Towards a Theory of Joint Management:
A Case Study on the Windigo Interim Planning Board

By

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A practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Natural Resources Management.

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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
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TOWARDS A THEORY OF JOINT MANAGEMENT: A CASE STUDY ON THE
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of

M.N.R.M.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Despite the growing interest in joint management, there is no underlying theory linking case studies and offering reasons for the success or failure of joint management. Berkes (1997) proposed that four components are essential to the success of joint management: trust between the actors, appropriate institutions, legal protection of local rights, and economic incentives for local communities. Each of these components was treated as a hypothesis. The purpose of this practicum was to begin developing a theory of joint management by testing these four hypotheses on case studies in the literature and a practical case study of the Windigo Interim Planning Board (WIPB) in northwestern Ontario, Canada.

Established in 1993 for a period of 5 years, the objectives of the WIPB were to develop a land use plan, review development proposals, recommend consultation methods in the north and identify economic opportunities in the region. The WIPB made decisions by consensus and consisted of three members from Ontario (non-Aboriginal), two members from the affected First Nation communities (Cat Lake and North Caribou Lake), and one member from the Windigo tribal council. The WIPB was evaluated from three sources of information: personal observation, interviews and written documentation. Interviews were conducted with board members, the chair, the coordinator, government employees, developers, and First Nations community members.

The case studies from the literature revealed a continuum between joint management and multi-stakeholder cases, but the hypotheses were not fully applicable to cases closer to the multi-stakeholder end. The theory of joint management, therefore, does not have a clearly defined boundary, but focuses on bilateral agreements with local people closely connected to the land/resource. Case studies from literature also illustrated the social or self empowerment context of the hypotheses.

The four hypotheses concerning trust, appropriate institutions, legal recognition, and economics were found to be interconnected and complementary. The success of each depended on the others. Each of the hypotheses, with some further explanation, appeared to be hold true for joint management. Trust, linked with effective communication, was important for building the relationship between the two parties. Local, government and joint management institutions were critical for facilitating the relationship between people. Legal recognition of local rights promoted stability through long-term protection and security. Economic incentives were one common method of motivating local people's participation and the principles of community economic development helped improve these incentives. Although case study authors identified other important factors, such as united purpose, culture, philosophy, education and the inclusion of women, none of these reasons for success were repeated throughout the case studies. Further research needs to be conducted to find new, improved, innovative ways of building institutions, protecting joint management legally and establishing economic incentives.

Joint management is clearly a multi-disciplinary practice. Joint management requires people who are highly knowledgeable about many different disciplines and are able to give direction for the integration and balancing of those ideas. This task is not easy and we need to learn how to make our institutions, legal foundations, and economic methods function better together. Joint management, despite these difficulties, has offered one forum or method of integrating the social, economic and ecological concerns of a community.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

Joint management (also called co-management or collaborative management) involves the sharing of power and responsibility for natural resources management between governments and local people (Berkes 1995; Korten 1996). Joint management experiences vary due to local circumstances, but there are three common characteristics link joint management initiatives (Borrini-Feryerabend 1996). First, the government and the local people bring complementary expertise to the management of resources. For example, to the scientific and large scale perspective of the government, the local people may add more specific knowledge of their local ecosystem (Berkes 1995). Second, working together through joint management they strive for more appropriate, more efficient and more equitable management of natural resources (Pinkerton 1989). Third, in order to move towards this goal, the local people and the government share the rights and responsibilities of management. The sharing of responsibilities and the level of involvement of the community in joint management vary along a continuum. At one end of the continuum, managers inform local communities of management rules and receive minimal feed-back. In the middle of the continuum, communities make recommendations for the direction of management and some of their ideas are incorporated. At the other end of the continuum, the community is given the power and responsibility of resource management in a partnership with the government (Berkes 1995).

The success of joint management initiatives varies widely (McDaniels et al. 1994). Evaluations of why joint management efforts are more successful or less successful are rare. Yet, in order to improve the success of future joint management initiatives, understanding the underlying reasons for success or failure is important.

Transcending differing ecological, social and economic conditions, a joint management theory would attempt to explain reasons for the differing success of joint management. Such a theory would enable comparison between case studies and give joint management practitioners helpful principles for establishing new joint management initiatives. Berkes (1997) proposed four elements of successful joint management which may transcend differing local conditions. These four essential elements were tested as hypotheses in this practicum. The hypotheses are:

H_O1: Trust between actors is an essential component of joint management;

H_O2: Appropriate institutions are an essential components of joint management;

H_O3: Legal recognition of local resource rights is an essential component of joint management;

H_O4: Economic incentives for local people is an essential component of joint management.

In order to begin developing a theory of joint management, these hypotheses were tested through an examination of case studies in literature and a practical case study of the Windigo Interim Planning Board (WIPB).

The WIPB, in Northwestern Ontario, was an example of a joint planning arrangement. Established in 1993, the WIPB consisted of three Ontario non-aboriginal members and three members from Windigo First Nations [Cat Lake First Nation and North Caribou Lake First Nation (Figure 1.1)]. The WIPB was responsible for developing a land use plan, reviewing development proposals, recommending consultation methods in the North and promoting economic development in the region.

The WIPB was an appropriate case study for this research, because the WIPB was nearing the end of its five year mandate, and it had valuable practical experience with the problems and successes of joint management. Evaluating a practical case study provided a better understanding of aspects not obvious in the literature case studies. The WIPB case was also valuable because it was unique for several reasons. First, it was an example

of joint management based on an area of land (outside a park) and not a specific resource. Second, the WIPB was an example of proactive joint management rather than reactive conflict management. With more development moving into the mid-north across Canada, governments are searching for appropriate ways to involve local people, many of whom are of Aboriginal heritage. The WIPB may be viewed as an experiment in addressing this complex problem. Finally, it was a case which has some elements of the multi-stakeholder model. This aspect is important to help delineate the situations where the hypotheses are applicable. The WIPB case study was therefore important to the evaluation of the hypotheses.

Figure 1.1 Location of the Cat Lake and North Caribou Lake First Nations involved in the Windigo Interim Planning Board.

1.2 ISSUE STATEMENT

Governments around the world have sought to improve natural resource management enforcement and practices by including local resource users in the management process. Joint management efforts between governments and local users are numerous, but not always successful. What are the major reasons for the success or failure of joint management agreements? A theory for joint management is needed to identify the essential common elements in more successful cases and to allow comparison between case studies. It is hypothesized that the following components are essential for effective joint management: trust between actors; appropriate institutions; legally recognized local resource rights; and economic incentives. To test the hypotheses and begin developing a theory of joint management, a practical case study and literature case studies were examined.

1.3 OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this research is:

1. To examine the relationship between the hypotheses and published joint management case studies from around the world.

2. To evaluate the joint planning process of the Windigo Interim Planning Board.

3. To assess the usefulness of the hypotheses for the Windigo Interim Planning Board.

4. To modify the hypotheses, as appropriate; and recommend further areas of research.

1.4 METHODS

Case studies of joint management representing a range of different locations and resources were selected for analysis. Case studies were categorized as being within or outside of Canada to reflect the differing political, social and economic conditions around the world (Mallik and Rahman 1994). Case studies in each geographic region, (Canada and outside Canada) were selected by resource (fisheries, wildlife, forestry, and parks/land use), because the joint management literature has often been categorized by resource [for example Co-operative Management of Local Fisheries (Pinkerton 1989)]. The selection of case studies within the eight geographic-resource categories was based on the level of detail available.

Case studies were examined to determine if each hypothesized element was a critical factor contributing to the problems or solutions in joint management. All the reasons for success or failure mentioned in case studies were listed. Common reasons were noted and related to the hypotheses. This information helped to establish whether the hypotheses appeared to be applicable universally or only in certain circumstances.

A case study of the Windigo Interim Planning Board (WIPB) served as a practical test of the hypotheses. The successfulness of the WIPB was evaluated against its objectives. Evaluation of the WIPB was based on interviews with the people involved in the WIPB or affected by the decisions of the board. Five of six board members, the chair, and the coordinator of the WIPB were interviewed individually. The interviews were based on a prepared set of questions, but allowed for supplementary questions and additional information gathering. The questions were structured to elicit responses concerning: 1) the background and role of the individual in the WIPB; 2) the individual's evaluation of the WIPB experience; 3) the importance of the hypotheses to the WIPB experience.

Interviews were also conducted with two of the developers who had submitted proposals to the WIPB and two government employees. The questions were focused on their assessment of their experience with the board. Finally, interviews were conducted with members of the affected First Nations, North Caribou Lake and Cat Lake. A short survey was used to structure their evaluation of the WIPB's role and actions relating to: (1) the WIPB objectives established in the Order-in-Council; (2) the four hypotheses. The people interviewed were chosen both strategically (people involved in the government of the First Nation) and randomly (other First Nation members).

The decision-making process of the WIPB was evaluated and the resulting actions were analyzed with respect to their objectives. Results of the WIPB analysis were then compared to conditions for success identified in the hypotheses. The hypotheses were then accepted, rejected or modified to incorporate the information learned from the case studies in the literature and the WIPB. The results of this analysis were used to begin developing a theory of joint management.

1.5 ORGANIZATION OF PRACTICUM

In the second chapter of this practicum, the literature related to joint management is reviewed. The third chapter presents the complete methods and results from the analysis of the literature case studies. The fourth chapter presents the WIPB case study, followed by the conclusions and recommendations in the final chapter.

2.0 A REVIEW OF JOINT MANAGEMENT LITERATURE

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Recent crises in resource stocks have caused the effectiveness of past management to be questioned; therefore, new management techniques have been sought (Gunderson et al. 1995). Joint management is increasingly cited around the world as a method for improving conservation (Korten 1996). In this chapter, joint management, although an ambiguous term, will first be defined and described. The underlying motivations for joint management will then be examined, and finally the gaps in joint management research will be identified.

2.2 DEFINITION AND DESCRIPTION OF JOINT MANAGEMENT

Joint management involves the sharing of power and responsibility for resource management between governments and local people (Berkes 1995). The wide variety of approaches to joint management reflect diverse local circumstances. Fundamentally, joint management is a relationship between two groups of people; the relationship is not static and needs to continually adjust to new conditions. Joint management ideally draws on the strengths of the participants to improve management (Borrini-Feryerabend 1996). Local people are familiar with the area in which they live and often have acquired detailed knowledge about the ecosystem through their experience using the resource. They also have immediate interest in the continued welfare of the resource because their livelihood, culture and health usually depend on the resource. Governments, on the other hand, are able to view larger scales and consider implications of the resource use for neighbouring users or assess cumulative impacts (Berkes 1995). Governments also have the legal authority to make necessary regulations and usually offer scientific and

international perspectives (Berkes et al. 1991).

Since both the government and the community contribute to the joint management process and are affected by the results of management decisions, the management plan is designed to benefit all. Governments benefit from better resource management, and the reduction of direct management responsibilities. Local people benefit not only from better conservation, but also from the integration of their social and economic concerns into the management process (Borrini-Feryerabend 1996).

A final important component of joint management is the sharing of rights and responsibilities. Responsibilities accompany the right to use or manage a resource (Borrini-Feryerabend 1996). The distribution of the rights and responsibilities between the local people and governments varies widely. Governments may only inform the local people of regulations or they may give equal or even total power to the local people. Between the two extremes is a continuum of differing degrees of local involvement in the management process. Based on the Arnstein (1969) ladder of participation, Berkes (1994) developed a similar ladder of joint management identifying seven levels of community involvement (Figure 2.1). Joint management initiatives need to identify the most appropriate level of involvement for the local conditions. In cases where the resource is critically threatened, the time to develop a partnership may not be available and the government may quickly prescribe rules for local people (Borrini-Feryerabend 1996). On the other hand, long term partnerships between the local people and governments can be beneficial to all involved.

7	Partnership/Community Control	Partnership of equals; joint decision-making institutional-ized; power delegated to community where feasible
6	Management Boards	Community is given opportunity to participate in develop-ing and implementing management plans
5	Advisory Committees	Partnership in decision-making starts; joint action on com-mon objectives
4	Communication	Start of two-way information exchange; local concerns begin to enter management plans
3	Co-operation	Community starts to have input into management, e.g., use of local knowledge, research assistants
2	Consultation	Start of face-to-face contact; community input heard but not necessarily heeded
1	Informing	Community is informed about decisions already made

Figure 2.1 Levels of joint management with differing amounts of community participation (Berkes 1994 after Arnstein 1969).

2.3 WHY JOINT MANAGEMENT?

2.3.1 The Common-Property Dilemma

Joint management almost always involves a common-property resource. A common-property resource is "a natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large so as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use" (Ostrom 1990, p. 30). Examples of common property resources are fish, wildlife, grazing lands, forests, irrigation water and ground water (Berkes 1995). The use of a common-property resource by one individual reduces the availability of the resource for another user. In addition, the cost of an individual exploiting the common property resource is imposed on all users of the resources. As a result, the benefit of harvesting greatly exceeds the cost experienced by the individual and the individual is encouraged to exploit the resource at the maximum rate to obtain the maximum benefit (Perman et al. 1996). Overgrazing, overfishing, erosion, or extinction of species may result. The "solution" to this common property dilemma has been the subject of much research and debate.

Two prevalent attempted solutions to the commons dilemma are privatization and state regulation (Ostrom 1990). Privatization, under these circumstances, involves the division of the resource among users. Owners are assumed to maximize their profits in the long-term by restricting the access of other users and using the resource sustainably. The effectiveness of privatization depends on the individual experiencing all the costs and benefits associated with his/her resource use. Privatization also assumes that the resource is divisible and homogeneously distributed. As a result it may be an appropriate management method for grazing land and sometimes forestry rights, but often inappropriate for movable and unevenly distributed resources such as water, fish, and wildlife (Ostrom 1990).

Alternatively, the state may set rules concerning resource use and the penalties for violating the rules (Ostrom 1990). Ideally, appropriate state resource management would benefit all users. However, efficient resource management is dependent on the validity of several hidden assumptions. The state is assumed to have accurate information about the resource, particularly the carrying capacity and the resulting sustainable yield. Furthermore, it is assumed that the state can monitor resource use effectively and penalize offenders reliably. Finally, it is assumed that the costs of administration are considered when weighing the benefits and costs of state management (Ostrom 1990). If one of these assumptions is not met, the state will not be as effective at managing the resource. Gunderson et al. (1995) found state management regimes led to less resilient ecosystems, more rigid management institutions and societies which were more dependent on a constant supply of the resource. Management strategies were also focused on the short-term local scale without an integrated approach. The ability of the state to manage resources effectively can be questionable.

A third solution to the problems associated with common property management, community-based management, may be effective for two reasons (Ostrom 1990). First, decisions are made by the community of users alone, hopefully simplifying the process of decision making, monitoring, and enforcement (Western 1994). Second, communities often have a detailed knowledge of the ecosystem based on long-term resource use. The intimate connection between communities and the environment strengthens the management scheme (Western 1994).

Unfortunately community-based management has many obstacles to overcome, if it is to be effective. A community is often unaware of the larger conservation issues in their area (Western and Wright 1994). Communities also often have internal problems. For example, corruption or conflict within the community make management difficult or ineffective. They also may lack the skills or knowledge necessary to manage the resource. Finally, poverty and the desire for progress can put great pressure on the

resource (Western and Wright 1994). Ostrom (1990) reviewed a number of case studies on common-property resources and proposed a set of conditions that are necessary for long-term community-based management of a resource (Table 2.1).

In reality these different approaches to solving the problems associated with common property resources are not mutually exclusive (Ostrom 1990). State managers often ask for input from the local users and the community-based approach is often only possible with the cooperation of the state. Privatization as a solution also often involves regulations by the state. Joint management is the integration of the state and community-based approaches to common-property resources management.

2.3.2 Livelihood, Cultural/Social, Ecological Triggers of Joint Management

Although the common property dilemma explains the need for joint management, more immediate reasons are also evident and important to the local users and state. Often the warning signs of ineffective management and the triggers for joint management are economic losses, threatened cultural traditions, social changes, or ecological collapse of the resource.

Resource use is often a major component of the local economy, and as a result any changes in the management or availability of resource stock affect the local economy (informal subsistence use or formal market sales). The establishment of parks is a particularly dramatic example of how an economic crisis can trigger joint management. The park area often is a source of resources for neighbouring communities, but resource extraction is generally forbidden after park designation. The local people, therefore, often experience a significant cost, and furthermore they usually do not receive any tangible benefits from the park. Park fees are directed to the government and tourist revenues are frequently directed to larger centers with the appropriate infrastructure or to private companies within the park (Ghimire 1991). Solutions to this problem have often proved unsatisfactory. For example, buffer zones, for limited resource use, around the core

Table 2.1. Essential characteristics of long-term, self-governing management of common-property resources (CPR) (Ostrom 1990) p 90.

Rule	Description
Clearly defined boundaries	Individuals or households who have the rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself.
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions	Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labour, material and/or money.
Collective-choice arrangements	Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules.
Monitoring	Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior, are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.
Graduated sanctions	Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both.
Conflict-resolution mechanisms	Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials.
Minimal recognition of rights to organize	The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities.
Nested enterprises (if part of larger system)	Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.

protected area are frequently not coordinated with the needs of the local people and do not offset costs (Ghimire 1991; Shyamsundar and Kramer 1996). Joint management of the parks to reduce economic impacts has involved establishing formal or informal agreements with the affected local people. In South Africa, for example, joint management with local South Africans involved addressing concerns about land leasing, revenue sharing, fuelwood and thatching grass collecting, medicinal plants harvesting, culled meat distribution, livestock grazing, access and employment opportunities (Anderson 1995).

