...to join in opposition to the rearmament of Germany - "so that the murderers of six million Jews will never again be armed"...<sup>49</sup>

Similarly, the Canadian Peace Congress, in 1961, publicly demanded the reinstatement of Patrice Lumumba as President of the Congo and later, after he had been murdered, the punishment of his murderers.

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<sup>48</sup>"Justice For Kenya Montreal Group's Aim," C.T., XVII:858 (Jan. 4, 1954), p. 15.

<sup>49</sup>"U.J.P.O. Call To Jewish Congress," C.T., XVII:879 (May 31, 1954), p. 7.

Thus far the satellite organizations have been grouped according to their interests. They may also be grouped in relation to their permanency, relationship with the party and method of operation. Examining the movement in this light it is possible to discover four different types of organizations.

The first is the permanent organization designed to appeal on the basis of nationality, sex or age. Examples are: the A.U.U.C., the U.J.P.O., the Y.C.L.<sup>50</sup> and the C.C.W.. Because they are not particularly intended to be mass movements but rather to resemble clubs and public service organizations composed of fairly like-minded people, they do not make any elaborate attempts to conceal their affinity for the C.P.C.. On occasion, they elect Communists as their heads as well as placing party members in subordinate influential positions. The permanency of these organizations has allowed regular channels of communication to be established with the party through the party's specialized sub-committees or individual members of leading committees. Their permanency also, when coupled with the regular income to be expected in a membership based on so arbitrary a factor as sex, age or nationality, allows the organizations to undertake a fairly broad program of activities. The same factors enable the groups in this category to set long range objectives, better realized through a program of education than, say, public demonstrations, as well as short term goals.

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<sup>50</sup>The Y.C.L. fits uneasily into this category because, as has already been explained, it is openly affiliated with the party.

The permanent organizations, as nearly as can be determined, have triple value for the C.P.C.. They are not, except in the case of the Y.C.L., openly Communist, but are avowedly radical. They thus attract people who, if they cannot always be persuaded to become party members, can almost certainly be convinced to support the C.P.C. at the polls. The permanent organizations also supplement the party's voice in presenting its program to the public. It is more impressive to the uninitiated and the unsophisticated party member to see part of the party program endorsed by several seemingly independent organizations rather than by the party alone. Thus the U.J.P.C. and the Canadian Slav Congress publicly opposed German rearmament in 1954. The organizations also provide a source of funds for the party.

A second type of front group is the permanent, functional organization. The Communist-led unions, the benevolent associations, insurance agencies and co-operatives, such as People's Co-op of Winnipeg and International Co-op Stores in Ontario, fall into this category. In most cases their association with the C.P.C. is over-shadowed by the service they provide. Once again there is no formal affiliation with the party. However, in the case of the unions, the N.E.C.'s labour secretary serves as a liason officer. Most of the other organizations have high-ranking party members in executive positions.

Generally speaking, the functional organizations provide two services to the C.P.C.. Firstly, they are a source of revenue.<sup>51</sup> Secondly,

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<sup>51</sup>See Chapter VIII, pp. 166-170.

such publications as they have supply the party with additional outlets for publicizing their program. Unions occasionally broaden their support to include political education for their membership. They also create committees to support other front organizations.<sup>52</sup> In the main, however, their usefulness to the party is confined to the two areas previously described unless, of course, one subscribes to the frequent accusations that the unions' power to invoke strikes provides the C.P.C. with a weapon to be employed in any attempt at a violent take-over of the country.

Semi-permanent special interest groups constitute the third category of satellite organizations. These organizations, of which the Canadian Peace Congress, the League of Democratic Rights, and the Union of Unemployed workers are examples, have been designed to function as mass movements. It is their purpose to turn existing climates of opinion and existing situations to the party's advantage. They attempt to organize and express, in terms favourable to a growth of C.P.C. influence in the country, the inarticulate feelings of the general public on matters of general interest such as peace, unemployment or civil liberties. They continue to exist as long as the situation they were designed to exploit exists.

In order to accomplish their goal of mobilizing and channelling public opinion they must have wide appeal and a broad base of support. Thus any relationship with the party must be covert or much of their

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<sup>52</sup>See page 148.



potential support is lost. Hence most of the semi-permanent organizations will be headed by men or women, such as the Reverend Andicott, who have no obvious connection with the party.

The supporters of the semi-permanent mass organizations provide the party with possible recruits. However, the potential of the organizations in this category as a source for C.P.C. members must be considerably less than is that of the permanent organization. Organizations such as the Peace Congress also give added effect to the pronouncements of the C.P.C.. Their resolutions parallel the party's stand on the same or similar issues and are often backed by a petition containing a long list of names, many of them being those of prominent and respected members of the community; by public demonstrations, large enthusiastic rallies or by any combination of the three. Thus supported, their policies probably have some impact on the public mind paving the way, the C.P.C. undoubtedly hopes, for their eventual acceptance by the government concerned and increased support for the C.P.C..

The final type of front group is the ad hoc special interest organization. These groups exist almost solely for publicity purposes although they might also supply a slender trickle of new members to the C.P.C.. Such organizations deal with a single specific situation in an intense, concentrated short-term campaign. Examples are: the Fair-Play for Cuba Committee and the Committee for the Defence of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

In June, 1961 the Honorable David Fulton, in replying to questions asked about the R.C.M.P.'s security investigations, made the following

statement:

...It is an unfortunate fact that it is a tactic of Communism to infiltrate perfectly respectable organizations...Let there be no doubt about it, the respectability of the organization or the subject matter with which the organization is concerned is no guarantee against efforts to infiltrate....<sup>53</sup>

Infiltration<sup>54</sup> would seem to be a standard technique of the C.P.C. in union activities which has great potential application in other fields of endeavour. Both Igor Couzenko<sup>55</sup> and Pat Sullivan<sup>56</sup> have explained the technique as it has been employed in unions. Briefly, its success is dependent upon the Communists being organized while their potential opposition is not. Political immaturity on the part of an organizations' membership is of further aid. Communists often employ the following simple tactic when attempting to persuade an organization not under their domination to adopt resolutions or set policies which would assist, in some way, the accomplishment of C.P.C. objectives: they contrive to extend the time of a meeting so that many non-Communist members will be forced to leave before its conclusion and others will become somnolent.

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<sup>53</sup>Debates of House of Commons of Canada session 1960-61 vol. VI p. 6120, Fri. June 9, 1961.

<sup>54</sup>The term "infiltration" is used advisedly. It is, perhaps, too highly coloured to judiciously describe this particular method employed by the Communists in their efforts to build a mass movement and extend their influence. One thus qualified, however, no simple word or phrase more adequately portrays the tactic than does "infiltration."

<sup>55</sup>Igor Couzenko, Op. cit. p. 198.

<sup>56</sup>Pat Sullivan, Op. cit. p. 146.

With their potential opposition thus reduced, the Communists will quickly rush through any legislation they desire. In securing executive positions Communists are aided not only by their own political training but also by the fact that they are united behind one candidate while other members of the organization often split their votes between two or more office-seekers. The effective employment of these techniques often necessitates a "fraction" meeting before the actual meeting of the organization. That is, the Communists meet earlier and apart from other members in order to decide on tactics.

A Winnipeg Free Press<sup>57</sup> article, which described the process by which a home and school association gained a Communist executive illustrates the technique. Several Communists joined the Inkster Home and School Association. After a short time they became quite active, proposing resolutions and displaying a better-than-average knowledge of correct meeting procedure. At one time they proposed that the association issue a protest about civil defence training in schools. A member referred to the incident in these words:

...What could we do about it? We can't make speeches like these people. They're trained for things like this. We're just ordinary people. And they're convincing. Even my wife was taken in and was going to vote for a protest. Practically nobody spoke against the idea....<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>57</sup>Ted Byfield, "How The Reds Invaded The Inkster Home and School," W.F.P., May 21, 1955.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid...

Mr. Gable, who was succeeded as president of the association by Mrs. Annie Ross, a member of the L.P.F., described the events leading to Mrs. Ross' election:

...[The Communists] wanted us to get into all sorts of things home and school associations shouldn't deal with...At meetings they'd heckle and interrupt me until I didn't know what I was doing.

Few parents besides the Communists turned out for the next annual meeting. Mr. Gable resigned. "I could see myself surrounded by them on the executive...so I quit the association altogether. Maybe that was wrong. I don't know"....<sup>59</sup>

In the future, as to some extent they do today, the C.P.C. could quite profitably employ the technique of infiltration to regain the publicity and potential support it is now losing because of a general decline in the strength and influence of its satellite organizations. If party members avoided any overt action, such as an open struggle for the presidency of an organization, they could probably secure the adoption of some of their policies. At the same time newspapers and other critics would not be so quick to cry Communist for fear of arousing the anger of non-Communists within the organization. If Canada's Communists do feel the need to revitalize their ailing movement, increased use of the technique of infiltration is possibly the method they will employ.

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<sup>59</sup>Quoted in Ibid..

CHAPTER VIII

PARTY FINANCES

It becomes difficult to understand how the C.P.C. can finance its multitude of activities and those of its satellite organizations, when the relatively small size of the party and the disfavour with which it is viewed by the public are taken into consideration. Election campaigns at all levels of government require a considerable expenditure of funds. Newspaper advertisements, radio and television time, pamphlets, posters, the occasional bill-board - all cost money. Further, public demonstrations by the C.P.C. and its front groups, the circulation of petitions, publicity campaigns for projects of the party and the movement, deputations to the government, and representations to royal commissions require expenditures. The same is true of some programs designed for the political education of party members. The party press is a large financial liability. All official publications and most products of the satellite press run deficits of considerable size. John Stewart has stated:

...If one were to add up the total cost of production of the three L.P.P. papers - the Tribune, Pacific Tribune and Combat, the figure would run close to \$100,000 a year. By and large, this money is raised by supporters of the movement who are also called upon to support a dozen or so independent progressive newspapers to the extent of an additional estimated production cost of \$350,000 a year - only a relatively small part of which comes from outside sources such as advertising. The annual financial campaigns alone of all these papers when put together...comes to a quarter of a million dollars - a heavy burden on a relatively small number of people...<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>John Stewart, "Reshape Party Thinking on the Concept of the Press," N.A.M., XIV:3 (Mar., 1957), p. 10.

That the party is able to sustain this burden becomes even more amazing when one notes the formal financial obligations of the membership. While the membership fees of the C.F.C. are roughly on a par with those of other Canadian parties, it is immediately apparent that they would barely pay the salaries of functionaries and paid help if, indeed, they are sufficient for even that purpose. The following is a reproduction of the schedule of dues and initiation fees contained in the present Constitution:<sup>2</sup>

<u>MONTHLY INCOME</u>	<u>DUES</u>	<u>INITIATION FEE</u>
Housewives, pensioners, unemployed persons and students.....	\$ .25	\$ .25
Under \$175.00 .....	.50	.50
\$176.00 to \$300.00 .....	1.00	.50
\$301.00 and over .....	2.00	.50

In addition to these monthly assessments based upon take-home pay, the party also requires each member to pay an annual convention assessment of one dollar if his income is under \$176.00 per month and two dollars if over.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup>Const., p. 37.

<sup>3</sup>Const., p. 36. The income obtained by these methods is distributed amongst the various organizational levels on the following basis:\*

The obvious disparity between the potential income represented by membership, initiation and convention fees and the total outlay probably required by party activities has led several writers to speculate about the methods employed by the C.P.C. to finance its operations. One recurrent theme is the claim that the Soviet Union subsidizes the party through its embassy in Ottawa. No concrete evidence supporting this charge has been discovered. Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet Embassy who defected to Canada, claimed, in his book This Was My Choice, that a single transfer of \$40,000 in Embassy funds to the Canadian party probably took place during his service in this country.<sup>4</sup> However, it is generally conceded that, while the party received considerable aid from Moscow during its early years,<sup>5</sup> this source has largely dried up since 1935. Subsequent donations to the C.P.C. from Moscow, if any, have likely been emergency measures. This case, it must again be stated, is unproven. Only the people involved in such transactions, would know the truth.

STAMP VALUE	CLUB		CITY OR REGIONAL OFFICE		PROVINCIAL OFFICE		NATIONAL OFFICE
	Retains 10%	Pays City or Region	Retains 20%	Pays Prov. Office	Retains 20%	Pays Nat'l Office	Retains 50%
\$ .25	.09	.22	.05	.17	.05	.12	\$ .12
.50	.05	.45	.10	.35	.10	.25	.25
1.00	.10	.90	.20	.70	.20	.50	.50
2.00	.20	1.80	.40	1.40	.40	1.00	1.00
<hr/>							
Initiations							
.25		.25		.25		.25	.25
.50		.50		.50		.50	.50

\*Const., p. 39



Ronald Williams, writing in the Financial Post, made a fairly convincing case for the claim that Communist-controlled businesses supply the party with the bulk of its revenue.<sup>6</sup> Although the writer was not dealing with the post-1953 period, the businesses he specifically mentioned still exist. On this basis it would be reasonable to assume that his arguments would be, in a general sense, as valid today as they were at the time of writing.

Mr. Williams began his article by arguing, as has been done in this chapter, that the formal financial commitments of the membership were insufficient to cover party expenditures. He also dismissed possible donations by Moscow and by "angels," wealthy sympathizers, as being sufficient to fill the gap. He claimed that the largest donation to party coffers by an individual was, at the time of writing, the \$20,000 contributed by a Toronto businessman. He then asked: "How do [the Communists] fill up?" and answered his own question by stating: "Mainly through profits from their business enterprises"....<sup>7</sup> Rather dramatically, he continued:

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<sup>4</sup>Igor Gouzenko, This Was My Choice, p. 241.

<sup>5</sup>Ronald Williams "There's Big Money In Communist Business Network" [Fin. Post, XLV:8 (Feb. 24, 1951)], tells an interesting story of a female party leader smuggling \$10,000 from the Soviet Union into Canada in her bedroll.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid...

<sup>7</sup>Ibid...

...Lift the local iron curtain and you'll discover a Communist business system functioning within the Canadian economy.

The extent and scope of this Red business is eye-opening. The amount of business being done is staggering -- somewhere in the neighborhood of \$10 millions a year."<sup>8</sup>

Most of the businesses to which Williams refers are largely supported "by the fifteen foreign language groups whose numbers form the backbone of the L.P.P." and, it might be added, the present C.P.C.. By no means all participants in the various business organizations are Communists. However:

...Communists operate restaurants, clothing stores, flower shops, laundries. They have at least one movie house and a movie distributing agency. And whenever a Communist gets a call to Moscow there's a Communist-owned travel agency to handle the business....<sup>9</sup>

The biggest individual enterprises are, Williams states, insurance and co-operatives.

...These operate inside the two biggest foreign language groups connected with the L.P.P.: Association of United Ukrainian Canadians and the Finnish Organization of Canada...between them [they] control the bulk of the insurance and co-operative business on which the party relies for financing....<sup>10</sup>

The writer went on to discuss the People's Co-operative of Winnipeg, the Worker's Benevolent Association of Canada, both based on the A.U.U.C., the Workers' Co-op of New Ontario and the International Co-op Stores, both based on the Finnish organization and both with headquarters in Ontario,

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid...

<sup>9</sup>Ibid...

<sup>10</sup>Ibid...

listing their considerable financial assets. He also mentioned the Independent Mutual Benefit Federation, the benefit association and credit union of the U.J.P.O. and referred to four other Communist controlled co-operatives in various parts of Canada. Progress Books, which operates a publishing house and several book stores, was also discussed. Williams claimed that all these enterprises had Communist directors. While it has not been possible to verify this claim in every instance, it is certainly true today of the People's Co-operative, the W.B.A. and Progress Books. The other businesses mentioned continue to advertise in one or more of the party publications, a fact that would tend to support the claim. Finally, Williams attempted to present the means by which these several enterprises contribute to the support of the party.

Various methods, he said, are employed. One was implied in a statement about the International Co-op Stores and the Workers' Co-op:

...Both have something else in common: despite healthy turnover, their balance sheets say that they lose money....<sup>11</sup>

Generally, however, the party would get its cut in a round about way:

...Take the 150-odd Communist business or professional men. The party has a pretty good idea of how much they are making. Each is expected to contribute in direct ratio to his earnings. This is why the party tries to keep all Communist business within the family circle: the more a Communist merchant or professional man makes, the more the party gets....<sup>12</sup>

The larger enterprises make their contribution by becoming, in effect, party machines, doing much of the party work and paying most of

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid...

<sup>12</sup>Ibid...

the party bills in their area of operations. Communist organizers are, for example, employed by Co-operatives. William Kardash, manager of Peoples Co-operative, does organizational work in Manitoba. Co-ops and insurance societies become virtual "recruiting agencies" for the party. For example, customers of the Communist co-ops were asked to sign the various peace petitions circulated by the Communists in the early fifties. "Advertisements" consisting of pleas to support Communist-sponsored projects with brief mentions of the products available in the stores are circulated by the same co-operatives. The International Co-op "spends unknown sums of money on 'education'," maintains a summer camp in the Port Arthur area and publishes tracts on the Soviet way of life or, at least, it did so at the time the article was written. When the great importance the party attaches to propaganda is noted, it becomes apparent that such activities on the part of sympathetic businesses relieves the party of a potentially large drain on its resources. In addition, the party enterprises help finance conventions by direct contributions and by footing the bill for their own delegates. Further, there is a "kickback in cash from people [planted] in jobs in various business[es] and in labor unions."<sup>13</sup>

Claims similar to those made by Williams are contained in a Free Press article of February, 1956 which places its main emphasis on charitable associations connected with the party.<sup>14</sup> Evidence in support

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid..

<sup>14</sup>"Gifts for Russia," W.F.P., Feb. 23, 1957.

of the arguments contained in the articles mentioned and others like them, is supplied by the business advertisements contained in some Communist publications. Although some specific examples employed to substantiate these claims may be called into question, the argument in general, makes good sense. However, no indisputable evidence of its truth has been discovered. The party has on occasion categorically denied the existence of any mysterious source of income, although the wording of the denials does not eliminate the possibility of Williams' suspicions being correct.

Prior to the 1953 federal election, in which the L.P.P. ran one hundred candidates, the Toronto Telegram carried a report from Ottawa about a mysterious million dollar L.P.P. election fund.<sup>15</sup> Paul Phillips, then L.P.P. national treasurer, stated that the story was a "complete invention."<sup>16</sup> The evidence Mr. Phillips mustered to support his case is interesting.

The 1953 election campaign of the L.P.P. will be financed, as in the past, through the efforts of ten of thousands of supporters going out to collect money and contributing money towards that fund most of it in small donations of one to twenty-five dollars.

There will be no centralized treasury each constituency will raise its own fund and supervise its own spending....<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Peter Dempson, "Million Dollar Mystery," Toronto Telegram, January 3, 1953.

<sup>16</sup>Paul Phillips, "That Million Dollar Election Fund Mystery," C.T., XVI:807 (Jan. 12, 1953), p. 3

<sup>17</sup>Ibid..

There exists a sizeable body of evidence which indicates that the party does rely heavily on the contributions of members to finance its operations. For example, the collapse of the French-language party organ Le Combat, and the youth publication Champion, the reduction in size of the Canadian Tribune, the six month absence of the monthly theoretical journal followed by its re-appearance under a different name at two month intervals, and the claimed reduction in the number of paid functionaries following the resignations and expulsions of the 1956-57 party crisis seem to indicate a dependence on the generosity of members. So, too, do letters to N.A.M. complaining of the heavy financial burden imposed by the party and of the frequency of fund raising campaigns:

...It is imperative that the heavy financial burden be lifted, that measures of economy be undertaken to lessen that load and relieve their the "progressive organizations" members and supporters of unending financial campaigns....<sup>18</sup>

...The revision of [financial] quotas, if there is any at all, has been in only one direction -- up. Likewise the present graduated dues scale has a coercive effect, particularly on new members. We should have an even scale of dues within reason, depending for additional financial support on the ideological level of individual members....<sup>19</sup>

Another member demanded that the party "find some way to reduce the load of money raising."<sup>20</sup> Numerous similar statements could be cited.

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<sup>18</sup>John Weir, Op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>19</sup>C. Caron, Op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>20</sup>H.F. and D.F., "A Contribution to the Party Discussion," N.A.M., XIV:2 (Feb., 1957), p. 8.

The Constitution of the C.P.C. specifically states that "No obligatory assessment, other than the Convention Assessment shall be levied upon the membership, except by special decision of the National Committee of the Party."<sup>21</sup> The party seems little inclined to rely solely upon the inherent generosity or the "advanced ideological level," which phrase might be loosely translated to mean sense of duty, of its members to prompt additional contributions. Often, as in the case of campaigns for the Canadian Tribune's sustaining fund, the party's constitution is circumvented by the assigning of quotas on the basis of geography.<sup>22</sup> Meetings are held at which an appeal for funds is made and donations are publicly pledged.

Ronald Williams' allegation, that what amounts to a tithe is imposed upon the membership,<sup>23</sup> is supported by Pat Sullivan -- at least insofar as the income from positions gained partly through party influence are concerned.

...After my re-election to office [as vice-president of the T.I.C.] I felt I was in a sound financial position...However, this happy state was not fated to last, for the Communist party informed me that the task of organizing and of converting the people of Canada to the idea that they needed scientific socialism cost money. They taxed me to the extent of 10% of my wages and if anyone thinks that the Canadian government is a heartless tax collector he should see the comrades of the Communist party in action....<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Const., art. 10, sec. 2, p. 34.

<sup>22</sup>Cf. ff., Ch. V, p. 70.

<sup>23</sup>Loc. cit...

<sup>24</sup>Pat Sullivan, Op. cit., p. 118.

Of course, both Williams and Sullivan were writing prior to 1953. No evidence has been discovered that would suggest the practice is continued but, on the other hand, neither has any to suggest that it has ceased.

Communist-controlled unions serve as another source of revenue for the C.P.C.. However, the rapid decline in their membership over the past few years has undoubtedly reduced the significance of their contributions to the party budget. Satellite organizations such as the A.U.U.C. and the U.J.P.O. also, in all likelihood, make donations to the party. Some of the party's potential financial burden is eased by the common practise of having front groups solicit funds for their own campaigns, as did the Committee for the Defense of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Sullivan claims that, in one case at least, the funds raised by a front group were not employed for their publicly proclaimed purpose.<sup>25</sup> Partial substantiation of the charge is supplied by the following quotation from N.A.M.:

...For at least the past eight years, Tribune financial campaigns have been inextricably mixed up with L.P.P. financing. Frequently Tribune campaigns are used to raise additional money for party organizational work which in effect often means that donations collected from Tribune supporters in the name of the Tribune are used by party organizations for other than Tribune work....<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>26</sup>John Stewart, Loc. cit..



It would be overstating the case to say that the financial operations of the C.P.C. are the Churchillian "mystery inside an enigma." However, to one outside party ranks, they remain extremely puzzling. Nor is it likely that the Communists will see fit to open their ledgers to the public in the near future. The traditional reticence of Canadian political parties to reveal the details of their finances, only slightly violated by the N.D.P. and C.C.F., stands in little danger of being subverted by Canada's party of the extreme left.

SECTION III  
PROGRAM AND POLICIES

CHAPTER IX

THE VISION: PARTY PROGRAMS

The program of the C.P.C. is a manifesto which sets out the party's goals in general terms and describes the manner in which they will be achieved. The program also offers a description of the C.P.C.. Its wording and tone suggest that it serves two broad purposes: to acquaint the Canadian public with the C.P.C. and its goals, and to inspire party members. The following passages taken from the 1960 program, The Road to Socialism in Canada, serve as illustrations:

The sweep and power of socialist progress are demonstrating the superiority of socialism over capitalism. The idea of socialism has seized the imagination of the majority of mankind. The working people are becoming increasingly convinced that the way forward is through the establishment of socialism.<sup>1</sup>

.....

The historic mission of the working class is to lead Canada from capitalism to socialism. The Communist Party is the political party of the working class, of all who labor by hand or brain. It arises out of the working class, and is the organized political detachment of that class. The Canadian working class will not achieve socialism without its Communist Party.<sup>2</sup>

Between the years 1953 and 1960, the party has twice revised the program adopted in 1943 by the newly formed L.P.P.. On March 28, 1954, the Fifth National Convention of the L.P.P. unanimously adopted a program entitled Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament: Canada's Path to Socialism. Tim Buck, in the foreward to the draft of the program

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<sup>1</sup>The Road to Socialism in Canada: Program of the Communist Party of Canada, Ch. 1, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., Ch. 7, p. 8.

approved by the N.C. in 1952, claimed that it constituted the first successful attempt to delineate in concrete terms "the Path to Socialism in Canada."<sup>3</sup> The complete statement suggested that he distinguished between the specific methods to be employed in creating a Communist Canada, the generalities expressed by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and the specific methods employed by nations within the Communist bloc.