Preservation of cultural values can also be an important issue triggering joint management. If local people are prevented from collecting herbs, or harvesting traditional foods and materials, cultural traditions linked with these activities also suffer. For example, due to international pressure in 1987, the United States banned whaling of the bowhead whale in Alaska. The Inuit immediately reacted because: "Inuit cultural continuity is at stake. [Inuit] do not want the bowhead whale to become extinct, the reason being that the bowhead is a critical social, cultural, economic keystone to the Inuit culture" (Freeman 1989, p. 140). Either the ban on whaling or the extinction of the bowhead would have been devastating for the Inuit community, and, as a result, they pressed for joint management.

Another social trigger for joint management is the demand for participatory democracy. Particularly in North America, increased public participation in land use decisions is being driven by the principle that "those affected by a decision should participate directly in the decision-making process" (Duffy et al. 1995, p. 2). Dissatisfied with past decisions, stakeholders want cooperative decision-making, where they are not merely consulted, but help to make decisions. Joint management is one method of management driven by participatory democracy. Pinkerton (1989 p. 5) suggested that a secondary goal for fisheries joint management is "managing the consent of local fishermen and reducing conflict through a process of participatory democracy".

Joint management may also be triggered as a response to the depletion or threatened future of the resource. Scarce resources will force managers and users to make difficult decisions. Although, there are alternative sources of action (state imposed rules in emergency, users ignoring all warnings and continuing harvesting etc.), joint management may be an effective method of handling the depleted resource.

2.4 GAPS IN JOINT MANAGEMENT LITERATURE

A growing number of case studies on joint management throughout the world in many different sectors have provided an initial base of literature, although the IUCN recognizes the need for more case studies to be documented (i.e. Pinkerton 1989; Western 1994; Mugisha 1996; Poffenberger and McGean 1996; Bernard and Young 1997). A few limited attempts have been made to review and summarize the findings of these case studies. For example, Pinkerton (1989) reviewed fishery case studies and developed a list of 20 propositions which predict the best preconditions, mechanisms, supporting conditions, scale, and pre-adapted groups for joint management. Borrini-Feryerabend (1996) focused on joint management of protected areas and suggested feasibility questions, process indicators and a general process for joint management. Management of protected areas with the local people is one of the most frequently studied areas of joint management.

No underlying theory, however, connects the many joint management sectors. Ostrom (1990) emphasizes the importance of theory and its link to the empirical studies:

Without theory, one can never understand the general underlying mechanisms that operate in many guises in different situations. If not harnessed to solving empirical puzzles, theoretical work can spin off under its own momentum, reflecting little of the empirical world. p. 46

A theory of joint management is needed to identify why joint management initiatives have varying degrees of success, and to provide a framework for the development of future joint management projects. Learning from past mistakes and successes will help to improve future joint management practices.

Each of the four hypotheses has been recognized as an important element of joint management by other authors (Table 2.2). Each hypothesis will now be introduced in more detail. Trust between actors is a difficult component to identify, but Pinkerton (1989) suggested that successful joint management would create a higher degree of trust between the government and local people. Since joint management involves a relationship between two groups of people, trust may be an important factor in developing that relationship.

Institutions could be defined as:

> the sets of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what information must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions (Ostrom 1990, p.51).

The institution may or may not be legally or formally defined. "Institutions" as used in this study will generally refer to the "institutional actors" or organizations which implement the institutional rules. Effective functioning of resource management, economic development and development plans is linked to the existence of appropriate institutions (Berkes and Farvar 1989). Appropriate community institutions (for example fishing cooperatives) and government institutions are mechanisms for management.

Legal protection of local rights may be a critical factor because the power has traditionally rested with the state. State litigation against aboriginal people, and the reverse, has often been the catalyst of the joint management process. The resulting judgments often serve as a legal basis for joint management (Dale 1989). Pinkerton (1989) suggested that legal recognition and the formalizing of agreements was one of

seven preconditions for joint management. Legal protection of local rights is a method of transferring some power to the local people.

Economic incentives are particularly important for joint management of protected areas (Ghimire 1991). Protected areas may eliminate sources of income or subsistence for local people, and alternative economic development may be necessary to maintain the livelihoods of the local people (Borrini-Feryerabend 1996). Economic incentives may also be important outside parks, because compliance with new management rules could reduce the profits of users.

Table 2.2. Support for joint management hypotheses based on Berkes (1997) from other published literature.

Hypotheses	References
Trust between actors is an essential component of joint management.	Pinkerton 1989; Bankes 1995
Appropriate institutions are essential components of joint management.	Berkes and Farvar 1989; Pinkerton 1989; Ostrom 1990
Legal recognition of local resource rights is an essential component of joint management.	Dale 1989; Pinkerton 1989
Economic incentives for local people is an essential component of joint management.	Pinkerton 1989; Ghimire 1991; Borrini-Feryerabend 1996

2.5 CONCLUSIONS

Joint management is one way of attempting to solve the problems associated with the management of common property resources. Joint management also responds to the need to integrate the social, cultural, economic and ecological concerns of local people into resource management decisions. An underlying theory of joint management is missing and would provide a way of comparing case studies and improving future joint management initiatives. To begin developing such a theory, four elements of joint management are hypothesized as being essential to its success. In the next chapter these hypotheses will be tested against case studies found in literature.

3.0 CASE STUDIES IN LITERATURE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Examples of joint management, as a relationship between government and local communities, have been documented as case studies. Comparing case studies from different geographical, economic, political and cultural contexts is difficult, yet common elements may be found (Ostrom 1990). The common elements identified in the four hypotheses need to be tested on multiple case studies to ensure they hold true in many circumstances. At the same time, multiple case studies may help to determine situations where the hypotheses are not valid. This chapter uses eight cases studies found in literature to test the hypotheses. First, the methods of choosing and analyzing the case studies are outlined. The results are then presented as case descriptions and as evaluations of the hypotheses for each case study. In the discussion, each hypothesis is evaluated in relation to the case studies.

3.2 METHODS

Case study methodology is appropriate for this study for three reasons. First, the study attempts to answer the questions "how" and "why". How was the joint management process carried out? Why did it work or why did it not work? A focus on these questions means some survey methods are inappropriate because they determine who, what, where, how much or how many (Yin 1994). Second, joint management is a contemporary institution, and as a result, a historical review is not an appropriate method of study. Third, behaviour and circumstances cannot be manipulated or controlled precisely, and consequently an experimental approach is not appropriate. Case studies, however, investigate contemporary issues within their context, where the context is not

easily separated from the issue (Yin 1994). Joint management is a contemporary issue which is intimately connected with the local situation.

Case studies were chosen based on four criteria. First the cases were chosen to represent eight geographic-resource categories. The differing resources and countries provide theoretical replication (Yin 1994). Although the outcomes of joint management theoretical replications may vary, the reasons for success or failure are assumed to remain constant. Different locations were selected particularly to represent differing social, economic and political conditions in Canada and internationally (Mallik and Rahman 1994). Case studies in each geographic category (Canada and international) were selected on the basis of the use of different resources (fisheries, forestry, wildlife and parks/land use). Selecting cases by resource was important because the joint management literature has often been classified by resource, and some resource sectors may have experiences which are valuable, but not well known outside the sector literature [for example Co-operative Management of Local Fisheries (Pinkerton 1989b)]. Selecting cases which represent a variety of geographic locations and resources is important to ensure that the results are applicable to a wide variety of situations.

The second selection criterion, within each geographic-resource category, was the completeness of case study information. Detailed information about the organization of a specific joint management arrangement was required to identify causes of success and failure, and in order to allow comparison with other studies. The third selection criterion was the availability of more than one published source and preferably more than one author for each case study. This criterion is important to provide sufficient information and to allow for comparisons between authors (a single author may have been biased). Fourth, some cases were selected if they were viewed as being relatively more successful. Table 3.1 outlines the case studies selected for each resource-geographic category.

Each case study was evaluated to determine if the four proposed hypotheses were critical to the success or failure of joint management. In order to evaluate each

hypothesis the following question was asked: was the hypothesized characteristic a significant factor contributing to the success or failure of the joint management? In addition, all the causes of success or failure mentioned by authors of the case studies were listed. Common elements between case studies were analyzed to determine how they related to the hypotheses.

Table 3.1 Case studies and sources for testing hypotheses.

Resource	Canadian Cases	International Cases
Wildlife	Beverly-Kaminuriak Caribou Management Board (Scotter 1991; Usher 1991)	CAMPFIRE, Africa (Murindagomo 1990; Metcalfe 1994)
Fisheries	Herring Fishery in Bay of Fundy (Kearney 1984)	Japanese Marine Fisheries (Lim et al. 1995; Ruddle 1995)
Forestry	Temagami, Ontario (Benidickson 1992; Benidickson 1995)	Joint Forest Management in India (Poffenberger 1994; Poffenberger and McGean 1996; Sarin 1996)
Land based	B.C. Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE) (Wilson et al. 1995; Wilson 1995)	Amboseli National Park, Kenya (Lindsay 1987; Talbot and Olindo 1990; Western 1994)

3.3 RESULTS

3.3.1 Case study descriptions

CAMPFIRE, Zimbabwe

CAMPFIRE is a relatively recent initiative; however, the national joint management strategy for wildlife outside parks in Zimbabwe is quite unique. The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) began formally in 1989-90 when the government provided a means of granting authority for wildlife management to local authorities. District authorities (for several communities) were responsible for wildlife management (harvest rates), monitoring, enforcement and distribution of benefits. The National Parks branch of the government was responsible for ensuring the district authorities operated responsibly. As of 1991, 12 CAMPFIRE projects had been established. Since the actual devolution of power is negotiated separately for each district, the structure of joint management and the local institutions supporting it varied from district to district. The long history of safari hunting in Zimbabwe provided a foundation for generating revenue from wildlife (Metcalfe 1994).

One reason for success was the link between the benefits and costs of wildlife (Metcalfe 1994). The gross revenue for one ward was US$ 212 000 for a population of 16, 000 (Metcalfe 1994). The costs (i.e. trampled gardens) were more easily accepted because people received tangible benefits from the wildlife. The devolution of authority for wildlife was another important factor enabling CAMPFIRE to be a success. On the other hand, local institutions were one significant area of concern. Democratic local authorities were only four years old and there were concerns regarding the accountability of institutions to the local people. In some cases individual households had very little involvement in management. In one of the more successful initiatives the individual households voted on the use of the collected revenues and had more input (Metcalfe

1994). Outside pressures on the local institutions were immigration and poaching. Distribution of wildlife revenues was another source of conflict. Uneven distributions of wildlife, and the definition of a "household" and a "community" were significant areas of concern (Metcalfe 1994; Murindagomo 1990).

Coastal Fisheries, Japan

The management of coastal fisheries in Japan is one of the longest running examples of joint management. Although local fisheries associations have been established since the Fisheries Law was passed in 1901, management became more effective using local Fisheries Cooperative Associations (FCAs) established under the Fisheries Law of 1949 (Lim et al. 1995). All resident full-time fishermen are required to be members of FCAs. Each FCA has legally protected property rights to the coastal waters in their area. The FCA is responsible for setting management practices, monitoring practices, enforcing rules, and marketing fish. They operate on a consensus basis with major decisions being made by all member fishermen at the general meeting (Ruddle 1995). The FCAs relate to the government through several avenues. Sea-area fisheries adjustment commissions (SAFAC) under joint federal and local jurisdiction prepare fishing plans, resolve conflicts and offer advice to the local government. The FCA also interacts directly with municipal and prefecture (regional) governments (Lim et al. 1995).

A key to the successful aspects of joint management in Japan has been the effectiveness of the FCAs (Lim et al. 1995; Ruddle 1995). The culturally appropriate FCAs avoided conflict through consensus decision-making, incorporation of cultural values, and the promotion of compliance behaviour (Lim et al. 1995). Success was due to the legal ownership of the resource by the FCA and government technological, legal and financial support (Lim et al. 1995). Management has not been completely effective and decline in the resource has put pressure on the FCAs. Poor economic performance

decreased membership in the FCAs and put more stress on consensus decision-making. In addition, changing to more appropriate gear for declining stocks became too costly for fishermen and young people began leaving the communities (Lim et al. 1995).

Forestry, India

State management and conflicts with local people over forest use have led to severe degradation of forests in India. The dependence of local people on the forest and severe degradation led some small communities to join together to protect, regenerate, and manage their local forests. Initially, many of these initiatives were independent of the government or informally accepted by local forestry government employees. After observing successes of these groups, the government has encouraged other groups to form. In some cases local governments or organizations have initiated forest protection (Sarin 1996). National and state resolutions to encourage and establish guidelines for joint management have been introduced from 1988 to 1992 (Poffenberger 1994). These resolutions recognize the rights of villagers to some forest products. Thousands of village groups have since been involved in joint forest management. Unfortunately many villages are unable to sustain effective management. For example, in one district in Bihar, 70 % of forest protection committees had collapsed (Poffenberger and McGean 1996).

The ecological results of forest protection have been impressive in some regions. For example in Chandana, Southwest Bengal, after 7 to 8 years of protection, trees had reached heights of 6 to 8 m and more than 214 species of flora and fauna were present in the forest. Local people used 189 species for subsistence uses. The basal area increased from zero in unprotected forests to 71 m^3 after five years of protection (Poffenberger 1994). Many of these impressive results are due to the resilience of the ecosystem. The effective local control over access and enforcement of management rules was also important. The local institutions that spontaneously initiated forest management were

effective in including the whole village, distributing benefits and enforcing rules. Problems that threaten effective local institutions include: other villages raiding the forest to cut wood; government taking large portions of the wood sale profit for management; small financial return in some areas; severely degraded ecosystems; and the exclusion of women (primary forest users) from management decisions (Poffenberger 1994). In other examples, government imposed institutions are ineffective or detrimental to existing institutions.

Amboseli National Park, Kenya

Over the past century, the relationship between the Maasai pastoralists, the Kenyan government and the wildlife of the Amboseli region has been tumultuous, but has gradually reached some level of joint management. The Maasai pastoralists of the Amboseli region herded livestock in coexistence with wildlife for thousands of years prior to the arrival of Europeans (Lindsay 1987). Europeans interrupted this way of life, forced the Maasai onto reserves and changed their lifestyle. In 1948, the Amboseli National Reserve (a park) was created. Over the next three decades conflict was common. Some people were working towards a national park and others were advocating the importance of including the local people in the development of the park. In 1974, Amboseli was declared a national park and by 1977 the implementation of development plans to benefit the Maasai had begun. Dramatic success was visible for the first few years, before benefits stopped reaching the Maasai and policies were no longer followed. Between 1982 and 1987 the Maasai initiated their own economic development projects including a tourist camp, fencing of gardens and a tourist concession. In 1990, the Kenya Wildlife Service replaced the Wildlife Conservation and Management Department which was corrupt and had a poor relationship with the Maasai. New initiatives were established by the Maasai to guard wildlife and ensure they had a large habitat. The

Wildlife Service began to share gate profits from admission to the park and work with the Maasai. Many unresolved issues remain, but Western (1994) is optimistic.

The long history and frequent attempts at joint management at Amboseli provide examples of multiple reasons for failure and success. Successes occurred due to economic development projects initiated by the Maasai, communication, key individuals and changing attitudes (Western 1994). Initial problems occurred because the historical relationship between the government and Maasai people gave them a fear of land loss and wildlife preservation (Western 1994). Government and local institutions were another source of failure. Governments lacked money, commitment and integrity, while local institutions failed to distribute funds appropriately (Lindsay 1987; Talbot and Olindo 1990; Western 1994). Other problems arose when the financial commitments of the government to give 25% gate receipts and access to bore holes to the local people failed to materialize (Western 1994). Talbot and Olindo (1990) also suggested that lack of an official written agreement was a reason for failure.

Beverly-Kaminuriak Caribou Management Board,
Mid-northwest Canada

The Beverly and Kaminuriak Caribou Management Board, one of the first joint management initiatives in Canada, is often cited as an example of successful joint management. The Beverly and Kaminuriak barren ground caribou (*Rangifer tarandus groenlandicus*) herds range over northern Manitoba, northern Saskatchewan and the Northwest Territories. Population estimates by the government in the late 1970's suggested the herds were in decline, but Inuit, Indians and Métis hunters disputed the population data. The presence of many different user groups, several different governments and disputed data created an uncertain situation. In 1982, the Beverly and Kaminuriak Caribou Management Board was created for a 10 year term by the five government departments involved, and Aboriginal and Métis organizations. The board

consisted of five government members and eight user members representing Aboriginal people. It was responsible for developing a management plan, monitoring habitat, disseminating information and reporting progress to the affected organizations and local individuals. Over the next 10 years the board carried out these responsibilities successfully through video interviews, school programs, radio programs, a newspaper, a management plan, and habitat improvement recommendations (Scotter 1991).

Reasons for their considerable success included: good communication, respect, and understanding among board members (Usher 1991). Other reasons for success were the acceptance of recommendations by the government, senior government members who could immediately make changes, patience, long term commitment, majority of votes for local people, and efficiency (Scotter 1991). The major possible reason for failure in the future would be increased scarcity of the resource and an increased human population (Scotter 1991).

Bay of Fundy Herring Fishery, Nova Scotia, Canada

Under state management, competition between fishermen using different harvesting gear, mismanagement of the stocks, a monopsonist (one buyer) economy, lack of control over prices and underdevelopment of the region were some of the problems in the Bay of Fundy herring fishery prior to 1976. Government policy in 1976 allowed for joint management of the fishery and a "special advisor" from the Minister of Fisheries was sent to coordinate the new approach. The Atlantic Herring Fishermen's Marketing Co-operative (AHFMC) was formed by the purse seiners to negotiate prices with the processors, direct fishing boats to the appropriate ports, and establish sub-allocations to reduce competition among fishermen. Despite significant successes, in 1979 the AHFMC began falling apart and by 1980 completely broke down (Kearney 1984).

Initial success was attributable to the improved communication between different gear groups, initial power of the AHFMC and economic benefits for the fishermen. The

management authority of the AHFMC allowed them to set daily quotas for individual boats and to monitor catches. The real incomes of Bay of Fundy purse seine fishermen approximately doubled between 1975 and 1978. Many different factors contributed to the failure of the joint management. Changes in government institutions occurred when authority was transferred from the "special advisor" to the local district and changes were made in policy. As a result, the perception of who had the authority switched from the AHFMC to the government. Through declines in prices in the herring market, perceived decreased authority and unhelpful government policy, the AHFMC disintegrated (Kearney 1984).

Temagami Forest, Ontario, Canada

The old growth forest of the Temagami area of Northern Ontario, became a renewed centre of controversy for forest companies, environmentalists, First Nations, and other stakeholders in 1987. In 1990, the provincial government and the First Nations negotiated an agreement to form the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA) to take responsibility for the area. The WSA was comprised of six First Nation members and six members appointed by the provincial government. These government appointees unofficially represented municipalities, industry, labour, tourism, cottagers and environmentalists (Benidickson 1992). Their mandate included monitoring, studying and planning for all activities on the land of four townships. They were provided with decision-making authority, but only within the policy framework already established. The WSA produced a stewardship plan and ceased operations by 1995 (Benidickson 1995). The implementation of the plan is still uncertain and a planning council for a larger area is now responsible for management of the land.

The effectiveness of the WSA was reduced partly because of the lack of clear accountability for Ontario members and the unclear role of the WSA (legislative, adjudicative, or administrative) (Benidickson 1992). The long-term stability is

questionable because the results were not binding and the new provincial government seems less likely to implement the plan (Benidickson 1992; Duffy et al. 1995).

Vancouver Island Commission on Resources and the Environment,
British Columbia, Canada

The Vancouver Island Commission on Resources and the Environment (VICORE) was an 18 month process, ending in 1993, to address land use issues. Vancouver Island was at the centre of conflict over resources, particularly forest resources, for some time (Wilson 1995). VICORE was a multi-stakeholder consensus based process, including members from fourteen sectors. Significant Aboriginal participation was never achieved, in part due to the large number of First Nations with no method of choosing representatives (Wilson 1995). Near the end of the mandate two separate groups of members (multi-sector coalition and Conservation Sector) presented two different unauthorized proposals to VICORE. These proposals were directed at the person of ultimate authority and were not a method of seeking consensus. A final report was approved by fourteen sectors, but the ultimate decision was made by government authorities (Wilson 1995).

The goal of better informed, more balanced and stable decisions may have been reached, but many problems continued (Wilson et al. 1995). The government provided inadequate policy guidance on several significant issues. Membership did not include First Nations and some coercion of one member by another occurred (employees by employers). Funding and time constraints also posed problems. Although initially participants were willing to work towards consensus, desire to work together quickly disappeared and in the end there was no unified proposal (Wilson et al. 1995).

3.3.2 Relevance of Hypotheses to Case Studies

In order to evaluate each hypothesis the following question was asked: was the hypothesized characteristic a significant factor contributing to the success or failure of the joint management case study? For some case studies insufficient information prevented answering the question. Probably in most cases the authors did not consider that aspect important enough to mention and as a result that hypothesis was not critical to the success or failure of joint management. In other cases, the hypothesized characteristic was present but of intermediate importance to joint management. Table 3.2 shows the results for each hypothesis and case study. Five case studies cited trust as a significant factor; in one case study trust was of intermediate importance and two case studies had insufficient information. Economic benefits were important to three cases studies; three case studies found economic benefits to be of intermediate importance and two case studies had insufficient information to evaluate the role of economic benefits. Institutions were important in seven case studies and there was insufficient information for one case study. Legal recognition of local rights was important for four case studies and of intermediate importance for the other case studies. Although individual case studies mentioned other factors, such as united purpose, culture, philosophy, education and the inclusion of women, none of these reasons for success was repeated throughout the case studies.

Table 3.2 Was the hypothesized characterisitic a significant factor contributing to the success or failure of the joint management (JM)? "Yes" means the hypothesized characterisitic was important to the success or failure of JM. "Unsure" means there was insufficient information or it was not mentioned as being important. "Medium" means the hypothesis was somewhat important, but it did not appear to be a critical factor. "JM institution" refers to the group or board (often with government and local representatives) which made JM decisions.

	TRUST	ECONOMIC BENEFITS	APPROPRIATE INSTITUTIONS	LEGAL RECOGNITION
Wildlife, Africa	(illegible)	Yes, economic benefits were the aim, but some areas were more profitable. Distribution of benefits was a critical issue.	Yes, institutions were formalized or created under new legislation. Problem with unfamiliarity of democracy.	Yes, power, benefits and responsibility, given to local peopl permanently.
Park, Africa	Yes, trust grew over time. Lack of trust often caused problems.	Yes, lack of promised economic benefits caused the collapse of JM and CED caused success.	Yes, institutions' effectiveness changed both on local and government levels.	Medium Some of the process was protected by legislation, but local rights were not.
Fishery, Japan	Yes, trust was established over the long history of development.	Medium. Economic benefits directly related to size of resource.	Yes, the well established local insitution was the foundation of JM.	Yes, legislation has established and protected all of the process.
Forest, India	Medium. Trust between villages was important. Trust with government was variable and with differing importance.	Medium. Some regions clearly benefited, others had fewer resources and suffered; additional CED was used to supplement.	Yes, spontaneous insitutions were effective. Government iniated institutions had varied success, but were critical.	Yes, now national and state legislation, but effective before legislation in some areas.
Caribou, Canada	Yes, trust was established among board members and appeared to be between community and board.	Medium. Economic benefits directly related to size of resource.	Yes, the JM instituion seemed to be effective.	Medium. Protected 10 year term for the board, but only power to recommend. Recommendations accepted.
Bay of Fundy, Canada	Yes, lack of trust of government appeared to contribute to failure. Trust between users never established firmly.	Yes, economic benefits appeared to be significant. A decrease in prices, decreased benefits.	Yes, the local cooperative was a reason for success, and the breakdown in the cooperative eliminated the chance for future JM.	Yes, the lack of government legislation establishing the authority of the local cooperative was a problem.
Temagami Canada	Yes, trust was established between members of the JM institution.	(illegible)	Yes, the JM institution did reach a consensus.	Medium. Short term protection. They could only recommend.
VICORE, Canada	(illegible)	(illegible)	(illegible)	Medium. Legally established, but no binding power.

3.4 DISCUSSION OF CASE STUDY RESULTS

3.4.1 VICORE and Temagami, Canada

These two case studies differed significantly from the other case studies. VICORE was a multi-stakeholder process. Each person represented a different sector; whereas all other cases were two party negotiations between local people and the government. In addition, the local people in other case studies were local users closely linked to the resource, but the relationship between the sectors on VICORE and the land was different. Although some people may have depended on the resource for jobs, they were unlikely to have valued the land in the same spiritual and social ways that historical users do.

Temagami case was a discourse between two parties: Aboriginal and non-Aboriginals. In this case, the non-Aboriginals represented different sectors, such as cottagers and environmentalists (not government), and the representatives were chosen through or by their sector. As a result, the process appeared to be part joint management and part multi-stakeholder. Benidickson (1992) felt the lack of clear roles for the non-Aboriginal members created confusion which was never resolved during the process.

As a result of these differences, the hypotheses were not very applicable to these case studies. For example, the coercion of labour unions by forest companies during the VICORE process demonstrated how relationships were not changed by the process (Wilson 1995). In Temagami, although trust temporarily developed between the members involved in the process, the relationship between foresters and environmentalists was unlikely to be significantly altered.

Economic incentives were also less important in the VICORE and Temagami case studies. Compensation for those involved in the board may have been important and the resulting decisions may have affected the economic vitality of the forestry and tourism

industries, but the economic impact was not as direct. The impacts in most cases would be through markets, companies and/or unions, before they impacted individuals.

Institutions were important to both cases, particularly structure and function of the joint management institution (organization which developed and/or administered joint management usually involving both parties). Outside institutions were important for providing the technical support required and holding members accountable. Although both processes were established legally, legal recognition was for a short period of time and involved limited devolution of power. As a result, local rights of access and management of the resource were not protected.

These case studies may be better evaluated by the criteria applied to multi-stakeholder processes. For example, Duffy et al. (1995) suggested the criteria of fairness, efficiency and stability. The four hypotheses seem only to apply to joint management involving two parties, where one of the parties is closely linked with the resource. Thus the remaining discussion will be applied primarily to the six studies that meet these criteria.

3.4.2 Trust

Trust was generally a critical factor. Trust was important between: local people and the government, the government and the joint management institution, the local people and the joint management institution, joint management institution members, and different groups of local people . In each case study one or more of these trust relationships was an important factor.

The initial level of trust and the difficulty in establishing a trusting relationship was significantly dependent on the historical relationship between the government and the local people. For example, in one area around Amboseli National Park the long-time warden was respected and trusted by the local people. In another area, the government had a history of acting with little regard for the local people. Joint management was more

easily established in the first case than in the second, in part due to the better historical relationship between authorities and local people (Talbot and Olindo 1990). This example also demonstrates the importance of having key individuals build trust and promote joint management. Communication was important to building trust at Amboseli, Beverly-Kaminuriak caribou board, and the Bay of Fundy.

3.4.3 Appropriate Institutions

Appropriate institutions (local, government and joint management) were clearly very important to the success of joint management. Ineffective institutions were often the obvious reason for the failure of joint management. For example, CAMPFIRE institutions were built around democratic institutions new to the local people. In some cases the novelty of representative democracy meant that local people were not adequately consulted about management and benefit distribution decisions. The institution became an elite organization among the local people. At Amboseli National Park, the inability of government institutions to keep commitments was cited as a cause of failure (Western 1994). In Japan the local fishery cooperative institution was very effective and capable, and as a result clearly important to maintaining the joint management of the fishery for many years.

The local institutions were tested by challenging circumstances requiring difficult management decisions and action. The decline in the fishery and subsequent benefits threatened the Bay of Fundy and Japanese local institutions. The distribution of benefits was a significant problem in India, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Bay of Fundy. Forest products collected by villagers in India were sold collectively by the village; Kenya government benefits were a lump sum to the community; CAMPFIRE trophy hunting profits were from a single company; seine netters as a cooperative sold their fish in Bay of Fundy. Some benefits were kept by the community and were used for community projects such

as schools and health facilities. Other benefits were distributed to families based on variables such as skill, location of residence, and equality.

3.4.4 Legal Recognition

Legal recognition of local rights was generally important, but the type of legal recognition varied. Three significant issues surrounded legal recognition: establishment of the joint management institutions, distribution of power, length of time protected. In Temagami, VICORE, Beverly-Kaminuriak Caribou, CAMPFIRE and India, legal recognition involved the establishment of the joint management institution and the rules by which it would operate. Although this protection was important to provide funding and security, the rights of local people to the resource were not necessarily protected. In other countries, the establishment of many joint management initiatives with one piece of legislation (as in CAMPFIRE and India) limited the flexibility of local institutions and process.

Another issue was the distribution of power. Did local people have decision-making authority? In all Canadian case studies, the joint management institution and local people were only able to recommend actions. The caribou board and the Bay of Fundy fishermen (initially) did have a lot of influence over decisions. The other two boards had intermediate influence over decisions. Japan, CAMPFIRE and India gave power to local people. The government in Kenya still made the decisions.

Finally, the length of commitment to joint management impacted the effectiveness. VICORE and Temagami both had short mandates (18 months and 5 years). The short mandate made forming trust difficult and long term significant changes unlikely. They did not establish the relationship which was evident in all other cases. Joint management needs to be viewed as a long term project.

3.4.5 Economic Benefits

Economic benefits were usually very important. At Amboseli National Park the failure of the government to provide the promised economic benefits caused the collapse of joint management and later community economic development initiatives prepared the way for successful joint management (Western 1994). Similarly, economic benefits for CAMPFIRE participants and Bay of Fundy fishermen were important. The livelihood of the local people was dependent on the resource and on the benefits received directly or through joint management.

For three other cases the economic benefits were important, but not always realized depending on the health of the resource. The fishery in Japan, the local forests in India and the Beverly-Kaminuriak caribou herd in Canada were all resources pressured by human use. The local people in each case were economically very dependent on the resource. In order to conserve the declining resource local people in India would have to sacrifice income. Fishermen in Japan were losing revenue as the stock declined and were approaching the time when the harvest would be reduced further to protect the stock. The Beverly-Kaminuriak caribou herd had not yet reached a crisis. These three examples demonstrate the significant problem of conserving a resource while providing the economic benefits that local people need for survival.

In India the problem was addressed in several ways. In some cases conservation improved the state of the resource and the economic returns. A local management group then distributed benefits and economic losses were minimized. In other situations the revenue distributed by the local management group was too little to sustain the local people. One way of increasing revenue was to create an alternative source of income for the community. Community economic development initiatives (such as value added operations) could be very helpful in providing sources of revenue which did not require increased harvesting rates. Economic benefits for local people did not seem to be a universal requirement for successful joint management. In some cases the promise of

future economic benefits may have motivated local people, in other cases economics was of little importance.

3.5 CONCLUSIONS

The hypotheses did not seem to be very applicable to the multi-stakeholder case studies (VICORE and Temagami) and these cases would be more appropriately evaluated by other criteria. Although the other case studies did vary widely in their circumstances, there were significant common bonds. Trust was generally important in building a relationship between the two parties. Institutions were clearly critical to joint management. The legal recognition was most effective when some power was given to the local people for a long period of time. Economic benefits were important, but often linked with the health of the resource. In the next chapter, the case study of the WIPB will be used to further test the hypotheses.

4.0 WINDIGO INTERIM PLANNING BOARD
CASE STUDY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Recent Canadian court decisions have affirmed Aboriginal title, Aboriginal interest in land, and the Crown's fiduciary responsibility to First Nations. These court decisions and other actions have encouraged governments to settle land claims and move towards self-government. Although Aboriginal self-government has growing support, there is little practical progress. The Ontario government tried a joint management experiment with the Windigo Interim Planning Board (WIPB), which may have been a step towards self-government.

The WIPB involved two parties (First Nations and non-Aboriginal Ontarians), but did not include any government employees on the Board. The Board had a proactive mandate: to do land use planning in a remote area of northwestern Ontario (see Figure 1.1). The WIPB was originally established as an experiment to learn from and suggest future directions for land use planning in northern Ontario. Since the conditions of remote First Nations reserves are similar across the country, this experiment has implications for people in and outside Ontario. The lessons learned from this case study can also be useful for understanding joint management in general. After presenting the background and methods, the results will be discussed. A brief discussion of the process used by the Board will be followed by a detailed examination of the Board's accomplishments with respect to each of its objectives. The four hypotheses of essential elements for joint management were further analyzed in relation to the experience of the WIPB.

4.2 BACKGROUND

Cat Lake and North Caribou Lake First Nations are part of the Windigo First Nations Tribal Council in Northwestern Ontario, Canada. The communities are remote fly-in reserves with populations of 522 and 838 respectively. The populations are very young (34% between 18 and 35) and are growing quickly. In 1989, negotiations began on a resource development agreement between local First Nations and the company developing the Musselwhite gold mine. Although this agreement was more sophisticated than previous resource development agreements, First Nations felt that a more permanent and proactive solution was needed for land use problems in the area. To avoid problems with the environmental assessment of the new mine, the provincial government agreed to establish the two land use planning boards.

An agreement was negotiated with an independent facilitator to establish two planning boards named after the tribal councils the communities belonged to: Shibogama Interim Planning Board (Kingfisher Lake and Wunnumin Lake First Nations), and Windigo Interim Planning Board (Cat Lake and North Caribou Lake First Nations). The focus of this study is on the Windigo Interim Planning Board (WIPB), although occasional mention may be made of the Shibogama Interim Planning Board.

The agreement was signed by the communities, tribal councils and four provincial government departments on February 13, 1992. September 1, 1993 an Order-in-Council formally established WIPB as stated in the agreement. The WIPB has four purposes as established by the Order-in-Council:

   (a) developing a plan for land-use and resource development in the planning area
   (b) reviewing and commenting on applications...
   (c) identifying potential opportunities for resource-based economic development and
        the practice of traditional economic activities
   (d) developing community participation models suitable for use in remote northern
        Ontario

The WIPB was established for five years unless terminated earlier by an Order-in-Council. It received $200 000 per year for operating expenses from which it paid for a full time coordinator, half-time secretary (position was only filled some of the time), remuneration of board members/chair, and all other expenses.