The claims to original thinking would seem to be based largely on the statement that:

...not all countries will reach Socialism in the same way; each will introduce special features in the form of the working-class rule it establishes and in the rate at which it carries out the various phases of the reconstruction of social life....<sup>4</sup>

However, since Stalin's death, the truth of this claim had been tacitly admitted even by the Soviet Union. As early as 1952 there had been indications that the U.S.S.R. would adopt such a position. More originality seemingly lay in the belief that, in Canada, the way to a Communist society could be opened by the normal electoral process. That is, "our democratic peace-loving people can and must save Canada by electing a people's government."<sup>5</sup> However, J.B. Salsberg argued:

...Some original thinking went into the working out of our Party Program of 1954. But it must be stated that the essential newness of that program - the projection of the possibility of the parliamentary

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<sup>3</sup>Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament: Canada's Path to Socialism: Draft Program of the L.P.P., p. 3.

<sup>4</sup>Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament: Canada's Path to Socialism. Program of the L.P.P., Ch. 6, p. 19.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

path to socialism - came from the Program of the Communist Party of Great Britain which had been adopted previously...<sup>6</sup>

Other than the possibility of the development of a Communist Canada being initiated by a victory of progressive forces at the polls, there would seem to be little difference between the Canadian path to socialism and that formally pursued by the people's democracies of Eastern Europe. The first step would be a coalition government representing:

...a class alliance of the workers, farmers, urban middle classes and those capitalist elements whose economic interests will be served by policies of Canadian independence and the progressive development of Canada...<sup>7</sup>

The coalition would eventually be replaced by an L.P.P. government:

...The Canadian people, out of their own experience, will judge all programs and the parties as they are tested in the struggle. It will be the task of the L.P.P. to win a majority of the working class for the transition from capitalism to socialism...<sup>8</sup>

A sharp struggle with reactionary elements would precede the establishment of a socialist state and the gradual transition to a Communist society:

...The defeat of reaction inside and outside of Parliament will require steadily extending militant support by the broad masses of democratic Canadians. Mass political activity at this time will reach unprecedented heights and draw millions into its scope.

The whole people will be aroused to the vigilant, constant safeguarding of their new government by engaging in mass political activity for the defeat of saboteurs and plotters.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>J.B. Salsberg "For a Socialist Realignment in Canada," Op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>7</sup>Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament, Op. cit., Ch. 5, p. 17.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., Ch. 6, p. 18.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid..

In February, 1958 the N.C. of the I.P.P. approved the draft of a new program. The Sixteenth National Convention of the C.P.C., meeting in October 1959, authorized its acceptance subject to editing in the light of the discussion at the Convention. The Road to Socialism in Canada was eventually published in July, 1960.<sup>10</sup> Considering the events which had shaken world Communism in general and the C.P.C. in particular since the adoption of the 1954 program, it incorporated surprisingly few changes. The reference to Stalin contained in the 1952 draft of Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament<sup>11</sup> had been omitted from the final form adopted by the Fifth National Convention in March, 1954. Thus, there was no need for any overt concessions to de-Stalinization in the 1960 program. There was, however, a subtle change in the role attributed to the U.S.S.R. within the World Communist movement as a result of different formulas adopted by the movement in an effort to accommodate the Chinese party.<sup>12</sup> Other differences will become apparent as the discussion of program and policies progresses.

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<sup>10</sup>It was published in Toronto. The date is that noted on the title page.

<sup>11</sup>...The I.P.P.'s policy and program are based upon the impregnable foundation of Marxist science which embodies the sum of the experience of the international working class, as developed by Marx and Engels and creatively enriched by Lenin and Stalin.... (1952 Draft Program of the I.P.P., Op. cit., p. 28.)

<sup>12</sup>cf. Ch. X, p. 198.

Neither the 1954 nor the 1960 program could be considered a model of lucidity or logical development. A theme can be discerned in each, however. They can be characterized as analyses and projections of Canadian history based on the premise of the inevitability of socialism and eventual establishment of a Communist society. The expression of current party policies is incidental to the overall theme.

Canada's development is traced from colonial origins through its "gallant" resistance to the expansional aim of the U.S., as typified by the War of 1812, to the "democratic revolution of 1837."<sup>13</sup> In that year, according to the 1954 program:

...led by MacKenzie and Papineau, the people of French and English-speaking Canada fought unitedly to free our country from British colonial oppression, to win democratic liberties and open the path of economic development....<sup>14</sup>

"The revolutionary struggle for democracy"<sup>15</sup> led eventually to the "compromise of 1867,"<sup>16</sup> wherein the Canadian capitalist class, born during the period of revolutionary struggle, undertook to keep the Dominion within the Empire in return for the granting of legislative sovereignty in Canada.

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<sup>13</sup>Canadian Independence and the People's Parliament, Ch. 1, p. 3.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid..

<sup>15</sup>The Road to Socialism in Canada, Op. cit., Ch. 3, p. 10.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid..



"Canadian capitalism developed in accordance with the laws of motion of society."<sup>17</sup> Merchant capital and small-scale hand industry at first predominated. Then came the industrial revolution, large-scale machine industry and the formation of the modern Canadian working class. There followed the merging of industrial capital and banking capital to form monopoly capital and introducing Canada into the imperialist stage of development. At that point there occurred:

...a turn in the direction of the assertion of Canadian bourgeois nationalism, and the Statute of Westminster (1931) declared the "equality of status" of members of the Commonwealth....<sup>18</sup>

The development of capitalist monopoly in Canada, the programs claim, coincided with "the rise of the United States to world capitalist dominance."<sup>19</sup> The Canadian bourgeoisie became more and more closely linked with United States monopoly interests. The interests of monopoly capital thus became at variance with Canadian national aspirations and "proceeded to turn this country into a dependent satellite of U.S. imperialism."<sup>20</sup> The two programs vary somewhat in the emphasis they place upon the phenomenon.

The 1960 program implies that the "betrayal by monopoly capital of Canadian independence, our national interests and national safety"<sup>21</sup> by monopoly capital will act as a catalyst, liberating Canadians from their

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<sup>17</sup>Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament, Op. cit., Ch. 1, p. 4.

<sup>18</sup>The Road to Socialism in Canada, Op. cit., Ch. 3, p. 11.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.      <sup>20</sup>Ibid.      <sup>21</sup>Ibid.

traditional voting patterns and thereby opening the way for the establishment of a socialist state. Nationalism is described as the product of a certain type of economic relationship and as such is allowed to loom larger in the Communists' calculations for achieving power than does simple economic hardship produced by cyclical economic crises and capitalist exploitation of the working class. Indeed, the frustration of working-class national feeling by monopoly capital is considered to be part and parcel of capitalist exploitation:

...Recurring economic crisis, the pressure of exploitation, chronic unemployment and insecurity, the effects of U.S. domination and the threat of war, move the Canadian people into a constant search for permanent relief from these evils. The threat to our country's independence evokes a surge of national feeling and patriotism among Canadians....<sup>22</sup>

In contrast, the 1954 program placed much greater emphasis upon economic crisis. The "betrayal" of Canadian national ambitions by monopoly capital was seen as producing economic crisis:

...What are the evil consequences for Canada of national betrayal to the U.S.A.?

Itself in crisis, U.S. imperialism seeks to maintain its profits and get out of its mounting difficulties by exporting economic crisis to Canada, with consequent widespread insecurity and suffering among Canadian workers, farmers, small employers and businessmen....<sup>23</sup>

The difference in emphasis may be attributed to the partial discrediting, by Communist economists, since the death of Stalin, of the belief that

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., Ch. 4, p. 14.

<sup>23</sup>Op. cit., Ch. 1, p. 5.

major economic crises are an inevitable by-product of capitalism. Communists now seem willing to concede that capitalism is capable of learning from its mistakes and thereby of instituting measures to modify the effects of cyclical variations.

The difference in emphasis upon the manner in which economic factors would affect Canada's development produced a corresponding, but even more subtle, difference in the party's conception of the manner in which Parliament would become an instrument of the socialist revolution. Both programs envisage the establishment of a coalition government composed of representatives of all progressive elements within Canadian society. The 1954 program, however, seemed to envisage more spontaneity in the event than does the Road to Socialism in Canada. Growing economic crisis would disillusion the electorate with the Liberals and Conservatives and cause them to elect more progressive, socialistically oriented representatives. Once in the House of Commons the representatives of these new political groups would realize they outnumbered the "old line" parties and would form a coalition to consolidate their gains.

...The people's coalition will form around common electoral programs uniting the most diverse elements who break away from the reactionary leaders of these parties.

A people's majority in Parliament will be confronted with the necessity of forming a coalition government to carry through the broad democratic national platform....<sup>24</sup>

The 1954 platform's description of the creation of the people's coalition or "National democratic front," which would fight the election leading to

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid., Ch. 5, p. 17.

the events just described, was ambiguously phrased. In essence, however, it seemed to suggest that the national democratic front would be a de facto rather than de jure coalition. The various elements composing the front would quite possibly compete with each other at the polls. At any rate this interpretation would help to explain the running of L.P.P. candidates in direct competition to their C.C.F. counterparts, between 1953 and 1956, at a time when the L.P.P. was calling for a united front in Canada.

The 1960 program, while it is also ambiguously worded, seems to indicate a formal coalition of progressive forces taking place before the election:

...The Communist Party consistently has advocated the building of an all-inclusive, federated labor-farmer party as the vehicle for united parliamentary action against the monopolies. Such a party, built around a program of working-class and farm needs, and rallying to it the middle sections of the population in the cities and towns, could be that political force which is necessary to defeat the capitalist parties who express the policies of monopoly capital, and release all the pent up forces making for social and economic progress.

The Communist Party believes that the road of a united, all-inclusive labor-farmer political party is the most advantageous way to bring about the defeat of monopoly capital and its parties, and to unite all democratic freedom-loving forces among the Canadian people to achieve independence, peace and social progress....<sup>25</sup>

As the foregoing passages might lead one to anticipate, the two programs display slight differences in their attitude towards other Canadian political parties.<sup>26</sup> The following quotation, taken from the

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<sup>25</sup>Op. cit., Ch. 5, p. 17.

<sup>26</sup>Cf., Ch. XI, pp. 261-64.

1954 program, would be almost equally at home in The Road To Socialism in Canada.

...The two capitalist parties are now agreed upon the basic course of subordinating Canada to the dictate of Washington. They have abandoned even the aim of national development. The leaders of the C.C.F. and Social Credit parties actively support the policies of national betrayal....<sup>27</sup>

However, the 1954 program also states:

...As the national crisis arising out of the betrayal of Canada to the U.S.A. deepens, the treacherous acts of the Liberal and Conservative parties and their right-wing C.C.F., trade union and Social Credit collaborators cause them to lose their hold upon the people. Some of the leaders of these parties and organizations under popular pressure will reject anti-national policies....<sup>28</sup>

The program saw very little difference between the four parties. Social Credit and C.C.F. supporters were considered to be more likely supporters of a people's coalition than their Liberal and Conservative counterparts because they had already moved away from traditional political alliances. C.C.F. supporters were thought to be more progressive than Social Crediters because they espoused a form of socialism, misguided though it might be.

The 1960 program ignores the Social Crediters, probably because of their party's dismal showing in the 1958 Canadian federal election. The Liberals and Conservatives, too, receive scant attention, but the C.C.F. is singled out for comment. The 1960 program is not quite so quick to attribute unworthy motives to the C.C.F. as was the previous program.

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<sup>27</sup>Op. cit., Ch. 5, p. 15.

<sup>28</sup>Op. cit., Ch. 5, pp. 16-17.

Rather, it takes great pains to point out what the C.P.C. conceives to be the errors of social reformism as practised by the C.C.F.<sup>29</sup> It is careful not to close the avenues to future collaboration. Indeed, at one point the program states:

...In order to establish the widest possible national unity for the building of a socialist Canada, the Communist Party advocates agreement on a common program to this end between all political groups who recognize the necessity of such a social transformation....<sup>30</sup>

The possibility of C.C.F. participation in such an agreement is not denied. Moreover, although no specific passage can be cited as proof, C.C.F. participation actually seems to be anticipated.

The two programs also differ slightly in the terminology employed to describe the results of a successful coalition of progressive forces and the following parliamentary victory. The 1954 program termed the government thus created a "people's government" and the state a "people's democracy." The 1960 program does not employ any specific phrase to describe the government and state in the period of transition to socialism. Instead, the program speaks of an "independent Canada," the "establishing of a socialist state" and an "anti-monopoly government."

Despite the differences discussed, both programs are united in the belief that the establishment of a socialist Canada cannot take place

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<sup>29</sup>Op. cit., Ch. 5, p. 20.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., Ch. 6, p. 22.

without the working class playing a leading role.<sup>31</sup> Both programs imply that the active participation of the C.P.C. (L.P.P.) is also essential to the creation of a people's coalition and all that would follow its birth; that, in fact, the C.P.C. (L.P.P.) would supply such a formula to an increasingly discontented and militant electorate. The two programs agree that no one party could dominate the envisaged coalition at first. This belief is implicit in the 1960 program<sup>32</sup> and explicit in its predecessor: "A people's coalition cannot be the property of any one party. Its strength lies in its all-embracing character."<sup>33</sup> Moreover, each of the two programs state that, while French-Canadians do have a legitimate cause for grievance with the English-speaking majority in Canada, French-Canadian interests will best be served by whole-hearted participation in the struggle for national independence and the establishment of a socialist state. Once a government dedicated to achieving those aims had been

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<sup>31</sup>...The unity of the working class around the democratic national program is indispensable for the formation of a people's coalition.... (Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament, Op. cit., Ch. 5, p. 16.)

...any political movement or alliance of these groups, to be effective and successful, must of necessity have the working class as its core, its driving force and leader.... (The Road to Socialism in Canada, Op. cit., Ch. 5, p. 16.)

<sup>32</sup>Op. cit., Ch. 5, pp. 16-21.

<sup>33</sup>Op. cit., Ch. 5, p. 15.

elected it would be quick to recognize French-Canada as a nation "enjoying the rights of self-determination up to and including separation if the French Canadian people so desire."<sup>34</sup>

Following the formation of a government by a coalition of progressive groups, the next stage in "the historical development" of the country is:

...inevitably the establishment of a socialist mode of production. It will become clear to the majority of Canadian people that only socialism can unfetter the forces of production by taking them out of the hands of the capitalist class and making them social property, and that only in this way can people satisfy their material and cultural needs....<sup>35</sup>

Both the 1954 program and its successor state that the Communists advocate a peaceful transition to socialism within the framework of the "historically evolved Canadian Parliamentary institutions."<sup>36</sup> The 1960 program appears to be the more certain of the possibility of peaceful change. The reasons for such a belief are somewhat obscure but in both cases the development of Communism into a "world system of states," presumably capable of supporting any fledgling Communist regime, and the decline of "imperialist" power would seem to play major roles. However, while Canadian Communists "advocate" a peaceful transition to socialism their program warns that they, at the same time, recognize:

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<sup>34</sup>Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament, Op. cit., Ch. 4, pp. 12-13. The Road to Socialism in Canada, Op. cit., Ch. 3, pp. 11-13.

<sup>35</sup>The Road to Socialism in Canada, Op. cit., Ch. 6, p. 21

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., Ch. 6, p. 22.



...that the danger will inevitably arise of capitalist violence against the socialist state and the expressed will of the majority of the Canadian people, and that this cannot be overlooked except at severe costs....<sup>37</sup>

"Therefore," the 1960 program vaguely concludes:

...the peaceful transition to socialism, which is desirable, depends not only on the wishes of the people but on the relationship of forces at the time. The maximum unity of the people and their single-minded purpose, the participation of the widest masses of the working class in political struggles and the forging of unbreakable bonds of unity with the farmers and the middle sections of the urban population, must be such that will be able to offset and paralyze capitalist violence and political reaction....<sup>38</sup>

The transition to socialism will be carried out under the leadership of the working class in close co-operation with farmers and other "democratic elements."<sup>39</sup> The role assigned to the Communist Party lacks clarity in both programs. The 1960 program states:

...In order to establish the widest possible national unity for the building of a socialist Canada, the Communist Party advocates agreement on a common program to this end between all political groups who recognize the necessity of such a social transformation....<sup>40</sup>

As has already been noted, the 1954 program seems to envisage the eventual dominance of the L.P.P. because of the sterling example it would set.<sup>41</sup>

The apparent difference in the two positions is somewhat obscured by the 1960 program's statement that:

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<sup>37</sup>Ibid...

<sup>38</sup>Ibid...

<sup>39</sup>Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament, Op. cit., Ch. 6, p. 18.

<sup>40</sup>loc. cit...

<sup>41</sup>Op. cit., Ch. IX, p. 179.

...The forces of the left will grow in the course of the people's struggles and reformism and right-wing policies will be exposed and defeated by a combination of experience and the spread of Marxist understanding by the Communist Party....<sup>42</sup>

The new government would:

...replace the old capitalist state apparatus by a new socialist state apparatus whose duty it will be to enforce the constitution and code of laws of the Canadian socialist republic, to maintain proper rule, protect socialist property and the rights and personal property of the individual. A popular militia will be formed to preserve socialist law and order.

The socialist state will be an extension and a higher level of democracy, because it will draw millions of working people directly into the conduct of the country's affairs. Socialist democracy will unite the legislative and administrative functions of government and will not only proclaim the rights of the people but will provide the means by which everyone can enjoy these rights....<sup>43</sup>

The political power of the working class in alliance with the farmers and supported by "other democratic circles" being thus firmly established would mean that the dictatorship of the proletariat had been created.<sup>44</sup>

The 1960 program states that "although capitalism prepares the material prerequisites for it, socialism does not develop spontaneously, but must be built in a prolonged struggle against the old and for the new."<sup>45</sup> Therefore, massive social, economic and political reforms would

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<sup>42</sup>Op. cit., Ch. 5, p. 21.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., Ch. 6, p. 23.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid... It is interesting to note that while the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" is defined by the 1960 program in the manner recorded above, it was not mentioned in the 1954 program.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid...

have to be instituted.<sup>46</sup> Banking and credit, insurance companies, large scale industries, railways, big commercial enterprises, monopoly held land and natural resources would be nationalized. In "certain cases" non-monopolist enterprises would be compensated for their investment. Some small businesses would continue to operate for some time "as a part of the economy and of the overall economic plan." Joint private and state ownership might be established in some industries. However, "individual ownership of personal possessions, pensions, savings and insurance policies" would be protected. The greater degree of efficiency introduced into Canada's economy by thus eliminating the capitalist class and the waste inherent in an economy based upon unsupervised competition, coupled with the positive effects of over-all economic planning, would allow Canada to progress at an unprecedented rate.

The "right to work" would be guaranteed to every Canadian by law. A six-hour day, thirty-hour work week would be quickly instituted. Trade unions would continue to operate but since industry would be publicly owned, class conflicts would disappear. The interests of "workers, engineers and managers" would be in complete harmony. "Wages would be paid according to the work performed."

Farmers would be guaranteed security of tenure of their land by law

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<sup>46</sup>The description of the transition to Socialism which follows is entirely based upon the 1960 program (Op. cit., Ch. 6, pp. 23-27.) since it differs only in wording from the 1954 program.

and be completely relieved of the burden of debt "imposed on them by the banks, mortgage companies and industrial monopolies." Great improvements in rural life would take place as a result of government policies dedicated to bringing those comforts and benefits normally associated with urban life into the countryside. However, farmers would be "encouraged to voluntarily take the path of co-operative farming so as to take full advantage of higher techniques and to join with the workers in a socialist way of life."

The state would actively foster the growth of "a democratic Canadian people's culture." Through the state's efforts and the response of the people:

...Science, technique, art, literature and music will flourish. In a socialist Canada state support of science and culture will stimulate the development of truly Canadian forms to a people's culture whose content will be socialist humanism....

No section of society would be ignored by the socialist government. Long standing demands of women, youth, Indians, Eskimos,<sup>47</sup> French-Canadians and ethnic groups would be recognized and guaranteed by law. A full social security program, guaranteeing complete freedom from physical wants from birth to death, would be instituted. Meeting halls, printing plants, television and radio would be put at the disposal of working people and their organizations.

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<sup>47</sup>Aside from being guaranteed "full rights to their language and culture," the Indian and Arctic people would enjoy "regional self-government."

A socialist constitution would be adopted. The constitution and the country's laws would guarantee "fundamental civil rights" including freedom of speech, press and association, the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and police action, the access of all citizens to the courts, habeas corpus and trial by jury. Moreover, "citizens [would be] free to hold and practise their religious beliefs, and to hold and disseminate rationalist views."

The constitution would:

...declare that all power derives from the people and is exercised at all levels (federal, provincial, municipal) by the people through their elected representatives....

The "principles" of referendum and recall "[would] prevail." Mass participation of the people in the administration of Canada would be made possible through "the elected organs of government and through trade unions, factory committees, farm, community and professional organizations." Further, the complete independence of Canada would be declared. Henceforward, Canada's relations with other countries would be governed "by the principles of equality, peace, cultural exchanges and trade on mutually advantageous terms."

In the new society thus created each would receive according to his work.<sup>48</sup> The exploitation of man by man [would be] abolished. People would become "socially-minded." "Human worth not the dollar stamp would be the

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<sup>48</sup>Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament, Op. cit., Ch. 1,  
p. 3.

criterion of public esteem." In short:

...A new people will emerge, free from bigotry and prejudice, reared in an atmosphere of friendship and brotherhood. Creative labor for the good of society will be the outstanding quality of the citizens of a Canadian socialist commonwealth....

The "new people" would bring into being:

...the communist society mankind has dreamed about for centuries - a classless society, in which the state will wither away and each person will receive according to his need....

CHAPTER X

THE APPROACH: FOREIGN POLICY

In the lexicon of the C.P.C., the word "policy" refers to short-term measures employed by the party in attempts to construct the political and social structure outlined in party platforms. Party policies deal with both recommended governmental action and instructions for the party. Topics with such radically different implications as the C.P.C. attitude towards public health insurance and C.P.C. - C.P.S.U. relations can, with equal validity, be termed policy. The common, somewhat arbitrary, but nonetheless useful, practise of separating policy into its domestic and external aspects has been adhered to in the present chapter and chapter eleven. This division has been applied to both policies defining actions desired of Parliament and to policies governing the operation of the party.

In discussing the policies of political parties it is normal to discuss their internal policy before analyzing their approach to foreign relations. Such an approach is employed because foreign policy is normally a function of its domestic counterpart. In one sense the same is true of the C.P.C.. Its foreign policy is dedicated to establishing a world situation favourable to the expansion of Communism and, ultimately to the development of a Communist Canada. On the other hand, the methods the C.P.C. employs to achieve its ends are, in a sense, determined outside Canada in the congresses and presidium of the C.P.S.U.. It is, thus, only after the relationship between the C.P.S.U. and the C.P.C. has been grasped that C.P.C. policies, domestic or foreign, can be fully understood.

C.P.S.U. influence on C.P.C. policies far exceeds that suggested by the bland generalities of the current C.P.C. program:



...In line with its Marxist-Leninist world-outlook, the Communist Party studies and learns from the experiences of the working-class movements in other lands. It develops close fraternal relations with other Communist and Workers' parties on the basis of solidarity, ideological unity, independence, full equality, exchange and examination of experiences and views. It upholds the Marxist-Leninist unity of the world Communist movement....<sup>1</sup>

The quoted formula is virtually identical to that established at the Twentieth Congress C.P.S.U.. The term "full equality" was conspicuously absent from the 1954 program.

...The camp of peace, led by the Socialist Soviet Union, embraces the majority of the people of the world. It has acquired immense power by the coming into being of a system of Socialist states which stand for peaceful co-existence and peaceful competition with the capitalist system....<sup>2</sup>

In suggesting that C.P.C. policies are influenced by the C.P.S.U. it is not necessarily implied that the influence is exerted through the medium of written directives or similarly direct means. Occasions on which the Canadian party has been caught napping, notably following the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 and Khrushchev's 1956 attack on Stalin, demonstrate that there is, in all likelihood, no formal arrangement by which the C.P.S.U. indicates policy changes to the C.P.C.. Rather, a long habit of accepting the Soviet lead has made the Canadian leadership especially sensitive to changes in the Soviet line. When the changes are not too radical in nature the C.P.C. is able to bring its

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<sup>1</sup>The Road to Socialism in Canada, Op. cit., Ch. 7, p. 30.

<sup>2</sup>Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament, Op. cit., Ch. 2, p. 8.

policies into accord with a minimal lag in time and with little confusion.