The WIPB is composed of six members and an independent chair. Three members represent First Nations, one from each community and one from the tribal council in general. The Chief and Council of each First Nation chose the member to represent their community. In one community the board member was initially a Band Councillor, but even though he did not remain on Council he remained on the Board for the five years. The board member from the other community changed each time the Council changed. As a result, five different board members represented that community in four years. Three members were chosen by the provincial government from applicants responding to advertisements. The provincial government chose one person with experience in the mining industry, one person with experience in tourism and one person with experience in planning. The Ontario board members did not officially represent any sector, but represented the interests of all Ontarians. Although all of the appointments were initially one year Order-in-Council appointments, Ontario renewed them each year (except the community member which changed).

4.3 METHODS

A case study of the Windigo Interim Planning Board (WIPB) served as a practical test of the hypotheses. The members have been involved long enough to have gained valuable experience and the WIPB represented a different approach to joint management which was not focused on a single resource. Evaluation of the WIPB was based on (1) interviews with the people involved in the WIPB or affected by the Board's decisions, (2) meeting minutes and packages, and (3) personal observations.

In order to increase the construct validity (appropriateness of measures used for issues studied) of the case study, multiple sources of evidence were used for data triangulation (convergence of multiple sources of evidence) (Yin 1994). The sources of data used in the triangulation included: documents (correspondence, minutes, meeting packages), open-ended interviews (board members), structured interviews (local users), and observations (Table 4.1).

The interviews with board members were nonscheduled structured interviews. Nonscheduled meant the questions did not have to be asked in the same order every time and supplementary questions could be included. The interviews were also nonscheduled to allow for clarification and rephrasing particularly to respond to cultural or language differences.

Table 4.1 Interview locations, dates and number of people interviewed.

Interview site	Interview dates in 1997	# of board members interviewed	# of others interviewed
Cat Lake	Sept. 2-4	1	18
North Caribou Lake	August 20-25	1	37
Thunder Bay	August	3	0
Sioux Lookout	August 20, 25	2	0
Winnipeg (phone)	October	0	2

Structured meant the interviewer had a set of questions to ensure the important information was collected. The board members reviewed the proposal and therefore understood the purpose of the research. Their consent for research about the Board included their consent to use the information. The interviews with board members constituted the most important source of evidence. As a result, prior to the first question each was asked if he/she minded having the interview audio-taped to ensure all information was recorded accurately. Prior to the interview each was told that his/her responses would be anonymous, and he/she could refuse to answer a question or stop the interview at any time. Questions were used to learn the following information: 1) how the individual became involved and what role they played 2) an evaluation of the joint management process (successes and failures) 3) the importance, from his/her experience, of the issues identified in the hypotheses (Appendix 1). Five of the six board members were interviewed (the other board member could not be interviewed, despite three attempts). The coordinator (full time employee responsible for daily operations) and the chair of the board were asked the same questions and will be included as board members to protect their identity.

Developers who had submitted proposals to the Board and Ontario government employees were also interviewed. The board provided a list of the developers, and developers were chosen to represent different types of development and those most familiar with the work of the Board (those developers who submitted multiple proposals or were identified with associations). The choice of developers and government employees to interview was also based partially on recommendations of the board chair. Prior to the interviews, each person being interviewed was told that his/her responses would be anonymous, and they could refuse to answer a question or stop the interview at any time. One mining employee and one area tourist operator were interviewed. Developers were asked questions to learn about: 1) their experience with the Board 2) their evaluation of the successes and failures of the Board 3) the impact of the Board on

their development approval process (Appendix 1). Two government employees from different departments were interviewed and were asked about: 1) the communication between the Board and the government, 2) their evaluation of the successes and failures of the Board.

Board members were asked to assist in introducing the researcher to the communities. Members of the leadership of each First Nation were strategically selected and other members were selected randomly for interviewing. Members of the board were asked to assist in identifying key First Nation members to interview. Local users were informed of the purpose of the study and asked for their consent prior to questioning. Local people were asked what they know about the Board, and whether or not they felt the WIPB had been successful (Appendix 1). Some of the questions were not understood properly (probably because of cultural differences). In most cases, all questions were still asked because it gave the person being interviewed another opportunity to talk and more opportunity for their general views and understanding to be communicated to the interviewer.

One community was visited August 20 -25, 1997. A translator was hired for two and a half days. The translator selected houses to visit (mostly older people who did not speak English) and if the residents were present and willing to be interviewed, she would continue with the questions (Figure 4.1). A number of the employees at the Band office were also interviewed (in English), including two Councillors. Finding people to interview was a problem and as a result age and gender distributions could not be carefully followed, although some attempt was made to get a variety. Other people were randomly interviewed by approaching them and asking if they would be willing to be interviewed.

The second community was visited Sept. 2-4, 1997. A number of the employees at the Band office and economic development office were interviewed, including two Councillors. More people were randomly interviewed by just approaching them and

asking if they would be willing to be interviewed. Questions were added or deleted based on the knowledge of the person who was being interviewed. Often additional information about the Board or its work had to be shared to help the person being interviewed understand the questions or be able to give an informed answer. The sex of the person interviewed was recorded and his/her age estimated as 20-30, 30-50, and 50+. Ages were estimated to avoid being invasive. Each evening after interviews, notes were reviewed to ensure their accuracy.

Efforts were made to minimize possible sources of error or bias. First, the design of the questions may have affected the answers. One of the questions (Would you recommend a similar process for another area?) was not understood by most people because of cultural differences (they do not want to interfere in other people's affairs). However, informant fatigue (giving less informative answers or incorrect answers because the informant was tired) seemed unlikely to have been a problem. Board member interviews were approximately one hour long, but no one showed signs of fatigue and many expressed surprise that it was finished so quickly. Community interviews were never more than 20 minutes and often less than 10 minutes.

Figure 4.1 Number of Interviews Conducted in Communities by Sex and Age

Third, recall failure was present for both board members and community members. The aspects forgotten by board members were assumed to be of less importance to that board member and therefore did not impact results. To help community members remember, the interviewer explained further about the Board.

Interviewer bias may have resulted from either the translator or the researcher. First when the translator was interviewing, mistranslation of the questions or the answers may have affected results. Answers were very long and therefore translation was inevitably a summary. This made it possible for the translator's opinion to be mixed in. Answers sometimes seemed to be made to fit the question (i.e. using the Board's name when the researcher could tell that the person had not said the Board's name). The translator may also have led the person being interviewed by the examples given. Despite these possible sources of error, the translator was able to keep the community member talking for a while and the most important (frequently repeated) message of the community member's comments was established.

Another possible source of error when the researcher was interviewing would have occurred if the person did not feel comfortable talking to a white stranger and as a result gave a false impression of how much he/she knew about the WIPB. Although this may have happened in a couple of cases, several times after giving them more information about the Board they were willing to speak from their experience. As a result the researcher learned what information helped to encourage them to talk and considered the results quite reliable.

The fifth source of bias may have been strategic bias. The people being interviewed may have also given answers that they thought the researcher wanted to hear (the WIPB was doing a good job and should be continued). In most cases examples confirmed their statements. Finally, non-response bias (the people who were not interviewed were not represented proportionately by those who did respond) was unlikely to have been a factor, because so few people knew about the work of the Board. Overall

the triangulation of data sources and review by the Board ensured that the general conclusions drawn from the interviews were accurate.

Each community member interview was reviewed and the knowledge of the community member about the Board was assigned to one of six categories by the researcher.

1. never heard of the WIPB

2. heard of the WIPB but knew nothing about it

3. heard of the WIPB and could say some of the words associated with the work but showed no understanding

4. heard of the WIPB and understood one aspect of their work

5. heard of the WIPB and understood several aspects

6. knew as much as a Board member about the WIPB

Key comments by each participant were recorded under categories.

The written case study was returned to the board members for comments to ensure that the account was accurate. The operation and work of the Board as understood from all sources of information was evaluated by several criteria. The results were first evaluated in terms of the process of the Board (efficient and effective?), communication with developers (effective?), and the outcomes reached by the Board in comparison with their objectives. The results were then analyzed with respect to the four hypotheses. Were the problems encountered by the WIPB addressed in the hypotheses? Were the successful aspects of the WIPB process included in the hypotheses?

4.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION - PROCESS, COMMUNICATION, AND OUTCOMES

4.4.1 Process

Board Operation

The process of the Board making decisions and acting, depends on the membership, decision-making process, balance of power, trust between members, and cultural influences. Each of these aspects will be examined.

Although the members of the Board representing Ontario were involved in tourism, mining and planning, they did not officially represent those sectors. The Ontario government did not meet with the Ontario members to discuss what their role would be and, as a result, it was up to the individual board member to decide how to act. Ontario members felt they were "left to flounder" with no direction as to how to proceed. Within the first couple of years there was "talk" of getting together with the government or just the Ontario members alone, but no action was taken by either the government or the board members. Board members and one government employee felt that lack of communication was a problem. One government employee had received some negative comments from other government sectors. A Ministry of Northern Development and Mines employee had said that the Ontario representatives "sold out" by not stopping some anti-industry actions. On the other hand, the lack of communication with the government, as pointed out by a government employee, may have given the Board more freedom to work towards consensus and not be controlled by external agendas.

Ontario board members felt that their knowledge about the mining sector, tourism operations and planning in general contributed a lot to the Board. According to one board member, the board member most involved in a sector was consulted more during discussions about that sector. Almost all comments of board members indicated that having official sector representation would have weakened trust, and made progress more

difficult. On the other hand, some board members recognized that official representation may have made the land use plan a more powerful document which would be more likely to be implemented. Some confusion was evident because some board members and First Nations people did not seem to understand that the board members did not officially represent any sector. The confusion probably did not negatively affect the process.

The First Nations assumed after the agreement was negotiated that government employees were going to be on the Board. This assumption was significant because the First Nations assumed government employees would have their time and travel paid for by their employer, freeing up more money for the work of the Board. One of the most knowledgeable First Nations community members interviewed for this practicum, who was not on the Board, still believed there were government representatives on the Board. This perception led to some unwarranted mistrust. A benefit of not having Ontario government representation on the Board was the consistency in Board membership. Lack of consistency was already a problem encountered by the Board. Five different people represented one of the communities over four years and these changes were cited by some board members and some community members as one of the problems. The secretarial position was also changed a great deal; for some Board meetings, board members took minutes. The government contacts also changed several times and the provincial government changed during the Board's operation. All of these changes were recognized as problems by at least four board members and, as a result, if government members had also kept changing on the Board, the work of the Board would have been greatly hindered. In the case of the Beverly-Kaminuriak Caribou Management Board, government members were in senior positions that were less likely to change and were able to implement changes more quickly (Scotter 1991). Less senior government employees as representatives were not considered a benefit. In general, the board membership was seen as being appropriate and successful as long as the land use plan is accepted and implemented.

One of the problems encountered in the operation of the Board was the difficulty in getting a quorum (four board members, not including the chair). As all of the board members had other jobs, some of them found attending all the meetings difficult. One board member was absent particularly often and the Board has began having an alternate attend. The Order-in-Council established that the Board was to make decisions based on consensus. No one mentioned any problems with consensus decision-making. The balance of power was seen to be equal, although the board members representing the communities participated less frequently in discussion. One First Nations board member thought in one or two instances he/she was not heard, but felt overall there were no problems. The board members thought trust was important to achieving consensus. Board members did not perceive other board members as having hidden agendas, but thought that all were working towards similar goals.

The coming together of two cultures was the central reason for the Board and appeared to influence all of the work of the Board. Although different cultures did not create conflict, over the first couple of years board members learned more about the other culture and built trust. The Board was seen by some Board and community members as a method of educating the government and industry about aboriginal culture and different views about the issues. The chair of the board was important as a neutral facilitator between the two cultures. The main cultural difference that affected the Board's operation was the limited number of comments by First Nations board members. Despite some minor problems, the Board operation was successful and fairly smooth. Much of the credit for the smooth operation goes to the chair of the Board who kept things going, facilitated between people, wrote many of the documents and directed the Board's work.

Communication with the Mining Industry

Previous bad experiences with mines made First Nations suspicious; furthermore, they had limited knowledge about the operation of the mining industry. The mining

industry is only beginning to understand the concerns of First Nations and to consult them. As a result, the Board was bridging a gap between these two parties. The Board spent the first two or three years focused mainly on mining. The construction of the Musselwhite mine required some environmental reviews and the approval of many permit requests. Furthermore the Board, itself, needed to learn a great deal about the mining industry. Much time was spent reviewing permit requests for exploration and writing guidelines describing how mining companies should deal with First Nations. Guidelines were sent to all companies holding claims in the area. Numerous presentations were made to the Board about mining and meetings were held in the communities between mining companies and community members. The Board participated in two conferences with Northwestern Ontario Prospectors Association. A lot of education, understanding and communication was needed to begin to build bridges between mining companies and First Nations. Board members tended to think communication with the mining industry was adequate.

Government employees felt the communication between the Board and the mining industry was inadequate. An atmosphere of "fear and suspicion" was created which caused the mining companies to write letters to the government objecting to the WIPB. They felt there was a lack of consultation during the development of the plan. Although there is always room for improvement, the Board put a lot of effort into communicating with the mining industry.

Communication with the Tourism Industry

Fly-in remote hunting or fishing tourism is very common in one part of the planning area of the Board's operation. Board members generally thought communication with the tourism industry could have been improved. Tourist operators within the Board's area of operation were informed of the purpose of the Board when planning began. Unfortunately some tourist operators from just outside the official area

of operation, but within the traditional area of one of the communities, did not receive notification and this later became a problem. It appeared that the tourist operators formed their own ideas about the Board and concluded that only Aboriginal-owned tourist operations would be allowed in the future. A tourist operator in the area felt they should have had more input in the development of the plan. She felt the Board did not understand why a non-native person would be upset with the process. First, the tourist operators did not like one group having control over large areas of land. Second, the tourist operators did not like being forced to hire or share earnings with First Nations people when they had done all the work and taken the financial risk. They recognized the need for a process to deal with these conflicts but did not feel that WIPB was able adequately to address those concerns.

A meeting between the Board and tourism operators in the third year of the Board's mandate was seen by one board member as the first time First Nations had talked with tourism operators in this manner. This meeting may have improved understanding of the Board's work, but one community Board member observed that a tourism camp had been built in the spring and the Board had not been informed. Almost everyone seemed to agree that there were problems with the communication between the Board and the tourism industry. Probably the focus on the mining industry, rather than the tourism industry, was due to the development of the new mine (the catalyst of the process) and the large number of permits related to mining which were reviewed.

4.4.2 Outcomes vs. Objectives

"The Board shall advise the Ministers by reviewing and commenting on applications."

The Board reviewed 27 permit requests before October 1996. The requests included permits for mining exploration, roads, fly-in tourist camps, and baitfish blocks

(most by non-Aboriginals). Fourteen permit requests were approved; four permit requests were approved with conditions; and four permit requests were refused. All but three of these were decisions were agreed upon by the Board, the communities and the Ministry of Natural Resources. One request was supported by the Board, but not by the community. Another request was supported by the community with conditions, but the MNR did not issue the permit (the Board only provided information to both parties). Only one permit was opposed by the Board and communities, but issued by the MNR because the exploration was viewed as minor and not harmful (letter Mar. 1995 from the Minister of Natural Resources). In this case, the mining company decided not to proceed because the community did not support the exploration project. Thus, the Board's recommendations were followed, even when radical. For example, one of the refused permits was for diamond drilling exploration, the first time in Ontario that a permit for basic exploration on a recognized claim was refused (according to one board member). An article in Northern Ontario Business April 1993 documented the "harsh words" of the mining company president objecting to the lack of explanation from the government before (that problems may have existed) or after. He also felt the rejection of his permit was unreasonable because the "helicopter-based program would have minimal impact on the Native community". Although, one board member gave two examples of the government not listening (a permit which was issued despite objections by the Board and some boat caches were allocated without approval), the majority of board members felt that the government listened to and implemented their recommendations.

The Board was efficient and effective in reviewing proposals. Permits were generally reviewed within one to five months, although a few permit reviews extended over a year. The length of time for renewal was reasonable, yet longer than the traditional 30 day public review previously existing. One general member of the First Nations pointed out that 30 days was insufficient for their communities to adequately respond to permit requests. The Board was able to ensure the community voice was

heard, with respect to each permit, because it was not restricted by to 30 days. In the future, if the Board's mandate is not extended, another mechanism must be found to ensure the First Nations have sufficient opportunity to reply to permit requests. Some board members were unaware of the importance of this aspect of their work; they felt the most important work was the land use plan or improving communication with stakeholders.