On the other hand, the indignation expressed by Canadian party leaders at the Soviet party's failure to inform them of the contents of Khrushchev's secret speech could indicate a breach of normal procedure. The N.E.C. stated that the C.P.S.U. had committed a "major blunder" in attempting to keep the contents of Khrushchev's speech from "other" Communist parties.<sup>3</sup> Despite the plausibility of such arguments, it remains more likely that C.P.C. outrage resulted from the acute embarrassment they suffered as the result of Soviet secrecy. During the period 1953 to 1962, there has seldom been a hint of preparation for policy changes, which might be interpreted as an attempt by the C.P.C. to bring its actions into line with a new Soviet tack, until after the receipt of the first reports of Canadian delegates to C.P.S.U. Congresses or until the C.P.S.U. has published a policy statement.<sup>4</sup>

Numerous examples of the C.P.C.'s disposition to follow the Soviet party's lead exist. Policy changes motivated by such a consideration will be pointed out as they are discussed. However, even startling similarities in policy leave room for speculation. For example, it is possible, although not likely, that independent analysis of specific situations by men embracing the same political philosophy could lead to consistently

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<sup>3</sup>"Statement of the N.E.C. of the L.P.P.," N.A.M., XIII(B):5 (May-June-July, 1956), p. 24.

<sup>4</sup>A possible exception to this general statement lies in the lesser attention devoted to Stalin, following his death, by L.P.P. publications. The change may have been a natural result of his death. On the other hand

identical or strongly similar solutions. But fairly conclusive proof of the C.P.S.U.'s strong influence on actions of Canadian Communists, in the period prior to 1956 at least, does exist. Criticisms of the L.P.P.'s subservience to the U.S.S.R. were printed in L.P.P. publications during the inner-party crisis of 1956-57.

The statement of a Toronto party member implied that the L.P.P. had adhered closely to Soviet policies:

...We should state that the lack of experience of the Soviet Communist movement of our conditions so qualifies and almost nullifies their ability to even make useful or outstanding contributions to our theory and practise. Marxism without concrete experience and practise can only lead to sectarian positions and dangerous practises or sterile practises.

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Democratic centralism, internationally, is an obsolete theory in my opinion....<sup>5</sup>

R.M. Laxer, a top theoretician of the L.P.P. and member of the N.C. until he left party ranks in 1957, was less oblique in his references to Soviet influences:

...When Canadian Marxists gave up an independent examination of capitalist economy and felt impelled to make their views fit in with those of Stalin or of the Soviet economists they went off the track.

...Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R....became

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it may have been the consequence of a premonition of future efforts at de Stalinization. Another possible explanation is that the C.P.C. took its cue from the Soviet press which devoted far less attention to Stalin in 1954-56 than during his lifetime.

<sup>5</sup>Leith McMurray, "For New Kind of Relations Between Communist Parties," N.A.M. XIII (B):7 (Sept., 1956), p. 9.

a sort of bible for Canadian Marxists....<sup>6</sup>

Norman Penner, one-time head of the N.F.Y.L. and a member of the N.E.C. in 1956, made similar charges:

...I will say that too [the L.P.P. is a Canadian party] and vigorously defend our record in this country. But I will not deny that a certain impression of us has been created by our ideological subservience to the CPSU....<sup>7</sup>

In a proposed amendment to the draft policy resolution of the Sixth National Convention of the L.P.P., Penner went further:

...Our party like most communist parties throughout the world accepted Stalin as the unquestioned leader and our work, our policies, our approach to Canadian reality were decisively determined by his ideas.

In the first place, we uncritically accepted and defended every action of the Soviet Union....

...We did not perform the prime responsibility of a Marxist party - namely to work out our own Canadian path to socialism. Instead we mechanically transposed first the Soviets and then people's democracy as the form of transition to socialism in Canada....<sup>8</sup>

J.B. Salsberg agreed with such statements:

...In my opinion, it is necessary for us to realize and to state so clearly that we have been ideologically and politically subservient to the C.P.S.U.. This crippled our ability to think independently... on many major issues throughout the years.

[The entire passage was printed in italics.]

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...As for international affairs and matters pertaining to the socialist sector of the world, our party's attitude was one which was

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<sup>6</sup>R.M. Lexter, "For Creative Marxism in Political Economy - A Review of Past Errors," N.A.M., XLIII(B):7 (Sept., 1956), p. 10.

<sup>7</sup>Norman Penner, "Speech at Toronto L.P.P. Meeting," Op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>8</sup>Norman Penner, "Comrade Norman Penner's Amendment," N.A.M., XIV:1 (Jan., 1957), p. 9.

concretely expressed by comrade Buck at the August 1955 N.C. plenum when he replied to some of my remarks by saying: "What is good enough for the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. is good enough for me."...<sup>9</sup>

The foregoing quotations cannot be dismissed as simply constituting an attempt by dissident elements within the party to discredit the existing leadership; for the N.C. formally incorporated a similar, though milder, statement into the draft policy resolution of the Sixth National Convention of the L.P.F..

...We made serious errors in our relationships with other communist parties. While justly hailing and popularizing the achievements of the Soviet Union and other socialist lands, we suffered seriously from an oversimplified, one-sided approach to, and an uncritical acceptance of, many views of Marxists and Marxist parties in other countries.

Particularly has this been the case in our relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union....<sup>10</sup>

After thus criticizing the L.P.F.'s past activities, the N.C. went on to offer an explanation:

...As the party which led the working people of their country in establishing the world's first socialist state, the C.P.S.U. holds a foremost place, historically, in the world communist movement; and its rich experiences, critically and independently studied by Communists and socialists of other lands possess great significance.  
.....

...We made a most serious mistake in idolizing Stalin and in effect attributing infallibility to his ideas. We fell victim to the cult which grew up around him....<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>J.B. Selsberg, "For a Socialist Realignment in Canada," N.A.M.; XIV:2 (Feb., 1957), p. 3.

<sup>10</sup>"Draft Policy Resolution of the Sixth National Convention L.P.F.," N.A.M., XIV:1 (Jan., 1957), p. 5.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid..

The explanations have merit. The C.P.C. began its career at a time when the vague phrase "working class internationalism" had been translated by the medium of the Comintern into a formal institution. Membership in the Comintern could be achieved only by accepting the twenty-one conditions of admission which implied the submission of national Communist parties to the directives of the international body. More than a generation of party leaders throughout the world were trained to subordinate their own "narrow national interests" to those of international Communism as they were interpreted by the central co-ordinating agency, the Comintern. Over a period of time Moscow and the Comintern became confused in the minds of Communists. The interests of international Communism became identified with those of the Soviet Union - as interpreted by Stalin.

Stalin, friend and associate of Lenin, leader of the world's first and, for many years, only Communist state became the high priest of the movement. As such he was treated with a veneration and adulation of which the world has seldom seen an equal. The Canadian party was certainly not exempt from the process. A Communist and one-time Winnipeg alderman, Jacob Penner, went so far as to predict that most of us would live to see statues of Stalin in every Canadian city and town.<sup>12</sup>

After the demise, in 1953, of Communism's undisputed oracle, a combination of rigidly disciplined and thoroughly indoctrinated leadership, inertia, lack of popular support for the L.P.P., and Soviet authority born

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<sup>12</sup>"Busy Time For Sculptors," W.F.E. Mar. 10, 1953.

of her pioneering efforts in the movement and strengthened by her wartime accomplishments led Canadian Communists to maintain their long established pattern of subordination.

In 1956, however, the L.P.P. began a vigorous outward display of autonomy. The L.P.P. delegation sent to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1956 for conversations with Soviet leaders "emphasized," according to statement of the N.E.C., "the change in relationships of Communist countries of the world to purely fraternal relationships of equal parties in no way subordinate one to the other."<sup>13</sup> The 1956 draft policy resolution also implied a change:

...But it is clear that [the experience of the Soviet Union], like that of other parties...can be of help to us only if it is critically and independently studied, and lessons drawn from it in the light of conditions abroad and in Canada....<sup>14</sup>

There is a faint irony in the belligerently expressed independence of the L.P.P. because it came into evidence only after Khrushchev had expressed, at the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U., a desire for a greater display of autonomy on the part of other Communist parties.

Moreover, the Salsberg faction was highly skeptical of the L.P.P.'s new-found independence. In a letter to N.A.M. in early 1957, Harry Binder, J.E. Salsberg and Stewart Smith stated their reasons for supporting the N.E.C.'s action in sending telegrams to Khrushchev and Gomulka protesting

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<sup>13</sup>"Labor-Progressive Party Delegation to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," N.A.M., XIII (B):8 (Oct. 1956), p. 1.

<sup>14</sup>loc. cit..

against Soviet interference in the October 1956 meeting of the Central Committee of the United Worker's Party of Poland. They then claimed that the later withdrawal of the N.E.C.'s telegrams<sup>15</sup> to Gomulka and Khrushchev by the H.C. indicated continuing subservience:

...For the N.E.C. to hide or ignore these facts is to be dishonest and to uphold a policy of continuing servility to the C.P.S.U..

And yet the fact that he [Leslie Morris] voted for the [repudiation of the telegram] did not prevent comrade Leslie Morris from stating at the Toronto membership meeting following the H.C. plenum that "from now on there must be a new relationship to the C.P.S.U.." In words, for the new; but in deeds upholding the old relationship of subservience to the C.P.S.U....<sup>16</sup>

Fenner, referring to the same incident, said:

...The political act of the NC in revoking the cables to the Polish and Soviet parties and the defeat of the amendment by Stewart Smith withdrawing only the word 'condemn' signified a defeat for [a new, more independent] relationship [with the C.P.S.U.] and indicated a return to the old straitjacket....<sup>17</sup>

Their pessimism seems to have been justified in the event; for the pattern of policy formation in the Canadian party has been the same since 1956 as it had been before.

The C.P.C. seems to come closer to operating on the basis of "complete equality" in its dealings with the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe than it does with the C.P.S.U.. At any rate, it is not apparent that Canadian Communists view the Eastern European regimes with

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<sup>15</sup>Cf. Ch. II, p. 23.

<sup>16</sup>J.B. Salsberg, Harry Binder, Stewart Smith, "Letter From Comrades J.B. Salsberg, Harry Binder, Stewart Smith," Op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>17</sup>Norman Fenner, "Speech at Toronto L.P.P. Meeting," Op. cit., p. 7.



the same way as they do the U.S.S.R.. The Canadian party's attitude towards the Chinese regime before 1957, however, displayed a deference second only to that accorded the Soviet Union. The People's Republic, for example, was the only Communist country other than the U.S.S.R. singled out for special mention in the 1954 program of the L.P.P.. The same is true of the 1960 program. Of the Communist parties not in power, the Canadian party, understandably, seems to maintain closest relations with the Communist Party of the United States (C.P.U.S.A.) and the Communist Party of Great Britain (C.P.G.B.).

Scarcely an issue of Canadian Tribune or the party's theoretical journal, until the advent of the Marxist Quarterly, over the past thirteen years has passed without including some material about a Communist bloc state or an article written by a member of one of the bloc's parties. Such material falls into several categories. There are policy statements, articles on theory, and discussions of current events. News items, descriptions of life and industry within bloc nations and biographical sketches of prominent foreign Communists also appear. Similarly, the World Marxist Review and the World Trade Union Journal contain the odd article by Canadian Communists about conditions in Canada. The exchange of articles does much to keep Canadian Communist's informed about conditions and thought in other communist states and to keep other Communist parties informed about C.P.C. activities.

The potential value of such exchanges is compromised by the inaccuracies which are a part of most descriptive, as opposed to theoretical, articles. Articles by Canadian party members published in the World

Marxist Review, for example, commonly exaggerate both the deprivations suffered by workers and farmers in this country, and the growth of left-wing thought. Conditions within the Soviet bloc seem to be idealized by Canadian publications. On the other hand the "poetic license" employed in the writing of the articles undoubtedly does much to convince rank and file Communists of the strength of their movement and the correctness of its doctrine.

In Canada, the bulk of the news items and purely descriptive or biographical articles are carried in the Canadian Tribune. Articles on theory are largely the property of the theoretical journal. Policy statements seem to be shared between the two publications. Of the policy statements by foreign Communist parties, those of the C.P.S.U. receive by far the most attention.

From the end of the war until Stalin's death, a considerable majority of the articles by foreign authors in Canadian Communist publications were written by members of the C.P.S.U.. Similarly, the number of accounts of life and conditions within the U.S.S.R. exceeded that of similar articles on other nations with Communist regimes. The lack of attention the Eastern European nations received may well be explained by the relative youth of their regimes and by the physical and economic evidence of the ravages of war which existed in abundance well into the fifties. Lack of observers, and a desire to conform to the rigid hierarchy established by Stalin within the world Communist movement are probable additional factors. In any event, following Stalin's death, articles by members of the C.P.S.U. and commentaries on the U.S.S.R. occupied less space in relation to similar material

from and about other bloc nations than had formerly been the case. Material on China or by Chinese theorists, especially, enjoyed a boom period from 1954 to 1959.

The change in editorial policy, if it may be so described, was, in all likelihood, at first the product of uncertainty within the Canadian party bred by the obvious confusion in upper echelons of the C.P.S.U.. With no strong leadership being supplied by Moscow, the L.P.P., perhaps, felt compelled to seek out new sources of guidance. At the Twentieth Congress C.P.S.U. the formula of complete equality among Communist parties and the desire for greater evidence of autonomy on the part of parties outside the Soviet union were voiced. The Canadian party, as a result, gained an incentive for continuing to devote considerable attention to the Eastern European and Chinese parties, even though firm leadership was apparently being restored to the Soviet Union. Improved conditions of travel and the undoubted achievements of the Chinese and Eastern European regimes were, most likely, additional factors contributing to the Canadian party's continued interest.

In addition to the representatives of Communist bloc regimes, R. Palm Dutt and Harry Pollit of the C.P.G.B.; William Z. Foster and Eugene Dennis of the C.P.U.S.A.; and Palmiro Togliatti, the Italian Communist leader, have been occasional contributors, by direct or indirect means, to the Canadian party's theoretical journal. Of the Eastern European regimes, Poland seems to supply the most material for descriptive articles. East Germany and Czechoslovakia seem to be the next most popular. Albania was virtually ignored even before the Sino-Soviet dispute. Con-

tributions by Chinese theorists and articles discussing life and change in the People's Republic have, however, declined in number since early 1960.

The Canadian party's attitude towards the Yugoslavian regime is illustrative of how closely L.P.P. and C.P.C. policy has paralleled that of the Soviet Union. From 1948 to 1955 Tito was denounced by the L.P.P. as a "semi-fascist" and a "dupe of Wall Street warmongers":

...Note...the omission of the fascist Tito clique in Yugoslavia from the list of countries in the Operation X Act. One doesn't buy those who are already bought....<sup>18</sup>

Cartoons in the Canadian Tribune depicted Tito in Nazi-style uniforms and surrounded by weapons or being manipulated like a puppet by John Foster Dulles.

After 1955 and the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement, the Canadian party quickly accepted Khrushchev's contention that the split had been a mistake and the result of Lavrentia Beria's devious machinations. In 1957, the L.P.P.'s former policy towards the Yugoslav regime was formally admitted to have been in error:

...[An example] of the failure to think independently, as Marxists must, [is] ...the acceptance without question of the rupture of relations between the world communist movement and the Communist League of Yugoslavia....<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>Editorial in N.A.M., IX:2 (Feb., 1952), p. 5.

The "operation X" mentioned in the quotation was, allegedly, a U.S. plan of widespread espionage activities within the Soviet bloc including the assassination of leading Communist leaders.

<sup>19</sup>"Draft Resolution For the Sixth National Convention, L.P.P.," N.A.M., XIV:1 (Jan., 1957), p. 1.

The L.P.P.'s official opinion of the Yugoslav regime again changed following the publication of the program of the Communist League of Yugoslavia in 1958. In the change, the old pattern of uncritically accepting Moscow's lead can be discerned. First comment on the Yugoslav program came in the June-July, 1958, issue of the Marxist Review. It consisted of an article from the April 6, 1958, issue of Kommunist, the theoretical organ of the C.P.S.U.. The Marxist Review's introduction to the article stated:

...Many of the revisionist ideas exposed in the article were advanced in the L.P.P. and defeated at its 6th National Convention....<sup>20</sup>

The comment quoted constituted the article's only "Canadian content." The next edition of the Marxist Review contained the L.P.P. official statement which denounced the Yugoslavian program as being "contrary to the spirit of the Belgrade Declaration" and "Revisionist."<sup>21</sup> In the same issue, Tim Buck wrote a lengthy comparison of Tito's program and the stand of the Salsberg faction during the inner-party crisis of 1956-57.<sup>22</sup> The L.P.P.'s theoretical objections to the program paralleled those of the C.P.S.U.

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<sup>20</sup>"On The Draft Program of The Communist League of Yugoslavia," M.R., XVI:161 (June-July, 1958), p. 49.

<sup>21</sup>"On The Program of the Yugoslav League of Communists," M.R., XVII:162 (Aug-Sept., 1958), p. 15-18.

<sup>22</sup>Tim Buck, "Tito Exposes Canadian Revisionists," M.R., XVII:162 (Aug-Sept., 1958), pp. 19-25.

in every aspect. Similarly, the Canadian party's attitude towards Tito's regime has since been identical to the Soviet Union's: one of objective distaste - a sort of limited disapproval.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>It is interesting to note E.W. Kemp's comments on the L.P.P.'s policy towards Yugoslavia:

...Tim Buck, and the rest...were relying [during the Hungarian revolt] - as of old - solely on the say-so of the C.P.S.U.. This, I believe, is what they wish to continue to do, under the guise of "comradely solidarity" and "proletarian internationalism."

That this is true of Tim Buck requires, I think, little demonstration. In 1948 Tim travelled through Eastern Europe and he wrote a book Europe's Rebirth upon his return. In that book he describes Yugoslavia as "a people's state in every sense of the word" and Marshall Tito as the man "whose genius was the guiding and unifying force which personified both the heroism and aspiration to complete national freedom of all the southern Slavs..."

A short time later Marshal Tito, personifying the aspiration to complete national freedom of all southern Slavs, led Yugoslavia out of the monolithic unit. He was denounced, and the leadership and the followership of the L.P.P. (including me) joined in the denunciation.

Tim had here a choice between an independent judgment and a judgment based on comradely solidarity with the CPSU. He chose comradely solidarity. I repeat: the main point is not that Tim was wrong, but that he wouldn't, or couldn't judge for himself.

I don't think Tim has changed in this respect...

(E.W. Kemp "For An Independent Marxist Labor-Progressive Party,"  
Op. cit., p. 9.)

The foregoing passages do not, of course, offer conclusive proof that Canadian Communists have failed to alter their relationship with the C.P.S.U. since 1956. However, the fate of the N.E.C.'s October 22, 1956 cablegram to Moscow was an indication that any significant change in the relations between the C.P.C. (L.P.P.) and C.P.S.U. would be highly problematical. The cable to the C.P.S.U., which declared the N.E.C. to be "for the principle of equal relations between parties and non-interference"<sup>24</sup> and which implied that the C.P.S.U. actions constituted unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of the United Workers' Party of Poland, became the subject of sharp debate at the October N.C. meeting. The majority of the N.C. voted to send a letter to the C.P.S.U. stating that the N.C. had sharply criticized the N.E.C. for its action in sending the cable on Poland. In so doing, the N.C. voted down an amendment by Stewart Smith. The Smith amendment sought to admit that an error had been committed by the use of the word "condemn" in describing the N.E.C. attitude, but at the same time to make certain that the C.P.S.U. remained aware that its actions had caused displeasure to the Canadian party. The amendment "placed its main emphasis on reaffirming equal relations between parties, free from overt interference."<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>J.B. Salsberg, H. Binder, S. Smith, Op. cit., p. 7.

The following account of the debate regarding the cable to Moscow is based on this same letter.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid..

The draft of the letter sent to the C.P.S.U. by the N.C. contained the following words:

...the national committee of our party is satisfied that there is no basis in fact for the charges of interference by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in the internal affairs of the United Worker's Party of Poland during the time of the October meeting of its Central Committee....<sup>26</sup>

The men and women who approved the draft were those who were to dominate the party's leading committees following the final defeat of the Salsberg faction at the 1957 National Convention. Thus their attitudes determine the party's policies today. On the basis of the evidence it would seem that one of their attitudes, in 1956 at least, was an unquestioning acceptance of the Soviet lead. Facts known or suspected at the time of the N.C. meeting in October, 1956 made it clear that the Soviet Union had exerted considerable pressure on the Polish party in an effort to bring it to heel. It was known that Khrushchev had shouted, loud enough for the foreign press to hear: "Ochab is a traitor."<sup>27</sup> It was known that Marshall Rokossovsky had surrounded the Polish capital with troops. It was rumoured that Khrushchev had made several statements upon his arrival in Warsaw that could have been interpreted to be attempts at intimidation. It was further rumoured that the United Worker's Party itself had armed

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid..

<sup>27</sup>Ochab, who preceeded Gomulka as first secretary, remained as one of the United Worker's Party national leaders.



some of the citizens of Warsaw so as to equip them to resist any Soviet attempt to impose its will by force.

The party's official stand on the revolt in Hungary, published long after the crisis had passed, provides another example of the present leadership's propensity to accept the Soviet word as gospel. The first statement, an interim comment by the N.E.C., was composed of innocuous generalities. It was written at a time when it was not yet apparent that the back of the Salsberg-led opposition to Buck had been broken at the October N.C. meeting. The Salsberg faction was, for the most part, opposed to the Soviet actions in Hungary. The second N.E.C. statement, issued January 21, 1957, unequivocally supported the Soviet Union:

...The facts prove that the legitimate and fully justifiable movements of the Hungarian people, which started with the October 23 demonstration for the correction of sore grievances were seized upon by internal and external reactionary and fascist elements to stage a counter-revolution aimed at destroying the Hungarian socialist state.  
.....

Soviet troops are not in Hungary as conquerors, as British troops are in Cyprus. They are there temporarily and will be withdrawn as quickly as the democratic forces of the Hungarian people...are in a position to guarantee the peaceful, independent development of Hungary towards socialism...<sup>28</sup>

Significantly, the interval between the two statements was sufficient to allow Buck to determine that he retained very solid support in Western Canada. With such knowledge he and his supporters on the new N.E.C. could continue to pursue the course best guaranteed to produce what one party

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<sup>28</sup>"Statement On The Events In Hungary," N.A.M., XIV:2 (Feb, 1957), p. 2.

member charitably described as "comradely solidarity" with the C.P.S.U..

Until 1957, Canadian Communists viewed People's China with unqualified approval. As mentioned previously, the Chinese regime ranked second only to the C.P.S.U. in the esteem of the L.P.P.. The Draft policy resolution for the Fourth National Convention, L.P.P. (April, 1951) described the new People's China as "...a mighty obstacle to the U.S. drive against the national independence aspirations of the peoples of Asia."<sup>29</sup> The numerous articles on China carried by the Canadian Tribune were uniformly laudatory. They covered almost every facet of life and every important event in the People's Republic from the "first scientific census in the history of China,"<sup>30</sup> to the beginning of the Hundred Flowers campaign<sup>31</sup> (although the end was not recorded), to the writing of China's new constitution.<sup>32</sup> There has even been an article on a blind Chinese balladeer, Han Chi-hsiang, who played a san hsien which, the author explained, is a three stringed instrument played like a banjo.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>"Unite For Peace And Canadian Independence" (Draft Resolution for presentation to the Fourth National Convention, L.P.P.), K.A.M., VII:12 (Dec., 1950), p. 6.

<sup>30</sup>Chou Wei-Pin, "First Scientific Census In History of China -- Counting 600 Million People," C.T., XVIII: 1938 (July 18, 1955), p. 9.

<sup>31</sup>"C.P. of China Goal: Free Debate, Diversity," C.T., XIX:989 (July 9, 1956), p. 4.

<sup>32</sup>Lin Tsun-Chi, "China's New Constitution," C.T., XVII:897 (Oct. 4, 1954), p. 6.

<sup>33</sup>Yang Yu, "Now He's China's Most Popular Balladeer," C.T., XVI:839 (Aug. 24, 1953), p. 9.

Even after the fact, that the Chinese and Soviet regimes were at odds, became suspected in 1957, the Canadian party maintained its deferential attitude towards the Chinese. In 1958, for example, of the numerous birthday greetings the L.P.P. received from Communist parties throughout the world, only those of the Chinese and Soviet parties were published in full.<sup>34</sup> The fact that the Sino-Soviet dispute existed was not apparent in the material published by Canadian Communist publications. Reports of the 1957 Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' parties of Socialist Countries,<sup>35</sup> and of the Eighty-one party conference held in the same city in 1960, avoided any mention of the conflict which made the conferences necessary. In both cases the relative accord achieved at the end of the conferences occupied the L.P.P. and C.P.C. rapporteurs' attention.

Until 1962, there was little overt indication of which side Canadian Communists favoured in the dispute. Theoretical articles by both Chinese and Soviet authors were carried in the Marxist Review with editorial comment. Early in 1959, the Canadian theoretical journal printed Mao Tse-tung's November 18, 1957 speech to the twelve party Moscow Conference in which he attacked the failure "to slight the enemy as a whole" as

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<sup>34</sup>"36th Birthday Greetings," M.R., XVI:160 (Mar. - Apr., 1958), p. 41.

<sup>35</sup>Tim Buck, "The World Conference of Communist And Worker's Parties," M.R., XVI:160 (Mar. - Apr., 1958), pp. 21-27.

"committing the mistake of opportunism."<sup>36</sup> Neither the policy resolution nor the special resolutions of the Sixteenth National Convention, C.P.C., held in October 1959, suggested the existence of a dispute or defined the C.P.C.'s position. However, following the publication, in April 1960, of the book Long Live Leninism, Canadian Communist publications began to devote less attention to the Chinese regime.

The report of the N.E.C. to the Seventeenth National Convention, C.P.C. (January 19-21, 1962) placed the Canadian party firmly at the side of the C.P.S.U. in opposition to the stand taken by the Chinese regime. For the most part, the statement used the ploy of attacking the Albanian party to indicate its rejection of the Chinese position. At one point the report stated, after confirming the need for the Twenty-second Congress, C.P.S.U. to deal with Albania's intransigence:

...It is self-evident...that it is not a difference between the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor and the C.P.S.U. alone. The leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor have, in effect, repudiated their signature to the 81 Party Statement. This and the false arguments they are distributing touch directly on our program and the work of our party. When we endorse the work of our party's representatives at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU there should be no doubt whatever that the Convention is rejecting the position of the leaders of the Albanian Party of labor....<sup>37</sup>

The report went on to note the three basic theses of the Eighty-one Party Conference: that war is not inevitable; that peaceful coexistence is the only correct basis for the foreign policies of socialist countries;

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<sup>36</sup>Tao Tse-tung, "Strategy and Tactics," P.R., XVII:166 (Apr.-May, 1959), p. 6.

<sup>37</sup>"For a Democratic Solution To the Crisis In National Policy," Documents Of The 17th National Convention, pp. 5-6.

and that, in some countries, a peaceful transition to socialism was possible under certain conditions. The three principles, the report said, would continue to be wholeheartedly endorsed by the Canadian party. The same three principles, the report argued, had been first adopted by the Twentieth Congress, C.P.S.U.; had been endorsed by the Moscow Conference of Communist and Worker's parties; and had formed "the heart" of Canadian party's program since 1952.<sup>38</sup> After further discussion of the validity of the three theses, the rapporteur stated:

...Some comrades will say: "But you are polemicizing against variations of some of the formulations used by the Chinese comrades." My answer is that I am arguing against the use of such emphasis by anybody. What I do want to emphasize is that our party program and the 81 Party Statement both deal with the struggle for peaceful coexistence as an integral part of the struggle for socialism....<sup>39</sup>

The C.P.C.'s long delay in acknowledging the existence of the Sino-Soviet dispute and in making its position, with regard to the dispute, clear, was probably the result of three factors. Firstly, the party had to consider the arguments of the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic in order to decide which it favored. This process should not have taken too much time, if, as the main report to the Seventeenth National Convention stated, the Soviet arguments had formed "the heart"<sup>40</sup> of the C.P.C. and I.P.P. program since 1952. A second factor contributing to the delay was probably a desire to determine the outcome of the dispute before becoming committed to one side or the other. The Eighty-one Party Conference provided the opportunity for such an assessment to be made. Moreover, the

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<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid..

existence of the dispute did not really become public until very recently. Thus, any formal statement by the C.P.C. might have been viewed as premature. Finally, the C.P.C. was quite possibly rendered shy of making any controversial decisions by the disastrous events of 1956-57, and only committed itself when sitting on the fence was no longer possible. This conclusion is based upon fairly sketchy but, nonetheless, revealing information.

During the 1956-57 inner-party crisis several letters in both the Canadian Tribune and N.A.M. indicated that a small but solid group within the I.P.F. were not at all pleased with Khrushchev's attack on Stalin. One letter to N.A.M. suggested that some party members had begun to favor the Chinese regime over the C.P.S.U. as early as 1957:

...We are now admiring the wisdom of the Chinese party which avoids all the errors committed in the Soviet Union in the building of socialism. But the Chinese communists know that they were not the first to enter the path to a new society....<sup>41</sup>

Moreover, the N.E.C. report to the C.P.C.'s 1962 National Convention suggested that a body of support for the Chinese exists within the C.P.C.:

...It must be said that there are [some] comrades who still maintain [certain] reservations concerning the unequivocal emphasis for peace which is the essence of the [July, 1960 Statement of the 81 Parties]....<sup>42</sup>

Now that the C.P.C. has decided its course in relation to China and Russia, it will undoubtedly continue to abide by its decision in the

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<sup>41</sup>I. Sharinsky, Op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>42</sup>Op. cit., p. 7.

foreseeable future. It seems unlikely that the evident splitting of the international Communist movement into two connected but mutually antagonistic camps will be duplicated within the Canadian party in the near future. Had the more militant and doctrinaire elements within the C.P.C. sufficient strength to assert themselves, the time to have done so would have been in 1958 and 1959 during the discussion of the draft of the present C.P.C. platform. At the time such a move would have had its best chances of success since the lines of opposition between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic were not so solidly drawn as they later became.

Two of the three basic theses of the Eighty-one Party Conference, the denial of the inevitability of war and the need for peaceful coexistence, have, since 1952, formed the cornerstone of the Canadian foreign policy advocated by Canadian Communists. In fact, as early as 1950, the draft policy resolution for the Fourth National Convention, I.P.F. included the following statement:

...It is clear that a third world war is not inevitable. The warmongers can be stopped. Peace can be maintained by policies based honestly upon the United Nations Charter and its provisions for peaceful coexistence of the socialist and capitalist systems....<sup>43</sup>

The degree to which the desire to avoid war coloured the foreign policy advocated by the party was indicated by the draft policy resolution for the Sixth National Convention I.P.F. (April, 1957):

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<sup>43</sup>"Unite For Peace And Independence!", Cp. cit., p. 7.

...The central issue of our time is whether or not the socialist and capitalist states can peacefully coexist, and whether the peoples can go forward to national freedom and to socialism without undergoing the horrors of H-Bombs and A-Bombs....<sup>44</sup>

As the previously quoted statement from the Fourth National Convention's draft policy resolution indicates, the doctrine that war is not inevitable is conditional upon the establishment of peaceful coexistence. Peaceful coexistence, in its turn, is made possible in part because of the world-wide horror of nuclear warfare:

...the deep yearning of all mankind for peace...[help]...to make the principle of peaceful coexistence coincide with the best interests of the people of Canada and of all peoples who desire peace....<sup>45</sup>

Other factors are also considered to contribute to the possibility of a lasting peace and peaceful coexistence between the socialist and capitalist segments of the world. The C.P.C. claims that the "role of the masses" in the government of the countries of the world, especially the capitalist countries, has increased "immensely" in the past few years, and that the people are making their desire for peace known.

...In all countries, including Canada, organized democratic actions for peace and complete general world disarmament are growing rapidly....<sup>46</sup>

Moreover, "the imperialist impulsion to war" is today countered by the growing power of the socialist world system of states.<sup>47</sup> The capitalist

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<sup>44</sup>Op. cit., p. 1.

<sup>45</sup>"For A Democratic Solution To The Crisis Of National Policy," Op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid..

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 7.



ability to wage war has been further compromised by a decline in the strength of the imperialist states. Finally:

...half of the people of the non-socialist part of the world are in the countries which are grouped in the camp of neutralism opposed to world war. The struggle for national liberation is a struggle against imperialism and, objectively against its impulsion to war....<sup>48</sup>

The latter argument is a fairly recent acquisition of the party's ideological arsenal. The 1954 program reads:

...The world is divided into two camps - the camp of war, fascism and national oppression, and the camp of peace, democracy and national independence....<sup>49</sup>

Reference was made to the "colonial and semi-colonial people fighting for national freedom" but they were not recognized as a third force. Rather, they were lumped together with the Soviet bloc: "...The camp of peace and national liberation is stronger than the camp of war and national oppression."<sup>50</sup> While the 1960 program and, indeed, the 1957 and 1959 policy resolutions made no explicit reference to a third force, neither did they display a belief in Stalin's division of the world into two hostile camps. However, the first explicit acknowledgment of Khrushchev's third force occurred in the N.E.C. report to the Seventeenth National Convention, C.P.C..<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>48</sup>Ibid., pp. 7-8.

<sup>49</sup>Canadian Independence And A People's Parliament, Op. cit., Ch. 2, p. 8.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid..

<sup>51</sup>cf. Ch.X p. 222.

What Canadian Communists mean by peaceful coexistence is somewhat difficult to determine. The term definitely cannot be considered self-explanatory. The draft policy resolution for the Sixth National Convention, L.P.P. noted:

...It is a mistake to assume that the struggle for peaceful coexistence means, automatically, the absence of conflict, [as the invasion of Suez and Western attempts to gain advantage from the Hungarian Revolution] show clearly. The urgent need for unremitting vigilance and people's action for peace is to be seen in the fact that, following the recent lessening of tensions, the imperialists were able to revive the danger of war....<sup>52</sup>

The N.E.C. report to the Seventeenth National Convention, C.P.C. argued:

...Peaceful coexistence does not mean renunciation of the class struggle; on the contrary, it is of necessity a policy of continuous mobilization of the masses, a continuous launching of vigorous actions against the enemies of peace....<sup>53</sup>

Moreover, peaceful coexistence is not an end in itself, but a means to an end:

...Placing the struggle for peace and peaceful coexistence as the crucial task of the Communist and Worker's parties does not imply minimizing the struggle for socialism or relaxing it in any way. Any such assumption would be a serious error. To prevent war is a crucial task because peace is a loyal ally of socialism. If world war is averted the world-wide triumph of socialism is certain....<sup>54</sup>

The only actual attempt to define "peaceful coexistence" encountered, and it was more properly a description, occurred in the policy resolution of the Sixteenth National Convention:

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<sup>52</sup>Op. cit., pp. 1-2.

<sup>53</sup>Op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid..

...The end of the cold war is now a definite possibility providing that men and women who desire peace and social advance take decisive action to bridle those forces who would foment war. Such action can compel governments of the imperialist states to accept the idea of peaceful coexistence. In its fullest sense this will mean agreement to settle international disputes by negotiation instead of by war. It means the scrapping of all arms and preparations for war. It means competition in peaceful pursuits, such as civilian production, trade and scientific and cultural achievements....<sup>56</sup>

In addition to describing the state of peaceful coexistence, the preceding quotation indicates the character of some of the limited objectives in foreign policy for which the party attempts to gain public support.

Broadly speaking, the objectives in foreign policy pursued by the C.P.C. have remained virtually unchanged between 1953 and 1962. The party has consistently demanded negotiated settlement of international disputes, total disarmament, withdrawal from all military alliances, normalization of relations with the Soviet bloc including the recognition of the People's Republic of China, and greater trade with the Soviet bloc and the Commonwealth.

The details of their foreign policy, however, have, from time to time, been altered to correspond with the existing world situation. Thus the 1953 federal election platform "Put Canada First" specifically demanded: "An immediate cease-fire in Korea as the first step to a just peace," and "No re-militarization of Japan."<sup>57</sup> The draft federal election

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<sup>56</sup>"The Struggle For Total Disarmament, Peace and Independence," Resolution Of The 16th National Convention, C.P.C. (Oct. 9-12, 1959), N.R., XVII:170 (Dec., 1959), p. 16.

<sup>57</sup>"Put Canada First," Federal Election Platform of the L.P.F., N.A.N., X:6 (June, 1953), p. 10.

platform submitted to the Sixth National Convention, L.P.P. suggested:

...The menace of the deadly Strontium 90 in the fall-out of radioactive dust is acknowledged now by governments. Canada should give support in the United Nations to the proposal of Sweden for a "Two Year Holiday" from all atomic and H-bomb tests....<sup>58</sup>

The policy resolution of the Sixteenth National Convention made reference to the NORAD (North American Air Defence Command) agreement concluded in the previous year:

...restore the RCAF to Canadian control and Command; withdraw Canada from NATO and NORAD....<sup>59</sup>

"An increase in the armed forces and the plans to equip them with U.S. atomic bombs" were opposed by the policy resolution of the Seventeenth National Convention, C.P.C..<sup>60</sup>

The one substantial change in C.P.C. foreign policy was introduced at the Sixteenth National Convention. The change was an addition and in no way affected the "traditional" demands and suggestions of C.P.C. foreign policy. The policy resolution of the 1959 Convention stated:

...the many-sided struggle for peace requires a positive position of active support for a policy of Canadian neutrality....<sup>61</sup>

Neutrality, The Road to Socialism explained, "would not mean isolationism."

The 1960 program went on to explain what neutrality would mean and in so

<sup>58</sup>"Draft Federal Election Platform of the Labor-Progressive Party," N.A.H., XIV:5 (May, 1957), p. 1.

<sup>59</sup>Op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>60</sup>"Policy Resolution of the 17th National Convention of the Communist Party of Canada," Documents of the 17th National Convention, p. 14.

<sup>61</sup>Loc. cit..

doing listed the usual objectives of C.P.C. foreign policy. Neutrality had, since 1953 and before, been one of two logical consequences of the foreign policy advocated by Canadian Communists. The second was alignment with the Soviet bloc, since Canada was to withdraw from her Western alliances. That the latter conclusion was never explicitly drawn was probably due to its unpopularity with Canadians. When the theory of a third force was accepted by the world Communist movement, the Canadian party could seize upon the advocacy of neutrality as a convenient means of giving direction to its foreign policy.

The Communists seem to have realized at an early date that Canadian foreign policy has traditionally pursued three major objectives: protection against aggression, expanding trade, and the preservation or, rather, assertion of the Canadian national identity. Communist party foreign policy has consistently been presented in a manner designed to suggest that it fulfils each of the desired goals. The Communists' task has not been an easy one. Most of their specific objectives have been diametrically opposed to those of Canada's four major political parties and thus, it may be assumed, to the wishes of the vast majority of Canadians. That few Communist objectives have been achieved, or even have found official support from another political party indicates that their campaign has been largely unsuccessful. Nevertheless, their foreign policy, considering the relative unpopularity of its specific objectives, has been cleverly presented.

One of the major objectives of I.P.P. and C.P.C. foreign policy has been the normalization of relations with the Soviet bloc. In

attempting to persuade the Canadian public to accept that goal, the Communists have not restricted their efforts to extolling the virtues of the Soviet system, although such measures have constituted an important element of their approach. Rather, they have, in addition, attempted to persuade Canadians that the major threat to our continued independence comes not from the Soviet Union, but from the U.S.A.. The following statement is typical:

...The Canadian monopolists reject peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition of the Socialist and capitalist systems....

"This insane course is screened by the lying pretence that there is a "danger" of "military aggression" against Canada by the Socialist countries. That is the new edition of the Hitler "big lie" .

.....

The people are against war. Their united action in the world-wide movement for peace can stop the outbreak of war and isolate the main instigator of war - U.S. imperialism....<sup>62</sup>

The 1960 program noted that "U.S. imperialism locks on Canadian national sovereignty as an obstacle to the complete control and domination of our country."<sup>63</sup>

The examples they muster to support their contentions are well chosen. Almost without exception the situations selected to illustrate the increasing U.S. domination of Canada have been well-known to the Canadian public and the source of considerable discontent. Policy resolutions, election platforms and programs have, for example, often

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<sup>62</sup>Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament, Op. cit., pp. 8-9.

<sup>63</sup>The Road To Socialism In Canada, Op. cit., Ch. 4, p. 13.

made reference to the large number of U.S. servicemen in Canada and to the extra-territorial rights conceded to U.S. bases in Canada. U.S. control of Canada's industries and natural resources is even more frequently mentioned.

Having thus cast doubts upon whether the current attitude of viewing the U.S.S.R. as a potential enemy and the U.S.A. a constant ally actually contributes to our national security and the preservation of national identity, the Communists proceed to demonstrate that current attitudes most certainly restrict our trade. This has been a favourite topic of the Canadian Tribune:

...Canada could immediately open up a \$100,000,000 a year export trade with People's China if government policies were changed, R.B. Spiro, leading Toronto business man and a spokesman for the Canadian Exporter's Association told the Tribune last week.

A director of the association and president of Coleman Lamp and Stove Company, Mr. Spiro declared trade with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Hungary would benefit Canada too...<sup>64</sup>

By so restricting our trade, they argue, we compromise our country's growth potential and increase unemployment.

In passing, it should also be mentioned that the evident support of the L.P.P. and C.P.C. for the Commonwealth is based largely upon the consideration that the Commonwealth has the potential of diverting some of our trade from the U.S. and, indeed, of expanding our trade.

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<sup>64</sup>See "\$100 Million Trade With China," C.T., XVII:862 (Feb. 1, 1954), p. 1.

...Stop the surrender of Canada's markets at the behest of U.S. monopolists. Win back Commonwealth markets. Trade with the world  
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While the Communists appear to find little value in the Commonwealth except as a potential market, their support of the institution, for whatever reasons, can do them little harm among Canada's numerous Anglo-philies. At the same time, by treating the Commonwealth as a purely economic proposition, they do not alienate the almost as numerous Anglo-phobes.

In its efforts to persuade Canada to withdraw from NATO and NORAD and to adopt a position of neutrality, the C.P.C. appeals both to national pride and to Canada's desire to avoid attack:

...The most effective and specific way in which Canadians can advance the fight for peace and peaceful coexistence is by declaring a policy of neutrality. Canadian neutrality would mean extricating our country from the aggressive U.S. military system by withdrawal from NATO and NORAD, removing U.S. bases from Canadian territory, refusing to join in preparations for nuclear war and declaring to the world that this country is neutral and requests respect by all countries of its neutrality. Our country's safety demands this....<sup>66</sup>

The policy resolution of the Sixteenth National Convention, C.P.C. declared:

...A great national effort is needed to stop the building of missile launching sites on Canadian soil; take the Maritime Provinces out of the Northeastern Command of the United States War Department; restore the R.C.A.F. to Canadian control and Command; withdraw Canada from NATO and NORAD.

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<sup>65</sup>"Put Canada First," Op. cit., p. 9.

<sup>66</sup>"Policy Resolution Of The 17th National Convention Of The Communist Party Of Canada," Op. cit., p. 14.



These changes in Canada's foreign policy are necessary now to protect Canada against the dreadful danger of nuclear war and make her an active force for peace and peaceful coexistence....<sup>67</sup>

The 1954 program was even more specific:

...Our country's right to decide its own fate in war and peace has been set aside by Ottawa through the automatic commitment to war, at the behest of Washington, as provided in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)....<sup>68</sup>

One of the party's major objections to NATO has been the re-arming of West Germany. In order to mobilize Canadian opinion against putting weapons into the hands of Germans, the L.P.P. revived memories of Nazi atrocities, reminded Canadians of Canada's World War Two dead,<sup>69</sup> and charged that Canadian troops would be commanded by a "Nazi" general (Speidel). A single issue of the N.A.M. carried articles with the following titles: "German Re-armament A Threat to Canadian Security," and "The Illusion that German Militarism Can be Controlled." The pamphlets reviewed in the same edition were: German Militarism: Reactional Prussianism, by Marx and Engels; The Scourge of the Swastika, by Lord Russell; and West Germany Prepares a War of Revenge, written for the Canadian Peace Congress.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup>Op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>68</sup>Canadian Independence And A People's Parliament, Op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>69</sup>The Canadian Tribune [XVII:911 (Oct. 1, 1955)] for example, ran a large picture of a military cemetery with the caption: "We shall not Break Faith with out 100,000 war dead."

<sup>70</sup>E.A.M., IX:12 (Dec., 1952).

As their arguments against NATO and NORAD imply, Canadian Communists suggest that total disarmament and negotiated settlement of international disputes are the ultimate form of security for Canada. Not only would the accomplishment of these goals reduce the danger of war but also remove the encroachments on our independence which our present military alliances represent. Once again, the United States is presented as the major stumbling block to the achievement of the two objectives.

For example:

...Refusing to learn from history, the U.S. imperialists reject the peaceful coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist sectors of the world. Instead, they drive for world domination and threaten civilization with H-bomb annihilation in a third world war....<sup>71</sup>

At times Canadian Communists have felt the need to present themselves as staunch defenders of the United Nations. Each case, however, in which they have been so moved has followed an action by the United Nations with which they could not agree. At such times the I.P.P. and C.P.C. have charged that the noble purpose of the U.N. has been subverted by the United States. The party's reaction to the Korean conflict is an example:

...In the United Nations, the representatives of the Soviet Union point the way forward, by which peace can be maintained. They have fought against the subverting of the Charter by the U.S. imperialists, fought to uphold the principles upon which the U.N. was founded, pressed for constructive measures to further the cause of peace: peaceful settlement in Korea, seating of People's China, disarmament, outlawing of atomic weapons, a stop to war propaganda....<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>71</sup>Canadian Independence And A People's Parliament, Op. cit., Ch. 2, p. 7.

<sup>72</sup>"Unite For Peace And Canadian Independence!", Op. cit., pp. 6-7.

Moreover, when a United Nations' action has been opposed by Canadian Communists they have stopped at nothing in their efforts to discredit the organization's endeavors. Their reaction to the Korean War again provides an outstanding illustration. Not only did the I.F.P. and its satellite organizations, notably the Canadian Peace Congress, charge the U.N. with the use of germ warfare, but also trotted out the old Canadian bogey: conscription. Once again the Canadian Tribune was actively involved in the campaign and opened its pages to anti-conscription articles by N.F.Y.L. leaders. The 1953 federal election program demanded: "No conscription. Stop the enrollment of 16-year-olds in the armed forces."<sup>73</sup>

In actuality the United Nations does not occupy a central position in Canadian Communist foreign policy. Rather, it seems to be viewed as simply another method, like the frequently advocated Great Power conferences, of settling international disputes by negotiation. The conception of the U.N. as a step towards world government finds no mention in the party's policy resolutions or programs. Canadian Communists, in all likelihood, view such an organization in a world composed entirely of socialist nations, as they think it inevitably will be, as being entirely superfluous.

On every major issue which has confronted the United Nations, the C.P.C. and I.F.P. have adopted a stand corresponding to that of the Soviet

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<sup>73</sup>"Put Canada First," Op cit., p. 10.

bloc. Canadian Communists opposed the United Nations' actions in Korea and the Congo. They have supported the police action in Suez and the "troika" system. Indeed, every element of the party's foreign policy has been calculated to more closely attune Canada's position in international affairs to that of the Soviet bloc. The cornerstone of their foreign policy may be the doctrine that war is not inevitable and the advocacy of peaceful coexistence, but its foundation is solidarity with the Soviet world system of states.

C.P.C. members would hotly dispute the above conclusion, claiming that their foreign policy has been the product of an independent examination of the world situation in the light of Canadian conditions and the experience of countries engaged in building socialism. Nevertheless, one is left with the impression that the belief in the coincidence of Canadian and Soviet bloc interests is the starting point, rather than the conclusion of C.P.C. foreign policy.

CHAPTER XI

THE APPROACH: DOMESTIC POLICY

Since World War Two, Canadian Communists have been engaged in an active campaign to foster and to associate their party with the growing interest in and insistence upon, to use their own phrases, a Canadian "people's culture" and "Canadian independence."

...[The C.P.C.] champions the closest fraternity between Canadians of all national origins and fights for their right to develop their national traditions as contributions to a Canadian people's culture....<sup>1</sup>

...[The L.P.P.] dedicates itself to the flowering of a democratic Canadian people's culture, of Canadian science, technique, art, literature, music and education. The stimulation of a democratic national pride and spirit will give a truly Canadian form to a people's culture whose content will be Socialist humanism....<sup>2</sup>

...The Labor-Progressive Party calls on Canadians to fight for the national security of Canada, to keep our country free, strong and independent, subject to no foreign power and living in friendly and equal association with all countries who respect our national sovereignty....<sup>3</sup>

The patriotism the party so whole-heartedly endorses should not, it insists, be confused with chauvinism. Its present program and the 1954 program specifically opposed "'big nation' chauvinism, as well as narrow nationalism in politics, economics, cultural and social thought."<sup>4</sup>

Three major factors probably contributed to the party's present vociferous concern for the realization of Canada's national aspirations.

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<sup>1</sup>The Road To Socialism In Canada, Op. cit., Ch. 7, pp. 29-30.

<sup>2</sup>Canadian Independence And A People's Parliament, Op. cit., Ch. 7, p. 25.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., Ch. 2, p. 7.

<sup>4</sup>The Road To Socialism In Canada, Op. cit., p. 29.