The Board encountered two problems with respect to reviewing permits. The first was a lack of understanding of the board members. They were asked to review many aspects of the mining process and some of the board members did not have any prior knowledge of the mining cycle or the environmental impacts. Mining companies made presentations to the Board explaining various aspects of the mining process, but, particularly at the beginning, there was a lot to learn in a short period of time. One First Nations board member saw this lack of understanding as a definite problem which decreased his ability to contribute to discussions. The lack of understanding may have been a reason for the concern expressed by one board member that not enough recommendations were made in the early years. The second problem encountered by the Board, was the discontinuation of the requirement that companies obtain work permits for basic exploration shortly after the new provincial government was elected. As a result, the Board and the communities did not know what subsequent exploration occurred in that area, unless a company voluntarily provided this information. The Board sent recommended guidelines for doing exploration in the area to companies known to be working there, but they are still searching for a more effective way to ensure that the communities are aware of activities within their traditional areas.

Unfortunately, the Board did add an additional layer of bureaucracy to an already complicated resource management process. A First Nations person was informed by the Ministry of Natural Resources that final approval of a tourism facility was subject to six different approvals (NAN under the Interim Measures Agreement, WTPB, 30 day public

review under Environmental Assessment Act, Ministry of Tourism, comments from Regional Archaeologist of the Ministry of Culture and site approval). Perhaps the WIPB should have replaced one or more of the permit processes already in place.

"The Board shall advise the Ministers by:... identifying potential opportunities for resource-based economic development and the practice of traditional economic activities."

The identification of potential opportunities for economic development was thorough and a strong emphasis for the Board. Four of the board members identified gathering information as one of the most successful achievements. The slow process of mapping traditional areas, traplines, sensitive areas and other important features by the First Nations peoples was frequently cited as being very important. Some concern arose over what information would be subject to the Freedom of Information Act and how sensitive information could be protected. Consultation with legal advisors alleviated these fears and the community members gradually came to trust the Board to use the information wisely. The identification of tourism opportunities was another area on which the Board focused. It developed an assessment tool to help First Nations know if a lake was suitable for tourism. They tried to apply these criteria to the lakes within the Board's jurisdiction, but the lack of fisheries information was a limiting factor. Interpretation of satellite imagery provided some preliminary forestry information on the area surrounding the reserves. Hydro electric potential sites and eskers that may be valuable for gravel were also identified by consultants. The Board did not spend a lot of effort detailing mineral potential, although some research identified the greenstone belts which criss-cross the area. The Board coordinated prospecting courses in each community to encourage mineral exploration by the First Nations.

The information collected was important in identifying the missing pieces of information, particularly with respect to fisheries and forestry. Lack of information about

the lakes (lake surveys) in the surrounding area was identified as a serious problem, because fishing is of great importance to the First Nations people. The Board tried for 2-3 years to offer a training course in doing lake surveys, but was unable to find an instructor or assistance from the Ministry of Natural Resources in providing an approved curriculum.

Preliminary resources information is now available if an Aboriginal person wished to start a business in any of these sectors. The mapping of sensitive areas will help to prevent harmful development activities and disturbances to these important features. The mapping of traditional activities will help to protect this information for future Aboriginal people.

"The Board shall advise the Ministers by:...developing community participation models suitable for use in remote northern Ontario." Although the Board has not made any recommendations regarding this directive, it may be assumed that recommendations will be based on its experiences communicating with the two communities. The methods the Board used to consult the communities will first be documented, followed by an evaluation based on interviews in the communities.

The WIPB made communicating with the communities a priority and used many different methods. The Board distributed simplified terms of the agreement in English and Syllabics to all community members at the beginning of the Board's term. Every permit request or decision was forwarded to the Chiefs and Councils for their review and approval. The board member representing each community acted as a liaison between the Board and the community. The Board held two Board meetings in each community which included public meetings (a maximum of 25 people attended each meeting and sometimes less than 10) and phone-in radio programs. The full-time coordinator visited the communities regularly to consult with the board member, Chief and Council and other community members. Many of the trappers were also contacted during interviews

to map resource distribution or when a permit request affected their trap-line. Each community also had an initiative to specifically involve women, because women were rarely consulted through other methods. To talk to youth in the communities the Board visited the senior classes in each community school twice and an additional meeting was held with a few youth in one community.

A year after the Board commenced meeting, it tried to establish Advisory Committees with eight representatives in each of the communities. The committees were to provide: information for the maps, comments on proposals and the land use plan, and any other assistance required by the Board. Unfortunately these advisory committees were not effective and did not exist for long or make great contributions. The Board also hired part-time fieldworkers, but a high turnover in fieldworkers in one community, personal problems and difficulties in supervising led to the elimination of part-time fieldworker positions. Fieldworkers were subsequently hired on a contract basis for special projects. This system proved to be satisfactory. The attempts to communicate with the communities were extensive and in many forms. The effectiveness of these attempts was examined by the researcher through visits to each community.

In total 55 community members (37 from one community and 18 from the other) were interviewed: 23 women and 32 men. Nine people had never heard of the Windigo Interim Planning Board (Figure 4.2, 4.3). Fourteen of those who had heard of the Board had no idea what it was about. For example, a typical comment was: "hears about it on the radio, but doesn't really understand what they are talking about". Twelve people demonstrated very little knowledge of the Board; they perhaps had heard the words associated with the Board, but didn't give the impression of understanding the significance of the words. Therefore, at least 64% of those interviewed didn't know enough to give an evaluation. These results are consistent with the opinions of the translator, board members, and fieldworkers who were interviewed. Furthermore, the attendance at community meetings hosted by the Board suggested that not many people

Figure 4.2 Level of understanding about the Windigo Interim Planning Board (WIPB) by sex (B.M.=board member).

Figure 4.3 The level of understanding of the Windigo Interim Planning Board (WIPB) by age (B.M.=board member).

would have heard more than what was said on the radio.

A number of people cited the following as beneficial aspects of the Board's work: the exchange of information (telling the government what the communities want and finding out what they should be aware of); providing a liaison with the government; protecting the land, fishing and trapping; protecting their freedom to go anywhere and to do what they want; making of the maps (Appendix 1). The only consistent negative comment regarding the Board's work was concern over the government's future reaction (the government may not listen). Generally, everyone thought that economic activity had been encouraged (training and jobs at the mine were often mentioned). The lack of communication or lack of understanding was another common comment.

All Board members believed they had put a lot of effort into communicating with the communities, but they recognized that there were problems. At least five board members identified communicating with community members to be a problematic aspect. Many reasons for the problems in communicating with the communities were identified. Board members recognized that the concept of land use planning was totally foreign and helping the First Nations to understand the concept was very difficult. One community Board member said that he may have been more effective if he understood all that was going on. The work of the Board is very complex to explain to anyone, and the Board appeared to focus on one main aspect of its work. People in the communities associated the Board most with hunting, trapping and fishing, but the board also spent a lot of time on mining and tourism. One board member suggested only time and repetition would help people to understand. Another factor was personnel problems. First Nations people were used as fieldworkers to encourage capacity building, but many of them lacked skills or experience for the work. Some people interviewed in one community had worked in the same office as the fieldworker and did not know anything about the Board or the fieldworker's role. Unskilled fieldworkers, board members, and Band Council members all hindered communication. For example, advertising of meetings in one community

was poor and notice time was short. Finally, in one community, serious social problems competed for community members' attention to the degree that it may be unrealistic to expect people to listen, understand, and react to the Board.

There is no question that the Board made communicating with the communities a priority and earnestly sought to be as effective as possible. They were not, however, overly successful and some simple changes may have increased local awareness. These suggestions were based on recommendations from community members and observations gathered by the researcher when in the communities. Radio was the most important method of communicating with the people and the Board may have been able to use the radio more frequently and more effectively. A simpler name than Windigo Interim Planning Board may have helped community members to remember. In addition, written material may have been used more often to help reach people. The written mandate of the Board could also have been provided to people who moved into the community after the initial distribution. House to house visits may have been helpful to raise awareness because very few people attended meetings. House to house visits also could have improved communication with women who found it difficult to get to meetings. Community members who previously had bad experiences with mines or had talked with people on other reserves that had experienced difficulties with development were most appreciative of the Board's work. The Board may have been able to extend understanding by showing how other reserves had been negatively affected by development without planning. Although these methods may have improved the communication with the communities, time and repetition did appear to be the most important factors to improving understanding.

Lack of trust between community members and government had a long history which will not be easily influenced in a short time by the Board. Trust between the communities and developers was fairly poor because lack of understanding by both parties was part of the history of development in the north. It seemed that trust was

strongest (among board members) between individuals. Trust was weaker when people were trying to trust institutions (developers, government, the Board without knowing the people).

"The Board shall... develop a plan for land-use and resource development in the planning area"

The draft land use plan was released in September, 1997. The plan has four parts. The first part, the introduction, outlines the purpose of the plan and the underlying philosophy. The philosophy of the plan is summarized in the following statement:

> The land is an integral part of the cultural, economic and spiritual existence of the First Nations people. Its character has been principally wilderness used by the First Nations people in a sustainable way. This relationship between the people and the land must be the cornerstone of future decision making for the Windigo Planning Area. (pg. 23)

Further details are given in the 20-year vision statements developed by each community and by numerous principles on society, culture, resource protection, resource development and use of abandoned/completed projects. The second part of the plan, "setting the stage", describes the physical features of the area, cultural traditions, tenure and future trends. The third part of the plan, "the process", describes the implementation and renewal process for the plan. The plan is to be implemented by four parties. The First Nations will have a Council member and supporting local planning committee who are responsible for land use or resource development issues. The Windigo First Nations Council will be a: "facilitator" between the communities and developers or government; "buffer" who ensures the communities are aware of activities in their area; and "coordinator" who gathers information. The government is expected to use the plan and distribute the plan to potential developers. Potential developers are encouraged to read the plan and establish a dialogue with the communities. It is recommended that the signatories of the agreement meet once a year to ensure the plan is implemented and after five years review progress. The fourth part of the plan, "the plan", includes the

description of the land use areas surrounding the communities: traditional area, intensive subsistence harvest area, First Nation economic development resources area, and protected areas. All sectors or resources are then reviewed with recommendations for their development and/or conservation.

A complete evaluation of the plan is beyond the scope of this study, but a brief comparison with the Shibogama Planning Board Plan (initiated with the same parameters at the same time) will provide some insight into the direction of the Windigo land-use plan. When comparing the land use plans it is important to remember these plans are for different communities. The Shibogama communities were geographically closer together and historically linked; the Windigo communities were farther apart and did not appear to feel socially linked to each other. The Shibogama communities were also smaller and more remote. They had only one tourism operation in their territory and the only big development concern was a provincial park. On the other hand, the Windigo communities had a lot of tourism and mining development around them.

The two plans were similar in that they both discussed all development considerations, and a process for implementing the plan. Both plans included an inventory of resources, although the Windigo assessment appeared to be more comprehensive (this may reflect the fact that they were less remote). Both plans included many recommendations of how development should or should not be carried out in the area. These recommendations were broken down by sector.

The plans differed in three significant ways: style, recommendations, and implementation. The Shibogama plan included many cultural stories explaining the names of features in their area and the locations of their communities. The plan also contained many quotes from the people of the communities which told the story of their lives and their views with respect to the land and their future. The Windigo plan does include a little section on traditional activities and the Aboriginal philosophy of the land, but that section is part of the introduction, rather than half the document as in the

Shibogama case. The Windigo land use plan documents resources and development from a Western point of view.

The Shibogama plan differs significantly from the Windigo plan in terms of political philosophy and recommendations. The Shibogama plan strongly asserts the desire for self-government (although the planning agreement states "Nothing in this Agreement shall be so construed as to affect in any way the aboriginal, treaty, constitutional or other rights, privileges or freedoms of the members of The Nations" pg. 12). The first Shibogama recommendation is: "the people of the Kingfisher Lake and Wunnumin Lake First Nations access, use and manage the land, resources and wildlife in accordance with their traditional management system." The economic statements of the two Windigo communities do say they aspire to be self-governing over affairs in the community (i.e. education, health and justice), but they do not mention the land and resources.

The Shibogama plan is to be implemented by returning to the system of management based on Traditional Land Stewards. The Windigo Board chose instead to work within the current Chief and Council system (through a resources committee appointed by and reporting to the Chief and Council). The WIPB struggled to know whether to have land use decisions made by trappers of the area (similar to Traditional Land Stewards) or to rely on the Chief and Band Council to make the decision. The entire design of the Windigo plan is probably more easily integrated into the current Ontario government system and more easily understood by developers. A government employee compared the plans by saying the Shibogama plan was more "assertive" and the Windigo plan was "more politically sensitive".

The future of the land use plan after the end of the Board's term is very uncertain. In a review of all Agencies, Boards and Commissions in Ontario, the new provincial government decided the Board would not continue to exist after its initial five year mandate. What happens to the plan? Who implements it? Will it be successful without

the lobbying of the Board? These questions have no clear answers at the present time and people being interviewed did not agree. Community members were skeptical about what would happen next. One person pointed to welfare reforms which weren't implemented and suggested a similar thing might happen with the land use plan. Many suggested that the Board needed to continue. One person expressed concern that district level planning was needed for four purposes: addressing permitting, implementing the land use plan, gathering data, and being a "watchdog" of the government and industry. Overall, many asked "who would do the work of the Board?"

Board members seemed to have conflicting opinions as to what would happen after the Board's term ended. One person considered that the land use plan would be used as a planning mechanism by the Ontario government. Another mentioned the need to get the information to industry and wondered who would do that. Two board members suggested that the implementation of the land use plan by the communities was most important. These conflicting opinions suggest that the implementation plan of the Board may not be effective if the government fails to be a leader implementing the plan.

Many questions exist for which there are no answers at the current time. Would the recommendations within the plan for the implementation be effective? Should the Board be altered to a different form to implement the plan? For example, should they meet less frequently or should their area of interest increase? How will the Board's work integrate with two new planning land use processes started by the Ontario government? Over the next 5 or 10 years we will learn the answers to these questions.

4.4.3 Internal Evaluation Conclusions

An overall evaluation of the Windigo Interim Planning Board was obtained when every person was asked whether he/she would recommend a similar process for other reserves. Most community members did not understand this question and so their answers did not provide helpful information (cultural traditions which do not allow for

interference in other's affairs made this question ineffective). With the exception of two community people, all those who understood the question (including developers) recommended the process for another area. Some suggested three communities should be involved and that there should be lower effort for longer. The WIPB was very effective at reviewing proposals and identifying economic opportunities (Table 4.2). Although there may have been some improvements in communication and the land use plan, the WIPB made significant contributions to the communities.

4.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION RELATING TO HYPOTHESES

4.5.1 Trust

Many relationships had the potential to develop trust, between board members, between community members and the Board, between community members and the provincial government, between community members and developers. Trust among board members, as discussed above, seemed fairly good. Trust of the Board by community members was often blind due to lack of communication. Many community members knew too little about the Board to have a reason to trust or distrust it. A community member who understood and appreciated the mandate of the Board was suspicious of the Board's work based on false information. Early in the Board's operation the communities expressed concern that the government had appointed non-aboriginal members without their approval and they had no control over what they would do in their position. Trust of the Board would have been greatly improved if there had been more communication and community members could have seen how the Board did work for their benefit.

Table 4.2 WIPB achievements relative to their objectives established in the Order-in-Council.

Objective	Outcome
Review Permits	-effective and efficient -made both positive and negative recommendations -facilitated better community consultation than traditional 30 day period -added another layer of bureaucracy -problems with lack of education of board members and discontinuation of permits
Identify Economic Opportunities	-large amount of information gathered -several areas of missing information identified
Communicate with Communities	-a priority for the Board and significant efforts were initiated in this direction -64% of community people did not know enough about the Board to evaluate it -hindrances to effective communication included: the foreign concept of land use planning, unskilled workers, communication methods
Land Use Plan	-a comprehensive document -more "politically sensitive" and directed within the current government system than the Shibogama Land Use Plan -uncertain future for implementation of the plan

4.5.2 Appropriate Institutions

Inappropriate local institutions hindered the work of the Board. The local advisory committees and fieldworkers provided little support because they were not able to function without close supervision which was unavailable in such remote locations. The Chief and Band Council were the most frequently used local institutions. Communication between the Board and the Council was frequent and was evaluated as effective by the board members in the communities and by some Councillors. Unfortunately, particularly in one community, the Chief and Band Council had problems. Two community members commented that the frequent turnover in people elected to these positions meant that they never understood their job well before they left their position. As a result of the Board choosing always to work through the Chief and Band Council, some of their work was less effective than directly consulting the community. Fewer people attending WIPB community meetings, poorer understanding of the work of the Board, and less awareness in this community may be partly attributed to the problems with the local institution (Chief and Band Council). Another local institution was the registered trapline users. Although there was no formal gathering of trapline holders, their use of traplines gave them an interest in land use decisions. Unfortunately, this institution also had problems over time resulting, in some cases, in large traplines for small families and small traplines for large families. Furthermore, head trappers tended to be older men with a particular view regarding the importance of the hunting and trapping lifestyle as a key element in the future community economy. This view may not have been representative of the whole community.

The government institution also had weaknesses which affected the work of the WIPB. The new provincial government changed priorities, directions and policies part way through the WIPB term. In addition, there were continual reorganizations of the government departments and staff reductions. General communication included annual reports and budgets submitted by the Board. The government employees seemed

satisfied with the amount of information they received from the Board; however, the Board was not equally satisfied. One board member particularly felt the government did not sufficiently assist the Board in gathering information. Although a legitimate complaint, probably the whole government bureaucracy system would have to change in order to improve this aspect.

The most effective institution was the Planning Board itself. The operation was fairly smooth, no large conflicts arose, trust was developed between members, and consensus was an effective method of making decisions. The Board operated well and made significant contributions. Its efforts were undoubtedly hindered by the ineffective institutions in the communities and government.

4.5.3 Legal Foundation

A negotiated agreement was the foundation of a provincial Order-in-Council which established the Board. The Order-in-Council for the most part referred the reader to "the agreement" for the details of the Board's operation and duties. Two major flaws existed in this legal foundation. First, section 11 of the Order-in-Council states: "The term of the Board shall be for up to five years from the date of approval of this Order-in-Council unless terminated earlier by Order-in-Council". Although legally established, the Board had no guarantees that their operation would not be terminated at any time. This section provided a guarantee for the government to be able to stop a rebellious Board. Three years into their term the provincial government changed and the new government reviewed all similar organizations. After a time of uncertainty, WIPB was allowed to continue for the original five years. One important role of a legal foundation is to provide assurance to the local people that the joint management arrangement will not be canceled on a government whim. If the Board could be eliminated at any time, there is little real transfer of power and less incentive for local people to work with the government.

The second important problem with the legal backing was the short term of operation. Section 20 of the Order-in-Council states:

> The Ministers, the Cat Lake First Nation, the [North Caribou] Lake First Nation, and the Windigo Tribal Council shall assess the effectiveness of the Board after three years. They shall recommend that more permanent arrangements be negotiated if, having regard to their evaluation, they consider it advisable.

The Board was originally established as an "experiment" which if it was successful would continue and be replicated in other areas. One government employee suggested that although some people may have considered the establishment of the Board to be a delaying tactic for a sensitive issue, the government really did want to find a feasible solution. The new provincial government changed the perspective when they decided the Board would be terminated after five years. The Board discussed what that meant to their operation in July 1996. Suggestions were that they should: focus more on capacity building; prioritize what should be done; complete the land use plan and the process for using it; emphasize communication between developers and communities; find background information, and; ensure the integrity of the Board. The priorities of the Board were changed when their length of operation was shortened. Long term commitment is necessary to enable the people involved to learn enough to be effective, to build a relationship, to work on broken communication links between developers and communities, and to be able to make changes that are actually seen on the ground.

4.5.4 Tangible Economic Benefits

The agreement between the communities, tribal council and government states that the Board should "enhance the economic...development within each planning area; promote the traditional economic activities of [the communities]". The Board was supposed to encourage economic activity.

The encouragement of economic activity within the communities was an important focus of the Board's work. Board members felt they were effective in

encouraging economic activity by developing economic strategies with the communities, encouraging small businesses, and training for prospecting. The Board also helped the communities by giving them a better understanding of the operation of the business world, encouraging them to take a bigger part in development, promoting communication with developers, and helping them when dealing with the government. In general, there seemed to be some positive results, but it is too soon to know how effective the Board was in encouraging economic development in the communities.

Assessing whether the Board encouraged economic activity outside the communities, but in the general area, was difficult. Another layer of bureaucracy, and uncertainty of First Nation's demands may have been discouraging factors to businesses such as tourism and mining. Tourism operators worried about being forced into joint partnerships and mining companies worried about not having certainty of tenure. Probably the Board did not influence this type of economic activity significantly.

One First Nations community member did not feel that the Board did enough to help individual businesses rather than the whole community. Another community member suggested the Board did not change things from the trend initiated when whitemen first came. One community member identified a conflict between the organized economic point of view and the community interests. Most other people considered the Board helpful in encouraging economic activity.

There was a possible bias in the positive responses of community members. Many of the words used by respondents were the same as in the question (economic development was described as protecting old jobs, providing training, creating new jobs, or identifying opportunities and these words were used in responses). Furthermore, several people cited jobs at the Musselwhite mine as evidence of the Board's good work, but, although the Board may have encouraged Musselwhite to keep commitments, these jobs were part of a separate agreement. Some people suggested nothing like training or jobs would happen without the Board which seems an extreme assessment considering

the tribal council and economic development corporations were working towards improved economic conditions. Despite these problems some people did have specific examples showing they understood the question and thought that the Board had encouraged economic activity. Over all, although many of the foundations for future economic development were laid (training, gathering information, identifying opportunities, promoting communication, capacity building), community members received little tangible benefit during the period of the Board's operation.

4.5.5 Conclusions Concerning Hypotheses from WIPB Study

The WIPB case study revealed several important issues surrounding the four hypotheses. The building of trust was shown to be highly dependent on effective communication. Since communication with the communities was not very effective, the level of trust of the WIPB was either blind or based on false information. Appropriate institutions were shown to be very important. In this case the local institutions hindered the work of the Board more than government institutions. The security of a long term commitment from the government was shown to be important to the legal recognition of local rights. Economic benefits were difficult to evaluate, and were not tangible to community members. These lessons will now be combined with those from the literature case studies to offer final comments on the applicability of the four hypotheses.

5.0 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Joint management case studies are common and diverse, as shown in the previous chapters. Efforts to link these case studies by common principles or practices are important to enable comparison between cases. Comparing between case studies may help agencies and individuals to predict the most important elements for more successful joint management initiatives.

Berkes (1997) suggested four key elements necessary for joint management: trust between actors, appropriate institutions, legal recognition of local rights, and economic incentives. These four elements were treated as hypotheses in Chapters Three and Four to provide a basis for testing a theory of joint management. In order to better understand the hypotheses and their relationship to a joint management theory, this final chapter will first examine the community development context of joint management. To understand the limitations of the hypotheses, the assumptions behind joint management will be discussed and the conditions under which the hypotheses hold will be defined. The four hypotheses will then be discussed in turn to determine if they do represent key elements of successful joint management.

5.2 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

Often joint management is described in the context of common property theory (Chapter 2) or resource sustainability, but joint management may also be described in a social context. Pinkerton (1989) identifies community-based development as a secondary goal or benefit of joint management. Community development, a process of improving the well-being of the community, commonly requires self-empowerment. Self-

empowerment strengthens the "ability [of communities] to participate and take action on decisions which affect their lives" (Seymoar and Ponce de Leon 1997). Joint management usually arises in situations where communities have little power over the management of resources closely linked with their livelihoods. In other words, there exists a power inequity between the government (power holders) and a community. Joint management could, therefore, be described as part of a community development process by which a community overcomes inequities and seeks to improve its well-being. The general community development process of self-empowerment and overcoming an inequity was modeled by Seymoar (1997). Application of this model to joint management will contribute to a better understanding of the social aspect of joint management theory.

Seymoar model of self-empowerment

Seymoar (1997) developed a model for community self empowerment which describes the steps that a community follows to overcome an inequity. The model can be adapted to joint management and reveal new ways of thinking about joint management.

The model recognizes that conflict is inevitable and important to enable communities to strive for empowerment. It also recognizes that community development is not a finite linear process, but rather a continual cyclical process which gradually and continually empowers the community. The model (Figure 5.1) shows five stages: inequity, conflict, identity and independence, partnership, and a new inequity. An inequity in power may be in: access to resources (economic, social or natural), the ability to influence decisions affecting yourself, or freedom of choice. The circle of empowerment only begins when an inequity is recognized or felt. Often a precipitating crisis causes people to react. The next phase is conflict. The conflict is with the group which holds the power. The conflict may vary in length and in means from violent to peaceful. The conflict stage is important to begin to give the community the sense that

Figure 5.1 Seymoar (1997) model of community self-empowerment which can be applied to joint management

they do have power and can achieve their goal. The third phase is identity and independence. The community identity is no longer based just on an opposition to the group holding power, but now is established from within. The next phase is partnership. Once self-identity is stronger, the community no longer feels as threatened by the group in power and can work with them as equal partners. The cycle then begins again as another inequity is recognized.

Application of the Seymoar model to joint management

The first stage, recognition of an inequity, often through a crisis, is critical for joint management to be desired by the community. Chapter 2 documents "triggers" of joint management which include: economic losses, threatened cultural traditions, social changes, and ecological collapse of the resource. A precipitating crisis caused people to act and to begin asking the power holder, the government, for a solution to the inequity. Seymoar (1997) suggests that often communities must experience "severe difficulties" before they feel the inequity and are ready to act. A ban on whaling or a collapse of a fish stock certainly would cause "severe difficulties" for the local people. Dale (1989) also recognized that several concurrent crises led to the joint management of salmon in Washington State

If the community does not "feel severe difficulties" they may not be motivated to participate in government initiated programs, like joint management. In India and Zimbabwe many of the government initiated joint management cases have failed or are struggling. One reason may be that the communities were not motivated or prepared to be part of joint management. Although the WIPB First Nations initiated the WIPB process, only a few individuals were involved in the petition for joint management. WIPB communities not recognizing an acute problem may have been one reason why the Board found it difficult to involve community members in the joint planning process.

Particularly in the more northerly community, the threat of logging or large mining developments which would totally change its way of life is still remote.

Those community members who were concerned often had either worked at mines with a bad environmental record or had talked with people from other reserves which were already affected by resource development. Seymoar (1997, p. 133) suggests "a political or spiritual critique often arising from exposure to other communities or external ideas" was also important in raising the awareness of the community. The WIPB may have been able to help the communities "feel" the problem by having other people from inside or outside the community tell their stories.

The second stage in the model is conflict. Conflict can be expressed in many forms: peaceful, violent, verbal, physical, etc. Pinkerton (1989) documents several joint management case studies in North America where Aboriginal people have initiated court challenges to try to overcome the inequity. Conflict also may be violent, as in the killing of many wild animals by the Maasai people when the government threatened to establish a park (Western 1994). Conflict is often viewed as bad or undesirable, but conflict helps to motivate people and direct them towards a solution. Joint management practitioners and governments need to be aware of the role conflict plays and plan for ways to resolve conflict, rather than avoid the conflict.

The third stage of the model is independence and identity. The stage of withdrawal to themselves at Amboseli Park in Kenya, by the Maasai, allowed them to establish their own enterprises and not depend on the government (Western 1994). This stage is also characterized by some community-based management movements. Community-based management can be directed to obtaining all power for the community and management of the resource by the community alone. The independence stage may also help to solidify local institutions which were formed during the conflict stage. Strong, effective local institutions are critical for the next stage, partnership.

The fourth stage of the model, partnership, is essentially joint management. Having recognized the power within the community and established its identity, the community is now ready to recognize the need to work with governments. The four hypotheses are trying to answer the question: "How do we help this partnership stage last?". The cycle then begins again with a new inequity. As a result, institutions involved in joint management should continue to expect conflict and plan for ways to resolve it. Understanding joint management within the self empowerment cycle context is helpful to enable practitioners to view conflict and withdrawal as positive signs moving towards joint management. Furthermore, if the stages of conflict and independence are eliminated (perhaps when a government dictates joint management as in CAMPFIRE), joint management may be more likely to fail because those stages are important to preparing the community for the roles and responsibilities involved in joint management.

5.3 DELIMITATIONS OF THE JOINT MANAGEMENT THEORY

Assumptions

One of the most important aspects of theory development is the identification of underlying assumptions. Joint management practice and theory has several built in assumptions. First, joint management assumes that privatization, state regulation, or communal regulation alone are not effective at managing the common property resource (see Chapter Two). Second, individual components of joint management may be assumed to be simple, perhaps because many practitioners and researchers of joint management often come from a single discipline background (Devons and Gluckman 1982). Leach et al. (1997) have criticized community-based sustainable development and joint management for oversimplifying two main ideas.

First, Leach et al. suggest that there is a faulty assumption of "homogeneous, consenual 'communities'" (Leach et al. 1997, p. 2). The institution hypothesis suggests

that joint management needs appropriate local institutions which unite the community and enable the community to share power with the government. Leach et al. (1997) suggested, that while institutions are important, the complexity in communities is often ignored. Conflict is common and multiple institutions exist at several different scales. Problems could occur if indigenous institutions are not used in joint management or if new institutions try to copy very complex indigenous institutions. They warn that oversimplification of community interactions and institutions could lead to less successful joint management.

The second assumption they challenge is that of a "stable, universally-valued 'environment'" (Leach et al. 1997, p. 2). Within the field of ecology the idea of stable, single equilibrium ecosystems is being challenged (Gunderson et al. 1995), but do the implications of that challenge influence joint management practices? Managers often assume that there will be a constant, predictable yield (single, stable equilibrium) from a resource. If there is not a single stable equilibrium, management techniques must change or the resource could be quickly depleted. There may be other assumptions too, for example in the field of economics. Unfortunately, simplification is unavoidable for an inter-disciplinary practice like joint management, but the simplifications must be acknowledged and regularly re-examined.

Geographical and Temporal Demarcation

Joint management is applied in many very different situations. The case studies in Chapter Three were selected to reflect some of the diversity in resources and geography. Certainly not all situations were represented (no case study from Latin America or Europe), but it is hoped that the variety was sufficient to make the conclusions applicable in a wide variety of conditions. Joint management is for the most part a fairly recent phenomena, chiefly after 1970. Although, the fundamental elements

of joint management may not change, the findings of this practicum may not be applicable in future political, economic and social conditions.

Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives and Joint Management

Are there some situations in which a joint management theory, such as the four hypotheses, would not apply? Examination of Table 3.2 will highlight some dramatic differences between the applicability of the hypotheses to the VICORE in British Columbia and the Temagami Board in Ontario and that of all the other cases. The most reasonable explanation is that these cases were examples of multi-stakeholder initiatives rather than joint management. Multi-stakeholder initiatives involve gathering people who have different direct interests in the land or resource to seek a consensus on the future management of the land or resource. Often the different groups of people represent radically different perspectives on the resource. For example, the VICORE process had fourteen different sectors represented, including forest companies, forest company employees, conservationists, youth, outdoor recreation and local government (Wilson 1995). Each group was directly accountable to the sector they represented. On the other hand, the Beverly-Kaminuriak Caribou management board had only provincial/territorial governments and Aboriginal people on the board (Usher 1991). VICORE involved many groups, rather than only two, and as a result more permanent devolution of power would be difficult. The trust hypothesis was not as relevant for VICORE due to its short length of operation. Legal recognition and appropriate institutions hypotheses were applicable in a different way. The legal recognition only provided the mandate of VICORE (in joint management cases legal recognition of local user rights was important) and the most relevant institution was VICORE (in joint management the local institution and government institutions were often more important). Furthermore the relationship between the VICORE members and the resource (land in their case) is different from the relationship between the Aboriginal people and the caribou herd. Consequently, the

economic incentive hypothesis did not apply very well. The economic incentives were influenced by or filtered through governments, employers, public opinion and economic trends. In the Beverly-Kaminuriak case, the caribou directly contributed to the economic and cultural well-being of the local people.

The Temagami case study was neither pure multi-stakeholder nor pure joint management. It was a two party negotiation in that there were equal numbers of Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals on the Board, but the non-Aboriginals had diverging perspectives on the resource (environmentalists, cottagers, industry, municipalities, tourism and labour) (Benidickson 1992). Unlike VICORE, these people did not officially represent the sector to which they belonged and they were not accountable to anyone. The same problems with the four hypotheses were encountered. Legal recognition of the Board was present, but local rights were not protected because the Board was a short term institution. Once again the board as an institution was important, but even less importance was placed on other institutions because there was no official representation or accountability. Building trust was once again a short-term exercise and the economic incentives were influenced by external factors.

The WIPB had a very similar design to Temagami, but the area was less politically volatile. Therefore, the WIPB functioned more as a joint management initiative because the non-Aboriginal people did represent a more united second party. As a result, it is possible to observe a continuum between multi-stakeholder and joint management initiatives, where VICORE would be a multi-stakeholder initiative and the Beverly-Kaminuriak Board and all international cases were examples of joint management (Figure 5.2). Temagami and WIPB would be in between, with Temagami closer to VICORE. The theory of joint management, therefore, does not have a clearly defined edge, but the key principle of a bilateral agreement with the local people closely connected to the land/resource is obviously important.

VICORE

Multi-stakeholder

Temagami

WIPB

Joint management

Beverly-Kaminuriak
Caribou Board

Figure 5.2. The continuum between joint management initiatives and multi-stakeholder initiatives

5.4 EVALUATION OF THE FOUR HYPOTHESES

5.4.1 Trust

The first hypothesis states that more successful joint management initiatives have

trust between the actors. Govier (1997) suggests that the following are involved in

trusting:

> A. expectations of benign, not harmful, behaviour based on beliefs about the
> trusted person's motivation and competence
> B. an attribution or assumption of general integrity on the part of the other; a
> sense that the trusted person is a good person
> C. a willingness to rely or depend on the trusted person, an acceptance of risk or
> vulnerability; and
> D. a general disposition to interpret the trusted person's actions favorably.

Trust or lack of trust is a central part of daily life for all people. From the words used in

the above four aspects of trust, it is obvious that trust is important in joint management.

"Motivation", "competence", "integrity", "depend on", "vulnerability", and "interpret

actions favorably" all describe some of the underlying relationships involved in joint

management. Negotiating the sharing of power and responsibility for a resource depends

on the belief that the other party is competent, possesses honorable motives, can be

depended on and can be trusted with the vulnerability of the other party. "To a far greater

extent than we normally realize, trust is implicit in our daily lives and our social world."

(Govier 1997, p. 3).