Firstly, the Second World War produced a rapid growth in the national-consciousness of Canadians. Communists could not ignore a social development of such significance and hope to better their fortunes. Moreover, the party's nationalistic attitude in the latter part of the war had paid demonstrable dividends. Secondly, during the war Stalin had consciously fostered the patriotism of his own countrymen, thus providing the Canadian party with a highly successful precedent upon which to base its own actions. Thirdly, a stated support and concern for Canada's national ambitions would offset the tendency of Canadians to consider the party to be the C.P.S.U.'s agent in Canada. Measured by the latter standard, the campaign must be considered a failure.

The C.P.C. believes that growing national consciousness and the frustration of national aspirations by monopoly capital will ultimately make a major contribution to the establishment of a Communist society in Canada. These beliefs provide the theoretical justification for the campaign:

...The course of our national development up to and including the present crisis of national policy determines that Canada's path to her bright socialist future lies through the struggle for Canadian independence....<sup>5</sup>

The party's professed national consciousness has been coloured by a violent anti-Americanism that borders on paranoia. Virtually everything Canadian Communists believe to be wrong with their country is attributed, directly or indirectly, to the untoward influence of the United States. Undoubtedly the attitude described is partly a result of

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<sup>5</sup>Canadian Independence And A People's Parliament, Op. cit., Ch. 7, p. 26. Also cf. Ch. IX, pp. 182-183.

the fact that the United States is Communism's most powerful and, in many ways, most adamant opponent. Of probable greater significance is the undoubted prominence of anti-Americanism in the normal expression of Canadian nationalism.

Canadian Communists employ a number of techniques in their efforts to have their party accepted as a "truly Canadian" party and their policies recognized as the only method of realizing Canada's national aspirations. The most obvious method has been the bald assertion that the party is composed of true Canadian patriots coupled with the equally bald assertion that it takes no orders from foreign powers. For example, the 1960 program proclaims:

...The Communist Party takes a stand on all matters affecting the people of Canada. It defends the basic interests of the working class and the working people as a whole. It champions the democratic national interests -- which are those of the vast majority of Canadians.

The Communist Party defends Canada's national sovereignty and independence against foreign encroachment or aggression....<sup>6</sup>

It was asserted, in the 1954 program, that:

...[The L.P.P.] contemptuously rejects the charge that it 'takes instructions from abroad'. It draws its policy from the experience, traditions and vital interests of Canada's people and places on every member of the Party the obligation of making its program known to the people....<sup>7</sup>

A second technique employed has been the attempt to link the L.P.P.

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<sup>6</sup>Loc. cit..

<sup>7</sup>Loc. cit..



and the C.P.C. with Canada's democratic reform, and nationalist movements:

...The Communist Party carries forward and builds upon the tradition of those who, like MacKenzie, Papineau and Riel, fought for democratic liberties and national independence. It embodies the dreams and aspirations of the heroes of countless Canadian labor struggles....<sup>8</sup>

The party has gone to ridiculous lengths to foster this image. Trophies granted in competitions to increase Canadian Tribune circulation bear such names as MacKenzie, Papineau, Lount and Riel. A Canadian Tribune article magnanimously declared: "It is only fair to say that volume one, number one of the Colonial Advocate marks it as a worthy forerunner of the Canadian Tribune."<sup>9</sup> Another article in the same newspaper declared "the Labor-Progressive Party [members to be] the inheritors of the Riel tradition."<sup>10</sup>

Another method employed by the party in its attempts to foster a Canadian national consciousness and its own image as a Canadian party, has been to carry considerable material about Canadian events and historical figures in its newspapers and periodicals. Articles with

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<sup>8</sup>The Road To Socialism In Canada, Loc. cit... The 1954 program (Op. cit., Ch. 7, p. 24) contained a similar paragraph.

<sup>9</sup>Chuck Fine, "MacKenzie's 'Colonial Advocate' Fought for Canadian Independence," C.T., XV:744 (May 26, 1952), p. 8.

<sup>10</sup>John Stewart, "Where Louis Riel Fought," C.T., XVI:798 (Nov. 10, 1952), p. 8.

titles such as: "Laura Secord's Story of How She Stopped the Yanks at Beaver Dams on June 23, 1813";<sup>11</sup> "Papineau the Patriote";<sup>12</sup> "My Uncle - Samuel Lount";<sup>13</sup> "Louis Riel: Father of Canadian West";<sup>14</sup> and "Tecumseh - 'Shooting Star'"<sup>15</sup> appeared frequently in party publications. The party press has also printed numerous denunciations of the tendency of American heroes to over-shadow those of Canada. For example, the Canadian Tribune, with obvious approbation, quoted a professor as having said:

...Unlike Davy Crockett...Canadian heroes were not professional Indian killers...Those who were explorers and coureurs-de-bois... were friends of the Indians or Indians themselves, like Tecumseh....<sup>16</sup>

Many of the articles have presented a Marxist interpretation of Canadian history and have attempted to illustrate the validity of Communist doctrine for Canadian conditions. The abbreviated accounts of Canada's development carried in the party programs of 1954 and 1960, and described in chapter nine are indicative of the contents of such articles.<sup>17</sup> Most such attempts to illustrate historical materialism at work in Canada

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<sup>11</sup>Victor Hopgood, C.T., XVII:822 (June 21, 1954), p. 10.

<sup>12</sup>Gai Caron, C.T., XV:793 (Oct. 6, 1952), p. 9.

<sup>13</sup>Samuel Lount Soules, C.T., XVIII:924 (Apr. 11, 1955), p. 9.

<sup>14</sup>Phyllis Clarke, C.T., XVIII:944 (Aug. 29, 1955), p. 11.

<sup>15</sup>C.T., XVIII:916 (Feb. 14, 1955), p. 10.

<sup>16</sup>"University Professors Hit Crockett Craze. Canadian Heroes Are Second To None," C.T., XVIII:930 (May 23, 1955), p. 5.

<sup>17</sup>Cf. Ch. IX, pp. 181-184.

have been extremely facile. Dogmatic assertion that Canadian development has conformed to Marxist prognostications, rather than reasoned argument has characterized many of the articles. For example, Dr. V.G. Hopgood in a review of Bruce Hutchison's The Incredible Canadian, disagreed with Hutchison's statement that W.L. MacKenzie King was a greater heretic than his namesake. To refute Hutchison's contention, the reviewer simply stated:

...William Lyon MacKenzie and Louis Joseph Papineau were the founders of Canadian Democracy, the leaders of the bourgeois - democratic revolution in Canada, the leaders in the first stage of Canada's struggle for independence....<sup>18</sup>

After reading several such articles one begins to lack sympathy with the party's frequent demands for "a people's history of Canada."<sup>19</sup>

A fourth manifestation of the party's interest in Canadian nationalism has been its attempts to foster the growth of a Canadian "people's culture" and to protect existing Canadian cultural institutions and "cultural workers" from American encroachments. The party placed greatest emphasis on cultural activities between 1952 and 1956. The policy was undoubtedly given impetus by the 1952 draft program, upon which

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<sup>18</sup>V.G. Hopgood, "Anemia Among Canadian Historians," N.A.M., X:2 (Feb., 1953), p. 33.

<sup>19</sup>Stanley Ryerson's Founding Of Canada: Beginnings To 1815, (Toronto: Progress Publishing Co., 1960) the long awaited people's history, is, however, a competent work far superior, in general, to the piecemeal efforts of the Canadian Tribune.

Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament was based.<sup>20</sup> It was the draft program which first emphasized the role to be played in "the struggle for socialism" by national consciousness. The inner party crisis of 1956-57, however, cost the party most of its intellectuals and compromised the ability of the C.P.C. to sustain its cultural activities.

The main resolution of the third National L.P.P. Cultural Conference defined the aim of the party's cultural activity as follows:

...The L.P.P. will do all in its power to help in the building of a broad movement of all patriotic Canadians in English-speaking and French Canada united around the fight for Canadian democratic culture. Such a culture will revive the democratic heritage as a weapon in the present struggle for peace and independence....<sup>21</sup>

The conference thought American influences to be the main obstacle to the development of a true Canadian culture. This in itself is not unusual. Most Canadian observers would concur with such an opinion. However, the conference extended the argument to imply that American domination of Canada's cultural activities has been part of a sinister plot to reduce Canada to the status of a subservient American satellite. The report stated:

The fight for Canadian democratic culture is one of the main

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<sup>20</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>21</sup>"For Canadian Democratic Culture," (Main resolution of the 3rd National L.P.P. Cultural Conference endorsed by the National Executive Committee), N.A.M., IX:7 (July, 1952), p. 49.

fronts of resistance to and struggle against the U.S. occupation of Canada....

The poisoning of our cultural life by a flood of cheap U.S. literature, by motion pictures, radio and television, theatre and music - and even the fostering of brutality in sports - is being countered by a wave of public indignation and protest. But the St. Laurent government, far from acting to defend our culture, shamefully aids the poisoners as part of its policy of betraying our sovereignty to Wall St. and Washington....<sup>22</sup>

One tangible result of the party's interest in Canadian culture was the publication of a literary journal of dubious quality entitled New Frontiers. Another was the short-lived Toronto Arts Council. For the most part, however, the party restricted its efforts to denouncing the sale of U.S. crime and horror comics on Canadian newsstands;<sup>23</sup> demanding an "all-Canadian" Canadian National Exhibition Grandstand show;<sup>24</sup> and decrying the purchase of American television shows by the C.B.C..<sup>25</sup> Of a more positive nature were articles in the theoretical journal and the Canadian Tribune which lauded Canadian achievements<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp. 47-48.

<sup>23</sup>Margaret Reeves, "Stop This Slow Poison," C.T., XV:778 (June 30, 1952), p. 14.

<sup>24</sup>Victor Hopgood, "Grantstand Show Not So Grand," C.T., XVIII:946 (Sept. 12, 1955), p. 10.

<sup>25</sup>John Stewart, "C.B.C. Flooded With Protests As Government Makes Sell-out T.V. Deal With U.S.," C.T., XVI:807 (Jan. 12, 1953), p. 6.

<sup>26</sup>Lyman B. Jackes, "Canadian Firsts," C.T., XVII:893 (Sept. 6, 1954), p. 7. (Abridged from a C.B.C. talk by Jackes)

and discussed Canadian painters, writers and other artists. The articles, by and large, lacked a genuine critical approach. In their desire to demonstrate their party's concern for Canada and, perhaps, overwhelmed by the difficulties inherent in any attempt to persuade Canadians to overcome their long habit of ignoring accomplished countrymen, the authors were often excessive in their praise. It was also apparent, in many of the articles, that the author had a political axe to grind. The following quotation, taken from an article on E. Pauline Johnson is typical:

...But more than just a writer of poetry, Pauline Johnson was a tribune of her people, the native Indians. She knew the sufferings of her people, the injustices and abuses to which they were subjected, and her own pen transmitted the innermost feelings of her heart.

Her most powerful poems, which cry out against injustice, are not to be found in school books or Canadian poetry anthologies.

That side of her life and work 'respectable' bourgeois society prefers to forget.<sup>27</sup>

In its desire to create and exploit a demand for a Canadian "people's culture," the party has placed heavy emphasis on the country's sporting prowess or, more accurately, its lack thereof. The Canadian Tribune has been quick to acknowledge the achievements of Canadian athletes in international competitions. The newspaper has also noted the country's frequent poor showings in such events and has repeatedly proposed greater

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<sup>27</sup>Maurice Rush, "Pauline Johnson Fired Canadian Hearts With, 'the Glory of Nationhood'," C.T., XVII:870 (Mar. 29, 1954), p. 6.

financial participation by the government in the preparation of Canadian teams for the Olympic, Pan American and British Empire Games. The need for more and better training facilities has been another favority topic.<sup>28</sup>

The final manifestation of the party's patriotic stance has been the assertion that the policies it advocates will bring about the realization of Canada's national ambitions. The 1953 election platform, "Put Canada First" outlined a "New National Policy" designed "to develop our rich resources for the benefit of the Canadian people."<sup>29</sup> The term "New National Policy" was based upon the slogan which Sir John A. MacDonal employed to defeat Alexander MacKenzie's Liberals. The draft election platform of 1957, "For a Canadian National Policy!" used a similar approach:

...Our country needs a policy of national development based squarely upon the interests of the people of French and English-speaking Canada.....<sup>30</sup>

Moreover, platforms, policy resolutions and programs have been liberally sprinkled with demands for a distinctive flag, a national anthem and similar devices designed to appeal to national sentiment.

Among political parties with a national following, the C.P.C. is

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<sup>28</sup>Bert Whyte, "How Will Canada Fare In B.E.G.?", C.T., XVI:839 (Aug. 24, 1953), p. 8.

<sup>29</sup>"Put Canada First," Op. cit., p. 9.

<sup>30</sup>"Draft Federal Election Platform of the Labor-Progressive Party," Op. cit., p. 2.

unique in its demand for a "Made-in-Canada Constitution."<sup>31</sup> The constitution proposed by the party would be "fully elaborated" through wide public discussion and then would be adopted "by a constitutional convention fully representative of the two nations of our country." The proposed constitution would incorporate a Canadian bill of rights. It would also repudiate the theory that the government's authority derives from the Crown. Constitutional provision "would clearly establish" the fact that the government of Canada derives its authority "solely from the Canadian people." The party has consistently pledged itself to return legislative sovereignty to parliament and to stop government by order-in-council. In addition, the constitution would maintain provincial rights "in full sense" and "specify the irrevocable, constitutional rights of the province of Quebec to Provincial Autonomy and the democratic right of the people of French Canada to full national self-determination." As previously noted, the party endorses referendum and recall<sup>32</sup> although the devices have not been mentioned in election platforms. Another electoral procedure approved by the party, although again not mentioned by its election platforms nor, for that matter by its programs and policy resolutions, is the preferential ballot. The party unsuccessfully opposed the abolition of multi-member constituencies

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<sup>31</sup>"Put Canada First," Op. cit., p. 12. The account of the party's constitutional proposal which follows is based upon the 1957 draft election platform (Loc. cit.).

<sup>32</sup>Cf. Ch. IX, p. 194.



in British Columbia, Manitoba and Alberta.<sup>33</sup> The obvious reason for the party's stand is that it does not have sufficient support, in most cases, to be successful at the polls in a single-member riding.

The C.P.C.'s economic policies are also unique, if not in kind then in degree, among the nationally organized political parties. Its warnings of imminent economic crisis are not only more emphatic than the customary wails of parties in opposition, but also have a motivation beyond that of attempting to discredit the party in power. Such predictions by the C.P.C. are based upon the firm conviction that the capitalist system, by virtue of its nature, breeds economic crisis:

...A cyclical economic crisis is maturing. It is aggravated by the federal government's reckless sacrifice of great markets in the sterling area and the Socialist third of the world and by United States dumping of huge surplus stocks of manufactured products on the Canadian market. While corporation profits are at the highest level in the history of Canada, inflation and crushing burden of taxes have reduced real wages, lowering the purchasing power of the masses, hastening the trend to a new economic crisis....<sup>34</sup>

From 1949 to 1957 the party placed heavy emphasis upon the imminence of extreme economic crisis. J.B. Salisberg has suggested that the party was, at the time, influenced by Soviet economists.<sup>35</sup> The climax of the campaign to convince Canadians that their country was on the brink of economic collapse came late in 1953 with the publication

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<sup>33</sup>"Manning Seeks To Abolish Democratic Vote System," C.T., XIX:975 (Apr. 2, 1956), p. 12.

<sup>34</sup>"Stop The Betrayal of Canada! Unite for Peace and Canadian Independence," (Draft policy resolution for the 5th National Convention, L.P.P.), N.A.M., IX:1 (Jan., 1954), p. 50.

<sup>35</sup>J.B. Salsberg, "For A Socialist Realignment In Canada," Op. cit., p. 3.

of the L.P.P.'s Ten-Point-Program "How To Beat the Threat of Depression."<sup>36</sup> The plan advocated expansion of trade through restoring trade with the Commonwealth, establishing trade with the Soviet bloc and processing raw materials in Canada rather than exporting them. Parity prices for farmers, the construction of 750,000 housing units and the construction of a number of large public projects such as the South Saskatchewan Dam were suggested. A reduction in armament expenditures to liberate capital for the construction of schools, nurseries, hospitals, theatres, recreational facilities, roads and other public services, was proposed. Increased social welfare payments, better conditions for labour and, oddly enough, a demand for a Canadian bill of rights were also part of the L.P.P.'s solution for the allegedly looming disaster.

At the Sixth National Convention, L.P.P., the predictions of crisis were stated to have been partly in error:

...While the party correctly emphasized that the basic laws of motion of capitalism continue to operate, it failed to study the specific effects of the post-war economy.

Because the party failed to study these developments adequately it made the mistake of estimating that the sharp downturns of the economy in 1949-50, and in '54 and '55 marked the beginning of a general economic crisis....<sup>37</sup>

The party claimed that it failed to see the growth of "state monopoly capitalism" in Canada. The merging of the monopolies with the state made possible "certain temporary controls of economic factors."<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament, Op. cit., p. 32.

<sup>37</sup>"Draft Policy Resolution for the Sixth National Convention of the Labor-Progressive Party," Op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

Whatever the reasons, since 1957 the probability of economic collapse has not occupied so prominent a position in the party's policy statements. However, the prospect of economic crisis remains an important consideration. The party's current attitude is typified by a statement from the 1957 draft policy resolution.

...While it would be incorrect to declare that an economic crisis is around the corner, it would be equally harmful for the labor movement to fall prey to the illusion that because of the present boom all is well with the Canadian economy....<sup>39</sup>

The party's economic policies are also unique in the massive program of nationalization advocated.<sup>40</sup> The most specific statement in this regard was included in the 1950 draft of The Road to Socialism In Canada: The draft listed "the transfer of the big industrial and banking firms, the strongholds of monopoly capitalism, to public ownership" as being among the first acts of a farmer-labor coalition.<sup>41</sup>

It continued:

...The basic economic policy is socialist nationalization, that is, state ownership and workers control and management of the principle means of production, distribution, transportation, and communication....Examples of industrial and financial giants to be brought under state control are the C.P.R., the banks, INCO, General Electric, Bell Telephone, the Big Three of the auto industry, the big chain stores....<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>Ibid.      <sup>40</sup>Cf. Ch. IX, p. 192.

<sup>41</sup>The Road To Socialism In Canada: Draft Program of the L.P.P., M.R., XVI:159 (Feb.-Mar., 1958), p. 24.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

The C.P.C. (L.P.P.) was the first national political party to officially accept the two nation concept of Confederation. It is the only national political party to guarantee French-Canada full self-determination up to and including separation.<sup>43</sup> The C.P.C. actually advocates self-government for Indians and Eskimos as being "the basic solution of the national in equality now imposed upon them."<sup>44</sup> The party also demands the repeal of all laws discriminatory towards the Indian and Eskimo.<sup>45</sup>

Immigrant minority groups have received considerable attention in party policy statements and its programs. Usually however, such references to ethnic groups have been confined to generalities. They begin with a tribute to the contribution made to Canada by "immigrant workers from many lands;" go on to deplore discrimination based upon "Anglo-Saxon chauvinism" and to state that there must be an end to such practises. Finally, they state the need "for the equality and brotherhood of all working people, for the unhampered contribution of all national groups to Canadian cultural life."<sup>46</sup> One of the few immigrant

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<sup>43</sup>Cf. Ch. IX, p. 189 and Ch. XI, p. 245.

<sup>44</sup>"The Struggle For Total Disarmament, Peace and Independence," Op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>The Road To Socialism In Canada, Op. cit., p. 12.

groups that have been singled out for special attention by the party in its policy statements are the Doukhobors. The party opposed the placing, by force, of Sons of Freedom Doukhobor children in state schools. In 1955, Nigel Morgan, L.P.P. British Columbia provincial secretary, promised the sect that "the L.P.P. will do all it can to make the government stop such brutality."<sup>47</sup>

Considering that the party is exceptionally dependent upon ethnic groups for its support,<sup>48</sup> it is somewhat surprising that it devotes very little attention to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in its policy statements. Indeed, the only specific reference that has been encountered was a resolution of the Sixteenth National Convention C.P.C..<sup>49</sup> The resolution charged that "discrimination was practised by citizenship and immigration authorities in refusing to grant citizenship to members of the C.P.C. and "many other Canadians" holding "progressive views" or belonging to "democratic organizations." The provisions of the Citizenship Act, the resolution alleged:

...[give] autocratic powers to the court and the Ministry of Immigration and Citizenship in this matter and provides for star chamber hearings where the recommendation of the R.C.M.P. is practically decisive without the necessity for such recommendation to be grounded....

The resolution also charged that the R.C.M.P. had been "blackmailing"

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<sup>47</sup>"The Doukhobor Mothers Cry 'Give Us Back Our Children'," C.T., XVIII:914 (Jan. 31, 1955), p. 5.

<sup>48</sup>Cf. Ch. V, pp. 86-88.

<sup>49</sup>"Canada Citizenship Act," ("Resolutions"), M.R., XVIII:170 (Dec., 1959), pp. 33-34.

foreign-born Canadians to become police informers in "people's cultural and social organizations." The Convention "most earnestly" protested against all such practises and demanded amendment of the Canadian Citizenship Act "to prevent such injustices in the future."

Statements by the Canadian Tribune on Canada's immigration policy have, probably, been prompted by the anti-Communist attitude of the vast majority of recent immigrants. A January, 1954 article attacked the government for failing to reduce the rate of immigration in the face of increasing unemployment.<sup>50</sup> An earlier news item, headed "Luftwaffe Officers Strut On Canada-bound Vessel Carrying Immigrant D.P.'s," referred to immigrants of the early 'fifties as "facist, strike-breaking hoodlums." It declared that "Canada must not be allowed to become a dumping ground for every self-confessed anti-progressive in Europe."<sup>51</sup>

The party's defence policy might be termed an "anti-policy." It has consisted solely of the demand to radically reduce defence expenditures. Such a policy, the party argues, would liberate capital for badly needed public construction and social welfare. At the same time such a step, coupled with a declaration, by Canada, of her neutrality would be an effective step towards the eventual achievement of world-wide total disarmament. Moreover, the party argues, the present defence

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<sup>50</sup>"Lured Here By Promise Of Jobs Immigrants Face Destitution," C.T., XVII:860 (Jan. 18, 1954), p. 1.

<sup>51</sup>C.T., XV:759 (Feb. 11, 1952), p. 4.

establishment is approved by Canadians on the false premise that the Soviet bloc constitutes a threat to Canada's security. In actuality it represents one more example of the governments policy of "sell-out" to the United States. The policy resolution of the Fifth National Convention, L.P.P. included a statement from its counterpart of the previous convention which argued that the government had:

...tied Canada's economy to the U.S. war machine, betrayed every electoral promise of social reform, in favour of the open adoption of a 'guns before butter' program - all as part of the planned outcome of its calculated long term aim: to turn Canada into a completely dependent satellite of the United States....<sup>52</sup>

Women and youth, normally, have been singled out for special attention in party policy statements. The women have been promised equal pay for equal work. The appeal to youth has been based upon the prospect of better educational opportunities including more and better vocational schools and free university education. Better sports and recreational facilities have also been promised.

The policy resolution of the Sixteenth National Convention, C.P.C. stated that the party would support the farmers "in their immediate demands such as parity prices, deficiency payments, adequate floor prices, government action to expand export markets and in defense of the family farms." Support of the farmers in their demands is, perhaps, the best possible description of the C.P.C. (L.P.P.) short-term farm policy. It has displayed little originality of thought

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<sup>52</sup>Op. cit., p. 64.

reflecting, in all likelihood, the party's relative lack of farmer-members and its desire to avoid alienating, with radical proposals, any potential farmer-members. In keeping with its philosophy, the party has been quicker to recommend governmental action, such as nationalization of the packing houses<sup>53</sup> or the establishment of government slaughtering, refrigeration and milk drying plants in areas far from market centres, than any other party with the exception of the N.D.P. (C.C.F.). That the party's ultimate goal is co-operative production, processing and marketing of agricultural products<sup>54</sup> is not all apparent in their short-term policies. Indeed, references to co-operatives have been, for the most part, uncontroversial expressions of support for those already in existence. For example, the 1957 draft election platform promised to guarantee farm co-operatives the full protection of the Friendly Societies Act.<sup>55</sup>

As might be expected with a party "dedicated to the cause of the working class," C.P.C. (L.P.P.) policies devote considerable attention to bettering the conditions of labour. The policies advocated are quite orthodox and well in tune with the position of labour's official agencies. The following quotation, taken from "Put Canada First," is briefer than

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<sup>53</sup>"Policy Resolution Of the 17th National Convention, C.P.C.," Op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>54</sup>Cf. Ch. IX, p. 193.