In the joint management context, trust or lack of trust is an issue between many

individuals and groups (Figure 5.3). Individuals on a joint management board need to

trust each other in negotiations. Community members need to trust other community

members and their representatives. The community must trust the government to be able

and willing to accomplish what is negotiated. The government must trust the community

Figure 5.3 A model of trust relationships between government and community groups. Each arrow represents a trust relationship between joint management actors (circles). Trust needs to occur between all joint management actors.

and the joint management institution before delegating any power or responsibility. These relationships are all complicated and not easily characterized, but there seem to be two main sets of relationships: relationships between community members; and the relationship between the community and the government.

Each of these relationships is profoundly influenced by historical relationship and events. Govier (1997) suggests that trust among community members and the resulting cooperation is easier when there is a "social capital" or history of trust within the community. Putnam (cited by Govier 1997, p.153) suggested that "Trust lubricates cooperation. The greater the level of trust within a community, the greater the likelihood of cooperation. And cooperation itself breeds trust." Thus, a community which has had a history of trusting and cooperating will more easily cooperate together towards joint management. Recognizing that communities are not homogeneous, the level of trust and history of trust within the community must be examined and acknowledged as an important factor influencing the outcome of joint management.

History also greatly affects the relationship between the community and the government. Often there exists a history of distrust with the government, related to the inequity recognized by the communities. For example, WIPB and Kenya both had colonial government histories (Collett 1987). One community member distrusted the WIPB because the government failed to make promised welfare reforms in the past. The hope in the face of these historical relationships is that "Trust between groups also exists, of course, and tends to facilitate communication and cooperation." (Govier 1997, p. 201).

Through examination of the case studies and the WIPB, two principles have been continually connected with trust: communication and the importance of individuals. Communication is intricately connected with trust. The above quote suggests that trust is necessary for communication; when the other party is trusted then one will be willing to reveal more sensitive information. For example, the WIPB had to win the trust of the people before being able to collect information about their hunting, trapping and other

practices. On the other hand, trust can be developed as a result of improved communication. The proposal for a park which gave the benefits to the local Maasai on the premise that 'wildlife have to pay' was not immediately welcomed by the people. "Their attitude was, 'If the government hasn't given us anything in the past , why should it now?'" (Western 1994, p.29). It was only after much dialogue that the people eventually accepted the plan. Therefore, communication builds trust and trust encourages communication.

Another method of promoting trust is to appreciate and recognize individuals. First, within each group the various individuals and their opinions provide the opportunity for innovation. In the Maasai situation described above, although the majority of elders were not able to see the benefits of the plan, one elder recognized the potential and eventually persuaded the others. "Affecting key individuals or making use of dynamic tensions in a group can lead to constructive and creative shifts in collective attitudes." (Govier 1997, p.209).

Second, meeting and getting to know individuals in the other group is critical to dispelling stereotypes and prejudice. "Though groups can properly be said to trust and distrust, attributions of attitudes to groups are often based on stereotypes and poorly grounded on evidence" (Govier 1997, p.208). Joint management institutions are particularly effective at developing trust by meeting individuals and dispelling stereotypes. One of the first steps in the Bay of Fundy was to gather for discussion individuals of different fishing gear groups; WFPB fostered listening and better understanding of the different cultures; in Temagami, the interaction between individuals of opposing groups began building trust (Benidickson 1992; Ruddle 1995).

Trust is a complicated social phenomenon which can neither be ignored nor completely explained. Since responsibility sharing and communication between two groups is the essence of joint management, trust is inherently important. Although there are no easy solutions or prescriptions for developing trust, acknowledging the historical

relationship between the two groups is very important. In addition, the involvement of individuals to dispel stereotypes and to build on the innovative diversity within the community is helpful for building trust in joint management. Communication is closely coupled with the development and maintenance of trust. Communication can be both a prerequisite for trust and a result of trust. Furthermore, communication does not guarantee the presence of trust; therefore, communication cannot replace truat as one of the four essential components of joint management. However, since trust and communication are difficult to separate, a more complete description of this essential element of joint management would be 'trust based on effective communication'.

5.4.2 Appropriate Institutions

Institutions are clearly very important in joint management and a great deal of research has been conducted on how to develop the best institutions (referring to the 'institutional actors' rather than the technical definition of the 'rules governing behaviour'). Rather than trying to develop answers for this complex issue, I will comment on several aspects of institutions which became particularly obvious throughout the case studies. First, there were up to three institutions involved: government, local, and joint management institutions. The government institution was critical in many cases, particularly the changes made in Amboseli and Bay of Fundy, but is subject to many other pressures which make the analysis too complicated for this document (Western 1994; Ruddle 1995).

Local institutions are both critical and yet difficult to establish successfully. Many of the problems with local institutions resulted from the diversity within the community. As a result, one of the key issues is whether the institution is effective in representing the majority of the community and whether representatives of the institution represent a majority or a consensus. Accountability of the institution and its representatives is also critical. The WIPB community representatives felt they were not

able to speak for the community and, as a result, all decisions were approved separately by the communities. This extra step may have slowed down the process. In the case of Temagami, the individuals sitting on the joint management institution did not officially represent any group and as a result they were not accountable to anyone (Benidickson 1992).

Another common element in local institutions was the presence of "key individuals" or visionaries. In Kenya, WIPB and Bay of Fundy the importance of key individuals was clearly stated, but others also hinted that individuals may have led the path towards joint management (Kearney 1984; Western 1994). Pinkerton (1998) documented a case study of joint forestry management in British Columbia in which the development of joint management paralleled the personal development of a leader within the community. Included in her conditions for holistic joint forest management was "development of vision, leadership and political will" (Pinkerton 1998, p. 387). Dale (1989) suggested that one of the elements needed for joint management of salmon on the British Columbian coast was leadership by individuals committed to joint management. Bernard and Young (1997, p. 195) examined eight American communities moving towards sustainability and found in all cases a visionary. "In every case we, too, have found a key person or persons who could envision a freshly conceived alternative future and who could put it into words the community understands." Individuals are probably also important for building trust with the community. It may be much easier for a community to trust an individual than an organization or group of people. Of course the organization is important to ensure an enduring vision if the single individual leaves, but ignoring the importance of individual leaders would be inappropriate.

If the community is following the self-empowerment cycle, the institution may be formed in the conflict stage to facilitate the fight for equality. Bernard and Young (1997) suggest that cooperation may occur after a precipitating crisis. A crisis affecting the whole community can unite it to fight for the common goal of a better future. Some type

of institution may be needed to facilitate cooperation among community members and lead the fight against the inequity. However, the institution is probably solidified in the independence stage. The institution is then tested as to whether it is representative and accountable in the partnership / joint management stage. Local institutions clearly had enormous stresses on them. Declining resources, fragile economies, social problems, immigration, and many other problems made the functioning of these critical elements difficult. These stresses emphasize the importance of an institution being able to deal with conflict, as suggested in the by the iterative self empowerment cycle. However, hope lies in the example of the Japanese fishery where the local institution has been functioning well for decades.

The joint management institution is the place where representatives from the government and local institutions come together to facilitate joint management. Although not always formalized, the joint management institution was important to facilitate communication and negotiation. The Canadian and Japanese examples showed the importance of the legal establishment of these institutions.

5.4.3 Legal Protection of Local Rights

The third hypothesis states that the rights of local people to the resource must be recognized legally. The type of legal recognition is critical in determining the place on the joint management continuum of power distribution. Legal recognition of local rights to resources is at the top of the ladder described in Figure 2.1, community control and partnership. In several of the international case studies legal recognition was given to local rights; however, in all Canadian examples, legal sanction was only given to the joint management institution. Although some northern Aboriginal joint management may be based on legal recognition of Aboriginal rights to manage and use the resource, most Canadian cases are not. Probably joint management is then limited, at a minimum, to the sixth level, management boards.

Without legal recognition of local rights, legal sanctioning of the joint management institution was important to provide the stability required for effective work. Stability is both necessary for and established by the relationships between the people (Duffy et al. 1995). Trust cannot be formed without a long-term commitment to the process, especially where there is a history of distrust. Temagami and VICORE were short-term initiatives where the trust developed between participants was unlikely to have a lasting influence on the situation. WIPB, although established for a five year period, was still short in terms of the amount of work to be done and the difficulty of establishing relationships and communication. Security is also important for building trust. If there is a threat of cancelling the initiative at any time then there is little incentive to build relationships. Bay of Fundy was not protected at all under law and collapsed after a couple of years in part because fishermen were not sure the local institutions was permanent; they began ignoring it. Stability, through long-term security of the joint management institution was desirable, but not effectively achieved in the these cases.

In each of the Canadian cases, recognition of local rights was not present. Legally sanctioning the joint management institutions could have provided the long-term security required for joint management. For example, of the Canadian cases, the Beverly-Kaminuriak Caribou Board was the most stable and long-term. In many ways, the establishment of the Board was a recognition that local Aboriginals had a right to be decision-makers in caribou management. Yet after 10 years the future of the Board was uncertain. Providing secure, long-term recognition of local rights directly, rather than through a joint management institution, seems to be important.

Lack of legal recognition may not hinder joint management in the short-term, if trusting relationships are developed betweeen government representatives and local people. However, there is no guarantee that subsequent government representatives will pursue that same relationhip. Government policy can provide a directive for joint management, as in the Bay of Fundy case. Government policy may later change to

eliminate joint management (as in Bay of Fundy) or it may be the first step towards stronger legal recognition. Memoranda of Understanding, Agreements in Principle or other similar agreements may provide adequate legal recognition in the short-term, but legislation is probably important for long-term security.

5.4.4 Economic Incentives

Economic incentives were critically important in some cases to ensure that joint management was successful. In other cases economic benefits were closely related to resource health. In these cases, subsistence resource use was often involved, joint management may have a negative effect on the economy (formal or informal) if the resource is threatened. For example, the forests in India were often highly degraded. In order to improve the condition of the forest, the people had to decrease harvesting rates and probably suffer economically (Poffenberger 1994). Such a situation poses a difficult test for joint management, especially because threatened resources are common triggers of joint management. In some cases, the promise of benefits when the resource health improved may be sufficient economic incentive for the local people. Some Indian forestry initiatives demonstrated that the local people were willing to reduce harvests with the hope that in the future they would have equal or greater harvests. In other cases, the resource may not ever be able to sufficiently support the community. As a result, community economic development (CED) was used to offset the decreased returns from the resource or to multiply the benefits to the local people (Kearney 1984; Poffenberger 1994). The implications of not assuming a stable single equilibrium ecosystem need to be carefully considered as part of CED initiatives. Although rarely documented or acknowledged, there is a close link between joint management and CED.

The goals of joint management and CED both relate to improving community welfare and sustainability. The goal of joint management is 'more appropriate, efficient and equitable management' (Pinkerton 1989). Secondary goals may include facilitating

community-based development and/or decentralized decision-making (Pinkerton 1989). Similarly, CED's primary goal may be to diversify the economy and create jobs, but secondary goals may include improving social conditions and empowering the community to control their future.

Not only are the goals similar, but the success of each often depends on the other. Natural resources are the center of many economies and having more control over their management through joint management may strengthen CED initiatives. Joint management helps communities confront external groups and empower the communities to make their own decisions about the resource benefits and economic enterprise (Kofinas 1993). Often joint management can help redirect benefits to the local people as was shown by CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe. On the other hand, joint management is often only accepted by local people if there are tangible economic benefits (Borrini-Feryerabend 1996). In India, Kenya and the Bay of Fundy, the principles of CED were clearly helpful for securing more benefits for local people and obtaining their support for joint management (Kearney 1984; Poffenberger 1994; Western 1994). CED and joint management are entwined. Joint management practitioners should be aware of this relationship and take advantage of the accumulated CED knowledge and experience.

Despite the importance of CED and its link with joint managment, the economic benefits hypothesis was not supported in all cases. People are often motivated to act on the basis of economics, but it may be an oversimplification to assume increasing or maintaining wealth is the only motive for the actions of people. Empowerment or more security in access to resources without increasing wealth may be a significant benefit for local people. Furthermore there may be cultural, religious or other social benefits which are completely separate from the economy of the community. Therefore, a more accurate description of this essential component of joint management would be 'economic or significant social incentives for local people'.

5.5 CONCLUSIONS

The four hypotheses concerning trust, appropriate institutions, economics and legal recognition are not independent or mutually exclusive. The success of each depends on the others. Each of the hypotheses, with some further explanation, appears to hold true for joint management cases. Trust, linked with effective communication, is important for building the relationship between the two parties. Appropriate local, state and joint management institutions are critical for facilitating the relationship between people. Legal recognition of local rights promotes stability through long-term protection and security. Finally, economic incentives are important for the commitment of local people and the principles of community economic development may help improve these incentives. Although individual cases mentioned other important factors, such as united purpose, culture, philosophy, education and the inclusion of women, none of these reasons for success was repeated throughout the case studies. Further research needs to be conducted to find new, improved, and innovative ways of building institutions, protecting joint management legally and establishing economic incentives.

Joint management is clearly a multi-disciplinary practice. The multi-disciplinary nature of joint management requires people who are highly knowledgeable about many different disciplines and are able to give direction for the integration and balancing of those ideas. This task is not easy and we need to learn how to make our institutions, legal foundations, and economic methods function better together. Joint management, despite these difficulties, has offered one forum or method of integrating the social, economic and ecological concerns of a community.

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APPENDIX 1 - INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Questions for Board members and Chair
What group or organization do you represent?
Why and how did you become involved in the WIPB?
How do you ensure the views you present at the WIPB reflect those of your group or organization?
How do you communicate the WIPB discussions and conclusions to your group or organization?
Did you feel you received sufficient support from your group/organization?
What do you think were the most successful aspects of the WIPB?
What do you think were the most important factors that made the successes of the WIPB possible?
What do you think were the more unsuccessful parts of the WIPB?
What do you think were the major causes for the more unsuccessful aspects of the WIPB?
Do you think the board has sufficient power?
Do you think all the appropriate stakeholders are represented on the board?
Was trust developed among board members?
Do you think that communication was effective between the WIPB and the organizations represented on the board? with other stakeholders not represented on the board?
How did the cultural traditions of the First Nations influence the operation of the WIPB?
How did they influence the decisions of the WIPB?
Was that important?
Were economic incentives important in the successful aspects of the WIPB?
Do you think trust was an important aspect of the success of the WIPB?
What do you think the future of the WIPB should be?

Questions for Developers and other Stakeholders

How did your experience with the WIPB differ from normal government bureaucracy?
Were you legally bound to seek approval from the WIPB?
Were you satisfied that they were representing the different interests they claimed to represent (government and reserves)?
Do you think the WIPB is successful and should be continued? Why or why not?
What do you think were the main reasons for its success?
What do you think were the main problems with the WIPB?
Did they encourage economic development?

Questions for Government

What were the main reasons for the start of the WIPB?
Do you feel that your interests were accurately represented at the WIPB?
Do you feel that you were sufficiently aware of the business of the WIPB?
What do you think were the successful aspects of the WIPB?
What caused these successes?
What do you think were the less successful aspects of the WIPB? Why?

Questions for First Nations

Have you heard of the WIPB?
What do you think it does?
Do you know anyone who is on it?
Do you think it has been helpful?
What do you think were some of the successes or strengths of the board?
What do you think were some of the problems with the board?
Do you trust the board's decisions? Why or why not?
Do you think the board has improved economic development in the area?

APPENDIX 2 – RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS

Comments from Communities

As much as possible comments were written exactly as said by the person being interviewed. One person may have made several comments (i.e. several "-" may be from the same person).

Good/Beneficial Aspects of the Board's Work
-benefit for person if knows how to start tourist camp
-protection of trapping and fishing not to be interfered with
-maybe water no good in the future because so many mines - very happy for what they are doing
-not to give up what the government promised a long time ago- standing with them; what their success will be: protect land and water
-trying to spread the word is good
-hopeful that being free to do anything for longtime: afraid will change
-without board wouldn't know what was happening and what to be aware of
-still holding on to lakes to be free to fish and same with trapping
-important to keep on being able to be free to go anywhere
-trying to help Native land and allow to go everywhere
-trying to keep the land and use of it because that is where fishing/trapping
-trying to help them
-not finished but way is going looks good
-where trapping/hunting/fishing writing on map
-good two-way communication
-get another person to help; someone to be ahead of them like a father to direct and guide; an anchor just like when ask God for help
-didn't plan ahead when created the reserve for the number of people in the future; now more educated so plan 50 years from now
-really impressed with mapping
-as long as not restricted to go hunting and fishing
-tourism as an option for air service to survive
-come update us
-make maps of traditional activities, minerals
-present what people want to government; what people want to use for
-trying to hold the fishing sites or hunting or trapping sites for the people
-the most important factor is trying to save the land
-meeting through the radio
-making the maps of trapline sites and fishing areas - locate them and not lose them
-information to go to most important people - like the government
-settled as a team -already a strong group when government comes to interfere
-if government makes request then already in paper that were together
-keep traditional thing going
-help some people - how do I start tourism camp
-able to say which land where don't want it touched
-have authority, may what not to be touched to work for First Nations
-trying to get information for First Nations
-promoting business good
-good because reminds them about planning; can loose a lot of land and water; concerned because of what he saw at mine he worked at

-at another mine the land and lake was destroyed-not enough wild animals; it wasn't considered before what would happen unlike now with mine
-putting community efforts together with Tribal Council
-forestry and tourism
-work closely with MNR
-venturing into forestry: always represent community
-assist traplines
-assist with any problems with MNR
-info available if need
-good work by board
-know what's in area for mineral, animal, who has cutting rights
-it worked: complicated by reserve extension
-coordinator very good: very thorough in research and information gathering
-2 presentations at school
-land use plan: good idea
-covers most of stuff First Nations talking about
-better understanding of issues
-appreciation of tourism and industry
-helping to stand up for rights
-pretty good : control our land: no mining or timber companies

Problems with the Board's work
-if don't know what doing may be a problem for the future, but if know what are doing and have goal will do really good
-nothing as a problem now, probably know what doing with land use, problem if don't know what doing
-if doesn't fight for promises made and if quit helping the people
-doesn't know anything about problems
-problem if board not there to allow everywhere
-wouldn't comment because felt would be only one - he feels a different way about it
-doesn't think of problems because still in the process of plan
-major problem when take it to the government and doesn't do what WIPB would cause
-information gathered is taken to head person and if not accepted is a problem
-hope it doesn't get shelved
-don't want to see reserve canceled as in James Bay
-didn't look at individual business; First Nation view not individual people
-trying to create work for people but not all people do good work and looks bad for others
-can't really think of problem-if white men came in to destroy the land and pollute the area
-if this an answer from the government not going to work
-money - lack of funding
-if workers take to government and get answer no, no
-lack of interest from First Nations
-if we don't understand it right
-should be focused on visiting community, more workshops
-should be more aggressive in representing whole First Nations people and trapping
-implementation: works more in white way i.e.. lines down on paper
-we need more time
-communication is weakest here
-come here and want answers: we answer when feel like it not when being asked
-might have missed some sacred areas for maps: never asked her or parents
-didn't go too deeply to older generation
-communication: not good, more consultation, more advance advertised
-survey: reluctant to let info out because don't know where going

-communication : not published ahead of time when meeting and why
-resource people too much work load
-wanted to get to grassroots people: not so, wasn't effective
-more video tapes, demonstrate i.e. forest cutting
-government here just to get more and more information out
-what happens down the road found out missed a couple of things
-majority of women had very little knowledge of what it is
-didn't get through to the people; don't ever hear; doesn't get through to whole community why here

Was Economic Activity Encouraged?
-not to forget old jobs and training they still have; try to create new jobs for people
-protecting old jobs, provide training-without the board I don't think anything like that would exist
-without board it wouldn't go well; they protect old jobs on behalf of the people
-wouldn't have happened much differently without board since white man came it changed - thinks we are giving up the land
-not to destroy their rights and land, water
-yes training at Musselwhite
-help to look for funds for individual businesses
-help them get into work-did line cutting at Musselwhite; possibility of getting jobs for the people
-mine would not hire treaty Indians if no WIPB; only reason hired
-without the board I don't think there would be encouragement for economic activity
-trying to create new jobs and training
-very good, people go to the board to get information from; without board people wouldn't have anyone to go to
-train First Nations about land use planning
-main concern trapline - doesn't want anyone to go and bother
-Musselwhite mine, not First Nations would get jobs
-WIPB -agreed this is First Nation territory you should hire from her and get benefit
-provide training programs
-yes, need to know what economic activities are there for the future
-conflict between organized economy point of view and community interests
-community doesn't last in jobs: due to lifestyle on the land
-training: young won't go; is it useful?
-possibly some in tourism
-yes, definitely
-some things did come from community level
-yes, improve: WIPB suggests things
-not really, I don't think so; I don't really know about it

Future of the Board
-very important for him - I don't know how long with Ontario government
-as long as people are doing work will last a long time
-whatever they are planning - it may not be followed in the future (just like welfare regulations)
-can't predict the future - one day at a time
-not sure how it will impact our way of life-now one really knows
-funding - cutbacks is future
-based on jurisdiction/mandate and power First Nations could have with government
-future is difficult to keep agreements in place because once start they don't occur
-continue with work
-like to see it continue in some format

-need district level liaison to address permitting
-need to serve 3 functions: 1. land use plan 2. data gathering 3. watch dog for MNR and industry
-study shouldn't end there; negotiate to assist people with working committee to work with logging
-provide money to start then that's it, you're on your own
-who's going to make sure plan is followed; nobody there to enforce it

Other Comments
-up to people whether the people listen and whether they want it
-hears on radio - doesn't really understand what they are talking about
-hears about it- but doesn't really know what it is
-to get information from the government and notify the people what government really wants -usually hears people say "before they make plans they should get input from people", but don't know what it is
-wants another reserve
-if help to get new reserve that would help us
-understands land part, doesn't understand government part
-Indian and white men way are different and conflict
-when we voted yes then should continue and we will keep up our end
-meetings-didn't really ever settle, doesn't go the way its supposed to be
-don't want anyone touching mapping
-chief and councilors have a lot to do and they can't really do it all without board
-no motivation to show up at meetings
-never heard this what happening
-lack of promoting
-should try to be kept for the long run rather then quitting part way
-if no WIPB no goals or plans held for First Nations
-without the board nothing would plan ahead for long-term
-if the reserves all around helped each other with more communication things would go better
-if really knew what were doing would have more to say
-if people could really understand what it is it could help with the answer
-should be as long as it can be
-if it is successful and they know what they are doing it will be a long term thing
-keep going to help youth
-mostly older people interested; most people around here have lost their traditions so that's why not interested
-always talks about the land hunting and fishing rights
-lot of things we could do but nobody wants to do (i.e. training)
-First Nations have first right on their reserve - traditional rights
-may not be there because of funding
-usually hears that people agree that people don't want people working around the reserve
-hardly goes to meetings-all you hear at meetings is arguing
-should be more focused on what will be happening in our territory- First Nations should be given some sort of royalties
-haven't heard much about it
-if read about could have had more to say than just hearing on radio
-community put raw material in and don't receive benefit
-community trust intention, but intention not in wording so get in trouble: keep agreements together is hard
-just moved back 3 weeks ago: haven't seen much change
-not publicized enough
-heard of it but doesn't know enough to make judgment

-heard of it but not well informed to say anything
-not sure any details
-be more in the field
-go only to certain people they know in past
-go house to house
-give piece of paper then come back and will have thought about it
-land not used need to get serious thinking to before others
-need outside people to tell what to do
-old people know where samples are, keep telling young people and don't do anything
-I don't know what they do what they do up here
-like throwing candy to kid: company comes in asking for permission and gives money to get acceptance
-liked to expand to other community 3 other community in Musselwhite not involved
-not always happy with membership; concerned when came to head might not represent the community; want community controlling measure as to conduct of board members; thought government was on board
-all knew mining, tourism, reps there to represent separate interests but can't take precedence over goal
-on individual level can trust some because have worked with for years
-should have some kind of revenue for community: infrastructure from resource development
-boundaries/districts they follow (jurisdiction and red tape) traditional area in a different government district so not included in board area
-bring together sections of community (i.e. elders) and show thoroughly what it is
-women have responsibilities at home so can't go to meetings or have time to talk or absorb what talking about
-could have used learning centre
-fieldworker didn't work: worked next-door to them but they never knew what are doing
-selection of people without thinking (on committees etc.)
-hard to say what is in the plan
-don't agree with board negotiation
-making decision for us
-like reading material like that

Board Member Comments

Roles of Board Members
-talk of meeting with MNR to brief about what the province expected
-piece together in my own mind what to do
-don't know why we've been left to founder; wouldn't have known who to approach
-represent sector perspective as much as ON
-for issues on that sector asked opinion more and other wise just a regular board member
-tried to get meeting with government rep
-source of frustration
-advising capacity
-give Ontario resident capacity, importance to Ontario as a whole - native and non-native
-good to have, First Nations don't have much knowledge
-voice of community, keep posted
-liaison between community and board, communicating both ways
-to advise the Ontario government

Board Membership
-rep sector as much as Ontario
-saw other ON members as rep of sector

-easier when not mining/tourism people to get into a lot
-without government employee more able to do own thing (support from Gov.)
-Shibogama board had Ontario members with Archeology , Geology, and Business backgrounds
-specific rep would clout issue "this is what we want" would happen
"I want, I need"
-wouldn't have found/earned trust
-fear - industries may not agree, not acceptable
-purpose for communities
-if government thing and go nowhere
-I don't know
-good not to involve Gov. -tied more to the process, may not have contributed so equally weakens final product - not connected with sector/Ontario
-government yes - more information on government proposal

Communication with Mining Industry
-met with mining interests once, went fairly well
-new to companies: all crown land now need serious PR with local communities
-industry prefer buffer around reserve on map instead of large uncertain area
-communication is the key; helped on both ends
-Musselwhite easier; mixed with general sector
-may lead to linkage and on going rapport
-helped at both ends; communication the key
-wrote all claim holders
-NWO miners and prospectors (2 conferences)
-traditional area of Cat Lake outside board area didn't know because didn't get letters
-could always be more
-new to here - idea of extra step
-to help make decision on behalf or support First Nation decision
-to get communication between mining and First Nation
-effective when work permits in place (not a much now)
-trying to find ways to do without permits
-yes

Communication with Tourism Industry
-heard and built their own ideas that only Native enterprise in future
-slow; sat down and show not as negative as first thought
-first time First Nations talk to tourism
-no
-had initial who we are; more should have been done
-need special consideration because of attitude: own lake
-tourist operators not well represented in their view
-yes
-not really; tourist camp built this spring in traditional area and never notified WIPB

Communication with Communities
-pretty good; not a high degree of understanding, more in one community than in the other, especially trappers
-what we are doing is foreign to Native tradition
-mixed; took long time to get messages, to recognize cultural differences
-trapper advisory committee not at all successful
-not sure got "planning" message out to community, got to understand
-not sure community expectation of plan; implementation expression of community
-tried but maybe not sink in

-concept foreign: needs lots of repetitions to sink in
-tried to get monthly radio
-not, but thought a lot
-still don't know what planning board does
-may not feel visible enough in Sioux Lookout, Sandy Lake, Pickle Lake, but dealing with 2 specific communities
-yes very effectively
-communication with leadership is effective
-most trappers affected (work permits in their area)
-whether average member knows?
-something new (not board's fault) don't get understood easily may not in 5 years
-fieldworkers distributed laymen terms of agreement and in syllabics
-from board good; from community so-so
-difficult to get community input

Balance of Power
-quite balanced; no board member tries to dominate
-Windigo reluctant to speak so whether got expressions as should have
-difficult to get full appreciation of that side
-Ontario used to speaking so had to pull back or chair would
-decision making equal (some did more work)
-community communicated well what wanted
-independent chair important
-yes equal opportunity to comment on any issue
-work was done for communities (First Nations offered a lot of information)
-some decisions in favour of First Nations

Trust
-definitely; crucial for consensus
-trust developed over the first couple of years
-as trust develops it makes it easier to really listen to what people are saying
-yes, say better by Yr. 3
-very important for any
-I think so; no one with selfish objectives
-if First Nation think who gets to see, who will hear, should I tell
-maybe, maybe not
-things written up differently
-most times OK every now and then
-sometimes First Nation may not approve 100% because did not say anything; equal all through
-trusted to do as asked

Culture
-see it a good thing; board established because there were 2 cultures
-some of the board members have some experience with other culture
-learned from each other
-trust and respect for the other side grown
-Ontario had way more in first 3 years because more dominant
-try to take advantage of different cultures
-didn't create a lot of conflict
-essence of whole thing
-if weren't difficult wouldn't have needed
-a lot of assumptions from First Nations which would be different from most Ontario
-don't think it did (schedule time frames yes)

-future going in and wanting decision now: won't be
-will be frustrated developers in future: education process
-yes, represent First Nations but working for Ontario government as advisor
-advise because don't know about culture
-more selling job for First Nations to make others understand what they were about
-others pleased to know what we were about
-easier for me to understand how the system works
-made them understand Aboriginals have different view of things

Successful Aspects
1. taking time to have consultations
2. both sides hear what board doing
3. help to communicate: did lot of work, consultations with MNR, information sharing
4. access to all kinds of information the board could get members couldn't
1. mapping
2. dialogue within communities: awareness elders and youth
3. some awareness in industry; hard to know who all the players are to communicate with
4. land use plan: next year key
reasons: people on board of similar views, both First Nations agreement with board and wanting to learn and go forward, high degree of consensus
1. not approvals: could have happened
2. if First Nations believes in plan and can use: not sure of government
3. bringing together info: maps available
4. training: management of community for land use
5. understanding where at
6. harmony and trust developed
1. land use plan with full agreement of all members
2. giving community voice; strengthening ability to communicate
3. bringing government along
reasons: seeking to understand First Nation position, careful good consultation, listening, patient
1. model protocol for mining: gives First Nations security to know what to do
2. collection of data in First Nations: gives big picture, shares within community
3. identify opportunities: steps in place
4. orderly development; land use plan
5. appreciation of First nation for loop holes in order to run business that can be passed on
reasons: willingness to keep focused on goal, no personal agendas, commitment and trust, good listening skills, persistence, chair very important, open mindedness of board members
1. have info that have put in place
2. put into plan so put it into use
3. protect our interests in traditional areas
reasons: cooperation (First Nations), responding, set up to collect info and put in plan
1. two parties here worked quite well
2. board members worked as a group

Unsuccessful Aspects
1. hard to get community input
1.communication to communities: what we're doing, why doing, why important, why should support it
2. after board gone: how to keep plan as living document?
3. turn over in staff and one community board member
reason: planning process is a new concept to the communities

1. hard time to start to write plan
2. land use plan not well rooted in First Nation: not culturally the same approach (protect and conserve)
3. board more comfortable with day to day permit
4. future accepting (Ontario wants zone map)
5. lack of direction from both sides of what was expected
6. land use planning new to first Nations
1. Ontario not connecting with reps
2. acceptance of work
3. turnover in government
4. inertial forces
5. one community dysfunctional
6. capacity building by using First Nations
1. not being able to start with clean plate (mine already there)
2. 1-2 years focused on mining issues
3. not clear what Ontario rep should be doing
4. timeline/table difficult at first
5. frustration: we still don't know what WIPB does
6. getting people together
1. availability of schedules
2. members keep changing
3. workers (secretary) kept changing
4. lack of understanding and knowledge from First Nation point of view, can't participate
5. to get direction from people difficult to get because don't fully understand to present
1. lack of technical information available
2. MNR change a lot, assistance not materialized
3. lack of funding
4. Freedom of Information Act
5. more meetings at community
6. difficult to get quorum
7. getting groups together
8. decision making: band and council or trapper affected
9. putting something permanent in place may not be possible

Recommendations Listened to?
-yes, only 1 went against
-early didn't make enough recommendations
-planning: set up a mechanism of decision-making not how land would be used in 20 years
-listened to by government; mining company who had lot of pull with government got permit even though no from WIPB
-other boat caches
-yes; Ontario government is going to use that as part of North of 51 and fit in
-yes except one work permit
-First Nations still at deadlock if not accepted
-I don't know

Economic Activity
-most important economic thing to help First Nations realize to have a healthy economy they have to work with development and will come anyway; their are ways to plan and communicate
-yes whenever possible, moved in that direction very consistently
-yes more than otherwise - communication
-awareness on both sides that is bigger projects (mining/forestry) the way to go

-Native groups more clear what is reasonable to have some control in
-met with economic development people for plan, training
-in last while yes
-interest we promoted and development to self-sustaining level
-not job quota; be participant
-definitely; encouragement to prospecting when community might oppose
-small business development and capacity to move ahead
-longer time: more a part when implementing plan
-yes-awareness can become involved in development or not
-community meetings focus on yes or no to economic development
-yes; economic strategy for community
-find ways to survive and not to depend on government
-helped a lot to achieve goal
-gave aspirations
-yes; limited by resources and staffing
-communication part: mining companies don't know how to communicate with First Nations
-yes, board made recommendations to economic development

Future
-happy with 5 years; not a great need to exist after plan made; can process remain in use without board pushing for it?
-one of purposes to establish skills of how to approach development problems in communities
-staff resource for of what it is and how it functions
-integration with other in period of time; may fail without
-still large message initiatives
-annual meetings
-hope communities say we will do land use plan
-may not be needed to continue to make sure it happens
-need to get information to industry: communication key, how will it happen?
-communities using is key
-planning mechanism used by Ontario government
-no idea; group established to monitor plan
-First Nations need planning board to encourage economic development (watch dog for environmental part); communication between the 2; watch do for First Nations on land use plan
-chiefs should find way to keep it going; helpful in many ways
-board did a lot of work for them: going to stop without board

Recommendation
-yes, way to make a change after White past
-treat with respect, voice heard before decision made: going long way to improving
-don't know; communities very different development: don' t know if would work for all
-yes, expensive for small area, but too large becomes political; use for 3 communities
-long period over reduced amount (evolution needed)
-yes
-don't know; don't know more than this model
-yes success, can't see doing it another way; next best without First Nations doing all on own
-yes

Other
-meaningful, non-aligned chair to hold together to work together; good model

-what communities will do; they know best, they asked for it
-very interesting; don't know how will affect our culture/ way of life once land use plan is implemented

IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (QA−3)

150mm

6"

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