<sup>55</sup>Op. cit., p. 2.



most party statements on the subject but provides an accurate indication of the type of policies that have been proposed.

PROTECT AND EXTEND THE HARD WON RIGHTS OF LABOR.

A democratic National Labor Code. A national minimum wage, a 7-hour day, 5-day week with no reduction in pay, minimum 2-weeks vacation with pay.

End the discriminatory wage differential which imposes lower living standards on French Canada.

Equal pay for equal work for women and young workers.

A progressive immigration policy in line with continued expansion of Canada's economy.<sup>56</sup>

What is meant by the final sentence in the quotation is not at all clear. However, some indication is provided by the fact that the Tribune printed articles, shortly after the platform was published, criticizing government for maintaining high levels of immigration at a time when unemployment was a problem.<sup>57</sup>

Social welfare measures have always occupied a prominent position in the party's policy statements. Once again, the party's suggestions are not at all startling. In fact, with regard to social welfare measures, St. Laurent's epithet of "Liberals in a hurry" would fit the Communists as well as it did the C.C.F.. The party has not objected to the piecemeal approach to social welfare of the Liberal and Conservative governments, it has demanded nothing more radical than Britain's approach to social services. The party has, in general, limited its suggestions

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<sup>56</sup>Op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>57</sup>Cf. Ch. XI, p. 251.

and promises to more and better services of the type now generally available. For example, the 1953 election platform<sup>58</sup> pledged the party to raise old age pensions to seventy-five dollars a month payable to men at sixty-five years of age and women at sixty; higher veterans pensions and higher family allowances. The 1957 draft election platform<sup>59</sup> advocated such benefits as a national minimum wage of one dollar; no waiting period to collect unemployment benefits; an increase in unemployment benefits to seventy-five percent of average earnings; and an increase in family allowances. The party has also consistently proposed a national health insurance scheme. Among its few unorthodox welfare proposals have been the construction of 750,000 homes by the federal government<sup>60</sup> and the provision of unemployment benefits to "women workers in maternity."<sup>61</sup>

The party's position on civil rights is summed-up in its demand for a Canadian bill of rights entrenched in a new Constitution. The few civil rights questions which the party has considered to be of sufficient importance to warrant specific mention in its policy resolutions have invariably been those which restricted or threatened to restrict the activities of the party, organized labour or both. Quebec's Padlock Law

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<sup>58</sup>Op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>59</sup>Op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>60</sup>"Put Canada First," Loc. cit..

<sup>61</sup>"Draft Federal Election Platform of the Labor-Progressive Party," Loc. cit..

and the Garson Amendments to the Criminal Code (variously known as Bill H8, Bill 0, Bill 93 and eventually passed by Parliament as Bill 7) have been the party's major targets in recent years. Typically, the party characterized such legislation as being the result of American influences. For example, the policy resolution of the Fifth National Convention, L.P.P. stated:

...The St. Laurent government feared to enact the new Criminal Code on the eve of the federal election because of widespread public opposition. Back in office it promptly re-introduced it as Bill 7, retaining the anti-democratic sections placed there at the demand of the U.S. government....<sup>62</sup>

In short, the party's short-term domestic policies provide but little indication of its long-term aims. This is not to say that the two are incompatible, they aren't. But the election platforms and policy resolutions are far removed from the fundamental reorganization of society advocated by the programs.

In addition to determining the policies they would incorporate into a legislative program if given the reins of government, Canada's Communists have had to settle two questions of policy which were of pressing concern to the party itself. They were: the determination of the character of the party and the method to be employed in gaining political power.

The question of the character which the party was to assume was

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<sup>62</sup>Op. cit., p. 66.

decided in a short-lived and bitter dispute. It grew out of the cumulative effects of the Folkstimme revelations, de-Stalinization and the Hungarian Revolution. As the draft policy resolution for the Sixth National Convention indicated, these events shocked Canadian Communists.<sup>63</sup> The shock forced many to re-examine their political philosophy and to see their party in a new light. Some were prompted to put forward plans for altering the organization and the operating principles of the party. For several months a sharp debate, between the would-be reformers and members basically satisfied with the character of the party, was waged. The columns of N.A.M. and the Canadian Tribune reflected the dispute. At the Sixth National Convention the reformers or "revisionists," as they were termed by the victorious element, were crushed.

The discontented elements of the party were sizeable, as the one-third to one-half decrease in party membership during the dispute indicates. The brief removal of Buck from the general-secretaryship of the party and the controversial October 23rd cabled to Moscow and Warsaw demonstrate that dissident elements briefly dominated the N.E.C.. The leaders, if they may be so termed, of the reformers were among the most able and responsible party members. But they lost. Many factors contributed to their defeat: Buck's able politicking; the party's long years of habitual

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<sup>63</sup>Op. cit., p. 1.

obedience to Buck;<sup>64</sup> and the indecisiveness of the reformers as evidenced by the restoration of Buck to the office of general-secretary. Most significant, however, was the fact that nothing united the dissidents but their disillusionment. Many simply left the party. Those who stayed to fight for internal reforms were united only by their desire for reform. They had no common course of action.

Some believed that the establishment of a more "mature" relationship with the C.P.S.U., the ending of long years of subservience would be sufficient to transform the party:

There is only one basic issue which confronts the Labor-Progressive Party now [February, 1957]: namely the domination of the L.P.P. by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This domination is accomplished mainly by the agency of the party leader, Tim Buck. The method he employs is a demand for the unquestioning acceptance of the 'principles of Marxism-Leninism'....<sup>65</sup>

Others believed that the party would have to alter its whole approach to politics and, in effect, adopt many of the techniques and goals of the democratic socialists:

...In almost half the world there has taken the form of socialist states which in spite of manifold difficulties and weakness have ended capitalist rule and are moving forward to a new life for the people giving hope and inspiration and material strength to the peoples movements elsewhere....

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<sup>64</sup>One member commented: "...I consider this is my party, our party not the 'party of Tim Buck' as we used to say..." (Carol Lynne, "Searching For The Canadian Path," N.A.M., XIV:2 (Feb., 1957), p. 14.)

<sup>65</sup>E.W. Kemp, Loc. cit....

In our country it has expressed itself in the great and growing strength and influence of the organized labor movement which has assumed such tremendous proportions in recent years.

Though still under the influence of bourgeois labor leaders, this advance of the working class in Canada is part of a world advance and cannot be separated from it. This is illustrated both by the advance of the labor movement towards independent political action and by the growing debate in the C.C.F. and in labor circles to the C.C.F. on the Canadian path to socialism.

For Canadian Marxists, continued isolation from these trends is an impossible situation....<sup>66</sup>

Still others went so far as to demand dissolution of the party:

...We need in this country a party that will be thoroughly democratic and independent. A party that will not seek to dominate but to co-operate with, to influence as well as to learn from every part of the labor movement in the country.

We need a party that will creatively apply all that is valid in the body of scientific social knowledge to Canadian conditions and to chart our own Canadian path to socialism. The L.P.P., with its long history of subservience to the C.P.S.U., its dogmatism, its sectarianism, its isolation from the masses and the distrust with which it is regarded cannot be transformed into such a party....<sup>67</sup>

In the face of such varying demands Buck's supporters maintained a united front. Thus, the declaration on the party adopted by the Sixth National Convention L.P.P. was able to state:

...The 6th National Convention is of the firm belief that our party's cause is right and we face the future with resolution and confidence in our ability to make a greater contribution than ever before to the Canadian people.

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<sup>66</sup>N. Penner, "Comrade Norman Penner's Amendment," Loc. cit..

<sup>67</sup>J.B. Salsberg, "For A Socialist Realignment In Canada," Op. cit., p. 4.

This is the time to reaffirm our principles and reject all attempts to revise them....<sup>68</sup>

In broad outline, the method to be employed by the party in achieving power was laid down in Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament.<sup>69</sup> The parliamentary road to socialism is, however, merely the preferred method and, despite pledges of respecting the right of opposition<sup>70</sup> and of defending traditional Canadian political institutions,<sup>71</sup> does not rule out other methods. J.B. Salsberg argued:

...As to the parliamentary path to socialism, the discussion at this plenum December 12-18, 1956 has revealed an amazing retreat from the position we haltingly advanced in the recent past. An unusually large number of N.C. members who spoke here have flatly rejected the concept of a peaceful path to socialism. They argued for amending even this present draft so as to empty that concept of any real meaning....<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>68</sup>"Declaration On The Party," N.A.M., XIV:6 (June, 1957), p. 1.

<sup>69</sup>Cf. Ch. IX, pp.

<sup>70</sup>...The parliamentary transition to socialism, as we envisage it, includes the recognition of the place and rights of opposition parties in a people's parliament, and rejection of the concept of a single party government as the form of transition....

("Draft Policy Resolution for the Sixth National Convention of the Labor-Progressive Party," Op. cit., p. 4.)

<sup>71</sup>...The Communist Party defends the historically-evolved popular institutions of Canadian democracy....

(The Road To Socialism In Canada, Op. cit., Ch. 7, p. 29.)

<sup>72</sup>J.B. Salsberg, "For A Socialist Realignment In Canada," N.A.M., XIV:2 (Feb., 1957), p. 3.

The acceptance, no matter how conditional, of the concept of a parliamentary road to socialism based upon a labour-farmer coalition inevitably involved a definition of the Communist party's relationship with Canada's social democrats. This has long been a question of debate in the party and is not yet settled. In 1934, the C.P.C. labelled the C.C.F. movement as "social-facism." In 1936, the label was dropped in favour of a policy of "united front from below." The 1945 election saw the C.P.C. advocate a Liberal-Labor coalition in an effort to "bypass" the C.C.F.. Three years later, the L.P.P. slogan was "Elect a C.C.F. Government." In the 1953 federal election, as has been previously noted,<sup>73</sup> the L.P.P. nominated 100 candidates, most of whom ran in opposition to C.C.F. nominees. The same policy was pursued in provincial elections which took place between 1953 and 1956 even though the party was advocating a united front at the time. As has been stated,<sup>74</sup> the approach can probably be explained in terms of a belief that any coalition of progressive forces would inevitably occur with formal arrangements being made at the executive level.<sup>75</sup>

The withdrawal of all but two L.P.P. candidates in favour of C.C.F. nominees in the 1956 Saskatchewan provincial elections indicated

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<sup>73</sup>Cf. Ch. IX, pp. 184-185.

<sup>74</sup>Cf. Ch. IX, pp. 184-189.

<sup>75</sup>This brief account of the development of the C.P.C.'s attitude towards democratic socialism is based upon J.B. Salsberg's article "For a Socialist Realignment In Canada" (Loc. cit.).



a change of policy which was confirmed in the draft resolution for the Sixth National Convention L.P.P.:

...In the interests of labor unity and advancing the role of the working class in the political life of our country, the L.P.P. declares that, except in the limited number of carefully selected constituencies in which our party nominates candidates, it will work for the election of progressive candidates - representatives of the C.C.F. labor and farm movements...

...In the majority of cases we will probably be supporting candidates of the C.C.F.....<sup>76</sup>

The statement of intent, subsequently pursued in practise, did not prevent the L.P.P. from maintaining its attitude of hostility towards the C.C.F.'s "right-wing" leadership.<sup>77</sup>

Similarly, the approval with which the C.P.C. greeted C.L.C. and C.C.F. attempts to form a new party, was tempered with suspicion:

...It is necessary to emphasize, however, the right-wing supporters of capitalist policies in the labor movement along with the leadership of the C.C.F. are making a calculated and systematic effort to prevent the implementation of the Winnipeg resolution [C.L.C. resolution which laid the foundation of the N.D.P.]. Instead of an all-inclusive national political reform movement they now have a scheme to restrict trade union political action to support of the C.C.F. - perhaps under another name. This would be to repeat exactly the policy which has failed in the past and which the Winnipeg resolution was supposed to replace. Such a policy assists the representatives of capitalist politics in the ranks of the working class ...who are determined to sabotage the Winnipeg resolution....<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>76</sup>Op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>77</sup>Cf. Ch. IX, p. 187 and Ch. XI, p. 262.

<sup>78</sup>"The Struggle For Total Disarmament, Peace and Independence," Op. cit., p. 23.

Notwithstanding such objections, the policy resolution of the Seventeenth National Convention, C.P.C. waxed eloquent over the advance the N.D.P. represented:

...The formation of the New Democratic Party is welcomed by the Communist Party as a major development in the struggle to break the political domination of the parties of monopoly capital. It opens up new and favorable opportunities for labor political action and to unite labor with the farmers and middle class....<sup>79</sup>

However, the resolution warned, "the possibilities and promise of the N.D.P. cannot be realized if the right-wing leaders of social democracy, at this time in the leadership of the N.D.P., have their way."<sup>80</sup> To prevent the right-wing leadership from having its way, the C.P.C. called upon its members and members of all progressive, democratic organizations "to work for the affiliation of these organizations with the N.D.P." and to work in friendship with its members and supporters. Support for the N.D.P. was still advocated but with more specific qualifications than had been included in the 1957 draft policy resolution:

...In other constituencies where the Communist Party does not nominate our efforts should be directed to the election of candidates of the N.D.P., with the exception of outspoken advocates of policies indistinguishable from the main policies of the old line parties, and who could not honestly be supported by progressive voters....<sup>81</sup>

Communists' efforts to associate themselves with the N.D.P. have been greeted, by the latter party, with violent rejection and acute embarrassment. That this should be the case demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the C.P.C.'s attempts to reshape its image in the mold of

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<sup>79</sup>Op. cit., p. 19.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid...

<sup>81</sup>Ibid...

Canadian patriotism and non-violent revolution. The C.P.C.'s vision for Canada seems to have been brought no closer to realization by the party's current approach to politics.

SECTION IV: CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER XII  
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, FUTURE  
PROSPECTS

The C.P.C. is today a small party of a rigidly bureaucratic character, isolated from the public by its policies, popular reputation and introspection. It has little or none of the aura of messianism which surrounds or has surrounded the bulk of the world's most successful Communist parties. Its affairs over the past decade have been dominated by organizational problems and ideological discussions generated by events occurring outside of Canada, of little concern to the vast majority of Canadians, and so encrusted with the jargon of Communism as to be virtually unintelligible to the casual enquirer.

During the inner-party crisis of 1956-57, a sizeable element of the party demonstrated itself to be aware of the C.P.C.'s isolation.

Norman Penner argued:

...We have become highly institutionalized, have made organization our chief concern instead of ideology, and have built ourselves a tight, closely knit party along Stalin's lines, bearing little resemblance to either Marx or Lenin concepts of democratic debate, public discussions and the free play of opinions within socialist circles.

All of these practices have harmed Marxist thinking and have resulted in a growth of the role of leadership, a denial of the creative role of people, and a constant decline in our strength and influence....<sup>1</sup>

A Toronto member, in a letter to N.A.M. demanding a more independent and truly Canadian character for the party, claimed that the C.P.C. was "weak and isolated."<sup>2</sup> Two party members from Winnipeg stated:

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<sup>1</sup>Norman Penner, "Comrade Norman Penner's Amendment," N.A.M., XIV:1 (Jan., 1957), p. 9.

<sup>2</sup>Carol Lynne, "Searching For The Canadian Path," N.A.M., XIV:2 (Feb., 1957), p. 14.

...At our Provincial Convention here in 1956 our slogan was "Build a Mass Party in Manitoba." Well, a year later we are still the same size, if not smaller and the slogan remains just words....<sup>3</sup>

The Quebec City and district committee of the L.P.P. discussed, in N.A.M., the reasons for "the stagnation" of the party and claimed that "the recruiting of members has hardly amounted to anything" and that "the diffusion of our press has been regressive when it should have been increasing."<sup>4</sup> Another party worker described the CPC as a "middle-class, pseudo-intellectual debating society."<sup>5</sup> In other articles and letters the words "sect" and "sectarian" were frequently employed as descriptions of the party.

Moreover, the party's isolation and relative weakness has been acknowledged by the national organization. The acknowledgement has been implicit in the recurrent appeals, in the resolutions of National Conventions, for party members to increase and intensify their efforts to "build the party."

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<sup>3</sup>Jack and Betty Perlmutter, "For N. Penner's Amendment," N.A.M., XIV:3 (Mar., 1957), p. 5.

<sup>4</sup>Quebec city and district committee of the L.P.P., "Proposals To Build Quebec L.P.P.," N.A.M., XIV:3 (Mar., 1957), p. 19.

<sup>5</sup>Olive Olynyk, "Let Us Close Ranks To Go Forward For Socialism," N.A.M., XIV:4 (Apr., 1957), p. 21.

A relatively unimportant force in Canadian politics today, the future prospects of the C.P.C. will be determined as much by its existing strengths and weaknesses as by developments within the country or external events. The latter two factors are largely imponderables. However, a reasonably accurate projection of the development of the C.P.C. can be made on the basis of the strengths and weaknesses of the party as revealed in the preceding chapters and summarized in the following passages.

Its hierarchical structure and the rigid discipline it imposes upon its membership are one of the greatest sources of strength of the C.P.C.. Under normal circumstances policy is, de facto, formulated at the executive level and unquestioningly, although with varying degrees of efficiency, implemented by the lower echelons. Instructions from above have the force of orders rather than requests. Provincial, municipal and federal organizations are totally integrated. All these factors combine to allow the C.P.C. to function with a decisiveness and a consistency in a given situation not usually possible in the more loosely organized structures of Canada's major political parties. The C.P.C. is in fact invested with the resiliency of a military command structure. Thrice forced underground in its history, the C.P.C. has each time returned to public life as strong or stronger than it was when outlawed. While other factors contributed to the continued existence of the party, none was so influential as its structure and discipline.

Connected with and, to an extent, complementary to the discipline



required of party members is the fact that their social contacts are largely restricted to other party members.<sup>6</sup> This situation provides the party with the opportunity to more effectively impose its discipline and also limits the opportunities for a party members' belief in Communist doctrines to be challenged, for doubts to be instilled, through normal social discourse.

The type of organization just discussed is most effective in a society suffering under the virtually complete breakdown, as the result of military or economic disaster or a combination of both, of traditional social and political institutions. Of this, graphic examples are provided by the recent history of China, Russia and Yugoslavia, to name three countries. However, there are also disadvantages attendant upon the existing structure and discipline of the C.P.C..

The most obvious weakness resulting from the rigid discipline and hierarchical structure of the C.P.C. is that illustrated by the inner party crisis of 1956-57. That is, a divergence of opinion or actual split in the upper echelons results in an extreme degree of confusion at the lower levels. The following statement by a party member serves as an illustration:

...The greatest tragedy of the present party crisis is that it could have been avoided. The hostility, villification and resignations from the party were all needlessly brought about by a leadership which did not face up to the significance of the 20th C.P.S.U.

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<sup>6</sup>Cf. Ch. V, pp. 80-81.

Congress for Canadian communists, and to this day refuses to recognize that fundamental changes are required or we face further disintegration and a future which holds little promise for the L.P.P....<sup>7</sup>

Other weaknesses, less apparent but with an equally destructive potential, also flow from the martial qualities of the party's organizational structure. Perhaps the greatest of these is the sapping of individual initiative. Some party members have noted the tendency and commented upon it:

...There has been too much high pressure salesmanship (with regard to policy) from the top and too little feeling for the members who do the legwork. This has largely destroyed the initiative of the rank and file and turned our lower bodies into semi-isolated sects....<sup>8</sup>

The relative isolation of party members from their community also has attendant disadvantages for the C.P.C.. The most obvious weakness of the situation is that it allows the party to ignore vital changes within the community; to prevent it from seeing the inadequacies in its stereotyped descriptions of society and solutions to society's problems; to even express itself in a manner both unintelligible and unacceptable to the very people it hopes to convert. The latter weakness was remarked upon in a letter to N.A.M..

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<sup>7</sup>Norma Penner, "Some Changes We Need," N.A.M., XIV:4 (Apr., 1957), p. 14.

<sup>8</sup>J.P., "On the Debate and the Draft Resolution: Six Proposals to Improve Our Party," N.A.M. XIV:4 (Apr., 1957), p. 10.

...Phrases like "a handful of parasitic finance capitalists," and "the democratic and peace-loving Canadian peoples" are no part of the Canadian tradition of thinking, writing and speaking....<sup>9</sup>

Two members from the Lakehead attacked the insularity of L.P.P. members and exposed its results in a letter to N.A.M.

...Standards of conduct for Communists are very high. Therefore we consider it a high honour to be a party member, and rightly so. But out of this attitude has arisen a negative feature. Not only do we often act in a conceited manner towards "outsiders" (!) but we have developed a feeling about this scientific organization of the working class, which amounts almost to "party worship." We have all listened to eulogies to "our party." Perorations have often been given as to the greatness, the gloriousness, etc. etc. of "our party."

Undue respect is expected of members toward party institutions and officers (and, indirectly, toward party leaders). "Cult of the individual" or "cult of the party," both are unhealthy and distasteful to the Canadian worker....<sup>10</sup>

A second potential strength to the C.P.C. is the conviction of its membership that Communism and Communism alone holds the keys which will unlock Canada's full potential as a nation; that they are the vanguard of the proletariat. They maintain the conviction despite their expulsion from the bulk of Canada's unions and their constant lack of success at the polls:

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<sup>9</sup>E.W. Kemp, "For an Independent Marxist Labor-Progressive Party," N.A.M., XIV:2 (Feb., 1957), p. 10.

<sup>10</sup>M.F. and D.F., "A Contribution to the Party Discussion," N.A.M., XIV:2 (Feb., 1957), p. 8.

...Our party, the Y.C.L. and the press will be built to the extent that the Canadian people see us as the foremost champions of peace, Canadian independence and their vital economic needs. We must bring to Canadians the real picture of the Communist Party - the party of patriots, of democrats, of consistent fighters for socialism, people devoted to the cause of the working class and distinguished by their readiness to unite with all democratic Canadians on the issues of the day....<sup>11</sup>

Such a massive and irrational faith has, if properly motivated, an undoubtedly great potential for action. However, based, as many of the party members' convictions seem to be, upon indoctrination rather than upon a rational examination of factual material, the faith of party members stands as inordinately great chance of being shattered by indisputable facts which run counter to their opinions. The validity of such a charge is illustrated by the effects of the Folkstimme revelations and Khrushchev's secret speech upon the Canadian party. Moreover, such rigid conviction can lead to the adoption of attitudes which ignore reality and which make the party both slightly repugnant and highly ludicrous to Canadians outside its pale. One example of such an attitude is the past worship of Stalin or, as the party phrased it:

...We made a most serious mistake in idolizing Stalin and in effect attributing infallibility to his ideas. We fell victim to the cult which grew up around him....<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>"Policy Resolution of the 17th National Convention of the Communist Party of Canada," Op. cit., sec. IV, sub-sec. 1, p. 21.

<sup>12</sup>"Draft Policy Resolution for the Sixth National Convention of the L.P.P.," N.A.M., XIV:1 (Jan., 1957), p. 5.

One might argue that the events of 1956-57 must have forced Canada's Communists to adopt a more down to earth attitude. A fitting rejoinder to such an argument is to point out the alacrity with which the victorious "old guard" of the C.P.C. abandoned Stalin once he had been denounced.

The factor which, more than any other, prevents Canadians from dismissing the C.P.C. as being politically insignificant is its links with the international Communist movement and, more particularly, the Soviet Union. No Communist party can be ignored, as the post-war events in Eastern Europe testify, while Communist regimes continue to control a significant proportion of the world's human and natural resources. Another strength with which the Soviet connection provides the C.P.C. is that of prestige by association. That is, the Canadian and, indeed, Western habit of interpreting all events in the Soviet Union in a purely political sense places every worthwhile achievement of the Soviet Union in the position of being a triumph for Communism. Since the Canadian party is closely modelled upon the C.P.S.U. and since its aims are virtually identical with those of the Soviet regime the C.P.C. is bound to reflect some of the glory of Soviet achievements. There is, for example, good reason to believe that the heroism of the Red Army did much to support the growth in strength of the L.P.P. during World War Two and, more recently, that the sputniks contributed in no small way to the C.P.C.'s recovery from the inner party crisis of 1956-57.

Paradoxically the C.P.C.'s connections with the U.S.S.R. also have the effect of weakening the party's influence in Canada. To most Canadians the U.S.S.R. is, today, the enemy. By association membership

in the C.P.C. is viewed as being mildly treasonable. As one party member expressed it:

...The illusion that the leaders of the L.P.P. owe their first allegiance to Canada has been shattered as far as I am concerned. I have come to the conclusion that they owe their first allegiance to what they call "proletarian internationalism," which is a catch-word for subservience to the policies and political concepts formulated by the C.P.S.U....<sup>13</sup>

The result of the situation was succinctly described by two other party members who stated that: "The way things now stand it seems that whatever issue we [the L.P.P.] touch we taint."<sup>14</sup> The process of guilt by association is undoubtedly aided by the dim, but still extant, memories of the Gouzenko case.

There is, in Canada, a widespread and healthy fear of what has been termed "red baiting." Red baiting, in effect constitutes highly emotional attacks on Communism, irresponsible and unprincipled attacks upon proponents and suspected proponents of the doctrine, "hate-mongering" and the advocacy of severely restrictive laws specifically designed to limit the activities of Communism. Canadian deprecation of such policies has undoubtedly been strengthened by knowledge of the excesses and injustices produced by Senator Macarthy's regime in the U.S.A., particularly where they affected Canada as in the case of Ambassador Norman.

Whatever the reasons for the fear of red-baiting, it is an asset

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<sup>13</sup>Carol Lynn, Loc. cit..

<sup>14</sup>Jack and Betty Perlmutter, Loc. cit..

to the Communist party. It has resulted in Canadian Communists being much less circumscribed in their activities than their American counterparts. The drafting of legislation and the institution, by executive action, of practises designed to harass Communists have undoubtedly been severely curtailed by the public outcry which, it is anticipated, would greet their introduction.

The advantage the C.P.C. derives from its countrymen's unwillingness to formally treat it as being anything other than another Canadian political party is more than counterbalanced by an informal but firm belief that the party is different and alien. Aside from those qualities of the party, such as its Soviet affiliations and its distinctive jargon, which indicate to all and sundry that the party is, at best, distinctive, there are a number of external factors which contribute to the inability of the C.P.C. to find a significant degree of acceptance in Canada. The unanimous opposition of other Canadian political parties to the aims, professed and suspected, of the C.P.C. is one such factor.

Because of the peculiar ability of political parties both to reflect and to mold public opinion, the insistence of other Canadian political parties upon treating the C.P.C. as a somewhat unsavory special case both indicates and serves to perpetuate the Communist's inability to make their doctrine acceptable to Canadians. Most outspoken in their opposition to the C.P.C. and the earlier L.P.P. have been the Social Crediters. They have consistently advocated the outlawing of the C.P.C.. Although the language with which the Social Crediters express their dislike of the C.P.C. has grown progressively more moderate, their attacks

on the Communists have been characterized by a vehemence not present in the pronouncements of the other parties. During the early fifties some Social Crediters so far forgot themselves as to make statements which would have been quite at home in Nazi Germany:

...this twenty-five year long red campaign [to subvert the free world] was characterized by a bewildering combination of cunning, duplicity and treachery such as has accompanied all the moves of an utterly unmoral, unscrupulous, unrelenting and insatiable monster. A good many who laugh may laugh on the other side of their faces if that monster gets into Canada, as it is rapidly getting in. This insatiable monster is the Turko-Mongolian-red conspiracy which the free world faces today....<sup>15</sup>

Under the leadership of George Drew, the Progressive-Conservative Party also advocated outlawing the L.P.P.:

...I do not believe that communist activities, which are designed and intended to undermine the strength of the state at a time when we are spending so much money, and putting forward so much human effort to prevent communist aggression, should be permitted in this country....<sup>16</sup>

Led by John Deifenbaker and in office, the Conservative attitude toward the C.P.C. changed. In reply to a question put to him in the House by Lucien Cardin, Mr. Deifenbaker said:

...In so far as the Canadian government is concerned, its policy is that the Communist Party may operate in Canada as a legal entity. However it becomes subject to prosecution when its members contravene the provisions of the criminal code with respect to sedition or treason or, in other words, endeavour to act in such a way as to undermine the government by force or contravene other provisions of the criminal code....<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>J.H. Blackmore (Social Credit, Lethbridge), Debates of the House of Commons of Canada, Session 1953-54, IV (Mar., 29, 1954), p. 3455.

<sup>16</sup>The Hon. George Drew, Debates of the House of Commons of Canada, Session 1952, III (May 26, 1952), p. 2561.

<sup>17</sup>The Hon. John G. Deifenbaker, Debates of the House of Commons of Canada, Session 1960-61, I (Nov., 24, 1960), p. 147.



The policy of the Conservative government as enunciated by Mr. Diefenbaker very closely approximated that pursued by Liberal governments during the 'fifties. However, while the Liberals and, it would seem the Conservatives, are prepared to concede the C.P.C.'s legal right to propagate its doctrine, they have also instructed the R.C.M.P. to maintain a surveillance of the activities of party members.

The older parties' legalistic and antagonistic attitude towards the C.P.C. is duplicated in most respects by the N.D.P. and before it the C.C.F.. The democratic socialists differ from the other parties in their greater concern about the injustices and potential injustices which have or might result from the R.C.M.P.'s investigation of Communists. Their concern is not the product of an inherent sympathy for Communism. Rather it is the product of a firm belief in individual freedom and a natural fear that over-zealous and poorly-educated investigators might fail to see the distinction between Communism and democratic socialism.

The aforementioned R.C.M.P. surveillance of the C.P.C. and its members, is another of the factors which inhibit the growth of Communism in Canada. The surveillance effectively sets the C.P.C. apart from other Canadian organizations. It indicates that membership in the C.P.C. while legal, is suspect. Party members come to be viewed either as a band of potential and actual traitors or as a group of martyrs subjected to unnecessary indignities by an unenlightened political regime. In general, R.C.M.P. investigations have had the effect of limiting the opportunities for a person to form a casual association with the C.P.C..

Another substantial obstacle to the growth of Communism in Canada

is the attitude which has been adopted by the non-Communist media of mass communication. Although to a lesser extent than their American counterparts, the Canadian media, with the major exception of the C.B.C., seem to have assigned themselves the duty of protecting the nation against the inroads of Communism. The terms employed to describe Communists and Communism, the anti-Communist jokes and anecdotes, the attention paid by, for example, the Winnipeg Free Press in discovering the exposing Communist front groups<sup>18</sup> are not merely the reflection of existing attitudes. They are part of an attempt to shape opinion. The effects of this program, which is conducted both consciously and unconsciously, are strengthened by the American magazines on Canadian newsstands and by American programs broadcast by Canadian radio and television.

Another check on C.P.C. expansion is the adamant opposition of organized religion, in particular the Catholic Church and fundamentalist sects. The reasons for its dislike of the C.P.C. are obvious. Its beliefs with regard to Communism, in a general sense, are so well known that they need no elaboration here. The degree of influence which church and synagogue exert on public opinion cannot be determined. Suffice it to say that, while the influence of organized religion has declined over the years, it remains a reasonably potent force in the shaping of Canadian opinion, especially in Quebec and Newfoundland.

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<sup>18</sup>Cf. Ch. VI, pp. 104-108.

A further obstacle for the party to overcome, although it is surmised a relatively minor one, are the organizations, such as Moral Re-  
armament and Alert, which are avowedly anti-Communist. The tracts of  
such organizations are so obviously written with an extreme bias that  
they probably do not exert a direct influence on many people. They may,  
however, when modified and diffused through discussion, contribute to  
the sustaining of an anti-Communist climate of opinion.

Of probable greater influence are the various non-Communist, ethnic,  
fraternal organizations. A very large section of the post-1945 immigrants  
came from Eastern Europe where they had direct experience of Communism,  
or from Central Europe where thousands of Germans and Austrians had fought  
on the Eastern front. Hence the situation in ethnic circles has been very  
different, since 1945, to what it was after World War One. Many non-  
Communist ethnic organizations, as a result, are actively anti-Communist.  
The words of their newspapers and workers add to the stream of anti-  
Communist sentiment in Canada. At the same time, the organizations do  
much to warn the unwary immigrant about the Communist leanings of variously  
ethnically-oriented front groups. The C.P.C. is thereby deprived, in all  
likelihood, of a number of potential converts and of increased size and  
influence for its satellite organizations.

A similar effect is created by the C.L.C.'s continuing resolve to  
prevent Communists and Communist-led unions from playing a part in the  
organization of Canadian labour.<sup>19</sup> The possible implications of C.L.C.

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<sup>19</sup>Cf. Ch. VIII, pp. 133-134.

opposition to the C.P.C. become apparent when it is remembered that the two most influential Communist parties outside the Communist bloc, those of France and Italy, are based largely on the labour unions. The attitude, previously discussed, of post-1945 immigrants has, undoubtedly, made the task of the C.L.C. easier. Immigrants compose a large section of the Canadian labour force and might have provided the C.P.C., under different circumstances, with more support and members than, for instance, business or professional people.

Of definite advantage to the party is its ability to be somewhat indiscriminate in its support of popular causes. Moreover, it is able to dwell upon the shortcomings of the government and the flaws in Canadian society and to make them appear even worse than they are by painting glowing pictures of what might be with only the vaguest reference to means of effecting the change. Such practises are, of course, common to all parties not in power and hence not hampered in their actions by the responsibilities of office. However, the C.P.C. in its endeavours to secure support has been willing to go beyond such mildly dishonest practises and resort to completely irresponsible measures. At one point, for example, the L.P.P. unequivocally supported the Montreal riots which resulted from the suspension of Maurice Richard, a hockey player, from the league finals. The party's contention that the suspension was simply another act of Anglo-Saxon chauvinism, (the league's president's name was Clarence Campbell); that the riots were a demonstration of French-Canada's growing national

consciousness, and a just protest against deep-seated grievances, must have struck responsive chords in Quebec.<sup>20</sup>

Once again, however, the potential gains in support represented by such practises are limited by another trait of the party. As it has been frequently noted, the C.P.C. seems unable to present its ideas in a form and language acceptable to the vast majority of Canadians.

Although most Canadians have been persuaded to abhor Communism doctrines and although most would avoid any contact with the C.P.C., their resistance to the party is, for the most part, passive rather than active. Indeed, the greatest asset to the C.P.C. at the polls, especially at the municipal level, is the general apathy of the Canadian electorate. In areas with a large concentration of Communists, such as Spadina in Toronto and Ward Three in Winnipeg, disinterest on the part of the electors coupled with a disciplined and virtually total turn-out of Communists can, and has, done much to produce occasional Communist victories. However such concentrated pockets of Communists are relatively few. Thus the C.P.C. has been unable to fully exploit the political apathy of Canadians. Winning elections by default remains a largely unrealized potential of the party.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>Gui Caron, "Richard and National Feelings of French Canada," C.T., XVIII:922 (Mar. 28, 1955), p. 1 and George Barr, "Who's to Blame for l'Affaire Richard?," C.T., XVIII:922 (Mar. 28, 1955), p. 11.

<sup>21</sup>Cf. Appendices D and E.

A factor which both indicates and perpetuates the C.P.C.'s weakness is its relatively small size. It faces the dilemma of all minority political parties in Canada. That is, it is not large enough or wealthy enough to mount a full slate of candidates in an election and thus put on a convincing display of seeking to form a government. Electors which might be attracted by its candidates or its platform are thus discouraged from voting for the party because of a belief that they would be wasting their votes. This factor contributes to a poor showing at the polls and thereby compromises the party's ability to gain converts. At the same time lack of members limits the C.P.C.'s ability to send out canvassers who might overcome such attitudes in the case of some electors.

The relative prosperity Canada has enjoyed over the past decade confronts the C.P.C. with a final and virtually insurmountable obstacle. As the bulk of the people are blessed with a relatively secure and comfortable existence, they are unwilling to accept radical solutions to the problems which continue to confront them. They are afraid to take the possible risk of losing some of the considerable advantages they enjoy through treading an unknown path however rewarding the adventure might be made to appear.

In balance, then, it would seem that the C.P.C., in the immediate future, will strongly resemble the party of the last decade in size and influence. An increase in the prestige of international Communism or a radical change of Canadian conditions may result in some gains for the party. Unless, however, such changes should prove to be permanent, there is little reason to believe the party's gains will be anything but

transitory. Similarly, there seems to be little chance that the C.P.C. will radically decline in strength. The party's resiliency has been effectively demonstrated by its recovery after the inner-party crisis of 1956-57. Moreover, there would seem to be, at present, but one dispute with the potential of producing a significant schism - the Sino-Soviet dispute. As has been noted<sup>22</sup> the C.P.C. is now firmly committed to the Soviet camp and the best opportunity for those elements of the party which sympathize with China to state their case has passed. At any rate, if and when the split between the Soviet Union and China does occur, the centripetal forces which have been so much in evidence within the Communist movement since Stalin's death will guarantee a lesser degree of confusion than resulted from de-Stalinization. In addition the element of shock will be missing.

The organizational structure and general character of the C.P.C. will also likely remain unchanged in the near future. The inner-party crisis of 1956-57 left the old guard firmly entrenched and caused most of the members desirous of change to leave the party in one manner or another. For the same reason no fundamental alteration in the party's tactics should be expected. The technique of infiltration<sup>23</sup> will probably be more frequently employed, however, as conditions continue to mitigate against a fully effective use of the thinly disguised front groups.

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<sup>22</sup>Cf. Ch. X, p. 220.

<sup>23</sup>Cf. Ch.VII, p. 158-161.

The extreme unlikelyhood, barring some unprecedented military or economic catastrophe, of the C.P.C. gaining power solely through its own endeavors must now be abundantly clear to even its most obtuse and militant members. Therefore the party will likely continue to pursue the chimera of an alliance of all "progressive" elements in the country. The C.C.F. and the N.D.P. consistently rejected such approaches during the past decade. The attitude of the C.C.F. towards a left alliance was made plain by M.J. Coldwell on several occasions in the House of Commons. Rising on a point privilege regarding some remarks made by Walter Harris, then Minister of Finance, Mr. Coldwell said:

The radio and press over the weekend have carried a story that the Minister of Finance, when speaking in Toronto Saturday night, made what is a serious allegation. In discussing the expulsion of certain Trotskyites from the C.C.F. - may I say no organization in Canada has been more careful to expel communists when we have discovered them within the C.C.F. - [the Minister implied similar sympathies existed among the C.C.F. members of Parliament].

.....

The thing that surprised me is that a Minister for whom I had a great deal of respect would stoop to that level of smearing....<sup>24</sup>

On another occasion George Drew cast doubts upon Mr. Coldwell's claim

"that the socialist parties are the most ardent antagonists of communism."<sup>25</sup>

Mr. Coldwell replied by saying:

Perhaps I should put it the other way around, that the socialist parties of Europe are the most hated by the communist parties.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>M.J. Coldwell, Debates of the House of Commons of Canada, Session 1955, III (Apr. 18, 1955), pp. 2894-95.

<sup>25</sup>The Hon. George Drew, Debates of the House of Commons of Canada, Session 1953-54, VI (June 26, 1954), p. 6797.

<sup>26</sup>M.J. Coldwell, Ibid..



Mr. Drew then made an oblique reference to the Nenni Socialists' alliance with the Communist Party of Italy. Mr. Coldwell's rejoinder was: "There are black sheep in every group."<sup>27</sup> There is no reason to expect a change of attitude on the part of the N.D.P.. Firstly, the Communists do not command enough support at the polls to make an alliance, with all the compromises it would entail, worthwhile. Secondly, given the existing climate of opinion about Communism, any gains a Communist alliance might bring would be far out-weighed by the odium which would attach itself to the N.D.P.. Thirdly, and most important, is the fact that the N.D.P. is a less radical organization than its predecessor. In its endeavour to secure a broad base of support the N.D.P. has pushed the process, begun by the C.C.F., of watering down the socialist content of its program virtually to the limits commensurate with maintaining a distinctive identity. An alliance with the Communists would amount to a reversal of this trend.

With few prospects of a significant increase in size and support, with even dimmer prospects for the creation of a left alliance, the C.P.C. seems destined to remain a small isolated sect operating on the fringes of Canadian political life. Whatever opportunity for a renaissance there was died with the expulsion and resignation of most of the party's less doctrinaire minds following the internal disputes of 1956-57. The aging,<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid..

<sup>28</sup>An aging rank-and file presents another major problem. According to Leslie Morris the "party's average age is in the 50's." The quotation was taken from the keynote address delivered by Leslie Morris, national

dogmatic and bureaucratic party leadership has impressed an indelible image of its character upon the C.P.C.. Confined by the iron bonds of orthodoxy the party will continue to fail in its endeavours to establish a dialogue between itself and the Canadian people. Its direct influence on the country's affairs will remain small. So long, however, as international Communism remains a vital force in the affairs of the world, the C.P.C. will continue to attract and deserve, a degree of attention which would be unwarranted if it stood alone.

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leader of the C.P.C., to delegates attending the Eighteenth National Convention, C.P.C. (Mar. 27-30, 1964) and published in his Challenge of the '60s: Three Point Program for Canada, p. 27.

**SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY**

In the interest of brevity it has been found advisable, in the footnotes of the thesis, to assign abbreviations to those periodicals and newspapers frequently cited as sources. The following is a list of the abbreviations employed and the corresponding full titles:

<u>C.T.</u>	.....	<u>Canadian Tribune</u>
<u>M.Q.</u>	.....	<u>Marxist Quarterly</u>
<u>M.R.</u>	.....	<u>Marxist Review</u>
<u>N.A.M.</u>	.....	<u>National Affairs Monthly</u>
<u>W.F.P.</u>	.....	<u>Winnipeg Free Press</u>

## A. PRIMARY SOURCES

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APPENDIX A  
IMPORTANT EVENTS  
IN THE RECENT HISTORY  
OF THE C.P.C.



It will be noted that the following chart treats the inner party crisis of 1956-57 in considerably more detail than any corresponding period of time in the party's recent history. It is believed that the central importance of the crisis to the post-Stalinist period warrants such a treatment.

Aug. 21-22, 1943	Constituent Convention founds the L.P.P.
June 11, 1945	Canadian federal election. Fred Rose, an L.P.P. candidate, re-elected to represent a Montreal riding in the House of Commons.
Sept. 5, 1945	Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Russian Embassy in Ottawa, defects with information on a Soviet spy ring operating in Canada. Fred Rose, M.P., and Sam Carr, L.P.P. organizer, are implicated. Both men are eventually tried and sentenced to prison for their part in the ring's operation.
June 1-5, 1946	Second National Convention, L.P.P..
1948	J.B. Salsberg begins to question the treatment of the Jewish minority in the U.S.S.R..
Feb. 4-8, 1949	Third National Convention, L.P.P.. New constitution adopted.
1948-1951	T.L.C. and C.C.L. begin to purge themselves of Communist dominated unions and Communist officials.
Jan. 25-27, 1951	Fourth National Convention, L.P.P.. Plans made for a new election platform.
Feb., 1952	Draft a new program, <u>Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament: Canada's Path to Socialism</u> , published.
May, 1952	N.C. adopts new election platform "Put Canada First."
Mar. 3, 1953	Stalin dies.

- 1953 J.B. Salsberg dropped from N.E.C. because of his constant demands for an investigation of alleged anti-semitism in the U.S.S.R.. He is not re-elected to the body in March, 1954.
- Mar. 25-28, 1954 Fifth National Convention, L.P.P.. New program, Canadian Independence and a People's Parliament; Canada's Path to Socialism, is adopted.
- 1955 J.B. Salsberg visits U.S.S.R. to conduct his own investigation into anti-semitic practises. His report, because of pressure from the N.E.C., understates his findings.
- Feb., 1956 Twentieth Congress C.P.S.U..
- Mar., 1956 First reports of C.P.S.U. Congress in N.A.M..
- Mid-Apr., 1956 Buck returns from Congress.
- Apr. 25, 1956 Canadian Tribune reports Folkstimme revelation of anti-semitic practises in the U.S.S.R..
- May, 1956 Salsberg, vindicated, reinstated to N.E.C..
- May 22, 1956 N.E.C. issues statement on Twentieth Congress C.P.S.U.. Statement characterizes Khrushchev's explanations of Stalin's excesses as inadequate; criticises the C.P.S.U.'s attempt to keep Khrushchev's speech from other C.P.'s.
- Early June, 1956 U.S. State Department publishes unofficial text of Khrushchev's secret speech.
- June 30, 1956 Central Committee of C.P.S.U. issues statement designed to reduce controversy aroused by the publication of Khrushchev's secret speech.
- Late June, 1956 N.E.C. passes resolution asking C.P.S.U. for a full explanation of Stalinist excesses.
- July 31, 1956 N.E.C. issues a resolution referring to the June 30 statement of the C.P.S.U.. General approval is expressed.

- Late Aug., 1956 N.E.C. dispatches delegation composed of Buck, Leslie Morris, J.B. Salsberg, and William Kardash to Moscow to interview C.P.S.U. leaders. Upon its return the delegation can't agree upon the wording of its report.
- Oct. 10-12, 1956 Buck and Salsberg address Quebec membership. Their differences come out into the open.
- Oct. 12, 1956 N.E.C. unanimously adopts the report of the delegation to Moscow. Salsberg votes in favour "with certain reservations."
- Oct. 15, 1956 N.E.C. receives notification of the resignation of Gui Caron and five other leading members of the Quebec provincial organization.
- Oct. 19, 1956 Harry Binder and Buck go to Montreal in an attempt to secure the withdrawal of the resignations. They are unsuccessful.
- Oct. 22, 1956 N.E.C. votes to have Buck surrender the office of general-secretary. The whole N.E.C. resigns. Salsberg is opposed to the latter move.
- Oct. 23, 1956 N.E.C. sends cables "greeting" Gomulka and chastizing C.P.S.U. for its attempt to interfere in the internal operations of the Polish party.
- Oct. 24-28, 1956 Sometime between these dates, at a special meeting, the N.E.C. unanimously withdraws its motion demanding Buck step down. However, it does not withdraw criticism of Buck.
- Oct.28-Nov.9,1956 N.C. meets. It elects a new N.E.C. and withdraws telegram to Moscow.
- Nov. 17, 1956 N.A.M. publishes a plea, from the N.E.C., for members to remain loyal to the party.
- Late Dec., 1956 N.C. meets to prepare for a National Convention.
- Apr. 19-22, 1957 Sixth National Convention, L.P.P.. Buck emerges victorious. New constitution adopted.
- Mar., 1958 Draft of the new party program, The Road to Socialism in Canada, published

- Oct. 9-12, 1959      Seventh National Convention, L.P.P.. Party's name reverts to C.P.C.. Convention becomes known as Sixteenth National Convention, C.P.C.. Constitution adopted.
- July,                1960                New program, The Road To Socialism In Canada, published
- Jan. 19-21, 1962      Seventeenth National Convention, C.P.C.. Constitution revised. Leslie Morris succeeds Buck as general-secretary.

APPENDIX B

C.P.C. MEMBERSHIP 1939-1962

The following table was not designed to present an accurate accounting of C.P.C. membership figures between 1953 and 1962. Rather the table is intended to supply the reader with a rough guide and, at the same time, to illustrate the difficulties encountered by anyone attempting to establish the precise size of the C.P.C. in a given period.

Figures marked with an asterisk have been taken from, or attributed to, Communist sources.

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>MEMBERSHIP</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
1939	18,000	<u>World News and Views</u> (London), April 6, 1939.
*1944	18,000	Pat Sullivan, <u>Red Sails On The Great Lakes</u> , p. 145.
1947	23,000	<u>World News and Views</u> (London), March 15, 1947.
1947	14,000	"'Old Red Comrades' Are Not Fading Away," <u>Fin. Post</u> , June 18, 1955.
1948	12,000	<u>Ibid..</u>
1949	10,000	<u>Ibid..</u>
1950	7,000	<u>Ibid..</u>
1951-54	5,500	<u>Ibid..</u>
*1953	"Under 10,000"	Statement by Tim Buck in an interview published in <u>W.F.P.</u> , Nov. 24, 1955.
1955	"almost 12,000"	<u>Ibid..</u>
1955	7,000	<u>Fin. Post</u> , June 18, 1955.
1957	..."Fewer than 2,000"	Ralph Allen, "The Slow Comeback of Canada's Communists," <u>Maclean's</u> , July 29, 1961.

YEAR	MEMBERSHIP	SOURCE
*1959	6,000	Statement by Fajon, French Communist leader, <u>Humanite</u> . Quoted in <u>Marxist Review</u> Jan-Feb. 1960.
1959	6,000	Statement by Tim Buck, <u>Winnipeg Tribune</u> , Dec. 14, 1959.
*late 1959	"recent low point of 5,000"	Tim Buck, quoted by John Leblanc, <u>W.F.P.</u> , Mar. 11, 1961.
*1960	"we have 6,000 active members right now"	Statement by Nelson Clarke in an interview with Terence Robertson, <u>Fin. Post</u> , Dec. 10, 1960.
*1961	"around 7,000"	Tim Buck, quoted by John Leblanc <u>Loc. cit.</u> .
*1961	"3,000 card-carrying members"	Tim Buck, quoted by Hon. E. David Fulton. <u>Debates of the House of Commons of Canada</u> , Session 1960-61. vol. VI (June 9, 1961), p. 6120.
1962	4,500	Sidney Katz, "Inside Canada's Secret Police," <u>Maclean's</u> , Apr. 20, 1963.

APPENDIX C  
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION  
OF  
COMMUNIST AND SATELLITE ORGANIZATIONS



The following table was compiled from messages of greeting and advertisements traditionally published in the May Day, Labour Day and New Year's Day editions of the Canadian Tribune.

The table does not supply a complete accounting of party clubs and satellite organizations in Canada. Quebec and British Columbia, for example, have far more Communists and Communist sympathizers than the table indicates. It is suspected that organizations from those two provinces place their messages in Combat and the Pacific Tribune respectively.

Regretably the relevant numbers of the Canadian Tribune for 1961 were not available at the time the table was compiled. Hence the absence of any figures for that year.

1953

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other
Man.	Winnipeg	C.T. XVI(823) May 4, 1953	11	A.U.U.C. 4 Br. U.J.P.O. 1 Br. W.R.A. 1 Br. Head Office Point Douglas Mass. Assoc.	1 local	1
	Brandon	"	1	Polish Dem. Assoc. Ukr. Labor Hall Comm.		
Ont.	Toronto	"		Bulgarian-Can. People's League 1 Br. Macedonian-Can. People's League 1 Br. U.J.P.O. 1 Br.		5
	Oshawa	"	1			"a group" from local 200 U.A.W.
	London	"	2	A.U.U.C. 1 Br. Fed'n Russ. - Can. 1 Br.		
	Waterford	"		A.U.U.C. 1 Br.		
	Windsor	"	1	A.U.U.C. 1 Br. Fed'n Russ. - Can. 1 Br.		

Cont.

1953

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other
(Niagara Penn.)	St. Catharines	C.T. XVI(823) May 4, 1953	1			
	Niagara Falls	"	2			
	Welland	"	2		1 local	
(N.W. Ont.)	Pt. Arthur	"	4	Finnish Org. of Can. 1 Br.		2
	Ft. William	"	3	A.U.U.C. 1 Br.		
(N. Ont.)	Timmins	"	3			1
	Hearst	"	1			
	Kapuskasing	"	1			
	Kirkland Lake	"	1			
	Sudbury	"	1			
P.Q.	Montreal	"	1	U.J.P.O. 1 Br. Prog. Ukr. 1 Br. Prog. Czecks 1 Br.		
(N. Ont. Reg. Comm.)	Rouyn	"	1			

1954

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other
Sask.	Regina	C.T. XVII(875) May 3, 1954	1			
Man.	Winnipeg	"	10			
	Brandon	"	1	Russ. - Can. Fed'n	1 Br.	
Ont.	Toronto	"	1			8
	London	"	1	A.U.U.C. Prog. Slavic Workers	1 Br.	
	Ottawa-Hull	"	1	Progressive Women of London	1 Br.	
	Windsor	"		A.U.U.C. Fed'n of Russ. - Can.	1 Br.	1
(Niagara Penn.)	Welland	"	1			
	Niagara Falls	"	2			
	St. Catherines	"	1			

Cont'd.

1954

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other
(M.W. Ont.)	Pt. Arthur	C.T. XVII(875) May 3, 1954	4	Finnish Org. of Canada 1 Br.		
	Ft. William	"	5			1
(N. Ont.)	Kirkland Lake	"	1			1
	Geraldton	"	1			
	Devon	"	1			
<hr/>						
Ont.	Toronto	1955 C.T. XVIII(972) May 2, 1955 C.T. XVIII(995) Sept. 25, 1955 C.T. XVIII(944) Aug. 29, 1955	26	Fed'n Russ. - Can, 1 Br. 2 locals Can. - Soviet Friendship U.E. Society 1 Br. Finnish Org. of Can. 1 Br.		
	London	C.T. XVIII(913) Jan. 24, 1955	1			
	Hamilton	"	2			
	Windsor	"	4	A.U.U.C. 1 Br. Fed'n Russ. - Can. 1 Br. Chinese Youth Lit. Assoc. NFYL 1 Br.		2
	Ottawa-Hull	"	2			

Cont'd. 1955

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other
(Niagara Penn.)	St. Catharines	C.T. XVIII(913) Jan. 24, 1955	1			
	Welland	"	1		1 local U.F.	
	Niagara Falls	"	1			
	Thorold	"	1			
	Pt. Colbourne	"	1			
	Niagara-on-the- Lake	"	1			
(N.W. Ont.)	Pt. Arthur		2	A.U.U.C. 1 Br. W.B.A. 1 Br. Finnish Org. of Can. 1 Br.		
	Ft. William	"		Fed'n Russ. - Can 1 Br.		
Ont. (N. Ont.)	Kirkland Lake	C.T. XVIII(972) May 2, 1955	1	Fed'n Yugo. - Can. 1 Br.		
	Timmins	C.T. XVIII(995) Sept. 25, 1955	6			

1955

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other
	S. Porcupine	C.T. XVIII(944) Aug. 29, 1955	1			
	Schumacher	"	1			
	Hearst	"	2			
	Kapuskasing	"	1			
	Sudbury	"	6			
	Sault Ste Marie	"	1			

Greetings were also received from Kitchener Rubber Workers, Kitchener, Ont.

Also Tri-town Club

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P.Q. (N. Ont. Reg. Comm.)	Rouyn	"	1
	Val d'Or	"	1

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1955

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other	
Alta.	Edmonton	C.T. XVIII (972) May 2, 1955	1				
	Calgary	C.T. XVIII (995) Sept. 25, 1955	1				
	Medicine Hat		1				
Sask.	Porcupine Plain	C.T. XVIII (944) Aug. 29, 1955	1				
	Pelly	C.T. XVIII (913) Jan. 24, 1955	1				
	Pretty View	"	1				
	Kamsack	"	1				
	Regina	"	2	Hung. Lit. Comm.	1 Br.		
	Elrose	"	1				
	Moose Jaw	"	1				
	Saskatoon	"	1	A.U.U.C.	1 Br.		
	N. Battleford	"	1				
							xxviii



1955

<u>Province</u>	<u>City or Town</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Clubs</u>	<u>Satellite Organizations</u>	<u>Unions</u>	<u>Other</u>
Man.	Winnipeg	C.T. XVIII(913) Jan. 24, 1955	8	A.U.U.C. Fed'n Russ.-Can.	8 Br.	
				W.B.A. Polish Dem. Org.	1 Br. 4 Br. 1 Br.	
	Brandon	"	1			

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1956

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other
Man.	Winnipeg	C.T. XIX(997) Sept.	10	A.U.U.C. W.B.A. U.J.P.O. Fed'n Russ.-Can.	6 Br. 5 Br. 3 Br. 1 Br.	1 local
	Brandon	"	1	Polish People's Dem. Assoc. Fed'n Russ.-Can.	1 Br. 1 Br.	

Also Greetings from "friends in the village of Rosburn.

Ont.	Toronto	C.T. XIX(997) Sept. 3, 1956 C.T. XIX(979) Apr. 30, 1956		Bulgarian-Can. People's League Macedonian People's League	2 locals 1 Br. 1 Br.	12 U.E.
	Windsor	"	2	Fed'n Russ.-Can.	1 Br.	2
	Hamilton	"	1	A.U.U.C.	1 Br.	
	Ottawa-Hull	"	1			1
(Niagara Penn.)	Welland	"	2	U.J.P.O.	3 Br.	
	St. Catherines	"	1			
	Niagara Falls	"	2			

1956

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Others
(N.W. Ont.)	Pt. Arthur	C.T. XIX(979) Apr. 30, 1956	2	Finnish Org. of Can. A.U.U.C.	1 Br. 1 Br.	3
	Ft. William	"		Fed'n Russ. - Can.	1 Br.	2
(N. Ont.)	Timmins	"	3	Slovak Home Assoc. A.U.U.C.	1 Br.	1
	Schumacher	"	1			
	Kirkland Lake	"		A.U.U.C. Fed'n of Yugoslav-Can.	1 Br.	
				Finnish Org. of Can. Fed'n of Russ. - Can.	1 Br. 1 Br.	
Man.	Winnipeg	<u>1957</u> C.T. XX(1030) Apr. 29, 1957 C.T. XX(1046) Sept. 2, 1957	13	Polish Dem. Ass'n Fed'n Russ. - Can. Lith. Lit. Soc. W.B.A. A.U.U.C.	1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 3 Br. 5 Br.	1 local Creamery Workers 6
	Brandon		1			

1957

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other
Ont.	Toronto		14	U.J.P.O. Macedonian People's League Fed'n Russ. - Can.	1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br.	1 local U.E.
	Leaside					1 local U.E.
	London			Fed'n Russ. - Can.	1 Br.	
	Hamilton		6	Fed'n Russ. - Can. Yugo. Dem. Fed'n Lith. Lit. Soc. A.U.U.C. W.B.A.	1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 2 Br. 1 Br.	
(Niagara Penn.)	Welland		3	A.U.U.C.	1 Br.	1 local U.E.
	Thorold		1			
	Danville		1	W.B.A.	1 Br.	
	Niagara Falls		1			

1957

Cont.

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other
Ont. (N.W. Ont.)	Port Arthur	C.T. XX(1030) Apr. 29, 1957		Finn. Org. Can.		1
	Fort William	C.T. XX(1046) Sept. 2, 1957				1
	(N. Ont.)	Timmins	2			
<hr/>						
P.Q.	Montreal		13			
(N. Ont. Reg. Comm.)	Rouyn		1			

1958

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other
B.C.	Vancouver	C.T. XXII(1080) May 5, 1958		Fed'n Russ. - Can.	1 Br.	
Man.	Winnipeg	C.T. XXII(1097) Sept. 1, 1958	10	Lith. Lit. Soc. A.U.U.C. W.B.A. Fed'n Russ. - Can.	1 Br. 4 Br. 2 Br. 1 Br.	1 local Creamery Workers
	Selkirk			Fed'n Russ. - Can.	1 Br.	
	Brandon		1			
Ont.	Toronto		16	U.J.P.O. Fed'n Russ. - Can. Macedonian People's League Bulg. People's League Chinese Can. Welfare Assoc.	1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br.	1 local U.E.
	Leaside					1 local U.E.

1958

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other
	London		1	Fed'n Russ. - Can.	1 Br.	
	Windsor		1			
(Niagara Penn.)	Welland					1 local U.E.
	Thorold		1	Fed'n Russ. - Can.	1 Br.	
	St. Catharines		2			
	Brantford		1			
Ont. (N.W. Ont.)	Port Arthur	C.T. XXII(1080) May 5, 1958		Finn. Org. Can. A.U.U.C.	1 Br. 1 Br.	3
	Fort William	C.T. XXII(1097) Sept. 1, 1958		A.U.U.C.	1 Br.	
P.Q.	Montreal		5			

1959

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other
Alta.	Calgary	C.T. XXIII(1132) May 4, 1959	1			
Man.	Winnipeg	C.T. XXIII(1148) Sept. 7, 1959	10	A.U.U.C. W.B.A. Fed'n Russ. - Can. U.J.P.O.	6 Br. 1 local 3 Br. Creamery 1 Br. Workers 1 Br.	6
	Brandon		1			
Ont.	Toronto		28	Chinese Can. Welfare Assoc'n. Fed'n Russ. - Can. U.J.P.O. S.U.J. Carpatho-Russ. Soc. Carpatho-Russ. Youth Bulg. People's League Macedonian People's League Finn. Org. Can.	1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br.	1 local U.E.



1959

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other
	Brentwood				1 local U.E.	
	Leaside				1 local U.E.	
	London		1	Fed'n Russ. - Can.	1 Br.	
	Windsor		3	A.U.U.C.	2 Br.	
Ont. (Niagara Penn.)	Welland	C.T. XXIII(1132) May 4, 1959	4		1 local	
	St. Catharines	C.T. XXIII(1148) Sept. 7, 1959	2			
	Niagara Falls		2			
(N.W. Ont.)	Port Arthur		2	A.U.U.C. Finn. Org. Can.	1 Br. 1 Br.	4
	Fort William		6	A.U.U.C. W.B.A. Slovak Home Assoc.	1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br.	1
(N. Ont.)	Sudbury		1			
P.Q.	Montreal		8			

1960

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other
Alta.	Calgary	C.T. XXV(1182) May 2, 1960	1			
Sask.	Regina	C.T. XXV(1200) Sept. 5, 1960	1			
	Saskatoon		1			
	(?)			S.Sask. Club		
Man.	Winnipeg		12	A.U.U.C. Lith. Lit. Soc. Polish Dem. Assoc'n Fed. Russ. - Can. U.J.P.O. W.B.A.	5 Br. Creamery 1 Br. Worker's 1 Br. Union 1 Br. 1 Br. 3 Br.	8
	Brandon		1			
Ont.	Toronto		29	Fed. Russ. - Can. Finn. Org. Can. U.J.P.O. Carpatho-Russ. Youth	1 Br. 1 local 1 Br. U.E. 1 Br. 1 Br.	1

1960

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other
Ont.	Leaside	C.T. XXV(1182) May 2, 1960		Carpatho-Russ. Soc. 1 Br. Bulg. - People's League 1 Br. Macedonian People's League 1 Br. Y.C.L. 1 Br. Chinese-Can. Ass'n. 1 Br. A.U.U.C. 1 Br.	1 local U.E.	
	Peterborough	C.T. XXV(1200) Sept. 5, 1960			1 local	
	Windsor		3	A.U.U.C. Fed'n Russ. - Can.	2 Br. 1 Br.	1
	Hamilton		7			
(N.W. Ont.)	Pt. Arthur		3	Scan. Home Soc. Finn. Org. Can.	1 Br. 1 Br.	6
	Ft. William		3	A.U.U.C. Slovak Home Ass'n	1 Br. 1 Br.	3

Cont'd.		<u>1960</u>				
Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organizations	Unions	Other
(N. Ont.)	Sudbury		2			
	Sault St. Marie		1			
P.Q.	Montreal		6	A.U.U.C.	1 Br.	
<hr/>						
<u>1962</u>						
Alta.	Innisfree	C.T. XXVIII ( ) May 1962				1
Sask.	Regina	C.T. XXVIII (1304) Sept. 3, 1962	1			
<hr/>						
Man.	Winnipeg		12	A.U.U.C. Fed'n Russ. - Can. U.J.P.O. W.B.A.	5 Br. 1 local 1 Br. Creamery 1 Br. Worker's 3 Br.	7

Cont'd.

1962

<u>Province</u>	<u>City or Town</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Clubs</u>	<u>Satellite Organizations</u>	<u>Unions</u>	<u>Other</u>
Ont.	Toronto		24	A.U.U.C. Fed'n Russ. - Can. Finn. Org. Can. Indep. Mut. Benefit Fed. Carpatho-Russ. Soc. Y.C.L.	1 Br. 1 local 1 Br. U.E. 1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br.	7
	Hamilton				esp. from 1 local U.E.	
	Windsor		4	Fed'n Russ. - Can. A.U.U.C. All-Slav. Committee Windsor Yugoslavs	1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br. 1 Br.	
(Niagara Penn.)	St. Catharines		2			
	Gravenhurst			Muskoka Trib. Committee	1 Br.	

1962

Cont'd.

Province	City or Town	Source	Clubs	Satellite Organization	Unions	Other
Ont.	Port Colbourne	C.F. XXVIII( ) May 1962	1			
(Niagara Penn.)	Niagara Falls	C.F. XXVIII(1304) Sept. 3, 1962	2			
(N.W. Ont.)	Port Arthur		5	Finn. Org. Can. 1 Br. A.U.U.C. 1 Br. W.B.A. 1 Br. Scandinavian Home Soc. 1 Br. Fed'n Russ. - Can. 1 Br.		6
	Fort William		5	A.U.U.C. 1 Br. Slovak Home Assoc. 1 Br.		2
(N. Ont.)	Sudbury		3	A.U.U.C. 1 Br. Ukr. Can. Old Timers 1 Br.		2
	Sault Ste. Marie		1			

APPENDIX D

VOTES POLLED BY L.P.P. AND C.P.C. IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS

1953-1962

DATE	PROVINCE	NUMBER OF CONSTITUENCIES	CONSTITUENCIES CONTESTED	SEATS	NO.	VOTES %
Aug. 10, 1953	Nfld.	7	0	0	0	0.
	P.E.I.	4	0	0	0	0.
	N.S.	12	1	0	794	0.2
	N.B.	10	0	0	0	0.
	P.Q.	75	25	0	10,819	0.7
	Ont.	85	29	0	18,414	1.0
	Man.	14	7	0	6,194	2.3
	Sask.	17	9	0	3,906	1.1
	Alta.	17	12	0	9,155	2.7
	B.C.	22	17	0	10,340	2.2
	Yukon & N.W.T.	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0.</u>
TOTALS		265	100	0	59,622	1.1



DATE	PROVINCE	NUMBER OF CONSTITUENCIES	CONSTITUENCIES CONTESTED	SEATS	VOTES NO.	VOTES %
Jun. 10, 1957	Nfld.	7	0	0	0	0.
	P.E.I.	4	0	0	0	0.
	N.S.	12	0	0	0	0.
	N.B.	10	0	0	0	0.
	P.Q.	75	3	0	2,377	0.1
	Ont.	85	2	0	1,432	0.1
	Man.	14	1	0	1,579	0.5
	Sask.	17	1	0	212	0.05
	Alta.	17	1	0	815	0.2
	B.C.	22	2	0	1,345	0.2
	Yukon & N.W.T.	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0.</u>
TOTALS		265	10	0	7,760	0.1

DATE	PROVINCE	NUMBER OF CONSTITUENCIES	CONSTITUENCIES CONTESTED	SEATS	NO.	VOTES %
Mar. 31, 1958	Nfld.	7	0	0	0	0.
	P.E.I.	4	0	0	0	0.
	N.S.	12	0	0	0	0.
	N.B.	10	0	0	0	0.
	P.Q.	75	2	0	1,162	0.1
	Ont.	85	6	0	3,035	0.1
	Man.	14	1	0	1,503	0.4
	Sask.	17	2	0	458	0.1
	Alta.	17	2	0	1,196	0.3
	B.C.	22	5	0	2,515	0.4
	Yukon & N.W.T.	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0.</u>
TOTALS		265	18	0	9,869	0.1

DATE	PROVINCE	NUMBER OF CONSTITUENCIES	CONSTITUENCIES CONTESTED	SEATS	NO.	VOTES %
June 18, 1962	Nfld.	7	0		0	0.
	P.E.I.	4	0		0	0.
	N.S.	12	0		0	0.
	N.B.	10	0		0	0.
	P.Q.	75	1		347	0.02
	Ont.	85	5		1,886	0.1
	Man.	14	2		2,153	0.5
	Sask.	17	1		317	0.1
	Alta.	17	0		0	0.
	B.C.	22	3		1,547	0.2
	Yukon & N.W.T.	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0.</u>
TOTALS		265	12		6,250	0.1

Figures for the Aug. 10, 1953; June 10, 1957 and March 31, 1958 federal elections in the preceding table are based upon information contained in H.A. Scarrow's Canada Votes. Figures for the June 18, 1962 federal election have been compiled from the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer (Twenty-fifth General Election) and the Canadian Parliamentary Guide 1963, edited by Pierre G. Normandin.

APPENDIX E

VOTES POLLED BY L.P.P. AND C.P.C. IN PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS

1953-1960

The Communists have never run candidates in Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick. Nor have they contested the elected positions on the councils of the Yukon or the North West Territories. A United Front candidate was an unsuccessful contestant in the 1933 Nova Scotia provincial election, but no Communist has since contested a provincial riding in that province.

The figures in the following table are derived from H.A. Scarrow, Canada Votes.


DATE	PROVINCE	NUMBER OF CONSTITUENCIES	CONSTITUENCIES CONTESTED	SEATS	VOTES NO.	%
July 16, 1952	P.Q.	92	4	0	3,932	0.2
June 20, 1956	P.Q.	93	32	0	6,517	0.4
June 22, 1960	P.Q.	95	2	0	536	0.0
Nov. 22, 1951	Ont.	90	6	1	11,914	0.7
Jun. 9, 1955	Ont.	98	31	0	20,875	1.2
Jun. 11, 1959	Ont.	98	9	0	4,304	0.2

DATE	PROVINCE	NUMBER OF CONSTITUENCIES	CONSTITUENCIES CONTESTED	SEATS	VOTES NO.	VOTES %
Jun. 8, 1953	Man.	57	1	1	3,812	1.4
Jun. 16, 1958	Man.	57	1	0	1,207	0.4
May 14, 1959	Man.	57	3	0	1,731	0.4
Jun. 11, 1952	Sask.	53	2	0	1,143	0.2
Jun. 20, 1956	Sask.	53	2	0	536	0.1
Jun. 8, 1960	Sask.	55	2	0	379	0.1
Aug. 5, 1952	Alta.	61	2	0	1,132	0.4
Jun. 29, 1955	Alta.	61	9	0	3,420	0.9
Jun. 18, 1959	Alta.	65	4	0	844	0.2

DATE	PROVINCE	NUMBER OF CONSTITUENCIES	CONSTITUENCIES CONTESTED	SEATS	VOTES NO.	VOTES %
Jun. 12, 1952	B.C.	48	5	0	2,514	0.3
Jun. 9, 1953	B.C.	48	25	0	7,496	1.0
Sept. 19, 1956	B.C.	52	14	0	3,381	0.4
Sept. 12, 1960	B.C.	52	19	0	5,675	0.6

APPENDIX F  
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE  
C.P.C.





- \* Optional. Established by decision of the appropriate provincial committee.
- \*\* If two or more clubs in a city.
- \*\*\* Optional. If there is no city committee, the ward organization is under the jurisdiction of the appropriate regional committee.

APPENDIX G

TIM BUCK'S HANDS

BY: SONYA MORRIS\*

Your hands were bought at twelve years old.  
To us the childhood they unfold  
is not of plenty, nor of play.  
Child's strength they poured into machines  
to bring each week a paltry means  
to mother's brood of seven.

With muscles cut and fingers taut  
they still worked on. What have they wrought  
to spread your fame throughout the land?  
A mighty wrath to hurl at wrong,  
with mightier faith to hurl it strong;  
a patriot's call: on guard!

Your hands unmask the hideous hue  
and Shape of Profit - creatures who  
now fatten on the flesh of man;  
who mother's prayers for peace dare mock  
and put upon the auction block  
our country's very heart.

Your hands took dreams of laboring men  
and forged them into weapons when  
they gave these dreams a consciousness  
of mission. Fanning spark to flame,  
They burned into the dream an aim  
of Socialism won.

They fashioned with a patient stroke  
a Vanguard rooted like an oak  
tenacious of its native soil,  
our Party - in your name it stands  
a tribute to your working hand -  
to build our Canada.

\*C.T., XVII:858 (Jan. 4, 1954), p. 5.

APPENDIX H  
ABBREVIATIONS USED

ABBREVIATIONS USED

A.F.L.	American Federation of Labor
A.U.U.C.	Association of United Ukranian-Canadians
C.B.C.	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
C.C.C.L.	Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labor
C.C.F.	Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
C.C.W.	Congress of Canadian Women
C.C.L.	Canadian Congress of Labor
C.I.O.	Congress of Industrial Organizations
C.L.C.	Canadian Labor Congress
C.P.C.	Communist Party of Canada
C.P.R.	Canadian Pacific Railway
C.P.S.U.	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
C.S.U.	Canadian Seaman's Union
<u>C.T.</u>	<u>Canadian Tribune</u>
<u>Fin. Post</u>	<u>Financial Post</u>
I.F.L.W.U.	International Fur and Leather Workers' Union
I.U.E.	International Union of Electrical Workers'
I.W.A.	International Woodworkers' of America
L.D.R.	League of Democratic Rights
L.P.P.	Labor-Progressive Party

M.L.A.	Member of Legislative Assembly
M.P.	Member of Parliament
M.P.P.	Member of Provincial Parliament (Ontario)
<u>M.R.</u>	<u>Marxist Review</u>
<u>M.Q.</u>	<u>Marxist Quarterly</u>
<u>N.A.M.</u>	<u>National Affairs Monthly</u>
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
N.C.	National Committee
N.D.P.	New Democratic Party
N.E.C.	National Executive Committee
N.F.L.Y.	National Federation of Labor Youth
NORAD	North American Air Defence Command
R.C.M.P.	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
S.Y.L.	Socialist Youth League
T.L.C.	Trades and Labor Congress
U.E.	United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers' of America
U.J.P.O.	United Jewish People's Order
U.M.M.S.W.	International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers
U.N.	United Nations
U.S.	United States of America

U.S.A.            United Steelworkers of America  
U.S.S.R.           Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics  
  
W.B.A.            Workers' Benevolent Association  
W.F.P.           Winnipeg Free Press  
W.U.L.            Workers' Unity League  
  
Y.C.L.            Young Communist League